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ARISTOTLE 
DE ANIMA 


CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITPY PRESS WARD ΓΕ ΤΊ ΣΈ, 


C7. BF. CLAY, ALAN AGER, 
BHontborn:s FETTER LANE, EF. 
Ginsgow: oo, WELLINGTON STREET, 





Mripsia: F. A. ΠΗΓΉ KR IEA, 
β Boch: (6: 8 BET SN ASS StS, 
Bombay anh Caleta: MACMILLAN ANTI Cr, Jit. 


[til Migdds reserved} 


ARISTOTLE 
DE ANIMA 


WITH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION AND NOTES 


BY 


R. D. HICKS, M.A. 


FELLOW AND LATE LECTURER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 


CAMBRIDGE : 
AT THE UNIVERSIVY PRESS 


1907 


Wambridge: 
PRINTED BY JOIN CLAY, M.A. 
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 


TO HENRY JACKSON 


WHO HAS INSPIRED MANY 
WITH HIS OWN LOVE OF 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY 


ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA. 


Page 15, critical notes, line 2, a/fer ieliqui codd. add Bek. Trend. 


3} 


3} 


48, Critical notes, line 4, for appendicem vcad Fiagmenta t., Il. 1—3, p. 164 Z7277a. 

86, critical notes, line 12, after Bek. Trend. Torst. add Rodier. 

56, critical notes, line 13, afte Simpl. Soph. || add ζώντων Ῥ |. 

a7, translation, line 7, for body 7vad rest. 

64, critical notes, line 9, for append. για Fraymenta 01, 1. 61, p. 166 fufra. 

It4, critical notes, line 6, for rére...31. γίνεται read τότε... 31. καὶ ὁ, 

116, critical notes, last line, fur 162 read 160. 

145, Critical notes, line 12, for Hayduck read ITetnze. 

150, critical notes, line 7, for 540 read τ40. 

150, critical notes, line 13, after ap. crit. ad loc.) add” Bek. Trend. 

182, critical notes, last line, affer Bek. Trend. add Biehl. 

20... end of note on 403 b ὃ, edd A similar confusion of of Adyoe with of Adyorres 
τοὺς λόγους may he noticed yo7 b 13—17. 

ast, end of first note on 406 b 13, aad The meaning of ἔκστασις ἐκ τῆς οὐσίᾳ», 
so far as ἀλλοίωσις 1» concerned, is given less bluntly and paradoxically 
414 ULE SQ, 426 ἃ 4 5q-, Where ἡ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια is 
said to reside not ἐν τῷ ποιητικῷ, but ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι, 

251, line 2 of note on Ὁ 17. for Koch vvad Kock, 

386, end of note on 417 b 5, aad Ch 45ὺῸ 1 & Ὁ, 4300 14 ὁ τῷ πάντα yerdorda. 
The limitation, temporal or modal, which [ find in θεωροῦν, is often 
expressed by a dependent clause when the transition from ἔξες τὸ ἐνέργεια ts 
described, as here, in precise terms, e.g. ὅταν. φρονμῇ 41 tk, ἦταν νυῇ 
430 b 16, ὅταν θεωρῇ 432 ἃ 8, b ay, and generally ὅταν Cvepya gig Ὁ ay: 
cf. τὸ ἤδη ἐνεργοῦν 417 ἃ 12, ὁ ἤδη θεωρῶν 417 ἃ 25. 

377, line tt of note on yig b 24, for XI read No. XXX. (Vol. XEtL). 

385, line 4 of first note on σα 21, add Ch tap. τοῦ Ὁ 25 δὲ... 

goo, enc of first note on 4220 22 add’ Another Miltonie ceho contes from // 
Lenserosa (3-—~ 16 “ Whose saintly visage is too bright | To hit the sense 
of human sight, | And therefore to our weaker view | Overlaid with black.” 

449, end of note on 427 ἃ 4 add Perhaps a 3 ἔστε bi... ἡ ἀδιαίρετον shold rather 
be paraphrased thus: ‘There is, then, ἃ sense in which the percipient of 
two distinct objects is divisible; there is another sense in which it perceives 
them as being itself indivisible”? If so, with ἢ ἀδιαίρετον we should supply 
τὸ αἰσθανόμενον or τὸ αἰσθητικόν, and not τὸ διαιρετόν, as is dane on pe 11g. 

524, end of note on 430 1» 26, add’ In an instructive aete Torstrik (pp. τοῦ τα 19k) 
calls attention to the distinction between ὥσπερ and οἷον. The latter, he 
says, is used in citing examples or in passing from the genus ta its sub- 
ordinate species ; the former extends a predicate from one subject to another 
in sentences like the following: “The Greeks are sharp-wilted, as also 
(ὥσπερ καὶ) some of the barbarians.” Lf this be su, @omep fs quite in place 
in comparing the meaning of two terms. The termi φάσις denotes something 
predicated of something, as dues the term κατάφασις. But the writer passes 
from the term φάσις to the thing dented by the term when be adds in the 
next words that this predication is always true or false. 

§32, line 15, after better instance is zzsert ὁ δὲ νοῦς., οὐσία τις οὖσα sok b τῷ sq. CE. 


PREFACE. 


HE first English edition of this treatise appeared in 1882 
under the title of “Aristotle’s Psychology in Greek and 
English, with Introduction and Notes by Edwin Wallace.” It 
has been for some time out of print and, if Mr Wallace had 
survived to see his work through a second edition, he would 
probably have made considerable alterations, owing to the re- 
searches of the last quarter of a century. Of these I resolved 
to make full use, when, with their accustomed liberality, the 
Syndics of the Cambridge University Press accepted my offer 
to prepare an independent edition. Among the fresh materials 
which have accumulated, two are of special importance: I mean, 
the critical edition of De Anzma by the late Wilhelm Biehl and 
the series of Aristotelian commentaries re-edited under the 
auspices of the Berlin Academy. As regards the text, I have 
seldom had reason to deviate from Biehl’s conclusions, but in my 
critical notes, which are based on his judicious selection, I have 
gone further than he did in referring to, or occasionally citing 
from, authorities. The interval of time has enabled me to cite 
with greater uniformity than Biehl could do from the Berlin 
editions of the Greek commentators. I have followed the example 
of Wallace in printing an English version opposite the Greek text. 
A century ago, perhaps, the Latin of Argyropylus with the 
necessary alterations would have served the same purpose by 
indicating the construction of the sentences and the minimum 
of supplement needed to make sense and grammar of Aristotle’s 
shorthand style. But fashions have changed. The terse sim- 
plicity, not to say baldness, of literal Latin is now discarded for 
that rendering into a modern vernacular which, whatever its 
advantages, is always in danger of becoming, and too often is, 
a mere medley of specious paraphrase and allusive subterfuge. In 
compiling my notes I have drawn freely upon all my predecessors, 
not only on the Greeks themselves, who even in their decline were 
excellent paraphrasts, but also on modern editors and translators, 
from Pacius and Trendelenburg onward; while through Zabarella 
I have made some slight acquaintance with the views of the Latin 


Vili PREFACE 


schoolmen. Among modern critics few have the great gifts of 
Torstrik, who by his insight, candour and logic contributed beyond 
all others to improve Bekxker’s text of the treatise. Of this 
distinction nothing can rob him: haeret capiti cum multa laude 
corona. In matters of punctuation and orthography I have taken 
my own line, but, lest 1 should be accused of inconsistency, I must 
add that when citing from other editions J have been scrupulous 
in preserving their peculiarities. Thus, while for my own part 
I admit indifferently αἰεὶ and ἀεί, γίγνεσθαι and γίνεσθαι, when 
I cite the Metaphysics from Christ, [I follow him in always 
preferring αἰεὶ and ryiryveoGaz, to the exclusion of det and γίνεσθαι. 
Again, though I regard ζῷον and μέμεικται as alone correct, in 
citing from other editions where ζῶον and μέμικται are printed! 
I have been careful not to alter the spelling. In references to the 
Metaphysics, Ethics and Politics Ὁ have been content to give 
Bekker’s page, column and line without the addition of book 
and chapter, thus avoiding the confusion which arises from the 
double numbering of certain books and chapters. I have tried 
as far as possible to give in the notes the reasons for my 
conclusions, so that where I have erred it will be more easy for 
my critics to refute me. My own claims to originality are modest 
enough. In fact, in a subject like this, absolute novelty of view is 
almost unattainable, perhaps undesirable. 

I am indebted to Professor Henry Jackson, to whom the work 
is dedicated, for permission to publish sundry proposals, chiefly 
textual, taken from his public lectures delivered in the year 1903. 
Mr Τὸ, M. Cornford kindly placed at my disposal for this edition 
various notes on the third Book, which, after I had made use of 
them, were communicated to the Cambridge Philological Society. 
My book has profited by the vigilance and insight of several 
friends, to whom I desire to make fitting acknowledement. In 
particular, Miss Margaret Alford, Lecturer of Bedford College, 
revised for me the first draft of the notes and added to them much 
of value. Nor must I pass over the good offices of Dr T. L. ILeath, 
who assisted in correcting the proof-shects, or those of the Rev. 
J. M. Schulhof, who aided me five years ago at the commencement 
of my task. Lastly, I must express very great obligations to the 
staff of the University Press, including their accomplished readers, 
for their able and zealous co-operation. 


R. D. EL. 


CAMBRIDGE, Vovember, 1907. 


SUMMARY OF CONTENTS. 


PAGE 
List OF AUTHORITIES CITED. . . . . . ΧΊ----ΧΥ 
INTRODUCTION I.: SUBJECT . . . . . . ΧΙΧ---ἸΧΧῚ 
.» II.: Text . . . . . . ixxtti—Ixxxili 
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE CRITICAL 
NOTES. . . . . . . . . Ιχχχῖν 
GREEK TEXT, CRITICAL NOTES AND TRANSLATION . . 2—163 
FRAGMENTS OF AN OLDER RECENSION OF E 1n Boox II. 164—I17I 
NoTES . . . . . . . . . . 173—588 
APPENDIX: FRAGMENTS OF T'HEOPHRASTUS ON INTELLECT 589—596 
INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND PROPER NAMES . . . 597—598 
INDEX OF GREEK WORDS . . . . . . 599—626 


a5 


LIST OF AUTHORITIES. 


Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Trendelenburg (Ienae, 1833); ed. Belger-Tren- 
delenburg (Derolini, 1877). 

Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Torstrik (Berolini, 1862). 

Aristotle’s Psychology, ed. E. Wallace (Cambridge, 1882). 

Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Guil. Biehl (Lipsiae, 1884); nova impressio (Lipsiae, 
1896). 

Aristotelis De Anima liber B secundum recensionem Vaticanam, ed. H. Rabe 
(Gratulationsschrift der Bonner philol. Gesellsch. an Usener, Berolini, 
1891). 

Aristote, Traité de Ame, ed. G. Rodier (Paris, 1900). 

Translations of De Anima (other than those of Argyropylus, Barco, Wallace, 
Hammond and Rodier): 

Ides Aristoteles Schrift iiber die Seele, H. Bender (Stuttgart, 1872). 
Des Aristoteles Schrift tiber die Seele, E. Rolfes (Bonn, 1901). 

For ancient conimentaries on De Anima see Philoponus, Simplicius, Sophonias, 

Themistius. 





Editions of Aristotle before Bekker: 
Aldina (Vencetiis, 1495—1498) [collated by Trendelenburg]- 
Basileensis (Basileae, 15313; 1530; 1550). 
Sylburgiana (Francofurti, 15793; 1584; 1587). 





Aristoteles graece ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri edidit Academia regia 
Beorussica (Berolini, 1831—1870): 
Vols. I, ΠῚ, Graece ex rec. 1. Bekkeri. 1831. 
Vol. III. Latine interpretibus variis. 1831 [De Anima I[oanne Argyropylo 
Byzantio interprete, pp. 209—226]. 
Vol. IV. Scholia, coll. C. A. Brandis. 1836. 
Vol. ΚΝ. Fragmenta. Scholiorum supplementum. Index Aristotelicus. 1870. 
Aristotelis opera omnia. Graece et latine ediderunt Bussemaler, Dubner, 
Heitz (Paristis, 1848—1874). 





Editions of separate treatises of Aristotle: 
Organon, ed. Th. Waitz! (Lipsiae, 1844—1846). 
Physica, rec. Car. Prantl? (Lipsiae, 1879). 
De Caclo, De Generatione et Corruptione}, rec. Car. Prantl (Lipsiae, 1881). 
Meteoroloyica, rec. J. L. Ideler (Lipsiae, 1834—1836). 
Parva Naturalia, recogn. Guil. Biehl! (Lipsiae, 1898). 
De Sensu and De Memoria, ed. G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge, 1906). 
ἱστορίαι περὶ ζώων, Thierkunde, von H. Aubert and Fr. Wimmer (Leipzig, 
1868). 


1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 


xii LIST OF AUTHORITIES 


Editions of separate treatises of Aristotle (comdzzved) : 
De Partibus Animalium, ex recogn. B. Langkavel! (Lipsiae, 1868). 
(De Coloribus.) Ueber die Farben, von Carl Prantl (Munchen, 1849). 
Metaphysica, recogn. H. Bonitz (Bonnae, 1848—1849). 
Metaphysica, rec. W. Christ! (Lipsiae, 1886); nova impressio (Lipsiae, 1895). 
Ethica Nicomachea, rec. I. Bywater! (Oxonii, 1890). 
The Ethics, by Sir A. Grant (3rd edition, London, 1874). 
The Politics, by W. L. Newman! (Oxford, 1887—1902). 
Ars Rhetorica cum adnotat. L. Spengel (Lipsiac, 1867). 
Rhetoric with E. M. Cope’s Commentary, ed. J. E. Sandys (Cambridge, 
1877). 
Ars Rhetorica, ed. A. Roemer? (Lipsiae, 1885). 
De Arte Poetica, rec. J. Vahlen! (3rd edition, Lipsiae, 1885). 
Fragmenta collegit V. Rose (Lipsiac, 1886). 


Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca edita consilio et auctoritate Academiac 
litterarum regiae Borussicae (Berolini, 1882—1907). 


Aetius, Placita: in Diels, Doxographici Graeci. 

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, De Anima cum Mantissa, ed. I. Bruns! (Berolini, 
1887). 

—— Quaestiones. De Fato. De Mixtione, ed. I. Bruns?! (Berolini, 1892). 

—— In Aristotelis Metaphysica, ed. M. Hayduck! (Berolini, 18yr). 

In Aristotelis De Sensu, ed. Thurot (Paris, 1875); ed. Wendland! 

(Berolini, 1901). 

Anonymi Londinensis ex Aristotelis Iatricis Menoniis et allis medicis eclogae, 
ed. H. Diels (Berolini, 1893). 

Argyropylus: see Berlin eclition of Aristotle, Vol. 111. 

Aristoxenus, Die harmonischen Fraymente, von P. Marquard (Berlin, p88): see 
also Musici Scriptores. 

Apelt, O., Beitriige zur Gesch. der griechischen Philosophie (Leipzig, τδο τ). 

Bacchius: in Musici Scriptores, ed. Jan. 

Bacumker, Clem., Des Aristoteles Lehre von den dussern und innern Sinnes- 
vermodyen (Leipzip, 1877). 

——- in Philologische Rundschau 1882, Sp. 1356. 1360. 

Das Problem der Materie (Miinster, 18yo). 

Barco, G., Esposizione critica della psicologia greca.  Definizione delP anima 
(Torino-Roma, 1879). 

—— Del? anima vegetativa e sensitiva (Torino, 1881). 

Bast, F. J.. Commentatio Palacographica: appended, pp. 703. 861, to Greporti 
Corinthii ct aliorum grammaticorum libri de dialectis linguae gracecae, ed. 
G. H. Schaefer (Lipsiae, 1811). 

Beare, J. 1., De Anima LL. 8. 3, 419 b 22——25; De Sensu vit: in Hermathena 
No. XXX., Vol. XIII. (1905), pp. 73--76- 

—— Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alemacon to Aristotle 
(Oxford, 1906). 

Belger, Chr., De Anima A. 1. 4o2 b 16: in Hermes X1r (1878), pp. 302, 303. 

Bergk, Th., Zu Aristoteles’ De Anima 1. 4: in Hermes xvi. (1883), p. 518. 

Bernays, .. Die Dialoge des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1863). 

Bichl, W., Ueber den Begriff νοῦς bei Aristoteles (Linz, 1864). 

Bonitz, H., Aristotelische Studien 1.—v. (Wien, 1862— 1867). 








1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 


LIST OF AUTHORITIES ΧΙ 


Bonitz, H., Ueber den Gebrauch von re γάρ bei Aristoteles: in Zeitschrift fiir 
die osterreichischen Gymnasien ΧΙ. (1867), pp. 74—76. 
—— Zur Erklarung einiger Stellen aus Aristot. Schrift uber die Seele: in 
Hermes VII. (1873), pp. 416—436. 
Brandis, C. A., Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-romischen Philosophie 
(Berlin, 1835—1866). 
Brentano, Fr., Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom 
vous ποιητικός (Mainz, 1867). 
Bullinger, A., Aristoteles’ Nus-Lehre (De Anima 111. cc. 4—8 incl.) (Dillingen, 
1885). 
Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy (London and Edinburgh, 1892). 
Busse, Ad., De Anima 434a 12—15, in Hermes XXIII. (1888), pp. 469 sq. 
in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift x11. (1892), Sp. 549—552. 
——  Neuplatonische Lebensbeschreibung des Anstoteles: in Hermes XXVIII. 
(1893), pp. 252—276. 
Bywater, I., Aristotelia: in Journal of Philology xiv. (1885), pp. 40—52; XVII. 
(1888), pp. 53—74. 
Chaignet, A. E., Essai sur la psychologie d’Aristote (Paris, 1883). 
Chandler, H. W., Miscellaneous emendations and suggestions (London, 1866). 
Christ, W., Studia in Aristotelis libros metaphysicos collata (Berolini, 1853). 
Cornford, F. M., Plato and Orpheus: in Classical Review XVII. pp. 433—445. 
—— in Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society LXXV. (1906), p. 13. 
Dembowski, J., Quaestiones aristotelicae duae (Regimonti Pr. 1881). 
in Wochenschrift fur classische Philologie Iv. (1887), Sp. 430—433. 
Diels, H., Doxographi Graeci (Berolini, 1379). 
Studia Empedoclea: in Hermes XV. (1880), pp. 161-—179. 
—— Ueber die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles: in Sitzungsberichte der 
Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften 1883, pp. 477—494. 
Leukippos und Diogenes von Apollonia in Rheinisches Museum XLII. 
(1887), pp. 1-- 14. 
—— Parmenides (Berlin, 1897). 
Poectarum Philosophorum fragmenta (Berolini, 1901). 
——— Herakleitos von Ephesos (Berlin, 1901). 
Die Fraymente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1903). 
Dittenberger, W., Exegetische und kritische Bemerkungen zu einigen Stellen 
des Aristoteles (Metaphysik und de Anima). (Rudolstadt, 1869.) 
in Géttingische gelehrte Anzeigen 1863, pp. 1601—-1616. 
Dyroff, Αἰ, Demokritstudien (Leipzig, 1899). 
Essen, E., Der Keller zu Skepsis. Versuch tuber das Schicksal der aristotelischen 
Schriften. Gymn.-Progr. (Stargard, 1866). 
-——— Ejin Beitrag zur Lésung der aristotelischen Frage (Berlin, 1884). 
Das erste Buch der aristotelischen Schrift itber die Seele ins Deutsche 
iibertragen etc. (Iena, 1892). 
—— Das zweite Buch in kritischer Uebersetzung (Iena, 1894). 
—— Das dritte Buch (Iena, 1896). 
Empedoclis Ayrigentini carminum reliquiae, ed. 5. Karsten (Amstelodami, 1838). 
Eucken, R. De Aristotelis dicendi ratione (Gottingae, 1866). 
Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1868). 
———- _Methode der aristotelischen Forschung (Berlin, 1872). 
Euclidis, De Musica: in Musici Scriptores. 
Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum, coll. Meineke (Berolini, 1839—1841); Comi- 
corum Atticorum Fragmenta, ed. Th. Kock (Lipsiae, 1880-—1888). 





























xiv LIST OF AUTHORITIES 


Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum, ed. Mullach (Parisiis, 1860—1867, 1881). 

Frazer, J. G., The Golden Bough (London and New York, 1890). 

Freudenthal, J.. Ueber den Begriff des Wortes φαντασία bei Aristoteles 
(GG6ttingen, 1863). 

—— Zur Kritik und Exegese von Aristoteles: in Rheinisches Museum, 1869, 
pp. 81—93, 392—419. 

Gomperz, Th., Griechische Denker (Leipzig, 1896), Vol. 1, English translation 
by Laurie Magnus (London, Igor). 

Granger, F., De Anima (On the Active and Passive Reason): tn Classical 
Review VI., pp. 298—301: also in Mind 1893, pp. 307—318. 

Grote, G., Aristotle (London, 1872); 2nd edition (London, 1880). 

Waecker, F., in Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasialwesen, 1864, pp. 198—215. 

Hammond, W. A., Aristotle’s Psychology, translation of De Anima and Parva 
Naturalia (London and New York, 1902). 

Hart, G., Zur Seelen- und Erkenntnisslehre des Demokrit (Leipzig, 1886). 

Hayduck, M., Observationes criticae in aliquot locos Aristotelis, Progr. 
(Greifswald, 1873). 

Heiberg, J. L., Mathematisches zu Aristoteles: in Abhandlungen zur Geschichte 
der mathematischen Wissenschaften, 1904, Heft 4, pp. 8 sqy. 

Heitz, E., Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles (Leipzig, 1865). 

Heracliti Ephesii reliquiae, rec. I. Bywater (Oxonii, 1877). 

Hertling, G. von, De Aristotclis notione Unius commentatio (Berolini, 1864), 

Materie und Form und die Definition der Secle bei Aristoteles (Bonn, 

1871). 

Hesychii Alexandri T.exicon, rec. M. Schmidt (Jenac, 1858 ~-1868). 

Innes, H. M°L., On the Universal and Particular in -\ristotle’s Theory of 

Knowledge (Cambridge, 1886). 

in Classical Review XVI, pp. 461—463. 

Jackson, FI., Texts to illustrate a Course of Elementary Lectures on the History 
of Greck Philosophy from Thales to Aristotle (London, τοι), 

Joachim, ἘΠ. 1Π., Aristotle’s Theory of Chemical Combination: in Journal of 
Philology XXIX., pp. 72——-86. 

Johnson, W. A. E., Der Sensualismus des Demokritos (Plauen, 1868). 

Kampe, Ir. F., Die Erkenntnisstheorie des Aristoteles (Leipzig, 1870). 

Karsten: see Empedocles. 

Keil, Bruno, Analectorum Isocrateorum specimen (CGiyphiswaldiac, 188.4). 

Kern, Ὁ. De Orphei Epimenidis Pherecydis theogontis quaestiones criticae 
(Berolini, 1888). 

Krische, A. B., Forschungen auf dem Csebiete der alten Philosophie (Géttingen, 
1840). 

Lasswitz, K., Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis Newton (Hamburg, 
1890). 

Lobeck, C. A., Aglaophamus (Reyimontiit Prussorum, 1829). 

Phrynichi Eclogae nominum et verborum atticorum (Lipsiae, 1820), 

Madvig, J. N., Acdversaria critica ad scriptores graecos (Hauniae, 1871). 

Maier, Η., Die Syllovistik des Aristotelis (Tubingen, 1896--1goo). 

Marchl, P., Des Arist. Lehre von der Tierseele 1... 11, 1% (Metten, 1897-—180y). 

Martin, A., in Revue critique, 1902, pp. 425— 428. 

Michaelis, K. G., Zu Aristoteles De Anima 11. 3 (Neu-Strelitz, 1882). 

Musicae antiquae auctores septem graece et latine restituit Marcus Meibomius 

(Amstelodami, 1652). 

ed. C. Jan (Lipsiae, 1895). 














LIST OF AUTHORITIES XV 


Natorp, P., Ueber Demokrits γνησίη γνώμη: in Archiv fiir Geschichte der 
Philosophie I., pp. 348—356. 

—— Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems im Alterthum 
(Berlin, 1884). 

Neuhaeuser, J., Aristoteles’ Lehre von dem sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermégen 
und seinen Organen (Leipzig, 1878). 

Noetel, R, in Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasialwesen, 1864, pp. 131—144. 

Ogle, W., Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, translated with introduction and 

notes etc. (London, 1882). 

Aristotle on Youth and Age etc., translated etc. (London, 1897). 

Pacius, Julius, Aristotelis De Anima, Graece et Latine cum commentario 
(Francofurti, 1596; Hanoviae, 1611; Francofurti, 1621). 

Pansch, Car., Zu Aristoteles de anima: in Philologus xxX1. (1864), pp. 543—545.- 

Philippson, L., Ὕλη ἀνθρωπίνη (Berolini, 1831). 

Philoponi, Joannis, In Aristotelis De Anima libros Commentaria, ed. Hayduck! 
(Berolini, 1897). 

Poppelreuter, Hans, Zur Psychologie des Aristoteles, Theophrast, Strato 
(Leipzig, 1892). 

Praechter, K., in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift, 1902, Sp. 193—2o01. 

Prisciani Lydi quae extant (Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, pp. I—37), ed. 
Bywater (Berolini, 1886). 

Riddell, Digest of Idioms, appended to his edition of Plato’s Apology (Oxford, 
1877). 

Ritter, B., Die Grundprincipien der aristotelischen Seelenlehre (Jena, 1380). 

Rodier, G., Note sur un passage du De Anima d’Aristote, III. 2, 426b 3: in 
Revue des ¢tudes anciennes, 1901, pp. 313—3T5. 

Roeper, G., Zu De Anima 11. 5, U1 3, 1. 6: in Philologus vil. (1852), pp. 238, 
324, 768. 

Rohde, E., Psyche (3rd edition, Tiibingen und Leipzig, 1903). 

Sander, Julius, Alkmaeon von Kroton (Wittenberg, 1893). 

Schaefer, G., Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus und die moderne 
Heraklitforschung (Leipzig, 1902). 

Schell, J. Ἐξ, Mie Einheit des Seelenlebens aus den Principien der Aristo- 
telischen Philosophie entwickelt (Freiburg im Br., 1873). 

Schieboldt, F. ©., De imaginatione disquisitio ex Aristotelis libris repetita 
(Lipsiae, 1882). “ae 

Schlottmann, K., Das Vergiangliche and Unvergéngliche in der menschlichen 
Seele nach Aristoteles, Univ. Progr. (Halle, 1873). 

Schneider, G., Ueber einige Stellen aus Aristoteles de anima III. 3: in 
Rheinisches Museum XxXI. (1866), pp. 444—454. 

——— Ueber einige Stellen aus Aristoteles de anima ΤΠ. 3: in Rheinisches 
Museum XXII. (1867), p. 145- 

—— Zu Aristotelis de anima (111. 3, 428 Ὁ 25): in Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasial- 
wesen XXI. (1867), pp. 631—634. 

Shorey, P., in American Journal of Philology, Xx11. (1901), pp. 149 —164. 

Siebeck, H., Geschichte der Psychologie (Gotha, 1880—1884). 

Zu Aristoteles in Philologus XL. (1881), pp. 347356. 

Simplicii in libros Aristotelis De Anima Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck! 
(Berolini, 1882). 

Sophoniae in libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, ed. M. Hayduck 
(Berolini, 1883). 


1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 








Xvi LIST OF AUTHORITIES 


Stapfer, A. A., Studia in Aristotelis de anima libros collata (Landishutae, 1888). 
Kritische Studien zu Aristoteles’ Schrift von der Seele (Landshut, 1890). 
Steinhart, Car., Symbolae criticae, Progr. (Schulpforte, 1843). 

Stewart, J. A., Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1892). 

Susemihl, Franz, in Jahresbericht iiber die Fortschritte der classischen Alter- 
thumswissenschaft (Bursian), Vols. IX., pp. 347-352; XVII., 261 sqc. ; 
XXX., 35-48; XXXIV. 25—35; XLIL, 26, 238-240; LXVIL, 103-111: 
LXXV., 95-100; LXXIX., 99 Sqq., 279; LXXXVIII, I2—I5. 

—— in Philologische Wochenschrift, 1882, Sp. 1283 sq.; 1884, Sp. 784; 1893, 

Sp. 1317—1320; 1895, Sp. 1031. 

in Jenaer Litteraturzeitung IV. (1877), Sp. 707 sy. 
—— in Philologischer Anzeiger, 1873, pp. 683, 690. 
— in Wochenschrift fur classische Philologie, 1884, Sp. 1410. 








in Philologus XLVI. (1888), p. 86. 
Appendix to Aristotelis quae feruntur Oeconomica, ed. Susemihl (Lipsiac, 
1887). 
Tannery, P., Pour Phistoire de la science helléne (Paris, 1887). 
Teichmiller, G., Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe (Berlin, 1874). 
Themistii Paraphrases Aristotelis librorum quae supersunt, ed. IL. Spengel 
(De Anima in Vol. IL, pp. I—231). 
—— In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, ec. R. Heimze! (Berohm, 
1899). 
Theophrasti Eresii opera quae supersunt omnia, ex recogn. F. Wimmer 
(Lipsiae, 1854--- 1862). 
—— Fragmentum De Sensibus, ed. H. Diels! in Doxographi Graect, pp. 4y9— 
527. 
See also Priscianus Lydus. 
Thompson, W. H., On the genuineness of the Sophist of Plato ete.: in Journal 
of Philology vill. (1879), pp. 290—322. 
Torstrik, Ad., Die Authentica der Berliner Ausgabe des Aristoteles: in Philo- 
logus XII. (1857), pp. 494—530; XIII. (1858), pp. 204 sq. 
—— in Rheinisches Museum XXI. (1866), p. 640. 
—— Der Anfang. der Physik des Aristoteles: in Neue Jahrbiicher fiir ’hiloleie 
XCV. (17G/), pp. 236-—244. 
“Zu Aristoteles’ Psychologie (Γ 4, 429b 10; T 3, 42848; I 4, 429 a 29-- 
b 5): in Neue Jahrbucher ftir Philologie XCv. (1867), pp. 245 sy. 
in Literarisches Centralblatt (1877), Sp. 1462 sq. 
Trendelenburg, Fr. Ad., Geschichte der Kategorienlehre (Berlin, 1846). 
Historische Beitrage zur Philosophie 11. (Berlin, 1855); 11. (Berlin, 
1867). 
Elementa logices Aristoteleae, ed. 8 (Berolini, 1878). 
Vahlen, J., Beitrage zu Aristoteles Poetik (Wien) 1., 1865; 11, 18663 tL, 1V., 
1867. 
-~—— Aristotelische Aufsatze 1. (Wien, 1872). 
—— Grammatisch-kritische Miscellen zu Aristoteles: in Zeitschrift fiir die 
ésterreichischen Gymnasien XVIII. (1867), pp. 721—725. 
Grammatisch kritische Miscellen zu Aristoteles, in Zeitschrift fiir die 
ésterreichischen Gymnasien XIx. (1868), pp. 11-21, 253—256. 
Wilson, J. Cook, Conjectural emendations in the text of Aristotle and 
Theophrastus, in Journal of Philology x1. (1882), pp. 119— 124. 

















1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 


LIST OF AUTHORITIES xvi 


Wilson, J. Cook, Interpretation of certain passages of the De Anima in the 
editions of Trendelenburg and Torstrik, in Transactions of the Oxford 

Philological Society, 1882/3, pp. 5—13. 

in Philologische Rundschau (1882), Sp. 1473—1481. 

Wyse, W., The Speeches of Isaeus (Cambridge, 1904). 

Xenocrates, Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente von R. 
Heinze (Leipzig, 1892). 

Zabarella, J.. Commentaria in tres Aristotelis hbros de anima (Venetiis, 1605). 

Zabarellae opera integra ed. I. L. Havenreuter (Francofurti, 1623, 1624). 

Zeller, E, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Band I., δίῃ edition (Leipzig, 1892); 
Il., 4th edition (1889); 11. 2 Abth. (111), 3rd edition (1879); 111. 1 Abth. (IVv.), 
3rd edition (1880); 111. 2 Abth. (v), 3rd edition (1881). 

—— English Translation of 3rd edition of 11. 2 by Costelloe and Muirhead 
under the title “ Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics” (London, New York, 
and Bombay, 1897). 

——— in Archiv der Geschichte der Philosophie IIL, 303, 311 sq.3 VI., 406 sqq.; 
VIIL, 134 5646. ; IX., 536 sqq. 

Ziaja, J., Aristoteles De Sensu cc. 1, 2,3 bis 439 b 18 tibersetzt und mit Anmerk- 
ungen versehen, Progr. (Breslau, 1887), 

—— Die aristotelische Lehre vom Gedichtniss und von der Association der 
Vorstellungen (Leobschuitz, 1879). 





xx INTRODUCTION. 41 


external soul, on which the life of the individual depends, plays the 
same part as in the folk-lore of savages to-day*. The opening lines 
of the ad draw a sharp distinction between the heroes themsclves, 
left a prey for dogs and vultures, and their souls, sent down to 
Hades or the invisible world. The ghost of Patroclus, which 
appears to Achilles ina dream, is an emaciated, enfeebled shadow, 
deprived of all its strength by severance from the body, which was 
the real man. In the underworld these pale, ineffectual ghosts are 
much alike in general condition. Apart from a few notorious 
offenders punished for their misdeeds, they pursue the shadows of 
their former avocations. Whether in Greek language and thought 
two separate conceptions are blended, whether the sum of the 
intellectual and moral qualities was associated at one time with 
the blood and at another with the breath, whether the breath of life 
superseded an older smoke-soul, the exhalation arising from spilt 
blood, and whether these two conceptions were connected with the 
practices of inhumation and cremation respectively, are matters of 
speculation on which it is hardly possible to arrive at a definite 
conclusion® When we pass from Homer to later poets we find the 
same primitive beliefs variously modified. In Hesiod the heroes 
go no longer to the underworld, but to the Isles of the Blest, and 
ancestral spirits have developed into “daemons” exerting a benefi- 
cent influence on their descendants’. From the dirges of Pindar 
we have two important fragments‘. One is a glowing picture of 
the lot of the happy dead. In the other we are told that, “ while 
the body of every man followeth after mighty death, there still 
liveth a likeness of his prime which alone is of divine origin, which 
slumbereth so long as the limbs are busy, but full oft in dreams 
showeth to sleepers the issue that draweth near of pleasant things 
and cruel.” 

In the Orphic and Pythagorean brotherhoods the primitive 
Orphic beliefs were moulded into a thoroughgoing doctrine 
doctrine. of transmigration. Three main conceptions underlie 
Orphic asceticism. First, there is the opposition between body and 
soul. The soul is better than the body and is buried in the body 
for its sins, the body is its temporary prison. Next comes the 
necessity for a purification of the soul. All evil is followed by 


1 Frazer, éoc, cit., vol. 11., 6. iv. 

2 Etymologically θυμὸς is connected with Jumus: cf. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 1. 
PP- 249 Sq. ᾿ 

3 Hesiod, Works and Days, τῶι sqq. 

* Fragg. 95, 96. | 


INTRODUCTION. I ΧΧΙ 


retribution. Through abstinence and penance alone may the soul 
hope to regain its former blissful state. Thirdly, there is the long 
series of incarnations in which, according to their deeds during a 
former existence, souls take a higher or a lower place in human or 
animal bodies or even in plants’. Though these ideas occupy so 
small a place in literature, they are clearly very old, for the extant 
burlesque of Xenophanes? attests the acceptance of metempsychosis 
by Pythagoras, and all probability points to his having derived 
it from the still older Orphic sect. At Athens the Eleusinian 
mysteries, at which some such ideas were symbolically inculcated, 
were under the patronage of the state; but nevertheless the belief 
in an after life in the underworld, as set forth by Homer, for the 
most part maintained its hold upon the ordinary educated citizen. 
Little is to be learned from the Ionian thinkers, whom 
Tonian Aristotle calls physicists or physiologists’, In the 
physicists. dawn of enquiries which, strictly speaking, were 
rather scientific than philosophical, men sought to explain to 
themselves of what things were constituted and how they had come 
into their present condition. Their problem, we should now say, 
was the constitution of matter and, if occasionally, when they found 
the primary element in air or fire or some other body, they also 
declared that this was the cause of vital functions, it was merely a 
corollary to their general doctrine and of no special importance. 
The subjects on which we find hints are the substance of the soul, 
the distinction between its various powers, and the nature of 
knowledge. So far as the substance of the individual soul was 
identical with, or a product of, the universal element, they all 
agreed in regarding it as not immaterial, but of an extremely 
refined and mobile materiality. The soul was credited with the 
power to know and perceive, as well as the power to move the body. 
Heraclitus, who had grasped the flux of matter in 
constant circulation, held it to be governed by an 
universal law. Knowledge to him consists in apprehending this law. 
In comparison with such knowledge he deprecated the evidence of 
sense: eyes and ears are better than the other senses, but are 
bad witnesses, if the soul does not understand. Meanwhile in 
the West other schools of philosophy had arisen, the Eleatic and 


Heraclitus. 


1 Cf. Rohde, Prycke, 11. pp. 103 8qq- 

2 Frag. 7 D. | 

$ ‘The philosophical speculations 6n the soul from Thales to Democritus and Anaxagoras 
mre reviewed by Rohde, 11. pp. 137-198. Cf. also Beare, Greek Theories of Hlementary 
Lagrttion. : : 
οὐ κα, b 


Xxii INTRODUCTION. TF 


Pythagorean. Xenophanes distinguished between truth and opinion. 
Parmenides derived the intelligence of man from the 
composition and elementary mixture of his bodily 
parts, heat and cold being the elements of things’. The pre- 
ponderant element characterises the thought of the individual man. 
But the chief legacy of Parmenides to his successors was his 
doctrine of the one immutable Being, which alone satisfies the 
requirements of an object of knowledge. The element of the 
Ionians did not satisfy these conditions, being endowed with the 
power to pass from one condition to another, whether intermittently 
or perpetually. Nothing, according to Parmenides, is ever generated 
or destroyed, however varied its manifestations and the changes it 
presents to the senses. On the foundation thus laid by Parmenides 
Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Leucippus constructed their systems, 
resolving apparent generation and destruction into combination 
and separation of primary elements or principles, themselves 
indestructible. They differed, Aristotle remarks, as to the number 
and nature of these indestructible elements, Empedocles made a 
mistake in accepting a crude popular analysis into air, earth, fire and 
water, elements which do not so much as correspond to a rough divi- 
sion of matter into the solid, liquid and gaseous states. Anaxagoras, 
with his homoeomeries, was in our view still wider of the mark. 
Leucippus and Democritus at last found in the atoms a working 
hypothesis of the constitution of matter, which has lasted down to 
the present day. It is these three physical systems which most 
profoundly influenced Aristotle. He unfortunately accepted the first 
with modifications and opposed the last, by the merits of which he 
was nevertheless profoundly impressed. Each of these three systems 
took up the problem of the soul. But in the meantime medical 
enquiries had been actively prosecuted, and it is to a Pythago- 
rean, Alcmaeon of Croton, that we owe the earliest 
advances towards the physiology of the senses. Fle 
was the first to recognise the brain as the central organ of 
intellectual activity. He dissected animals and by this means 
discovered the chief nerves of sense, which, like Aristotle, he called 
“conduits” or “ channels,” and he traced them to their termination in 
the brain. Deafness and blindness he held to be caused when bya 
concussion the brain was shifted out of its normal position and the 
channels of hearing and seeing respectively were thus blocked. He 
submitted the several senses to a searching examination, starting 


1 Frag. 16 D. 
* De Anima 404. Ὁ 30 sqq. 


Parmenides. 


Alcmaeon. 


INTRODUCTION. I ΧΕΙ 


with the anatomical construction of the sense-organ. The air in 
the ear he regarded as a sounding-board, and he attributed to the 
moisture, softness, flexibility and warmth of the tongue its capacity 
to reduce solid bodies to fluid as a necessary preliminary to tasting. 
He noticed the phenomenon which we call seeing sparks when the 
eye has received a heavy blow, and this suggested a crude theory 
of vision, postulating fire in the eye, a mistake repeated by Em- 
pedocles and by Plato. But it is with the glittering or transparent 
element of water in the eye that it sees, and it sees better according 
to the purity of the element. Vision is effected by the image of the 
thing seen and by the rays which issue from the eye within and 
pass outwards through the water. He derived memory from sense- 
perception and opinion from memory; from memory and opinion 
combined he derived reason, which distinguishes men from the 
lower animals?. What scanty information we have about him 
comes chiefly from Theophrastus’, but it would be a great mistake 
to acquiesce in Aristotle’s neglect of him. He is only once 
mentioned in De Anza, as having held that soul is immortal, on 
the singular ground that by its incessant motion it resembles the 
heavenly bodies, which he also held to be immortal. 

In Empedocles we are dealing not with a sober physical 
enquirer, but with a religious enthusiast and poet-philosopher. He 
accepted the transmigration of souls in a slightly 
altered form; he introduced wicked as well as good 
“ daemons,” condemned for their sins to wander for 10,000 years and 
to become souls of plants, beasts and men. In the course of their 
purification they become prophets, poets, physicians, princes, and 
again return to the gods*. Sensation in general he explained by 
the action of like upon like. Particles emanate from external 
bodies and enter our bodies by channels or pores. They cannot 
enter unless there is a certain proportion® between the emanation 
and the size and shape of the channel which is to receive it. Thus 
a sense-organ is a particular part of the body which, possessing 
channels of a certain size and shape, is adapted to receive 
emanations of a certain kind, of flavour, odour or sound. But his 
theory of vision was more complicated. Not only are there 


Empedocles. 


1 Plato, Phaedo 96 B, where, however, the name of Alemaeon is not mentioned. 

t De Sensibus, 88 25, 26 (Doxogr. Gr. 306, 25 sqq.): cf. Philippson ὕλη ἀνθρωπίνη, 
pp. 20 sq. and Julius Sander, A/Awiaeon von Kroton. 

5 405 ἃ 29 566. 4 Cf. Plato, Phaedr. 248 Ὁ), E. 

δ συμμετρία, De Gen. εἰ Corr. 1. 8, 324 Ὁ 25 sqq-3 cf. Theophr. De Semsibus § 7. 
Perhaps Empedocles was seeking to express the same fact as was Aristotle when he 
afterwards applied the word μεσύτης to sense. 


62 


XXIV INTRODUCTION. 17 


emanations from visible objects, but there are also emanations from 
the eye. To this he was led by the analogy of the dark lantern, of 
which the camera obscura furnishes a modern illustration. The 
transparent plates of horn or linen in the lantern, made to protect 
the flame from the wind which might otherwise extinguish it, 
correspond to the thin coats or films in the eye covering the pupil, 
whose contents are partly of a fiery, partly of a watery, nature. 
From the pupil fiery and watery emanations leap forth through 
funnel-shaped channels to meet the fiery and watery emanations 
coming, the one from light, the other from dark, objects outside. 
The principle of “like by like” accounts for the mutual attraction 
of similar materials and their meeting, and, when the two sets of 
emanations meet, vision takes place. The preponderance of water 
or fire in the eye accounts for the fact that some animals see better 
in the dark, others in the daylight’. Thus, then, we perceive like 
by like, the four elements of all things, air, carth, fire and water, 
outside, because air, earth, fire and water are present in our bodies? 
Blood is the most perfect mixture of these four clements and to 
this blood where it is purest, viz. about the heart, he attributecl 
thought. As we see earth by earth which is in us, water by water, 
so we think by means of blood, the bodily tissue in which all four 
elements are most perfectly blended. Tempedocles, then, con- 
sistently confined his attention to the bodily process. The mental 
or psychical state is either ignored in his explanation or reduced to 
its physical conditions. Yet on the problem of knowledge, aware 
of the imperfection of the senses, he counsels us to withdraw our 
trust from them and prefer the guidance of reason. 

Anaxagoras distinguished sensation from intelligence and, 
whereas most of the Pre-Socratics agreed that we 
perceive things by having within us something like 
them, he held that we perceive in virtue of the presence within us 
of something opposite to the thing perceived®, Knowledge is not 
to be gained from the senses, because their powers cannot dis- 
criminate minute changes; while the reactionary physics which he 
propounded involved the presence in every sensible object of 
infinitesimal particles perceptible only in the aggregate and, 
blended with these, alien particles altogether imperceptible, because 
infinitesimal. Over against this infinity of homocomeries he set 


Anaxagoras. 


1 Aristotle, De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 8, 324 25 syq-y De Sense a, 437} 23--4588 By 
Theophrastus, De Sensibus, §3 7-~24. 

2 De A. 204} t1—15, 409 Ὁ 23 sep. 417 ἃ 21 βῆ, 

3 405 b 14-21, Theophrastus, De Senstbus, 3 1, 2, 29-—37. 


INTRODUCTION. JI XXV 


the other constituent of the universe, which alone is pure and 
unmixed and has nothing in common with anything else. This is 
Nous?. The part it played was to communicate the first impulse 
to that rotatory motion which ultimately evolved from the chaos in 
which all things were mixed the present order and regularity of 
the universe. Nous is in all living beings, great and small, in 
varying degrees. It governs and orders and knows. We fortu- 
nately possess the account which Anaxagoras himself gave of Nous, 
and upon the evidence the reader must decide for himself what was 
its nature’. Plato and Aristotle construed it as immaterial reason 
and censured the philosopher for not making more thoroughgoing 
use of its mighty agency. Returning now to sense, the contrast 
necessary to perception Anaxagoras found most clearly in touch, 
for our perception of temperature depends upon contrast. We 
know the taste of sweet and bitter only by contrast. Seeing, 
again, takes place by the reflection of an image in the pupil, but in 
a part of it which is of a different colour from the object seen. 
Eyes that see in the daytime are, generally speaking, dark, while 
animals with gleaming eyes see better by night. 

In the Atomists the tendencies of earlier Greek thinkers reach 
Leucippus mature development. The problem hitherto had been 
Democritus. to determine what matter is, and Leucippus pro- 
pounded a working hypothesis which has ever since been sufficient 
for the purposes of science. Though this theory is derived from 
sense, it departs very widely from the evidence of the senses. 
Knowledge, said Democritus, is of two kinds, genuine knowledge 
that there are atoms and void and nothing else, and knowledge 
which is dark or obscure, by which he meant the information given 
by the senses*. The existence of void apparently contradicts obser- 
vation, experiment fails even now to obtain an absolute void. The 
properties of body are all given by sense. The Atomists accepted 
the evidence of sense for resistance, extension and weight (perhaps 
Democritus was unaware of this last quality), but rejected it for 
colours, sounds, odours and flavours. Out of impenetrable atoms 
of different shapes and sizes the whole universe is built up, and the 
different qualities in things are due either to difference of shape or 
size, or to different arrangements, of the atoms composing them‘. 
The soul is no exception. It is a complex of atoms within the 


1 4oga 25 Sqq., 4o4b 1-—6, 4050 13---21,) 405 Ὁ 19---2 .., 429 a 18—20, b 23 56. 
2 Frag. 12 D, quoted entire on p. 229 tafra. 

* Krag. 11 D apud Sext. Emp. ἄν. Mathematicos, Vil. 138 sq. 

4 De A. 4044 1-4, De Gen. et Corr. 1. 4, 315 Ὁ 6 sqq.- 


XXV1 INTRODUCTION. 1 


body. Soul-atoms are spherical in shape, extremely minute and 
mobile. They resemble the atoms of fire. In thus postulating a 
body within the body to account for vital and intellectual functions, 
Democritus reverts more consistently and systematically than any 
previous philosopher to the standpoint of the savage who, when he 
sees an animal move, is unable to explain the fact except by 
supposing that there is a little animal inside to move him. But 
there is this difference, that the little animal is imagined to be alive, 
the soul-atoms of Democritus are mere matter”, Thus to push the 
implicit assumptions of their predecessors to their logical con- 
sequences and make the half-conscieus hylozoism of the early 
Ionians blossom forth in materialism is the great merit of 
Leucippus and Democritus. Al]! processes of sensation, then, are 
instances of the contact® between bodies. They are caused by 
“idols” or films which are constantly streaming off from = the 
surface of bodies, of inconceivable thinness, yet preserving the 
relative shape of the parts. So far this agrees with Pmpedocles : 
but the latter made his emanations enter the body through chan- 
nels, while the Atomists conceived them as entering by the void 
between the atoms. The same explanation would apply ta thought, 
which is excited when the material image of an object enters the 
equally material mind. All the senses are thus but modifications 
of touch. This was made out satisfactorily for taste, and 
Democritus attempted to determine the shapes of the atoms which 
produce the different varieties of taste*+ Things made of atoms 
angular, winding, small and thin, have an acid taste, those whose 
atoms are spherical and not too small taste sweet, and κὰν θὰ. {{|5 
four simple colours, white, black, red and green, are accounted for 
by the shape and disposition of atoms, but a similar analysis was 
not attempted for the objects of sound and smell. 

In marked contrast with the attempts which the Atomists and 
Diogenca of EVEN Empedocles made to bring physics and physio- 
Apollonia. logy into shape is the retrograde system of Diogenes 
of Apollonia, whose fantastic absurdities have been immortalised! 
for us by Aristophanes. He was not satisfied with the resolution 
by Anaxagoras, himself a reactionary in physics, of bodies into 
infinitesimal particles possessing definite qualities, though he was 


1 403 Ὁ 31—404.0 16, 405.8 5-—13. 

2 Ch. De 4. 406 b 15—22, 409 Ὁ 7—15. 

® De Sensu 4, 442.8 29 sqq- For what follows see Theophrastux, e Senséfus, @ 4 
—83, who treats of Democritus very fully. 

4 Theophrastus, De Sensibus, ὃ 64 9qq- 


INTRODUCTION. TI XXVIII 


more attracted by the supposition of unmixed Nous, which is the 
seat of intelligence. But he supplemented this theory by reverting 
to the position of the IJonians, one of whom, Anaximenes, had 
chosen air for his primary element. Diogenes endowed air with 
sentience and intelligence. “All creatures,’ he says, “live and 
see and hear by the same thing” (viz. air), “and from the same 
thing all derive their intelligence as well?” He thus made the 
air in us play an important part in the processes of perception 
and thought. From Alcmaeon he must have borrowed the idea 
that the brain is the central organ; the air in the sense-organs, 
the eye, the ear, the nostrils, transmitted the impression to the 
air in or near the brain. The common view that seeing takes 
place by the reflection of an image in the pupil he supplemented 
by postulating that this image must be blended with the internal 
air; otherwise, though the image is formed, there is no seeing. 
He pointed to the fact that, when the optic nerve is inflamed, 
blindness ensues because, as he thought, the admixture with the 
internal air is prevented. His account of hearing may be cited 
for the likeness it bears to that given in De Anza. “The animals 
which hear most acutely have slender veins, the orifice of the ear 
(like that of the nose) being in them short, slender and straight, 
and the external ear erect and large. For movement of the air in 
the ears sets in motion the internal air” [in or near the brain]. 
“ Whereas, if the orifice be too wide, the movement of the air in 
the ears causes a ringing in them, and what is heard is indistinct 
noise, because the air upon which the audible sound impinges is 
not at rest?” 

In the fifth century the evolution of successive systems came 
to a halt. The progress of enquiry had been marked by the 
foundation of new sciences like geometry and astronomy, both in 
a flourishing condition, and new arts, like rhetoric and dialectic. 
The bustle and unrest of the times was attended by a growing 
mistrust, not only of the old traditional religious and moral beliefs, 
but of the bewildering intellectual movement which in so short a 
space of time had put forward so many brilliant and contradictory 
speculations. The professional educators, whom we know as the 
Sophists, turned as a rule to practical interests and made human- 

ism, literary criticism, erudition their main themes. 


Protagoras. Protagoras, the greatest of them, adopted a sceptical 


1 See Simplicius, ὧς Physica, p. 151, 24—153, 24, Theophrastus, De Sensibus, 


88. 39-—48. 
* Theophr. De Sensibus, § 41: cf De A. 4208 3 8qQ4- 


XXVili INTRODUCTION. 1 


attitude and maintained that man was the measure of all things, 
which, as interpreted by Plato, means that, as things appear to me, 
so they are to me, or the denial of objective truth. There were 
many sceptical currents in the sea of speculation on which Greece 
had embarked. The followers of Heraclitus pushed the doctrine of 
flux to an extreme. Things never are, but are always becomuny, 
they have no fixed attributes. When we say that a thing is, we 
must in the same breath pronounce that it is not. There are 
always two of these fluxes, one the movement or chanye producing 
sensations, flux outside, the other the movement which receives 
the sensations, the flux of our senses. The result of the contact 
between them is that, for example, wood becomes white wood and 
the eye becomes a seeing eye. When the flux of Socrates well 
comes in contact with wine, the wine will be sweet, but, if he ts 
ill, it will be sour. Both these statements will be true: tn facet, 
all statements are true. What wine is depends entirely on the 
man perceiving it. There is no criterion of truth in external 
things, they change so rapidly. On the other hand, Gorgias of 
Leontini in his essay on Nature or the Non-existent hardly 
caricatured the position of the younger Eleatics when he put 
forward the thesis that, if anything existed, tt could not be known, 
and, if anything did exist and was known, it could not be cam- 
municated. Such views as these or that of Futhydenius that 
falsehood is impossible are by no means universal amon the 
Sophists, many of whom had no psychological or epistemological 
theories at all; and, where their views were sceptical, it was the 
scepticism not of one school, but of many. Aristotle justifies the 
revolt of the Sophists against philosophy, he hokis that mast of 
the leading Pre-Socratic systems tend implicitly or explicitly te 
the doctrine of Protagoras. Protagoras first called attention te 
the importance of the knowing mind in every act of knowledee. 
In the view of a plain man like Socrates all the systems ware 
discredited and the question, what is knowledge, was for the time 
more urgent than the ambitious problems proposed by those 
who had sought to know the nature of the universe. Psycholovy 
can glean nothing from the ethical discussions of the historical 
Socrates. When he declared that virtue is knowledge, he was 
confessedly using the latter term as one which neither he nor his 
interlocutors could adequately define. 

Plato in his writings is always talking about the soul, but not 
all that he says is intended to be taken seriously. 


Plato. . 
We must allow for the mythical element, and in 


INTRODUCTION. JI X XIX 


particular for his imaginative sympathy with the whole mass of 
floating legend, myth and dogma, of a partly religious, partly 
ethical character, which, as was stated above, found a wide but 
not universal acceptance at an early time in the Orphic and 
Pythagorean associations and brotherhoods'. The Platonic myths 
afford ample evidence that Plato was perfectly familiar with all 
the leading features of this strange creed. The divine origin of 
the soul, its fall from bliss and from the society of the gods, its 
long pilgrimage of penance through hundreds of generations, its 
task of purification from earthly pollution, its reincarnations in 
successive bodies, its upward or downward progress, and the law 
of retribution for all offences, these and kindred subjects the fancy 
of Plato has embellished with all the beauty and sublimity which 
the art of a lost poet could bestow upon prose. Such themes stir 
his imagination. His approval of ethical fiction is attested by his 
own words, but it would be the height of imprudence to infer that 
any part of his philosophy is bound up with his gorgeous poetical 
imagery. Plato never set about writing a treatise De “σιώπα. We 
find anticipations of a science, but not the science itself. In each 
dialogue he has a particular end in view. He proposes to examine 
the doctrine of Protagoras or, it may be, the import of predication. 
Incidentally in the course of a long controversy we come across 
models of psychological analysis which for subtlety and insight 
have never been equalled. Such an analysis was something ab- 
solutely new. The psychical or mental states on which Plato 
fixed his attention had hitherto, when they were not ignored 
altogether, been confounded with their bodily concomitants: a 
mistake not unnatural, so long as both sensation and thought 
were regarded as changes in the body. In the TV eactetus® we 
find the following argument. We do not perceive by but through 
the senses. What we perceive through one sense we cannot 
perccive through another. Consequently, if we know something 
about both a sound and a colour, it cannot be known through 
sense. Now we clo know many such things; that they are, that 
they are different from one another, that both are two things and 
that cach is one. How do we know such facts? The soul appre- 
hends them through itself without any sense-organs. Being and 
Not-Being, likeness and unlikeness, number, identity and diversity 
are not apprehended through sense, but through the soul alone. 
The soul apprehends the noble and the base, the good and the 


} See Cornford, “ Plato and Orpheus” in Class. Hee. XVUL. pp. 433-—-445> 


XXX INTRODUCTION. 1 


bad, not through the senses, but by calculating in herself the past 
or present in relation to the future. All men and animals from 
the moment of birth have by nature sensations which pass through 
the body and reach the soul, but to compare these sensations in 
relation to Being and expediency comes with difficulty and τὸ- 
quires a long time, much trouble and education. I[t is impossible 
to attain truth and know it without attaining Being ; knowledve 
does not consist in affections of sense because we cannot by them 
attain Being. It is by reasoning about sensations that this is 
alone possible. 

In the Phaedo the Platonic Socrates undertakes to prove that 
learning is reminiscence, which indeed is implied by the fact that, 
if questions are properly put, the right answers are elicited, showing 
that the knowledge sought, the knowledge, ee. of geometry, existed 
previously in the mind of the respondent, This proof is as follows. 
The picture of a lyre reminds us of the person who used the lyre, 
a picture of Simmias may remind us of Kebes or of Simtuias 
himself, so that the reminiscence may be brought about cither in- 
directly or directly. If it is effected directly and the abject seen 
is similar to the object it recalls, we cannot fail to see how far 
the remembrance is exact. Jfor instance, we affirm that there is 
an idea of equality which is called to our minds by our perception 
of sensibles which are equal. That this idea is something distinct 
from the equal sensibles is clear; for the sensibles may appear 
equal to one observer, unequal to another; but about the idea of 
equality no difference of opinion is possible. Now we are to 
observe that all sensible equals appear to us as falling short of 
the standard of absolute equality, which plainly shows that our 
knowledge of absolute equality is prior to our perception of the 
sensibles. And whereas (1) this sense of deficiency in the sensibles 
has been present so long as we have had any perceptions of them, 
(2) our perceptions of them date from the moment of our birth, 
it inevitably follows that our knowledge of the idea must have 
been acquired before our birth. Now this of course applies te all 
ideas as well as to that of equality. Since, then, we have obtained 
this knowledge, two alternatives are open: either we are born in 
full possession of it and retain it through life, or we lose it at 
birth and gradually regain it. The first must be dismissed on 
this ground: if a man knows a thing, he can give an account of 
it, but we see that men cannot give an account of the ideas: it 


+ 728—76bD. In the summary of the argument I have mainly followed that given by 
Mr Archer-Hind, p. 77. 


INTRODUCTION. I ΧΧΧΙ 


follows then that the second alternative is true; we lose this know- 
ledge and all learning is but the recovery of it. And since our 
souls certainly did not acquire it during their human life, they must 
have gained it before our birth and at birth lost it. Many more 
passages might be cited to prove that Plato kept the mental 
process distinct from the bodily process and that it is the former 
which he sought to explain. 

Though the various mental operations are often discussed and 
Classification distinguished, yet we find no exhaustive classification 
of mental in any dialogue. The reason is obvious. The varia- 
operations. . . . 

tion is due to the fact that each attempt at partial 
classification is made, as above stated, for a special purpose, to 
prove a particular conclusion in a particular dialogue. Thus in the 
Republec' the tripartite division into reason, passion and appetite 
is brought in to show the relation of justice to the other virtues, 
and this, again, whether subordinate to, or coordinate with, the 
analogy between the individual and the state, is a means to the 
determination of a perfect political constitution, which is said in 
the 7zmmaeus* to have been the chief subject of the dialogue. Nor 
does this tripartite division itself tally either with that into know- 
ledge, opinion (or sense-presentation) and ignorance’, or again, 
with the fourfold division into thinking, understanding, belief and 
conjecture (an expansion probably of the distinction between know- 
ledge and opinion), which we find in other parts of the Repzb/zc'. 
In the Sophist® discursive thought is a dialogue of the soul with 
herself, opinion is the silent assertion of the soul in which this 
results, imagining is a combination of opinion and sensation. In 
the Philebus* Plato goes more into detail and distinguishes sen- 
sation, memory, imagination and recollection. When the affections 
of the body do not reach the soul, the state of the soul is said 
to be insensibility or unconsciousness. When the affections of 
the body are communicated through the body to the soul, there 
is sensation. The retention of such a sensation is memory, its 
non-rctention, the fading of memory, is forgetfulness. The recovery 
of lost memories by the soul without the aid of the body is 
recollection. Later in the dialogue’ the relation of memory to 
imagination is illustrated: the former is a scribe or recorder, what 
it records being propositions, opinions; the latter is a painter, 


1 434 C445 K 

217 B,C. 3477 A SY. 4 511 D, Ἐ, 533%, 5344. 
S 26,Nsqq. Ch Theactelus, 189%, Pile. 38 Ὁ. 

© 33 σσσδασ, 7 38 E—4o Β. 


XX Xii INTRODUCTION. 1 


whose glowing pictures excite hope. In this dialogue also there 
is a practical end, all these distinctions being subservient te 
the classification of pleasures as true or false. Similarly in a 
memorable passage of the Theaetefus* the introduction of two 
illustrations, one from a waxen block and the other from a doveecot 
or aviary, is incidental to a refutation of the thesis that knowledge 
is true opinion. But the similes in themselves are contributions 
to psychology of permanent value. That of the waxen block 
presents in its sum and substance the entire theory of sensation 
conceived as an impression from without, like the print of a seal 
upon wax, and the theory of memory as the retention of such 
impressions, the different degrees of retentiveness in individuals 
being ascribed to the size of the block, the quality of the wax 
and the number of impressions crowded together in small compass*. 
The other, that of the aviary, conveys in a striking manner the 
relation between memory and reminiscence, the latter being the 
deliberate recovery of lost impressions ; at the same time it shows 
the relation between the mere possession of knowledae and tts 
actual application or exercise. 

The most comprehensive view of Plato’s psychology is te be 
found in the 7rwaers. He starts with reason or with 
the operations of intellect. The soul thinks. This 

process is first described as it goes on in the soul of the universe 
or universal soul and, because it is an activity, is compauredl with 
circular motion. The revolution of two circles, that of the Same 
and that of the Other, gives judgments of identity and difference, 
the two most important relations, and without such judginents 
there can be no knowledge. But this ceaseless activity of thought 
from time to time suffers disturbance, and the interference results 
in sensation. In the allegory the creation of particular souls follows 
upon the creation of universal soul, and it is to these particular 
souls, each united to a body, that the following description applies. 
When the revolutions of the immortal soul had thus been confined 
in a body, a body, as Plato says, “in-flowing and out-flowineg 
continually,” these revolutions, “being confined in a great river, 


Sensation. 


Ὁ 19re sqq-, 107 ὦ sqq. 

* The comparison of a present sensation with a previous impression implies sone 
representative faculty; in this passaye we hear of ἔννοια and δόξα, but not of φαντασία, 
Plato often uses ἔννοια for free constructive imagination. It is carious to find that, for 
the sake of an Homeric allusion and perhaps under the influence of a false etymology, 
Plato substitutes ἐνσημαινόμενα els τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ (104. (7) for εἷς τὸν σὴς ψυχῆς 


κηρόν. But it would be a mistake to infer that he here favours the heart rather than the 
brain as the organ of senses communis. 


INTRODUCTION. JI XXII 


neither controlled it nor were controlled, but bore and were borne 
violently to and fro. For great as was the tide sweeping over 
them and flowing off which brought them sustenance, a yet greater 
tumult was caused by the effects of the bodies that struck against 
them; as when the body of any one came in contact with some 
alien fire that met it from without, or with solid earth, or with 
liquid glidings of water, or if he were caught in a tempest of winds 
borne on the air.” The body of the animal, be it remembered, is 
composed of the same four elements, air, earth, fire, water, with 
which the animal comes in contact in alicn bodies, whether in the 
process of nutrition or in that of sensation. “And so the motions 
from all these elements rushing through the body penetrated to 
the soul. This is in fact the reason why these have all alike been 
called and still are called sensations’. Then too did they produce 
the most wide and vehement agitation for the time being, joining 
with the perpetually streaming current in stirring and violently 
shaking the revolutions of the soul, so that they altogether hindered 
the circle of the Same by flowing contrary to it, and they stopped 
it from governing and from going; while the circle of the Other 
they displaced....So that the circles can barely hold to one an- 
other, and though they are in motion, it is motion without law, 
sometimes reversed, now slanting, and now inverted....And when 
from external objects there meets them anything that belongs to 
the class of the Same or to that of the Other, then they declare 
its relative sameness or difference quite contrariwise to the truth, 
and show themsclves false and irrational; and no circuit is governor 
or leader in them at that time. And whenever sensations from 
without rushing up and falling upon them drag along with them 
the whole vessel of the soul, then the circuits seem to govern 
though they really are governed. On account then of all these 
experiences the soul is at first bereft of reason, now as in the 
beginning, when she is confined in a mortal body*®.” The soul, 
according to this account, is in ceaseless activity, and such normal 
activity, or thought, is from time to time disturbed by sensation, 
which has a tendency to pervert right thinking into falsehood 
and error. We might compare the definition from the Phzledus 
above summarised’, in which it is said that when the bodily 
affections pass through both body and soul and give rise there 
to a sort of shock or tremor not only peculiar to each, but shared 


1 Plato connects αἴσθησις with dlocev. 
2 Tin. 43 A sqy-, Archer-Eind’s translation, 3 33D. 


XXXIV INTRODUCTION. 1 


by both in common, the movement which body and soul thus 
share may properly be called sensation. 

Plato started with intellect and thought. Rightly understood, 
Sense and he does not oppose body to soul, but rather sense to 
reason. reason, as one faculty of soul to another. But what 
are the limits of sense and reason? To which should be referred 
the knowledge of relations of cause and effect, of good and evil? 
Sense, we are told in the Republic’, is sufficient where a thing does 
not tend to pass into or be confused with its opposite; where the 
data tend to become confused, sense is insufficient ancl we must 
appeal to intellect. What sense perceives confusedly thought 
thinks distinctly and in isolation. Sense at the best can only 
give opinion, but reason and true opinion are distinct “because 
they are different in origin and unltke in nature. The one is 
engendered in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the 
one is ever accompanied by right understanding, the other ts 
without understanding; the one ts not to be moved by persuasion, 
the other yields to persuasion; true opinion we must admit fs 
shared by all men, but reason by the gods alone and a very sinall 
portion of mankind.” Sense and thought are concerned with 
different objects, the particular and the universal. The defects 
of sense are not in the subject, but in the object, because the 
particulars of sense are in flux and have no fixed being. Prota- 
goras held that sensible things have their so-called qualittes only 
by acting or being acted upon and, as activity and passivity are 
always relative, no quality belongs to anything fer se We cannot 
say that they are per se anything in particular, or even that they 
are at all. They only become: things are always becoming, not 
being. When an object comes in contact with our scnse-organ 
and interaction takes place, a sensation arises in the organ and 
simultaneously the object becomes possessed of a certain cpuality. 
But the sensation in the organ and the quality in the object are 
results which are produced only by the contact and last only as 
long as it lasts. In this doctrine of Heraclitus and Protagoras 
Plato acquiesced, so far as it relates to sense and sensibles. The 
testimony of Aristotle on this point is explicit* and the dialogucs 
confirm it. But, instead of concluding with Protagoras that all 
presentations are relatively true and that there is no such thing 
as objective truth, he drew a different inference, viz. that, if there 


1 523 4 sqq. 
7 Tim. 51 8, Archer-Hind’s translation. 
* Metaph. 987 a 32 sqq., 1078 b 12—17. 


INTRODUCTION. TI XXXV 


is such a thing as knowledge, which he firmly believed, its object 
must be an intelligible object and an universal. 

The process of sensation in the separate bodily organs is 
Physiology of thus described in the Tewzaews. “When that which 
the senses. is naturally mobile is impressed by ever such a slight 
affection, it spreads abroad the motion, the particles one upon 
another producing the same effect, until, coming to that which 
is conscious, it announces the property of the agent: but a sub- 
stance that is immobile is too stable to spread the motion round 
about, and thus merely receives the affection, but does not stir 
any neighbouring part; so that, as the particles do not pass on 
one to another the original impulse which affected them, they 
keep it untransmitted to the entire creature and thus leave the 
recipient of the affection without sensation. This takes place with 
our bones and hair and all the parts we have which are formed 
mostly of earth: while the former conditions apply in the highest 
degree to sight and hearing, because they contain the greatest 
proportion of fire and air!.” For the process of vision Plato 
adopts with modifications the theory of Empedocles, for the 
process of hearing that of the Pythagoreans. As to smell, he 
holds that odours cannot be classified according to kinds. For 
no element in its normal state can be perceived by smell, because 
the vessels of the nostrils are too narrow to admit water or earth 
and too wide to be excited by air or fire. They can thus only 
perceive an element in process of dissolution, when it is being 
liquefied or decomposed or dissolved or evaporated. The object 
of smell, then, is either vapour, which is water changing to air, 
or mist, which is air changing to water. The only classification 
we can make is that scents which disturb the substance of the 
nostrils are unpleasant, while those which restore the natural 
state are pleasant. In his account of tasting Plato makes the 
sensation depend upon the contraction or dilatation of the pores 
of the tongue by substances that are dissolved in the mouth, the 
peculiar effect of the principal flavours being briefly indicated. 
He made the flesh the organ of touch and, considering the various 
tactile sensations as relative to the tangibles, proceeds to explain 
what constitutes bodies hot and cold, hard and soft, heavy and 


light?. 


1 Cf. De A. 4254 3-—-7, 4358. 11--- 3. 
2 Hor the various senses see Zim. 45 Β 544.) 61 Ο 564.» 65 CSqq., 66 Ὁ 544.» 67 A—68 Ὁ. 
See also Theophr. De Sensibus, 88 61, 83-91. 


XXXVI INTRODUCTION. 4 


I have dwelt at what some may think inordinate length upon 
Plato, because in psychology, as elsewhere, making allowance for 
the fundamental difference between the two philosophers, we find 
nothing in Aristotle but the development in a systeinatic form of 
the Platonic heritage. It was the disciple’s task to maintam on 
independent grounds the essentials of the master’s doctrine on the 
subject of the soul, and to do this in face of the widely conflicting 
views and the general uncertainty which, as the foregoing sketch 
sufficiently shows, were prevalent at the time. With the conscicus 
or half-conscious materialism of his predecessors sAristotle has no 
more sympathy than Plato and, as compared with this point of 
agreement, the differences between them count for little, however 
much Aristotle may exaggerate them. In the criticism which he 
passes upon the 7zzaeus! he affects to take the narrative literally. 
The point at issue is whether the activity which both Plato and 
Aristotle ascribe to the thinking soul can justly and reasonably be 
called a movement. The doctrine of the two philosophers is on all 
important points the same: they agree that there is an tinimortal 
soul and a mortal soul, that the immortal clement thinks always 
and that thinking must belong to its essence. What Plato calls 
“movement” is familiar enough in Aristotle as “energy "oor 
“activity’” If Plato would only say “energy,” there werd 
seemingly be no room for objection. But in the tenth book of 
the Laws, the work of his old age, when he may have been perc. 
sumed to have had some acquaintance with the views of his disciple, 
Plato obdurately refused to say “energy,” and by his clussitication 
of the ten species of motion assimilated physical movement and 
change to the only activity which in his view had reality, the 
“movement” of thought’, defining the soul as that which is able to 
move itself. And after his death Nenocrates persisted tn attribut- 
ing “movement” to the number which is the soul At this point 
a brief summary of the first part of Aristotle's treatise may be 
Aristotle's the best means of indicating the way in which the 
treatise. writer approaches his subject and the conclusians 
at which he arrives. 

At the outset, he says, we wish to ascertain the nature or 
substance, and the accidents, of the soul, which is a principle of 


1 De A. 406 b 26 sqq. 

* “ Breaking Plato’s metaphor on the wheel,” to cite a happy phrise, Aristotle elipes 
back occasionally into the use of the melaphurical term himself, avin Wefaph. ropa to. 
Compare my sole on 433 Ὁ 17. 


3. 893 B~-895 A, 8085 Ἐ 566. 


INTRODUCTION, I XXXVI 


animal life. A few preliminary enquiries are suggested. Is soul 
“something”? Substance? Or quality? Or to which category 
does it belong? Is it potentially existent or is it an actuality? Is 
it divisible or without parts? This suggests the further question, 
Is it homogeneous in all species of animals? If not, are the 
differences between souls generic or specific differences? If it is 
without parts, it must be variable, there will be many sorts of soul. 
If it is homogeneous, the homogeneous soul must be made up of 
different parts. Ought we, then, to start with the whole soul or 
with the parts, ought we to study the parts first or their functions, 
and, if the functions, why not first the objects? As an apology 
for not deciding, it may be remarked that, while in order to 
know the properties of a thing, we ought to know its essence, yet 
knowledge of properties contributes to knowledge of essence: in 
fact, the one is involved in the other. 

The attributes of the soul cannot properly be separated from 
those of the body. ‘The one that seems most separable is thinking : 
but, if this is akin to imagining or if it involves an image, neither is 
thinking separable. If any attribute is peculiar to the soul itself, 
then soul may be independent of body; if not, soul cannot be 
so independent. The attributes of soul are notions or forms in 
matter and, as such, fall within the province of the physicist or 
natural philosopher, while the dialectician studies and defines their 
form apart from their matter. Here is the point of difference 
between the objects of physics and of mathematics: the attributes of 
soul as such, e.g. fear and anger, are inseparable from the physical 
matter of the animals to which they belong; the mathematical 
objects, eg. line and surface, though really inseparable, are 
separable in thought from the concrete things to which they 
belong. 

From this discussion of method we pass to consider the 
opinions of our predecessors. The characteristics of animate being 
are motion and sensation. Hence some have regarded the soul as 
par excellence the cause of motion, Democritus, who thought it fire, 
and Anaxagoras, being typical instances. All assumed that if a 
thing causes motion, it is itself moved. Others, again, start with 
the assumption that like is known by like and infer that the soul is 
composed of all the elements, whether they are one or many: 
Empedocles that it is composed of earth, air, fire and water; Plato 
of number. All definitions may be reduced to three: that it causes 
motion, is perceptive, is incorporeal, The last characteristic leads 
those to choose the finest matter, who acknowledge none but 


Fi. ἔ 


ΧΧΧΥΙΙ INTRODUCTION. ἡ 


corporeal elements. Subsequently it is objected that if the soul is 
a fine matter, as the soul is in all the sensitive body, we have two 
bodies in one. 

The application of the idea of motion to the soul leads, it 
is argued, to absurdities. There are four kinds of motion, loco- 
motion, qualitative change, decay, growth, and our enquiry 15 
whether the soul is moved in and through itself, and not as sailors 
inaship. All kinds of motion are in space; therefore, if the soul is 
moved, the soul must be in space. As it moves the body, it would 
naturally move like the body; and in that case it would go up and 
down in, and in and out of, the body. In general, we contend, 
the soul does not move the body, as Democritus supposed, by 
physical agency, but by means of purpose of some sort, that ts, 
thought. The most thorough application of motion to explain 
soul, and in particular the soul which thinks, was made by Plato 
in the 7vmaeus, and this is criticised at some length. Like other 
theories, it neglects the rclation between soul and body in virtue of 
which the soul acts, the body is acted upon, the soul moves anel 
the body is moved. 

Another definition of the soul makes it a harmony or blendingr 
of opposites. This notion may be applicable to health or any 
bodily excellence, but will not apply to the seul. Harmony will 
not cause motion. Harmony means cither (1) a close fit or adjust- 
ment of bodies, or (2) the proportion in which clements are mixed. 
It is needless to show that the first meaning Is Inapplicable, there 
are so many fittings of the limbs. As to (2),in flush and bleed 
the elements are mixed in different proportions; which mixture is 
the soul? Returning to motion, we conclude that the only metion 
of which soul admits is motion per aceidens, due to motion af the 
body, as whiteness is moved when a white body is moved. ἃ 
stronger argument than any our predecessors have adduced is 
derived from the attributes of the soul, such as pain and pleasure, 
fear, anger, and other emotions, sensation and thought, all of which 
are commonly believed to be movements. In them, however, the 
soul is not moved: it is merely the cause of movement in the heart 
or some other bodily part. It would be better to ascribe these 
attributes to the man and say that he perceives or thinks or feels 
pleasure and pain with his soul, This leads to an interesting 

; digression on intellect, followed by a refutation of Nenocrates, who 
*,defined the soul as a self-moving number. Hlow can the attributes 
which are known to belong to soul possibly be deduced from such 
a definition? It will not afford even the slightest bint of them. 


INTRODUCTION. TI XXXIiX 


The same argument had previously been used against the definition 
of soul as a harmony. 

Two characteristics of soul, (1) that it moves itself, (2) that it is 
composed of very fine matter, have now been dismissed. Against 
the third, that it is composed of the elements and that like knows 
like, it may be urged that then the soul ought to have in it 
all compounds, all categories. Moreover, a unifying principle 
would be needed. The soul is not to be held divisible into parts 
independent of each other, for in that case what keeps its parts 
together? That must be the real soul. Again, as the whole soul 
keeps the whole body together, each part of the soul should keep a 
part of the body together: but we can assign no such function 
to intellect. 

Book II. begins by defining the soul. We premise that of 
entities to which categories are applied substance is one, where by 
substance we mean either (1) matter, which is not yet anything in 
particular, or (2) form, which makes it something in particular, or 
(3) the union of matter and form in the particular thing. Under 
substance in the last sense is included a natural body partaking of 
life. What we mean by life is the power of the body to nourish 
itself and to grow and decay of itself. Body is clearly matter here, 
therefore soul is form. And, if for matter and form we substitute 
potentiality and actuality and distinguish the first stage of actuality, 
corresponding to knowledge, from the second, corresponding to the 
exercise of knowledge, the soul will be the first actuality of a 
natural body furnished with organs, or of a body that has in itself 
the principle of movement and rest. Thus soul is the quiddity or 
formal essence, to which we have analogies in the cutting power of 
the axe and the visual power of the eye, both actualities in the first 
degree, as contrasted with actual cutting and actual seeing, which 
are actualities in the second degree. 

The definition thus found is the most comprehensive possible, 
applying to life in all its various forms, (1) intellect, (2) sense, 
(3) locomotion, (4) motion of nutrition, growth and decay. Plants 
exhibit life in its last form only. Animals, in addition to this, 
have sensation. Of the different senses touch is indispensable. 
Experiment shows that most of these vital functions are really 
inseparable from one another, though at the same time separable in 
thought. Whether this holds of intellect also it is not so easy to 


1 Aristotle's own view is that the sense-organs are composed of the elements, in 
touch all are blended. But sense is not this corporeal organ itself, lut rather the 
character or power which resides in the organ. 


th 


ΧΙ INTRODUCTION. I 


decide. If to these vital functions be added appetence, which 
clearly is present where sensation is, a certain gradation can be 
recognised. They may be arranged in an ascending series. The 
lower can exist without the higher, but the higher in mortal 
creatures always involve the lower. And there is a similar 
gradation in the senses. It scems, then, that there is one definition 
of soul exactly as there is one definition of rectilinear figure. Alike 
in figures and in the various types of soul, the earlier members of 
the series exist implicitly and potentially in the later; the triangle 
is implicit in the quadrilateral and the nutritive faculty” in the 
sensitive. The definition does not dispense us from investivating 
in detail what is the soul in the plant, in the brute, and in man. 
Having reached this point, we naturally expect that each of the 
four main vital functions, nutrition, sensation, intelleet, locomotion, 
will be investigated in detail; and this in fact is what the writer 
proceeds to do. Nutrition, growth and decay and reproduction, 
are dealt with briefly in Book IL, G 43 sense-pereeption at very 
great length, Book IL, c. 5—Book ML, ο΄. 2; and imagination, which 
is intimately connected with sense, in Book IIL, ὦ 35 Upon 
imagination follows intellect, Book IIL, cc. 4-—8; and, lastly, the 
principle of propressive motion in animals, which ts identified with 
appetence, occupies us in Book IIL, ce, g—it. The treatise ends 
with an attempt, from the standpoint of teleology, to answer the 
question why the various forms of life occur in this ascendinuy, scale, 
Aristotle himself was not consciously constructing a new 
science. Tis discussion of the soul was forced upon 
him when, traversing the wide domain he had set 
apart for his science of nature or physics, he passed from inorganic 
to the borders of organic life. The method of science laid down 
in the Ovgazoz, and hitherto pursued, is a method partly inductive, 
partly deductive, aiming to establish rational theories on empirical 
data and often falling short of its aim, because either the data were 
at fault or the theories inappropriate, or because there were defects 
in both. Natural science has to do with nature and with natural 
bodies, which by common consent are pre-eminently substances, 
sensible substances, Nature is itself a cause of things, the power 
in the things themselves which makes them what they are Hts 
characteristic is that, like human intelligence, it devises means to 
ends. In this respect natural bodies or natural substances may 
be compared with the products of art and skill, but in the former 


Method, 


1 sighs 16 sq. 


INTRODUCTION. JI xii 


case the cause is, and in the latter case is not, in the product itself. 
We wish to know what are (1) the concrete natural substances, 
(2) their properties, (3) their physical changes, (4) the causes of 
these changes. If we could answer these questions, we should 
know the ends of nature in making concrete substances, the 
means used to realise these ends, the form and matter of which the 
substances consist. In logic we proceed from one determination to 
another. Psychology is concerned with mental acts or operations. 
In some of these operations we are conscious of a process; for 
example, in operations of reason we know how we reason, by what 
steps we advance. To search for a method is to aim at determin- 
ing the order and arrangement in which these processes follow one 
another in any science. In geometry certain principles are assumed 
and necessary conclusions are deduced from them. Induction 
generalises from known particulars in order to obtain principles. 
Both induction and deduction may be combined in a more com- 
prehensive method which, after establishing general principles, 
deduces derivative laws and verifies the particular conclusions 
which follow from them. But it may be impossible to apply this 
complete method directly in its simplicity. The effects, which are 
conclusions, may be known, while the causes are to seek. If so, it 
is necessary to infer backwards and discover the causes from the 
effects. The early progress of mathematics and astronomy, with 
their applications to optics and harmonics, led to the belief, which 
Plato endorses, that deduction is the method of scientific research. 
Aristotle agreed for pure mathematics, while in applied mathe- 
matics he regarded induction from the materials collected as, 
strictly speaking, lying outside of the science and subsidiary. But 
in the natural sciences, where we rise from effects to causes, a 
thorough description of facts is a necessary preliminary to the 
discovery of the ultimate principles, and the inverse method must 
be applied. The method of astronomy, we are told, was to collect 
the facts, the phenomena, and from them to deduce astronomical 
laws. The whole method is summed up with convenient brevity 
thus: “In every department of nature we must first ascertain the 
facts and then after that state the causes.” The task to which the 
History of Animats is devoted is thus described: “First let us 
ascertain the existing varieties of animals and the properties of 
each, and after that we must try to discover their causes. This is 


1” 


the natural method which puts the collection of material first’. 


1 nal. Prior. 1. 30, 460 1958qq., De Part. 44.1.1) 6400 14, Hast. Am 1.7, 493 4 
δ, 966. 


ΧΙ INTRODUCTION. Jf 


Characteristic of Aristotle’s mind is the notion that some things 
can be got at both deductively and inductively: it is the con- 
silience of fact and theory. The soul being a part of nature, 
psychology must needs be a branch of general physics, as all 
preceding thinkers, including Plato, agreed. The presuppositions 
of Aristotle’s metaphysics refer life to a cause. Vital phenomena, 
wherever found, are sufficiently alike in their manifestations to 
justify the assumption of one such cause. The treatise, then, is a 
preamble to all parts of the system dealing with plants, or animals, 
or with yet higher beings, if endowed with life. As one of the 
series of biological works, it stands in the closest connexion with 
the tracts known as the Parva Naturalia, with the morphological 
treatise De Partibus Animalinm, and with that upon embryolary, 
De Generatione Animalium, The part which the enquirer professes 
to take calls for very careful demarcation. It is impossible tea say 
what contributions, if any, Aristotle himself made in the field of 
psychology: the presumption is that they were but small The 
evidence of his dependence upon Plato for all that relates to 
psychical phenomena is so overwhelming”, so constant. Possibly 
the repeated illustrations from zoophytes or stationary animals and 
from worms, which give signs of life after they have been severed 
into parts®, are original; but in the main hus facts are precisely the 
facts of his predecessors, the scantiest stock now at the disposal af 
any ignorant layman, Speculation had outrun observation. Nor 
is there any complaint of the scantiness of the data. Ne. Such 
as they are, they have already called forth tee numereus and tad 
divergent explanations. The writer’s modest aim is by preliminary 
discussion to settle a few, just a few, fundamental questions as te 
the nature and attributes of the one principle of Hfe and mind. 
Aristotle’s enquiry is founded on his metaphysies. Et is the 
Body and business of natural science to discover form and 
soul. matter in natural substances. Every animal, every 
plant is a natural substance, compounded of body, which is 
matter, and soul, which is form, and the science of nature has 
therefore to investigate both body and soul. Yet here a provises 
is needed. Natural science does not necessarily treat of the whole 
: The ae SS De part. An. ᾿ r, Ggta 17 BC 3 cf Plata, θύρα, 170 (μι. 
, east; but Aristotle's real merit comes ont θη» 
spiionsly in the tracts Je Some and Qe Memoria. 
"6.8: 410 Ὁ 19, 432} 20, 4rrb 10 sqqey 413 16 sqq. Aristotle may alse be credits 
with the simple experiment of placing a sensible object upon the sense-organ itvelf as userdt 


to show the necessity of a meclium, grgar2, 420 b rg Β΄. 423 b 17 Sip, and the appeal 
to experiment, as e.g. 421 Ὁ rg. 


INTRODUCTION. TI xliti 


soul. Wherever soul as form is in matter, wherever it employs 
a bodily organ, we are still in the domain of natural science; but 
anything included under soul which is independent of the body 
and which cannot be thus defined must be reserved for meta- 
physics’. The meaning which Aristotle attached to independence 
or separate existence must be grasped, if we would understand what 
he conceived by a substance or thing. Primarily this separate 
existence is the attribute of concrete particulars presented to 
sense in the external world. They are bodies locally, numerically 
and by magnitude separate. From them the conception is trans- 
ferred to whatever the mind thinks as distinct, and even for 
immaterial notions Aristotle has no other formula. They, too, 
like concrete bodies, are described as being in time, in space and 
in conception separate or distinct? In reducing soul to the logical 
essence or form of body Aristotle, according to his own presup- 
positions, so far from favouring materialism, secures once and for 
all the soul’s absolute immateriality. The living body has in- 
dependent existence, has its own form and its own matter. Even 
a dead body or an inanimate thing is something existing inde- 
pendently, to which we can apply the pronoun “this*.” But the 
soul does not exist in the same way. Nor, again, is it a thing 
capable of being added to or subtracted from another thing, the 
body, any more than form in general is a thing which can in 
mechanical fashion be united to and separated from its appropriate 
matter’. If a brazen sphere be melted down, the brass remains. 
It is still “this” something, “this” mass of metal; but we cannot 
then say of its spherical shape that it is “this” anything or that 
it any longer exists. The lifeless body is like the eye which 
cannot see or the axe which is spoilt for use.’ We may apply to 
them the same names as before; but, as the nature is no longer 
the same, the application is irrelevant, misleading, equivocal. But, 
though the lifeless body is still a concrete particular and a sub- 
stance, the soul apart from its relation to the body is no such 
thing at all. Now the soul as form stands to the body as matter 
of the concrete individual precisely as the spherical shape to the 
brass, as vision to the eye, as cutting power to the axe. In every 
case the form is a quality predicable of the matter. But the 

1 De Dart, Amt 1. το 6412 14-—b το, 

2 Meaph. 1016) 1--.3. 

5. Biological writers now avoid the ambiguity attaching to the use of the term “body” 
in two distinct senses by means of the term ‘‘organism.” 


4 Cf. Metuph. 1045 Ὁ 12 8qq- 
® 412b τὸ 866. 


xliv INTRODUCTION. 1 


body is not predicable of the soul, we cannot explain the soul 
in terms of body or make it a material thing, however fine the 
materials. On the contrary, we must explain body in terms of 
soul. It is form which determines and we only know a thing as 
determined. Primary matter, the absolutely indeterminate, is in 
itself unknowable’. Therefore, if we would know the living bady, 
we must study its activitics and operations and all the attributes 
which it acquires in virtue of soul. Soul and body, then, are nat 
two distinct things, they are one thing presenting two <listinct 
aspects. The soul is not body, but belongs to body ?: it is not 
itself a concrete particular, although its presence in the beady 
makes a concrete particular; it resides in a body and, what is 
more, in a body of a particular kind, furnished with the means 
whereby the functions of the soul can be exercised. The relation 
of matter to form in the particular thing is one instance of a 
relation of higher generality, that between potence and act be- 
tween the power to become and the realisation of that power in 
actuality. Before it is,a thing may be or may not be, and when 
it is, if it has the power to act, it may act or it may not act. 
Now body stands to soul, and matter to form in general, as the 
potential to the actual which has reached the first stage: ane 
already is. In other words, the soul is the power which the living 
body possesses and the lifeless body lacks. This is first actual- 
isation or first entelechy. Again, the actual possession of facultics 
unused still stands to the exercise of these faculties in the relation 
of potence to act. Life itself, the use of actual power, is the 
seconcl stage, energy. The actual use must be preceded by actual 
power. Soul is actual power to live, but is not life. Τὰ Plate 
body is opposed to soul. The body could be trained te obey the 
soul by gymnastic and music. In Aristotle the body is the natural 
instrument of the soul, and so the body into which a particular 
soul enters must be adapted to its use. This fact renders the 
Pythagorean idea of transmigration absurd‘ Soul is Ukewise 
both the final and efficient cause of the body* It is the final 
cause, because the soul is merely means to vital power and life; 
it is the efficient cause not only in the obvious case of progressive 
motion, but also in all the various changes which the body under- 


goes in the exercise of vital functions, including nutrition, growth, 
sensation. 


1 Metaph. 1036 ἃ 2—9. 4 gtah δ aay, 414.ἃ ty μὰ 
5 4t2ag sqq., a 22 sqq., b 27 qq, 
4 407) 20—~26, 5 grab Bane. 


INTRODUCTION. TI χὶν 


Such, in brief, is the description of soul considered in and by 
Classification itself, including the various separate powers, which 
of vital are assumed to account for the varieties of vital and 
powers. . . . 

psychical operations. The great problem is how this 
multiplicity of acts or operations should be classified. Plato in 
some dialogues divides soul into parts, an immortal part, reason, 
and two mortal parts, passion and appetite. His pupil is more 
cautious. He does not go beyond the supposition of certain 
powers or faculties. In one sense, he says, this division into 
powers is illusory, for the powers of soul are really infinite in 
numbert But he contends that his own groups are convenient 
groups. Faculties, like every other basis of classification, are 
only means to an end. Plato, he thinks, should have added the 
nutritive and sensitive faculties. Desire, again, runs through all 
operations: there is the rational wish, the angry impulse and the 
instinctive appetite. Here at least it is clear that the different 
powers are but different capacities of the single soul. Yet his 
ignorance of the bodily conditions of thought and his consequent 
assumption of a separable and immortal part of soul leave Aris- 
totle much in the same position as Plato. In order to get a clear 
view, special stress must be laid upon the statement that the 
powers of soul are arranged in an ascending scale% In mortal 
creatures, at all events, the higher faculty always presupposes the 
lower, without which it cannot exist*, The lowest power, that of 
nutrition and propagation, is common to animals with plants; in 
plants it exists alone. Animals have sensitivity in addition: of 
the senses they must possess at least touch. So far we are on 
safe ground. From this point we may simplify in one of two 
ways. In the third Book the two faculties, sense and intellect, 
tend more and more to be conjoined as the judging faculty, while 
appetency, which in its lowest form is implied by sense‘, is made 
the principle on which progressive motion depends® These con- 
siclerations lead to the following scheme : 








t. Nutritive 2. Discriminative 3. Motive 
[ Γ ἰ ᾿ 
Sense Intellect Appetence Faculty of 
locomotion 


On the other hand, intellect is said to be the highest of all our 
powers, and the lower forms of appetency, as well as the power 


1 4324 22 sqq., 433 Ὁ 1---- 2 arab 28—q4isa τ. 
δ 4rsa II. 4 414 1 sqq. 8 4324 21 560: 


xlvi INTRODUCTION. 2 


of progressive motion, are associated with sense, while an inter- 
mediate place must be found for the imaginative faculty. These 
considerations suggest the following table of faculties: 

1. Nutritive; 2. Sensitive, which is also appetitive ; (this is in 
most animals joined with) 3. Locomotive; 4. Imaginative; 5. In- 
tellective. 

In the ascending series of vital functions we start with the 
The soul of lowest, which constitute the sole life of plants and 
the plant. are an indispensable element in the life of animals. 
Their isolation from all others in the vegetable kingdom facilitates 
their study. We accordingly assume! a power of self-nourishment, 
the nutritive faculty. But we must be careful to remember that 
this faculty has also to account for growth, decay and reproduc- 
tion; by which last it partakes, so far as it can, of immortality, 
the species of plants, as well as of animals, being imperishable, 
though the individual members of the species perish. If we are 
to define things by their end, the primary soul, the soul of the 
plant, is that which is capable of reproducing the species. But 
if the individual plant or animal is to be capable of this, it must 
be kept alive. Hence in a certain sense the subsidiary functions 
of nourishment and growth are even more important than the 
end to which they are means. Tfood or nutriment is the cor 
relative object of the nutritive faculty, and we must determine how. 
things are nourished. It was a common opinion that contrarics 
are nourishecl by contraries. This is generally, but not always, 
true of the clements or simple bodies. Fire, Aristotle points ont, 
is nourished by water, but not water by fire. Others said like was 
nourished by like These two views can be reconciled. Undi- 
gested food is unlike, but food, when digested, has been assimilated 
to that which it nourishes, and then like is nourished by lke. 
Nutrition, then, is motion or change, and it is casy to discever the 
movent, the instrument and the moved. Soul is the nourisher, 
food the instrument of nutrition, body the nourished. Vital heat, 
as well as food, is employed by the soul in the process, and we 
have an analogy in the steersman, who employs his hand to move 
the rudder with which he steers the ship. 

Little suspecting what advances botanical science was to make, 
Aristotle denied that plants have sensitivity. He admits that they 
are affected by heat and cold, but only, he argues, as inanimate 
things are affected; that is, they are simply heated and covledd. 


11, c.g Cf also grit bb rg-——30, 4138 15 βῆ.» 4240 32 Mdey $326 17 MIT, 4358 
27-30, 4354 28 50. 


INTRODUCTION. JI xlvii 


They cannot receive the form of objects without the matter, and 
this because they have no organ in which the elements are so 
blended as to give the means of discriminating, say, cold and 
heat. When a plant touches an object, there is merely physical 
contact. Thus the excessive preponderance, as Aristotle supposed, 
of “earth” in the structure of plants precludes sensation, because 
it precludes the proper blending of the elements, which would be 
necessary to make organs of sense. The insensibility of certain 
tissues of the body, eg. bones, sinews, hair, he explained in a 
similar way as due to the presence in them of too much earth: 
and in this erroneous view he followed Plato. 

The characteristic of animals when contrasted with plants is 
Sense- that they not only live, but have the power to per- 
perception. ceive, which the Greeks regarded as essentially a 
cognitive power. They thought that we cannot perceive by sense 
without perceiving something, and interpreted this something 
objectively, as something which exists. The distinction so im- 
portant for modern psychology between sensation and perception 
had not yet received much attention. For Aristotle, as for his 
predecessors, the main question is, in what does this operation of 
perceiving consist and how does it take place? We must describe 
the various kinds of perception and determine how perceiving is 
related to thinking, since both are cognitive. One distinctive 
mark is that by sense we perceive individuals. But we have 
much knowledge of individuals which the five senses cannot give. 
Does, then, all this knowledge come from sense, or must it be 
referred in part to intellect, or must we invent new faculties or 
powers to account for it? Suffice it to say that, whenever per- 
ception takes place, an universal is perceived, but not directly and 
per se, only per accidens*, Directly sense perceives only “this,” 
just as directly sense perceives it here and now. The operation 
of perceiving something existent is made by Aristotle to depend 
on his own physical theories of motion, of efficient cause and of 
essential form. One specics of motion he defines as the production 
of an effect in matter by an efficient cause, as, e.g., the production 
of an impression upon wax by a seal or of an image in a mirror 
by a candle. Motions may be classified according to the categories 
as qualitative, quantitative or spatial, and the species of motion to 
which sense-perception is referred is the first species or qualitative 
change, the alteration or transformation which a thing undergoes 


> 417 19 564. 
2 Anal. Lost ts 3t, 87 Ὁ 28 sqq., 11. 19, 1000 173 Metaph. 10874 19 syq- 


xIvili INTRODUCTION. 1 


when it loses certain qualities and acquires new ones, remaining 
itself numerically the same. The form or essence without the 
matter is transmitted by the efficient cause or agent to the patient 
upon whom it acts, as when fire transmits heat to fuel. The form 
or essence is one in all the things thus affected. The one universal 
heat is the same wherever actually found, in fuel ignited, in water 
heated or in molten iron. Applying this physical theory, we 
should define the particular motion or qualitative change which 
we call perceiving by sense as the production of an effect in a 
particular part of the body, which we call a sense-organ, by a 
particular external thing, which we call the sensible object. But 
this is inadequate. Plants receive heat and cold and the air 
receives odour, but they do not perceive’. It is not enough, then, 
to say that perceiving is undergoing some affection or being acted 
upon. Besides, what is affected? Not the single organ, but the 
percipient as a whole; and we have scen that the animal is a 
particular case of composite substance, the body being matter, 
the sentient soul form. Now it is with the soul that we perceive, 
as it is with the soul that we live and think® Let us, then, amend 
the definition. Perception is an alteration in the soul. It consists 
in the production by an external object of an effect in the sensitive 
faculty. This effect is the reception of the form, without the 
matter, of the external thing perceived’. 

Thus Aristotle is able to decide between the conflicting views 
of his predecessors, according to some of whom like acts upon like, 
while Heraclitus and Anaxagoras insisted that for any change to 
be perceived object and percipient must be unlike. As we saw 
about nutrition, both are right and both are wrong. The /er- 
cipiendune is unlike, the perceptum is like, that which perceives its, 
for, when the process of percciving takes place, both the external 
thing which causes it and the percipient affected by that cause 
have in the very act one common form which, like every universal, 
is the same wherever it is found. That which sees is in the act 
of vision in a way coloured’, for it receives the same one form of 
colour which existed and exists in the coloured object perceived. 
But we may go a step further. Where one thing acts upon an- 
other, both the action and its effect reside in the patient, in that 
which is acted upon. Previous to their interaction, if they are 
physical bodies, the one is merely a potential agent, the other is 


1 4242 32—b 18. 
3 4148 12 5q., 408 b 13—r18. * 4248 17 ΒαΩ, 
4 416 b 35, 417 ἃ 18—20, 4184 3—6, 5 425 b 22. 


INTRODUCTION. 2 xlix 


merely a potential patient, whatever else they may be actually. 
Applying this to perception, the external thing is always per- 
ceptible, a percipiendum, a potential percepfum, the sense-faculty 
is always potentially percipient: but in the process of perceiving 
the potential in both cases has been transformed into an actual. 
The eye, eg., becomes a seeing eye, the whiteness whiteness per- 
ceived, and these two actualities reside in that which ts passively 
affected,in the sense. In other words, the actuality of the sensible 
object is one and the same with (not merely similar to) the actuality 
of the perceiving subject!, sense and sensible having in the act 
of perception one and the same essence, since the whiteness seen 
in the object is transferred to the visual faculty and, being an 
universal, a form, is one and the samme, wherever it resides. Is 
this, we ask, a doctrine of relativity? Most certainly not. The 
followers of Protagoras are supposed to argue that, if the sensible 
quality is alone real, nothing would exist at all unless there were 
living beings to perceive, for without them there would be no 
perception. 1 grant, Aristotle replies, that in the absence of living 
beings there would be no act of perception, no affection of the 
percipient. But for all that, it would be impossible to get rid of 
things, which are potential causes of perception even when they 
are never perceived. Jor perception does not perceive itself, there 
is something beyond the perception; and this must be logically 
prior to the perception, since whatever causes motion or change 
must be prior to that which it moves or changes: and this is not the 
less true because sensible object and percipient are relative to cach 
other’. In other words, the object perceived actually exists with 
its own form, its own qualities, even when it is out of all relation 
to a percipient. And similarly we may conccive a percipient out 
of all relation to an object, none such being actually present. It 
is then what it always was, a power of perceiving, a faculty of 
sense, mere sensitivity. 

These considerations apply most emphatically and most natur- 
ally to sense regarded as a whole, a single power which resides in 
the body of the animal, likewise regarded as a whole. But this 
power of perceiving is localised and pluralised. Wherever a part 
of the body subserves a particular end or function, it becomes 
an organ or instrument, and the general power of perception, as 
specialised in the five senses, employs its separate sense-organs, 


1 425 Ὁ 26 sqq.- 
2 Melaph. τοιοῦ 30—-1orr ἃ 2. 


] INTRODUCTION. ἡ 


the eye, the ear, the nostril and the organs of taste and touch. 
For the detailed account of the modes in which they are employed, 
the medium which they necessarily imply and their special objects 
or provinces, the reader must be referred to Book 11. ce. 7—11}. 
Here there is space only for a few general remarks. First, the 
parallelism between sense as a whole and the single special sense, 
e.g. sight or touch, must never be overlooked. “As the sensation 
of a part of the body is to that part, so is sensation as a whole 
to the whole sentient body as such.” ‘Thus the sense of vision 
presides over its own special province of colour, bounded by the 
opposites, white, black, and embracing every intermediate shade®. 
The sense of touching has its special province, or rather provinces, 
especially temperature and resistance, bounded the former by the 
extremes of hot and cold, the latter of hard and soft, and inclucling 
all varieties of temperature and resistance intermediate between 
the extremes in each province. Vision resides in the eye, touch 
in the internal organ of touch (probably the heart) or in the 
intra-organic medium, the flesh, according as we adopt the more 
scientific or the popular standpoint. To perceive is to undergo 
a qualitative change. In order, then, to become assimilated to 
the object, the organ must be capable of undergoing such change 
in the direction of either extreme or of any of the intermecliate 
grades between these extremes. If it could not respond to the 
stimulus, as modern psychologists would say, at any point in the 
scale of colour, of temperature or of resistance, the failure on the 
part of the organ would be attended by mal-perception or non- 
perception on the part of the faculty. This is brought home to 
us whenever we try to employ our senses upon objects either 
altogether out of their range or such that the perception is at- 


1 As might be expected, the contributions to the physiology of the senses, and 
especially vision, are worthless. ‘See Beare, Greek Zheortes, Introduction; alsa 
pp. 9—11- The mathematical researches of the Pythagoreans finally developod a more 
correct doctrine of sound and its propagation, to which the spurious treatine Jv 
Audibilibus, probably by Heraclides, bears testimony, See Jan, Musii Serintores, 
pp. s0—57, who also traces (pp, 130 sqq.) to Archytas some of the theories found in 
Plato’s Zimaeus. For the helplessness of the Greeks in empirical science cf. Zeller, 
Aristotle, 1. p. 443, Eng. Tr. From our superior knowledge we can afford to smile 
at the naive simplicity, the sheer audacity, which professes to explain growth, while 
knowing nothing of cells, discusses sensation and movement without understanding the 
nature and functions of the nervous system, and treats fire as an element in blissful 
ignorance of the chemical changes which go on during combustion. If Aristotle had been 
in possession of a microscope, it is probable that he would have made no better use of 
it than did Huxley’s unsophisticated correspondent (see Life of Mluxley, vol. τὰ, 
pp. 365 8qq-)- 

4 4xab 23——25. ® 426 Ὁ 8 sqq,, 422 Ὁ 1 sqq. 


INTRODUCTION, J li 


tended by pernicious effects, when we try to see in the dark or 
to look at the noonday sun or to plunge the hand in boiling water 
or to touch the air’. Now what is it which justifies our expectation 
that in normal cases a sensible object, when present, will be per- 
ceived? What are the physical or physiological grounds on which, 
with the science of his day, Aristotle based this belief? He ac- 
cepted from Empedocles the false physics which resolved all 
bodies into four elements, air, earth, fire, water, with four primary 
qualities, hot, cold, wet, dry. These elements are found in their 
compounds in the outside world. They are also found all four 
mixed (we might say, chemically combined) in the tissues or 
homeveneous parts of animal bodies, of which, again, the hetero- 
geneous parts or organs of animal bodies are composed. Hence 
there is a new application of the old maxim that like is known 
by like. The characteristic of cach object perceived depends not 
so much upon the materials which enter into its composition as 
upon the combining ratio of those materials, which constitutes its 
form. When Empedocles resolved bone into definite proportions 
of his four clements, he was not far from realising that this com- 
bining ratio is the form which makes bone what it 153, So, too, 
with the sense-organ. It also has its combining ratio which con- 
stitutes its form, and this form, again, is the faculty residing in 
the organ. Hence sense as a whole, and each special sense, Is a 
form, because it is the determining: proportion or combining ratio 
of the tissues composing the organ". In perceiving, form receives 
and apprehends form. In order that it may perceive all the quali- 
ties which came within its range, the sense must be neutral or 
indifferent to all, must be a mean between the opposite extremes 
which it can perceive and be actually neither of them“ In the 
organ of sense the constituent elements are blended in a certain 
way, «og. the finger has a certain temperature. But, as by the 
definition perceiving is qualitative change, this temperature must 
be capable of variation in the direction of either extreme or of 
any grade intermediate to the extreines, and the constituent 
elements of the organ of sense must be blended in such a way 
as to allow of this. This possibility of variation serves to explain 
the discriminating power which attaches both to sense as a whole 
and to the single special senses. Whatever is intermediate be- 


1 424 tr κήηή. 

t goa t3 sq, s10a 56..; Melaph. οὐ 0 15 aq]. 
3 τοὶ τ4--τῷὸ, 46 Ὁ 3, 4340 2 BY. 

4 423 b 30-4242 τὸ, 4168 27-- 7. 


1 INTRODUCTION. Lf 


tween two extremes is differently related to the one and to the 
other. In Aristotelian language, any point in the middle of a line 
is the beginning of the line in relation to one extremity, the end 
of the line in relation to the other. The single sense sight dis- 
criminates two shades of colour. It is in a certain relation to the 
first when it perceives the first, it is in a different relation to the 
second when it perceives the second. The discrimination measures 
the difference between these two relations. 

The parallel between sense as a whole and the separate special 
senses extends to the objects directly perceived. The objects which 
the special senses directly perceive are known by two marks: they 
cannot be perceived by another special sense and the appropriate 
special sense cannot be mistaken about them’. The objects not 
exclusively bclonging to this or that special sense, but perceived by 
two or more special senses, are referred to sense as a whole, often 
called sensus communis. Such percepts are shape and magnitude, 
unity and number, motion, rest and time. They include what 
Democritus considered and Locke called the primary qualities of 
body. About this common function of sense as a whole there has 
been much needless mystification. The sentient soul is one, and 
all the more important and more intellectual of its functions belong 
to it in virtue of this unity. As one, it perceives the common 
sensibles ; as one, it pronounces judgments of identity and differ- 
ence between sensibles; as a single faculty attendant upon each 
and every special sense, it is self-conscious% That to sense as a 
whole, the so-called sexsus communis, should be assigned functions 
which in degree, if not in kind*, exceed those of the separate special 
senses, need not surprise us. τ in sense we have a whole which 
is something more than the sum of its different parts. Analysis 
into its elements does not completely explain it, nor will the simple 
addition of these elements reproduce what was subjected to 
analysis. The operation of this single faculty is temporarily 
arrested in slecp, permanently in death. Lastly, to this faculty 
belong imagination, dreams and memory, which we are now to 
discuss. 


1 4188 7 5464., 4158. 14 8qq-, 428 b 18 sq. 

2 4254 27, 426 Ὁ 20 sqq.3 De Somno 2, 455 ἃ 12 Sqq. 

5. Some of these functions appear to be delegated by sensus communis to the special 
senses, if we interpret strictly the statements that each special sense discriminates the 
objects within its own province (426 b ro), and that it is by sight that we perceive that we 
see (4250 12 sqq.). Probably, however, both statements require careful qualification, 
which the latter receives from De Somso ἃ, 4558 12 sq. Cf. Beare, Greek Theories, 
PP- 233, 72. 2, 277. 


INTRODUCTION. I liii 


Sensation is defined as the production of an effect in the sense- 
Images and organ, a part of the body, by an external object. It 
Sleep. is, then, a movement or impression affecting the body 
and, so far as we are conscious of it, the sensitive soul as well. Now 
this movement does not always vanish with the disappearance of 
the object which caused it. Instances may be given of its 
persistence, as our inability at first to see in a darkened room if we 
have just left the sunlight ; or what is known as the after-image 
{more correctly, the after-percept) when, if we close our eyes after 
looking at the sun, we see a succession of images of it in different 
colours’. It is by facts like these that Aristotle explains 
imagination. He defines it as a motion generated by actual per- 
ception, a motion distinct from, yet similar to, the motion which 
constituted the original sensation’, or, as Hobbes translates, “ All 
fancies are motions within us, reliques of those made in the sense.” 
In order to learn how wide is the range of the imaginative faculty 
we must turn to the tracts on Sleep and Memory. Sense itself is 
often mistaken in regard to the common sensibles and the things 
to which sensible qualities belong, for example, as to what the 
coloured or sonorous body is and where it is+: and these errors 
of sense are shared in and increased by imagination, especially 
when the sensible object is perceived from a distance. Illusion in 
gencral is due to the clifference between imagination and judgment 
and between the standards they employ® It may sometimes be 
corrected by one sense coming to the aid of another, as when the 
object perceived as double by crossed fingers is seen to be single‘. 
The illusion that objects seem to move past us, when we in fact are 
travelling past them, implies that a movement is set up in the eye 
of the same kind as would occur if we were stationary and the 
objects themselves were in motion, In fact, the bodily movement 
induces a picture of the very object which might have been its 
cause. It is to the imaginative faculty that dreams must be 
ascribed’. Sleep is the arrest of the sensitive faculty as a whole 
or seusus coummnunis, by which when awake we are conscious that 
we are awake and have sensations’, Plants, having no sensation, 


1 Cf. go8b 18, 4151} 24 sy, 4208. 43 De Ζιφ τ, 2, 4508 24—28, 

% De ον. ἃ, 489 5-20. 

* 428 Ὁ ro—429 a 5. 

4 4180 18 56., 428b 20 sqq- 

δ De Lnsont. ὦ, 460b 16 sqq., 1, 458) 9 sqq. 

6 16. ἃ, 4690 b 20—-27. 

7 De Insomn. i, 4808 L422. 
8 De Somuo 1, 444 25-27, 4, 455 12-—b 2. 


liv INTRODUCTION. 1 


do not sleep. In order that sense, which is charged with motive 
as well as perceptive functions, may recover from fatigue, sleep 15 
necessary’, and it is brought about ultimately by the process of 
nutrition?, An evaporation from the food in the stomach rises to 
the head‘, is there cooled and descends, causing a feeling of 
drowsiness. The surface of the body is cooled and what heat there 
is in the system collects about the heart® It is clear that dreaminy 
is not a function proper to sense as a whole nor to any special 
sense, much less to understanding or opinion® Yet the tmages 
seen in dreams have sensible qualities. It only remains to refer 
dreaming to the same faculty as illusions in our waking hours. 
The residual movements in the organs are no doubt present in the 
daytime, but at night, when the action of the spectal senses ts 
suspended’ and the environment is peaccful, the imagination ts 
most active’, Then ev Aypothesi these persistent effects reach and 
stimulate the central organ of sense. We are most Hable to 
illusions when labouring uncer emotion or morbid states", as, fear 
example, when a patient in sickness mistakes figures on the wall 
for real animals” and even makes bodily movements to escape from 
them. In sleep, again, the judging faculty is weak", owing to the 
increasing pressure of blood around the heart There are, of 
course, cases in which creams are the result of seimi-conmsecious 
sensations, half-heard sounds or half-seen lights", which would have 
escaped attention in our waking hours: and reflections and ideses 
are often added to them, But in itself dreaminc is simply the 
result of the movement of our sensations curing the portod of sleeps 
as such*#, Dreams are movements which give rise to images within 
our serise-organs", 

The most important of all our images are those of memory. Tf 
Memory- imagining is consciously referred to an carlier per- 
image. ception of which the image is a copy, then we call it 
memory”, For memory there are two conditions, the affection mew 


1 De Sono i, 454) t7——485 ἃ 3. Ὁ 6. 2, 488 λ΄ 28. 
3 20. ἃ, 4560 32 sqq. 4 ibe 3, 56 1 «ἢ τη,» 
4b. ἃ, 457 33 BYq.3 Me Jresomin. 3, 461% 3 sqe). 

6 De Lusomn. t, 488 Ὁ 9--- 480 α 9. 7 th. 3, αὔτ 4. 

5 26. 3, 461.4 14--} 30. ® ih, a, αὔο Ὁ ἃ νη. 
W 7, 2, 460 bie 566. It sd, 4, Gt by Rom, 
2 ἐξ, 3, 462 τὰ 840... 26 sq. fh, 3, 4620 Sy mY 
Wid. 1, 458 15 βή.. 3, 4620 5---ἴ. 1S Jb. 3, 402 A τὸ 54}. 


1b γῇ. 3, 462 0 8 sqqy. 

17 Oe Mem. τ, 4490 24 Sq 450} δ᾽ πάλι a 2, 15 Φανγάσματοι, as εἰκόνων οὐ 
φάντασμα, ἕξις, where ἕξις, which is usually understood to mean * retention,” may 
mean ‘ reference.” 


INTRODUCTION. JI lv 


present, and the perception of time’; in other words, not only 
images, but images regarded as decayed copies of earlier im- 
pressions, and this involves the perception of time. By memory 
we see distance, not indeed in space, but in time? As memory is 
not confined to man, but extends to some of the lower animals, 
these latter must be credited with the imaginative faculty and the 
perception of time®. Here are very promising beginnings of a 
comparative psychology, which Aristotle, though he desiderated it 
in his predecessors, did very little himself to supply. His denial of 
understanding to brutes was a prejudice which a little research 
would have been able to surmount. As a matter of fact, he not 
only holds absolutely that, though the lower animals remember, 
they have no reasoning power, but, further, that, if memory were a 
function of pure intelligence alone, even man himself could not 
remember, since intellectual acts cannot be remembered fer se‘. 
What, then, can be remembered? The instrument of memory is 
the image. Hence whatever can be presented as an image can be 
directly remembered, all that cannot be presented as an image can 
only be remembered indirectly by means of the images with which 
it is associated. But how can we know the past which is not 
present, if our only instrument is a present affection, the image 
which survives after the original impression is gone®? Let us 
revert to the formation of images. The fact that a present move- 
ment of sensation sets up a subsidiary movement of imagination 
may be expressed in a clifferent way, if we employ the metaphor of 
an finpression, by which perception has been so often illustrated". 
The act of perceiving, as it were, stamps a particular impression 
upon the sense-organ, as a seal ring stamps an impression upon 
wax. This impression, which remains, is a potential image so long 
as it is latent, an actual image when we become conscious that it is 
still present. Is it, then, this image, the reproduced impression, and 
not that of which it is an image, which we remember? If so, it 
may be urged, remembrance is not of the past at all. δὲ that rate 
we might just as well suppose that in actual sensation also we sce 
and hear what is not present to sense ; an objection which cuts at 
the very root of cvery representative theory of perception. The 
objection is met by pointing out that in a certain way it is true that 
actual perception has for its object what is not present’. Wesee a 


1 fe Mom. τέ, 449) 18—29, 450 b Li—-20, 2, 4512 20-31. 


4 #6. 2, 4520 7 sqq. 3 2b, 1, 4508 15---22. 
* 1. τὸ 4802 τὸ τοῖα. 6 ib. I, 4508 25 Sq., 450 b £1 sqq. 
ὅδ δια 48O 30 SIG. 7 76. χ, 450 b 20 5646. 


a2 


lvi INTRODUCTION. 4 


likeness of an absent person: the picture is present, the original 15 
not. The picture, though numerically one and the same, may be 
regarded in two ways, either as a simple picture or, in relation to 
the original, as a likeness. Apply this to the memory-image. . [t, 
too, may be regarded in itself simply as an image before the mind, 
or in relation to something else of which it is a representation. If 
viewed in the latter aspect, it is a memorial or reminder of an 
earlier perception which it recalls. It is distinguished from other 
images by its reference to time past and by the fact that it is, what 
many images are not, a copy or representation. Memory may 
accordingly be defined not simply as a retention, but rather as a 
reference, of a mental presentation as a likeness to the original of 
which itis a likeness. All representations are likewise presentations. 
Images are before us in memory, in present sensation and in 
expectation, whether hope, fear, or desire, but we refer these 
images to the past, the present, and the future respectively) In all 
three cases something is presented, and the only way of cistingsuish- 
ing them is the accompanying perception of time, one of the 
common sensibles. Confusion of memory with imagination is one 
case of hallucination: thus Antipheron of Oreus was a type of 
mental derangement when he mistook what he only fancied 
for a past experience*, So far, then, like imagining in veneral, 
memory is a function of sexsus comununis, and hence it is to the 
central organ of sense that we must refer this movement or 
impression or image, or whatever else we call the corporeal change 
in question. 

The distinction between memory and reminiscence or recollec- 
tion is never very clearly stated by Aristotle, but, if we attend te 
what he says about acquiring knowledge and reacquiting it, he. 
about learning for the first time and learning over ayain what we 
have forgotten (neither of which, of course, is to be identitied! with 
memory or recollection), it seems that the case may be put as 
follows®, When we retain what we learn, whether by sense or 
thought, we are said to remember. Recollection iimplies the 
recovery of what has temporarily been obscured without poaing 
through the process of re-learning, and this whether the recovery 
is due to voluntary effort or is involuntary. We can remember 
without recollecting, if the image has never been lost, but is latent 
or potentially existent in us. When we recollect by voluntary 
effort we are conscious that it is lost and seek to recover it. Llere 


1 De Mem. 1, 440 Ὁ 25-——28. 2b. 1, 451 ἃ ἢ Heep. 
5. 2b. 2, 4518. λο---ῷ ro. 


INTRODUCTION. TI Ivii 


I cite at length the account given by Wallace, p. xcv: “ Recollec- 
tion may take place either intentionally or unintentionally : we 
may, that is to say, recall some event of past experience either 
accidentally as it were or by the help of a distinct effort to call it 
back to mind; but in either case it is regulated by certain laws 
which it is one of the great psychological merits of Aristotle to 
have tabulated for us. The laws which thus express the mode 
in which the mind attempts to recall its past impressions are what 
have commonly been designated since Aristotle’s day, the Laws of 
the Association of Ideas. But to Aristotle, it must be added, the 
laws in question have little or none of the significance which they 
have acquired in the hands of modern inquirers. To him they are 
simply a statement of the manner in which we seek to regain some 
fragments of knowledge which have for the moment got outside 
our consciousness. Recollection in short being the recalling of our 
past impressions, it follows that the success of our efforts to recall 
them will depend to no inconsiderable extent on the degree to 
which we can recall the order in which other impressions stood to 
that of which we are in search. But our impressions follow one 
another in memory in an order similar to that in which the actual 
sensations succeeded one another. Recollection thus involves 
a study of the laws of sequence in the order of our ideas: and 
Aristotle analyses the method of recalling past impressions in the 
following manner. ‘When engaged in recollection we seek to 
excite some of our previous movements, until we come to that 
which the movement or impression of which we are in search was 
wont to follow. And hence we seek to reach this preceding 
impression by starting in our thought from an object present to us 
or something else whether it be similar, contrary or contiguous to 
that of which we are in search; recollection taking place in this 
manner because the movements are in one case identical, in another 
case cuincident and in the last case partly overlap’ Similarity, 
contrariety and contiguity are thus to Aristotle the three principles 
by which for purposes of recollection our ideas and impressions 
have to be guided. Our sensuous movements and impressions really 
follow one another in an order corresponding to that of external 
nature. Thus, the more order and arrangement there is in the 
elements of our experience—the better connected our ideas are— 
the more easily will they be remembered. And again the greater 
number of times we have established a connection between our 


1 De Mem. 2, 451 b 16-—22. 2 ah. 2, 452 a I—3.- 


Iviii INTRODUCTION. 1 


ideas, the greater will be the ease with which we can recall them. 
Habit in short becomes a second nature: and the constant con- 
junction of two phenomena in outer experience will lead to their 
being so completely connected in the mind that the one will never 


177 


show itself without the other’. 

I have reserved to the last the highest employment of mental 
images in the service of the intellect. It 15 impossible to think 
without such an image before the mind* When we are contem- 
plating the object of thought, we must have an image before us. 
The past experience which we remember includes not only 
perceptions, but thoughts, and the reference of the image to 
sensus communis compels Aristotle to declare that nothing but 
what is sensible is remembered directly, fer se, ancl that the whole 
of our thoughts, notions and conceptions are remembered indirectly, 
per acctdens. Our thinking is conditioned by continuity, Le. oxten- 
sion, and by time. Just as in proving a geometrical proposition we 
are aware that the size of the figure does not affect the proof, but 
we nevertheless draw the figure of a determinate size, so in 
thinking, even though the object is not quantitative, we think of it 
as a quantum, and, if it is quantitative but indefinite, we neverthe- 
less think of it as of a definite size*, What affections of sense are 
to the sensitive faculty, such images are to the thinking soul, The 
total loss of a sense cuts off the man from all the knowledge 
available through that sense’, Without the sensations in question 
he will not have the corresponding images, and without them he 
cannot have the thoughts ancl conceptions. Intellect itself dos 
not think external things without the aid Of sense-perception® 
‘Further, the use of images in thinking implies their usc in that 
process of deliberation in which the mind balances the present 
against the future, and after due calculation decides upon a course 
of action’. When reason is obscured by passion, images of sense 
themselves directly move to action, and such images control the 
movements of the lower animals generally*. 

Intellect forms the subject of Book HL, cc. 4-8. But the 
detailed treatment there by no means exhausts what 
is said about it in the treatise. It will be convenient 
to collect here the more important of the scattered remarks 


Intellect. 


1 De Ment. 2, 4528. 27-—30. 

2 De A. 4314 16 8q., 4328 8—13; De Aven. t, 449) 81. 

3 De Mem. 1, 450 α I—14. 4 431 a 14sq. 5 4320 7 ay. 
6 De Seusu 6, 445 Ὁ 16 3q. 7 430b 2 sqq-, 4348 5 sq 
δ 4298 4.Sqq-, 43329 Sqq., Ὁ 28—go, 415 ἃ 11. 


LNTRODUCTION. I lix 


previously made on thinking, on intellect, or even on the soul, 
where the context suggests that Aristotle, like Plato, is using soul 
for that which thinks. 

If to think is a species of imagining or not independent of 
imagining, even thinking could not exist apart from body. 
Anaxagoras made soul the moving cause when he said that 
intelligence set the universe in motion. But, whereas Democritus 
absolutely identified mind with soul and did not use the term mind 
to denote a faculty conversant with truth, Anaxagoras was less 
consistent. He often made mind the cause of goodness and order; 
elsewhere he identified it with soul, as when he attributed it to all 
animals, great and small, high and low. And yet, Aristotle adds, 
mind in the sense of intelligence is not so widely distributed as 
soul or vital principle. Anaxagoras took mind as his first principle 
and said it alone of all existing things is simple, unmixed, pure. 
He attributed to one and the same principle that it knows and 
that it causes motion. Mind, according to him, is impassive and 
has nothing in common with anything else?. 

The criticism? of the Ziizaeus suggests that in Aristotle’s 
opinion the mind in the universe is not a magnitude; it is one and 
continuous in the same sense as the process of thinking, which 
consists of a series of thoughts; the unity of these thoughts is a 
unity of succession, the unity of number, not that of a magnitude. 
Hence, mind not being continuous like a magnitude, there are two 
alternatives: either it has no parts, or it has parts and is con- 
tinuous, but not like a magnitude. A magnitude is incapable of 
thinking ; if mind can apprehend with any one of its parts, it need 
not revolve nor have magnitude; it has to think two kinds of 
objects, the one kind divisible, the other indivisible. Thinking, as 
we know it, has limits which determine it, viz. the end in view or 
the new truths that the thinker discovers. Both thinking and 
inference bear far more analogy to rest or pause than to motion. 
In thinking the thinker ought to realise happiness. Thinking is 
the essence of the mind. Many held that entanglement in the 
body was a hindrance to thought ; a satisfactory theory ought to 
explain why the thinking soul is enclosed in the body and ‘under 
what conditions of the body. 

In criticising the doctrine of harmony, he asks, what part of the 
bodily compound combining with the rest, can we assume to be 
intellect?? In another connexion Aristotle says that intellect 


1 403 a 8—10, 4044 25—b 6, 405. a 13—19, Ὁ 19—21. 
+ 407a %2—b 26. 3 408 a 12. 


Ix INTRODUCTION. 1 


would seem to be a self-existing substance which comes into play in 
us and is in itself imperishable, in spite of senile decay. Thought 
and its exercise are enfeebled when something internal is destroyed, 
but the intellect in itself is impassive. Memory, love and hate are 
not affections of the intellect, which is something more divine and 
is impassive’. In criticising Empedocles, Aristotle remarks that it 
is impossible for soul, and still more impossible for intellect, to have 
anything superior to it and overruling it, to it belongs a natural 
priority and authority*. It is difficult to conjecture what part of 
the body intellect holds together or how it can hold together any 
part’. After soul has been defined, we are told that there is as yet 
no evidence to show whether intellect is, like some of the other 
faculties of soul, really inseparable and only logically separable, 
from the rest, It would seem to be a distinct species of soul and 
capable of separation, as the immortal from the perishable’. 
Sensation is of particulars, knowledge of universals, which are in a 
manner in the soul itself. Hence it is in our power to think 
whenever we please®, To think is not the same thing as to have 
sensation, though they were identified by the ancients, who believed 
both to be corporeal changes". Nor is thinking the same as 
imagination or as belicf? Imagination leads to action in the lower 
animals because they have no intellect, and sometimes ἴῃ man 
when intellect is obscured by passion, discase or sleep* 

What conclusions can be drawn from these scattered remarks ? 
Apparently in one passage we have a choice of alternatives τ cither 
intellect is without parts (and therefore by the presuppositions of 
the Aristotelian system must be immaterial and an energy), or it is 
something continuous, which is, however, continuous only like a 
number or series, by sequence, and not by coherence, ke a 
magnitude A bodily organ, which has parts, would alone secure 
the continuity of coherence; and for such an organ there is, or so 
Aristotle believed, no evidence. With this agrees the tentative 
assumption that intellect is something impassive, independent and 
imperishable, since its decay in the individual is an accident and 
not its real essence. 

The account of intellect in Book IIL, cc. 4—8, is condensed and 
imperfect and falls far short of the clearness which marks the 
exposition of sense-perception. Intellect is especially concerned 
with quiddities and universals. It employs no bodily organ, for of 

+ 408 b 18—a9. 4 gtob 1a—15. Yo grab rk. 


7 413 Db 24-27. 5 417 b 22 sqq, 9 437 a τῷ Μ}. 
7 7 ( 4 
427 14. 560. 4298 4-~8, 


INTRODUCTION. TI Ixi 


the functions of the nervous system Aristotle and his contem- 
poraries had no idea. It contains a divine element, which is 
independent of the body and immortal. This summary tells us 
hardly any more than we have collected from the casual or 
polemical remarks in the previous part of the treatise. But 
Aristotle might fairly claim to have set before us his view both of 
(1) the difference between intellect and sense, and (2) the way in 
which thinking comes about: and this is all he promised at the 
outset. 

(1) There is an analogy between sense and intellect, there is 
also a difference. Both furnish knowledge, both pass judgments, 
both are intermittent, sometimes in act, sometimes not. When in 
activity both have an object, the transition from the dormant 
power to its actual exercise does not depend upon sense alone or 
upon thought alone, and, when the activity is over, the alteration 
thus undergone leaves intellect absolutely, and sense to a great 
degree, unaffected. Sensitivity in the abstract is a form which 
knows or apprehends sensible forms. Similarly intellect is a form 
which knows or apprehends intelligible forms*. Moreover, in both 
sensation and intellection alike at the moment of apprehension, 
there is identity between the form which apprehends and the form 
which is apprehended. Again, sense-perception is always true of 
its own appropriate object, and similarly thinking is always true in 
respect of quiddities®. On the other hand, the external object which 
stimulates the sense-faculty to activity is an individual, a particular, 
and it is external to the percipient; whereas the universals, the forms 
which we think, are present in the understanding, at any rate, of the 
mature man. Sensation cannot dispense with a bodily organ, a part 
of the body appropriated to its special functions. For intellect no 
such organ can be discovered. Yet, when a sense-organ is wanting, 
the action of intellect is impeded, for all knowledge through that 
sense is cut off Moreover, excess in the sensible fatigues or 
destroys the organ of sense, but the activity of thinking cannot 
be thus impaired. Again, intellect is the higher faculty of the two 
and implies the lower ; the lower does not imply the higher. For 
actual thinking the indispensable condition is the presence of a 
mental image, for, as we saw above, we think of nothing apart 
from continuity. Even when the object conceived is not itself 
a quantum, we nevertheless think of it as such. And we never 
think of objects without thinking them in time® 


1 429 a 12 Sq. 2 431 Ὁ 20—432 4 3. 3 430 b 29—31, 433 4 26. 
* 4324 7 sq. 5 De Mem. τ, 450a 7—9. 


Ixil INTRODUCTION. Lf 


(2) The process of thinking an object is explained in much the 
same way as the process of perceiving an object by sense. In spite 
of the differences stated above, both, as acts of apprehending, are 
assimilated to the process of reciprocal action between physical 
bodies. Apprehension is reception of form. If the mind knows 
objects by receiving them, since nothing receives what it already 
has, it must be assumed to be at first without them; and further, so 
long as it remains capable of thinking, the same condition must be 
fulfilled for every fresh act. Hence intellect must be itmpassive, 
suffering in no way by the change from power to act and, since it 
thinks all things or, in other words, is capable of receiving all forms, 
it must in itself be devoid of any form, though at the same time it 
“provides room for forms.” It may be called, then, a mere 
aptitude or capacity to think. Until it actually thinks them, it is 
none of its objects, but becomes cach object in turn when it thinks 
that object. In physical action there is a transference of essence 
or form: in combustion the form of heat is transferred from tire 
actually alight to combustible fuel. When a white object Is 
perceived, the form of whiteness is transferred from the object te 
the eye and, as there is but one such form, is the same in the 
percipient sense as in the external object. Amd so when we think 
a stone, a horse, a triangle, the form or essence in our mind, the 
object of thought, is identically one with the form or essence outside 
in verum natura. As a contribution to the theory of knowleduc, 
this explanation is adequate. External things affect our sense, 
By sense we apprehend hot and cold and whatever other sensible 
qualitics are accidents of flesh’. We think cach sensible quality, 
gcneralising and abstracting the universals, of which sense by itself 
informs us only fer weeidens, The substance in which the attributes 
inhere, which is said to be indirectly perceived by sense, is directly 
judged and known by thought. 

50° far intellect has been treated as one. It is possible τὸ apply 
to this unity the analysis which resolves particular things. When 
nature gencrates or art produces a concrete particular. three 
conditions are fulfilled. There is the efficient agent transmitting 
form, there is the passive recipient upon which form is impressed, 
and there is, lastly, the result of the process, the new particular inte 
which matter impressed by form has been made. To manufacture 
a brazen sphere, we need the craftsman with the design in his 
mind and brass to receive that design, The form of a sphere is 


429 b rg—r16. 


INTRODUCTION, I Ixill 


impressed upon the brass and a new particular is made, precisely 
as the form of humanity is transmitted from father to son'. Our 
knowledge and actual thinking answer to the manufactured 
product, they are generated in the receptive intellect by something 
which must be assumed in intellect itself to correspond to the 
efficient cause. That which on one view is the reception of essence, 
is on another the spontaneous transition from potence toact. This 
is true of sense. Sense becomes like its object, in quality identical 
therewith. But it is just as true to say that sense has risen from 
the lower stage of potence to the higher stage of act and realised 
itself in full activity. So, again, thinking is reception of the form 
or essence, but it is just as true to say that intellect has risen from 
the lower stage of potence to the higher stage of act and realised 
itself in full activity. Perception, it is true, cannot be explained 
without assuming interference from without. The occasion which 
supplies the stimulus to the transition must be something given. 
With thought it is different. The occasion, the stimulus, are not 
external, but internal. I may say, if I like, that my potential or 
passive intellect has been acted upon and educed into actuality : 
but what brought this about? A mental agent, the active intellect, 
has called forth this activity and produced the thought. In my 
individual experience the power to think precedes actual thinking, 
but the transition cannot be explained except by assuming the 
prior existence of the efficient cause which brought it about. This 
point once reached and the unity of intellect being resolved into 
agent and patient, it follows that the agent which we postulate 
must have the same attributes as the patient, of which we have 
experience. It must be separable, impassive and unmixed, because 
its essence is activity, as the essence of the other factor is poten- 
tiality. Could it be actually separated and exist independently, it 
would be eternal. But this eternity is not communicated to the 
other factor of intellect, or to the intellect as a whole. Is such a 
hypothesis necessary? Can the potential intellect be affected by 
external things? So far as these things have matter in them, they 
are objects of thought only potentially. The intelligible forms are 
implicit in the sensible forms, and intellect er hypothest has no 
special bodily organ. But so far as knowable things are pure 
forms, no such expedient is required. The question, then, why an 
active’ intellect is introduced, may be thus answered. It is in 
order to provide a cause of that transition from potence to act 


which takes place whenever we actually think. 
1 Metaph. 1032 a 12—1033 Ὁ 26, 


Ixiv INTRODUCTION. ἡ 


The difficulty in understanding what Aristotle did or did not 
Diverse inter. intend by this analysis of the intellect, or rather this 
pretations. distinction of the intellect which makes from the 
intellect which becomes, is notorious. The scanty comments of 
Theophrastus! develop various lines of acute criticism, which in my 
judgment are not incompatible with an acceptance of the doctrine. 
So much is clear, that Theophrastus considered intellect in both tts 
forms, as making and becoming, to be our human intellect, which ts 
connatural and in us from birth to death, though its origin is 
elsewhere. In face of the difficulties which he is at pains to 
develop he seems content to regard the passive intellect dependent 
upon the body and the human intellect which results from the 
union of the passive with the active as in a sense distinct, yet as in 
another sense one nature, in so far as the two are related to one 
another as matter and form are in the unitary thing. That the 
active intellect exists ger se in man independent of the passive ts 
nowhere stated or implied either by Aristotle or Theophrastus. 
From a casual criticism by Themistius® it appears that certain of 
his predecessors had identified the active intellect with the 
premisses from which all our knowledge is derived and with the 
knowledge itself which we gradually acquire. Alexander of 
Aphrodisias*, who cndeavoured to preserve faithfully the teaching 
of Aristotle and to present it as consistent, distinguished a material 
intellect ancl an intellect ει A@drin, which the former becomes by 
actual thinking and reception of the intelligible form. The material 
intellect is the mere aptitude for thinking: this is a power or 
faculty of the individual human seul, the form of the body. Lastly, 
there ts the active intellect which is not a faculty or part of the 
human soul, though it is in it from birth to death whenever we 
actually think : not only when we think it or any of the immaterial 
forms with which it is identical, but also when we think forms in 
matter, for it is only through the agency of the active intellect that 
actual thinking is possible. Being wholly immaterial, enerpy 
devoid of all matter and potentiality, it always is, even when it is 
not thought by men; it is an eternal, imperishable, self-existent 
substance. There can be but one such substance: it must conse- 
quently be identified with the deity, the first cause of motion in the 
universe, whose nature and essence is activity, the energy of 


1 See Appendix, p. 580 sqq. 
7 y02, 32 sqq. 11., 189, 17 syq- Sp. This view follows from an extremely one-aided 
Interpretation of the statement that νοῦς is τὰ νοητά. 

8 De An, 80, t6-—g2, 11, Mantissa 106, 19-113, 24. 


INTRODUCTION. J ᾿ Ixv 


thinking. In individual men it supervenes as something coming 
in from outside. It finds in the capacity of thinking which does 
belong to the human soul an instrument ready for its use, upon 
which it can work and produce actual thinking. As to the reason 
why men think not always, Alexander has no better explanation to 
offer than a suggestion of his teacher’, that the craftsman is still a 
craftsman even when he has laid aside his tools. The eclectic 
Themistius? refused to identify the active intellect with the deity 
outside man. He appeals to two expressions of the master 
(1) “that these differences must be present in the soul,” (2) “this 
alone is immortal and eternal,’ which he thinks Alexander’s 
interpretation forces out of their natural meaning. As to (1) 
Alexander has his own explanation to offer, according to which the 
active intellect, and therefore the deity, is in our mind whenever we 
think: but there is some force in the contention that Aristotle 
would never have described the deity as “alone” immortal and 
eternal. However, the point in which Themistius agrees with 
Alexander is more important than the points in which they differ. 
He fully admits that the active intellect is one and the same in all 
men, it is distributed among different individuals as light is divided 
into single rays. Of the other commentators, the Neo-Platonist 
Simplicius* distorts Aristotle’s account in order, as far as possible, 
to adapt it to his own philosophical presuppositions. According to 
him, the rational human soul is one immortal substance, It has 
three states: in the first it remains in itself; this is the active 
intellect. In the second it enters the body; it then knows nothing, 
but is the pure potentiality of thought. Intellect of the first stage 
acts upon intellect of the second stage, and the result is the third 
stage, when intellect is iz Aadztu and acquires knowledge. The 
passive intellect is mortal, because it ceases to be passive and is 
absorbed in the higher or active intellect. It is not worth while to 
pursue the course of speculation further among Arabian philoso- 
phers and the schoolmen, in both of whom the theological bias is 
unmistakeable. Avicenna‘ was an original thinker who exerted a 

1 fJantissa 110, 4 ἤκουσα δὲ περὶ νοῦ τοῦ θύραθεν παρὰ ᾿ἈΑριστοτέλους, ἃ διεσωσάμην 
κτὸ. If this is not a pleasant fiction, which would be more incongruous in Alexander 
than the one joke in Thucydides (ὁ λέων γέλασε), we must acquiesce in Zeller’s con- 
jecture ᾿Αριστοκλέους, Phil, der Gr. 1v.3, p. 785. 

2 98, 12—109, 3 H, 181, 3-200, 25 Sp. 

3 217, 23 SQq-, 243, [0—245, 2, 246, 10-—-248, 17. 

* I have not studied the mediaeval philosophers at first hand. Fox my acquaintance 
with them I am indebted mainly to Zabarella, Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 


pp- 8 sqq., who gives copious extracts, Ueberweg, Geschichie der Philosophie, Siebeck, 
Geschichte der Psychologie. 


Ixvi INTRODUCTION. JI 


great influence on his successors; but neither his distinction of 
universals, ate res, in vebus, post ves, nor his doctrine that these 
universals are at once substantial forms in things outside us and 
intelligible forms to the mind which thinks them by abstraction 
has any direct Aristotelian authority, and when he makes both 
forms alike emanate from the active intellect and ultimately from 
God, this doctrine becomes nearly akin to that of the Neo-Platonists. 
Averrocs and Aquinas, though both professing to interpret Aristotle, 
modify his doctrines to suit their own preconceptions. «s\ccordingr 
to the former, neither passive intellect nor active intellect is part of 
the human soul as defined in the definition. In scholastic language 
each is forma assistens, superveniens and not ferma dans esse 
homintz. Fach is immortal and each is one and the same in all 
men. According to Aquinas, active intellect as well as passive 
intellect is a faculty of the rational human soul, which was created 
by the will of God and is yet immortal, having the power as form 
to provide a vehicle for itself after it is separated from its present 
body. Regarded as interpretations of z\ristotle’s doctrine, these 
two conflicting views, which clivided the allegiance of the later 
schoolmen, cannot both be right, but may both be wrong. Aristotle 
himself was free from the preconceptions of his two commentators : 
he was not a Moslem mystic nor a Christian theologian. 

These successive attempts to fill in the meagre outline 
presented by the text of De “πέρα proceed mn two directians. 
Either they make the two intellects two faculties of the human 
soul, or they seek to identify one, if net both, of them, with an 
intelligence outside man. Alexander, Averroes, and in modern 
times, Ravaisson and Renan, have gone to the greatest lengths in 
the latter direction. ut, if the act of thinking is independent of, 
or alien to, man’s nature, how can the aptitude for thinking be any 
longer a part of it? Averroes no doubt is consistent: he declares 
the passive intellect also to be an immaterial substance ancl ne part 
of the soul which is the form of the human body. But, in order to 
maintain this, he is obliged to do violence to the lanyuave of the 
treatise. In particular, his wzrtus cogtfativa, with which, according 
to him, the definition of soul endows man, has to be divorced from 
intellect proper and reduced nearly to the level of sensus connaunis 
or imagination, Jéven then he is unable to explain why, after the 
definition of soul has been obtained, it should have been left an 
open question whether intellect properly so called is or is not a 
part of the soult, or why it should be designated as a “ part” when 

1413 13-26, 41K a τὰ sp 


INTRODUCTION. JI Ixvii 


at last it comes up for special treatment?, But in fact all views in 
which human intellect or a part of it is identified with the activity 
of divine intellect are met by the same insoluble difficulty: what is 
to be made of the intellect which becomes all things? Modern 
enquirers are hopelessly divided as to what the passive intellect is. 
Trendelenburg answers “all the lower faculties in contradistinction 
to the active intellect?,” Zeller “the sum of those faculties of 
representation which go beyond imagination and sensible percep- 
tion and yet fall short of that higher Thought, which has found 
peace in perfect unity with its object®,” Ravaisson “the universal 
potentiality in the world of ideas‘,” Brentano ‘“ imagination’,” 
Hertling “the cognitive faculty of the sensitive part*,”’ and 
Hammond, if I understand him rightly, “the life of sensation as a 
potentially rational mass,” “the sum of the deliverances of sense- 
perception and their re-wrought form in memory and phantasy, 
regarded as potentiality”.” The last two would seem almost to 
identify its functions with those of sewsus communis as a judging 
faculty. Now these various answers do not accord with the 
description in De Azzma of the process and act of thinking, 
whether as apprehension of the intelligible object or as the 
judgment which makes two concepts one; they do not fit either 
the conception of intellect zz haditu, the process by which 
knowledge is acquired, or the sharp distinction drawn between 
a thought and a mental image. Thinking is not the same as 
receiving or retaining or remembering or judging the percepts of 
sense, which are all individual and lack the universality required. 
Abstraction alone renders thought possible, and abstraction cannot 
be restricted to the active intellect. Again, all the operations of 
thought imply a single judging power. This position, which 
Aristotle has maintained for sense, he would certainly maintain as 
strongly for thought. When he controverts the Protagorean maxim 
and points out that it must lead to universal relativity, he contends 
that there is such a thing as absolute existence, a something 
determinate in itself apart from all relations, for presentation of an 
object implies a subject to whom the object is presented®. The 


1 4294 Io, 

3 >. 308: ‘*Omnes illas, quae praecedunt, facultates,in unum quasi nodum collectas, 
quatenus ad res cogitandas postulantur, νοῦν παθητικὸν dictas esse iudicamus.”’ 

* Aristotle, 11. Ὁ. 102 Eng. Tr. 

4 Essai sur la Métaplysique α Aristote, 1., pp. 586 sqq.: cf. 11., pp. 17, 19. 

5 Psychologie, p. 208 sq. 

8 Materie τε. Form, Ὁ. 174. 

7 pp. lxxxiii sq. 8 Metaph. 1011 a 17-—20. 


Ixviil INTRODUCTION. 7 


object of thought, then, implies a thinking subject. If these 
modern interpreters were right in equating the intellect which 
becomes with one or other of the lower faculties or with the sum of 
them, then the functions of these faculties would be identical with 
the function of thought, so far as the intellect becomes all things. 
But the lower faculties, sense and imagination, never succeed in 
obtaining an object which is a true universal. 

If, however, we vindicate the right to think for the intellect 
which becomes all objects and is said to be ἐκ Aabitu when it 
acquires knowledge, it would seem that this can only be done at 
the expense of the intellect which makes all objects. The functions 
of the latter are then reduced within the narrowest compass, 
According to some, it does not really think at all, it does little more 
than “illuminate” the mental image, thus facilitating the abstrac- 
tion of the universal form. But Aristotle speaks of its perpetual 
activity, he says there is no intermission in its thought Yet it is 
not unreasonable to suppose that determinations so unlike is 
“pure potentiality” and “incessant activity” refer to the same 
thing under two different aspects. IJach describes it abstractly, 
and, to know the whole, the two determinations must be combined, 
If there is within us a thought which is continuous ancl always in 
activity, at any rate expericnce does not tell us πὸ" it can only be 
a conclusion of reason. ILow, then, did Aristotle reconcile this con- 
clusion with the facts? Apparently he mace this thinkiny latent. 
The intellect always thinks, but we do not remember. This, then, 
is what the attribute “ potential” means as applied to the intellect4; 
and this agrees with the conception of the powers or faculties of 
the soul in general, which are permanent possessions, all dormant 
and unconscious, until roused to activity in conscigusness. Tere 
we may recall a previous use of the antithesis between potential 
and actual in Aristotle’s account of jinagination. “Phe images or 
survivals of sensation are not always present to consciousness, yet 
Aristotle treats them as still in existence; they continue, he says, 
in the organs of sense, they are potential images while they are 
dormant, actual iinages when they are revived and reappcur, as we 
should say, in consciousness’ It may be worth while to hazard the 
conjecture that the intellect which docs not consciously think is 

1 So, at least, I understand 430 a 22. 

2 Cf. Anal. Post. 11. τὸν οὐ Ὁ 25 wérepov...al ἕξεις. ἐνοῦσαι λελήθασιν. 

4 Aristotle conceives νοητὰ to be directly presented, much as meuderm paycheh opiate 
conceive perceptual objects to be directly presented and ty form a perceptual continuum. 


Cl. Meflaph. 1087 ἃ 1o-—25. 
+ Cf. 4256 24 8q., De Insomn. ἃ, 460) 2 Βα.7) ἃ, 461 b T1107. See alse p. liii. 


INTRODUCTION. JI Ixix 


similarly described as potential intellect, and yet all the time its 
thoughts are there, though its incessant activity is subconscious. 
It will be seen that, though I do not entirely agree with Wallace, I 
nevertheless recognise a certain element of truth in his solution of 
the difficulty. He thus conceives the relation of the two intellects : 
“the creative reason is the faculty which constantly interprets and 
as it were keeps up an intelligible world for experience to operate 
upon, while the receptive reason is the intellect applyine itself in 
all the various processes which fill our minds with the materials of 
knowledge.” And again: “the two it must be remembered are not 
‘two reasons’: they are merely different modes of viewing the 
work of reason®.” 

In the account of sense and thought, with which we have been 
Desire and hitherto mainly occupied, the cognitive element is very 
Volition. prominent. It is natural to infer that our philosopher 
regards man chiefly on the intellectual side, as a spectator of the 
universe, a being who contemplates. And this impression would 
seem to be confirmed when we learn from the E¢h#ics wherein 
man’s chief good consists. But no Greek could overlook the other 
side of human nature. The conclusions of the #¢fhkics must be 
taken in conjunction with the wider gencralisations of the Polzzzcs; 
and, if the self or ego is identical with intellect, intellect is practical 
as well as theoretic. The true is in the same class with the good; 
good, real or apparent, is the goal of all striving and effort. With 
his teleological bias, Aristotle would have endorsed the words of a 
modern psychologist*: “ Looking broadly at the progress of life, as 
it ascends through the animal kingdom and onwards through the 
history of man, it secms safe to say that knowledge is always a 
means to ends, is never an end by itself—till at length it becomes 
interesting and satisfying in itself. Psychologically, then, the sole 
function of perception and intellection is to guide action and 

{ p. xeviil. 

2 p.cxv. Wallace was not alone in holding that Aristotle never intended to afhrm 
two distinct intellects, but only to distinguish two phases or aspects of the one intellect. 
A similar view is maintained on very different grounds by Bullinger, Wzs-ZLekhre, pp. 3489q., 
and by Mr F. Granger, Class. Kev. V1. pp. 298—301, who states it as follows: ‘‘the reason 
is passive and affected by corporeal conditions, so far as it uses the φαντάσματα, grasping 
the εἴδη from among them. It is purely active only when it concerns itself with 
vonrd, among which itself is included.” Cf. Brandis, Gesch. der Antw. τ. Ὁ. 518, 
Handbuch, ul. Ὁ, 1178. Kampe and Grote came to the conclusion that intellect, though 
separable from the human body, is not separable from body in general. They affirm that 
it has for its necessary substratum the ether, the most divine of the elements: Kampe, 
Lrkenntiisstheorte, pp. 12—49, Grote, Aristotle, U. p. 220 sqq. See, however, Zeller, 


Aristotle, 11. Ὁ. 95, π. 2, Eng. Tr. 
® Professor James Ward, Znc. Brit., Article on Psychology, p. 56. 


H. é 


Ixx INTRODUCTION. 72 


subserve volition—more generally, to promote self-conservation and 
betterment.” In De οἱ ριΐμα, a professedly biological treatise, with 
the soul in all living things for its subject, this part of the enquiry 
is not pushed far’. The main outlines are given, but we must look 
elsewhere, and particularly to the £7¢/zcs, for further details. The 
problem is presented in a very simple fashion. In the animal 
world motion, in the sense of locomotion, is an all-pervading fact, 
and but slight observation suffices to show that this motion ts not 
random or irregular, but is directed to an end. To what power or 
faculty, then, is it to be ascribed? The nutritive faculty, Aristotle 
thinks, sufficiently accounts for movements of growth and decay, 
whether in animals or plants, but not for the progressive move- 
ments of animals, movements prompted by want and directed ta 
an end. If the nutritive faculty were sufficient to produce such 
movements, Aristotle adds with unconscious irony, plants would 
move spontaneously and would have organs adapted for the 
purpose. Nor can these movements be explained as due to the 
sensitive faculty, since there are whole genera of perfectly-developed 
animals of a low type which do not move from place to place. 
But if locomotion were implied in sensation, they, too, would have 
organs adapted for locomotion. Is intellect, then, the cause of 
which we are in search, as Plato thought? No. Intellect is etther 
theoretical or practical. The former fssues no command as to 
what we should avoid or pursue and, although the latter does issue 
such commands, they are not necessarily obeyed. The analogy of 
the arts, too, shows that, in order to produce action, something 
else is required beyond the mere knowledge of what is to be 
pursued or avoided. Shall we say, then, that there are two motives 
to action, (1) desire and (2) the intellect which calculates means to 
ends, the place of which latter in animals devoid of reason is taken 
by imagination? If so, how are the two connected? Desire ts 
always of an end, and this end is the starting point for the calcula- 
tions of the practical intellect. Intellect and desire, then, are 
connected by the ultimate unmoved movent, the end of action. 
It is this which stirs desire, while intellect, assuming that the end 
can be realised, calculates the steps towards its attainment. Thus 
the physician whose aim is to cure an apue assumes this to be 
done, just as if he were trying to solve a geometrical problem, ancl 
then reasons backwards from the patient's recovery to the normal 
temperature which this implies, from the normal temperature to 
the production of heat or cold, and from that to some remedy at 
1 See Book 111, ce. Q—-11. 


INTRODUCTION. I Ixxi 


his command; and thereupon, having reached the end of his 
calculations, he proceeds to act. Hence the statement that there 
are two motives to action calls for qualification. Had there been 
two, they would have had some common character, but as a 
matter of fact intellect is never a motive apart from desire. On 
the other hand, desire does sometimes move to action in spite of 
reason. Desire is thus found in all forms of mental life. In reason 
it is rational wish, but there are also irrational desires, anger and 
appetite, or mere desire of pleasure. In fact, an appetitive faculty 
must be assumed in which Plato’s anger and appetite are both 
included, and Aristotle says quite fairly that the soul may be 
divided into many faculties, any two of which are more distinct 
than these two of Plato. Wherever in the animal world there is 
sense-perception, there is also the feeling of pleasure and pain. The 
pleasurable prompts desire, the painful aversion, and the survival of 
sense-impressions, which is imagination in its lowest form, can 
prompt to desire no less than the present object in the moment of 
perception. For the intellect images take the place of present 
sensation. A conflict of desires may arise, for though reason will 
judge correctly, anger or appetite may be blinded. They may take 
apparent good for real good, or they may interpret good as the 
pleasure of the moment. Every desire, whether rational or 
irrational, implies a corresponding image of the object desired. 
Hence a distinction between images, according as they proceed 
wholly from sense (and this class of images alone belongs to 
irrational animals) or proceed from reason, calculation; in fact, 
deliberation. This latter class of images is peculiar to man. Yet 
even in man in the abnormal state of incontinence the irrational 
desire gets the better of reason and controls action. In order to ex- 
press the antecedents of action, whether of the normal or abnormal 
kind, Aristotle resorted to the analogy of the syllogism. From a 
universal major premiss and a particular minor a conclusion is 
inferred. For example, all men should take exercise, Callias is a 
man, exgo Callias should take exercise. His taking exercise is 
regarded as an inference from the premisses. It resembles the 
conclusion of a syllogism just in so far as a particular case is 
brought under a general rule. But this way of looking at the 
matter by no means ensures rational action or justifies the assump- 
tion that the intellect always calculates correctly, for incontinence 
has a syllogism of its own. For example, all sweet things are to be 
tasted, this thing before me is sweet: then, if you have the power 
and are not hindered, you cannot but at once put the conclusion 
€ 2 


Ixxii INTRODUCTION. I 


(this is to be tasted) into practice. In this way the triumph of the 
irrational impulse and the sacrifice of the permanent good to the 
pleasure of the moment may equally be considered to bring a 
particular case under a general rule. In other words, although 
reason has a natural right and ought to prevail, experience shows 
that it is not always effective, even in beings endowed with reason, 
who look before and after, When tmpulsive action has) been 
distinguished from deliberative and we are dealing with the latter 
only, since purpose is desire following upon deliberation, if the 
purpose is to be all it should be, both the calculation or reasoning 
must be truce and the desire right, and the very same things must 
be assented to by the reason and pursued by the desire’. 

In the foregoing sketch I have been content to let -\rtstotle 
speak for himself, piecing together various utterances and putting 
the best construction [ could on what is obscure and eniematical in 
them, but refraining as a rule from criticism. Obviously he studied 
psychology as a philosopher and was chiefly interested in it as it 
bore upon philosophical problems. Ife exalted the cocnitive 
element, while his treatment of the emotions and the will fs 
wholly inadequate, even if the έτος and the Afetorre be called 
in to redress the balance. It is now contended that the sefence οὗ 
psychology, which has made vast strides since these humble be- 
ginnings, must be based exclusively upon individual expertenee 
and be made independent of physiology. Whatever can be set 
down to the credit of Aristotle as a psychologist rests upon the 
Opposite assumptions. He approached his subject from the 
psychophysical standpoint, as it is called; he had his own repre- 
sentative theory of perception, his own account of the vradual 
ascent from sense, through memory, to science and reason Ee 
could not escape the errors and confusion incident to such assumip- 
tions, if after all they are not ultimately valid. Thus we are 
brought face to face with grave metaphysical problems. But this 
is not the place to examine Aristotle's system as a whole. and 
without such an examination it is impossible to do justice cither 
to his theory of knowledge or to the treatise on the seul, 


1 hth. Nie. w39 0 2a~-26, 


INTRODUCTION. II. 
THE TEXT. 


The text of De Anima rests mainly on the authority of a single 
good manuscript, cod. Parisiensis 1853, better known by the symbol 
E, given it by Bekker. Trendelenburg’, p. xvi, describes it thus; 
saeculi decimi, membranaceus, eleganter et perspicue scriptus, 
vocibus non seiunctis sed inter se ligatis. Torstrik adds, p. viii: 
In co igitur codice qui sunt de Anima libri duabus manibus scripti 
sunt, antiquissimis, elegantissimis, simillimis, sed duabus. Book L, 
Book Π1|. and the fragments of a recension or paraphrase of Book 11., 
different from the vulgate (see pp. 164 sqq. zz/ra), are in the same 
hand as the /’4ysics, which cod. E also contains, and have 38 lines 
to the page. Book II. in a complete form and’in practically the 
same recension as all other manuscripts present is the work of 
another hand and has 48 lines to the page. Cod. E has been 
scrutinised by Bekker, Trendelenburg, Bussemaker, Pansch, Tors- 
trik, Bichl, Stapfer and Rodier. For further information respecting 
its peculiaritics I refer my readers to Trend.! pp. viii, xxiii—xliii, 
Trend. pp. vi, xiv—xviii, Torstrik pp. ii, vili—xv, Stapfer, Stadza zzz 
Aristotelis de anima libros collata, especially pp. 4—13. In Book 
ΣΤ. cod. EF is mutilated, one leaf, which should have come between 
fol. 200 and fol. 201, is missing: it doubtless contained upon its 
76 lines the text from 430a 24 μνημονεύομεν to 431 b 16 ἐκεῖνα, 
or 84 of Bekker’s lines. Further, the last leaf is also wanting, 
which should have contained from 434a 31, the -θὲν of μηθέν, to 
the end, 435 b 25, or about 86 of Bekker’s lines. The loss of these 
two leaves is serious, but is in some measure compensated by the 
fact that for the whole of Book III. we have cod. L, Vaticanus 253, 
presenting a text which agrees more closely with that of cod. E 
than with that of the other extant manuscripts. Cod. L, which 
contains only the third book of De Anima, is described by Trend.?, 
p. ix, as follows: codex chartaceus, foliis quaternis minoribus, satis 
recens, cuius librarius interdum scripturae compendia male in- 
tellexit. Hauthalius codicem bombycinum perspicue et diligenter 


Ixxiv INTRODUCTION. If 


scriptum saeculi XIV esse litteris nobis significavit. A lectionum 
praestantia (saepius enim cum vetustissimo codice (I) consentit) 
antiquior quam recentior esse videatur. 

Besides codd. E and 1. Bekker collated six other codices of later 
date, which he indicated by the symbols STUVWi. To these 
in what follows I shall give the name of the S-X group. The six 
have, so far as know, never been scrutinised or collated by anyone 
since Bekker. Torstrik consulted the manuscript materials (pre- 
served in the Royal Library of Berlin), which Bekker collected 
for his edition, and was thus enabled from Bekker's own evidence 
to correct a few errors in Bekker’s report of the readings of cod. 5, 
as of cod. E (Torstrik, p. vii sq.: ef. PAidolagus XU. 3, pp. 494— 
530, XIIL 1, pp. 204——206). The conclusion which Stapfer! reached 
after carcful study was that without a fresh collation of these 
six inferior codices the question of their mutual relationship and 
pedigree could not be definitely settled, but that the result of such 
a fresh collation would not be worth the trouble expended upon 
it (Kvitésche Studicn su dristoteles Schrift vou der Seele, pp. 33 84.) 
What is certain is that, while codd. HI. go back te one common 
archetype, those belonging to the S-X group go back to another 
and a different common archetype, This result is established as 
follows: 

(A) Cod. FE has two lacunae, each, 1 conjecture, a line of its 
archetype, which the other six codices supply. These lacunae 
are 405b 25 sq. ἄλλο, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοίως ἕν τὶ τούτων and 
425 Ὁ 30 6. τότε κυἡ Kar’ ἐνέργειαν ἀκοὴ ἅμα γίνεται καὶ ὁ. Further, 
cod. E in 44 several places omits a single particle, an article, 
adjective, noun or verb, or even two (and once three) words, which 
are supplied by the group S-X. On the other hand, there are 22 
cases where cod. Τὸ has a slightly fuller text than the S-X group, 
the latter having omitted most frequently a particle, sometimes 
ἃ noun or verb, and twice a couple of words (ὁμοίως δὲ 426 ἃ 31, 
ὁ νοῦς 420 Ὁ 13). 

(Β) When we come to classify the readings in which ec. αὶ 
differs? from the S-X group, we sometimes find (1) a different word 
or (2) a different inflexion of the same word. The following are 
instances. In all cases the reading put first is the reading of 
cod. E, that put second is the reading of the S-X group, while 

1 Tn all that follows upon the relationship of the manuscripts to each other Tam 


largely indebted to Stapfer's two pamphlets. 
# I mean the first hand of cod. E. See below as to the corrections. 


INTRODUCTION. II lxxv 


the words within brackets denote variants in some of the six 
manuscripts of the S-X group. 

(1) 4028 26 μόνον : μᾶλλον, 4038 19 σημεῖον : μηνύει, 403 Ὁ 12 
ὅσα : ὁπόσα, 406 ἃ 10 δισσῶς : διχῶς, 407a 19 ἤ : καί, 409b 9 μιυ- 
Kpas ᾿σμικράς, 409b 11 ταύτας : αὐτάς, 410a 7 ἐνεῖναι: εἶναι, ἀτο ἃ 25 
τεῖ τί, ΔΙῸ 18 πάσης : ἁπάσης, 411. ἃ 30 αὔξη : αὔξησις, 426b 2 
λιπαρά: πικρά, 427 Ὁ 11 ταὐτό: τὸ αὐτό, 4284 14 ἐνεργῶς : ἐναργῶς, 
428 b 3 ποδιος: ποδιαῖος, 428 Ὁ 15 αὐτῆς :αὐτη, 428 Ὁ 16 κατὰ ταύ- 
τὴν KAT αὐτήν, 4290a9 διότε: διὰ τί, 429 4 14 ὅτε: τι", 432 bg αὔξην Ἐ, 
(Trend.), αὔξειν Βὶ (Bek.) : αὔξησιν, 432 Ὁ 27 ἐκείνων : κινῶν, 4334 18 
ὀρεκτόν : ὀρεκτικόν, 4348. 3 λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχονσα : λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ 
ἐνοῦσα, 4348 14 ἐνῇ : γένηται. 

(2) 4020 4 μόνον : μόνης, 402 Ὁ 6 ἑκάστην : ἕκαστον (ἕτερον), 
402} ὃ κατηγορεΐται" : κατηγοροῖτο, 403 29 ὁρίσαιντο : ὁρίσαιτο, 
405a ὃ ἀποφαινόμενος : ἀπτοφηνάμενος, 406a 18 ὑπάρχει : ὑπάρξει, 
406 Ὁ 23 ταῦτα ταὐτά : τοῦτ᾽ αὐτό (ποτε), 407 ἃ II μορίῳ : τῶν 
μορίων, 407 ἃ 26 ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπόδειξις : αἱ δ᾽ ἀποδείξεις, 408 Ὁ 34 ἴδια: 
ἐδίᾳ, 409b 7 τοῖς σώμασι : τῷ σώματι, 410b 6 γνωρίζει : γνωριεῖ, 
411 12 ἡ ψυχή: τὴν ψυχήν, 424 Ὁ 27 ἐκλυπεῖν : ἐκλείπειν, 425b 1 
yorny ὅτι: ὅτι χολή, 426 Ὁ 4 ἄγεται: ἄγηται, 428 Ὁ τό ὑπάρχει: ὑπάρ- 
yew, 428 Ὁ 20 διαψεύσασθαι : διωψεύδεσθαι, 428 Ὁ 30 ἔχοι : ἔχει, 
4308 2 γιγνομένη : γεγνομένης, 420 Ὁ 23 ἀπαθής : ἀπαθές, 4308 II 
ἐκεῖνο : ἐκεῖνα, 431 Ὁ 25 δυνάμεις : τὰ δυνάμει, 4328 7 αἰσθανόμενον : 
αἰσθανόμενος, 432 a 12 sq. φάντασμα : φαντάσματα, 4328 27 ταύτας: 
ταῦτα, 16. φανεῖται : φαίνεται (φαίνονται), 432 1 τό: τῷ. 

(3) Where the words are the same in cod. E as in the other 
six codices, the order is sometimes different. The following are 
instances: 4048 5 τῆς ὅλης φύσεως στοιχεῖα λέγει : στουχεῖα λέγει 
τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, 4044 28 ψυχὴν ταὐτόν : ταὐτὸν (τὴν) ψυχήν, 
406 b 32 κύκλους δύο: δύο κύκλους, 407 Ὁ 2 ἂν κινοῖτο : κινοῖτο ἄν, 
4τι Ὁ 21 μὴ καὶ : καὶ μή, 4288 7 ὑπάρχοντος τούτων : τούτων ὑὕπάρ- 
χοντος, 4298 25 τίς γὰρ ἄν : γὰρ ἄν τις, ἐδ. ἢ ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμός : 
θερμὸς ἢ ψυχρός, 430a 18 ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμυγής : ἀμυγὴς καὶ ἀπαθής, 
4308 τῷ δ᾽ αὐτό : αὐτὸ δ᾽, 431 Ὁ 21 ἐστι. πάντα γὰρ ἤ : ἔστι πάντα. 
ἢ γάρ, 432 Ὁ 30 διώκειν ἡ φεύγειν : φεύγειν ἢ διώκειν, 433 8 Ο ταῦτα 
δύο: δύο ταῦτα, 4338. 27 κινεῖ μέν : μὲν κινεῖ, 433 Ὁ 18 κίνησις ὄρεξις : 
ὄρεξις κίνησις. 


1 Stapfer’s statement (A7vit. Siud., p, 21) “Ero STUVWX ὅτι" will mislead no 
one. By a similar inadvertence he has (p. 23) interchanged the authorities for 403 a 29 
ὁρίσαιντο and ὁρίσαιτο. 

2 See Stapfer, Stwd., p. 5. 


Ixxvi INTRODUCTION. ΜΝ 


From the instances given under (A) we may at once conclude 
that neither any single manuscript of the group S-X nor their 
common archetype was copied from cod. EF, but we cannot directly 
infer that cod. E was not copied from the archetype of group 
S-X, for the omissions in cod. E, even the larger ones, are acci- 
dental. But the passages adduced under (B) sufficiently prove that 
cod. E is independent of the archetype of the group S-X. Chance 
might account for two or three or even a dozen variations, but 
not for 50. There can be no connexion between cod, EH and the 
archetype of the group S-X. 

But had the six manuscripts of the group S-X a common 
archetype? Yes: not because of the common omissions, which 
are few and insignificant, but because of such variants as the 
following: 403a 19 σημεῖον : μηνύει, the transposition of 4oga 5 
already noticed, 425 1 χολὴν ὅτι : ὅτε χολή, 426b 2 λιπαρὰ: 
πικρά, 4344 3 λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχουσα : λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα. 
Taken singly, the manuscripts of the group S-X are full of 
mistakes. There are inany cases where they diverge frem cach 
other in all manner of ways; but, as soon as we get a reaclings 
or arrangement of the words which presents a noteworthy differ- 
ence from that of cod. If, they all agree. In fact, it has been 
proposed to use a fresh symbol for the agreement of the proup 
S-X, as opposed to cod. FE. 

But can we say how the manuscripts of the group S-X are 
related to each other? For example, in 403b 2 UX have εἶδος, 
ST VW ὁ δὲ or ὅδε. Possibly the genuine tradition of the arche- 
type may have come down to us in the numerical minority of the 
representatives of the group. It may be that four of the six 
represent one lost codex of equal value with the remaining twe. 
Let us consider, besides 403 Ὁ 2 just mentioned, where UX have 
εἶδος, ST V, like E, ὁ δὲ and ΚΝ ὅδε, 402a τὸ ἀπόδειξίς τίς, where 
τίς is omitted, not only by TU W Χ, but also by E; 403 b 26 δυοῖν 
TU, δυεῖν Εἰ, δνσὶ SVWX; 40o4gb 31 ἀσωμάτους XK, ἀσωμάτοις 
ESTUVW; 4054 If λεπτομέρειαν corr. E and T, μικρομέρειαν pr. 
EUVWX, pixporerrropépecav S; 408 Ὁ ὃ τὸ V, τῷ reliqui codd.; 
410a 6 γένοντο TVW, ἀγένοντο ES UX; 410b 30 δὲ TWX anel 
corr. E, δὴ reliqui codd.; 425a2 τοῦ δι’ TW, τοῖν L,om ES UV Κα; 
426 a 1 εἴπειεν T W, εἴποιεν EH L, εἴπτου y, φήσειεν SUV X; g29b 13 
ἔχοντυ TW X,om. EL SUV; 429b 20 ἄλλο ἘΝ X, ἄλλῳ reliqui 
codd.; 431 Ὁ 27 τὸ TW, room. ELSUVX; 432a5 ἐν TWX, ἐν 
om.E LS UV; 433b τό sq. τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν TW X, room. EL SUV. 


INTRODUCTION. II Ixxvii 


Cod. T and cod. W almost universally go together in the third 
book. 

Another circumstance confirms the conclusion that the six 
manuscripts of the group S-X are derived from a common arche- 
type. After cod. E had been copied, it was subjected to much 
revision and many corrections were entered, either between the 
lines or in the margin. A great number of these, which on palaco- 
graphical grounds are attributed to a second hand, agree in the 
main with the readings of the S-X group. Hence it may be 
inferred that the reviser, whether the original scribe or someone 
clsc!, collated cod. E with a manuscript which, whether it was 
or was not the archetype of the group S-X, agreed generally with 
the clistinctive readings of that group. In other words, corr. E 
agrees in the main with the manuscripts of the group S-X where 
they differ from the first hand? of E. Let us assume, then, that 
the text of Books I. and 111, has come down by two independent 
traclitions. The variations in Book 11. are of minor importance, 
whether because, as Torstrik supposed, cod. E in the second Book 
follows a different authority from that which it follows in the other 
two Books, or because the two traditions never diverged to the 
same extent in this Book as in the others. It cannot be claimed 
that cither is infallible. To begin with (A) omissions and insertions: 
if we examine the several instances in detail, the presumption is 
that the omissions are due to carelessness. The good manuscript 
E has this peculiarity in common with the late manuscript P? of 
the Politics, that it is apt to omit small words. It would be 
absurd to prefer a text which omitted 403a 6 δέ, 4038 18 γάρ, 
407b 9 γε (cf. 407 b 32, 409 a 30), 408b 15 οὔσης, 408 Ὁ 19 οὖσα, 

1 In Books 1. and wu. Stapfer distinguishes three hands E, ἘΞ, E*, admitting that ἘΞ 
is hardly to be distinguished from E and that Ἐδ is the same hand in which Book 11. is 
copied: ‘Kae igitur [correctiones] plurimae inveniuntur in primo et tertio libro, aliquot in 
secundo. Alterius vero manus scriptura proxime accedit ad prioris manus similitudinem. 
Etenim ab utrius calamo manaverit scriptura, solum cognosci potest cum ex aliarum 
quarundam litterarum forma, tum ex diphthongo “ει facillime concluditur..,Accedit, ut 
secunda manus aliquoties litteras radendo, prior nonnisi expungendo deleat. Tertiae vero 
manus litterarum ductus idem stint ac librarii secundi libri” (Stapfer, Szvaia, p. 4). 

2 See Stapler, ἄγη Stud. p. 34: * Derselbe [der Archetypus von ST ὃν W ΧῚ gilt 
allgemein fiir verloren. Auch ich war dieser Ansicht, bis eingehendere Studien tiber 
die Korrekturen in E mich belehrien, dass die von zweiter Hand nach keiner anderen 


Vorlage gemacht sein kinnen als nach diesem Archetypus. Die Griinde hieftr sind teils 


palivgraphischer, teils kritischer Natur.” 
3 Since ΕἾ is of the tenth century, P4 of the fifteenth, it is quite possible that the 


archetype from which Demetrius Chalcondylas derived his copy may have deserved the 
censure which Newman passes upon it, vol. 11, Ὁ. lvii, 111. p. vil sq., Class. Kev. VII. 


Ῥ- 305- 


Ixxviii INTRODUCTION. Il 


429b 21 dpa, 430a 4 ἡ before θεωρητική (cf. 431b 29, 432a 15, 
bis, Ὁ 28, 433b 4), 431 Ὁ 24 εἷς, 432b 13 Ti, 433b 31 «at: and 
these omissions are doubtless duc to the same haste or care- 
lessness which has mangled the text by curtailment in 400 ἃ 10, 
428 Ὁ 7, 428 Ὁ 3 sq., 432 a 2, as well as by the longer lacunae already 
enumerated. Only three times does it appear that cod. FE is un- 
doubtedly right in its omissions; 426b 1, 429b 8, 433b 3. For 
my part, though I have not had the courage of my opinion, 1 
think that in 428b 2 φαίνεται δέ ye καὶ ψευδῆ is an improvement?: 
while, if we compare 433a 9 with 433a 17, two passages which 
ought to be similarly worded, the balance of probability surely 
inclines to the supposition that in both the scribe of FE. or of its 
archetype is at his old trick of omitting a small word, even though 
in the former passage all our other sources join in the error, On 
the other hand, cod. IX seems redundant in 407b 24, 411 b 4. 24), 
425b 3, 429b 11, 13 (zs), 16: and that this, too, is due to care- 
lessness is very evident in the dittography of ἁ δεὸ καὶ 425 b 3 and 
the impossible article in 429b 16. (133) aN comparison, again, 
of the variations which depend either upon a different word (ea. 
403 ἃ 19 σημεῖον : μηνύει) or a different inflexion of the same word 
shows that, although I. is undoubtedly the best manuscript, it has no 
decisive superiority over the common archetype of the τὸν proup. 
The text printed in this edition, which differs very little from Torstrik 
and still less from Biehl, agrees in this respect 23 times with cod. Ie 
against the S-X group and 29 times with the latter against cod. Fe, 
On the other hand, out of 15 instances where the same words are 
differently arranged in cod. KE and in the S-X group, I follow my 
predecessors in preferring the order of cod. EF 12 times and the 
order of the S-X group only 3 times, viz. 411 b 21, 4334 9, 
433b 18: though, as will be seen from my note on the last 
passage, I incline to think that there also the order given by 
cod. E may have been that of the original text. Bich] himself, 
who of all editors adhered most closely to cod. E, sometimes 
departed from it, and I have gone still further in this directicn, 
as in 4028 12, 4028 19, 403b 17, 4078 26, 27, 408 a 21, 415 ἃ £7, 
418 Ὁ 22, 4208 4, 427 ἃ 14, 428b 4, 431 b 25, 26, 431 b27. On 
the other hand, I return to the reading of cod. E in 4o4b τος 
4138 298q., 4268 27, 433 Ὁ 17. 

Two other manuscripts have been collated since Bekker com- 
pleted his labours. The one is Parisiensis 2034, collated by 


* To the lemma of Philoponus sos, 15 I attach little value for reasons given below. 


LNTRODUCTION. JIT Ixxix 


Trendelenburg and called by him P. Belger, however, preferred 
to denote it by y and has been followed by subsequent editors. 
It offers many peculiarities, which may sometimes be due to 
conjectural emendation or to the arbitrary selection of a scribe 
who was acquainted with the variations in older manuscripts. 
The other is Vaticanus 1339, from which Rabe published a 
collation of the second Book in 1891. Its symbol is P. 
Besides certain essays by Alexander of Aphrodisias! and his own 
treatise De Azuma, in which he follows the lines of Aristotle’s, we 
have two paraphrases, one by Themistius and one by Sophonias. 
These are not, however, entirely paraphrase: a large proportion of 
commentary is interspersed. We have also two commentaries, 
one by Simplicius, the other ostensibly by Philoponus. Hayduck, 
who has re-edited Philoponus, inclines to think (p. v) that the 
commentary on Book III. is not by the same author as that upon 
Books I. and I1., and attributes it conjecturally to Stephanus, the 
author of the extant commentary on Περὶ ἑρμηνείας. Four of 
these writers go back centuries beyond our oldest manuscript. 
Alexander lived at the end of the second century A.D., Themistius 
belongs to the latter half of the fourth, while Simplicius and Phi- 
loponus were contemporaries in the reign of Justinian in the sixth 
century. Of Sophonias Fabricius’ says: “Quis ille Sophonias 
fuerit et quando vixerit, non liquet.” But an extant manuscript 
of his paraphrase is of the thirteenth or fourteenth century. The 
writings of Alexander, including his lost commentary on De Anima, 
were used by all his successors, and Simplicius and Philoponus 
betray an acquaintance with Themistius’. So far, then, the sug- 
gestion of a continuous tradition among the commentators of 
Aristotle may be readily admitted. But with Alexander our 
stream of tradition stops: a gap of five centuries separates him 
from Aristotle and Theophrastus. It is a perfectly gratuitous 
assumption that these later commentators represent the unbroken 
tradition of the Peripatetic School‘, especially as Alexander is the 


1 viz. those collected in pp. ro1—r150 of the AZazrissa (formerly known as the second 
book of his De Anima), also’ Amoplat καὶ λύσεις I. 2, 8, 11a, τα’ 17, 26, 11. 2, 8, 9, 10, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 111. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, llept κράσεως καὶ αὐξήσεως, pp. 213 sqq., ed. Bruns. 

2 As cited by Trend.%, Ὁ. xi. 

8 Simpl. 151, 14, Philop. 408, 25; 409, 33 410, I. 353; 418, 25; 450, 9. 19; 508,203 
514, 29. Cf. also Priscianus Lydus, Proven. Solutionun, 42, 18. 

4 Rodier, vol. 1. p. ii: ““En Hsant ces commentaires, on s’apergoit bientét que ceux 
qui les ont dcrits possédaient, pour l’exégése d’Aristote, des traditions qui remontaient 
jusqu’a ses disciples immédiats,”’ 


Ixxx INTRODUCTION. Il 


only one of them who can be reckoned as a genuine Peripatetic. 
For the interpretation and criticism of Aristotle in the earlicst 
days of the school our only authority is Priscianus Lydus, a con- 
temporary of Simplicius and Philoponus, who wrote Jletaphrasis 
iz Theophrastum. A portion of this is preserved and was edited 
by Bywater for the Supplementuim cl ristotelscum. 

What aid, then, do these testimonia furnish to the text? From 
the nature of the case they must be subsidiary to ancient manu- 
scripts. A paraphrast may indeed be content to repeat his author 
without change, as Themistius frequently does. But his main 
object is to render the meaning clear, and the freedom with which, 
in the pursuance of this object, he varies either the actual words 
or the arrangement of the words and sentences of his author must, 
even under the most favourable circumstances, render him a very 
unsafe guide to the reconstruction of the text. If anyone thinks 
this a harsh judgment, let him consider what sort of an idea we 
should have of the text of this treatise, supypesing the manuscripts 
and commentaries had been lost and only Themistius and Sopho- 
nias preserved. The problem of determining what text or texts 
the paraphrast had before him is analogous to the problem) of 
determining the reading of. the manuscript or manuscripts used by 
William of Moerbeke when he made his Latin translation. We 
never can be sure that the paraphrast or translator confined him- 
self to a single manuscript. In the particular case of Sophonias, 
however, the difficulty of this problem is greatly diminished. The 
attention bestowed upon him by Trendelenbury, Torstrik, }layduek 
and Stapfer! has established this result, that his paraphrase agrees 
more nearly with cod. IX than with any other of our manuscripts. 
The case of Themistius, Simplicius and Philopouus is different. 
A. study of the critical notes in this edition will show that their 
evidence, such as it is, favours sometimes cod. EK and at other 
times the readings of the S-X group. Sometimes, as may be seen 
from my notes on 4208 4, the words of Themistius suggest one 
reading, but can be shown to be in all probability an intentional 
variation upon the other. The evidence to be obtained from the 
commentaries of Simplicius and Philoponus must in cach case 
be weighed independently of the prefixed lemma. I heartily 
endorse the judgment of Torstrik, p. vi: Philoponi ct Simplicii 
ῥητά nullius sunt momenti. He adds: pertinent enim ad deterioris 


1 Studia, py. th—~23. 


INTRODUCTION. II Ixxxt 


familiae codices: licebatque eos negligere uno excepto loco Sed 
quum in Philoponi commentario passim natarent quaedam ῥητά 
antiquiora et librariorum errore cum ipsa interpretatione com- 
mixta, haec exscripsi...duabus de causis: primum quod habent 
quaedam bona: deinde ne nocerent: possunt enim facile pro iis 
haberi quae ipse Philoponus apud Aristotelem legerit. It is by 
no means certain that the lemma comes from the commentator 
at all: at most, he was probably content for brevity to indicate 
the first words and the last, with ἕως τοῦ interposed, or the first 
words followed by καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, a practice which may still occasion- 
ally be detected in Simplicius, eg. zz Phys. 50, 5; 113, 20; 
114. 233 440, 18; 935, 21; 1220, 27; De Antma 71, τι sq.; 76, 13; 
93,15; 99, 5; 163, 27: 192, 22; cf. Philop. 431, 30. Subsequent 
copyists would expand the lemma! and piously supply the missing 
words from the best text of Aristotle available, without paying 
much regard to the incications of the commentary appended. 
This may be illustratecl by a comparison of the Aldine editions 
of Simplicius and Philoponus with those recently edited by 
Hayduck. Trincavellus took his lemma with almost unfailing 
regularity from the Aldine edition of Aristotle. This fact is many 
times admitted by HTaycduck in the course of his critical apparatus. 
See, 6g., 315, 8; 374, 14; 388, 11; 394, 335 423, 25; 425,1; 441, 12; 
451,29; 461,13 467,25; 473, 30; 483,17; 492, 22; 498, 12; 505, 15; 
513, 21; 530, 28; 533, 14; 553,175 562, 5; 569,25; 606, 3. But 
the same thing is true of scores of passages where Hayduck has 
not pointed out the dependence of Trincavellus upon the Aldine, 
eg., Philop. 179, 27 καὶ om.; 181, 10 δέ; 189, 8 παραλογώτερον ; 
189, 28 ὠπολαβεῖν; 76. wepl insert.; 192, 14 τῇ οτὰ.; 210, 26 ὕλη; 
236, 14 καὶ ὥσπερ; 236, ι5 οὕτω Kal; 237,27 καὶ πότερον μόρια; 
260, 4 δὲ τὸ; 200, 26 τὰ μέν; 263, 25 λόγον; 267, 18 τῶν ἐν τοῖς 
ξῶσεν ὄμγων; 273, 34 ἔστι δέ; 274, 25 ἡ ψυχή; 283, 21 ἔτι τροφή 
πάσχει TL; 284, 30 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐδέ; 320, 2 ὅτε Om.; 345, 31 δὲ καί; 
423, 26 ἔκδηλον; 477, 3 54. μέν, ὅταν ἄγηται, εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἀμευγῆ 
ὄντα ὥγεται εἷς; 524, τῷ αὐτοῦ; 585, 17 post κινοῦν add. πρώτως. 
In all these cases the reading indicated must have come from the 
Aldine edition. It is not known from any manuscript of De 
Antma. Besides these differences, wherever the Aldine edition 
presents a peculiar order of words, this order is adopted by Trin- 
cavellus for the lemma of Philoponus. Asulanus made a similar 
use of the Aldine Aristotle for his edition of Simplicius, as may 


1 Trincavellus certainly did this. See Hayduck’s critical notes on Philop. 211, 9; 288, 
223 204, 103 461, 1, 


Ixxxil INTRODUCTION. Lf 


be seen from such instances as Simpl. 11, 1; 16, 31; 23, 1; 72, 17; 
82,13; 271, 11. It is reasonable to infer that the same thing had 
been done before. For, even when the interference of the Aldine 
Aristotle is excluded, as it is in Hayduck’s edition, lemma and in- 
terpretation are not always completely in accord. See for example 
Philop. 247, 13; 303, 31; 461, 1, where Hayduck has adapted the 
lemma to suit the interpretation (as he has also done e.g. 475, 28; 
534,173 574,23); 553,17. Compare also 45, 16 σώματος with 46, 5 
τοῦ σώματος; 186, 22 with 186, 24; 241, 16 with 241, 21 and 261, 15; 
315, 7 with 315, 10; 348, 9 with 348, 10; 377, 32 with 378, τ; 
425, 1 with 425, 22; 493,15 with 493,17; 560, 23 with 560, 26. 
The same tendency is seen in Themistius, and the last editor, 
Heinze, may be within his rights in altering the words or the 
order of the words in the paraphrase, in spite of his manuscripts, 
to ensure consistency with the context as a whole. Two notable 
instances are Them. 116, 18, where Heinze has substituted τῶλλα 
for ταῦτα, and Them. 58, 9 sq., where the alteration affects the 
order of the words, The commentators, then, as distinct from 
their copyists, are only to be held responsible for those variants 
which they cither distinctly attest by διττὴ ἡ γραφὴ and the like 
or cite verdatine in the course of their interpretations. Even then 
caution is needed, since Philoponus is not alone in using φησὶν 
for a paraphrase and alteration of the Aristotclian text, much as 
Froude may be said to have violated the sanctity of inverted! 
commas when he printed between them his own abstracts of the 
documents he cited. AI] beyond this is matter of inference, often 
no doubt correct, but seldom sufficiently strong to stifle a feeling 
of uneasiness and uncertainty. For the rest, the readings of 
Simplicius and Philoponus, and indeed of Alexander and Plutarch 
in the few cases where we have information about them, do net 
seem uniformly to favour either cod. FE oor the S-N group. A 
few instances of bad readings are appended. In 431 a 24 Simpli- 
cius read ὁμογενῆ: if he had consulted Philuponus §61, 6 sq. he 
might have found the right reading, μὴ ὁμογενῆ. In giGh 27 
Alexander and Simplicius read κω οῦν μόνον with the S-X group, 
while cod. KH hag the support of Themistius and Sephonias, Vhile- 
ponus knew both readings (288, 10 5.) Where the manuscripts 
leave us in the lurch, it is seldom that a commentator helps us out, 
as Simplicius undoubtedly does in 403 b 12 by reading 7, not 7, and 
in 431a23 by reading ὄν, not ὅν, It is very sivnificant that in 
both these cases the change required is a change of breathing, 
which would not be indicated in an uncial manuscript or older 


INTRODUCTION. II Ixxxili 


kind of papyrus. The reader of an ancient book understood as 
no modern can the meaning of the line νοῦς op7 καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, 
τἄλλα κωφὰ Kai τυφλά!. On the other hand compare 431 a II, 
where Simplicius prefers 7 to the 7 which is presented (rightly, 
as I think) by Philoponus. Again, the right sense could some- 
times be got out of a bad reading. Thus in 431 b17 Simplicius 
read with most of the S-X group ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέρ- 
γείαν τὰ πράγματα νοῶν, but he escaped the absurdity which results 
from such a reading by suggesting that τὰ πράγματα should be 
transposed to precede ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν (Simpl. 279, 7-9). In short, 
the text which the commentators had before them was substantially 
the same as that of our manuscripts. They all found in it μαρτυρεῖ 
TO νῦν λεχθὲν 410a 29, τῶν αἰτίων 430b 25, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον 
434Ὁ 4sq. Where we are perplexed, so as a rule were they, and 
we look to them in vain to solve the riddle of such passages 
as 403 Ὁ 2,407 ἃ II, 407b 285sq., 408 a 255q., 411 b 25, 4128 17, 
425 b 1, 2, 4268 27, 427 ἃ 10, 13, 14, 428 Ὁ 198q., 428 Ὁ 30—429 a 2, 
430 Ὁ 148qq., 26sqq., 433 Ὁ 17, 18, 434a I2—15. 


1 Epicharmus apud Plut., De Sollertia animalium, g6t A. 


EXPLICANTUR SIGLA 


QUIBUS IN APPARATU CRITICO USI SUMUS. 


E, codex Parisiensis 1853. 

L, 5 Vaticanus 253. 

P, 4,  Vaticanus 1339, ex ed. H. Rabe. 

S, Laurentianus δι. 

T, 5  Vaticanus 256. 

U, ,  Vaticanus 260. 

V, »  Vaticanus 266. 

W, , Vaticanus 1026, 

xX, 5, «&mbrosianus H 50. 

y,; 5,  Paristensis 2034. 

m, ,,  Parisiensis 192t. 

Ald., eclitio Aldina. 

Basil, 4, Basileensis tertia. 

Sylb., ,,. Sylburgiana. 

Bek, 4, Bekkeri Academica. 

Trend, 5 ‘Trendelenburp'ii, 

Torst., » Torstriki. 

Bus. 4 Bussemakeri (Didotiana) 

Bhi, 5 Biehl. 

Κι, »  Rodiert. 

Bon., Bontts. 

Alex., Alexander Aphrodisiensis. 

Them., Themistius. 

Simpl., Simplicius. 

Philop., Philoponus. 

Soph., Sophonias. 

Prisc. Lyd., Prisetanus Lydus. 

vet. trans., vetusta translatio latina ex editione Juntina, Venet. 1530, et 
Thomae Aquinatis op. tom. XX., ed. Parmae 1866. 

BJ., Jahresbericht iib. die Fortschr. ete. herausy. v. C. Bursian ete, 


ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ. 


1 


ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ A. 


Τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, μᾶλ- 
λον δ᾽ ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ Kat ἀκρίβειαν ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε 
=> a ‘ Ἢ ΝΗ 
καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, δι’ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὴν περὶ τῆς ψυ- 
Ἂ ς , > / * 3 , θ 4 ὃ ἴω δὲ '᾿ 
χῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως ἂν ἐν πρώτοις τιθείημεν. OOKEL OE καὶ 
πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἣ γνῶσις αὐτῆς μεγάλα συμβάλ- 
‘ 
λεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν- ἔστι yap οἷον ἀρχὴ 
~ , 2 σὰ \ A ‘ - ΄ » 
τῶν ζῴων. ἐπιζητοῦμεν δὲ θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνώναι τήν τε φύ- 
3. AN ‘ ‘ 3 f oA ΜΨ ξ ‘ ? , 
σιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, εἶθ᾽ ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν᾽ 
ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι 
ἐκείνην καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν. πάντῃ δὲ πάντως ἐστὶ τῶν 
χαλεπωτάτων λαβεῖν τινὰ πίστιν περὶ αὐτῆς. καὶ yap ὄν- 
TOS κοινοῦ τοῦ ζητήματος καὶ πολλοῖς ἑτέροις, λέγω δὲ τοῦ περὶ 
τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι, τάχ᾽ dv τῳ δόξειε μία τις εἶναι 
Ed Ν / 4 Tt a o~ ᾿ > 
μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων περὶ ὧν βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τὴν ov- 
ν᾽ Vd Ν “ ‘ ‘ ἰδί > >) ἐ 
σίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, 
4 lA ¥ N la ¢ ᾿ δ ,»Ὰ» f 
ὥστε ζητητέον ἂν ein τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην. εἶ δὲ μή ἐστι μία 
τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον 
γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι: δεήσει γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκα- 
ὁ ς f ‘ ἈΝ Ἀ εχ ‘4 > + ¢ , 
στον τίς ὁ τρόπος. ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν ἢ, πότερον ἀπόδειξίς τίς 
ἐστιν ἢ διαίρεσις Kai τις ἄλλη μέθοδος, ἔτι πολλὰς 


Codices EST ΟΝ ΚΥ Χγ: libro secundo P, libro tertio L. 

I. μᾶλλον...3. εἶναι Alexander Philopono teste spuria notabat i 2. recom. Καὶ Torst., lege: 
runt Philop, Soph. || 3. ταῦτα om, If Torst., leg. Philop. Soph. et, ut videtur, Them. 1, 18 3 
περὶ οἵα. STUWX Bek. Trend., add. Soph. Torst. {τῆς om. Vy Soph. ἢ g. καινὰ pro 
δι’ ἐκείνην y, τὰ δὲ κοινὰ καὶ rots ζώοις δι' ἐκείνην U, receptum textum tuenturs Ther. 
Soph. || ro. δὲ καὶ πάντως ST UV Wy, πάντῃ δὲ πάντως etiam Philop. | ra. καὶ om 
EX Bek. Trend. Biehl Rodier || 13. τὸ] τοῦ SVWKX Philop. Bek. Trencl., τὰ TU 
15. ἀπόδειξιν SUWX Bek., ἡ ἀπόδειξις T, ἀπόδειξιν etiam Soph. ἢ 17. καὶ κοινή ris 
ὌΝ ΧΥ || τὸ] τοῦ STUWX || 19. post τρόπος virgulam Bek. | ὅταν SU W, af V, 


4028 


DE ANIMA. Βοοκ I. 


Cognition is in our eyes a thing of beauty and worth, and this 1 
is true of one cognition more than another, either because it is 
exact or because it relates to more important and remarkable 
objects. On both these grounds we may with good reason claim 
a high place for the enquiry concerning the soul. It would seem, 
too, that an acquaintance with the subject contributes greatly to 
the whole domain of truth and, more particularly, to the study of 
nature, the soul being virtually the principle of all animal life. 

Our aim is to discover and ascertain the nature and 

The sub- : 

ject of essence of soul and, in the next place, all the accidents 
“we belonging to it; of which some are thought to be 
attributes peculiar to the soul itself, while others, it is held, belong 
to the animal also, but owe their existence to the soul. But every- 2 
where and in every way it is extremely difficult to arrive at any 
trustworthy conclusion on the subject. It is the same here as in 
many other enquiries. What we have to investigate is the essential 
nature of things and the What. It might therefore be thought 
that there is a single procedure applicable to all the objects 
whose essential nature we wish to discover, as demonstration is 
applicable to the properties which go along with them: in that case 
we should have to enquire what this procedure is. If, however, 
there is no single procedure common to all sciences for defining 
the What, our task becomes still more difficult, as it will then be 
necessary to settle in each particular case the method to be 
pursued. Further, even if it be evident that it consists in demon- 
stration of some sort or division or some other procedure, there 
ἐὰν etiam Simpl. p. 10, 4 || τις post ἀπόδειξις om. pr. ET U WX, etiam Philop. Biehl (in 


alt. ed.) || 20. post μέθοδος punctum Bek. || ἔτε δὲ πολλὰς TU V W Bek., δὲ om. etiam 
Soph. 


4 DE ANIMA I CH. 1 


“~ ¥ 
ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ πλάνας, ἐκ τίνων det ζητεῖν: ἄλλαι yap 
Ἂν 3 ,ὔ / 3 a \ 3 , 
ἄλλων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμών καὶ ἐπιπέδων. 

3 πρῶτον δ᾽ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί 
> 7 ‘ / , Ν > 4 A Ν a Ν +) , 
ἐστι, λέγω δὲ πότερον τόδε TL καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ Kat τις 
ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν 25 

΄ μ ‘A on > ᾽ , , ‘ ¥ 
δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά Tiss διαφέρει yap ov τι 

4 σμικρόν. σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἶ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον 402 Ὁ 
ε δὴ ha Ν mal “An 3 δὲ ‘ εξ ὃ / f 
ὁμοειδὴς amaca ψυχὴ ἢ οὐ" εἰ OE μὴ ὁμοειδὴς, πότερον 
μά Ζ x ΄ ΜᾺ Ν Ν ¢ 4 ‘ 
εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ γένει. νῦν μὲν yap οἱ λέγοντες καὶ ζη- 
τοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης ἐοίκασιν ἐπι- 

ra 3 ? > Ὁ \ ᾽ ? e € / 
ς σκοπεῖν. εὐλαβητέον δ᾽ ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὃ λό- 5 
7A 3 ᾽ὔ ? ¢ A > « , Ψ - 
γος αὐτῆς ἐστί, καθάπερ ζῴου, ἢ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἕτερος, οἷον 
¥ / 3 ’ ΤᾺ δ ‘ Ὰ Ν ‘ ¥ > 
ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι od- 
, 3 aA Ὁ ε ΄ δὲ Ἄ ¥ Ν ¥ 
θέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον: ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο KaTN- 

6 yopotro: ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ μὴ πολλαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀλλὰ μόρια, πότερον δεῖ 
ζητεῖν πρότερον τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἢ τὰ μόρια. χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ 10 
τούτων διορίσαι ποῖα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ πότερον 
τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ 
νοεῖν ἢ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν: ὁμοίως 

‘ ‘ > NS “ ¥ > ‘ ‘ ¥ ΄ a ‘ad 

7 δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ay 
τις ἀπορήσειεν εἶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερα τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον 

8 τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοῦ. ἔοικε δ᾽ 
οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι 

~~ Ψ Pa’ 

τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς 

/ f ‘ > fs ‘ / κι , Ν ν 3 7 

μαθήμασι τί τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ καμπύλον ἢ τί γραμμὴ Kal ἐπί. 

πεδον πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν πόσαις ὀρθαῖς αἱ τοῦ τριγώνου γωνίαι 20 
ἴσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέ- 
ya μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστιν: ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχω- 


mt 


5 


46. μᾶλλον] μόνον Ἐὶ (Trend), μᾶλλον tuentur Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. ἢ z+ om 
SVWkXy, legit Soph. {402 b, 2. dporoedds utrobique TUVWX, ὀμυειδὴς tucntur 
Them. Philop. Simpl. || 4. μόνον y Torst., μόνης corr. ἘΣ et reliqui, etiam Them. Philop. 36, 
γ Soph. || 6. ἑκάστην pr. If Torst., etiam Soph., ἕτερον V y, ἕκαστον reliqui ante Torstrikium 
omnes, etiam, ut videtur, Simpl. 13, 4 et Philop. in prooemio ad lib, 11. 205, 20 || 7. δὲ] 
γὰρ V, Alex, da. καὶ Ato. (ed. Bruns) p, 21, 15. 22, 2. 24, 4, etiam Soph. || &. κατηγορῆται 
Εἰ, sed ἡ in rasura (Trend.), κατηγορεῖται Torst., κατηγοροῖτο reliqui, etiam Simpl. Alex. 
23, τὸ || 11. τοῦτο V {|ἀλλήλων ἕτερα X || 12, δεῖ U WX |] rs. πρότερον TUVWX 
Philop. Soph. Bek. Trend. || 16. vof IOV X, in textum recepit Biehl (cf. gaya, 17), 
γοητοῦ ἢ, νοητικοῦ reliqui et scripti et impressi, eliam Philop., pro αἰσθητικοῦ οἱ νοητικοῦ 
legi vult αἰσθάνεσθαι et νοεῖν Belger, Llermes, 1878, p. 302, at αὐσθητικοῦ etiam Philop. ἢ 
19. kalrizvdn. SU Wy, καὶ τί κι TX |] aa. εἰδῆσαι STU W Xy, εἰδήσειν V. 


CH. I 402 a 2I—402 Ὁ 22 5 


is still room for much perplexity and error, when we ask from 
what premisses our enquiry should start, for there are different 
premisses for different sciences; for the science of numbers, for 
example, and plane geometry. 

The first thing necessary is no doubt to determine under which 3 
The of the summa genera soul comes and what it is ; I mean, 
problems. whether it is a particular thing, ie. substance, or is 
quality or is quantity, or falls under any other of the categories 
already determined. We must further ask whether it is amongst 
things potentially existent or is rather a sort of actuality, the 
distinction being all-important. Again, we must consider whether 4 
it is divisible or indivisible; whether, again, all and every soul is 
homogencous or not; and, if not, whether the difference between 
the various souls is a difference of species or a difference of genus: 
for at present cliscussions and investigations about soul would 
appear to be restricted to the human soul. We must take care not 5 
to overlook the question whether there is a single definition of soul 
τα there answering to a single definition of animal; or whether 
asingle there is a different definition for each separate soul, as for 

horse and dog, man and god: animal, as the universal, 
being reyardecd either as non-existent or, if existent, as logically 
posterior. This is a question which might equally be raised in 
regard to any other common predicate. Further, on the assump- 6 
tion that there are not several souls, but merely several different 
Questions = Parts in the same soul, it is a question whether we should 
of pro- begin by investigating soul as a whole or its several 
cedure. «oy Ὁ , . . 

parts. And here again it is difficult to determine which 
of these parts are really distinct from one another and whether the 
several parts, or their functions, should be investigated first. Thus, 
eg. should the process of thinking come first or the mind that 
thinks, the process of sensation or the sensitive faculty? And so 
everywhere else. But, if the functions should come first, again 7 
will arise the question whether we should first investigate the 
correlative objects. Shall we take, eg., the sensible object before 
the faculty of sense and the intelligible object before the intellect ? 

It would seem that not only is the knowledge of a thing’s 8 
A teat of essential nature useful for discovering the causes of its 
a good ς attributes, as, ¢.g., in mathematics the knowledge of what 

‘ is meant by the terms straight or curved, line or surface, 
aids us in discovering to how many right angles the angles of a 
triangle are equal: but also, conversely, a knowledge of the 
attributes is a considerable aid to the knowledge of what a thing is. 


6 DE ANIMA I CH. I 


μεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκό- 
A on f 
των, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας 
Ν, 3 Ν, 
ἕξομέν τι λέγειν κάλλιστα: πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ 25 
a ῪᾺ [4 ‘ 
τί ἐστιν, ὦστε καθ᾽ ὅσους τῶν ὁρισμῶν μὴ συμβαίνει τὰ συμ- 
βεβηκότα γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐ- 4038 
a a a Ψ 
μαρές, δῆλον ὅτι διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηνται καὶ κενῶς ἅπαντες. 
3 / > »¥ Ν Ν , aa οὐ / / 3 / 
9 ἀπορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι Tav- 
ΝᾺ oe ων »¥ 
Ta κοινὰ Kal τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστί τι Kal τῆς ψυχῆς ὕδιον αὖ- 
~ ans 1. ἴω \ 4 ω > c # / , 
τῆς: τοῦτο yap λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, ov ῥᾷάδιον δέ. φαίνε- 5 
Tat δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ 
™ Ὄ 3 , ™~ > ~ wd > / 
ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. 
; > ὃ» ¥ N ΝᾺ 3 > 2 Ν N “~ ? 
μάλιστα δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν- εἶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία 
Ὁ . » , 3 3 ? > ἃ OS “a > Κ᾿ 
τις H μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ évdéyour ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἄνευ 
το σώματος εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστί τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ 
, » 3 7 5. ἃ > N ? > ‘ 
παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι: εἰ δὲ μη- 
» a ΡᾺ 
θέν ἐστιν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ 
A Ὁ ~ 
εὐθεῖ, ἢ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον ἅπτεσθαι τῆς χαλ.- 
κῆς σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ μέντοι γ᾽ ἅψεται οὕτω χωρι- 
σθὲν τὸ εὐθύ: ἀχώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ ἀεὶ μετὰ σώματός TE 15 
νός ἐστιν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι με- 
Ν 4 / ? f ἂν / ἂν 
τὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι 
Ἃ “ 
χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν: ἅμα yap τούτοις πά- 
σχει τι τὸ σῶμα. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐν- 
ca 4 
ἀργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φο- 20 
βεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ᾽ ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν 
ΜᾺ »ΝἬ Ψ 
ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται. ἔτι 
Ν “ a 
δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον φανερόν" μηθενὸς yap φοβεροῦ συμβαΐνον- 
τος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου. εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως 
¥ Sar Ψ ‘ ‘6 λό ¥ λ , 3° τ cy 
ἔχει, ONAOV OTL TA TAO) λόγοι EVVAOL εἰσιν. WOTE OL OPOL 35 


= 


© 


25. τί λέγειν TU V, re insert. Ey Simpl. Soph. || drs κάλλιστα TV X y, τι κάλλιον ὟΝ, 
κάλλιστα etiam Simpl, Philop. || yap tuentur praeter onines codd. Philop. Alex. apud Philep. 
Simpl. || 403 a, 6. δὲ om. E || τῶν μὲν EX y Philop. Soph. Torst., μὲν om. reliqui ante 
Torst. omnes || dvev τοῦ σώμ. E Philop. Soph. Torst., τοῦ om. reliqui ante Torst. omnes ἢ 
8. ἰδίω SWXy, Simpl. Philop. Trend. ed. pr., cov etiam E, sed ον in ras., ὦ superser. 
(Bhl.), ἔδιον etiam Them. Soph. || 9. ἄνευ rod σώμ. Wy et, ut videtur, Philop. 46, 5, χοῦ 
om. etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 13. ἢ εὐθεῖ W et Ey, 9 εὐθύ Ἰὼ (Stapf) Il 14. οὕτω 
solus E et Bonitz (Hermes VIL, 417), reliqui ante Biehlium omnes τούτου, etiam Philop, 
Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 7, 28 |] 18. καὶ τὸ μισεῖν SW X | γὰρ et χορ. 710m. Ἐς, leg. 
Soph. || dua...19. σῶμα unc. inel. Torst., tuentur haec verba praeter codd, Simpl. Philop., 


CH. I 402 Ὁ 23—403 a 25 7 


For when we are able to give an account of all, or at any rate 
most, of the attributes as they are presented to us, then we shall 
be in a position to define most exactly the essential nature of the 
thing. In fact, the starting point of every demonstration is a 
definition of what something is. Hence the definitions which lead 
to no information about attributes and do not facilitate even con- 
jecture respecting them have clearly been framed for dialectic and 
are void of content, one and all. 

A further difficulty arises as to whether all attributes of theg 
Soul and soul are also shared by that which contains the soul or 
body. whether any of them are peculiar to the soul itself: a 
question which it is indispensable, and yet by no means easy, to 
decide. It would appear that in most cases soul neither acts nor is 
acted upon apart from the body: as, e.g., in anger, confidence, desire 
and sensation in general. Thought, if anything, would seem to be 
peculiar to the soul. Yet, if thought is a sort of imagination, or 
not independent of imagination, it will follow that even thought 
cannot be independent of the body. If, then, there be any of the ro 
functions or affections of the soul peculiar to it, it will be possible 
for the soul to be separated from the body: if, on the other hand, 
there is nothing of the sort peculiar to it, the soul will not be 
capable of separate existence. As with the straight line, so with 
it. The line, gud straight, has many properties; for instance, it 
touches the brazen sphere at a point; but it by no means follows 
that it will so touch it if separated. In fact it is inseparable, since 
it is always conjoined with body of some sort. So, too, the 
attributes of the soul appear to be all conjoined with body: such 
attributes, viz., as anger, mildness, fear, pity, courage; also joy, 
love and hate; all of which are attended by some particular 
affection of the body. This indeed is shown by the fact that some- 
times violent and palpable incentives occur without producing in 
us exasperation or fear, while at other times we are moved by 
slight and scarcely perceptible causes, when the blood is up and 
the bodily condition that of anger. Still more is this evident from 
the fact that sometimes even without the occurrence of anything 
terrible men exhibit all the symptoms of terror. If this be so, 
the attributes are evidently forms or notions realised in matter. 


e.g. 50, 22, Soph. || 19. σημεῖον E Torst., μηνύει reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Them. 
Soph. || μὲν ὑπὸ ἰσχ. TU V WX Soph. || 21. δ᾽ δὲ καὶ UV Wy, om. καὶ etiam Them, 
Soph. || é4x ST V WX Soph., ὅταν etiam Simpl. || 23. μᾶλλον τοῦτο ST VW X y, τούτου 
μᾶλλον coni. Torst., τούτῳ coni. Christ || 25. ὅτι καὶ τὰ U Vy || ἐν ὕλη ET, ἔνυλοε etiam 
Them. Philop. Soph. 


II 


8 DE ANIMA I CH. I 


ΜᾺ @ \ 3 , ? , ral δὶ ra A 
τοιοῦτοι οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ TOLOVOL σώματος ἢ 
, «ἡ ὃ , eon ἡὃ 9 7 \ ὃ \ A +5 
μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα NOH 

A , κε on , 
φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης. 
διαφερόντως δ᾽ ἂν ὁρίσαιντο φυσικός τε καὶ διαλεκτικὸς 
ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργὴ τί ἐστίν" ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυ- 

σὰ ΜᾺ Φ 
πήσεως ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος 


ἢ θερμοῦ. τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὃ δὲ τὸ 403Ὁ 


5 a 
εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον. ὁ μὲν yap λόγος εἶδος τοῦ πράγματος, 
> + > 4 Ν > ¢ > » y > “ 
ἀνάγκη δ᾽ εἶναι τοῦτον ἐν ὕλῃ τοιᾳδί, εἰ ἔσται: ὥσπερ οἰκίας 
a Ν ~ 
ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ὅτι σκέπασμα κωλυτικὸν φθορᾶς ὑπ᾽ 


20 


ἀνέμων καὶ ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων, ὁ δὲ φήσει λίθους καὶ ς 


πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα, ἕτερος δ᾽ ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος ἕνεκα των- 
, , > ς \ , , ε ν,νΝ Ψ \ 4 
δί. τίς οὖν ὁ φυσικὸς τούτων; πότερον ὁ περὶ THY ὕλην, τὸν δὲ 
λόγον ἀγνοῶν, ἢ ὃ περὶ τὸν λόγον μόνον; ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐξ 
3 κ᾿ 3 ’ Ν \ ’ ¢ “ x > ¥ ξ ‘ 
ἀμφοῖν. ἐκείνων δὲ δὴ τίς ἑκάτερος; ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τις ὁ περὶ 
τὰ πάθη τῆς ὕλης τὰ μὴ χωριστὰ μηδ᾽ ἢ χωριστά, ἀλλ᾽ 
ὁ φυσικὸς περὶ ἅπανθ᾽ ὅσα τοῦ τοιουδὲ σώματος καὶ τῆς τοι- 
αὕτης ὕλης ἔργα καὶ πάθη: ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἣ τοιαῦτα, ἀλ- 
λος, καὶ περὶ τινῶν μὲν τεχνίτης, ἐὰν τύχῃ, οἷον τέκτων ἢ 
ἰατρός, τῶν δὲ μὴ χωριστῶν μέν, ἦ δὲ μὴ τοιούτου σώμα- 
- ‘ ? 3» δ ε é i \ 
τος πάθη Kal ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁ μαθηματικός, ἢ δὲ κεχωρι- 
a € a ? ? > 3 id + € + 
σμένα, ὃ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανιτέον ὅθεν ὁ λόγος. 
S Κ' >» ᾧ ν rd a ἴω > Fd ἴων * 
ἐλέγομεν δ᾽ ὅτι τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς 
ὕλης τῶν ζῴων, ἦ δὴ τοιαῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει, θυμὸς καὶ φόβος, 
καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον. 


26. κίνησιν Ἰὼ κίνησις etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph. Cf ad 402 αν 18 || τὰς om. ES Soph, 
rts leg. etiam Simpl. Philop. || 27. ἤδη} δὴ STV Wey, om. X ff 2g. ὁρίσαιτο ᾧ. V, dploaro 
6¢.S5TU WXy Soph. || καὶ ὁ διαλεκτικὸς W y, 60m. etiam Soph. || 31. τοιοῦτο STU V W, 
τοιοῦτον etiam Soph. || verba αἵματος καὶ (vel ἢ) removenda esse censet Steinhart, Syntb. 
Crit. 1843 || 403 b, 1.4] καὶ Ἰὼ Bek. Torst., ἢ etiam Philop. Soph. Trend. || 2. εἶδος rod] 
εἶδος mihi suspectum, ὅδα τοῦ W et, ut videtur, Soph. 8, 35, fortasse recte, ὁ δὲ τοῦ 
EST Vy Simpl. Philop. Plutarchus ap. Simpl. a1, 15. || 3. εἶναι τοιοῦτον V, τοῦτον 
εἶναι W || ἐπὶ οἰκίας Wy || 4. ὅτι) τις S, res ὅτι X, ἂν εἴη TW, ἂν εἴη ὅτι UV { 
5. καυμάτων καὶ ὄμβρων WX, ὄμβρων καὶ πνευμάτων Ἰὼ, textum tuentur etiam Them. 
Philop. Soph. || φησι ΒΨ ΧΥ || καὶ wd.) καὶ om. V {{|6. ἐν om. W it 9. post ἀμφοῖν 
interrogandi signum Bek., correxit Trend. {| 8% om. UV || τὸ. post μὴ χωριστὰ 
virgulam Bek. et Trend., sustulit Torst. {| cx. πάνθ᾽ T, ἅπανθ᾽ etiam E, sed α 
eras. (Stapf) || 709 om. SUW || τοιουδὶ] φνσικοῦ T || 12. ὅσα FE Philop. Torst., το αὶ 
ante Torst. omnes ὁπόσα || ἦν ἘΣ, sed ν expunct. (Stapf), 7 Simpl. Bon. (Metaph. p. 484) 
Torst., omisisse videtur Philop. in interpr. 62, τό, reliqui ante Torst. omnes ὃ || 13. roves 
T, twa UWy, τινῶν etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph. || 1s. 6 om. E, leg. etiam Soph. ἢ 


CH, I 403 a 26—403 Ὁ 19 9 


Hence they must be defined accordingly: anger, for instance, as a 
certain movement in a body of a given kind, or some part or 
faculty of it, produced by such and such a cause and for such and 
such anend. These facts at once bring the investigation of soul, 
Digres- whether in its entirety or in the particular aspect 
sion. described, within the province of the natural philosopher. 
But every such attribute would be differently defined by the 
physicist and the dialectician or philosopher. Anger, for instance, 
would be clefined by the dialectician as desire for retaliation or 
the like, by the physicist as a ferment of the blood or heat 
which is about the heart: the one of them gives the matter, the 
other the form or notion. For the notion is the form of the thing, 
but this notion, if it is to be, must be realised in matter of a 
particular kind; just as in the case of a house. The notion or 
definition of a house would be as follows: a shelter to protect us 
from harm by wind or rain or scorching heat; while another will 
describe it as stones, bricks and timber; and again another as the 
form realised in these materials and subserving given ends. Which 
then of these is the true physicist? Is it he who confines himself 
to the mattcr, while ignoring the form? Or he who treats of the 
form exclusively? 1 answer, it is rather he who in his definition 
takes account of both. What then of each of the othertwo? Or 
shall we rather say that there is no one who deals with proper- 
ties which are not separable nor yet treated as separable, but 
the physicist deals with all the active properties or passive affec- 
tions belonging to body of a given sort and the corresponding 
matter? All attributes not regarded as so belonging he leaves 
to someone else: who in certain cases is an expert, a carpenter, 
for instance, or a physician. The attributes which, though in- 
separable, are not regarded as properties of body of a given sort, but 
are reached by abstraction, fall within the province of the mathe- 
matician: while attributes which are regarded as having separate 
existence fall to the first philosopher or metaphysician. But 
to return to the point of digression. We were saying that the 
Conelu- attributes of the soul are as such,—I mean, as anger and 
sion. fear, inseparable from the physical matter of the animals 
to which they belong, and not, like line and surface, separable in 


thought. 


17. οὔτε ὡς χωριστὰ ex solo E Biehl Rodier, quasi 19. καὶ οὐχ huic οὔτε respondeat, 
sed aut <odre xwpierd > οὔτα aut οὐδὲ pro οὔτε minus incommodi haberet, χωριστὰ ΤΥ X, 
οὐ χωριστὰ Soph. Torst. Dembowski, Woch. f. class. Phil. 1887, p. 430, reliqui ἀχώριστα, 
etiam Them. Philop. Simpl. {| 18. 7 δὴ] ὅ ve U Simpl., εἴ ye T, ἢ X, 7 δὴ etiam Philop. 
Soph. || τοιαύτη X. 


II 


10 DE ANIMA 1 CH. 2 


3 ~ 4 Ἀ ΨᾺ 3 aA “4 ὃ 
ο Επισκοποῦντας δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀναγκαῖον apa διαπο- 20 
ροῦντας περὶ ὧν εὐπορεῖν δεῖ προελθόντας, τὰς τῶν προτέρων 
ἴω 3 
δόξας συμπαραλαμβάνειν ὅσοι τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφήναντο, 
Ψν \ Ν ων > / / 9 δέ Ν 
ὅπως τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰρημένα λάβωμεν, εἰ δέ τι μὴ κα- 
2has, τοῦτ᾽ εὐλαβηθῶμεν. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ζητήσεως προθέσθαι 
Ν ’ ΜᾺ > e / 5 ~ Ν “ ‘ μη 
τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦνθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῃ κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ ἐμψυ- 25 
χον δὴ τοῦ ἀψύχου δυοῖν μάλιστα διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει 
‘ ~ 3 , ᾽ N ‘ ‘ ~ 
τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. παρειλήφαμεν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν προ- 
ΦᾺ ‘ ‘a ‘N Ν ¥ 
γενεστέρων σχεδὸν δύο ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς" φασὶ yap ἔνιοι 
Ν ͵ νΝ ‘ 5 ‘ “ 2 θέ δὲ 
καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν. οἰηθέντες δὲ 
τὸ μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖν ἕτερον, τῶν 30 
f Ν x 3 ΄ > ¥ ‘4 \ 
3 κινουμένων τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι. ὅθεν Δημόκριτος μὲν 
A \ ΄ > AN = > + \ ¥ 
πῦρ τι Kal θερμόν φησιν αὐτὴν civar ἀπείρων yap ὄντων 4048 
“Ἂ ~ ‘ ‘ 
σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων τὰ σφαιροειδῆ πῦρ Kal ψυχὴν λέ- 
yet, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα, ἃ φαίνεται ἐν 
ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτῖσιν, ὧν τὴν μὲν πανσπερμίαν 
a / ee - ε a μ" A ξ΄ 
τῆς ὅλης φύσεως στοιχεῖα λέγει" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος" τού- 5 
a \ 
των δὲ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ ψυχήν, διὰ TO μάλιστα διὰ παντὸς δύ- 
a ‘ ‘ 
νασθαι διαδύνειν τοὺς τοιούτους ῥυσμοὺς καὶ κινεῖν τὰ λοιπὰ 
“ ‘ > 7 ξ ν΄ ‘ ‘N t ‘ 
κινούμενα καὶ αὐτά, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ 
μ᾿ ΜᾺ ων ν 
παρέχον τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν κίνησιν. διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ὅρον εἶναι 
τὴν ἀναπνοήν: συνάγοντος γὰρ τοῦ περιέχοντος τὰ σώματα το 
καὶ ἐκθλίβοντος τῶν σχημάτων τὰ παρέχοντα τοῖς ζῴοις 
Ν fd Ν ΝΗ 3 3 ἽἝ 3 ma) ff ζ΄ 
τὴν κίνησιν διὰ τὸ μηδ᾽ αὐτὰ ἠρεμεῖν μηδέποτε, βοήθειαν 
γίγνεσθαι θύραθεν ἐπεισιόντων ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν 
κωλύειν γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐκ- 
κρίνεσθαι, συνανείργοντα τὸ συνάγον καὶ πηγνύον" καὶ ζῆν 15 
δὲ ν ὰ δύ ~ ra] ¥ 4 4 \ 5 »" 
4 δὲ ἔως ἂν δύνωνται τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν 
Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν: ἔφασαν 
, 3 ~ € 
γάρ τινες αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, οἱ 


20. δὲ πάλιν περὶ Ὁ || 21. προδιελθόντας Ὁ Philop. Soph., διελθόντα X et pr. T, 
ante προελθόντας virgulam ponunt Bek. Trend. || 22. συμπεριλαμβάνειν TWX, διαλαμ- 
Bavew V, συμπαραλαμβώνειν etiam ‘Them. Philop. Soph. || 23. καλῶς om. T, post εἰρημένα 
ponit U {μήτι UV || 24. τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ θῶμεν S || a6. δυεῖν Ἐς, δυσὶ SVWX | μάλιστα 
ante δυσὶ W || δοκεῖ διαφέρειν X || 28. φασὶ] φασὶ μὲν V ἢ ἔνιοι γὰρ W ἢ 29. πρῶτον ET, 
πρώτως etiam Philop. Simpl. Soph. | 30. μηδ᾽ dvd. Vy |] gn. ψυχὴν οὕτως ὑπ. Uy || Ang. 
μὲν) καὶ Anu. V |] 4040, 1, αὐτήν gnow ΤᾺΝ | a. τὰ σφαιρ...«λέγει et 4. ὧν delenda et 
5. ὁμοίως.. "Λεύκιππος parenth. includenda censet Madlvig, adversaria critica I, p. 471, 


» ele mae Nala TNlale Lh’ σὰ ἔγυνε ιν ὑ δὲ 


CH. 2 403 Ὁ 20—404 a 18 11 


In our enquiry concerning soul it is necessary to state the 2 
problems which must be solved as we proceed, and at the same 


The time to collect the views of our predecessors who had 
current anything to say on the subject, in order that we may 


adopt what is right in their conclusions and guard against 
their mistakes. Our enquiry will begin by presenting what are 2 
commonly held to be in a special degree the natural attributes of 
soul. Now there are two points especially wherein that which is 
animate is held to differ from the inanimate, namely, motion and 
the act of sensation: and these are approximately the two charac- 
teristics of soul handed down to us by our predecessors. There are 
some who maintain that soul is preeminently and primarily the 


Soul cause of movement. But they imagined that that which 
mover ΚΟ is not itself in motion cannot move anything else, and 
movent. thus they regarded the soul as a thing which is in 
motion. Flence Democritus affirms the soul to be a sort of fire or 3 
The | heat. For the “shapes” or atoms are infinite and those 
Stomists- _ which are spherical he declares to be fire and soul: they 


may be compared with the so-called motes in the air, which are 
seen in the sunbeams that enter through our windows. The 
agerregate of such seeds, he tells us, forms the constituent elements 
of the whole of nature (and herein he agrees with Leucippus), 
while those of them which are spherical form the soul, because 
such figures most easily find their way through everything and, 
beings themselves in motion, set other things in motion. The 
atomists assume that it is the soul which imparts motion to 
animals. It is for this reason that they make life depend upon 
respiration. For, when the surrounding air presses upon bodies 
and tends to extrude those atomic shapes which, because they are 
never at rest themselves, impart motion to animals, then they are 
reinforced from outside by the entry of other like atoms in respira- 
tion, which in fact, by helping to check compression and solidification, 
prevent the escape of the atoms already contained in the animals ; 
and life, so they hold, continues so long as there is strength to do 
this. The doctrine of the Pythagoreans seems also to contain the 4 


Certain same thought. Some of them identified soul with the 
τ Ασα, motes in the air, others with that which sets these motes 


der Vorsokratiker, p. 363, 7 |l 4: τὴν μὲν πανσπ. E (Trend.), Them. Torst., μὲν om. reliqui 
ante Torst. omnes, etiam Philop. Soph. || 5. στοιχεῖα λέγει τῆς ὅλης φύσεως excepto E 
omnes codd.-, etiam Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. || 6. σφαιρ. πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν V || 9. διὸ... 
12. κίνησιν om. V || 10. τὴν εἰσπνοὴν καὶ τὴν ἀναπνοήν S. {| 13. οὐρανόθεν T {| εἴτ᾽ 
εἰσιόντων E, ἐπεισιόντων etiam Them. Soph. et sine dubio Philop. et Simpl. ᾿ 


12 DE ANIMA TI CH. 2 


as “Ἂ Ν ¥ “A 
δὲ τὸ ταῦτα κινοῦν. περὶ δὲ τούτων εἴρηται διότι συνεχῶς 
5 > , 35..Ν 
φαίνεται κινούμενα, κἂν ἢ νηνεμία παντελής. ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ δὲ 20 
\ \ κι 
φέρονται καὶ ὅσοι λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν" ἐοί- 
κασι γὰρ οὗτοι πάντες ὑπειληφέναι τὴν κίνησιν οἰκειότατον 
> a κ᾿ \ ‘ \ » , - δ \ ‘ 
εἶναι TH ψυχῇ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν 
7 ra > € 73 € an Ν Ν μ c “Ὁ a Δ 
ψυχήν, ταύτην δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς, διὰ τὸ μηθὲν ὁρᾶν κινοῦν ὃ 
‘ ‘ > Ν a ¢ ΄ δὲ \ 3 Fd ν 
5 μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ᾿Αναξαγόρας ψυχὴν 


® 
rn 


κ μ ‘ an) \ ¥ ¥ » ε Ν ΄“Ὰ 
εἶναι λέγει τὴν κινοῦσαν, καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος εἰρηκεν, ὡς TO πᾶν 
ἐκίνησε νοῦς, οὐ μὴν παντελῶς γ᾽ ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος" ἐκεῖνος 
Ν ‘ ε ΡᾺ Ά > δ \ a ‘\ Ν 3 Ἀ εν 
μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν καὶ νοῦν’ τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἷ- 

\ f Ἁ ΜᾺ a ‘ ν € 
vat τὸ φαινόμενον' διὸ καλῶς ποιῆσαι τὸν Ὅμηρον ὡς 
Ἕκτωρ Keir ἀλλοφρονέων. οὐ δὴ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὡς δυνάμει 30 

Ἁ ἈΝ Ἁ 3 / 3 ‘\ ἘΝῚ ΄ ᾿ Ν Ἂ 
τινὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν. 
᾿Αναξαγόρας δ᾽ ἧττον διασαφεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν: πολλαχοῦ μὲν 4040 
γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸν νοῦν λέγει, ἑτέρωθι 
δὲ τοῦτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν: ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν 
τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμο- 
τέροις. ov φαίνεται δ᾽ ὅ γε κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς πᾶσιν 5 
ε 4 ε ΓΤ a) 4 , 3 ION ~ > - ~ 
ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ Tots ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν. 

ν ἈΝ με > Ν Ν a δ ¥ ? id 
6 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀπέβλε- 

Φ ‘ 7 ¢ a ‘ 4 a > 
wav, οὗτοι TO κινητικώτατον ὑπέλαβον τὴν ψυχήν" ὅσοι ὃ 
> 4 4 ΄ a 53 ᾿ “ἌἽὦ)ὃᾶἰν,νν ᾿ 4 , 
ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λέ- 

Ν \ , κ᾿ 
γουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες [ταύτας Ϊ, 10 
wd ΤᾺ “ 
οἵ δὲ μίαν ταύτην, ὥσπερ ᾿Ιἱμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων 
΄ > δὲ ‘ Ψ Ἀ ra id " 
πάντων, εἶναι O€ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτως 
/ Ν & ~ 3 , 7 ne ON 
γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ᾽ ὕδωρ, 
αἰθέρι δ᾽ αἰθέρα δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον, 
στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ. ts 


verla 19. περὶ δὲ rovrey...20. παντελής Bichlio suspecta videntur; legit quidem 
ea Philop. 70. 35 sq- Soph. rx, 22 sq. Them. 9, 30 sq., qui tamen verba περὶ 
δὲ τούτων εἴρηται practerit, de Simpl. 26, 13 sqq. non liquet || ry. virgulam pest 
εἴρηται sustulit Rodier || ὅτε 5, in interpr. εἴρηται δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, dre Soph. ἢ 
ar. ἑαυτὸ STVWXKX || 24. αὐτῆς E, ὑφ᾽ daurfs ctiam Them. || 26. virgulam post 
εἴρηκεν posuil Diels || 27. ὁ vols SW Χ γ, ὁ om. etiam Them. Soph. || post Agu. colon 
Diels, vulg. punctum || 28. ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν καὶ νοῦν ex solo EF (Trend.) Biehl, reliqui 
ante Bichlium omnes ταὐτὸν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν || 404 Ὁ, τ. πολλαχῇ KE, πολλαχῶς W, 
πολλαχοῦ etiam Them. qui in interpr. 10, 5. sq. πολλαχόθι posuit ἢ a. τὸ om. Vy, legit 
etiam Them. || 3, ταὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν τῇ ψυχῆ V, τὸν νοῦν εἴναι ταὐτὸν τῇ ψυχῇ TW et, 
qui τὸν αὐτὸν, Uy, similia veteres interpretes || 4. vulg. virgulas post fois et μικροῖς 


CH. 2 404 8 19—404b 15 13 


in motion: and as to these motes it has been stated that they are 
seen to be in incessant motion, even though there be a perfect calm. 
The view of others who describe the soul as that which moves itself 
tends in the same direction. For it would seem that all these thinkers 
regard motion as the most distinctive characteristic of the soul. 
Everything else, they think, is moved by the soul, but the soul is 
moved by itself: and this because they never see anything cause 
motion without itself being in motion. Similarly the soul is said to 5 
be the moving principle by Anaxagoras and all others who have held 
Anaxa- that mind sets the universe in motion; but not altogether 
goras. in the same sense as by Democritus. The latter, indeed, 
absolutely identified soul and mind, holding that the presentation 
to the senses is the truth: hence, he observed, Homer had well 
sung of Hector in his swoon that he lay ‘with other thoughts.’ 
Democritus, then, does not use the term mind to denote a faculty 
conversant with truth, but regards mind as identical with soul. 
Anaxagoras,* however, is less exact in his use of the terms. In 
His view ΠΊΘΩν places he speaks of mind as the cause of goodness 
ambigu- and order, but elsewhere he identifies it with the soul: as 
ewe where he attributes it to all animals, both great and 
small, high and low. As a matter of fact, however, mind in the 
sense of intelligence would not seem to be present in all animals 
alike, nor even in all men. 

Those, then, who have directed their attention to the motion of 6 
Soul, a8 the animate being, conceived the soul as that which is 
cognitive, most capable of causing motion: while those who laid 
from the stress on its knowledge and perception of all that exists 
siements- identified the soul with the ultimate principles, whether 
they recognised a plurality of these or only one. Thus Empedocles 
Empedo- Compounded soul out of all the elements, while at the 
cles. same time regarding each one of them as a soul. His 
words arc “With earth we see earth, with water water, with air 
bright air, but ravaging fire by fire, love by love, and strife by 


sustulit Diels || ἀτεμοτέροις ἘΣ (Stapf.) || 5. φαίνεται viv δὲ E (νῦν in rasura, Trend.) || 
6. πᾶσιν om. ST WX || 0. τὸ post καὶ om. STV Wy, leg. etiam Them. Soph. || δὴ U 
Them., om. VW |] 10. ποιοῦντες ταύτας οἱ VW et vet. transl. Biehl Rodier, ποιοῦντες 
αὐτὰς of in lermmate Philop. 72, 31 et in interpr. of μὲν πλείους εἰπόντες ἀρχὰς 73, 13, 
ποιοῦντεΞ τὰς ἀρχὰς οἱ Ὁ, et Philop. v. 1. 72, 31, ποιοῦντες ras ἀρχὰς ταύτας ol SXy et 
iu interpr. Them. Soph., ποιοῦντες, οἱ E Bek. Trend. Torst. ταύτας unc. includere malui, 
delemdum censet etiam Dembowski, p. 431, om. Diels, p. 213, Fr. 10g || ante ταύτας et 
11. ταύτην virgulas posuit Rocdier (| rr. μὲν om. STW || 22. οὕτως Ἐ, (Trend.), οὕτω 
λόγων SU, om. TW, vulgo ante Biehlium οὔτω || 13. δ᾽ insertum E, leg. etiam Them. 
Soph. i 14. δῖον TU VW, etiam Soph. 


14 DE ANIMA I CH. 2 


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ΜᾺ al Ν Ἂ 
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χαὶ ἐλέγοντο, εἰσὶ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων. κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πρά- 
\ \ ΓᾺ ‘ δ᾽ > ? \ δὲ δό ‘ δ᾽ 2 
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8 σθήσει: εἴδη δ᾽ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὗτοι τῶν πραγμάτων. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ 
κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικὸν οὕτως, ἔνιοι 
συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν 
9 κινοῦνθ᾽ ἑαυτόν. διαφέρονται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, τίνες καὶ 30 
πόσαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἱ σωματικὰς ποιοῦντες τοῖς ἀσωμάτους, 
é > ξ / ἈΝ 3 3 5 ἊᾺ Ν 3 Ὰ Ἴ 
τούτοις δ᾽ οἱ μείξαντες καὶ am ἀμφοῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποφὴη- 405¢ 
a ra ‘ Ἀ ‘ ν ~ € ‘ ‘ 
τονάμενοι. διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ wept τὸ πλῆθος: οἱ μὲν yap 
‘a ¢ δὲ , , ς / de / ‘ Ν, 
μίαν ot δὲ πλείους λέγουσιν. ἑπομένως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὴν 
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€ / > 3 / bd ¥ / “~ 
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ἀσώματον, ἔτι δὲ κινεῖταί τε καὶ κινεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πρώτως. 
/ ‘ ‘ f ¥ ? / 
12 Δημόκριτος δὲ Kal γλαφυρωτέρως εἴρηκεν ἀποφαινόμενος 
διὰ τί τούτων ἑκάτερον: ψυχὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν, 
τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναι τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀδιαιρέτων σωμάτων, κινητι- τὸ 
κὸν δὲ διὰ λεπτομέρειαν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα’ τῶν δὲ σχημάτων 


16. καὶ ὁ BH, “et Plato” vet. transl, om. STUV Wy, ὁ om. Bek. Trend. Torst. ἡ 
Ἰλάτων post Τιμαίῳ U Wy, port ψυχὴν 5. 1 |] at. τὰς δ' ἄλλας Them. et tanquam varia 
lectionem Philop. commemorat 79, 15, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα Simpl., τἄλλα δὲ Soph. | 23. dp! ev] 
γίνεται X, om. ἢ T, leg. etiam Them. Soph. || 24. αὐτὰ om. S X, leg. Soph. |! al ante ἀρχαὶ 
exuno Καὶ addunt Bek. et Torst., om. Soph. Trend. || 27. εἴδη δὰ καὶ ἀριθμοὶ coni. Steinhart, 
οὗτοι καὶ coni. Susemihl, Jen. Lit. 2. 1877, Ρ. 708 || 28. virgulam post οὕτως Torst. 
Belger in ed, alt. Trend. Rodier, etiam Soph. 14, 2, ante ofrws reliqui, ctiam Simpl. 
Philop. || 30. διαφέρονται... 405 Ὁ, 29. ψυχήν non satis ad praccedentia quadrare videntur 
Susemihlio, Oecon. p. 84 || 31. τὰς ἀσωμάτους e codd. solus X, τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις Them. 
Philop. Soph. Trend. Torst., ceteri codd. et Bek. τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις |] 405, 2. τοῦ πλήθοιν 
STVX || 4 reom. ST || 7. ὅτι δὲ Ey, sed eras., in ras. καὶ, καὶ etiam VX, fre δὲ καὶ 
STW || re om. STW | 8. ἀποφαινόμενος Torst. ex I, reliqui ante Torst. omnes 
ἀποφηνάμενος, etiam Soph. || 9. ψυχὴ E (Trend.) {| ταὐτὸν ST VX ἢ τὸ. εἶναι ἐκ τῶν 
TUVWX || x1. λοπτομέρειαν T et nunc Ἐν, sed Aerro in ras. (Stapf), “subtilitatem ” 


Ἐ 
wn 


CH. 2 404 Ὁ 16—405 a IL T5 


gruesome strife.” Inthe same manner Plato in the Tzsmaeus con- 7 
structs the soul out of the elements. Like, he there 
maintains, is known by like, and the things we know are 
composed of the ultimate principles. In like manner it was 
explained in the lectures on philosophy, that the self-animal or 
universe is made up of the idea of One, and of the idea-numbers 
Iwo, or primary length, Three, primary breadth, and Four, primary 
depth, and similarly with all the rest of the ideas. And again this 
has been put in another way as follows: reason is the One, know- 
ledge is the Two, because it proceeds by a single road to one 
conclusion, opinion is the number of a surface, Three, and sensation 
the number of a solid, Four. In fact, according to them the 
numbers, though they are the ideas themselves, or the ultimate 
principles, are nevertheless derived from elements. And things 
are judged, some by reason, others by knowledge, others again 
by opinion and others by sensation: while these idea-numbers 
are forms of things. And since the soul was held to be thus 8 
The self COgnitive as well as capable of causing motion, some 
moving thinkers have combined the two and defined the soul as a 
number. 
self-moving number. 

But there are differences of opinion as to the nature and number of 9 
Various the ultimate principles, especially between those thinkers 
theories of who make the principles corporeal and those who make 


elements : 
corre- them incorporeal; and again between both of these and 


theories of others who combine the two and take their principles 
soul. from both. But, further, they differ also as to their ro 
number: some assuming a single principle, some a plurality. And, 
when they come to give an account of the soul, they do so in strict 
accordance with their several views. For they have assumed, not 
unnaturally, that the soul is that primary cause which in its own 
nature is capable of producing motion. And this is why some αὶ 
identified soul with fire, this being the element which is made up of 
the finest particles and is most nearly incorporeal, while further it 
is preeminently an element which both moves and sets other things 
in motion. Democritus has expressed more neatly the reason for 12 
each of these facts. Soul he regards as identical with mind, and 
this he makes to consist of the primary indivisible bodies and 
considers it to be a cause of motion from the fineness of its particles 
and their shape. Now the shape which is most susceptible of 


Plato. 


vet. transl. Torst., cui assentitur etiam Noetel, Zeitschr. ἢ, Gym. 1864, p. 141, μικρο- 
λεπτομέρειαν ὃ, μικρομέρειαν rc. E et reliqui codd. Diels, p. 386, 33, quod rasurae subfuisse 
coni. Stapfer, Studia, p. 13, etiam Philop. Soph., σμικρομέρειαν Them. 


16 DE ANIMA I CH. 2 


ἴω 3 > / 

εὐκινητότατον τὸ σφαιροειδὲς λέγει" τοιοῦτον δ᾽ εἶναι τόν τε 
ΜᾺ \ Ν A > / δ᾽ » Ν Ψ λέ 

13 νοῦν καὶ τὸ πῦρ. ᾿Αναξαγόρας δ᾽ ἔοικε μὲν ἕτερον λέγειν ψυ- 
»" Ἀ / “Ὰ 3 
χήν τε καὶ νοῦν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον, χρῆται ὃ 

3 a] ε ἰὼ ’ Ν 3 4 Ν, oN 6 ᾽ 
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‘ > ~ ‘ / 3 (ὃ δ᾽ ¥ “~ > -”™ 
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ἀρχῇ. τό τε γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, λέγων νοῦν κινῆσαι τὸ 
14 πᾶν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς, ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι, κινητικόν 

mn ¥ ¥ 

τι THY ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὸν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, 


to 


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¢ x 7 “Ἂ Fd > Ψ , °° é 

15 ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ, Διογένης δ᾽ ὥσπερ καὶ eTEpot τινες 
ἀέρα, τοῦτον οἰηθεὶς πάντων λεπτομερέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἀρχήν" 
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γινώσκειν τε καὶ κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, ἢ μὲν πρῶ- 
τόν ἐστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὰ λοιπά, γινώσκειν, 7 δὲ λεπτότατον, 

Ν > . ς , \ Ν 9 \ >  F 

16 κινητικὸν εἶναι. Kat Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι 25 
ψυχήν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἧς τἄλλα συνίστησιν" καὶ 
ἀσωματώτατόν τε καὶ ῥέον ἀεί: τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ 
γινώσκεσθαι. ἐν κινήσει δ᾽ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κἀκεῖνος ᾧετο καὶ 

17 οὗ πολλοί. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ᾿Αλκμαΐων ἔοικεν 
€ a Ν o~ Ν ‘ > Νὰ 2) 2 > 
ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ ψυχῆς: φησὶ yap αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι 30 
διὰ τὸ ἐοικέναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις" τοῦτο δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ws 
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18 ἀεί, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον, τῶν δὲ 405b 
φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο, καθάπερ ἽἽππων' 
πεισθῆναι δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῆς γονῆς, ὅτι πάντων ὑγρά" καὶ 

Ν re ‘ ΐ , ‘ / Ψ φ ‘ 
yap ἐλέγχει τοὺς αἷμα φάσκοντας τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι ἡ γονὴ 
’ Φ ’ ὃ᾽ Τ Ν ΄ f ¢ > Ἔ 
το οὐχ αἷμα' ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ψυχήν. ἕτεροι δ᾽ al- 
™ ‘ Fa) 

pa, καθάπερ Κριτίας, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ψυχῆς οἰκειότατον 
ξ / a) ἾἍ.ϑβ,,ςε , \ Ἀ Νὰ Ψ 7 
ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τοῦτο δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος φύ- 
σιν. πάντα γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτὴν εἴληφε, πλὴν τῆς γῆς’ 


un 


14. Te orm, X || χρῆσθαι EX, χρῆται etiam Simpl. || 16. ἁπάντων Sy Them. 
Rodier, πάντων reliqui, etiam E (Stapf) Simpl. Philop. || 17. re om SV Wy ἢ 
19. virgulam post Θαλῆς et post ἀπομν. posuit Diels || 20. ὑπολαμβάνειν TUV Wy, 
ἀπολαμβάνειν S, ὑπολαβεῖν etiam Them. || τὴν λίθον X Them. Simpl. Philop., τὸν etiam 
Soph. || 24. λεπτομερέστατον TU VW |] a5. φησι τὴν ψ, UW If 26. καὶ γὰρ de. TU | 
a7. re] δὲ SX Zeller Ph. ἃ, Cir. I” p. 646, adn. 3, δὴ TU Bek. Trend., om. V, re 
etiam Soph. et, ut videtur, Them. 13, 28, Torst. || 31. post ἀθανάτοις virzulam vulg., 
colon posuit Diels || 32. ὅπαντα STUVX || gogb, 4. τοὺς om. UV W, leg. etiam 
Them. Soph. || 2. post Ἵππων vulg. punctum, colon Diels | 3. post ὑγρά punctum Diels ἢ} 
5. τὴν om. ST, πρώτην om. W, πρώτην δὲ ψυχὴν (v.l. τὴν ψυχὴν) λέγει τὴν γονὴν Philop. 


CH. 2 405 a I2—405 Ὁ 8 17 


motion is the spherical ; and of atoms of this shape mind, like fire, 
consists. Anaxagoras, while apparently understanding by mind 
something different from soul, as we remarked above, really treats 
both as a single nature, except that it is preeminently mind which 
he takes as his first principle; he says at any rate that mind 
alone of things that exist is simple, unmixed, pure. But he refers 
both knowledge and motion to the same principle, when he says 
that mind sets the universe in motion. Thales, too, apparently, 
judging from the anecdotes related of him, conceived 
soul as a cause of motion, if it be true that he affirmed 
the loadstone to possess soul, because it attracts iron. Diogenes, 
however, as also some others, identified soul with air. 
Air, they thought, is made up of the finest particles and 
is the first principle: and this explains the fact that the soul knows 
and is a cause of motion, knowing by virtue of being the primary 
element from which all else is derived, and causing motion by the 
extreme fineness of its parts. Heraclitus takes soul for his first 
principle, as he identifies it with the vapour from which 
he derives all other things, and further says that it is the 
least corporeal of things and in ceaseless flux; and that it is by 
something in motion that what is in motion is known ; for he, like 
most philosophers, conceived all that exists to be in motion. 
Alcmaeon, too, seems to have had a similar conception. or soul, 
he maintains, is immortal because it is like the beings 
which are immortal; and it has this attribute in virtue of 
being ever in motion: for he attributes continuous and unending 
motion to everything which is divine, moon, sun, stars and the 
whole heaven. Among cruder thinkers there have been some, like 
Hippon, who have even asserted the soul to be water. The reason 
for this view seems to have been the fact that in all 
animals the seed is moist: in fact, Hippon refutes those 
who make the soul to be blood by pointing out that the seed is not 
blood, and that this seed is the rudimentary soul. Others, again, 
like Critias, maintain the soul to be blood, holding that it is 
sentience which is most distinctive of soul and that this 
is due to the nature of blood. Thus each of the four 
elements except earth has found its supporter. Earth, however, 


Thales. 


Diogenes. 


Heraclitus. 


Alcmaeon. 


Hippon. 


Critias. 


89, 3 54., τὴν πρώτην leg. etiam Soph. || 6. τῆς ψυχῆς Uy |] 8, γὰρ] δ᾽ οὖν TV Them., 
οὖν Soph., dpa Susemihl. 


15 


17 


χϑ 


19 


18 DE ANIMA J CHS, 2, 3 


/ > 3 4 > / ‘ ¥ > ON » 3 
ταύτην δ᾽ οὐθεὶς ἀποπέφανται, πχὴν εἰ Tis αὑτὴν εὑρηκεν ἐκ 


mp ral / ra / 
πάντων εἶναι τῶν OTOLYELWY ἢ πάντα. 10 
ε ͵ A - Ν ‘\ Ν ¢ > a / 3 
20 ὁρίζονται δὲ πάντες τὴν ψυχὴν τρισὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν, κινήσει, αἰ- 


᾽ὔ a 3 é - 7° 3 a A ‘\ 3 [4 
σθήσει, τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ: τούτων δ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀνάγεταιπρος τὰς ἀρχάς. 
a“ ~ Ἃ 
διὸ καὶ οἱ τῷ γινώσκειν ὁριζόμενοι αὐτὴν ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ τῶν 
, “~ » [4 5 ’ Ν ξ , 
στοιχείων ποιοῦσι, λέγοντες παραπλησίως ἀλλήλοις, πλὴν ἑνὸς" 
φασὶ γὰρ γινώσκεσθαι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ 
ψυχὴ πάντα γιγνώσκει, συνιστᾶσιν αὐτὴν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἀρ- 


Lo | 


5 


ΝᾺ Ζ > 4X ~ g 
2I χῶν. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν μίαν τινὰ λέγουσιν αἰτίαν καὶ στοιχεῖον ἕν, 
‘\ Ν ᾿ a , Ὁ ΜᾺ A >? € δὲ 
καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἕν τιθέασιν, οἷον πῦρ ἢ ἀέρα" οἱ d€ πλείους 
lg ‘ ? \ \ \ \ , a >, 
22 λέγοντες τὰἂς ἀρχὰς καὶ THY ψυχὴν πλείω ποιοῦσιν. Ava- 
ξαγόρας δὲ μόνος ἀπαθῆ φησὶν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ κοινὸν 20 
> ‘ 3 Ν a“ ¥ ¥ ran) > «A nN ~ Ἀ 
οὐθὲν οὐθενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν. τοιοῦτος δ᾽ ὧν πῶς γνωριεῖ καὶ 
~~ » ΨᾺ 
διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν, οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνος εἴρηκεν OUT ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων συμ- 
23 φανές ἐστιν. ὅσοι δ᾽ ἐναντιώσεις ποιοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, καὶ 
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων συνιστᾶσιν: οἱ δὲ θάτερον τῶν 
3 ΄ Ό \ x x ¥ ω ¥ Ν 4 
ἐναντίων, οἷον θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, Kal τὴν 25 
ψυχὴν ὁμοίως ἕν τι τούτων τιθέασιν" διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν 
> ω ε Ἧ ‘ Ν, Ἀ ‘4 Y ‘ ΜᾺ . 
ἀκολουθοῦσιν" οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν λέγοντες, ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ 
Ν wn 3 # ¢ Ἀ ἊΝ ‘ ‘ ‘ Ψ ἈΝ Ν ‘ 
τὸ ζῆν ὠνόμασται, οἱ δὲ τὸ ψυχρὸν διὰ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ τὴν 
κατάψυξιν καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν. τὰ μὲν οὖν παραδεδομένα περὶ 
al > 
ψυχῆς, καὶ dv ἃς αἰτίας λέγουσιν οὕτω, ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν. 30 
5» ἴω ¥ 
3 Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν περὶ κινήσεως" Lows yap ov 
~ ~ Ψ 
μόνον ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς τοιαύτην εἶναι οἵαν 
“" a A 
φασὶν οἱ λέγοντες ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ ἢ δυνάμενον 406a 
a ΜᾺ ‘ ~ 
κινεῖν, GAN & τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων TO ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κίνησιν. 
5 »“"᾿ ΡᾺ ‘ a 
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον TO κινοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, πρό- 
δ Ν Ϊ 
τερον εἴρηται. διχῶς δὲ κινουμένου παντός (ἢ γὰρ καθ᾽ ἕτερον 


9. ἀποφαίνεται STV WX, ἀποπέφανται etiam Them. || 10, ἢ πάντα nunc E sed inter 
ἢ et πάντα ras., cui subfuisse coni. ἃ Rodier, ὅς Stapfer, ἢ 8s πάντα Soph. 15, 7 If re. δὴ 
pro δὲ coni. Hayduck, recepit Rodier, δὴ etiam Them. 14, 4 || rdvres ὡς εἰπεῖν τ. y. 
coni. Christ {τὴν om. ST, τὴν ψυχὴν om. V |] 15. γιγν. καὶ τὸ ὅμ. Ὁ, τὸ ὅμοιον γιγν. 
ST y, καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον γιγν. VW || r@ ὁμ. τὸ bu. X || ἐπειδὴ...τ6. ἀρχῶν post το. ποιοῦσιν 
transponenda censet Steinhart, Symb. Crit. p. 4, cui assentitur Susemihl, Oecon. p. 86. ἢ 
fom, E || 18. πλείω UV W, πλείονα y || 19. ποιοῦσιν] λέγουσιν STU Wy, ποιοῦσιν etiam 
Soph. || 21. γνωρίζει SU, γνωρίζοι y, futurum etiam Philop. || 25. ἄλλο om. X, ado... 
26. τούτων om. Ii, tuentur haec verba Philop. gz, 1 Soph. |f 26. post τιθέασιν vulg. 
punctum, colon posait Diels {| 27. yap ex uno E restituit et post ἀκολουθοῦσιν colon posuit 
Tawet oni aveantitnr etiam Noetel Ὁ, 142. praeterquam quod aut λέγοντας post 28. Ψυχρὺν 


CHS. 2, 3 405 Ὁ 9—406 a 4 I9 


has not been put forward by anyone, except by those who have 
explained the soul to be derived from, or identical with, all the 
elements. 

Thus practically all define the soul by three characteristics, 20 
motion, perception and incorporeality ; and each of these 
characteristics is referred to the ultimate principles. 
Hence all who define soul by its capacity for knowledge either 
make it an element or derive it from the elements, being on this 
point, with one exception, in general agreement. Like, they tell 
us, is known by like; and therefore, since the soul knows all 
things, they say it consists of all the ultimate principles. Thus 21 
those thinkers who admit only one cause and one element, as fire 
or air, assume the soul also to be one element; while those who 
admit a plurality of principles assume plurality also in the soul. 
Anaxagoras alone says that mind cannot be acted upon and has 22 
nothing in common with any other thing. How, if such be its 
nature, it will know anything and how its knowledge is to be 
explained, he has omitted to state; nor do his utterances afford 
a clue. All those who introduce pairs of opposites among their 23 
principles make the soul also to consist of opposites; while those 
who take one or other of the two opposites, either hot or cold 
or something else of the sort, reduce the soul also to one or other 
of these elements. Hence, too, they etymologise according to their 
theories ; some identify soul with heat, deriving ζῆν from ξεῖν, and 
contend that this identity accounts for the word for life; others 
say that what is cold is called soul from the respiratory process 
and consequent “cooling down,” deriving ψυχή from ψύχειν. Such, 
then, are the views regarding soul which have come down to us 
and the grounds on which they are held. 

We have to consider in the first place the subject of motion. 3 
For, unless I am mistaken, the definition of soul as the 


Summary. 


Criticism 


of the nat self-moving, or as that which is capable of self-motion, 
soul is misrepresents its essential nature: nay, more; it is quite 
moved. 


impossible for soul to have the attribute of motion at 
all. To begin with, it has been already stated that a thing may 2 
cause motion without necessarily being moved itself. A thing 
is always moved in one of two ways; that is, either indirectly, 


poni, aut verba 29. καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν eici vult, virgulam post Adyorres omissam post θερμὸν 
posuit Rodier || 28. post ψυχρὸν virg. Torst. Biehl Rodier, quod si recte est, illud 27. yap 
delendum est {406 8, 1. εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν U, τὴν om. etiam Philop. || αὑτὸ UW, ἑαντὸ 
etiam Them. Philop. | 


20 DE ANIMA 1 CH. 3 


Φ wn ζω 
ἢ καθ᾽ αὑτό: καθ᾽ ἕτερον δὲ λέγομεν, ὅσα κινεῖται τῷ ἐν 
5. τ δ ξ ΄ a - 
κινουμένῳ εἶναι, οἷον πλωτῆρες" OV YAP ὁμοίως κινουνται τῷ 
πλοίῳ: τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ κινεῖται, ot δὲ τῷ ἐν κινου- 
> ~ om 4 
μένῳ εἶναι. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων- οἰκεία μὲν yap ἐστι 
, aA ͵ Ψ \ ν᾿ 5 “ > ς “ 
κίνησις ποδῶν βάδισις, αὕτη δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων: οὐχ ὑπάρ- 
χει δὲ τοῖς πλωτῆρσι τότε) δισσῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ κινεῖ- 
Fon) “~ Ἀν ΜᾺ ~ 3 > e Ἂ 
σθαι, νῦν ἐπισκοποῦμεν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν κι- 
ΜᾺ > o~ 
3 νεῖται Kal μετέχει κινήσεως. τεσσάρων δὲ κινήσεων οὐσῶν, 
“ > ? a 3 , Cat 7 - 
φορᾶς ἀλλοιώσεως φθίσεως αὐξήσεως, ἢ μίαν τούτων κι- 
A> ἃ ΝΥ , rN , > \ ra ‘ ‘ 
vor ἂν ἢ πλείους ἢ πάσας. εἰ δὲ κινεῖται μὴ κατὰ συμ- 
7 ra Ἂ ε ? 7 ἫΝ > δὲ ~ ‘ 
βεβηκός, φύσει ἂν ὑπάρχοι κίνησις αὐτῇ εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ 
a ~ 3 
τόπος: πᾶσαι yap at λεχθεῖσαν κινήσεις ἐν τόπῳ. εἰ ὃ 
ΝᾺ on “~ > 
ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς TO κινεῖν ἑαυτήν, ov κατὰ συμβε- 
σι A 9 “A κι 
βηκὸς αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπάρξει, ὥσπερ τῷ λευκῷ ἢ 
“Ἂ ‘ ~ ? ‘ 
τριπήχει" κινεῖται γὰρ Kal ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβὴη- 
a“ ω Ἀ ~ 
κός- @ yap ὑπάρχουσιν, ἐκεῖνο κινεῖται, TO σῶμα. διὸ Kal 
ΨᾺ ~ ων ad 
οὐκ ἔστι τόπος αὐτῶν: τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔσται, εἴπερ φύσει κι- 
Ἵ 3 ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ φύσει κινεῦτα ἂν Bil - 
4«νήσεως μετέχει. ἔτι ύσει κινεῖται, κἂν βίᾳ Kun 
θείη- κἂν εἰ βίᾳ, καὶ φύσει. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ 
7) 3. ᾿ς ρ Χ 
~ Pa \ ~ 
περὶ ἠρεμίας: εἰς ὃ yap κινεῖται φύσει, καὶ Hpewer ἐν τούτῳ 
rd € 4 Ἅ ‘ Ἄ ὧι ΓᾺ ᾽ Ἂ 3 “ > 7 
φύσει" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς ὃ κινεῖται Big, καὶ ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τού- 
Bi a) δὲ βί Ὰ » 4 ¥ Ἀ 
τῳ βίᾳ. ποῖαι d€ βίαιοι τῆς ψνχῆς κινήσεις ἔσονται καὶ 
5 ἠρεμίαι, οὐδὲ πλάττειν βουλομένοις ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι. ἔτι δ᾽ 
3 μά ad ¥ > μ᾿ , ΜᾺ f 
εἰ μὲν ἄνω κινήσεται, πῦρ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κάτω, γῆ" τούτων 
® 
γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων al κινήσεις αὗται. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος Kal 
a ~ ‘ ΄΄α 
6 περὶ τῶν μεταξύ. ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπεὶ φαίνεται κινοῦσα τὸ σῶμα, 
“ ‘ Δ 
ταύτας εὔλογον κινεῖν τὰς κινήσεις as καὶ αὐτὴ κινεῖται. 
> δὲ “Ἂ ν..» f 3 on eX θὲ ῳ τὰ Ν “ 
εἰ O€ τοῦτο, καὶ αντιστρέψασιν εἰπεῖν ἀληθὲς ὁτι ἣν τὸ σώ- 


to. δισσῶς solus Ὁ Philop. Bich] Rodier, reliqui et scripti ct impressi διχῶν, etiam corr. 
το, Ἐ (Rr.) {ἷ δὲ] οὖν U, Them. in interpr., δὴ coni. Susemihl, Jen. Lit. 2877, p. 707, δὲ 
etiam Philop. || 12. καὶ «οὐκ cl>, vel καὶ «οὐκ εἰ καθ᾽ repoy> coni. Susemihl, καὶ 
<gice> Steinhart {| 13. φθίσεως om. pr. EB, ley. etiam Them. Philop., Dittenberyer, 
Gitt. gelehrte Anzeigen 1863 p. 1612, ex verbo φθίσεως in pr. FE omisso suspicatur, primum 
tres tantum motus species hoc loco nominatas esse: cf. Soph. 17, 11 τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν 
κινήσεων φυσικῶν || 18. ὑπάρξει practer ceteros codd. etiam Ie, sed & in ras. (Stapf), 
leg. et Soph. || r@ τριπήχει TU VW Bek. Trend. Torst., τῷ om. etiam Philop. ror, ὃ 
(acd ror, £1 ve Efayducki adn. crit.) Soph. || 20. virgulam post κινεῖται om. Bek. Trend., 
addidit Torst. || 23. εἰ om. pr. E (Trend. Bus.) || καὶ φύσει] κατὰ φύσιν pr. Ἐῶ, verba κἂν 
el Big, καὶ φύσει Trendelenburgio suspecta videntur, leg. etiam Philop. Simpl. Soph. ἢ 


5 


25 


39 


CH. 3 4ἀοδ8Α 5—406a 32 21 


through something else, or directly, of and through itself. We 
say things are moved through something else when they are in 
something else that is moved: as, for instance, sailors on board 
a ship: for they do not move in the same sense as the ship, for 
the ship moves of itself, they because they are in something else 
which is moved. This is evident if we consider the members of 
the body: for the motion proper to the feet and so to men also 
is walking, but it is not attributable to our sailors in the case 
supposed. There being thus two senses in which the term “to be 
Is the cour moved” is used, we are now enquiring whether it is of 
moved and through itself that the soul is moved and partakes 
me of motion. 

Of motion there are four species, change of place or loco- 3 
motion, change of quality or alteration, diminution and augmenta- 
Species of tion. It is, then, with one or more or all of these 
motion. species that the soul will move. If it is not indirectly 
or per accidens that it moves, motion will be a natural attribute of 
soul; and, if this be so, it will also have position in space, since 
all the aforesaid species of motion are in space. But, if it be the 
essential nature of soul to move itself, motion will not be an 
accidental attribute of soul, as it is of whiteness or the length of 
three cubits; for these are also moved, but per acczdens, viz. by the 
motion of the body to which these attributes belong. This, too, 15 
why these attributes have no place belonging to them; but the soul 
will have a place, if indeed motion is its natural attribute. 

Further, if it moves naturally, then it will also move under 4 
constraint; and, if under constraint, then also naturally. 


The theory . 

involves So likewise with rest. For, as it remains at rest naturally 
5 * - a . "» ΓῚ 

conse- in any state into which it moves naturally, so similarly 

quences. 


it remains at rest by constraint in any state into which 
it moves by constraint. But what is meant by constrained motions 
or states of rest of the soul it is not easy to explain, even though 
we give free play to fancy. Again, if its motion tends upward, 5 
it will be fire; if downward, earth; these being the motions proper 
to these natural bodies. And the same argument applies to 
directions of motion which are intermediate. 

Again, since it appears that the soul sets the body in motion, 6 
it may reasonably be supposed to impart to it the motions which 
it has itself: and, if so, then conversely it is true to say that the 
motion which the soul has itself is the motion which the body 


28. κινήσεται Ἐς, superscr. On E, (Stapf.). || 30. ἔπειτα δ᾽ εἰ corr. E || 31. εὔλογον ταύτας 
ST VWXy, ταύτας edd. etiam Soph. 


22 DE ANIMA I CH. 3 


ἴω , Ν " rd Ν δὲ ”~ a _ 06b 
μα κινεῖται, ταύτην καὶ αὐτή. TO δὲ σώμα κινεῖται Popa: 4 
ῷ fan] h 
ὥστε Kal ἡ ψυχὴ [μεταβάλλοι ἂν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα] ἢ ὅλη ἢ 
‘\ / / > Ν a> 2 δέ \ 9 6 “ 
κατὰ μόρια μεθισταμένη. εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἐξελθοῦ- 
ΟῚ - 4 9 , 2. κῃ , > YY > HK Ν " ? 
σαν εἰσιέναι πάλιν ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ dv: τούτῳ δ᾽ ἕποιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἀνί. 
\ ἴω nw ’ Ἁ \ Ν \ 
ἡστασθαι τὰ τεθνεῶτα τῶν ζῴων. τὴν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 5 
᾽ my eyo ¢ 9 A 5 7 \ aN , \ A 
κίνησιν κἂν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου κινοῖτο: ὠσθείη yap av Bia τὸ ζῷον. 
3 ~ \ Ὁ N © 7? ¢ ~ “ 3 ΡᾺ > 7 Aas? e¢ 3 
οὐ δεῖ δὲ ᾧ τὸ Ud ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐν TH οὐσίᾳ, τοῦθ᾽ ὑπ 
A ~ ἈΝ 9 Ν Ἁ ‘4 4 3 Ἁ 
ἄλλου κινεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ 
\ > en 3 \ Ἃ > c +, \ \ > » > δ 
τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ dv αὑτό, τὸ μὲν dv ἄλλο εἶναι, τὸ 
> ¢ “ Ψ Ν Ν Ἁ , , “ἊΟ ε \ ~ 
δ᾽ ἑτέρου ἕνεκεν. τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μάλιστα φαίη τις ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν το 
9 ~~ “ ¥ “Ὁ 3 Ν ‘ Ν 9 ~ 
8 αἰσθητῶν κινεῖσθαι, εἴπερ κινεῖται. ἀλλὰ μὴν Kal εἰ κινεῖ 
γε αὐτὴ αὑτήν, καὶ αὐτὴ κινοῖτ᾽ av, ὥστ᾽ εἰ πᾶσα κίνησις 
ἴω Ὄ “~ 
ἔκστασίς ἐστι τοῦ κινουμένου ἢ κινεῖται, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξίσταιτ᾽ 
ἂν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἑαντὴν κινεῖ, 

? > ¥ ξ ᾽ a 9 a > ~ ? ε ᾽ ¥ Ν Ἀ 
9 ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καθ᾽ αὑτήν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ 15 
‘= a) © ca) 
κινεῖν φασὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σῶμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, ὡς αὐτὴ κινεῖται, 

® / / rd a Ἂ 
οἷον Δημόκριτος, παραπλησίως λέγων Φιλίππῳ τῷ κωμῳ- 
4 ‘\ be) Ἀ ‘a rd “~ 
δοδιδασκάλῳ' φησὶ yap τὸν Δαίδαλον κινουμένην ποιῆσαι 
\ - 3 , 3 a > ¥ - ξ , Ἀ 
τὴν ξυλίνην ᾿Λφροδίτην, ἐγχέαντ᾽ ἄργυρον χυτόν: ὁμοίως δὲ 
καὶ Δημόκριτος λέγει’ κινουμένας γάρ φησι τὰς ἀδιαιρέτους 20 
4 ‘ \ - / a / 
σφαίρας, διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναν μηδέποτε μένειν, συνεφέλκειν 
το καὶ κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα πᾶν. ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἐρωτήσομεν εἰ καὶ ἠρέ- 
pyow ποιεῖ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα. πῶς δὲ ποιήσει, χαλεπὸν ἢ καὶ 
>a? 3, κ᾿ y ᾽ > ° , n ε ν 
ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν. ὅλως δ᾽ οὐχ οὕτω φαίνεται κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ 
4 “ 
τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλὰ διὰ προαιρέσεώς τινος καὶ νοήσεως. 25 
Ν ΝΣ \ 7 Loe τὰ κι Ν \ 
11 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὃ Τίμαιος φυσιολογεῖ THY ψυχὴν 
ΜᾺ ‘\ A ~ an \ “ “ 
κινεῖν TO σῶμα: τῷ yap κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ TO σῶμα κινεῖν 
\ ἊΝ a 
διὰ τὸ συμπεπλέχθαι πρὸς αὐτό. συνεστηκυῖαν yap ἐκ τῶν στοι- 
406b, 2, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα omnes codd., etiam Soph. et, ut videtur, Simpl. 37, 3. 4 
et vet. transl., κατὰ τόπον coni. Bon., Hermes VII, p. 424, μεταβάλλοι, σῶμα une. 
Inclusi, cf, Them. τύ, 16 sq.3 sin verba genuina sunt, fort. legendum ψυχή. μεταβάλλοι 
<i> ἂν xrd || 3. ἐνδέχοιτο ST VW, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν καὶ y Bon, LL, 
ἐνδέχεται etiam Soph. ct vet. transl. || 4. ἐνδέχοιτ' ἄν om. SWXy Bon., leg. etiam 
Soph. et vet. transl. || rovry...5. ξῴων a manu Christiani lectoris inserta esse suypicatur 
Trend., cui adversatur Bon. || 8 μὴ om. KE Simpl., leg. Philop. [{ 0. 8: αὐτὸ dy coni. 
Christ || 12. ye om. ΤΥ ΑΝ Alex. ἀπ. καὶ λύσ. 46, 24 Soph. || davrary STUVWy 
et corr. Ky Soph. || ed] ἐπεὶ Alex. 46, 25 || 13. ἐξισταίη T, ἐξίσταται (omisso av) S WX, 
ἐξίστατο y, ἐξίσταιτο ἂν Alex. 46, 26 || 14. οὐσίας αὐτῆς καθ᾽ αὑτήν, sed ad’ αὐτήν expunct. 


E, αὐτῆς receperunt Biehl Rodier, αὐτῆς hoc loco legisse videntur ‘Them. 18, 11 et 
Soph. 18, 36, omittunt ceteri, etiam Simpl. Philop. | 15. καθ' αὐτήν une. inel. Torst., 


CH. 3 406 b 1—-406 Ὁ 28 23 


has. Now the motion of the body is motion in space: therefore 
the motion of the soul is also motion in space, whether the whole 
soul so move, or only the parts, the whole remaining at rest. But, 
if this is admissible, the soul might also conceivably quit the body 
and re-enter; and this would involve the consequence that dead 
animals may rise again. 

To return now to motion per accidens, soul might certainly 7 
thus be moved by something external as well:—for the animal 
might be thrust by force. But a thing which has self-motion as 
part of its essential nature cannot be moved from without except 
incidentally ; any more than that which is good in itself can be 
means to an end, or that which is good for its own sake can be so 
for the sake of something else. But, supposing the soul to be 
moved at all, one would say that sensible things would be the 
most likely to move it. 

Again, even if soul does move itself, this is equivalent to saying 8 
that it is moved; and, all motion being defined as displacement 
of the thing moved guwzé moved, it will follow that the soul will 
be displaced from its own essential nature, if it be true that its 
self-movement is not an accident, but that motion belongs to the 
essence of soul in and of itself. Some say that the soul in fact 9 
Democri- moves the body, in which it is, in the same way in which 
tus. it moves itself. So, for example, Democritus; and herein 
he resembled Philippus, the comic poet, who tells us that Daedalus 
endowed the wooden Aphrodite with motion, simply by pouring 
in quicksilver: this is very similar to what Democritus says. For 
according to him the spherical atoms, which from their nature can 
never remain still, being moved, tend to draw the whole body 
after them and thus set it in motion. But do these same atoms, 10 
we shall ask in our turn, produce rest, as well as motion? How 
this should be, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say. And, 
Animal speaking generally, it is not in this way that the soul 
motion is would seem to move the animal, but by means of purpose 
purposive. ς 

᾿ οὗ some sort, that is, thought. 

In the same way the Platonic Timaeus explains on physical 11 
The grounds that the soul sets the body in motion, for by its 
‘Timaeus.” own motion it sets the body also in motion, because it 
is closely interwoven with it. For when it had been made out of 
tuetur haec praeter omnes codd. Alex. 47, 1. || 19. δὲ οἵα. Wy || 21. post σφαίρας virg. 
posuit Diels, post μένειν virg. om. Biehl Rodier || 22. καὶ] re καὶ T Vy || ἐρωτήσωμεν 
STUVW | tpentices STU V W, ἠρεμεῖν X, ἠρέμησιν etiam Soph. || 23. ποιεῖ τοῦτ 


atré ST U WX, τοῦτο ποιεῖ ποτε V, ποιεῖ τοῦτο αὐτὸ y et E, sed in rasura, videtur sub- 
fuisse ταῦτα ταὐτὰ (Bek. Trend.), τοῦτο ποιεῖ αὐτό Soph. 18, 31. 


24 DE ANIMA I CH. 3 


Ἁ Ψ 
χείων καὶ μεμερισμένην κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμονικοὺς ἀριθμούς, ὅπως 
»Ἤ Ν Ν Ὁ / 
αἴσθησίν τε σύμφυτον ἁρμονίας ἔχῃ Kal TO πᾶν φέρηται 30 
/ “ Ἁ 3 / 3 / ξ΄ 
συμφώνους φοράς, τὴν εὐθυωρίαν εἰς κύκλον κατέκαμψεν᾽" 
‘ ὃ Ν 3 Mm EN ’ λ δύ ὃ ni / 
καὶ διελὼν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς κύκλους OVO δισσαχῃῇ συνημμένους 
πάλιν τὸν ἕνα διεῖλεν εἰς ἑπτὰ κύκλους, ὡς οὔσας τὰς τοῦ 4078 
12 οὐρανοῦ φορὰς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐ κα- 
λῶς τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι: τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παν- 
Ν “A Ψ 7 >» ΄ ὯΔ 3.» \ ¢ , 
τὸς δῆλον ὅτι τοιαύτην εἶναι βούλεται οἷόν TOT ἐστὶν ὁ Kadov- 
a 3 Ν δὴ ὯΔ > ¢ 3 θ δ᾽ “ἃ e 5» θ 
μενος vous: οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἷόν γ᾽ ἡ αἰσθητική, οὐδ᾽ οἷον ἡ ἐπιθυ- ς 
ia χὰ 
13 μητική" τούτων γὰρ ἡ κίνησις οὐ κυκλοφορία: ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς 
ἃ 
καὶ συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ἢ νόησις: ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήμα- 
ἴω o~ “~ / > \ 
Ta’ ταῦτα δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἕν, ὡς ὃ ἀριθμός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς TO 
/ ὃ , © € ων WA ‘ ἐλλ᾽ ¥ ? ‘ nN 
μέγεθος" διόπερ οὐδ᾽ ὁ νοῦς οὕτω συνεχής, GAN ἤτοι ἀμερὴς ἢ 
, ΜᾺ ‘ Ν 
οὐχ as μέγεθός τι συνεχής. πῶς γὰρ δὴ καὶ νοήσει μέγε- 
a! a ~ 5» ‘ 
Jos ὦν; πότερον ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ τῶν αὑτοῦ; μορίῳ δ᾽ ἤτοι κατὰ 
14 μέγεθος ἢ κατὰ στιγμήν, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο μόριον εἰπεῖν. εἰ 
ον ea ¥ a“ 3 
μὲν οὖν κατὰ στιγμήν, αὗται δ᾽ ἄπειροι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε 
4 3 μ᾿ Ἁ a f x > , Pa 
διέξεισιν. εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοή- 
‘ > + rd δὲ )ν»νσ 5 ὃ / > ὃ᾽ € 
oe. τὸ αὐτό. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἅπαξ ἐνδεχόμενον. εἰ δ᾽ ixa- 15 
% ra € lan ΝᾺ ὔ rd ὃ a Fa “ θ A \ 
νὸν θιγεῖν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων, τί δεῖ κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι ἢ καὶ 
ἮΝ ᾿ θ μή . > δ᾽ 3 to ΡᾺ οὶ oN ’ Χ 
ὅλως μέγεθος ἔχειν; εἰ δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον νοῆσαι τῷ ὅλῳ κύκλῳ 
θυγόντα, τίς ἐστιν ἡ τοῖς μορίοις θίξις ; ἔτι δὲ πῶς νοήσει τὸ 
~ γ ~ os Ν 
μεριστὸν ἀμερεῖ ἢ τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῷ; ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν 
νοῦν εἶναι τὸν κύκλον τοῦτον: νοῦ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις νόησις, κύ- 20 
Ἄ a 
15 κλου δὲ περιφορά' εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις περιφορά, Kal νοῦς ἂν εἴη 


γμ- 


Ο 


30. re] τς καὶ TU, καὶ om. etiam Them. Philop. {ἁρμονίαν T UW Soph., ἁμμονίας 
etiam Them. Philop. in interpr., v. [ayducki ap. crit. 22, 27 || 32. κύκλοις δύο ex uno 
10 recepit Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes δύο κύκλους, Soph. τὸ, 23 ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς κύκλου δύο jj 
407 ἃ, 5. y om. Wy, leg. etiam Simpl. in prooemio acl lib. I, p. 4, ret Soph. ἢ 6. ante 
ὁ δὲ transponendum τῷ. dvayKatoy...22. νόησις censet Susemihl, Oecon. p. #4 i} τούτων, 
κυκλοφορία unc. incl. Essen, p. 18 || 7. καὶ συνεχὴς unc. incl. Kssen || 8. ὁ ἀριθμός pr. EK 
(Trend.) et U Simpl. Philop. (ec. princeps) Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes om. arti- 
culum, etiam Philop. (ITayduck cum cocdd.) 10. οὐδὲ νοῦς UW, οὐδὲ delere vult A. 
Martin, Revue Critique, 1902, p. 427 || offrw Biehlio suspectum videtur, delendum censet 
A. Martin, legit etiam Simpl. Soph. 20, 37 || συνεχής unc. incl. Hssen || rr. ὧν; πότερον 
ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ recepit Biehl ex solo pr. I! (cf Susemihl, Occon. p. 84), ὧν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων 
(omisso wérepov) rc. If et ceteri cocdkl. (praeterquam quod V ἐν ér. praebet) Philop., 
quam lectionem etiam Bek. recepit, ὧν πότερον καθόλου ἢ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν mop. scripsit Trend., 
sic etiam vet. transl, dv; πότερον καθ᾽ ὅλον θυγὼν ἢ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν pop. posuit Torst., av; 
πότερον Kad’ ὅλον ἢἣ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων Simpl. 43, 38, Soph. 2x, 7 (coll. 21, 303 22, 
rt. 23), unde ays πότερον καθ᾽ ὅλον ἢ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων Rodier || τῶν om. V Soph. ἢ 
ἑαυτοῦ T, αὐτοῦ y Ald. Sylb. Rodier, etiam Philop. Simpl. δορὰ, {{|μορίων δ᾽ omnes 


CH. 3 406 Ὁ 29—407 a 21 25 


the elements and divided in harmonical ratios in order that it 
might have a native perception of proportion and that the universe 
might move in harmonic revolutions, he, the creator, proceeded to 
bend the straight line into a circle; and then to split the one circle 
into two, intersecting at two points; and one of the two circles he 
split into seven, the revolutions of heaven being regarded as the 
motions of the soul. In the first place, it is not right to call 
Criticism the soul a magnitude. For by the soul of the universe 
in detail. -_ Timaeus clearly intends something of the same sort as 
what is known as mind: he can hardly mean that it is like the 
sensitive or appetitive soul, whose movements are not circular. 
But the thinking mind is one and continuous in the same sense 
as the process of thinking. Now thinking consists of thoughts. 
But the unity of these thoughts is a unity of succession, the unity 
of a number, and not the unity of a magnitude. This being so, 
neither is mind continuous in this latter sense, but either it is 
without parts or else it is continuous in a different sense from an 
extended magnitude. For how can it possibly think if it be 
a magnitude? Will it think with some one or other of its parts: 
such parts being taken either in the sense of magnitudes or in the 
sense of points, if a point can be called a part? If it be with 
parts in the sense of points, and there is an. infinity of these, 
clearly mind will never reach the end of them; while, if they be 
taken in the sense of magnitudes, mind will have the same thoughts 
times without end. But experience shows that we can think a 
thought once and no more. Again, if it be enough for the soul 
to apprehend with one or other of its parts, what need is there for 
it to be moving in a circle or to have magnitude at all? But, if 
it is necessary to thought that the mind should bring the whole 
circle into contact, what does the contact of the several parts 
mean? Again, how will it think that which is divisible by means 
of that which is without parts, or that which is without parts 
by means of that which is divisible? It must be mind which 
is meant by the circle in question. For when mind moves it 
thinks; when a circle moves it revolves. If, then, thought 
is a revolution, the circle which has such a revolution must 


libri scripti et impressi, etiam Philop. (sed v. 1. μορίῳ) Soph., μορίῳ δ᾽ e Susemihlti et 
sua coniectura Biehl, etiam Rodier || scripsisse Arist. v. 11. ὦν; πότερον ὁτῳοῦν τῶν 
αὑτοῦ -«- μορίων»; μορίων δ' suspicor || 15. φαίνεται... ἐνδεχόμενον a philosopho Platonico 
interpolatum existimat Christ, non legisse videtur Philop., legunt etiam Them. Simpl. 
Soph. | ef θ᾽ coni, Susemihl || 16. καὶ om. SV W, leg. etiam Them. || 19. ἢ τὸ E (Trend.) 
et y Philop. Soph. vet. transl. Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes καὶ τὸ {| dvaykaioy] v. ad 
407 8, 6. 


I2 


13 


15 


26 DE ANIMA I CH. 3 


4 / λ Ἂ ¢€ , ‘ / 3. αὶ δὲ ὃ ’ Ld 

ὁ κύκλος, οὗ ἡ τοιαύτη περιφορὰ [νόησις͵. ἀεὶ δὲ δή τι νοή- 

σει" δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ ἀΐδιος ἣ περιφορά: τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρα- 

κτικῶν νοήσεων ἔστι πέρατα (πᾶσαι γὰρ ἑτέρου χάριν), at δὲ 

θεωρητικαὶ τοῖς λόγοις ὁμοίως ὁρίζονται: λόγος δὲ πᾶς ὁρι- 25 
Ν A 3 / e ‘ εν > 4 & Ν 9 3 9» a) Ν 

σμὸς ἢ ἀπόδειξις: αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς, καὶ 

¥ ’ s Ν Ν Ἃ Ν δ 3 δὲ 

ἔχουσι πως τέλος τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα: εἰ OE 

μὴ περατοῦνται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνακάμπτουσί γε πάλιν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχήν, 

λ 4 δ᾽ > ἃ / Ν ἡ ὴθ ΓᾺ € de 
προσλαμβάνουσαι δ᾽ ἀεὶ μέσον καὶ ἄκρον εὐθυποροῦσιν- ἡ δὲ 
περιφορὰ πάλιν ἐπ᾿ ἀρχὴν ἀνακάμπτει. οἱ δ᾽ ὁρισμοὶ πάν- 30 

‘4 » ? £ 3 Ν “ a ὃ a 
16 TES πεπερασμένοι. ἔτι εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ περιφορὰ πολλάκις, δεή- 
4 “ ‘\ 3 / ¥ 8. ςε 4 » 3 δ 
17 σει πολλάκις νοεῖν τὸ αὐτό. ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει 
τινὶ καὶ ἐπιστάσει μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον 
\ ς / > ἈΝ Ν Qs 7 / Ν Ν ς ΄ 
18 καὶ ὁ συλλογισμός. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μακάριόν γε τὸ μὴ ῥᾷ- 
ὃ 3 Ν ,, > 2.3 ‘ ε , >” ‘ >? 
tov ἀλλὰ βίαιον. εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς μὴ οὐσΐα, πα- 407b 
το pa φύσιν ἂν κινοῦτο. ἐπίπονον δὲ καὶ τὸ μεμεῖχθαι τῷ σώ- 
ματι μὴ δυνάμενον ἀπολυθῆναι, καὶ προσέτι φευκτόν, εἴ- 
βέλ ~ n Ν ‘ / ¥) θ A ¥ θέ 
περ βέλτιον τῷ νῷ μὴ μετὰ σώματος εἶναι, καθάπερ εἰωθέ 
20Te λέγεσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ. ἄδηλος δὲ καὶ Tous 
κύ λ / θ Ν > ‘ ξ af ¥ ‘ os Ὰ ε 
κλῳ φέρεσθαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ αἰτία" οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ 
a / > - ΨᾺ 4 la > Ν ‘ ‘ 
οὐσία αἰτία τοῦ κύκλῳ φέρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 
Ψ ~ » % ~ ¥ > 3 ς Ἄ ~ 
οὕτω κινεῖται, οὔτε τὸ σῶμα atTiov, ἄλλ᾽ ἡ ψνχὴ μᾶλλον 
21 ἐκείνῳ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὅτι βέλ λέ . καί ᾿ ἐχρῆ 

. μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὅτι βέλτιον λέγεται" καίτοι γ᾽ ἐχρῆν 
διὰ A x θ Ν , λ on φέ θ ‘\ / aT" 

τοῦτο τὸν θεὸν κύκλῳ ποιεῖν φέρεσθαι THY ψυχήν, ὅτι 

aN > 7 ΝΟΦἶ “ θ ran) rg w~ θ δ᾽ y h ΥᾺλ 
βέλτιον αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τοῦ μένειν, κινεῖσθαι δ᾽ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως. 
3 Ν ? 5 ‘ € 4 , ¢ » , % 
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη σκέψις ἑτέρων λόγων οἰκειο- 
22 τέρα, ταύτην μὲν ἀφῶμεν τὸ νῦν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄτοπον συμ- 
βαίνει καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν περὶ ψυ- 
χῆς" συνάπτουσι γὰρ καὶ τιθέασιν εἰς σῶμα τὴν ψυχήν, οὐ- 15 
θὲν προσδιορίσαντες διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν καὶ πῶς ἔχοντος τοῦ σώ- 
/ 4 ὰ ΕΖ: ἴω + ὃ ba) Ν ‘ 
paros. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν τοῦτ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι" διὰ yap τὴν 


"»"Ἡλ Ρῖ 


o 


22. γόησις unc. incl. Torst., sine uncis Biehl Rodier, non legisse videtur Suph. 
23, 17, virgulam ante νόησις posuit Rodier || δή τι νοήσει. Soph, Bek. Trend., δὴ τί 
νοήσει: Simpl. Torst. Biehl Rodier || 23. γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἢ πρακτ. SUWX, ποιητικῶν 
ἢ non legisse videntur Them. Philop. (v. tamen Hayducki app. crit. ad 133, 8) Simpl. {{ 
25. was ἢ Uy || 26, al δ᾽ ἀποδείξεις STUV WX Bek. Trend., al μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξει: y 
et, ut videtur, Soph. 23, 27, Torst., ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπόδειξις Ἐῶ, sed superscr. al et as Ey 
(Stapf.) Biehl Rodier || 27. ἔχουσα FE Bich] Rodier, reliqui et seripti et impressi ἄχουσι | 
29. προσαναλαμβάνουσαι Ἰὼ, sed ava expunct. (Stapf.) Torst., προσκαταλαμβάνουσαι y, 
reliqui προσλαμβάνουσαι, etiam Philop. Soph. |} 30. of θ᾽ dp. coni. Christ || 407 Ὅν 1. μὴ 
οὐσία corrupta putat et coni. ἢ οὐσίᾳ Torst., ἢ οὐσία « καὶ», vel “«-ἕκστασιᾳ de> τῆς οὐσίαν 


CH. 3 407 a 22---407 Ὁ 17 27 


be mind. But then it will go on thinking of something for ever, 
for this is required by the eternity of the revolution. To practical 
thinking there are limits, for it always implies an external end; 
while speculative thinking is determined in the same way as the 
logical explanations which express it. Now every explanation 
consists either in definition or in demonstration. But demonstra- 
tions have a premiss for starting-point and reach a kind of goal 
in the inference or conclusion; while, even if they never reach 
a conclusion, at all events they do not revert to the starting-point, 
but with the aid of a succession of middle terms and extremes 
advance in a straight line. But circular movement returns to the 
point from which it started. Definitions, too, are all determinate. 
Besides, if the same revolution recurs again and again, the mind 16 
will be obliged to think the same thing again and again. Further, 17 
it is a sort of rest or coming to a halt, and not motion, which 
thinking resembles: and we may say the same of the syllogism. 
Nor, again, will that which does not move easily, but under con- 18 
straint, even realise happiness. If the motion of soul be not its 
essence, it will be an unnatural motion. And the entanglement of 19 
the mind in the body without the possibility of release is painful ; 
nay, it is to be avoided, if indeed it is really better for mind to 
‘be independent of body, a view commonly expressed and widely 
accepted. Also it is not clear why the heaven revolves in a circle ; 20 
seeing that circular motion is neither implied by the essence of 
soul (that form of movement being indeed merely accidental to it), 
nor due to the body: on the contrary it is rather the soul which 
causes the motion of the body. Besides, we are not even told that 21 
it is better so: yet surely the reason why God made the soul 
revolve in a circle ought to have been that movement was better 
for it than rest, and this form of movement better than any other. 

But such an enquiry as this belongs more appropriately to 
a different subject: so let us dismiss it for the present. We may, 22 
however, note here another absurdity which is involved in this as 
Relation in most other theories concerning the soul. They attach 
between the soul to, and enclose it in, body, without further de- 
body ins termining why this happens and what is the condition 
moved. of the body. And yet some such explanation would 
seem to be required, as it is owing to their relationship that the 


vel μὴ ἢ οὐσία coni. Susemihl, ac sane quidem Them. 22, 35 non leg. negationem, leg. μὴ 
Philop. Simpl. Soph. et vet. transl. || 2. ἂν κινοῖτο E Simpl., ceteri codd. κινοῖτ’ ἄν || 9. γ᾽ 
om. E (Trend.) et Torst., etiam Soph. 24, 21 || 10. ποιεῖν κύκλω SV Wy Torst., κύκλῳ 
ποιεῖν etiam Soph, || 14. τῶν περὶ, sic omnes codd., etiam E (Trend.) et Them., τοῖς περὶ Soph. 


2ὃ DE ANIMA I CHS. 3, 4 


κοινωνίαν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ TO δὲ πάσχει καὶ TO μὲν κινεῖται TO 
Ν a) ? > 3 ΔΝ ε / \ ¥ “ ~ 

δὲ κινεῖ, τούτων δ᾽ οὐθὲν ὑπάρχει πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς τυχοῦσιν. 
e \ / 3 ῬᾺ ‘4 “Ns ε / \ \ “~ 

23 οἱ δὲ μόνον ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν ποῖόν τι ἡ ψυχή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ 20 

ft ra 5242 .λ » ΄ ν 2 4 
δεξομένου σώματος οὐθὲν ἔτι προσδιορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐνδεχό- 
μενον κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς μύθους τὴν τυχοῦσαν ψυχὴν εἰς 
τὸ τυχὸν ἐνδύεσθαι σῶμα" δοκεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἴδιον ἔχειν εἶ- 
δος καὶ μορφήν. παραπλήσιον δὲ λέγουσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις 

’ Ν ‘ > 3 ‘ 3 δύ ~ \ ‘ \ 
dain τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνδύεσθαι" det yap THY μὲν 25 
τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. 

4 Καὶ ἄλλη δέ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πι- 
θανὴ μὲν πολλοῖς οὐδεμιᾶς ἧττον τῶν λεγομένων, [λόγους δ᾽] 
ὥσπερ εὐθύνας «δὲ; δεδωκυΐα καὶ τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γινομένοις λό- 
yous. ἁρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτὴν λέγουσι: καὶ γὰρ τὴν ap- 30 

μονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγ- 
2 κεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων. καίτοι γε ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι 
a“ ΄ A f Ν \ \ > ? » + 
τῶν μειχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἷόν τ 
Ὁ 4 ¥ δὲ Ν ~ > ¥ ε , ~ Se 

3 εἶναι τούτων. ETL O€ TO κινειν οὐκ ἔστιν appovias, ψνχῃ O€ 

, 2 a ΨᾺ / > ¢€ > a ς cd \ ~ 
4 πάντες ἀπονέμουσι τοῦτο μάλισθ᾽ ὡς εἰπεῖν. ἁρμόζει δὲ μᾶλ. 4o8a 
λον καθ᾽ ὑγιείας λέγειν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματι- 
a 3 “ bs A “~ 4 3 ¥ > 
κῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ κατὰ ψυχῆς. φανερώτατον δ᾽ εἴ τις ἀπο- 
, / Ν , ‘ \ ad ΤᾺ “~ e 
διδόναι πειραθείΐη τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς appo- 

/ “ Ν ‘ 3 / ¥ 3 ’ fa ᾿ 
svia Twi χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐφαρμόζειν. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ λέγομεν τὴν 5 
ἁρμονίαν εἰς δύο ἀποβλέποντες, κυριώτατα μὲν τῶν μεγε- 
θῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι κίνησιν καὶ θέσιν τὴν σύνθεσιν αὐτῶν, ἐπει- 
δὰν οὕτω συναρμόζωσιν ὥστε μηδὲν συγγενὲς παραδέχεσθαι, 

a Ἁ 
ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν μεμειγμένων λόγον, οὐδετέρως μὲν οὖν 
¥ @ \ A m “ é ~ ? > Cd 
εὔλογον, ἡ δὲ σύνθεσις τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν λίαν εὐεξέ- τὸ 


18. ποιεῖ τι τὸ ὃ ΤΨ ΝΥ Χὶ {{.|ὲ καὶ] σῶμα καὶ ς solo K seripsit Biehl, celeri seript! et 
impressi om, σῶμα, etiam Simpl. Philop. 139, τ΄ sqq. || δὴ 5X, δή τι TVW et Them, | 
27. de loco 27.,.g08a, 29. cf. Bon., Hermes VII, p. 428 syq. ff 28. πολλοῖς καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς 
TW pr. y Soph. | arrow TV Wy et corr. S Soph. v. 1. (ἦττον e cold. Hayduck, 
25, 5), πιθανὴ μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἧσσον Them. |} λόγοις V, λόγον. cont. ‘Tovst., Adyor 8" ὥσπερ 
καὶ coni. Bergk, Lermes XVIII, 518, λόγον δὲ καὶ ὥσπερ Susemihl, λόγους δ᾽ omittendum 
censet Bernays, die Dialoge des Arist. p. 1.5. cul assentiuntur Elaecker (Zeitschr. £ Ciym. 
1864, p. 204) et Bonitz (Ilermes VII, p. 429), unc. inclusi, λόγους leg, Philop. Soph., nen 
legisse videtur Them. || 2g. « δὲ - ¢ Bernaysii coniectura scripsi {| ywoudvors λόγοιφ] sic 
etiam Simpl, Aeqyoudvou λόγοις W Philop. in interpr. 145, 22, λεγομένοις Ὁ | 30. αὐτήν 
τινες V Wy, τίνας etiam Them. et Philop. 141, 31 legisse videntur {! 32. ye om. ὦ Soph. 
Torst. || 408 a, 1, ἀπονέμουσιν ἅπαντες τοῦτο STV Wy, ἅπαντες ἀπ. τ΄ X, πάντες etiam 
Soph. || 3. pavepwrdrav E, φανερώτατον corr. Ἐὰ (Stapf.) |} 5. λέγομεν pr. Ἰὼ (Trend.) 


CHS. 3, 4 407 Ὁ 18—408 a Io 29 


one acts, the other is acted upon, that the one is moved, and 
the other causes it to move; and between two things taken at 
random no such mutual relations exist. The supporters of such 23 
theories merely undertake to explain the nature of the soul. Of 
the body which is to receive it they have nothing more to say: 
just as if it were possible for any soul taken at random, according 
to the Pythagorean stories, to pass into any body. This is absurd, 
for each body appears to have a distinctive form or shape of its 
own. It is just like talking of a transmigration of carpentry 
into flutes: for the craft must employ the right tools and the soul 
the right body. 

There is yet another opinion concerning soul which has come 4 
down to us, commending itself to many minds as readily as any 
that is put forward, although it has been severely criticised even 
The theory in the popular discussions of the present day. The soul 
of har- is asserted to be a kind of harmony, for harmony is 
“mony on this view a blending or combining of opposites, 
and the components of the body are opposites. And yet this 2 
harmony must mean either a certain proportion in the components 
or else the combining of them; and the soul cannot possibly be 
either of these. Furthermore, to cause motion is no attribute of 3 
a harmony: yet this function more than any other is all but 
universally assigned to soul. Again, it is more in harmony with 4 
the facts to apply the term harmony to health or bodily excellence 
generally than to soul, as is very clearly seen when we try to 
assign to a harmony of whatever kind the affections or functions 
of the soul: it is difficult to harmonise them. 

Further, if we use the word harmony with a twofold appli- 5 
cation; first, and in its most natural sense, of those magnitudes 
Two which have motion and position, to denote the combining 
meanings of them into a whole, when they are so closely fitted 
term har- together that they do not admit between them anything 
mony: of the same kind; and then in a secondary sense to denote 
the proportion subsisting between the components of a mixture: in 
neither sense is it reasonable to call soul a harmony. The view which 
regards it as a combining of the parts of the body is singularly 


ST VX et, ut videtur, Soph. 25, 34, Torst. Bon., stud. Arist. IT, III. p. 61, ἔτι δὲ λέγομεν 
Madvig 471, reliqui ante Torst. omnes λέγοιμεν || 8. συνγενέσθαι E, μηδὲν μὴ συγγενὲς 
coni. Steinhart, μηδὲν <pire συγγενὲς μήτε μὴ: συγγενὲς coni. Susemihl, Burs. 
Jahrb. XVII, 261, vulgat. leg. interpretes, etiam Alex. De an. 25, 10 || 9. post λόγον 
punctum Bek., colon Torst., virgulam Trend. 


30 DE ANIMA I CH. 4 


? A € ad “A ran) \ 
ταστος. πολλαί Te yap αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν μερῶν καὶ πολλα- 
χῶς" τίνος οὖν ἢ πῶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν νοῦν χρὴ σύνθεσιν εἶναι, 

6 ἢ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἣ ὀρεκτικόν ; ὁμοίως δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ «τὸ» τὸν 
λόγον τῆς μείξεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν: οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει 
λόγον ἡ μεῖξις τῶν στοιχείων Kal ἣν σὰρξ καὶ καθ' ἣν ὀστοῦν" 15 
συμβήσεται οὖν πολλάς τε ψυχὰς ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν τὸ 
σῶμα, εἴπερ πάντα μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων μεμειγμένων, ὁ δὲ 

“A / a € / Ν é > ? > ¥ 

7 τῆς μείξεως λόγος ἁρμονία Kat ψυχή. ἀπαιτήσειε δ᾽ ἂν τις 

τοῦτό γε καὶ παρ᾽ ᾿Εμπεδοκλέους: ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν λόγῳ 

7 > ΄ > ε 7 > \ ς ᾽7 “Ὁ ἴω 
τινί φησιν εἶναι" πότερον οὖν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, ἢ μᾶλ- 20 
λον ἕτερόν τι οὖσα ἐγγίνεται τοῖς μέλεσιν ; ἔτι δὲ πότερον ἡ 
φιλία τῆς τυχούσης αἰτία μείξεως ἢ τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ; καὶ 
αὕτη πότερον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἕτερόν τι; 

8 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τοιαύτας ἀπορίας. εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἕτερον ἡ 
ψυχὴ τῆς μείξεως, τί δή ποτε ἅμα τῷ σαρκὶ εἶναι ἀναι- 25 

ἴω ~ ta) ΓᾺ »ἢ} 
ρεῖται καὶ τῷ τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις τοῦ ζῴου; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἴπερ 
μὴ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων ψνχὴν ἔχει, εἰ μή ἐστιν ἡ ψνχὴ ὁ λόγος 
τῆς μεΐξεως, τί ἐστιν ὃ φθείρεται τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπολειπούσης ; 

7 ‘ > ¥zp ἐ 4 5 3 ἐν ‘ Ν 
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐθ᾽ ἁρμονίαν οἷόν τ' εἶναι. τὴν ψνχὴν 

9 οὔτε κύκλῳ περιφέρεσθαι, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. κατὰ 30 

Ν δὲ “ θ θ ζ΄ ¥ ἂν ‘ 
συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἔστι καὶ κι- 

ra) ~ μὰ ω 
νεῖν ἑαυτήν, οἷον κινεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, τοῦτο δὲ κινεῖσθαι 
[4 Ἅ ΤᾺ Ν᾿ ¥ ? > é “~ s ΞΖ 
ὑπὸ τῆς ψνχῆς ἄλλως δ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τε κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τόπον 

τὸ αὐτήν. εὐλογώτερον 8 ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῆς ὡς Ki 
νουμένης, εἷς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας. φαμὲν γὰρ τὴν ψυν- 408b 
χὴν λυπεῖσθαι χαίρειν, θαρρεῖν φοβεῖσθαι, ἔτι δὲ ὀργί. 
, Ἢ > , ‘ A A 4 , 
ζεσθαί τε καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι: ταῦτα δὲ πάν- 
/ — ὃ ~ 54 5» θ , ὰ ΣΝ κι A 
τα κινήσεις εἶναι δοκοῦσιν, ὅθεν οἰηθείη τις ἂν αὐτὴν κινεῖσθαι" 

τὰ τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον. εἶ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ λυπεῖ- 5 

rr. αἱ om. ἘΝ || μερῶν} πολλῶν nunc Hf, subfuisse videtur μερῶν (Stapf.) i ra. χρὴ 
τὸν νοῦν ST V Wy || 13. καὶ τὸ λόγον VX, quod probat Bon., stud. Arist. I. p. 97, arin. 
1, καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον Soph., quod in textum receperunt Biehl] Rodier, malunt etiam Torst, 
et Bon., stud. Arist. 11, LIL. p. 61, reliqui καὶ τὸν λόγον || 15. post ὀστοῦν punctum vuly., 
colon posuit Diels |] 18. doracrjoee...28. ἀπολειπούσης in parenth, Torst. |] 19. αὐγῶν ἐν 
λόγῳ Wy Soph. |] a1. μέρεσιν pr. Io W et, ut videtur, y Torst. Biehl Rodlier, μέλεσιν re. 
ESTUV Bek. Trend. Diels, p. 175, μιχθεῖσιν X VPhilop, 150, τα Soph. |} 26. τὸ T et in 
interpr, Philop. Simpl. Chaignet, [essai sur la psych. (Ar. p. 246, adn. 2, Susemihl, om. 
SV W, τῷ in interpr. etiam Them. Soph. 1 27. μὴ prius delendum esse conset Chaignet, 


at Simplicium vulgat. non legisse ex interpr. 56, 18 sqq. parum constal. | 28. ri dora ὃ 
φθείρεται viclentur corrupta Torst., tuentur haee verba praeter omnes codd. Them. Philop. 


CH. 4 408 a 11—408b 5 31 


open to criticism. For there are many combinings of the parts, 
and they combine in many ways. What part, then, is that whose 
combining with the rest we must assume to be the intellect, and 
in what way does it combine? Or again, what of the sensitive 
and appetitive faculties? But it is equally absurd to regard the soul 6 
as the proportion determining the mixture. For the elements are 
not mixed in the same proportion in flesh as in bone. Thus it 
will follow that there are many souls, and that, too, all over the 
body, if we assume that all members consist of the elements 
variously commingled and that the proportion determining the 
mixture is a harmony, that is, soul. This is a question we might 7 
Empe- ask Empedocles; who says that each of the parts is 
docles. determined by a certain proportion. Is the soul, then, 
this proportion, or is it rather developed in the frame as something 
distinct? And, further, is it a mixture at random or a mixture in 
the right proportion which he ascribes to Love: and, if the latter, 
is Love the proportion itself or something other than the proportion 
and distinct from it? Such, then, are the difficulties involved in 
this view. On the other hand, if soul is something distinct from 8 
Dificulties the mixture, how comes it that it is destroyed simul- 
involved taneously with the disappearance of the quiddity of the 
ing the flesh and of the other parts of the animal? And, further, 
theory. . 

assuming that each of the separate parts has not ἃ soul 
of its own, unless the soul be the proportion of their admixture, 
what is it that perishes when the soul quits the body? 

From what has been said it is clear that the soul cannot be 
Conclu- a harmony and cannot revolve in a circle. But inci-g 
sion. dentally it can, as we have seen, move and set itself in 
motion: for instance, the body in which it is may move, and be 
set in motion by the soul: otherwise it cannot possibly move from 
place to place. The question whether the soul is moved would 10 

a more naturally arise in view of such facts as the 
Objection . . - . . 
stated and following. The soul is said to feel pain and joy, con- 
answered. fidence and fear, and again to be angry, to perceive and 
to think; and all these states are held to be movements: which 
might lead one to infer that soul itself is moved. But this is no 11 
necessary inference. For suppose it ever so true that to feel pain 
Soph., egregie totum hunc locum explicavit Bon., Hermes VII, p. 435 || 8] ᾧ coni. Barco, 
assentitur Susemihl, Oecon. p. 84 || ἀπολιπούσης TV Xy Them., ἀπολειπούσης in paraphr. 
Simpl. Philop. 153, 4 Soph. v. 1. (ἀπολιπούσης e codd. Hayduck 26, 37) || 408 Ὁ, 3. τε 
om. V jj 5. de hoc loco εἰ γὰρ...11. τὸ δὴ vide Bon., stud. Arist. IT, III. p. 22 sqq., 


quem in textu restituendo secutus est Biehl, etiam Rodier, nisi quod a verbis Ὁ, 9. τούτων 
δὲ parenth. incipere maluit Rodier. 


32 DE ANIMA JI CH. 4 


KA ca ΝᾺ - > Ν Ν y 
σθαι ἢ χαιρειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἕκαστον κι- 
A ͵ Ν \ κι , » es A A - Ν 
νεῖσθαι τούτων, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαί ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ 
ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ τὴν καρδίαν ὡδὶ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ 
δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἴσως ἢ ἕτερόν τι, τούτων δὲ συμ- 
βαίνει τὰ μὲν κατὰ φορὰν τινῶν κινουμένων, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ 
12 ἀλλοίωσιν (ποῖα δὲ καὶ πῶς, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος)" τὸ δὴ λέ- 
3 ’ “ ‘\ ῳ ἌἊ » / “ 
yew ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις λέγοι THY ψυ- 
Ν ε ΄ “ἃ 2 ὃ “Ἂ ἫΝ Ν κέ ᾿ λέ Ν 
χὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν: βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν 
ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρω- 
Tov τῇ Wyn τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ws ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, 
5 > εν Ν , 5 ΄ e oN δ᾽ > > 2 ? Ὁ ξ Ν 
ἀλλ᾽ ὁτὲ μὲν μέχρι ἐκείνης, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης, οἷον ἡ μὲν 
» 9 ‘ 4 ε 3 2 4 > 3 3 ’ > N ‘ > 
αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τωνδί, ἡ δ᾽ ἀνάμνησις am ἐκείνης ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν 
13 τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινήσεις ἣ μονάς. ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι 
οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι. μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθείρετ᾽ ἂν 
ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ ἀμαυρώσεως, νῦν δ᾽ ἴσως ὅπερ ἐπὶ 
~ 3 “ / > Ν , ς , ” 
τῶν αἰσθητηρίων συμβαίνει" εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ πρεσβύτης ὄμμα 
a / al Ψ ‘\ € ra Ψ Ἁ “~ > 
τοιονδί, βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ Kal 6 νέος. ὥστε TO γῆρας οὐ 
‘a \ / θέ LAX. > ®t θά > , 
τῷ τὴν ψνχὴν τι πεπονθέναι, ἃ ἐν @, καθάπερ ἐν μεέ- 
14 θαις καὶ νόσοις. καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται 
λλ Ν ¥ A / > AN δὲ 2 θέ > b) δὲ ὃ 
ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένον, αὖτὸ δὲ ἄπαθές ἔστιν. τὸ δὲ δια- 
“ θ Ν ~ Ἃ “ > ¥ 3 ? ‘8 > λὰ 
νοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ του- 
“~ ῬᾺ ya) ΡᾺ 4 
δὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ἡ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει. διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρο- 
΄ ¥ , ¥ λεῖ > S24 ey > ‘ “ 
μένον οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ" οὐ yap ἐκείνου Hv, ἀλλὰ τοῦ 
“ΔΑ. ἊΝ λ ξ δὲ mo ¥ θ ‘4 é \ 3 θέ bd 
κοινοῦ, ὃ ἀπόλωλεν" 6 δὲ νοῦς tows θειότερόν TL καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν, 


Ψ Ν > > Ὄ ied ‘ ‘a ‘ 
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε κινεῖσθαι THY ψυχήν, φανερὸν: 


ἐκ τούτων’ εἰ δ᾽ ὅλως μὴ κινεῖται, δῆλον ὡς οὐδ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς. 
‘ μ᾽ “ > , 3 , δ μ 5 ‘ εν 

16 πολὺ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀλογώτατον τὸ λέγειν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι 

τὴν ψυχὴν κινοῦνθ᾽' ἑαυτόν: ὑπάρχει γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατα 


7. pro δὲ coni. δὴ, quod probat Essen, et a verbis τὸ δὴ apodosin incipere vult 
Susemihl || 8, τὸ τὴν «. V Bon., reliqui ante Bon. omnes τῷ τὴν x. |] 0. ἢ τοιοῦτον Libri 
scripti et ante Biehlium impressi omnes, etiam Philop., ἢ τῷ τοῦτο coni. Torst., ἢ τὸ τοῦτο 
coni. Bon,, quod recepit Biehl || τούτων... τὰ. λόγος in parenth. Susemihl, Burs. Jahrb, (X, 
351 Roclier || cx. ποῖαι WM, litera ¢ inserta quidem sed aperte a prima manu (Trend.), etiam 
Philop. {| (wote...Aéyes) in parenth. Bon. {τὸ δὴ ST GBon., qui ab his verbis apodosin 
incipit ad 5. οἱ γὰρ, quod tam Philop. diserte fecerat 156, 10 sq., τὸ δὲ reliqui ante Bon. 
omnes, etiam Philop. {| 15. οὔσης om. pr. KE, sed ab antiqua manu insertum (Trend.) | 
16. μέχρις TV WX Philop. {| 18. ὁ 68...29. ἐστεν alieno loco inserta censet B. Ritter, 
Grundprinc. ἃ. Arist. Seelenl. Ὁ. 2y, cui assentitur Susemihl ἢ 1g. οὖσα om, pr. EB, 
56 (1 al antiqua manu insertum (Trend.), leg. etiam Them. Philop. (excepte Philop. 
cod. D) || 20. νυνὶ δ᾽ ὥσπερ STV WX y, ὥσπερ etiam Soph., viv δὲ ὅπερ Them. 20, 26 ἢ 


25 


CH. 4 408 Ὁ 6—408 Ὁ 33 33 


or joy and to think are movements, that to experience each of 
these is to be moved and that the movement is due to the soul: 
suppose that to be angry, for instance, or to be afraid means 
a particular movement of the heart, and that to think means 
a movement of this or of some other part, some of these move- 
ments being movements of locomotion, others of qualitative change 
(of what sort and how produced does not concern us here): yet, 12 
even then, to speak of the soul as feeling anger is as if one should 
say that the soul weaves or builds. Doubtless it would be better 
not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man 
does so with the soul: and this, too, not in the sense that the motion 
occurs in the soul, but in the sense that motion sometimes reaches 
to, sometimes starts from, the soul. Thus, sensation originates in 
particular objects, while recollection, starting from the soul, is 
directed towards the movements or traces of movements in the 
Intellect:  Sense-organs. But intellect would seem to be developed 13 
impassive ἴῃ us as a Self-existing substance and to be imperishable. 
perishable. For, if anything could destroy it, it would be the feeble- 
ness of age. But, as things are, no doubt what occurs is the same 
as in the case of the sense-organs. If an aged man could procure 
an eye of the right sort, he would see just as well as a young 
man. Hence old age must be due to an affection or state not 
of the soul as such, but of that in which the soul resides, just as is 
the case in intoxication and disease. In like manner, then, thought 14 
and the exercise of knowledge are enfeebled through the loss of 
something else within, but are in themselves impassive. But 
reasoning, love and hatred are not attributes of the thinking 
faculty but of its individual possessor, in so far as he possesses 
it. Hence when this possessor perishes, there is neither memory 
nor love: for these never did belong to the thinking faculty, 
but to the composite whole which has perished, while the intellect 
is doubtless a thing more divine and is impassive. 

From the foregoing it is clear that the soul is incapable of 15 
motion; and, if it is not moved at all, clearly it does not move 
Criticism itself. Now of all the views that have been put forward 16 


in detail of . . . . 
the self- by far the most irrational is that which makes the soul 
number. a self-moving number. Its supporters are involved in 


22. E superscr. οἷον νέος post τοιονδί est interpretamentum (Bhl.) || 23. πεπονθέναι τι τὴν 
ψυχήν VWy Philop., τὴν ψυχὴν πεπονθέναι S Them. 29, 29 || 25. ἔσω] ἔξω coni. 
Steinhart, ἐν ᾧ coni. Bon., cf. Susemihl, Burs. Jahr. XVII, 264, adn. 24, ἔσω tuentur 
etiam Simpl. p. 60, 30 Philop. Soph., εἴσω Them. 29, 30 et 30, 14, ἔσω retineri volunt 
etiam Zeller, Gesch. d. Ph. d. Gr. II, 2, p. 370 et Neuhiuser, Arist. Lehre von dem sinnl. 
Erkenntnissvermoégen, p. 12. 


H. 3 


34 DE ANIMA I CH. 4 


ra A \ 3 ~ ~ , » > > ~ 

πρῶτα μὲν Ta ἐκ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι cupBaivovta, ἴδια δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ 
2 > \ > , a Ν Ν on / 

λέγειν αὐτὴν ἀριθμόν. πῶς yap χρὴ νοῆσαι μονάδα κινου- 4098 

ΜᾺ > ~ id oO 

μένην, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος, Kal πῶς, ἀμερῆ καὶ ἀδιάφορον od- 


3 ᾽ 3 Ἁ \ rd fa A ¥ > 
I7 σὰν ; εὖ γὰρ ἐστι KLYYTLKY) Καὶ ΚυνΉΤΉ: διαφέρειν δεῖ. ἔτι ὃ 


9 ? 4. Ν 3 / Ὰ Α \ 
ἐπεί φασι κινηθεῖσαν γραμμὴν ἐπίπεδον ποιεῖν, στιγμὴν δὲ 
γραμμήν, καὶ αἱ τῶν μονάδων κινήσεις γραμμαὶ ἔσονται" ς 
ἡ γὰρ στιγμὴ μονάς ἐστι θέσιν ἔχουσα' ὃ δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς τῆς 


χ8 ψυχῆς ἤδη πού ἐστι καὶ θέσιν ἔχει. ἔτι δ᾽ ἀριθμοῦ μὲν ἐὰν 


ἀφέλῃ τις ἀριθμὸν ἢ μονάδα, λείπεται ἄλλος ἀριθμός" 
τὰ δὲ φυτὰ καὶ τῶν ζῴων πολλὰ διαιρούμενα ζῇ καὶ δο- 


19 κεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν τῷ εἴδει. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν οὐθὲν δια- 10 


rad , rd Ἀν, ? ? ‘ ‘ > a 
φέρειν μονάδας λέγειν ἢ σωμάτια μικρά: Kal yap ἐκ τῶν 
Δημοκρίτου σφαιρίων ἐὰν γένωνται στιγμαΐ, μόνον δὲ μένῃ 

“A \ an) 
TO ποσόν, ἔσται TL ἐν αὐτῷ TO μὲν κινοῦν τὸ δὲ KLVOUpErO?r, 
¥ ΕῚ “ aa) + \ ὃ ‘ ‘ rd Ζ A 
ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ! ov yap διὰ TO μεγέθει διαφέρειν 7 
/ / \ ΄ 3 > & 4 \ 3 
μικρότητι συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, GAN ὅτι ποσόν. διὸ ἀναγ- 15 

" > f Ν os ‘ (ὃ > δ᾽ 4 ζω ΄ \ 

καῖον εἶναί TL TO κινῆσον Tas μονάδας. εἰ 0 ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ TO 
A ξ / \ 9 nn 3 A 2 ? \ n \ \ 
κινοῦν ἡ ψυχή, Kat ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ὥστε οὐ τὸ κιιοῦν καὶ τὸ 


20 κινούμενον ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινοῦν μόνον. ἐνδέχεται δὲ δὴ 


ar 


a / » κυ ~ \ € rd Ν +] “~ 
πῶς μονάδα ταύτην εἶναι; δεῖ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τινὰ αὐτῇ 
ὃ \ \ \ TAX nw δὲ ὃ ἊὉ" / a al 
ιαφορὰν πρὸς Tas ἄλλας. στιγμῆς δὲ μοναδικῆς τίς ἂν εἴη 20 
διαφορὰ πλὴν θέσις ; εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ἕτεραι at ἐν τῷ σώματι 
μονάδες καὶ αἱ στιγμαΐ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσονται αἱ μονάδες" 
7 Ν᾿ ral ἮΝ / ? 4 3 “w 3 ~ 
καθέξει yao χώραν στιγμῆς. καίτοι τί κωλύει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ 
2 ‘ ? a ‘ 3 a 
εἶναι, εἰ δύο, καὶ ἀπείρους; ὧν yap ὃ τόπος ἀδιαίρετος, 
καὶ αὐτά. εἶ δ᾽ αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμαὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς 6 τῆς 25 
ψυχῆς, ἢ εἰ ὁ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν ἀριθμὸς ἡ 
ψυχή, διὰ τί οὐ πάντα ψυχὴν ἔχουσι τὰ σώματα; στιγμαὶ 


34. ἴδια Ἰὸ (Bus.) Simpl. p. 65, 17 Soph. et, ut videtur, Philop. 165, 31, receperunt Biehl 
Rodier, ἰδίᾳ reliqui οἱ scripti et ante Bichlium impressi omnes, etiam Them., ἴδια defendit 
Vahlen in ed. art. poet. tert. r1g || goga, 3. ef γὰρ] ἢ γὰρ T, ἦ γὰρ X, ἢ μὲν γὰρ Soph. ay, 
at || 10. αὐτὴν om. EE || ἔχειν ψυχὴν STU Vy Them. jl rt. σμικρά ST Them., μικρά etiam 
Soph. || 12. σφαιρῶν TX et re. E, σφαιρίων reliqui codd. et, ut videtur, pr. Ε (Trend.) |] 13. 
αὐτῷ] αὐταῖς Soph. 30, 9 || post κινούμενον virgulam delevit Torst. || 14. συνεχεῖ] μεγέθει 
T Wy Soph. || 15. σμικρότητι plerique codd., etiam Them. Soph., μικρότητι FE (Stapf) 
Bek, Trend. Torst. || 16. κινῆσαν T Wy, κινῆσον etiam Soph. || 17. ὥστε] πρώτως γε coni. 
Essen || τὸ post καὶ ογὰ, SUWXy |f 18. δὲ οἵα. SVWXy, leg. Them. |] 19. πῶς Them. 
Trend. Torst., πὼς (enclit.) et post εἶναι colon Bek. || ταὐτὴν] αὐτὴν TX, etiam Philop, 
168, 16 || 22. καὶ al] καὶ SUVWy,4T et rc. 1, καὶ αἱ pr.  (Trend.), ἔτεραι al ἐν τῷ 
σώματι στιυμαὶ καὶ αἱ μονάδες coni. Christ || 23. κωλύσει VW Them. Trend., κωλύει 


CH. 4 408 Ὁ 34—409 a 27 35 


many impossibilities, not only in those which arise from attributing 
motion to the soul, but also in others of a special character 
due to calling it a number. For how are we to conceive of a unit, 
a thing which is without parts or differences, as in motion? By 
what would it be moved, and in what way? For if it is capable 
of imparting motion as well as of being moved, it must admit 
differences. Further, since they say that a line by its motion gene- 
rates a surface and that a point by its motion generates a line, the 
movements of the units will also be lines, for a point is a unit 
having position. But the number of the soul must, from the 


nature of the case, be somewhere and have position. Again, if 18 


you subtract a number or unit from a number, a different number 
remains: whereas plants and many animals continue to live when 
divided and seem to have specifically the same soul in each seg- 
ment. Besides, it would seem to make no difference whether we 
Say units or tiny particles. For if the little round atoms of 
Democritus be converted into points and only their sum-total be 
retained, in such sum-total there will still be a part which moves 
and a part which is moved, just as there is in that which is 
extended. The truth of this statement does not depend upon the 
size of the atoms, whether great or small, but upon the fact that 
there is a sum-total or quantity of them. Hence there must be 
something to set the units in motion. But if in the animal the 
part which causes motion is the soul, then it is so likewise in 
the number: so that it will not be both that which causes motion 
and that which is moved which is the soul, but that which causes 


10 


motion only. How then can this cause of motion be a unit? 20 


For if it were so there must be some difference between it and 
the other units. But what is there to differentiate points which 
are units, except position? If, then, the units, that is the points, 
in the body are distinct from the units of soul, the units of soul 
will be in the same place as the points, for each unit will occupy 
the space of a point. And yet if two things can be in the same 
place, why not an infinite number? When the place which things 
occupy is indivisible, the things themselves are also indivisible. 


If, on the other hand, the number of the soul consists of the ar 


points in the body, or if the soul is the number of such points, 
why are not all bodies possessed of soul? For in all bodies there 


etiam Simpl. Soph. |] 25. ὁ prius om. X, alterum insert. E, || 26. ὁ τῶν E Them. Philop. 
17x, 12 Simpl. Soph., recepit Biehl, ceteri et scripti et ante Biehlium impressi omnes ὁ ἐκ 
τῶν, etiam. Philop. in lemmate r71, 6, ἐκ insert. Eg. 


3--2ὼ 


36 DE ANIMA I CHS. 4, 5 


ιν a icy ¥ ~ © 
22 γὰρ ἐν ἅπασι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄπειροι. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἷόν τε 
n ¥ 
χωρίζεσθαι τὰς στιγμὰς καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, εἰ 
io) / 
γε μὴ διαιροῦνται at γραμμαὶ εἰς στιγμάς ; 30 
5 Συμβαίνει δέ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸ λέγειν 
a a ~ ~ ? 
τοῖς σῶμά τι λεπτομερὲς αὐτὴν τιθεῖσι, TH δ᾽, ὥσπερ An- 
“ lan) ἴων » 
μόκριτος κινεῖσθαί φησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἴδιον τὸ ἄτοπον. 409b 
εἴπερ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ σώματι, 
ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δύο εἶναι σώματα, εἰ σῶμα τι ἡ 
ψυχή: τοῖς δ᾽ ἀριθμὸν λέγουσιν, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ στιγμῇ πολ- 
“~ “ ‘\ ¥ > \ ¢ 
has στιγμάς, ἢ πᾶν σῶμα ψυχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ διαφέρων s 
τις ἀριθμὸς ἐγγίνεταν καὶ ἄλλος τις τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν ἐν 
τοῖς σώμασι στιγμῶν. συμβαίνει τε κινεῖσθαι τὸ ζῷον ὑπὸ 
τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καθάπερ καὶ Δημόκριτον αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν κινεῖν" 
a N ¢ 4 - ‘ x a ta 
τί γὰρ διαφέρει σφαίρας λέγειν μικρὰς ἢ μονάδας μεγά- 
λας, ἢ ὅλως μονάδας φερομένας; ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ἀναγ- το 

3 καῖον κινεῖν τὸ ζῷον τῷ κινεῖσθαι ταύτας. τοῖς δὴ συμπλέ- 
ἕασιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ κίνησιν καὶ ἀριθμὸν ταῦτά τε συμβαΐνει 
καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: οὐ γὰρ μόνον δρισμὸν ψυχῆς 
ἀδύνατον τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβεβηκός. δῆλον δ᾽ εἴ 
τις ἐπιχειρήσειεν ἐκ τοῦ λόγον τούτου τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα 15 

σὰ a 3 / e UA ? / ς f 
τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδιδόναι, οἷον λογισμούς, αἰσθήσεις, ἡδονάς, 
y A Y 
λύπας, ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα' ὥσπερ yap εἴπομεν πρότερον, 
οὐδὲ μαντεύσασθαι ῥᾷδιον ἐξ αὐτῶν. 
“ ‘ / lA 3 a ¢ 4 ‘ 

4 τριῶν δὲ τρόπων παραδεδομένων Kal? ods ὁρίζονται THY ψυ- 
χήν, οἷ μὲν τὸ κινητικώτατον ἀπεφήναντο τῷ κινεῖν ἑαυτό, οἱ δὲ 20 
σῶμα τὸ λεπτομερέστατον ἢ τὸ ἀσωματώτατον τῶν ἄλλων. 

ῬᾺ \ / 9 A ‘ € / ¥ 4 
ταῦτα δὲ τίνας ἀπορίας τε καὶ ὑπεναντιώσεις ἔχει, διεληλύθα- 
f id > 3 , mn a ‘ > o~ 
5 μεν σχεδόν. λείπεται δ᾽ ἐπισκέψασθαι πῶς λέγεται τὸ ἐκ τῶν 


ag. ψυχὰς STU, στιγμὰς Ἰὸ (Bus.) οἱ VWXy Soph. vet. transl. et, ut videtur, 
Philop. 171, 21, Torst. || 30. ye om. Ef || els τὰς or. TW || 31. falso hic incipitur nevum 
caput || δὲ καὶ καθ. Ἰὼ, pro δὲ coni. δὴ Susemihl |] gog b, 1. ἔδιον om. S, τὸ om. X, 
verba ἴδιον τὸ ἄτοπον unc. incl. Torst., legerunt Vhilop. et sine dubio Them. et SimpL., 
tuetur Vahlen in ed. art. poet. tert. r19, non legisse videtur Soph. 31, 6 |] 2. περ om. pr. IE ἢ} 
σώματι om. Wy, leg. Philop. Soph. || 5. pro ἢ cont. Torst. καὶ, ἢ in interpr. Simpl. Philop. 
172, 25 sqq., defendit ἢ Dittenberger, Gétt. gelehrte Anz. 1863, p. 1615 || 7. τοῖς σώμασι 
E Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes τῷ σώματι || συμβαίνη E (Bek.), συμβαίνει E (Bus.) |} 
re] δὲ UX, om. S. || ὃ. αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν EX, receperunt Bich] Rodier, ἔφαμεν αὐτὸ reliqui et 
scripti et impressi || 9. μικρὰς E (Bus.) y; reliqui ante Bichlium omnes σμικρὰς |) 11. ταύτας 
-* “ss weliaani wimde tl 18. μαντεύεσθαι S'TUV Wy, 


CHS. 4, 5 409 a 28—409 Ὁ 23 37 


would seem to be points: nay, an infinity of points. And, further, 22 
how can the points be separated and set free from the bodies to 
which they belong; unless, indeed, we are prepared to resolve lines 
into points? 

It comes to this, then, as we have said, first, that this view 5 


The ob- coincides with that which makes of the soul a body 
tecapitz. composed of fine particles; next, that its agreement 


lated. with Democritus as to the manner in which he makes 


the body to be moved by the soul gives it an especial absurdity of 
its own. If the soul resides in the whole sentient body, on the 
assumption that the soul is a sort of body it necessarily follows 
that two bodies occupy the same space. Those who call the soul 
a number have to assume many points in the one point, or else 
that everything corporeal has a soul; unless the number that 
comes to exist in the body is a different number, quite distinct 
from the sum of the points already present in the body. Hence it2 
follows that the animal is moved by the number in the same way 
precisely as we said Democritus moved it. For what difference 
does it make whether we speak of small round atoms or large 
units, or indeed of units in spatial motion at all? Either way it is 
necessary to make the motion of the animal depend on the motion 
of these atoms or units. Such, then, are some of the difficulties 3 
confronting those who join motion and number: and there are 
many others, since it is impossible that the conjunction of motion 
with number should form even an attribute, much less the defi- 
nition, of soul. This will be evident if we try to deduce from this 
definition the affections and functions of the soul; its reasonings, 
perceptions, pleasures, pains, and so forth. For, as we said above, 
from the account given it is difficult even to divine what these 
functions are. 

Three modes of defining the soul have come down to us: 4 
some defined it as that which, in virtue of its self-motion, is most 
capable of causing motion; others as the body which consists of 
the finest particles, or which is more nearly incorporeal than any- 
thing else. And we have pretty fully explained what difficulties 
and inconsistencies these views present. It remains to consider 5 
what is meant by saying that the soul is composed of the 


μαντεύσασθαι etiam Them. Soph. et, ut videtur, Philop. 175, 1 || 20. of μὲν...23. σχεδόν 
in parenth. et post 21, ἄλλων colon pro vulg. punct. posuit Rodier || 20. éavré] ἑαυτήν 
Soph. || 22. re om. V W Philop. 


38 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 


/ 5 Α Ky 9 Ν - 7 3 > 4 , 
στοιχείων αὐτὴν εἶναι. λέγουσι μὲν γάρ, w αἰσθάνηταΐ τε 
τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἕκαστον γνωρίζῃ, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ συμβαΐνειν as 

λλὰ ὶ ἀδύ » λό ἴθενται γὰρ γνωρίζειν τῷ 
πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα τῷ λόγῳ. τίθενται γὰρ γνωρ τῴ 
x ‘ Ν , 
ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ THY ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα 
᾿ 3 ¥ \ / ΜᾺ ‘ N ‘ ῳ 
τιθέντες. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μόνα ταῦτα, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα, 
A > ¥ ¥ Ν 3 Ν Ν > ; 3 ® 
6 μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως ἄπειρα τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ἐκ τούτων. ἐξ ὧν 
μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἔστω γινώσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ 30 
9 ra 3 Ν Ν ᾽ , ~ RK 2 , 
αἰσθάνεσθαι' ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τίνι γνωριεῖ ἢ αἰσθήσεται, 
Φ / Ν a Ἅ ‘ ἌΣ A ε ΄ \ Ν 
οἷον τί θεὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν ; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 
ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν συνθέτων: οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντα τὰ 410a 

“~ / a > \ / Ν Ἁ / , 

στοιχεῖα τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινὶ καὶ συνθέσει, καθά. 
N . 3 o“ ‘ Ε a“ 
περ φησὶ καὶ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς τὸ ὀστοῦν' 
ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐστέρνοις χοανοισὶν 
τὼ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων λάχε νήστιδος αἴγλης, 5 
τέσσαρα δ᾽ “HAdaicroo' τὰ δ᾽ ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο. 

5 ΝᾺ ΤᾺ ἴω »-Ἁ 
οὐδὲν οὖν ὄφελος ἐνεῖναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.» εἰ μὴ καὶ οἱ 
λόγοι ἐνέσονται καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις" γνωριεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὸ 
wd \ > » a) πὰ Ἁ μή 3 , 9 ‘ Ἀ »“" 8 
ὅμοιον, τὸ δ᾽ ὀστοῦν ἢ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐθέν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ταῦτ 
> ?- a) » Φ sO 7 35 Δὰ “ rd / Ν Ἂ 
ἐνέσται. τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐθὲν δεῖ λέγειν: τίς γὰρ ἂν το 
3 rd > ¥ 3 “Ἂ »ἜἬ / » Ἂν ¢ ’ 
ἀπορήσειεν εἶ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ ψνχῇ λίθος ἢ ἄνθρωπος; ὁμοίως 
δὲ Ν ‘ 3 ‘\ ‘ Ν Ν > ‘a ‘ 2 N ‘ / 

é καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον 

y καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔτι δὲ πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος 
Ν, ia) \ ba 

(σημαίνει yap τὸ μὲν τόδε TL, TO δὲ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ Kai 

", ἮᾺ ΜᾺ ~ 
τινα ἄλλην τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν) πότερον ἐξ ἅπάν- is 

» ¢ ν ἃ ¥ 2y\> > a ‘ , ᾿ 
των ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ οὖ; ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ κοινὰ πάντων εἶναι 
os “' ω ~ ~ 
στοιχεῖα. ap οὖν ὅσα τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἐκ τούτων μόνον ; πῶς οὖν 
“ μὰ Fa 
γινώσκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ; ἢ φήσουσιν ἑκάστου γένους 
t ~ ‘ 2 ‘ ἰδί ε Ἔ ᾿ ᾿ f 
εἶναι στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχὰς ἰδίας, ἐξ ὧν τὴν ψυχὴν συνεστά- 

¥y ¥ Ν Ἀ Ν % 9 ’ 3 » at 4 3 

ναι; ἔσται apa ποσὸν Kal ποιὸν καὶ οὐσία. ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἐκ 20 


24. ἵν᾽ om. pr. E || αἴσθηται TW et corr. E (Trend.), αἰσθάνηται etiam Them. Soph. ἢ 
31. τίνι...η] οὐ... οὐδ᾽ WX || 41040, 1. ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο excepto Εὖ omnes curd, etiam Soph. 
Trend. || 2. τούτων] τῶν pr. Ὁ (Trend.) || post ἕκαστον virg. om. Diels, p. 208 |] 5. τὰ δύο 
V et rc. E Bek. Trend., ras δύο ἊΝ et Alex. in metaph. p. 135, τό (ed, Hayduck), τὼ δύο, 
quod iam Steinhart coniecerat, scripserunt Torst. Biehl in ed. pr, Rodier Diels, Herm. XV, 
166 sqq., τῶν δύο ST U Xy et pr. E (Bhl.), etiam Them. Philop. Soph., seripsit Biehl in 
ed. alt. || μοιράων UV Wy et το, E Philop., μερέων ut videtur pr. E (Trend.) et Alex. 1. 1 
Them. Soph. |[ 6. Ae” SUX Alex. 1. 1. Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. | dyévovro SU X, 
Alex. Them. Soph. Bek. Trencl., γένοντο nunc E, sed ante Ὑ est una littera erasa {81}1.}} 
7. ἐνεῖναι solus Ἰὼ Torst., ceteri codd. εἶναι, etiam Soph. || rx. ἐστὶν UW, ἔνεστιν 


CH. 5 409 Ὁ 24-—410 a 20 39 


elements. Soul, we are told, is composed of the elements in 
Soul is order that it may perceive and know each several thing. 
not a com- But this theory necessarily involves many impossibilities. 
the ele- For it is assumed that like is known by like; which im- 
ments: plies that soul is identical with the things that it knows. 
These elements, however, are not all that exists: there are a great, 
or perhaps we should say rather, an infinite number of other things 
as well, namely, those which are compounded of the elements. 
Granted, then, that it is possible for the soul to know and to 6 
perceive the constituent elements of all these composite things, 
with what will it know or perceive the compound itself? I mean, 
what God or man is; what flesh or bone is: and so likewise with 
regard to any other composite thing. For it is not elements taken 
anyhow which constitute this or that thing, but only 
Empe- . . . - . 
doclescri/ those which are united in a given proportion or com- 
Heised. bination, as Empedocles says of bone :— 

“Then did the bounteous earth in broad-bosomed crucibles 
win out of eight parts two from the sheen of moisture and four 
from the fire-god; and the bones came into being all white.” 

It is therefore of no use for the elements to be in the soul, 
unless it also contains their proportions and the mode of combining 
them. For each element will know its like, but there will be 
nothing to know bone or man, unless these also are to be present 
in the soul: which, I need hardly say, is impossible. Who would 
ask if stone or man resides in the soul? And similarly with that 
which is good and that which is not good: and so for all the 
rest. 

Being, again, is a term which has various meanings, signifying 7 
sometimes the particular thing, sometimes quantity or quality or any 
other of the categories which have been already determined. Is the 
soul to be derived from all of these, or not? It cannot be: the 
general opinion is that there are no elements common to all the 
categories. Does the soul, then, consist of those elements alone 
which are the elements of substances? How then does it know 
each of the other categories? Or will they say that each summum 
genus has special elements and principles of its own, and that the 
soul is composed of these? Then soul will be at once quantity, 
quality and substance. But it is impossible from the elements of 


etiam Soph. || ὁμοίως...12. μὴ ἀγαθόν unc. incl. Susemihl || 13. ἐπὶ τῶν TX Simpl. || 
17. τὰ στοιχ. Ey; τὰ om. Them. 33, 30 Soph. || post οὐσιῶν virgulam om. Bek. Trend. || 
μόνων STUVX || 20. ἔσται... οὐσία Torst. suspecta sunt, agnoscunt haec verba et eodem 
. quidem loco Philop. 179, 3 sq- Simpl. Soph., post 21. ποσόν posuit Belger. 


40 DE ANIMA I CH. § 


ἴω “A “~ > A \ ’ “~ Ἁ 
τῶν τοῦ ποσοῦ στοιχείων οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ποσόν, τοῖς δὴ 
ἴω “2452. Φᾧ 
λέγουσιν ἐκ πάντων ταῦτά τε καὶ τοιαῦθ᾽ ἐτερα συμβαΐνει. 
3, ‘ ‘ \ ΄ Ν 3 N 5S \ Ψ € A “ 
8 ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι μὲν ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ 
ΜᾺ 4 Ν 
ὁμοίου, αἰσθάνεσθαι δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ γινώσκειν 
τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον: τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι καὶ κι- 25 
νεῖσθαι τιθέασιν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τε καὶ γινώσκειν. 
Ν > 2 , \ ΄ ¥ a , 
9 πολλὰς δ᾽ ἀπορίας καὶ δυσχερείας ἔχοντος τοῦ λέγειν, κα- 
θάπερ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς, ὡς τοῖς σωματικοῖς στοιχείοις ἕκαστα 
A \ aA 
yuepilerar, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον [μαρτυρεῖ τὸ νῦν λεχθέν ]" 
ln) ἌᾺ , ~ Ὄ 
ὅσα γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων σώμασιν ἁπλῶς γῆς, οἷον 30 
> a a ΄ 3 Ἁ > , o~ 4 3 ION ~ 
ὀστᾶ νεῦρα τρίχες, οὐθενὸς αἰσθάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶν 4IOb 
ἴα ao“ ~ δ 
10 ὁμοίων: καίτοι προσῆκεν. ἔτι δ᾽ ἑκάστῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἄγνοια 
‘ 
πλείων ἢ σύνεσις ὑπάρξει’ γνώσεται μὲν yap ἕν ἕκαστον, 
Ν ΩΝ ΄ >? 3 
πολλὰ δ᾽ ἀγνοήσει: πάντα yap τἄλλα. συμβαίνει δ᾽ Ἔμ.- 
~ iy ‘ \ on) 
πεδοκλεῖ γε Kal ἀφρονέστατον εἶναι τὸν θεόν: μόνος yap τῶν 5 
Ἀ \ ‘ 
στοιχείων ἕν ov γνωρίζει, τὸ νεῖκος, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα" ἐκ 
τὰ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον. ὅλως τε διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν οὐχ ἅπαντα 
» Ἂν 
ψυχὴν ἔχει τὰ ὄντα, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἤτοι στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ στουχείου 
Ν Ὁ 
ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων ἢ πάντων ; ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ἐστιν ἕν τι γι- 
τς νώσκειν ἢ τινὰ ἢ πάντα. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ τί ποτ᾽ τὸ 
ω \ 
ἐστὶ TO ἑνοποιοῦν αὐτά" ὕλῃ yap ἔοικε τά γε στοιχεῖα" KU- 
΄ δ 3 a ‘ / Ψ / > 3 ’ a Ν 
ριώτατον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ συνέχον ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστίν: τῆς δὲ ψυ- 
> “ ‘ > 
χῆς εἶναί τι κρεῖττον Kal ἄρχον ἀδύνατον- ἀδυνατώτερον ὃ 
» ra) ~ \ ω ἐν 
ἔτι τοῦ νοῦ" εὔλογον yap τοῦτον εἶναι προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον 


‘ 4 \ 4 ad ‘a ἴω ΕΝ ΔΝ 
κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι. ι5 
έ , 4 € ‘ % di ‘ 3 é Ἂν 
1. πάντες δὲ καὶ οἱ διὰ τὸ γνωρίζειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὰ ὄντα 


‘ " 3 an - ΄ > » Ν ς \ 
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων λέγοντες αὐτήν, καὶ οἱ TO κι- 


48. δ yap TX Susemihl Vhilop. in interpr. 80, 5, Rodier || re lo Soph., reliqui re, 
etiam Philop. 81,4 {κινεῖν E, ποιεῖν UX i] 26. τε οἵ, Εν re V, leg. re etiam Soph. ἢ 
20. πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον sic omnes codd., ‘et ad simile” vet. transl., pro his τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον 
scripsit Torst. Sophoniam seeutus || post πρὸς virgulam posuit, post ὅμοιον sustulit Reslier | 
λεχθησόμενον T et corr. Uy, Soph. interpretatur τὰ ἐξῆς AexOnodueva, λεχθέν etiam 
Simpl. 7o, 8 Philop. 180, 23, quorum uterque λεχθησόμενον interpretatur, vet. transl, 
verba μαρτυρεῖ τὸ νῦν λεχθέν unc. inclusit Torst., probat Susemihl || 30. ἔνεστιν STU V 
Bek. Trend, ἐστιν etiam Philop. Suph. Torst. || 410 Ὁ, 2. προσῆκεν τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰς 
τρίχας γεηρὰ ὄντα τῶν ὁμοίων αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔτι W, de his nihil veteres interpretes || 3. πλέον 
SUV W Xy Soph., πλείων etiam Them. {{υὑπάρχει WX || ἑκάστη T WX Soph. | 4. πάντα 
γὰρ τῶλλα om. pr. HE, leg. Them. et sine dubio Soph., Dittenberger, Gétt. gel. Anz, 
1863, Ὁ. 1614, ut superflua omitti vult || 6, γνωρίζει solus E Torst., cui assentitur Noetel, 
Zeitschr. f. Gym. 1864, p. 141, reliqui ante Torst. omnes γνωριεῖ, etiam Them. Soph. |f 


CH. 5 4Ioa 21--- ΔΙῸ Ὁ 17 41 


quantity to derive substance or anything but quantity. These, 
then, and others like them are the difficulties which confront those 
who derive soul from all the elements. There is a further incon- 8 
sistency in maintaining that like is unaffected by like and yet at 
the same time that like perceives like and knows like by like. 
But they assume that perceiving is a sort of being acted upon or 
moved. And the same holds of thinking and knowing. 

Of the many problems and difficulties involved in holding with 9 
Empedocles that each thing is known through corporeal elements 
and by reference to its like [what has just been said ts evidence].— 
For, it would seem, whatever within the bodies of animals consists 
entirely of earth, such as bones, sinews, hair, perceives nothing 
at all, and consequently cannot perceive its like; as in consistency 
it should. Moreover, each one of the elemental principles will have ro 
a far larger share of ignorance than of intelligence; there being 
many things of which it will be ignorant and only one which it will 
know: in fact, it will be ignorant of all besides that one. It 
follows, for Empedocles at any rate, that God is quite the most 
unintelligent of beings. There is one of the elements, viz. Strife, 
which he, and he alone, will not know, while mortal things, being 
composed of all the elements, will know them all. And in general, rz 
seeing that everything is either an element or derived from one or 
more or all elements, why should not all things that exist have 
soul? For they must certainly know one thing or some things 
or all. It might further be asked what it is that gives them unity. 12 
For the elements, at all events, correspond to matter. That other 
principle, whatever it be, which holds them together, is supreme. 
Yet it is impossible that anything should be superior to the soul 
and overrule it; and still more impossible that anything should 
overrule intelligence. This, it may reasonably be held, has a 
natural priority and authority. Yet we are told that the elements 
are prior to all other things that exist. 

And it is characteristic, alike of those who derive the soul from 13 
the elements on the ground of perception and knowledge, and of 
those who define it as the thing most capable of causing motion, 


ἐκ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον unc. incl. Torst., praeter omnes codd. tuentur haec verba Them. 
Soph. 34, rg, et, ut videtur, Philop. 181, 28sq., defendit Dittenberger, Progr. Rudolstadt 
1869, p-19 || 7. δὲ STU V W, τε etiam Them. et, ut videtur, Soph. 34, 15 || 8. πᾶν om. 
pr. E, leg. Soph., πάντα Them. || #roe στοιχεῖον recepit Torst. ex solo E (Bus.), reliqui 
ante Sorst. omnes ἢ o7., etiam Them. {|| 9. ἢ ἐκ πλ. TVW || & re] ὃν SUX, ἢ ὃν W |i 
rx. γε οἵα. STW Χ || 12. γὰρ] γὰρ E, sed in rasura, Bek. δ᾽ subfuisse coni. (Trend.), 
γὰρ etiam ceteri codd. et Soph., δ᾽ scripsit Torst. || 13. κρεῖσσον E W X. 


43 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 


‘ , a ¥ \ ‘\ 

νητικώτατον, οὗ περὶ πάσης λέγουσι ψυχῆς. οὔτε yap Ta 

é \ > ? , 

αἰσθανόμενα πάντα κινητικά: φαΐνεται yap εἶναί τινα μό- 
a \ an 7 , 

νιμα τῶν ζῴων κατὰ Tomov: καίτοι δοκεῖ ye ταύτην μόνην 


to 
oO 


a , an ες \ Ν “ ε ῇ \ . ¢ 
τῶν κινήσεων κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ TO ζῷον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι 
τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιοῦσιν" φαίνεται 
‘ , Ν Ἂ 3 ? “~ nO 3 A / 
γὰρ τά τε φυτὰ Cyv ov μετέχοντα φορᾶς ovd αἰσθήσεως, 
‘ a) ? Ν / > ¥ > ’ ‘ -~ 
14 καὶ τῶν ζῴων πολλὰ διάνοιαν οὐκ ἔχειν. εἰ δέ TLS καὶ ταῦτα 
παραχωρήσειε καὶ θείη τὸν νοῦν μέρος τι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὁμοίως 25 
δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν οὕτω λέγοιεν καθόλου περὶ 
? ων 3 ‘\ Ἁ Ψ > am) “ δ , 
16 πάσης ψυχῆς οὐδὲ περὶ ὅλης οὐδεμιᾶς. τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε 
Ν ξ 3 ῪᾺ 3 ΡᾺ » ἤ, Ν Ἁ 
καὶ ὃ ἐν τοῖς ᾿Ορφικοῖς ἔπεσι καλουμένοις λόγος" φησὶ γὰρ 
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων, φερομένην ὑπὸ 
“ > fF 3 © / ‘ “Ἂ “ a 4 aQN 
TOV ἀνέμων. οὐχ οἷόν TE δὴ τοῖς φυτοῖς τοῦτο συμβαίνειν οὐδὲ 30 
τῶν ζῴων ἐνίοις, εἴπερ μὴ πάντα ἀναπνέουσιν": τοῦτο δὲ λέ- 4rra 
\ y ε , Ὗ va \ \ > σι 
16 ληθε τοὺς οὕτως ὑπειληφότας. εἴ τε δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν 
στοιχείων ποιεῖν, οὐθὲν δεῖ ἐξ ἁπάντων" ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον 
μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ἕαντό τε κρίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. 


in 


καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ Kal τὸ καμπύλον γινώσκομεν" 

Ν ‘ 3 ~ ¢ ὔ ΄Ν \ , » AP ε a 

κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανών, τὸ δὲ καμπύλον οὔθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ 

¥ A 3 / ἈΝ > “~ 7 > N ~ ra 

17 οὔτε τοῦ εὐθέος. καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες αὐτὴν pepetyOat 

o Ψ 5 ral 5.9 ? 4 a) εν 
φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς φήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. 
18 τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας" διὰ τίνα γὰρ αἰτίαν ἐν μὲν τῷ 
ΕΥ̓ ~ ἮΝ ΤᾺ “~ 

ἀέρι ἢ τῷ πυρὶ οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ ov ποιεῖ ζῷον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μει- τὸ 

19 κτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα βελτίων ἐν τούτοις εἶναι δοκοῦσα; ἐπιζητή- 
\ ¥ \ Ἁ ν᾿» > + ξ > ~ 9 fs \ ry 
σειε yap av τις καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ψυχὴ τῆς 
20 ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ ἀθανατωτέρα. συμβαίνει δ᾽ 
ἀμφοτέρως ἄτοπον καὶ παράλογον: καὶ γὰρ τὸ λέγειν 
~ ‘ on a # 

(gov τὸ πῦρ ἢ τὸν ἀέρα τῶν παραλογωτέρων ἐστί, καὶ τὸ 15 
t8. πάσης ἵν Them. Philop., ἁπάσης ceteri codd. et Soph. {| offre] οὐδὲ coni, Steinhart ἢ 
20. fortasse legendum μόνη annotat Trend., μόνην «« μόνη» coni. Susemihl, Oucan. p. $4, 
probat Rodier Il, p. 154 || 22. τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν unc. incl. Torst., tuentur Them. 
Philop. et Vahlen, Ocester. Gym. Zeitschr. 1868, p. 20 ἢ 23. φορᾶς οὐδ᾽ unc. incl. Torst., 
leg. etiam Philop. Simpl. ct sine dubio Them, || 26. οὕτω] οὗτοι Them. 35, 15 || καθόλου om. 
T UV Torst., tuentur etiam Them. Simpl. et Vahlen 1, 1. p. 21 || 27. οὐδεμιᾶε] οὐδ μιᾶς 
ETUVW Bek. Trend., μιᾶς (omisso οὐδὲ) Torst., οὐδὲ περὶ μιᾶς SX Simpl. (cf Soph. 
35, 12 οὐδὲ περὶ ὅλης οὐδὲ περὶ putas), οὐδεμιᾶς eliam Them. et sine dubio Philop., qui in 
interpr. bis περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ὅλης, seme] περὶ μιᾶς ὅλης, semel περὶ ὅλης μιᾶς || τοῦτο ae... 
411 ἃ, 2. ὑπειληφότας post 411 ἃ, 7. εὐθέος transponenda coni. Bywater, Journ. of Phil. 


1888, p. 53 Sq., cui assentitur Susemihl || 28%. καλουμένοις ἔπεσι TV Wy Them., καλουμένοις 
om. 8, καλούμενος Soph., λεγομένοις Philop. 186, 24 (sed in lemmate καλουμένοις) || Adyous 


CH. 5 410 Ὁ 18—41I1a 15 43 


that their assertions do not apply to soul in every form. For not 
all sentient beings can cause motion ; some animals are seen to be 
stationary in one place. And yet it is at all events a received view 
that this, namely, change of place, is the one form of motion which 
the soul imparts to the animal. Similarly with those who derive 
intelligence and the faculty of sense from the elements. For plants 
are found to live without any share in locomotion or sensation, and 
many animals to be destitute of thought. If we waive this point 
and assume intellect to be a part of the soul, and the faculty 
of sense likewise, even then their statements would not apply 
generally to all soul, nor to the whole of any one soul. The account 
The Or- given in the so-called Orphic poems is open to the same 
phic cos- strictures. For the soul, it is there asserted, enters from 
mogeny- the universe in the process of respiration, being borne 
upon the winds. Now it is impossible that this should be so with 
plants or even with some animals, seeing that they do not all 
respire: a point which the upholders of this theory have over- 
looked. And if the soul is to be constructed out of the elements, 
there is no need to employ them all, the one of a pair of contraries 
being sufficient to discern both itself and its opposite. For by that 
which is straight we discern both the straight and the crooked, the 
carpenter’s rule being the test of both. On the other hand that 
which is crooked is not a test of itself or of that which is straight. 
There are some, too, who say that soul is interfused through- 
out the universe: which is perhaps why Thales supposed 


Soul not 
ciffuses all things to be full of gods. But this view presents 
the uni- some difficulties. For why should the soul not produce 


verse. . - . 
an animal, when present in air or fire, and yet do so 


when present in the compounds of these elements: and that, too, 
though in the former case it is believed to be purer? One might 
also enquire why the soul present in air is purer and more im- 
mortal than soul in animals. Whichever of the two suppositions 
open to us we adopt is absurd and irrational. To speak of fire 
or air as an animal is very irrational; and on the other hand 


E,, λόγος corr. Ey (Bhi.) || 30. δὲ TW X et corr. E Soph., δὴ reliqui et scripti et impressi 
et E, || grra, 1. δὴ E, δὲ etiam Simpl. et, ut videtur, Them. 35, 20 || 2. εἰ δὲ X Trend., 
εἴπερ SV W, εἴπερ δὲ T et nunc ἘΣ, εἴ re δὲ olim subfuisse nihil nisi coniectura Bekkeri 
(Trend.), εἴγε U Bek. Torst., εἰ καὶ in interpret. Simpl. |] 8. ἴσως om. V Soph., leg. 
Simpl. || 9. τίνα μὲν γὰρ Vy et corr. ἘΣ, om. μὲν Them. || ἐν μὲν} wevom. ST Vy, leg. 
Them. || ro. ἢ ἐν τῷ STU jf 11. βέλτιον E, βελτίων etiam Soph. || ἐπιζητήσειε... 
13. ἀθανατωτέρα in parenth. Torst. Susemihl {| 12. γὰρ] δ᾽ WX Soph. et, ut videtur, 
Philop. 189, 4, yap reliqui, etiam re. E, sed Bek. coni. fuisse γ᾽ (Trend.) || 15. mapa- 
λόγων SU X, παραβολωτέρων Them. 36, 2, Philop. 189, 11 (sed in v. 1. utriusque vulg.) || 
room. TVW. 


14 


16 


20 


44 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 


Ν ? “ “~ 3 , ¥ € a > 5 ἢ 
21 μὴ λέγειν ζῷα ψυχῆς ἐνούσης ἄτοπον. ὑπολαβεῖν δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν 
> , ¢ “A 
εἶναι THY ψυχὴν ἐν τούτοις, OTL TO ὅλον τοῖς μορίοις ὁμοειδές" 
y 3 3» “ 9 ~ 4 ἃ ᾿ i € ΜᾺ A 
ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς λέγειν καὶ THY ψυχὴν ὁμοειδῆ τοῖς 
“ἽΝ “~ 4 “A 
μορίοις εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ἀπολαμβάνεσθαΐ τι τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐν 
Νὰ , » Ἁ “ / > > ¢ Ν ΔΝ ¢ 
τοῖς ζῴοις ἔμψυχα τὰ ζῷα γίνεται. εἰ δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀὴρ διασπώ- 
μενος ὁμοειδής, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀνομοιομερής, τὸ μέν τι αὐτῆς 
ς / oN Ψ ‘\ 3 3 ε , 3 -~ > >  N 
ὑπάρξει δῆλον ὅτι, τὸ δ᾽ οὐχ ὑπάρξει. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν αὐτὴν 
ἢ ὁμοιομερῆ εἶναι H μὴ ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ τοῦ παντός. 
> wn Ν 
22 φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὡς οὔτε τὸ γινώσκειν ὑπάρ- 
“a [αἱ ἰοὺ ἴων 
χει TH ψυχῇ διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι, οὔτε τὸ κινεῖ- 25 
23 σθαι αὐτὴν καλῶς οὐδ᾽ ἀληθῶς λέγεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ γινώ- 


to 
o 


~ ΜᾺ > ‘ ‘S ‘ 3 é ¢ ‘ Ν , 
σκειν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαΐ τε Kai τὸ δοξά- 
¥ Ν \ 3 ων Ν , \ & © 3 , 
Cew, ere δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ βούλεσθαι Kat ὅλως at ὀρέξεις, 
γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἣ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπὸ τῆς 
n » 3 ¥ ‘ > \ \ ra , ῷ 
ψυχῆς, ἔτι δ᾽ αὔξη τε καὶ ἀκμὴ καὶ φθίσις, πότερον ὅλῃ 30 
τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων ἕκαστον ὑπάρχει, καὶ πάσῃ νοοῦμέν τε καὶ 4IIb 
a) ¥ a 
αἰσθανόμεθα Kat κινούμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ποιοῦμέν τε 
‘ an 
kal πάσχομεν, ἢ μορίοις ἑτέροις ἕτερα; Kai τὸ ζῆν δὴ πότερον ἔν 
? > Ν A ‘ > a aay ~ A ‘ » 
τινι τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἢ πᾶσιν, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι 
¥ / ὃ - ‘ > # Ν * 4 
Δφαίτιον ; λέγουσι On τινες μεριστὴν αὐτήν, καὶ ἄλλο μὲν 5 
ca » \ 3 ™ [4 > , # ‘ ’ 
νοεῖν ἄλλο δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν. τί οὖν δή ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, 
εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα: δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὐ- 
» \ ω -" 
ναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν: ἐξελθούσης γοῦν 
διαπνεῖταν καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, 
> ~ / 3 ¥ 9 7 " 4 3 ΄᾿ 
ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη ψυχή. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κἀκεῖνο ζη. 
A“ ‘4 ἡ, 7 3 4 ‘ ¥ ‘ é > 
τεῖν πότερον ἕν ἢ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕν, διὰ τί οὐκ 
»242 2 \ ἐ Ny ᾧΨ ? 4 , , Ξ ὔ 
εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἕν; εἶ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζη- 
Ν ΜᾺ 
τήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ 
25 ἄπειρον. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ περὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς, 


μα 


Ο 


17. εἶναι om. SUX, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ΓΝ Wy Them. | ὅλον ἐν τοῖς ἢ τῷ. εἶναι 
om. pr. If || ἀπολαμβάνειν STU Wy, tuentur ἀπολαμβάνεσθαι Philop. Soph. ἢ 20. τὰ 
om STU V Wy || 22. ὑπάρξει δῆλον ὅτι fort. inserta ex margine putat Torst., tuentur 
etiam Simpl. Philop. || 23. ἢ ante 64. om. E, leg. Simpl. {| 26. οὐδ᾽ ἀληθῶς om. pr. Εὖ, 
leg, Soph., Dittenberger p. 1614 ut superflua omitti vult || ἐπειδὴ U Wy et corr. E, Bek. 
con, fuisse ἐπεὶ δὲ (‘T'rend.) || 27. τῆς om. TWy || τὸ ante d0& om. STU W Soph. ἢ} 
“8, δὲ καὶ τὸ SU WX, καὶ etiam Soph. || βουλεύεσθαι ΤΌΝ WX y et corr. ὦ Them. 
36, 29 Soph. || al om. TX, leg. Soph. || 29. ἡ om. E (Trend.) || 30. αὔξησις STUV WX 
et corr. Τὼ αὔξη etiam Soph, || gia b, 2, αἰσθ, καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ EV W Simpl, Soph. (qui 
καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα omittit) Torst., αἰσθ, καὶ κινοῦμαν καὶ X, καὶ κινούμεθα om. reliqui οὐκ ή,, 
etiam Bek. Trend. || 4. ἐστὶν ἢ ἑνὶ ἢ E, sed évl ἢ expunct. (Bhi.), ἐστὶν ἑνὶ ἢ Bek. ‘Trend. 


CH. 5 411 a 16—411 Ὁ 14 45 


not to call them animals, if they contain soul, is absurd. But az 
it would seem that the reason why they suppose soul to be 
in these elements is that the whole is homogeneous with its 
parts. So that they cannot help regarding universal soul as also 
homogeneous with the parts of it in animals, since it is through 
something of the surrounding element being cut off and enclosed 
in animals that the animals become endowed with sou]. But if the 
air when split up remains homogeneous, and yet soul is divisible 
into non-homogeneous parts, it is clear that, although one part 
of soul may be present in the air, there is another part which is 
not. Either, then, soul must be homogeneous, or else it cannot be 
present in every part of the universe. 

From what has been said it is evident that it is not because the 22 
soul is compounded of the elements that knowledge belongs to it, 
nor is it correct or true to say that the soul is moved. Knowledge, 23 
however, is an attribute of the soul, and so are perception, opinion, 
desire, wish and appetency generally; animal locomotion also is 
produced by the soul; and likewise growth, maturity and decay. 
Unityor  chall we then say that each of these belongs to the whole 
soul. soul, that we think, that is, and perceive and are moved 
and in each of the other operations act and are acted upon with 
the whole soul, or that the different operations are to be assigned 
to different parts? And what of life itself? Does it reside in any 
single one or more or all of these parts? Or has it a cause 
entirely distinct? Now some say that the soul is divisible and 24 
that one part of it thinks, another desires. What is it then which 
holds the soul together, if naturally divisible? Assuredly it is not 
the body: on the contrary, the soul seems rather to hold the body 
together; at all events, when it has departed, the body disperses 
in air and rots away. If, then, the unity of soul is due to some 
other thing, that other thing would be, properly speaking, soul. 
We shall need, then, to repeat the enquiry respecting it also, 
whether it is one or manifold. For, if it has unity, why not 
attribute unity to the soul itself at the outset? If, however, it 
be divisible, then again reason will go on to ask what it is that 
holds zz together, and so the enquiry will go on to infinity. It 25 
might also be asked what power each of the parts of the soul 
Torst. {|| καὶ πᾶσιν TU WX y, ἢ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν SV Soph. || 5. 6éST UV || 5 et 6. ἄλλο 
EW Torst., probat etiam Noetel, Zeitschr. f. Gymn. 1864, p. 141, reliqui ante Torst. 
omnes ἄλλῳ, etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. 37, 27 (v. 1. ἄλλο) vet. transl. || 7. ye ante τὸ 
TV, om. SUWXy || το. ἡ ψυχή TV Wy, ἡ om. etiam Them. Philop. || δὲ καὶ πάλιν 


Το Χ Bek. Trend., καὶ om. y et E (Bek. teste Torstrikio et Trend.) || 12. καὲ τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἕν SUWX, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὃν εἶναι Ty, ἐν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι V. 


46 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 


» 3 ¥ / ν 9 “~ A 3 A e a 
τίν ἔχει δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ σώματι. εἰ yap ἡ ὅλη 15 
a) “a ‘\ ΓᾺ 
ψυχὴ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συνέχει, προσήκει καὶ τῶν μορίων 
ἕκαστον συνέχειν τι τοῦ σώματος. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἀδυνάτῳ' 
ποῖον γὰρ μόριον ἢ πῶς ὁ νοῦς συνέξει, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλά- 
»᾿ \ Ν Ν Ν A “~ Ν an, 
26 σαι. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διαιρούμενα ζῆν Kat τῶν 
ΡᾺ 5 Ν ~ 
ζῴων ἔνια τῶν ἐντόμων, ws THY αὐτὴν ἔχοντα ψυχὴν τῷ 20 
\ ~ “ 
εἴδει, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀριθμῷ: ἑκάτερον yap τῶν μορίων αἴσθησιν 
ἔχει καὶ κινεῖται κατὰ τόπον ἐπί τινα χρόνον. εἰ δὲ μὴ 
 Ἂ > Ψ 
διατελοῦσιν, οὐθὲν ἄτοπον" ὄργανα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὥστε σώ- 
᾿ , 3 3 ΔΝ Ὁ 3 ε 7 ΤᾺ ΄ 
ζειν τὴν φύσιν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν μορίων 
Ψ , Ν an ἌᾺ “Ἂ 
ἅπαντ᾽ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὁμοειδεῖς εἰσὲὶν ᾽ς 
ἀλλήλαις καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ, ἀλλήλων μὲν ὡς οὐ χ ὦ 
ήλαις ὅλῃ, ἥλων μὲν ὡς οὐ χωριστὰ ὄντα, 
~ G ΤᾺ ~ » 
27 τῆς ὃ ὅλης ψυχῆς ὡς διαιρετῆς οὔσης. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν 
A ran) Ἀ 4 > 
τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀρχὴ ψυχή τις εἶναι: μόνης yap ταύτης κοι- 
ΜᾺ \ ia ‘ »“Ὰ 
νωνεῖ καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτά: καὶ αὕτη μὲν χωρίζεται τῆς 
? θ a > ΜᾺ ¥ θ δ᾽ ὑθὲ ¥ / ἂν 
αἰσθητικῆς ἀρχῆς, αἰσθησιν δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἄνευ ταύτης ἔχει. 30 
17. ἀδύνατον Philop. {{|Ἀτὃ, συνέχει EV οἱ fort. Simpl. (cf. p. gs, 31), συνέξει etiam 
Them. Philop. Soph. || ar. μὴ καὶ || yap] γοῦν SVX Soph, Bek. Trend., οὖν UW, 
yap in paraphr, Them. Philop. || 23. ὁμοειδῇ εἰσὶν ἀλλήλοις W et nunc ὦ (Trend.) Soph. 
Bek. Trend. Rodier, ὁμοειδεῖς εἰσὶν ἀλλήλαις reliqui σού, et pr. Κα (Bek.), etiain Philop. 
Simpl. Torst. Biehl || 26. ἀλλήλων} ἀλλήλοις W Soph., ἀλλήλαις Δ΄, ἀλλήλων etiam 
Simpl. Philop. || 28. ψυχὴ ante ἀρχὴ T Torst., om. SU, ψυχὴ post ἀρχὴ videntur legisse 


etiam Them. 34, 22sq. Philop. 202, 5.6 || 2g. καὶ τὰ ζῶα E, τὰ om. etiam Simpl. Soph., 
kal τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ in interpr. Them, 


CH. 5 ΔΙῚ Ὁ 15-411 Ὁ 30 47 


exercises in the body. For, if the entire soul holds together the 
whole body, then each of its parts ought properly to hold together 
some part of the body. But this seems impossible. For it is 
difficult even to conjecture what part the intellect will hold together 
or how it can hold any part together. It is found that plants, and 26 
among animals certain insects or annelida, live when divided, which 
implies that the soul in their segments is specifically, though not 
numerically, the same. At any rate, each of the two segments 
retains sentience and the power of locomotion for some time: that 
they do not continue to do so is not surprising, as they lack the 
organs requisite to maintain their nature. But none the less all 
the parts of the soul are contained in each of the two segments, 
and the two halves of the soul are homogeneous alike with one 
another and with the whole; a fact which implies that, while the 
parts of the soul are inseparable from one another, the soul as a 
Thesour Whole is divisible. It would seem that the vital principle 27 
in plants. jin plants also is a sort of soul. For this principle is 
the only one common to plants and animals; and, while it can 
be separated from the sensitive principle, no being which has 
sensation is without it. 


ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ B. 


1 Ta μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυ- 
χῆς εἰρήσθω' πάλιν δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπανίωμεν, πει- 
ρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἂν εἴη κοινότατος 

2 λόγος αὐτῆς. λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, 

7 \ ‘ \ ε Na a > € oN Ν 3 a a 
ταύτης δὲ TO μὲν ὡς ὕλην, ὃ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε 
Y ‘\ \ 4 3 > aA ¥ ᾽ ta 
τι, ἕτερον δὲ μορφὴν Kai εἶδος, καθ᾽ ἣν ἤδη λέγεται τόδε 

‘ la ν 3 , ¥ 2 ¢ ‘ Ψ , Ν 
τι, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ 
> > 2 ’ Ν a“ ω Ν Ν ε > / 
δ᾽ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, TO μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, 
Ν > ς Ν ~ > 7 Ν Ζ > > ΓᾺ ἈΝ 
370 δ᾽ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώ- 
\ al κω Me 
para, καὶ τούτων τὰ φυσικά: ταῦτα yap τῶν ἄλλων ap- 
la ca δὲ Δ Ν Ν ¥ ΄ ‘ δ᾽ 5 » 
yat. τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζωήν, τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει: 
Ν ‘ ΄ ‘ . > A , \ ¥ \ 
ζωὴν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ 
Ψ a) ~ “Ἂ 
φθίσιν. wore πᾶν σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον ζωῆς οὐσία ἂν 
¥ > 9 3 Ψ € f > Ν > 5 ‘ ‘ Saal 

4 εἴη, οὐσία δ᾽ οὕτως ὡς σννθέτη. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ σῶμα τοι- 
/ 5 Ν ‘ ¥ 7 wh» 7 ‘ an € , > 
ὄνδε, ζωὴν yap ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη TO σῶμα ἡ ψυχή: οὐ 
γάρ ἐστι τῶν καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὡς 
ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν 
μ᾽ ε to » ca ὃ ’ ‘ ¥ 
εἶναι. ws εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν éyor- 
τος. ἡ 8 οὐσια ἐντελέχεια. τοιούτου apa σώματος ἐν- 


412 ἃ, 3. Τὰ μὲν...4., ἐπανίωμεν] Harel δὲ τὰ παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, 
ἐφ᾽ ὅσον (ὅσων X), ἕκαστος ἀπεφήνατο (τῶν Ik) πρότερον (πρῶτον WX), εἴρηται σχεδόν, 
νῦν (νῦν δὲ W), ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν ὃ Ὁ ΚΝ δὶ τὶ Soph. et E fol. 186 (vide 
appendicem). ‘Them. Simpl. Vhilop. et vetusta translatio latina sine dubio vulgatam 
legerunt || 3. προτέρων Vy || 4. εἴρηται margo E, εἰρήσθω etiam Simpl. || §. ἐστι ψυχὴ E 
et fol. 186 et 187 (BhI.), ἡ om. etiam Them. Soph. || av ef) ἔστι SU WX, ἂν εἴη etiam 
Them. Soph. || κοινὸς UWX, κοινότατος etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 6. λέγομεν... 
12. φυσικά vid. append., vulgatam legerunt etiam Alex. ἀπ, καὶ Ave. 74, 32 et Them. ἢ 
6. δὲ UV, δὴ Alex. 1.1. Them. || & τὶ γένος S WX, γένος ἕν τι etiam Alex. 1. 1. Them. 
Soph. || 9. δυνάμει y Vhilop. et, ut videtur, Them. 39, 7. ro Simpl. 84, 1 (cf. $3, 30. 34), 
δύναμις etiam Soph. || ct. os τὸ om. If et margo E, leg. Them. If 14. ἑαυτοῦ Them., 
αὐτοῦ ctiam Simpl. Soph. 41, 5 (in cod. Vindob., teste Biehlio, δὲ αὐτοῦ ὁ cade, 
Ifayduck) || 16. δή ἐστι Ey y et, ut videtur, Them. 39, 33, qui interpretatur τοίνυν, re. E 


4128 


5 


»» 


5 


DE ANIMA. Book II. 


So much for the theories of soul handed down by our pre- ] 
Soulinthe accessors. Let us, then, make a fresh start and try to 
widest _ determine what soul is and what will be its most com- 
application . .. . . 
oftheterm prehensive definition. Now there is one class of existent 2 
Cehned. things which we call siibstance, including under the 
term, firstly, matter, which in itself is not this or that; secondly, 
shape or form, in virtue of which the term this or that is at once 
applied ; thirdly, the whole made up of matter and form. Matter 
is identical with potentiality, form with actuality. And there 
are two meanings of actuality: knowledge illustrates the one, 
exercise of knowledge the other. Now bodies above all things 3 
are held to be substances, particularly such bodies as are the work 
of nature; for to these all the rest owe their origin. Of natural 
bodies some possess life and some do not: where by life we mean 
the power of self-nourishment and of independent growth and 
decay. Consequently every natural body possessed of life must 
be substance, and substance of the composite order. And since 4 
in fact we have here body with a certain attribute, namely, the 
possession of life, the body will not be the soul: for the body is 
not an attribute of a subject, it stands rather for a subject of 
attributes, that is, matter. It must follow, then, that soul is 
substance in the sense that it is the form of a natural body having 
in it the capacity of life. Such substance is actuality. The soul, 


(Rr.) et reliqui δ᾽ ἐστὶ, etiam Soph. || καὶ ante σῶμα om. UV WX P Soph. Bek. Trend. 
Rodier Zeller II, 23, p. 480 || τοιόνδε ETP, καὶ τοιονδὲ τοῦτο SUV WX Rodier, καὶ 
τοιονδίέ y Trend. Hunc v. varie interpretantur; ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς σῶμα, ἀλλὰ σῶμα τοιονδέ 
Them., Philop. modo καὶ σῶμά ἐστι καὶ τοιονδί 215. 5, modo σῶμά ἐστι τοιονδί 215, 756.» 
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ τοιόνδε σῶμα Soph. || 17. τὸ om. SU Zeller, Archiv f. G. d. Ph. 
IX, p. 538 ll ἡ ψυχή SUV ΝΥ ΧΥ Philop. 215, 11. 18. 22 Alex. ap. Philop. Zeller 1. L, 
ἡ om. E T Bek. Trend. Torst. Biehl Rodier, etiam Soph., de Them. non liquet, qui, cum 
39, 35 οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τὸ σῶμα εἶδος τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος, tum 40, 4 ὅτι γὰρ οὐ σῶμα ἡ 
ψυχὴ δέδεικται interpretatur: cf. 40, 34 || εἶδος pro ψυχή coni. Innes, Cl. Rev. XVI, 
p- 462. . 

H, 4 


50 DE ANIMA II CI. I 


5 τελέχεια. αὕτη δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, 
ξ + ε Ἁ ΝᾺ Ν, 5 Ψ ε 3 7 3 ‘ 
ἡ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη" ἐν yap 
τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγοροίς ἐστιν, 
ἀνάλογον δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ᾽ ὕπνος τῷ 25 
ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν " προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ 
e 3 , ὃ ΝΕ f 3 3 λέ ε , , 
ἡ ἐπιστήμη. διὸ ἡ ψνχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος 
6 φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. τοιοῦτο δέ, ὃ ἂν ἢ ὀργανι- 
κόν. ὄργανα δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν μέρη, ἀλλὰ παντελῶς 412b 
ε Δ ry Ν , ΄ 7 Ν 4 
ἁπλᾶ, οἷον τὸ φύλλον περικαρπίου σκέπασμα, τὸ δὲ πε- 
κάρπιον ποῦ" αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στό ivddoyov: apd 
ρικάρπιον καρποῦ" αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον ayuda 
ba ¥ ‘ - > / Ν a oN , ΜᾺ 
γὰρ ἕλκει τὴν τροφήν. «i δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς 
ὃ “Ὁ a ¥ KN 3 , ξ 4 ? a 
et λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ 
5 ω ‘\ ‘ > “ “ > <A ε ‘ ‘ ‘ “ 
7 ὀργανικοῦ. διὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν εἰ ἐν ἡ ψυχὴ Kal TO σῶμα, 


σι 


Yy δὲ ‘ Ss N ‘ o~ δ᾽ Ψ A € 7 
ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν κηρὸν καὶ TO σχῆμα, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως THY ἑκάστου 
Ὁ Ἅ A i e - 4 ‘ é N \ ΩΝ > Ν 
ὕλην καὶ τὸ οὗ ἡ ὕλη" τὸ γὰρ ἕν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐπεὶ πλεονα- 
χῶς λέγεται, τὸ κυρίως ἡ ἐντελέχειά ἐστιν. 
7 Ν εν » "5 € ra > »ἢ \ ς Ν 
8 καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἰρηται τί ἐστιν ἢ ψυχή" οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ 
\ 4 “w \ ‘ 4% ἊΝ Lm) x F - ἂν 
τὸν λόγον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι, καθάπερ εἴτι 
a’ 3 a \ > nm εν 7 εν \ x "ἊΝ 
τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν ἣν σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς" ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἂν 
τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο" χωρι- 
σθείσης δὲ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς Fv, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὅμω- 
νύμως. νῦν δ᾽ ἐστὶ πέλεκυς: οὐ γὰρ τοιούτου σώματος τὸ Tits 
ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ τοιουδὶ ἔχον- 
οτος ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ. θεωρεῖν δὲ καὶ 
3 ΜᾺ ῬᾺ ὃ ~ ‘ λ θέ > 4 > ¢ »% \ »Ἂ 
ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν δεῖ τὸ λεχθέν. εἰ γὰρ ἣν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῷον, 
\ x +) > Ἂ ΨᾺ 
ψυχὴ ἂν ἦν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις’ αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ 
A 
κατὰ τὸν λόγον. ὁ δ᾽ ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη ὄψεως, ἧς ἀπολει- 20 
᾽, ϑ ΑΣ 5 4 Ἀ e f f € é 
πούσης οὐκέτ᾽ ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, καθάπερ ὁ λί- 


"-π 


Ό 


“ὅ, δὴ E (Bus.) οἱ Uy, reliqui omnes δὲ || 27. διὸ ἡ γ. ET Vy Biehl Rodier, 7 om, 
reliqui, etiam Soph. |} 28. τοιοῦτον STV WX | 412 b, 4. δὲ EST Vy, δὴ etiam Them. 
Soph. Philop. ad 402 b, 5 (37, 15) et in prooemio ad lib. II. (205, 15) Bek. Trend. Torst. ἢ 
5. ἡ πρώτη ἐντ, WX, vulgatam tuetur etiam Them. {| 8. οὗ ὕλη SUWX Soph. Bek. 
Trend. Torst. || 9. Ἀέγεται om. SU WX Them., leg. etiam Soph. | 12. μὲν (Trend. 
Bus.) et y Torst. Belger in ed. alt. Trend. Biehl Rodicr, om. reliqui, etiam Philop. || 
13. τὸ] τῷ ET W et re. X || 14. δὲ] γὰρ SX Bek. Trend. Torst., “autem” vet. transl., 
διὸ dredGotons P || 15. νῦν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν coni. Torst., neque Them. neque Philop. neque 
Soph. οὐ legerunt || 16. τοιουδὲ etiam Soph., τοῦ Alex. ἀπ, καὶ λ, 76, τῷ et Vhilop. ἢ 
x7. αὐτῶ SUVW Alex. 1. 1, αὐτῷ X, ἑαυτῷ etiam Philop. || 20. Torst. coni. ὁ δ᾽ 
ὀφθαλμὸς τὸ σύνολον, ἡ δὲ κόρη ὕλη ὄψεως, iisdem fere verbis interpretatur Them., 
ὁ δ',, ὄψεως in parenth. ponenda, puncto post λόγον ἀοϊείο, censet Bywater, J. of Ph. 


CH. I 412 a 22—412b 21 51 


therefore, is the actuality of the body above described. But the 5 
term ‘actuality’ is used in two senses; in the one it answers to 
knowledge, in the other to the exercise of knowledge. Clearly in 
this case it is analogous to knowledge: for sleep, as well as waking, 
implies the presence of soul; and, whilst waking is analogous to 
the exercise of knowledge, sleep is analogous to the possession 
of knowledge without its exercise; and in the same individual 
the possession of knowledge comes in order of time before its 
exercise. Hence soul is the first actuality of a natural body having 
in it the capacity of life. And a body which is possessed of organs 6 
answers to this description.—We may note that the parts of plants, 
as well as those of animals, are organs, though of a very simple 
sort: for instance, a leaf is the sheath of the pod and the pod of 
the fruit. The roots, again, are analogous to the mouths of animals, 
both serving to take in nourishment.—lIf, then, we have to make 
a general statement touching soul in all its forms, the soul will 
be the first actuality of a natural body furnished with organs. 
Hence there is no need to enquire whether soul and body are 7 
one, any more than whether the wax and the imprint are one; 
or, in general, whether the matter of a thing is the same with that 
of which it is the matter. For, of all the various meanings borne 
by the terms unity and being, actuality is the meaning which 
belongs to them by the fullest right. 

It has now been stated in general terms what soul is, namely, 8 
substance as notion or form. And this is the quiddity of such 
and such a body. Suppose, for example, that any instrument, 
Ulustra- say, an axe, were a natural body, its axeity would be 
ae its substance, would in fact be its soul. If this were 
axeity of taken away, it would cease, except in an equivocal sense, 
"ΣΝ to be an axe. But the αχεῖβ after all an axe. For 
it is not of a body of this kind that the soul is the quiddity, 
that is, the notion or form, but of a natural body of a particular 
sort, having in itself the origination of motion and rest. 

Further, we must view our statement in the light of the parts of 9 

the body. For, if the eye were an animal, eyesight 
{2) the eye- . - . . 
sightofan would be its soul, this being the substance as notion 
“yer or form of the eye. The eye is the matter of eyesight, 
and in default of eyesight it is no longer an eye, except equivocally, 


XVII, p. 54, cui assentitur Susemihl, vulgatam tuentur etiam Philop. 221, 24 Simpl. et 
vet. transl. || ἀπολιπούσης TVW Them. Simpl. Trend., ἀπολειπούσης etiam Soph. | 
21. οὐκ ἔστιν STU VW Bek. Trend., οὐκέτι EX, οὐκέτ᾽ Them. Torst., οὐκέτι ἐστὶν in 
interpr. Simpl. 93, 32, οὐκέτι ἔσται Soph. || ὁμώνυμος E. 


4—2 


52 DE ANIMA II CHS. I, 2 


ΜᾺ »" Ν 3 
θινος καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἐφ 
rs “n \ ‘ 
ὅλου τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος: ἀνάλογον yap ἔχει ws TO pé- 
¢ μέ Ν , ¢ 
pos πρὸς TO μέρος, οὕτως ἡ ὅλη αἴσθησις πρὸς TO ὅλον 
“ A 3 f Ὁ n ¥ δὲ 3 \ 3 λ Ἁ 
10 σῶμα τὸ αἰσθητικόν, % τοιοῦτον. ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀποβεβληκὸς 25 
Ν Ν Ν ’ x Ψ “ > Ν ‘ + ‘ δὲ 
τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ δυνάμει dv wate ζῆν, ἄλλα τὸ ἔχον" τὸ OE 
11 σπέρμα καὶ ὁ καρπὸς τὸ δυνάμει τοιονδὲ σῶμα. ὧς μὲν 
οὖν ἡ τμῆσις καὶ ἡ ὅρασις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγρήγορσις ἐντελέ- 
ς 3 ς Ἂν ἃ ε δύ ῪῪ 3 A ε an 
yea, ὡς δ᾽ ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὀργάνου, ἢ Wry’ 4138 
τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸ δυνάμει ὄν: ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς ἡ 
a ‘ ς ¥ > ΜᾺ ξ ‘N A ‘ a “A Y 
12 Κόρη Kal ἡ ὄψις, κἀκεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ TO σώμα ζῷον. ὅτι 
μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ μέρη 
τινὰ αὐτῆς, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον: ἐνίων γὰρ ἢ 5 
ἐντελέχεια τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἔνιά γε 
+f , Ν δ \ εν , > ΄ 
οὐθὲν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας. 
¥ \ ¥ 3 ν 3 / ἰῳ , ε ‘\ 
13éru δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ 
ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοίου. τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ διωρίσθω καὶ 
ὑπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς. 10 
2 “Bret δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφῶν μὲν φανερωτέρων δὲ γίγνε- 
ται τὸ σαφὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνωριμώτερον, πειρα- 
τέον πάλιν οὕτω γ᾽ ἐπελθεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς" οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ ὅτι 
δεῖ τὸν ὁριστικὸν λόγον δηλοῦν, ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ὅρων 
λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐμφαίνε- 
~ >, ἡ ? > € ΄ “ a 3 a 
σθαι. viv δ᾽ ὥσπερ συμπεράσμαθ' οἱ λόγοι τῶν ὅρων εἰσίν' 
οἷον τί ἐστιν ὁ τετραγωνισμός; τὸ ἴσον ἑτερομήκει ὀρθογώνιον 
εἶναι ἰσόπλευρον. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὅρος λόγος τοῦ συμπεράσμα- 
τος. ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι ἐστὶν 6 τετραγωνισμὸς μέσης εὕρεσις, 
‘on , ΄ ‘ ¥ , > > ᾿ ΄ 
2 τοῦ πράγματος λέγει τὸ αἴτιον. λέγομεν οὖν ἀρχὴν λαβόν- 20 
κω 4 é \ ¥ o 3 ν᾽, “ 
τες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ 
ζῆν. πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κἂν ἕν τι τούτων 


| oe 


5 


22. δὲ VX, δὴ etiam Them., τοίνυν interpr. Simpl. || 24. οὕτως om. UV WX Soph., 
leg. Philop. Simpl. (| 25. τοιοῦτο UW Bek. Trend, τοιοῦτον reliqui codd. et F (Bus.) 
Philop. Soph. Torst. || 27. τοιόνδε Alex. dar. καὶ λ, 76, 25 || 28. rufots codd., αἴσθησις 
coni. Christ {| 413.0, 2. ὁ 660. TU WX Simpl. Soph. Bek. Trend., ὁ om. Philop. ad 
412 Ὁ, 17 (231, 22) et Them, || 3. τὸ ζῶον SU WX Them. Simpl. Soph. Bek. Trend. ἢ 
5. ἐνίων γὰρ ἡ ἐντελόχεια) tua “γὰρ ἐντελέχειαι forsitan legerit Soph. 44, 29 [| 8. re E, 
δὲ etiam Philop. ad gira, 26 (139, 35) et Soph. ἢ 13. οὕτω E (Bhl.) P, reliqui οἱ 
scripti et ante Biehlium jimpressi omnes οὕτως || y’ ἐπελθεῖν EP Soph., reliqui et 
scripti et ante Hiehlium impressi omnes om. γε, ἐπανελθεῖν S Philop. 230, 6 Simpl. | 
17. ἐστι τετραγωνισμός VW Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. |] 18. λόγος om. ET V ἢ 
ty. ὁ post ἐστὶν om. WX Them. || οὔρησα TU WX || 20. λέγωμεν TW Alex. 77, 2, 


CHS. I, 2 412 Ὁ 22—413 a 22 53 


like an eye in stone or in a picture. What has been said of the 
part must be understood to apply to the whole living body; for, 
as the sensation of a part of the body is to that part, so is sensation 
as -a whole to the whole sentient body as such. By that which 
has in it the capacity of life is meant not the body which has lost 
its soul, but that which possesses it. Now the seed in animals, 
like the fruit in plants, is that which is potentially such and such 
a body. As, then, the cutting of the axe or the seeing of the eye 
is full actuality, so, too, is the waking state; while the soul is 
actuality in the same sense as eyesight and the capacity of the 
instrument. The body, on the other hand, is simply that which is 
potentially existent. But, just as in the one case the eye means 
the pupil in conjunction with the eyesight, so in the other soul and 
body together constitute the animal. 

Now it needs no proof that the soul—or if it is divisible into 
Soul in- parts, certain of its parts—cannot be separated from the 
separable | body, for there are cases where the actuality belongs to 

the parts themselves. There is, however, no reason why 
some parts should not be separated, if they are not the actualities 


IO 


of any body whatever. Again, it is not clear whether the soul 13 


Apossible may not be the actuality of the body as the sailor is of the 
analogy. ship. This, then, may suffice for an outline or provisional 
sketch of soul. 


But, as it is from the things which are naturally obscure, though 2 


more easily recognised by us, that we proceed to what is clear 
and, in the order of thought, more knowable, we must employ 
this method in trying to give a fresh account of soul. For it is 
Testofa "ot enough that the defining statement should set forth 
good the fact, as most definitions do; it should also contain 
definition. : . . 

and present the cause: whereas in practice what is stated 
in the definition is usually no more than a conclusion. For 
example, what is quadrature? The construction of an equilateral 
rectangle equal in area to a given oblong. But such a definition 
expresses merely the conclusion. Whereas, if you say that 
quadrature is the discovery of a mean proportional, then you state 
the reason. 


We take, then, as our starting-point for discussion that it is life 2 


which distinguishes the animate from the inanimate. But the 
term life is used in various senses; and, if life is present in but a 


λέγομεν etiam Them. Philop. Soph. {τὴν ἀρχὴν Alex. 1. 1.» τὴν om. Them. Philop., 
ἄλλην ἀρχὴν coni. Susemihl || 21. σκέψεως τοῦ πράγματος SU WX Alex. 1. 1., τοῦ πράγ. 
om. etiam Soph. || 22. ζἢ»] ξυὴν ἔχοντι σώματι Alex, 1. 1, 


eA DE ANIMA II CH. 2 


3 , », ΝᾺ > 4 a ΜᾺ ¥ ? 
ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κί. 
vyois καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τρο- 
8φὴν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις. διὸ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα 25 
πάντα, δοκεῖ ζῆν: φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν 
\ 3 Ν 2 ὃ 3 “Ὁ » , A Ad λ 
καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι ἧς αὔξησίν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμ.- 
βάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους" οὐ γὰρ ἄνω μὲν av&e- 
? 5» ¥ 5 3 ε 4 > 3 ¥ A 4 iy ἡ", 
ται, κάτω δ᾽ ov, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ ἄμφω καὶ πάντῃ, ὅσα αεὶ 
τρέφεταίΐ τε καὶ Ly διὰ τέλους, ἕως ἂν δύνηται λαμβάνειν 
4 τροφήν. χωρίζεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δυνατόν, τὰ 
> ¥ / > f 5 m~ ~ 4 2 ,» Ν 
δ᾽ ἄλλα τούτου ἀδύνατον ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς. φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ 
ao ΄ 3 , ‘ 3 ~ ε 4 4 ¥ 
τῶν φνομένων: οὐδεμία yap αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει δύναμις ἄλλη 
ψυχῆς. τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς 4130 
“ \ ἢ ml Ν 4 Ὁ» ᾿ Ν . A 
ζῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῷον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως: καὶ yap τὰ 
N - > 3 é 4 Ἂ > » 
μὴ κινούμενα μηδ᾽ ἀλλάττοντα τόπον, ἔχοντα δ᾽ αἴσθησιν 
5 faa λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆ 5v0 ἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπά 
, γομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον. αἰσθήσεως ρ ρ- 
a“ € » Ψ A 4 \ ζ΄ 4 
χει πᾶσιν ἁφή. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται ywpile- 
θ ΤᾺ € ΝᾺ X ζ Ε] a Ψ ξ ξ 5 “ 
FUaL TNS ἀφῆς Kal πάσης αἰσθήσεως, OUTWS Ἢ apn Τῶν 
LAA > θ , θ ἃ δὲ λέ Ἧ on / 
ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον 
δι κι a ‘ Ν , ᾿ ‘ δ A , 
τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ καὶ τὰ φνόμενα μετέχει: τὰ δὲ Coa πάντα 
[4 Ἀ ξ . ἂν ἂν ? a 3 > ὁ 
φαίνεται τὴν ἁπτικὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα: dv ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν 
ἑκάτερον τούτων συμβέβηκεν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. το 
6 νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω μόνον, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ψνχὴ τῶν 
εἰρημένωντούτων ἀρχὴ καϊτούτοις ὠρισται, θρεπτικῷ, αἰσθητικῷ, 
nw - 
7 διανοητικῷ, κινήσει. πότερον δὲ τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ 
μόριον ψυχῆς, καὶ εἴ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως WOT εἶναι χωριστὸν 
/ fd A % / μ᾿ \ nm ra 9 ‘ 
λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ, περὶ μὲν τινῶν τούτων OV χάλεπον 
8 ἰὼ a ¥ Se > , »” ¥ % > N “~ mo Ld 
ἰδεῖν, ἔνια δὲ ἀπορίαν exer. ὥσπερ yap ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν ἐνια 
΄ , A ‘ , , 3 9 , 
διαιρούμενα φαΐνεται ζῶντα καὶ χωριζόμενα amr ἀλλήλων, 
ὡς οὔσης τῆς ἐν τούτοις ψυχῆς ἐντελεχείᾳ μὲν μιᾶς ἐν ἑκάστῳ 
φυτῷ, δυνάμει δὲ πλειόνων, οὕτως δρῶμεν καὶ περὶ ἑτέρας 
Ν, aA Fan) ͵Ὰ >» 4 Fan’ 9 ? > ~ 
διαφορὰς τῆς ψυχῆς συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐντόμων ἐν τοῖς 20 
διατεμνομένοις:" καὶ γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον τῶν μερῶν ἔχει 


23. ὑπάρχη SWX Philop. || 25. φθίσιν et αὔξησιν SU WX Soph. Trend. Rodier { 
29. πάντη ἐκτρέφεταί re καὶ SUX Rodier, πάντη ὅσα ἀεὶ τρέφεταί re καὶ ET et omisso 
re W, πάντοσε καὶ τρέφεται καὶ V Bek. Trend., πάντοσε" καὶ rpéperal re καὶ Torst., πάντη" 
kal τρέφεται διὰ rédous καὶ ζῇ Ὁ, πάντῃ ὅσα καὶ τρέφεται, καὶ de coniectura scripsit Biehl || 
30. post τέλους virgulam Bek. Trend., om. Torst. || 413 Ὁ, 1. τοῖς ἢ] πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσι S U 
Them. Soph., rots ζῶσι πᾶσι X || 4. ὑπάρχει πρῶτον πᾶσιν 8, πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει πρῶτον X, 
τρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ceteri, etiam P || 5. δὲ] γὰρ X, δὲ etiam Them. Philop. || 8. φυτὰ 


Gs 
9 


rm 


ι-᾿ 


5 


CH. 2 4138 23—4I3b 21 55 


single one of these senses, we speak of a thing as living. Thus 
Various there is intellect, sensation, motion from place to place 
vital func- and rest, the motion concerned with nutrition and, 
operations. further, decay and growth. Hence it is that all 3 
plants are supposed to have life. For apparently they have within 
The ming.  tnemselves a:faculty and principle whereby they grow 
mum in and decay in opposite directions. For plants do not 
plants. grow upwards without growing downwards; they grow 
in both directions equally, in fact in all directions, as many as 
are constantly nourished and therefore continue to live, so long 
as they are capable of absorbing nutriment. This form of life 4 
can be separated from the others, though in mortal creatures the 
others cannot be separated from it. In the case of plants the fact 
is manifest: for they have no other faculty of soul at all. 

It is, then, in virtue of this principle that all living things live, 
Sensation Wether animals or plants. But it is sensation primarily 
in all which constitutes the animal. For, provided they have 
animals. . Ν - 

sensation, even those creatures which are devoid of move- 
ment and do not change their place are called animals and are 
not merely said to be alive. Now the primary sense in all animals 5 
is touch. But, as the nutritive faculty may exist without touch 
or any form of sensation, so also touch may exist apart from the 
other senses. By nutritive faculty we mean the part of the soul 
in which even plants share. Animals, however, are found uni- 
versally to have the sense of touch: why this is so in each of the 
two cases will be stated hereafter. 

For the present it may suffice to say that the soul is the origin 6 
of the functions above enumerated and is determined by them, 
namely, by capacities of nutrition, sensation, thought, and by 
Mutual motion. But whether each one of these is a soul or part 7 
connection of a soul and, if a part, whether it is only logically 
functions. distinct or separable in space also is a question, the 
answer to which is in some cases not hard to see: other cases 
present difficulties. For, just as in the case of plants some of them 8 
are found to live when divided and separated from each other 
(which implies that the soul in each plant, though actually one, 
is potentially several souls), so, too, when insects or annelida are 
cut up, we see the same thing happen with other varieties of soul: 
I mean, each of the segments has sensation and moves from place 


SU X Bek. Trend. || 12. θρεπτικῷ <dpexrixg > coni. Susemihl || 13. post κινήσει addendum 
ὀρέξει putat Steinhart || 15. τούτων om. SU WX Them. Soph. || 18. αὐτοῖς 5 UvVx 
Them. Soph. 


56 DE ANIMA Il CH. 2 


Ν [4 Ν Ν la > 3 » Ἁ 4 
καὶ κίνησιν τὴν κατὰ τόπον, εἶ δ᾽ αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαντασίαν 
\ » μέ Ν Ν » θ ‘\ hv Ν ἡ ὃ ’ὔ 
καὶ ὄρεξιν: ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ Ἠδονή, 
§ ω \ ἴω ~ 
9 ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία. περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ 
Ἀ ‘an at ὃ / NOE / IAA ¥ 
καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν Tw φανερόν, ἀλλ ἔοικε 25 
ἮΝ ιν “Ὁ ~ ΄ 
ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρί- 
10 ζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μόρια 
τῆς ψυχῆς φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι χωριστά, καθάπερ 
f “~ ‘ / a ν / > θ “ 
τινές φασιν: τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ὅτι ἕτερα, φανερόν: αἰσθητικῳ 
Ἃ εὺ ‘ wn v » ‘ Ν > , 
γὰρ εἶναι Kat δοξαστικῷ ἕτερον, εἴπερ Kal τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι 30 
wn , [1 A N Ν ἴω μέ Ὁ “ 3 4 
τοῦ δοξάζειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημέ- 
irvev. ἔτι δ᾽ ἐνίοις μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἅπανθ᾽ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, 
Ν / ? ς ἢ Ν ἃ ‘a ‘a Ν , 
τισὶ δέ τινα τούτων, ἑτέροις δὲ ἕν μόνον (τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσει 
διαφορὰν τῶν ζῴων)" διὰ τίνα δ᾽ αἰτίαν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. 4148. 
la \ ‘ ‘ Ν 9 7 / δ Ν Ν 
παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις συμβέβηκεν" τὰ μὲν γὰρ 
ἔχει πάσας, τὰ δὲ τινάς, τὰ δὲ μίαν τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην, ἁφήν. 
& “Ἢ ν᾿ 
2 ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα διχῶς λέγεται, 
καθάπερ ᾧ ἐπιστάμεθα (λέγομεν δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμην 5 
τὸ δὲ ἦν, ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ τούτων φαμὲν ἐπίστασθαι) 
ψνχήν, ἑκατέρῳ yap των Pap τ υ)» 
ξ ‘a Α Ἀ Ὄ ¢ 4 ‘ Ν ἕ ? ‘ ‘ / 
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ᾧ ὑγιαΐνομεν τὸ μὲν ὑγιείᾳ τὸ δὲ μορίῳ 
τινὶ τοῦ σώματος ἢ καὶ ὅλῳ: τούτων δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη 
." ς # Ἀ Ἀ / ‘ , Ν "Δ + » 
τε καὶ ὑγίεια. μορφὴ καὶ εἶδός τι καὶ λόγος καὶ οἷον ἐνέρ- 
γειὰ τοῦ δεκτικοῦ, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγιαστικοῦ 
ra ‘ σι “-" 
(δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ διατιθεμένῳ ἡ τῶν ποιητι- 
ΜᾺ € A 2 ἢ ¢ ‘ \ “ © A ‘ 
κῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐνέργεια) ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦτο ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ 
ἰσθανόμεθα καὶ ὃ μεθ TMS’ ὥστε λό ἂν εἴ 
αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ διανοούμεθα πρώτως" ὥστε λόγος τις ἂν Ely 


6 


-— 


2%. καὶ φαντασίαν deleri vult reudenthal, Ueber den Begriff φαντασία bei Arist. 
p- 8, cui assentiuntur Schieboldt, De imag. disquis., p. 44 et Susemihl, ἢν. J. 
LXXXVITI, 12, virgulam post αἴσθησιν delere, post φαντασίαν ponere in scholis maluit 
ΠῚ, Jackson || 23. καὶ ante λύπη om. SU WX Soph. || 23. οὐδέπω TUVWy οἱ 
Philop. in prooemio ad lib. 1 (11, 1) et ad gira, 26 (τ04., 10), sed hoc loco et ad giga, αι 
(261, 14. 16) οὐδέν rw, quod etiam Them. legit: ch Them. pp. 46, 4. 10% 12. 103, 7. J 
a6. xatom. 5. Cf. Ileinzii crit. adn. ad Them. 46, 5. τοῦ, 13. 103, 7 (immo, 8] ἢ 
ἐνδέχεται omnes codd. Soph. et Philop. ter hoc loco et ad 411 a, 26 (194, 11}, 561 δὰ 
4158, 11 (261, 18) ἐνδέχεσθαι et eam quoque seripturam ferri et ab Alexandro legi traclit 
ad πῆς locum Philop., ἐνδέχεσθαι etiam Them. 46, 5 || χωρίζεσθαι om. X, Cf, Them. 
1.1. fl 33. τοῦτο, 4χ4.ἃ, τ. Sour cum Torst. in parenthesi posuit Biehl || 33. ποιεῖ SUX YP 
Simpl. 103, 19 Philop. vet. transl, Bek. Trend. Torst., ἐποίησε Soph. || 4t4a, τ. διαφομὰτν 
TV XP, διαφορὰν etiam Philop. Simpl. Soph. {| 2. τὰς om. 1 et re. T, leg. etiam Soph. ἢ 
4. de hoc loco dmret...14. ὑποκαίμενον cf. Bon. stud. Ar. II, IIL. 120, ἐπεὶ 58...28. φανερὸν 
ἐς τούτων suspecta videntur Susemihlio, Oecon. p. 84, pro ἐπεὶ δὲ coni. ὅτε δὲ Trend., ἐπεὶ 
δὲ etiam Soph. || 5. post ἐπιστάμεθα virgulam Bek. Trend. Torst., delevit Bon. | M-youer... 


CH, 2 413 Ὁ 22--- 414 ξὶ 13 57 


to place, and, if it has sensation, it has also imagination and 
appetency. For, where there is sensation, there is also pleasure 
and pain: and, where these are, desire also must of necessity be 
Thecase or Present. But as regards intellect and the speculative 
intellect faculty the case is not yet clear. It would seem, how- 
not clear. * 4s - . - 

ever, to be a distinct species of soul, and it alone is 
capable of separation from the body, as that which is eternal from 
that which is perishable. The remaining parts of the soul are, 
as the foregoing consideration shows, not separable in the way 
that some allege them to be: at the same time it is clear that they 
are logically distinct. For the faculties of sensation and of opinion 
taken in the abstract are distinct, since to have sensation and to 
Opine are distinct. And so it is likewise with each of the other 
faculties above mentioned. Again, while some animals possess 
all these functions, others have only some of them, others only 
one. It is this which will differentiate animal from animal. The 
reason why this is so must be investigated hereafter. The case is 
similar with the several senses: some animals have all of them, 
others some of them, others again only one, the most indispensable, 
that is, touch. 

Now “that by which we live and have sensation” is a phrase 
Asecond With two meanings, answering to the two meanings of 
free = that “by which we know” (the latter phrase means, 
definition. firstly, knowledge and, secondly, soul, by either of which 
we say we know). Similarly that by which we have health means 
either health itself or a certain part, if not the whole, of the body. 
Now of these knowledge and health are the shape and in some 
sort form, the notion and virtual activity, of that which is capable 
of receiving in the one case knowledge, in the other health: 
that is to say, it is in that which is acted upon or conditioned 
that the activity of the causal agencies would seem to take 
effect. Now the soul is that whereby primarily we live, per- 
ceive, and have understanding: therefore it will be a species of 


6. ἐπίστασθαι in parenth. posui || λέγω coni. Torst., λέγομεν etiam Simpl. et sine dubio 
Soph. |] δὲ unc. incl. Bon., cui adversatur Bywater, p. 55 || 6. ἑκατέρῳ. .«.ἐπίστασθαι 
in parenth. posuit Bon. {| 7. ᾧ unc. incl. Bywater || ὑγίειαν X et pr. S, reliqui codd. 
et Bek. Trend. ὑγίεια, ὑγιείᾳ de coniect. Trend. a Torst. receptum probat Bon., ὑγιείᾳ 
iam Soph. || 8. ὅλῳ. τούτων Bek. Trend., post ὅλῳ colon Torst. Bon. {| 9. καὶ ante 
οἷον om. S UX {|{ το. τῶν δεκτικῶν X Philop. et in paraphr. Them. Simpl. || ὑγιαστοῦ 
XP Simpl. Philop. Soph. 50, 19, quod probat Hayduck. progr. Gryph. 1873 ἢ. 1, 
recepit Rodier, ὑγιαστικοῦ ceteri, etiam Bon. Ind. Ar. s.v. Barco || 12. Torst. incipit 
apodosin ab ἡ ψυχὴ, Bon. ab ὥστε 13, idque recte. || 13. πρώτως, ὥστε Bek. Trend., post 
“ρώτως colon Torst. Bon. 


9 


ΤΟ 


I2 


58 DE ANIMA II CHS. 2, 3 


\ > 3 3 > Ψ Ν Ν ε , ‘A \ 

13 καὶ εἶδος, GAN οὐχ ὕλη καὶ TO ὑποκείμενον. τριχῶς yap 
» a 

λεγομένης τῆς οὐσίας, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν εἶδος, 


μι 


5 
τὸ δὲ ὕλη, TO δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τούτων δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, 
‘ μ᾿ ἐὺ 9 , 3 Ν μ᾿ Ψ 3 ἰὼ ¥ > 
τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἔμψυχον, ov 
Ν ΝᾺ ’ > 3 / ΝᾺ 3 > Ψ , id 
TO σώμά ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ψυχῆς, GAN αὐτὴ σωματός τι- 
τάνος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δοκεῖ μήτ᾽ 
ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι Q ψυχή" σώμα μὲν 20 
γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν σώματι 
ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἐν σώματι τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πρότε- 
ρον εἰς σῶμα ἐνήρμοζον αὐτήν, οὐθὲν προσδιορίζοντες ἐν τίνι 
καὶ ποΐῳ, καίπερ οὐδὲ φαινομένου τοῦ τυχόντος δέχεσθαι τὸ 
τῷ τυχόν. οὕτω δὲ γίνεται καὶ κατὰ λόγον" ἑκάστου γὰρ ἡ ἐν- 25 
τελέχεια ἐν τῷ δυνάμει ὑπάρχοντι καὶ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὕλῃ πέ- 
5 , Ψ \ ΜΝ 3 ld 4 a > ‘ é 
φυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐντελέχειά Tis ἐστι Kal λόγος 
΄-“ > 
τοῦ δύναμιν ἔχοντος εἶναι τοιούτου, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. 
89 Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαν τοῖς μὲν 
ἴω ᾽ὔ wy " “ὋΝ 
ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοῖς δέ τινες εὐτῶν, 30 
9. ἢ Ν ᾿ ῥ f > ¥ an 3 
ἐνίοις δὲ pia μόνη. δυνάμεις δ᾽ εἴπομεν θρεπτικόν; dpe- 
\ 
2KTUKOV, αἰσθητικόν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. ὑπ 
vd de ἊἊ δ “ \ θ \ ¢ ec 7 δὲ 
άρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ 
oa Ff ‘ ‘ ? f 3 ‘ ‘ 3 ? ‘ \ 3 
τοῦτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ TO dpe- 414b 
/ ¥ μ᾿ ‘ 3 - ‘ ‘ ‘ δ 
κτικόν. ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, 
᾿ δὲ “~ ¢ > » [4 “ > A / % e 7 . 
Ta δὲ ζῷα πάντ᾽ ἔχουσι μίαν ye τῶν αἰσθήσεων, THY ἀφήν 


Ὄ δ᾽ + θ ξ ,ὔ ἢ ἡ Fd \ λύ - ἂν 
@ AOUNTLS ὑπάρχει, TOUT NOovy TE καὶ Λυπὴ Καὶ TO 


& 
ξ 


ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία: τοῦ 5 
3 γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη. ἔτι δὲ τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν' 
ἡ γὰρ ἁφὴ τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησις. ξηροῖς γὰρ καὶ ὑγροῖς 
καὶ θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς τρέφεται τὰ ζῶντα πάντα (τούτων 
δ᾽ αἴσθησις ἁφή, τῶν 8 ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν κατὰ συμβεβὴη- 
κός)" οὐθὲν γὰρ εἷς τροφὴν συμβάλλεται ψόφος οὐδὲ χρῶμα 


- 


0 


14. οὐχὶ ἡ ἊΝ, οὐχ ὡς SUV Xy Simpl. || pro yap coni. δὲ Hayduck. 1. 1. ff 14... 
19. cf. Bon. stud. Ar. II, IIL. 58 || 16. δ᾽ om. P || 17. post ἐντέλ, colon Tek. Trend. 
Torst., virguiam Bon. || ἐπεὶ τὸ] ἔπειτα τὸ E (Bek. Rr.) ἐπεὶ τὰ τὸ FE (Bhd), ut videtur, 
dra δὲ τὸ STP Bek. Trend. in ed. pr. Torst., δὲ auctore Trend. om. Belger, quod 
probat Bon. stud. Ar. II, ILL. 58, leg. δὲ Them. Philop. |] 20. μὲν om. SU X, 
leg. Them. Soph. || 23. προσδιορίσαντες SUX Soph., προσδιορέζοντες ctiam Philop. { 
45. οὕτω] τοῦτο Soph. g1, 38, ubi verbatim laudare videtur || 28. τοιουδὶ εἶναι SU X, 
εἶναι τοιούτου Them. Soph. || 30. dewep αἴπομεν W, om. ET y, καθάπερ εἴπομεν etiam 
Them. Soph. || 31. ὁρεκτικόν post αἰσθητικόν U VX Them. Belg., vulgatam tuetur Soph. 
“τα Ὁ, τ, αὐτό SW Soph., τοῦτό etiam Philop. || 2. ὀρέξεις E (Trend.) i 4. καὶ τὸ] 


CHS. 2, 3 414 δ 14---414 Ὁ Io 59 


notion or form, not matter or substratum. Of the three meanings 13 
of substance mentioned above, form, matter and the whole made 
up of these two, matter is potentiality and form is actuality. And, 
since the whole made up of the two is endowed with soul, the body 
is not the actuality of soul, but soul the actuality of a particular 

body. Hence those are right who regard the soul as not 14 
Soul is . . . 
not inde- independent of body and yet at the same time as not itself 
eee’ ἃ species of body. It is not body, but something be- 
boay longing to body, and therefore resides in body and, what 

is more, in such and such a body. Our predecessors were 
wrong in endeavouring to fit the soul into a body without further 
determination of the nature and qualities of that body: although 
we do not even find that of any two things taken at random the 
one will admit the other. And this result is what we might expect. 15 
For the actuality of each thing comes naturally to be developed 
in the potentiality of each thing: in other words, in the appropriate 
matter. From these considerations, then, it is manifest that soul is 
a certain actuality, a notion or form, of that which has the capacity 
to be endowed with soul. 

Of the powers of soul above mentioned, namely, those of 3 
The vital nutrition, appetency, sensation, locomotion and under- 
sanctions standing, some living things, as we remarked, possess 
tributed. 41], others some, others again only one. Plants possess 2 
the nutritive faculty only: other things along with this have 
Appetency sensation ; and, if sensation, then also appetency : where 
implied under appetency we include desire, anger and wish. But 
in touch. : “ 

all animals have at least one sense, touch: and, where 
sensation is found, there is pleasure and pain, and that which 
causes pleasure and pain; and, where these are, there also is desire, 
desire being appetite for what is pleasurable. Again, they have 3 
a sensation concerned with nutriment, touch being such a sense. 
For it is by what is dry and moist, hot and cold, that all living 
things are nourished (and these qualities are perceived by touch, 
whereas the other sensibles are not, except incidentally): for sound, 
colour and odour contribute nothing to nutriment, while flavour 
κατὰ τὸ coni. Barco || 5. re om. ET, leg. Simpl. Soph. || καὶ ἡ om. SU, ἡ om. V Philop. 
253, 2256. Soph. || 6. ὄρεξίς ἐστιν αὕτη ST UX, ἐστὶν ὄρεξις αὕτη Soph., ἐστιν om. etiam 
Philop. || δὲ om. EW y || 8. ζῶα T U VX Bek. Trend. Torst., ζῶντα etiam Them. Philop. 
250, 7 et vet. transl. || τούτων...9. συμβεβηκός in parenth. posui || 9. post ἁφή colon vulg. || 
rois δ᾽ ἄλλοις αἰσθητοῖς Torst. et Belg. in ed. alt. Trend., secuti Sophoniam, qui interpre- 
tatur τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν, vulgatam praeter omnes codd. tuentur Simpl. Philop. 
252, 36 et Alex. ap. Philop. 253, 13 et, ut videtur, Them. 47, 32 |] 10. post συμβεβηκός 


punctum Biehl Rodier || οὐθὲν...11. ἁπτῶν ἐστίν ante ξηροῖς.. συμβεβηκός collocanda 
censet Christ {| 10. οὐδὲ χρῶμα om. E, tuentur haec verba Them. Philop. Soph. 


60 DE ANIMA Il CH. 3 


? Ἀ 3 , ξ \ ‘ 4 ~ ε “Ἂ > a ~ δὲ ‘ 
οὐδὲ ὀσμή, ὃ δὲ χυμὸς ἕν TL τῶν ἁπτῶν ἐστίν. πεῖνα O€ καὶ 
/ 3 4 Ἀ e ‘N ~ a ‘ ~ e Ν 
δίψα ἐπιθυμία, καὶ ἡ μὲν πεῖνα ξηροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ, ἡ δὲ 
δίψα ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ: ὁ δὲ χυμὸς οἷον ἥδυσμά τι τούτων 
ἐστίν. διασαφητέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ὕστερον, νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον 

3 , wa δ᾽ , “ x ς Ἁ Ν πὰ ¢ ¢ 
εἰρήσθω, ὅτι τῶν ζῴων τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἁφὴν καὶ ὄρεξις ὑπαρ- 
Ἀ Ν 4 » Ψ > 3 - 9. καὶ 
4 χει. περὶ δὲ φαντασίας ἄδηλον, ὕστερον δ᾽ ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐνί- 


m 


5 


ous δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ TO κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, 
ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ 
εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τιμιώτερον. 
ΜᾺ “Δ wd ‘ > Ν , ©. RK ¥ ¢ “ Ἁ 
5. ὃδῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἷς ἂν εἴη λόγος ψυχῆς τε καὶ 20 
σχήματος" οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνόν ἐστι καὶ τὰ 
3 a ¥y o> 2 os Ν ‘\ \ > ᾽ ᾿ 3 
ἐφεξῆς, οὔτ᾽ ἐνταῦθα ψυχὴ παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. γίνοιτο δ᾽ ἂν 
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, ὃς ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, 
"4 3 9 \ ¥ ¢ € [4 \ ‘ 7% a > 
ἴδιος δ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἔσται σχήματος. ὁμοίως δὲ Kal ἐπὶ Tats εἰ- 
ρημέναις ψυχαῖς. διὸ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ 25 
24 7 ν 272 ¢ » ὰ > Lo» A ¥ ¥ 
ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρων, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἔσται τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος 
λόγος οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἄτομον εἶδος, ἀφέντας τὸν 
6 τοιοῦτον. παραπλησίως δ᾽ ἔχει τῷ περὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ 
Ν ‘N ‘4 7 oN ‘ 9 “ > a € / 4 
τὰ κατὰ ψυχήν: del yap ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει 
τὸ πρότερον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, 30 
® “~ 
οἷον ἐν τετραγώνῳ μὲν τρίγωνον, ἐν αἰσθητικῷ δὲ τὸ θρεπτι- 
Ψ ra 
κόν. ὥστε kal” ἕκαστον ζητητέον, τίς ἑκάστου ψυχή, οἷον τίς 
a N σι 5 ,ὕ BN , Ν , > >» » mo» 
7 φυτοῦ καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου. διὰ τίνα δ᾽ αἰτίαν τῷ ἐφε- 
Ly ΓΝ ΡὋᾺ ~ 
Ens οὕτως ἔχουσι, σκεπτέον. ἄνευ μὲν yap τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ 4rsa 
+] ‘ 3 ἂν a) ? 3 ΡᾺ a ἈΝ ΝἍ 
αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν" τοῦ δ᾽ αἰσθητικοῦ χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν 
> n A , > » ‘ ~ ¢ n ~ ¥ 
ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ᾽ ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων 
αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἁφὴ δ᾽ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρ- 
- λλὰ %, ΜᾺ 4 ¥ > ¥ ¥y 3 3 ‘ call 
χει: πολλὰ yap τῶν ζῴων ovr ὄψιν οὔτ᾽ ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν 5 
2 aN “ 
οὔτ᾽ ὀσμῆς αἴσθησιν. καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν 
¥ a 
ἔχει TO κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει. τελευταῖον 


χα, post ὁσιμή punctum vulg. |] 12. θερμοῦ καὶ ξηροῦ SX, ξηρ. καὶ θερ. etiam Them. Simpl. 
Soph. || 13- ὑγροῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ X Soph., καὶ ψυχ, καὶ ὑγρ. ὃ, ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ etiam Them, 
Simpl. || room. SUV, leg. Philop. || 15. διωρίσθω SU VX Them. Soph. {{τ8. κἂν post 
ἀνθρώποι X Vhilop. 255, 6, καὶ reliqui, etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || ry. ἐστιν ἔτεμον SUV 
Them., ἕτερόν ἐστιν ceteri, etiam Simpl. Soph., ἐστὶν om. Philop. ἢ ἢ καὶ ron, UN Them. 
Bek. Trend. Torst., καὶ omissy ἢ Philop., καὶ om. etiam Soph. { 22. ἡ ψυχὴ EVy 
Simpl., ἡ om. Soph. || yévocro ὃ UV X Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. ji 25. κοινὸν «Ὁ μόνον 1» 
coni. Susemihl, τῷ κοινῷ λόγῳ ἀρκεῖσθαι μόνῳ interpretatur Philop. 257, 13. {| 26. ἐστι 
SUX) Soph., ἔσται Them. {| 27. post λόγος vulg. virgulam sustuli ἢ οὐδὲ δεῖ fort. 


CH. 3 414 Ὁ r1I—415 a 7 61 


is one of the tangible objects. Hunger again, and thirst are forms 
of desire, the one for what is hot or dry, the other for what is cold 
or moist. Flavour is, as it were, the seasoning of these. We will 
deal with these in detail hereafter: at present let it suffice to say 
that all animals which have the sense of touch are also endowed 
with appetency. Whether they have imagination is not clear: this, 
Higher too, must be considered later. Some have in addition 4 
functions. the power of locomotion. Others—that is to say, man 
and any other species like man or, possibly, superior to him—have 
also the thinking faculty and intellect. 

From this it is clear that there is one definition of soul exactly 5 


A single as there is one definition of figure: for there is in the 
of soul, os one case no figure excepting triangle, quadrilateral and 
offigure. the rest,.nor is there in the other any species of soul 


apart from those above mentioned. Again, a definition might be 
constructed which should apply to all figures, but not specially 
to any species of figure. And similarly with the species of soul 
above enumerated. Hence it would be-absurd here as elsewhere 
to seek a general definition which will not be properly a definition 
of anything in existence and will not be applicable to the particular 
irreducible species before us, to the neglect of the definition which 
is so applicable. 
The types of soul resemble the series of figures. For, alike 6 

in figures and in things animate, the earlier form exists 


The as- . . . . 
cending potentially in the later, as, for instance, the triangle 
vital potentially in the quadrilateral, and the nutritive faculty 
functions. 


in that which has sensation. So that we must examine 
in each case separately, what is the soul of plant, of man or of 
beast. Why they are related in this order of succession remains 7 
to be considered. There is no sensitive faculty apart from the 
nutritive: and yet the latter exists without the former in plants. 
Again, none of the other senses is found apart from touch; while 
touch is found apart from the others, many animals having neither 
sight nor hearing nor sense of smell. Also of those which possess 
sensation, some can move from place to place, others’ cannot. 


Soph. interpretationi accommodatius esse censet Rodier IT, 220 || καὶ τὸ ἄτομον E Ty, τὸ 
om. Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 54, 30. Bek. Trend. Torst. || 28. καὶ ra...30. σχημάτων 
om. V || 29. κατὰ] περὶ τὴν SUV X || 31. μὲν τὸ τρί. V Soph. 54, 6 || 32. ὥστε καὶ 
καθ᾽ suscepit Torst. e prima editione E, reliqui omnes om. καὶ, etiam Soph. || 33. τῷ] 
τὸ PU Soph., om. V || 415 a, 3. οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς suscepit Torst. e prima editione E, 
οἷον om. reliqui. || 6. ὀσμῆς ὅλως αἴσθησιν STU WX Soph. Bek. Trend., ὅλως om. E 
(Trend.) y Torst. Belger. 


62 DE ANIMA If CHS. 3, 4 


‘ Ἀ 3 / ‘ “ 4 © ‘\ Ν ς 
δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν: οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπ- 
άρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, 
οἷς δ᾽ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμός, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν το 
9 ‘ - ‘ \ f ΄ a ‘ ‘ ua) 
οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ ζῶσιν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρη- 
τικοῦ νοῦ ἕτερος λόγος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁ περὶ τούτων ἑκάστου 
λόγος οὗτος οἰκειότατος καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, δῆλον. 
9 ~ ‘\ Ἃ ? Ν 7 4 Δ 
4 ᾿Αναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι 
a) μ᾿ 3 “a 5» > /pP Ψ Ν ΡᾺ 2 * 
λαβεῖν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ti ἐστιν, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων 15 

Ν Ν a ¥ > ἰοὺ 3 ‘ N ᾿ -.h6mY¢ 

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιζητεῖν. εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον 
> A © , Ν Ἀ a ‘ > ‘ a 4 , 
αὐτῶν, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικόν, 

/ ¥ fa a ‘ o “A ’ “ > ¢ ‘a 
πρότερον ἔτι λεκτέον Ti TO νοεῖν καὶ τί TO αἰσθάνεσθαι" πρό- 
τεραι γάρ εἶσι τῶν δυνάμεων at ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις κατὰ 
τὸν λόγον. εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως, τούτων δ᾽ ἔτι πρότερα τὰ ἀντικείμενα, 20 
δεῖ τεθεωρηκέναι, περὶ ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἂν δέοι διορίσαι διὰ τὴν 

2 αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, οἷον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ. wore 
πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον: ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ 
ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη 

- ¢ 2 a a ἃ ς , ‘ ΝᾺ Kd ? Ἀ 
δύναμίς ἐστι ψυχῆς, καθ᾽ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν. ἧς ἐστὶν 25 
ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσθαι: φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν 
ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα ἣ τὴν γένε- 
> - ¥ \ a’ vd * > F ~ \ 
σιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, TO πονῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν 
ζῷον φ ‘ δὲ μά ~ FN ‘ vs θ ¢ a e 
wov, φυτὸν ὃὲ φυτόν, ἱνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ TOU θείου μετέχωσιν ἢ 
δύνανται" πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει 415Ὁ 
μέ ΄ ‘ ; ‘ > " τ ΄ Ὰ ᾿ Ἂν ‘ 
ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ δ᾽ οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ 

πὶ ἴω ων »Ὁῳ ~ 
δὲ ᾧ. ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ TOU ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου TH συν- 

΄ ‘ Ν \ 2 2 "Ἂ a > A ‘ 
εχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν 
ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ἦἧ δύναται μετέχειν ἕκαστον, κοινωνεῖ κ 


8, ἐλάχιστον SUVWX, ἐλάχιστα etiam Philop. Soph. || διάνοιαν, οἷον ὁ (δ tan. E 
at Soph.) ἄνθρωπος Fre (ἢ εἴ τι Soph.) τοιοῦτον ἄλλο ὑπάρχει. οἷς Wy εἴ a prima manu 
margo Τὰ (Trend.) et Soph. || ri. ταύτη μόνον SUX, ταύτῃ μόνῃ Them. Philop. Soph. ἡ 
15. τί ἐστιν om. SUX, leg. Them. Simpl. Philop. || 16. ἢ καὶ SUX Bek. ‘Trend., ἢ 
om. Simpl. Soph. Torst. || (8. πρότεραι] πρότερον STUVWX Bek. Trend., πρότεραι 
KX. (Trend. Bus.) y Them. Soph. Torst. Kelger in ed. alt. Trend. [| 20. var om. BE 
Soph. || 8 ante ἔτι omnes codd., insertum E (Trend.) {| a1. de? τεθ, om. W, leg. 
Philop. Soph., ded τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν post τεθεωρηκέναι transponenda esse censet Christ ἢ 
23. γενέσεως I’, καὶ γεννήσεως deleri vult Essen, progr. Stargard 1864, p. 23. {f 
24. καὶ ante τοῖς om. V, ante wp. om. UVXy ἢ 25. as] ols VW, ἧς etiam Them. 
Philop. Soph. || 26. γεννῆσαί re καὶ W, etiam Philop. Soph. ij χρήσασθαι STU VX 
Soph. Trend., χρῆσθαι Philop. ad hune locum et ad 4164, τ (279, 1) 1 φυσικώτερον E 
(Trend.) et pr. y, φυσικώτατον etiam Simpl. Philop. Seph. ff 27. ζώοις SX, ζῶσι Them. 


CHS. 3, 4 415 a 8—q415bD 5 63 


Lastly and most rarely, they have the reasoning faculty and 
thought. For those perishable creatures which possess reason are 
endowed with all the other species of soul, but not all those which 
possess each of the other faculties have reason. Indeed, some of 
them have not even imagination, while others live by imagination 
alone. As for the speculative intellect, it calls for a separate 
discussion. Meanwhile it is clear that an account of the several 
faculties is at the same time the most appropriate account of 
soul. 

The enquirer who approaches this subject must ascertain what 4 
Order of each of these faculties is before he proceeds to investigate 
procedure. the questions next in order and so forth. But if we are 
asked to state what each of these is; that is to say, what the cogni- 
tive, sensitive and nutritive faculties respectively are, we must begin 
by stating what the act of thinking is and what the act of sensation 
is. For activities and functions are logically prior to faculties. 
But, if so, and if a study of the correlative objects should have 
preceded, these objects will for the same reason have to be defined 
first: I mean, nutriment and the sensible and intelligible. Con- 2 
sequently we have first to treat of nutriment and of generation. 

The nutritive soul belongs to other living things as well as 
man, being the first and most widely distributed faculty, in virtue 
of which all things possess life. Its functions are repro- 


The teleo- : . . ._ 
logical duction and assimilation of nutriment. For it is the 
aspect of . . .ν, . . 

repro- most natural function in all living things, if perfect 
duction. 


and not defective or spontaneously generated, to repro- 
duce their species; animal producing animal and plant plant, in 
order that they may, so far as they can, share in the eternal and 
the divine. For it is that which all things yearn after, and that is 
the final cause of all their natural activity. Here final cause is an 
ambiguous term, which denotes either the purpose for which, or 
the person for whom, a thing is done. Since, then, individual 
things are incapable of sharing continuously in the eternal and 
the divine, because nothing in the world of perishables can abide 
numerically one and the same, they partake in the eternal and 


Philop. Soph. {| 28. αὐτόματον 5 Ὁ W Soph., αὐτομάτην Them. Simpl]. Philop. || 29. μετέ- 
χουσιν E (Trend.) et U Soph. v.1. (μετέχωσιν e codd. Hayduck, 57, 1), μετέχωσιν 
etiam Them. Philop. || 415 Ὁ, 1. καὶ ἐκείνου TU V W et E (Bus.) Them., κἀκείνον reliqui 
ante Biehlium omnes, etiam Soph. || 2. post φύσιν et post 3. @, pro vulg. punctis, cola 
posuit Rodier || τὸ δ᾽ οὗ...3. @ unc. incl. Trend. (cf. Ὁ, 20), leg. haec verba hoc loco 
Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 3. ἐπεὶ οὖν...τῇ συνεχείᾳ] καθόσον δύναται" δύναται δὲ τῇ 
συνεχείᾳ μόνῃ in interpr. Them. 50, 19 || 4. τὸ αὐτὸ SUX Soph., ταὐτὸ Them. | 
5. ταύτη κοινωνεῖ SUX Them. 


64. DE ANIMA II CH. 4 


) > μὲν parr ) δ᾽ ἧττον: καὶ διαμέ IK αὐτὸ 
ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δ᾽ ἧττο at διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ 
3 3 ee Yr a > ΝᾺ ᾿ 3 Ψ ¥ > ᾿ 
ἀλλ᾽ οἷον αὐτό, ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἕν, εἴδει δ᾽ ἕν. 
¥ \ ¢ Ἀ “ A ’ > # ‘\ 3 ? “~ 
83 ἔστι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος αἰτία Kal ἀρχή. ταῦτα 
᾿ A / c , 29 ¢ Ν \ ‘ ΄ 
δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται. ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τοὺς διωρισμένους 
τρόπους τρεῖς αἰτία: καὶ γὰρ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις αὐτή, καὶ οὗ τὸ 
ἕνεκα, καὶ ὧς ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἐμψύχων σωμάτων ἡ ψυχὴ 
4 αἰτία. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ws οὐσία, δῆλον" τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι 
“A ς 3 f ἈΝ Ἁ ΜᾺ a ἰοὺ ‘ > / 3 > ¢ ‘ 
πᾶσιν ἡ οὐσία, τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν, αἰτία δὲ 
ν΄ 9 \ , ς ΄ ¥ a ϑ ΄ ¥ , ε 
καὶ ἀρχὴ τούτου ἡ ψυχή. ἔτι τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος λόγος ἡ 
> / ‘ δ᾽ ¢ Ν ® ¢ ς \ > “Ζ 
5 ἐντελέχεια. φανερὸν ὡς καὶ οὐ ἕνεκεν ἡ ψυχὴ atria: 
ὥσπερ γὰρ ὃ νοῦς ἕνεκά TOV ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ 
φύσις, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν αὐτῆς τέλος. τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἡ 
ψυχὴ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν: πάντα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς 
ψυχῆς ὄργανα, καὶ καθάπερ τὰ τῶν ζῴων, οὕτω καὶ τὰ 
“ am [1 Ψ a ΤᾺ » ΜᾺ \ XN κυ 
τῶν φυτῶν, ὡς ἕνεκα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα. διττῶς δὲ τὸ οὗ 20 
6 ἕνεκα, τό τε οὗ καὶ τὸ ᾧ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅθεν πρῶτον ἡ 
κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, ψνχή. οὐ πᾶσι δ᾽ ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσιν 
ε δύ ¥ ¥ δὲ ‘\ λλ - ‘ ἂν * 
ἡ δύναμις αὕτη. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις Kal αὔξησις κατὰ 
/ £ Ν Ν ¥ 2 ? 4 > ~ > 
ψυχήν: ἡ μὲν yap αἴσθησις ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ai- 
, > 302 λ ἃ Ν , ΄ ε ’ ‘ Ν ‘ > 
σθάνεται δ᾽ οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ μετέχει ψυχῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ av- 
ξήσεώς τε καὶ φθίσεως ἔχει. οὐδὲν γὰρ φθίνει οὐδ᾽ αὔξεται 
ΤᾺ ‘ - 
φυσικῶς μὴ τρεφόμενον, τρέφεται δ᾽ οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ κοινωνεῖ 
“ 2. Ἵ a > ? ΤᾺ ¥ ra 4 \ 
7 Cans. ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς δ᾽ οὐ καλῶς εἴρηκε τοῦτο, προστιθεὶς τὴν 
αὔξησιν συμβαίνειν τοῖς φυτοῖς κάτω μὲν συρριζουμένοις 
Ν ‘ Ν ΓᾺ Y ΄ ‘ , ¥ ‘ ‘ 
διὰ τὸ THY γῆν οὕτω φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν, ἄνω δὲ διὰ τὸ 416a 
ἴω € / ¥ ‘ x » % - ΄-, # 
πῦρ ὡσαύτως. οὔτε yap TO ἄνω Kal κάτω καλῶς λαμβά- 
νει" οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τῷ παντί, 
3 > « ξ Ἀ ων , 7 ε ef “~ ~ 
ἀλλ᾽ as ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν ζῴων, οὕτως αἱ ῥίζαι τῶν uray, 


ἰ 


5 


te 
at 


7. post δ᾽ ἕν addit διόπερ τὸ σπέρμα τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς 
ψνχῆς T, οἵ singulis verbis mutatis vel omissis VX Um, apud veteres commentatores 
practer Sophoniam nullum huius additamenti vestigium {| 8. ἔστε δὲ,..χ8. ζωῆς num 
ab Ar. seripta fuerint dubitat Susemihl, Ocecon., p. 84, et ne sequentia quidem 
aS. "Humedoxdijs...416a, 18 ὕλης satis conexa esse cum praecerentibus et sequentilus 
opinatur {| g. duws SUWX, ὁμοίως etiam Them. Philop. || siypyudvovs SU et pr. 
X, διωρισμένους Them. Vhilop. 273, 9 || to. αὐτῇ unc. inclusit Biehl, αὐτῇ FS, 
αὕτη Rodier, αὐτή reliqui omnes || 11. 4 ante οὐσία om. UX || 13. αἴτεον E, αἰτίᾳ 
etiam Philop. Soph. {| 14. τούτου EF. fol. 1 τὸ (vid. append.) ἢ Soph. 58, 31 et, ut videtur, 
Simpl. rrr, 13 Philop. 471, 34. 37- 273) 19 Sq,, recepit Rocdier, ceteri et scripti et 
impressi τούτων || rod ἐν Bur. SUX, ἐν om. Simpl. || 15. ἕνεκα STUVWX Soph. ἢ 
16. νοεῖ ES TV, ποιεῖ etiam Philop. Soph. {| 17. αὐτῇ UV WX Soph. Bek. Trend, 


CH. 4 415 Ὁ 6—416a 4 65 


divine, each in the only way it can, some more, some less. That is 
to say, each persists, though not in itself, yet in a representative 
which is specifically, not numerically, one with it. 

Now the soul is cause and origin of the living body. But cause 3 
Digression and origin are terms used in various senses: accord- 
on the sou! ingly soul is cause in the three senses of the word 
fold cause. already determined. For the soul is the cause of 
animate bodies as being in itself the origin of motion, as final 
cause and as substance. Clearly it is so as substance, substance 4 
being the cause of all existence. And for living things existence 
means life, and it is the soul which is the cause and origin of life. 
Furthermore, actuality is the notidm or forn’ of that which has -- 
potential existence. Manifestly, too, the soul is final cause. For 5 
nature, like intelligence, acts for a purpose, and this purpose is 
for it an end. Such an end the soul is in animals, and this in the 
order_of nature, for all the natural bodies are instruments of soul: 
and this is as true of the bodies of plants as of those of animals, 
shewing that all are means to the soul as end; where end has two 
senses, the purpose for which and the person for whom. Moreover, 6 
the soul is also the origin of motion from place to place, but not 
all living things have this power of locomotion. Qualitative change, 
also, and growth are due to soul. For sensation is supposed to bea 
sort of qualitative change, and nothing devoid of soul has sensation. 
The same holds of growth and decay. For nothing undergoes 
natural decay or growth except it be nourished, and nothing is 
nourished unless it shares in life. 

Empedocles is mistaken in adding that in plants, in so far as 7 
Error of they strike their roots downwards, growth takes place 
Empe- because the earth in them has a natural tendency in 
docles. . . . . 

this direction and that, when they shoot upwards, it 
is because the fire in them has a similar tendency upwards. He 
is wrong in his view of up and down. For up and down are not the 
same for all individuals as for the universe. On the contrary, the 
roots of plants correspond to the heads of animals, if we are to 


αὐτῆς etiam Philop. Torst. || 18. καὶ ante κατὰ φύσιν excepto U omnes codd., om. 
Trend., unc. incl. Torst., καὶ leg. etiam Simpl. Soph. || scripsisse Arist. ἔμψυχα σώματα, 
suspicatur Torst. || 20. διττῶς...21. @ leg. haec νεῦρα hoc loco etiam Simpl. Philop. 
Soph. || 25. ψυχὴν ἔχει SU X Them. Soph., ἔχει ψυχήν W Bek. Trend., μετέχει ψυχῆς 
ETYV Torst. || 26. αὐξάνεται TVX, αὔξεται etiam Them. Philop. || 27. μετέχει ψυχῆς ΝΥ, 
μετέχει ξωῆς Philop., κοινωνεῖ ζωῆς Them. Simpl. Soph. || 28. post τοῦτο virg. om. Diels || 
προσθέσει coni. Karsten, Emped., p. 454 || 29- ῥιζουμένων SUV WX, ῥιζουμένοις T 
Soph., verbum simplex etiam Them. || 416 a, 3. τὸ αὐτὸ E (Bus.) Them. Simpl. Philop. 
Torst., ταὐτὸ reliqui, etiam Soph. || kal τῷ παντί unc. incl. Susemihl. 


H. 5 


66 DE ANIMA II CH. 4 


3 ‘ Α ¥ , v4 ‘ > N “ μὴ 
εἰ χρὴ τὰ ὄργανα λέγειν ἕτερα καὶ ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἔργοις. 5 
,) ΝᾺ 
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς τἀναντία φερόμενα τὸ πῦρ 
ΜᾺ , » ‘ 
καὶ τὴν γῆν; διασπασθήσεταν yap, εἰ μή TL ἔσται TO κω- 
λύον-: εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ αὐὖ- 
8 ξάνεσθαι καὶ τρέφεσθαι. δοκεῖ δέ τισιν ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις 
ῪΝᾺ ΜᾺ “~ > ων 
ἁπλῶς αἰτία τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως εἶναι" καὶ γὰρ το 
nw “~ , 
αὐτὸ φαίνεται μόνον τῶν σωμάτων ἢ τῶν στοιχείων τρεφό- 
“~ \ ἴω 
μενον καὶ αὐξόμενον. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
rd ε ᾽ “ἃ, ~ 5 ‘\ > , ‘ δὲ 
ζῴοις ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον. τὸ δὲ 
συναίτιον μέν πώς ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν amas γε αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ 
a) ε f € “A Ν a Ν Ὗ > Ἂν 
μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχή: ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πυρὸς αὔξησις εἰς ἄπει- 
ρον, ἕως ἂν ἢ τὸ καυστόν, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων πάν- 
των ἐστὶ πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως" ταῦτα 
δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πυρός, καὶ λόγου μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης. 
9 ‘ > € 9 Ν - 7 nn ‘ ‘N la 
9 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς θρεπτικὴ Kal γεννητική, 
Ά, Ν ΡᾺ 9 on ΄ o~ > ? \ 
καὶ περὶ τροφῆς ἀναγκαῖον διωρίσθαν πρῶτον" ἀφορίζεται yap 20 
΄ Ν ¥ , “ἊΨ " “ΟΡ κ᾿ Ps 
πρὸς TAS ἄλλας δυνάμεις τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ. δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἶναι ἡ 
“ x‘ 5 é ~ 3 f > ~ Ν 4 3 : YF nw 
τροφὴ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ov πᾶν δὲ παντί, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα τῶν 
3 ΄ 4 ἢ , 9 > ΄ Ὁ 5 ‘ ᾿ 
ἐναντίων μὴ μόνον γένεσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἔχουσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ 
αὔξησιν: γίνεται γὰρ πολλὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πάντα 
, ῖ͵ € % 3 / , δ᾽ 10° > Ὁ » 
Toad, οἷον ὑγιὲς ἐκ κάμνοντος. φαΐνεται δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὸν 25 
αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀλλήλοις εἶναν τροφή, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ 
a ‘ 4 ‘ Ν a 2 μὲ Ν 58 Ψ ‘ iy 
τῷ πυρὶ τροφή, τὸ δὲ πῦρ οὐ τρέφει τὸ ὕδωρ. ἐν μὲν οὖν 
ΡΝ e ra) ΄ ae > ny , Ἄ Ἀ 
τοῖς ἁπλοῖς σώμασι ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα τὸ μὲν 
‘ \ μ᾿ , 2 ᾽ > »¥ % “ € 
τοτροφὴ τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον. ἀπορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει" φασὶ yap ot 
4 ‘ πὰ ΝᾺ € f », rd ‘ ἃ / 
μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ τρέφεσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ αὐξά- 30 
“ ΄ ~~ 
νεσθαι, τοῖς δ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν τοὔμπαλιν δοκεῖ, TO ἐναντίον 
τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ὡς ἀπαθοῦς ὄντος τοῦ ὁμοίου ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου, 
τὴν δὲ τροφὴν μεταβάλλειν καὶ πέττεσθαι. ἡ δὲ μετα- 
‘ A > ~ 9 , a 5 , ν , 
Born πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἢ τὸ μεταξύ. ἔτι πάσχει 
ε " ε » “~ , 3 > 2 om € Ἂς *~ 
TL ἡ τροφὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ TpEhopévov, ἄλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῆς 35 


~ 


5 


5 post ἔργοις addunt edit. Ald. et Basil.: τὸ 3° αὐτὸ λέγειν ὄργανον ᾧ ἂν F τὸ αὐτὸ 
ἔργον, quae fluxisse ¢ prima editione iudicat Torst., nihil huius additamenti habent 
veteres interpretes || 7. κωλῦσον SUV W Soph. Bek. Trend. || 11. ἢ τῶν στοιχείων une. 
incl. Torst., leg. haec verba omissis verbis τῶν σωμάτων ἢ Them. Simpl., Soph. habet 
τῶν σωμ. καὶ τῶν oroty. 50. 33 || 12. αὐξανόμενον SUV WX Them., αὐξόμενον ctiam 
Philop. Soph. || 1g. ἡ ante y. insert. Ἐς (BhI.), leg. Them. || 17. μεγέθους re cal] re om. 
TUVX, καὶ μογέϑους καὶ S Them, || 18. τῆς om. SU V WX Bek. Trend. Them. Soph. 


et, ut videtur, Philop. 278, 9 || 20. καὶ περὶ ET W, καὶ om. Philop, Them. Bek. Trend. 


CH. 4 4168 5—416a 35 67 


make identity and diversity of organs depend upon their functions. 
Besides, what is it that holds together the fire and the earth, 
tending, as they do, in opposite directions? For they will be rent 
asunder, unless there is something to prevent it: while, if there 
is, it is this which is the soul and the cause of growth and nourish- 
ment. 

Some hold the nature of fire to be singly and solely the cause 8 
Fire not of nourishment and growth. For it would seem that fire 
the cause is the only body or element which of itself is nourished 

and grows. Hence fire might be supposed to be the 
operative cause, both in plants and animals. Whereas, though it is 
in a sense a joint cause, it is not a cause absolutely: it is rather the 
soul which is so. For fire goes on growing to infinity, as long 
as there is fuel to be consumed, but in natural wholes there is 
always a limit or proportion which determines growth and size. 
But this belongs to the soul and not to fire, to form rather than 
' to matter. 

The nutritive faculty of the soul being the same as the repro- 9 
ductive, it is necessary first to give a definition of fhitriment. For 
it is by the nutritive function that this faculty is separated off 
from the others. The common view is that contrary is nutriment 
to contrary; though not in every case, but wherever each 
of two contraries is not only generated by, but derives 
growth from, the other. For many things are derived from one 
another, but not all of them are quantities: thus the sick man 
becomes well. But it is found that even the contraries supposed 
to derive growth from each other are not fed by one another in the 
same way: while water serves to feed fire, fire is not nutriment 
to water. It would seem, then, that it is in the simple bodies 
above all that of two contraries one is nutriment and the other 
is nourished. Yet here is a difficulty. It is said by the one τὸ 
side that like is nourished by, as well as derives its growth from, 
like; while the others, again, as we explained, hold that con- 
trary is nourished by contrary, on the ground that like cannot be 
affected by like, while food undergoes change and is digested. 
Now change is always in the direction of the opposite, or of the 
intermediate state. Further, nutriment is acted upon by that 
which it nourishes, and not the latter by the former: just as 


Torst. || διορίσαι UW Soph., διορίσασθαι y Them., διωρίσθαι etiam Philop. || 23. γέννησιν 
E, γένεσιν Soph. et, ut videtur, Them. κι, 30 || 24. πάντα om. SU Xy et corr. E | 
25. wood om. U W, in rasura E (Trend.) || 28. ἄλλοις 5 Ὁ X Philop., ἁπλοῖς etiam Soph. || 
32. ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου om. EW, tuentur Them. Philop. || 34. τὸ post ἢ insert. E (Stapf.), 
καὶ τὸ Them. codd. (ex Arist. corr. ἢ τὸ Heinze) Philop. 


Nutrition. 


5-- 2 


68 DE ANIMA II CH. 4 


A Ψ 3 3 ε 3 3 4 
τροφῆς, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ὁ τέκτων ὑπὸ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἐκεί- 416b 
5 > ’ 3 
vou αὕτη" ὃ δὲ τέκτων μεταβάλλει μόνον εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐξ 
A a 
τι ἀργίας. πότερον δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τροφὴ τὸ τελευταῖον προσγινό- 
= 4 ἊΝ » ὃ 7 > δ᾽ ¥ IAA. ε 
μενον ἢ τὸ πρῶτον, ἔχει διαφοράν. εἰ ἄμφω, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ 
Ἄ, , A 
μὲν ἄπεπτος ἢ δὲ πεπεμμένη, ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τὴν 5 
τροφὴν λέγειν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἄπεπτος, τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναν- 
- 4 ld \ Ψ ~ e [4 Ly 
τίῳ τρέφεται, ἡ δὲ πεπεμμένη, τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ. WOTE 
‘ 5 “~ A 
φανερὸν ὅτι λέγουσί τινα τρόπον ἀμφότεροι καὶ ὀρθῶς καὶ 
5 ΕἸ ἴω 3 Ν 3 > A , \ ? Ἂ \ ¥ 
12 οὐκ ὀρθῶς. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐθὲν τρέφεται μὴ μετέχον ζωῆς, τὸ ἐμ- 
A Ὄ ν Ν 
ψυχον ἂν εἴη σῶμα τὸ τρεφόμενον, ἡ ἔμψυχον, ὥστε Kat 10 
ε ‘ . »"» , 5 \ 5 Ν ΄ ¥ 
13 ἡ τροφὴ πρὸς ἔμψυχόν ἐστι καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἔστι 
δ᾽ ἕτερον τροφῇ καὶ αὐξητικῷ εἶναι: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποσόν τι 
Ἀ » 3 ’ἤ Koy ‘ , A > id ,ἤ 
τὸ ἔμψυχον, αὐξητικόν, ἢ δὲ τόδε TL καὶ οὐσία, τροφή᾽ 
σώζει γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ μέχρι τούτον ἐστὶν ἕως ἂν 
τρέφηται" καὶ γενέσεως ποιητικόν, οὐ τοῦ τρεφομένου, ἀλλ᾽ 
a ‘ 7) »Ὰ ? 3 3 Δ ε > ‘a “A 3 
οἷον τὸ τρεφόμενον᾽ ἤδη γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, γεννᾷ ὃ 
S/N > A ε di 3 Ν 7 Ψ Ψ e A 7 ΤᾺ 
οὐθὲν αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, ἀλλὰ cole. ὠσθ᾽ ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη τῆς 
ῪΝᾺ 5 \ vd , 3 Ψ 4 Ν ¥ 9 \ i) 
ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν ola σώζειν τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν ἢ 
τοιοῦτον, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ παρασκευάζει ἐνεργεῖν. διὸ στερηθὲν 
A > ? Oy 3 “ x 5 ‘ ΄ Ν, ld 
14 τροφῆς ov δύναται εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τρία, τὸ τρεφόμενον 20 
A @ la ‘ Ν - \ \ , > A ς 
καὶ ᾧ τρέφεται καὶ τὸ τρέφον, τὸ μὲν τρέφον ἐστὶν ἡ 
, , \ Se , ν ἡ , A @ 
πρώτη ψυχή. TO O€ τρεφόμενον TO ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα, ᾧ 
x. 3 ε 4 3 Ν ‘ > Ἀ a) , Ψ 
15 δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ τροφή. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἅπαντα 
προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον, τέλος δὲ τὸ γεννῆσαι οἷον αὐτό, 


¥ «ἡ ¢ / ‘ ‘ Φ 5. 2 ¥ Ν ® ᾽ 
16 εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἷον αὐτό. ἔστι δὲ ᾧ τρέ. 25 


μι 


5 


f 9 N & ΝᾺ Α ξ ‘\ ‘ “ 
φεται διττόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ᾧ κυβερνᾷ, καὶ ἢ χεὶρ καὶ τὸ πη- 
δ A Ν 
δάλιον, τὸ μὲν κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον «μόνον». 


a 


416 Ὁ, 3. προσκρινόμενον in interpr. Them. Philop., προσγινόμενον etiam Soph. | 
11. πρὸς τὸ ἔμψ, Them. Simpl., post ἔμψυχον addendum ἢ ἔμψυχον aut καὶ delendum 
censet Susemihl || 12. τροφὴ E Soph. v. 1. (τροφῇ e codd. Elayduck 62, 6), τροφῇ etiam 
Them. || 14. ἂν καὶ τρέφηι TW, ἂν τρέφῃ E (Stapf.), ἂν τρέφηται P Soph., ἂν τρέφῃ y, 
vulgo ἂν καὶ τρέφηται || 15. γεννήσεως ES Soph., γενέσεως etiam Them. Philop. || post 
ποιητικόν virgulam posuit Torst. {| 16. αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ST VWX Soph., ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ 
Philop., αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία Ἐ Ὁ vet. transl. Bek. Trend., Them. interpretatur τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν, 
unc. incl. haec verba Torst. || 17. αὐτὸ om. ἘΞ (Trend.) εἰ TV W, leg. Philop. Soph. { 
18. ἔχον etiam Philop. Soph., δεχόμενον E Wy || 22. ταύτην TXy et E (Bus.) et, ut 
videtur, Them. 53, 19, αὐτὴν reliqui ante Biehlium omnes, etiam Philop. Soph. | 
23. ἐπεὶ δὲ...25. αὐτό collocanda esse ante 20 ἐπεὶ censet Torst., eodem loco, quo 
vulgata, haec verba legerunt Them. Philop. Soph. || 25. γεννητικὸν EST WX, 
γεννητικὴ etiam Soph. || rpépe Ty et, ut videtur, Them. 53, 26, τρέφεται etiam Soph. ἢ 


CH. 4 ΑΙΘΌ 1—416b 27 69 


the carpenter is not affected by his material, but on the contrary 
the material by the carpenter. The carpenter merely passes to 
activity from inaction. But it makes a difference whether by 
nutriment we mean the final, or the primary, form of what is 
added. If both are nutriment, the one as undigested, the other as 
digested, it will be possible to use the term nutriment in conformity 
with both theories. For, in so far as it is undigested, contrary is 
nourished by contrary: and, in so far as it is digested, like by like. 
So that clearly both sides are in a manner partly right and partly 
wrong. But, since nothing is nourished unless it possesses life, 
that which is nourished must be the animate body as such: so that 
nutriment also is relative to the animate being which it nourishes: 
and this not incidentally merely. 

There is, however, a difference between nutritivity and con- 
ducivity to growth. In so far as the animate thing is 
quantitative, what is taken promotes growth; in so far 
as it is a definite individual, what is taken nourishes. For the 
animate thing preserves its substance or essential nature and exists 
as long as it is nourished: and it causes the production, not of that 
which is nourished, but of another individual like it. Its essential 
nature already exists, and nothing generates itself, it only main- 
tains its existence. Hence the above described principle of the 
soul is the power to preserve in existence that which possesses it 
in so far as it is a definite individual, while nutrition prepares it 
for activity. Therefore it cannot live when deprived of nutriment. 
There are, then, these three things, that which is nourished, that 
with which it is nourished, and that which nourishes it. The last 
of the three is the primary soul, that which is nourished is the 
body which contains the soul, that wherewith it is nourished is 
nutriment. As, however, it is right to name all things from the 
end they subserve, and the end here is reproduction of the species, 
the primary soul is that which is capable of reproducing the 
species. That with which the living thing is nourished may be 
Vital heat understood in two senses, just as that with which one 
and nutri- steers may mean the hand or the rudder; the former, the 
ment hand, both causing motion and being moved, the latter, 


Growth. 


26. καὶ ante ᾧ om. SUWX || καὶ ἡ χεὶρ EVy, καὶ om. reliqui et scripti et ante 
Biehlium impressi omnes, leg. Simpl. et sine dubio Them., qui interpretatur τῇ 
τε χειρὶ καὶ || 27. κινούμενον <pdvov>] κινούμενον E sine rasura (Trend.) Rodier, 
reliqui codd. κινοῦν μόνον, etiam Simtpl. Alex., teste Philopono, vet. transl., Bek. Trend. 
Torst., κιγούμενον μόνον, ut videtur, Them. 53, 30 8qq., κινούμενον μόνον interpretatur 
Philop., κινούμενον μόνως Soph., κινούμενον μόνον defendit etiam Dittenberger p. 1613. 


It 


16 


7ο DE ANIMA II CHS. 4, 5 


ΜᾺ 4 5 - 
πᾶσαν δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον τροφὴν δύνασθαι πέττεσθαι, ἐργάζεται 
\ “Ὁ ¥ ¥ ? 
δὲ τὴν πέψιν τὸ Oeppov: διὸ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἔχει θερμότητα. 
» » 3 
τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ἡ τροφὴ τί ἐστιν εἴρηται: διασαφητέον δ᾽ 30 
A ~ 3 Δ ? 
ἐστὶν ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις λόγοις. 
al ‘ - > 
5 δΔιωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγωμεν κοινῇ περὶ πάσης αἰ- 
“~ ΜᾺ a “ ᾽ 
σθήσεως. ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν 
, 7 » . ὃ ΜᾺ ‘ AX , ? ον 
συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴρηται' δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀλλοίωσίς rus εἷ- 
A / 
vat. φασὶ δέ τινες Kat τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχειν. 35 
A Q A \ a ὃ , 3. 4 3 a Abr 
τοῦτο δὲ πῶς δυνατὸν ἢ ἀδύνατον, εἰρήκαμεν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου 417A 
~ ΜᾺ > / “ cd 

2 λόγοις περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν διὰ τί 

‘ an 3 , 7 A > [4 » θ ‘ ὃ Ν / 
καὶ Tov αἰσθήσεων αὐτῶν ov γίνεται αἴσθησις, Kat διὰ τί 

A ΜᾺ » \ ~ ‘ 
ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω ov ποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, ἐνόντος πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ 
A ΕἾ 4 ® 3 \ ε 3» θ θ᾽ {ΠΝ Δ ‘ 
Tov ἄλλων στοιχείων, ὧν ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσθησις καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἢ τὰ: 
f , on Ss Ψ Ν 5 θ \ > ¥ 

συμβεβηκότα τούτοις. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν 
3 rd 9 Ν ὃ , / ὃ ‘ A / \ \ > 
ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλα δυνάμει μόνον. διὸ καθάπερ τὸ κανστὸν οὗ 
καίεται αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἄνευ τοῦ καυστικοῦ! ἔκαιε γὰρ ἂν 
δ ? ‘ 3 Δλὰ 3 μω ~ 53 * Ν » > ~ 
ἑαυτό, καὶ οὐθὲν édetro τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ πυρὸς ὄντος. ἐπειδὴ 
δὲ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγομεν διχῶς (τό τε γὰρ δυνάμει ἀκοῦον 10 
καὶ ὁρῶν ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν λέγομεν, κἂν τύχῃ καθεῦδον, καὶ 
. ἋΚῪ 9 A κ᾿ a , \ ε ¥ e \ 
τὸ ἤδη ἐνεργοῦν), διχῶς ἂν λέγοιτο καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ἡ μὲν 
ε 4 € \ ε 3 ’ ε 7 δὲ ‘ Ν 2 [ᾳ 
ὧς δυνάμει, ἡ δὲ ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνε- 

3 σθαι, τό τε δυνάμει ὃν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς 
τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν 15 
λέγωμεν: καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελὴς μώ- 
τοι, καθάπερ ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται. πάντα δὲ πάσχει καὶ κινεῦται 
ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος. διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὧς ὑπὸ τοῦ 
ὁμοίου πάσχει, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου, καθάπερ εἴπο.-. 
μεν" πάσχει μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, πεπονθὸς δ᾽ ὅμοιόν ἔστιν. 20 

82. λέγομεν VWX Them. Soph., λέγωμεν etiam Alex. ἀπ. καὶ No. 82, 23 || 33- rej 
τι STWX et sine dubio Them. Simpl. Marchl, Arist. Tierseele, De 17, 3» TL TO 
αἰσθητήριον V, Alex. variat, 1. 1. p. 82, 27 et 86, 20 τι, sed p- 86, 5 τε ll 4178» 1. εἴρηται 
V, εἴρηται μὲν Simpl. Philop. ad hunc locum et Alex. ap. Philop., εἴρηται μὲν καὶ S et κα 
417 a, 14. Philop., εἰρήκαμεν καὶ T WX, reliqui εἰρήκαμεν, etiam, ut videtur, Soph. 63, 23 {] 
καὶ ἐν STU WX Il 2. post πάσχειν Alex. ap. Philop. tradit ferri etiam lectionem : 
λεκτέον δὲ καὶ νῦν, quod additamentum fort. leg. et Them. et Soph., non leg. Simpl. 
Philop. || 3. οὐ post 2. τ SUX ῃ 4. αἰσθήσεις SUX || 7. διὸ om. VW, leg. Philop. ack 
417 Ὁ, 16. || καθάπερ] καὶ καθάπερ U, οὐκ αἰσθάνεται καθάπερ TX, καθάπερ οὐκ alo θάν «τας 
S || 8. καθ᾽ ἑαντὸ E Torst., ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ S Them., ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ U V, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ etiam Soph. {} 


9. αὑτό UX || το. τὸ αἰσθανόμενον Soph. || ἀκοῦον καὶ ὁρῶν omnes codd., etiam E 
(Trend. et, Torstrikio teste, Bek.) || 13. δύναμις et ἐνέργεια P || ὁμοίως... 14. ἐνεργείᾳ, que 


CHS. 4, 5 416 b 28—417 a 20 71 


the rudder, being simply moved. Now it is necessary that all food 
should be capable of digestion, and digestion is promoted by heat ; 
this explains why every animate thing has warmth. This, then, 
is an outline of what nutriment is. It must be more clearly 
defined hereafter in the discussion devoted specially to it. 


Now that these points have been determined, let us proceed 5 


to a general discussion of all sensation. As above 
remarked, sensation consists in being moved and acted 
upon, for it is held to be a species of qualitative change. Some 
add that like is in fact acted upon by like. How far this is 
possible or impossible we have explained in the general discussion 


Sensation. 


of action and passivity. The question arises why there is no 2 


sensation of the senses themselves: that is, why they produce no 
sensation apart from external sensibles, though the senses contain 
fire, earth and the other elements, which are the objects of sensation 
either in themselves or through their attributes. Evidently it 
Sensation follows that the faculty of sensible perception exists not 
fal ae in activity, but only in potentiality. Hence it must be 
tual. here as with the fuel which does not burn of and in 
itself without something to make it burn; otherwise it would 
kindle itself and would have no need of the fire which is actually 
existent. Now to have sensation has two meanings: we use the 
terms hearing and ‘seeing “of that which has the capacity to hear 
and see, even though it be at the time asleep, just as we do of 
that which already actually hears and sees. And therefore sensa- 
tion, too, will have two meanings: it may mean either potential 
or actual sensation. Similarly with having sensation, whether 
potential or actual. 


Let us then first proceed on the assumption that to be acted 3 


Agent ana Upon or moved is identical with active operation. For 
patient. movement is in fact active operation of some sort, 
though incomplete, as we have elsewhere explained. But in 
every case things are acted upon and moved by an agent in 
actual operation. It follows that in one sense what is acted upon 
is acted upon by what is like it, in another sense by what is unlike 
it, as we have explained. That is to say, while being acted upon it 
is unlike, after it has been ‘acted upon it is like the agent. 

Trend. suspecta videntur, unc. incluserunt Biehl Rodier, αἰσθητόν pro αἰσθάνεσθαι scripsit 
Torst. ex Alex. ἀπ. καὶ Nic. 83, 6, probat Brentano, die Psych. des Arist. 141, recepit etiam 
Rodier, totum hunc locum leg. etiam Them. Philop. vet. transl., defendit Barco, Aristotele, 
dell’ anima vegetativa e.sensitiva p. 43 || 15. post πάσχειν addendum re censet Susemihl || 


τοῦ ante ἐνεργεῖν om. EV Wy Philop. Soph. || τό. λέγομεν STU WX y Simpl. Philop. 
Soph. || 17. wdvra,..20. ἔστιν secludenda censet Susemihl. 


! 


; 


, 
\ 


72 DE ANIMA II CH. 5 


4 διαιρετέον δὲ Kat περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας" νῦν 
γὰρ ἁπλῶς λέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐπι- 
ε 
στῆμόν τι ὡς ἂν εἴποιμεν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιστήμονα, ὅτι ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ ἐχόντων ἐπιστήμην" ἔστι δ᾽ 
Ξ ‘ 
as ἤδη λέγομεν ἐπιστήμονα τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν γραμματικήν" 5 2 
ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δυνατός ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ὁ μὲν ὅτι τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ 7 ὕλη, ὁ δ᾽ ὅτι βουληθεὶς 
δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν, ἂν μή τι κωλύσῃ τῶν ἔξωθεν: ὁ δ᾽ ἤδη 
᾿ a 2 , Ὁ Ν , > , “ \ 
θεωρῶν, ἐντελεχείᾳ ὧν Kal κυρίως ἐπιστάμενος τόδε TO A. 
ἀμφότεροι μὲν οὖν οἱ πρῶτοι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστήμονες, 30 
ἀλλ: ὁ μὲν διὰ μαθήσεως ἀλλοιωθεὶς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξ 
» 
ἐναντίας μεταβαλὼν ἔξεως, ὁ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν 
~ ΝᾺ 4 
ἢ τὴν γραμματικήν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δ᾽ εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἄλλον 417b 
4 3 ¥ 3 € ων > A Ν ᾽ 3 Ν Ν ‘\ 
5 τρόπον. οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ TO πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ TO μὲν 
φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίον, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ δυνά- 
¥ ε Ν, ~ 3 if ¥ Ν ε ’ Ψ € , 
μει ὄντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύ- 
vapus ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν: θεωροῦν γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ἔχον 5 
Ἁ 9 ? y “Ὁ, 3 ¥ 2 ~ 3 > \ Ν ¢ 
τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (Eis αὐτὸ yap ἡ 
> » ‘ > 3 , λ sd δ 3 ? 
ἐπίδοσις καὶ eis ἐντελέχειαν) ἢ ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιώσεως. 
διὸ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέ 5 UY, ὃ ), ἀλλοιοῦ 
ς ἔχει λέγειν τὸ φρονοῦν, ὁταν Ppovy, ἀλλοιοῦ- 
ν 3Q\ \ 3 ’ Ψ 3 “ \ % > 
σθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ TOV οἰκοδόμον ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν 
εἰς ἐντελέχειαν ἄγον ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος κατὰ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ το 
~ > 7 9 3 c 6 6f > [4 ¥ a 
φρονοῦν ov διδασκαλίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν δί- 
καιον: τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος μανθάνον καὶ λαμβάνον ἐπι- 
é € Ν ΜᾺ 9 ’, » Ν Ξε 9 ‘ 
στήμην ὑπὸ TOU ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος Kal διδασκαλικοῦ ἤτοι οὐδὲ 


21. νῦν μὲν γὰρ TW, μὲν om. Soph., οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς coni. Roeper in Philol. ΝΠ, 
Ῥ. 238 || 22. ἐλέγομεν coni. Torst., λέγομεν etiam Philop. Soph. || 23. εἴπωμεν 
ETUVWy, εἴποιμεν etiam Soph. || 24. καὶ τῶν ἐχ. SUX || 25. ἤδη hoc loco 
positum suspectum videtur Torst., defendit Wahlen, Arist. Aufsiitze II, p. 26 | 
26. éxdrepos...28. ἔξωθεν in parenth. Torst., quod vituperat Vahlen 1. 1. || 27. om. ἡ 
Simpl. 121, 19, leg. etiam Philop. Soph. || 28. κωλύῃ Simpl., κωλύσῃ etiam Philop. | 
τρίτος δ᾽ ὁ ἤδη e Soph. scripsit Torst., τρίτος δ᾽ habet etiam Them., sed haud dubie 
per interpretamentum, vulgatam defendit Vahlen 1. 1. || 29. post θεωρῶν virgulam 
Torst. || ἄλφα literis scriptum E (Trend.) |} 30. πρῶτοι unc. incl. Torst., tuentur 
Simpl. Soph. et sine dubio Them. 55, 24 || Torst. coni. ἀμφότεροι μὲν οὖν οἱ κατὰ 
δύναμιν ἐπιστήμονες ἐνεργείᾳ γίνονται ἐπιστήμονες, ἀλλ᾽, tuetur vulgatam etiam Soph. ἢ} 
82. pro αἴσθησιν coni. Torst. ἀριθμητικὴν, quod re vera habet Them., αἴσθησιν leg. 
Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 417 Ὁ, 4. virgulam post ὁμοίου (Bek. Trend.) delevit Torst. || 
5. γὰρ tuentur praeter omnes codd. Them. Simpl. Philop. Alex. ἀπ, καὶ λύσ. 80, 4. 
81, 11. 84, 7 || 6. τὴν om. SX Alex. 80, 4, leg. Them. Philop. Alex. 81, rr. 84, 7 | 
ἑαυτὸ X Soph., αὑτὸ Trend., probat Beare, Greek Theories, p. 234, adn. 2, αὐτὸ leg. 


CH. 5 417 a 21---417 Ὁ 13 73 


We must also draw a distinction in regard to the terms 4 
potentiality and actuality: at present we are using them without 
Twomean- qUalification. For instance, we may use the term wise, 


i f > - Φ . 
poten. firstly, in the sense in which we might speak of man 
tality as wise, because man is one of the genus of beings 


which are wise and have wisdom; secondly, in the sense in 
which we at once call the man wise who has learnt, say, 
grammar. Now of these two men each possesses the capacity, but 
in a different sense: the one because the genus to which he 
belongs, that is to say, his matter, is potentially wise; the other 
because he is capable, if he chose, of applying the wisdom he has 
acquired, provided there is nothing external to hinder. Whereas 
he who is at the moment exercising his wisdom is in actuality and 
is wise in the proper sense of the term: for example, he knows the 
A before him. Thus the first two are both potentially wise: the 
first becomes wise actually after he has undergone qualitative 
change through instruction and often after transition from the 
reverse condition; while in the latter case it is by another kind 
of transition that the man passes from the mere possession, with- 
out the use, of sensation or grammar to the use of it. 

To suffer or be acted upon, too, is a term of more than one 5 
meaning. Sometimes it means a sort of destruction by the 
and of contrary, sometimes it is rather a preservation of what 
beingacted is potentially existent by what is actually existent and 
“pew like it, so far as likeness holds of potentiality when 
compared with actuality. For it is by exercise of knowledge that 
the possessor of knowledge becomes such in actuality: and this 
either is no qualitative change (for the thing develops into its own 
nature and actuality), or else is qualitative change of a different sort. 
Hence it is not right to say that that which thinks undergoes 
change when it thinks, any more than that the builder undergoes 
change when he builds. That, then, which works the change from 
potential existence to actuality in a thinking and intelligent being 
should properly receive a different name and not be called in- 
struction : while that which learns and is brought from potential to 
actual knowledge by that which is in actuality and capable of 
instructing should either not be said to suffer or be acted upon at 


Simpl. Philop. Them. 55, 38. 28, 30. Alex. 81, 12. 84, τὸ || 9. τὸ μὲν...11. δίκαιον suspecta 
videntur Hayduckio, progr. Meldorf 1877, p. 11 || 10. Torst., cui assentitur Susemihl, 
coni. ἄγειν, leg. ἄγον Alex. 81, 15 et, ut videtur, Philop. 304, 6. 306, 2 || κατὰ unc. 
incl. Torst., leg. Alex. 81, 15 || 12. ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος unc. incl. Torst., tuentur Philop. 
Soph. Them. 28, 29 sq. || 13. Hayduck 1. 1. legendum esse censet: οὐδὲ τοῦτο πάσχειν. 


74 DE ANIMA II CHS. 5, 6 


» A A ’ > 9 
πάσχειν φατέον, [ὥσπερ εἴρηται,] ἢ δύο τρόπους εἶναι ἀλ- 
᾿ , Ν 
λοιώσεως, τήν τε ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν 
Ἀ \ > \ Ν Ψ \ Ν , “A δ᾽ 3 θ m e€ ‘ 
6 καὶ THY ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις Kal THY φύσιν. τοῦ δ᾽ αἰσθητικοῦ ἡ μεν 
Ν ~ ao [τὰ 4 
πρώτη μεταβολὴ γίνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννῶντος, ὅταν δὲ yev- 
~ δ A 
νηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. καὶ 
ἴω a , 
τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν δὲ ὁμοίως λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν: διαφέρει 
ἴω ΜᾺ ’ »Ὰ᾽ ‘\ € Ν 
δέ, ὅτι τοῦ μὲν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔξωθεν, TO ὁρατον 20 
‘ \ 3 , e , δὲ Ν ν᾿ λ ον ω 3 θ “ 
καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. 
» > ¢ ~ » εχ ε > 5 2 »ν θ ε 
αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡ Kar ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ 
A A 3 9. A , 9 an 
δ᾽ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου: ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ πώς ἐστι TH 
» Ἁ “N ‘ 39 3 > OA ε 7 ᾽’ > - 
ψυχῇ. διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθά- 
9 3 3 3 3 “ > Ἂ ‘\ ε - A 3 θ 
νεσθαι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ" ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἰσθη- 25 
ἴσω “~ “~~ ~ 3 
τόν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει κἄν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς τῶν αἱ- 
ων Ά Ν \ > AN > 7 “4 ‘“ > ‘ ΝᾺ 3 
σθητῶν, καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὰ αἰσθητὰ τῶν καθ 


μὰ 


5 


ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διασα- 

» φῆσαι καιρὸς γένοιτ᾽ ἂν καὶ εἰσαῦθις. νῦν δὲ διωρίσθω 
τοσοῦτον, ὅτι οὐχ ἅπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει λεγομένου, 30 
3 Ν [οὶ Ν Y a ¥ \ τὸ ὃ ; θ 
ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰποιμὲν τὸν Tala ὀύνασθαι 
στρατηγεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ὡς τὸν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντα, οὕτως ἔχει τὸ 
αἰσθητικόν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀνώνυμος αὐτῶν ἡ διαφορά, διώρισται 4188 
δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ὅτι ἕτερα καὶ πῶς ἕτερα, χρῆσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τῷ 

, ‘ 3 ΜᾺ € a > # Ν 3 > 
πάσχειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ὡς κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν. τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθη- 

\ 5 4 > Ν Ὄ \ > Ἁ ¥ 3 - , 
τικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, καθά- 
TEP εἴρηται. πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ᾽ 5 
ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο. 

6 Δεκτέον δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν 
πρῶτον. λέγεται δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τριχῶς, ὧν δύο μὲν Kal! 

ε ’ 
αὑτά φαμεν αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἐν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. τῶν 
δὲ ὃ 4 δ ‘ Lo ’ 3 ε a > a ‘ ‘\ ‘ 

€ OVO TO μὲν LOLOY ἐστιν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν το 

ΡΜᾺ 3 
“πασῶν. λέγω δ᾽ ἴδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει 

3 , \ ~ 
αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι (οἷον 

14. ὥσπερ εἴρηται praeeunte Hayduckio unc. incl. Biehl, om. SUX Alex. 84, 26 
Them. Philop., leg. quidem Soph., fort. post # transponenda censet Susemihl | 
18. kal post alc. om. EU, καὶ τὸ om. V, leg. καὶ τὸ Simpl. Philop. Alex. 85, 3 || 
19. δὲ om. SV, post ὁμοίως ponit E, κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν δὲ leg. etiam Philop. Alex. 85, 4 ll 
24. ὅταν V WX Soph. || 31. εἴπωμεν SUX, εἴποιμεν etiam Soph. || 418 a, 2. τὸ T et E 
(Trend.) || 3. δ᾽ om. ES, τὸ δὲ Soph. || 4. καθάπερ εἴρηται ante 6. ἔστιν transponenda 


censet Essen || 8. δυοῖν SUX || 11. pro πασῶν et 19. πάσαις Schieboldt, De imag. p- 15, 
coni. πλειόνων et πλείοσιν || 12. οἷον...14. διαφοράς in parenth. posui. 


CHS. 5, 6 417 Ὁ 14—418 a 12 75 


all, or else two modes of change should be assumed, one to the 
negative states and the other to the normal habits and the true 
nature. 

In the sensitive subject the first change is due to the6 
parent: once generated it possesses sensation exactly in the same 
sense as we possess knowledge. And to have actual sensation 
Actual corresponds to exercise of knowledge. There is this 
sensation —=_ difference, however, that in the one case the causes of 
tioned by the activity are external: as, for instance, the objects of 
ternal sight, hearing and the other senses. The reason is 
sensible. that actual sensation is always of particulars, while 
knowledge is of universals: and these universals are, in a manner, 
in the soul itself. Hence it is in our power to think whenever we 
please, but sensation is not in our power: for the presence of the 
sensible object is necessary. It is much the same with the sciences 
which deal with sensible objects; and for the same reason, namely, 
that sensibles are particulars and are external. 

But we shall have a further opportunity of making this clear 
hereafter. For the present let us be content to have established 7 
that of the two meanings of potentiality, the one according to 
which a child might be called potentially a general, and the other 
according to which a man of full age might be so called, it is the 
latter which applies to the faculty of sense-perception. But as this 
distinction has no word to mark it, although the fact and the 
nature of the distinction have been established, we are compelled 
to use the terms to suffer or be acted upon and to be qualitatively 
changed as if they were the proper terms. Now, as has been 
ΜΕ explained, the sensitive faculty is potentially such as the 
tion of sensible object is in actuality. While it is being acted 
chiectin upon, it is not yet similar, but, when once it has been 
actuation, acted upon, it is assimilated and has the same character 

as the sensible object. 

In considering each separate sense we must first treat of their 6 
Thesensi.  rsJects. By the sensible object may be meant any one 
ble object: of three things, two of which we say are perceived in 
atucewea themselves or directly, while the third is perceived 


perceived 


(a) by whe per accidens or indirectly. Of the first two the one is 
several the special object of a particular sense, the other an 


object common to all the senses. By a special object of 2 
a particular sense I mean that which cannot be perceived by any 
other sense and in respect to which deception is impossible; for 


76 DE ANIMA II CHS. 6, 7 


ἈΝ ΜᾺ “~ e 
ὄψις χρώματος Kal ἀκοὴ ψόφου Kal γεῦσις χυμον, ἢ 
3 » e / ΄ 
δ᾽ ἁφὴ πλείους μὲν ἔχει διαφοράς), ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστη γε Κρίνει 
κι Y A 5» ¢ , 
περὶ τούτων, Kal οὐκ ἀπατᾶται ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ᾽ ὁτι ψόφος, 
ἴω A I Ν ΡᾺ jx o~ \ 
3 ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρωσμένον ἣ ποῦ, ἢ τί TO ψοφοῦν ἢ που. τὰ 
’ὔ Ν Ν ’ 3 
μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἑκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἦρε- 
Ὺ Ν Ν ~ 9 “~ 
pla, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος" τὰ yap τοιαῦτα οὐδεμιᾶς 
3 Ἀ ¥ 3 Ν Ν ? Ἁ Ν ε ἰοὺ , a , 
ἐστὶν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις. καὶ yap apy κίνησίς Tis 
δ Ν - 3 
4 ἐστιν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὄψει. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἱ- 
a Ὄ 9 Ν Ν ¥ »ἤ ce? Ν 
σθητόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν εἴη Διάρους υἱός: κατὰ συμβε- 
\ \. , 3 , Ψ a A , 
βηκὸς yap τούτον αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε 
᾿ a a ΩΝ o~ Ν ~ 
τοῦτο οὗ αἰσθάνεται. διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν πάσχει ἢ τοιοῦτον ὕπο TOU 
ΕῚ A“ Pr \ 5 e A > ~ , -»¥ ? > \ 
αἰσθητοῦ. τῶν δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ αἰσθητῶν τὰ ἴδια κυρίως ἐστὶν 
3 / Ἁ \ a ε 3 [4 ’ ξ [4 3 a 
αἰσθητά, καὶ πρὸς a ἡ οὐσία πέφυκεν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως. %5 
7 O8 μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁρατόν. ὁρατὸν δ᾽ 
3 Ν ω ? αν ἃ va \ ἂν 3 ΓᾺ 5 - δὲ 
ἐστὶ χρῶμα μέν, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ 
“ + on de » a - ~ 2 
τυγχάνει ὄν' δῆλον δὲ ἔσται ὃ λέγομεν προελθοῦσι μά- 
λιστα. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ 
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ: καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ οὐ τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐν 30 


γῇ 


5 


to 
oO 


ἑαυτῷ ἔχει TO αἴτιον Tov εἶναι ὁρατόν. πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα κινη- 
4 3 a 9.5. 92 ἰδὶ ‘\ mn fs ¥ b J 1 
τικόν ἐστι τοῦ Kar ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, καὶ TOUT ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ 4180 
7 7 3 € Ν id » 3 Ν ων \ oe Ud 
φύσις. διόπερ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ πᾶν TO ἑκάστου 
A 3 N cla \ \ \ A , ΄ 
χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶται. διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρῶτον λεκτέον τί 
2 ἐστιν. ἔστι δή τι διαφανές. διαφανὲς δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔστι μὲν 
ε / > 3 ¢ Ν δὲ ε Ν € € a > ~ 3 ‘ ? 
ὁρατόν, ov καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι 5 
3 , A“ a 43> La \ & Ἂ ‘ 
ἀλλότριον χρῶμα. τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πολλὰ 
τῶν στερεῶν: οὐ γὰρ 7 ὕδωρ οὐδ᾽ ἣ ἀήρ, διαφανές, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι 


13. post χυμοῦ vulg. punct. || 13. ἡ...14. διαφοράς in parenth. ponenda censet Susemihl {} 
14. post διαφοράς vulg. colon, post διαφοράς signum orationis imperfectae ponit Torst., cui 
adversatur Barco || ante ἑκάστη addendum ὡς censet Essen {ἕκαστον P || 17. ἑκάστης 
W Soph. 7o, 33, de Them. 57, 36 non liquet, ἑκάστη X, vulgatam defendit Barco || 
19. πάσαις om. Ὁ X et pr. S, πάντων το. 5, πασῶν videtur legisse Philop. 315, τὸ || γὰρ 
ἡ ἁφῇ E (Bhl.) || 20. ὄψει] γεύσει coni. Steinhart || post ὄψει editi ante Bekkerum omnes, 
ut videtur: καθ᾽ αὑτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ ταῦτα, quae legit etiam Soph. |] 21. διάρρους 
υἱὸς E'T Soph. v. 1. (Διάρους υἱὸς e codd. Hayduck 71, 4), διάρρου υἱὸς Ψ, υἱὸς om. ὟΝ, 
Διάρους vids Simpl., et Διάρους υἱὸς et Διάρης Them., Διάρης Philop., qui in nonnullis 
ἀντυγράφοις etiam scripturam esse Διάρους υἱὸς commemorat || 23. οὗ αἰσθάνεται ante 
22. συμβέβηκε transponenda censet Essen || xatom.S UV || ἦ οτὰ. SU X, tuentur et καὶ 
et 7 Them. Soph. || 26. ἡ om. SU || 27. μέν post χρῶμα EW Biehl Rodier, re το] αἱ 
omnes, etiam Philop. Simpl. || 28. προελθοῦσι: μάλιστα γὰρ coni. Essen II, 42 | 
μάλιστα om. 5 U X, leg. Soph. || 29. rofro...31. ὁρατόν unc. includenda censet Susemihl |{ 
29, 30. τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατῶν TW et E, (Bus.), τοῦ.. ὁρατοῦ etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph. || 


CHS. 6, 7 418 a 13—418b 7 77 


example, sight is of colour, hearing of sound and taste of flavour, 
while touch no doubt has for its object several varieties. But at 
any rate each single sense judges of its proper objects and is not 
deceived as to the fact that there is a colour or a sound; though as to 
what or where the coloured object is or what or where the object is 
which produces the sound, mistake is possible. Such then, are the 3 
special objects of the several senses. By common sensibles are 


or (2) by meant motion, rest, number, figure, size: for such 
phe senses qualities are not the special objects of any single sense, 
mon. but are common to all. For example, a particular motion 


can be perceived by touch as well as by sight. What is meant 4 
by the indirect object of sense may be illustrated if we 


The thi . . . . 
which have suppose that the white thing before you is Diares’ son. 
the attri- . : ἢ : ᾿ . 

butes are You perceive Diares’ son, but indirectly, for that which 


πύλην ιων ἢ you perceive is accessory to the whiteness. Hence you 

are not affected by the indirect sensible as such. Of the 
two classes of sensibles directly perceived it is the objects special 
to the different senses which are properly perceptible: and it is 
to these that the essential character of each sense is naturally 
adapted. 

The object, then, of sight is the visible: what is visible is colour 7 
Sightana and something besides which can be described, though 
colour. it has no name. What we mean will best be made clear 
as we proceed. The visible, then, is colour. Now colour is that 
with which what is visible in itself is overlaid: and, when I say 
in itself, I do not mean what is visible by its essence or form, but 
what is visible because it contains within itself the cause of 
visibility, namely, colour. But colour is universally capable of 
exciting change in the actually transparent, that is, in light; this 
being, in fact, the true nature of colour. Hence colour is not 
visible without light, but the colour of each object is always seen 
in light. And so we shall have first to explain what light is. 

There is, then, we assume, something transparent; and by this 2 
The I mean that which, though visible, is not properly 
medium. sneaking, visible in itself, but by reason of extrinsic 
colour. Air, water and many solid bodies answer to this de- 
scription. For they are not transparent gud air or gud water, 
31. αὑτῶ X, αὐτῷ ὌΝ, éaurg videntur legisse Them. 58, 31 Philop. 320, 18 || post χρῶμα 
add. ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔχει et κινητικόν...Ὁ, 1. διαφανοῦς unc. incl. Essen || 418 b, 2. πάντως 
ἕκαστον SUX Them. et fort. Simpl., πᾶν τὸ éxdorov etiam Soph. || 3. ὁρᾶται ET y 
Soph. Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes ὁρατόν || 6. χρῶμα deleri vult Siebeck, Philolog. 


XL, p. 347, probat Susemihl, xp. leg. etiam Theoph. ap. Prisc. 7, 28 || 7- post στερεῶν 
add. οἷον ὕελος κρύσταλλος T et margo U, similia in paraphr. Them. Philop. Soph. 


78 DE ANIMA II CH. 7 


ε > AN > , 9 Ν 
ἐστὶ φύσις ὑπάρχουσα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις καὶ 
~ oe ~ ’ ἰω 4 3 ε 7 > - 
ἐν τῷ ἀϊδίῳ τῷ ἄνω σώματι. φῶς δέ ἐστιν 7 τούτου ἐνέργεια, 
ς »-"Ψ , \ 59 ® ma > 5 ‘\ Ν μ᾿ 
τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἢ διαφανές. δυνάμει δὲ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τὸ 
ἴω “ν ῪᾺ vd 3  Ἂ A“ > 
σκότος. τὸ δὲ φῶς οἷον χρῶμά ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ἢ 
\ ε \ ‘ aA , ® XN 
ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου οἷον TO ἄνω 
ε , a Ν 53. / ΄ \ > 
σῶμα: Kal yap τούτῳ TL ὑπάρχει ἕν καὶ ταὐτόν. τί μὲν οὖν 
A ¥ Ψ ¥ ΄Ὰ »239 
τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τί τὸ φῶς, εἴρηται, ὅτι OVTE πῦρ OVH ὅλως 
7 3 / ¥ Ν jh ΓᾺ , ‘\ . 
σῶμα οὐδ᾽ ἀπορροὴ σώματος οὐδενός (εἴη yap ἂν σῶμά τι καὶ 15 
Ν / 3 “~ 
οὕτως), GANG πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφα- 
Νὰ > A 
νεῖ: οὐδὲ yap δύο σώματα ἅμα δυνατὸν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι: 
lan ~ / ¥ \ Ν / 
3 δοκεῖ Te τὸ φῶς ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ σκότει" ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος 
ΤᾺ A 9 “A Y 
στέρησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι 
a Ἁ 3 3 ~ 5 , 
καὶ ἡ τούτου παρουσία τὸ φῶς ἐστίν. Kat οὐκ ὀρθῶς Ἔμπε- 20 
A y ¥ ε , σι 
δοκλῆς, οὐδ᾽ εἴ τις ἄλλος οὕτως εἴρηκεν, ὡς φερομένον τοῦ 
A Ἃ a a Ν ΝᾺ 
φωτὸς καὶ γιγνομένου ποτὲ μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ περι- 
“A ~ / 3 Ἃ δὴ 
έχοντος, ἡμᾶς δὲ λανθάνοντος: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καὶ παρὰ 
/ + 
τὴν τοῦ λόγον ἐνάργειαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα: ἐν μι- 
A ὃ > 59 A > 9 \ 
κρῷ μὲν yap διαστήματι λάθοι av, am ἀνατολῆς δ᾽ ἐπὶ 25 
’ . 4 ¥y ‘ ra 
4 δυσμὰς τὸ λανθάνειν μέγα λίαν τὸ αἴτημα. ἔστι δὲ xpd- 
y c4 ‘ \ ¥ 
ματος μὲν δεκτικὸν τὸ ἄχρουν, ψόφου δὲ τὸ ἄψοφον. 
ϑ, 3 9 A SX ὃ \ XN A 9. ἢ A A sr 
ἄχρουν δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον ἢ τὸ μόλις 
“Ἂ a’ Q 
ὁρώμενον, οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ σκοτεινόν. τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ διαφανὲς 
> F 
μέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅταν ἢ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανές, GAN ὅταν Sv- 30 
᾽ὔ € ‘\ 3 Ἁ 4 £ ἢ Ἁ ‘a ε Ν δὲ “ 
paper’ ἢ γὰρ αὐτὴ φύσις ὁτὲ μὲν σκότος ὁτὲ δὲ φῶς 
ἐστίν. ov πάντα δὲ ὁρατὰ ἐν φωτί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἑκάστου 419a 
τὸ οἰκεῖον χρῶμα: ἔνια γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ φωτὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται, 
3 de ~ / A » θ ® Ν, ἠὃ ή 
ἐν 0€ τῷ σκότει ποιεῖ αἰσθησιν, οἷον τὰ πυρώδη φαινόμενα 
Ν , > F δ᾽ 3 \ a εν". 29 » i 
καὶ λάμποντα (ἀνώνυμα ἐστί ταῦτα ἑνὶ ὀνόματι), οἷον 
8, ἐστί τις φύσις UX Them. Simpl. Soph. Torst., om. τις reliqui || ἐνυπάρχουσα 
SU VX Them. Bek. Trend. || cat...9. σώματι unc. includenda censet Susemih] | 9. Virgulam 
post évépy. om. Bek. Trend., ἐνέργεια καὶ τοῦ διαφανοῦς coni. Trend. || το. virgulam post ἐστὶ 
Bek., post d¢Torst., δυνάμει δὲ καὶ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστί, τὸ σκότος coni. Steinhart || xz. Jom.E ἢ} 
12. 4...13- ταὐτόν unc. includenda censent Susemihl et Essen II, 43 || 14. εἴρηται καὶ τί τὸ 
φῶς V, similiter in paraphr. Them. || 15. post σῶμα transferenda esse, quae nunc 
17. leguntur, ita: σῶμα (οὐδὲ γὰρ... εἶναι), οὐδ᾽ ἀπορροὴ censet Torst., eundem, quem 
vulgata, ordinem servant Them. Simpl. Philop. || οὔτε TV W, οὐδὲ etiam Them. || 16. ἢ 
τοιούτου τινὸς unc. includenda censet Susemihl || 18. re] δὲ TU VX Bek. Trend. || σκότω 
ES || ὁ TU, om. V || 20. τὸ φῶς ἡ τούτον παρουσία SU X, vulgatam tuetur Them. | 


22. τεινομένον EV et vet. transl. Stapfer, Krit. Stud. p- τό Biehl Rodier, vulgo γιγνομένου, 
etiam Them. 60, 28 Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokr. Ρ. 170, 38 || ποτὲ] πρότερον als τὸ 


CH. 7 418 Ὁ 8---4108 4 70 


but because there is a certain natural attribute present in both 
of them which is present also in the eternal body on high. Light 
is the actuality of this transparent gud transparent. But where 
the transparent is only potentially present, there darkness is 
actually. Light is a sort of colour in the transparent when 
made transparent in actuality by the agency of fire or something 
resembling the celestial body: for this body also has an attribute 
which is one and the same with that of fre. What the transparent 
Lightnot 1s, and what light is, has now been stated ; namely, that 
corporeal. + it is neither fire nor body generally nor an effluence from 
any body (for even then it would still be a sort of body), but the 
presence of fire or something fiery in the transparent. For it 
is impossible for two bodies to occupy the same space at the 
same time. 

Light is held to be contrary to darkness. But darkness 3 
is absence from the transparent of the quality above described: 
so that plainly light is the presence of it. Thus Empedocles and 
whe velo. Others who propounded the same view are wrong when 
cityoflight they represent light as moving in space and arriving 
neredibie- at a given point of time between the earth and that 
which surrounds it without our perceiving its motion. For this 
contradicts not only the clear evidence of reason, but also the facts 
of observation: since, though a movement of light might elude 
observation within a short distance, that it should do so all the 
way from east to west is too much to assume. 

It is that which is colourless which is receptive of colour, as 4 
it is that which is soundless which is receptive of sound. And 
the transparent is colourless, and so is the invisible or the dimly 
visible which is our idea of the dark. Such is the transparent 
medium, not indeed when it is in actuality, but when potentially 
transparent. For it is the same natural attribute which is at one 
time darkness and at another time light. It is not everything 
visible which is visible in light, but only the proper colour of each 
thing. Some things, indeed, are not seen in daylight, though they 

produce sensation in the dark: as, for example, the 
Phosphor- . . . - 
escent things of fiery and glittering appearance, for which 
objects. there is no one distinguishing name, like fungus, horn, 


coni. Essen, coll. De Sensu 6, 446 b, 29, 30 {| τῆς yijs...23. περιέχοντος unc. incl. Essen | 
24. τὴν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ SUX Them. Bek. Trend. τὴν τοῦ λόγου etiam Soph. || ἐνάργειαν 
T Wy Soph. 75, 27 Torst., ἐνέργειαν E (Trend.), ἀλήθειαν reliqui ante Torst. omnes, 
etiam Them. || ἐν μικρῷ. ..“6. αἴτημα unc. incl. Essen || 419 a, 3. σκότωι E, σκότῳ Them., 
σκότει Soph. 


80 DE ANIMA II CH. 7 


ld ‘ > 
μύκης, κέρας, κεφαλαὶ ἰχθύων καὶ λεπίδες καὶ ὀφθαλ- 5 

~ XN 5 ow“ an) 3 a 

μοί: ἀλλ᾽ οὐδενὸς ὁρᾶται τούτων τὸ οἰκεῖον χρῶμα. de ἣν 
> A a“ ¥ / nN > 3 _ ON 

5 μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ταῦτα ὁρᾶται, ἄλλος λόγος: νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ το- 
ῷ \ ε ’, “ 

σοῦτον φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι TO μὲν EV φωτὶ ὁρώμενον χρῶμα. 

“A a) \ 5 3 a \ 
διὸ καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἄνευ φωτός: τοῦτο yap ἦν αὐτῷ TO 
χρώματι εἶναι, τὸ κινητικῷ εἶναι τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν διαφα- το 

κι ἴα: ἴω a “ ἈΝ ΄ 
νοῦς" ἡ δ᾽ ἐντελέχεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς φῶς ἐστίν. σημεῖον δὲ τού- 
Aw » os 5» 2’ A 
του φανερόν: ἐὰν yap τις θῇ τὸ ἔχον χρῶμα ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν 
τὴν ὄψιν, οὐκ ὄψεται: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα κινεῖ τὸ δια- 
ra » ΡΝ 
φανές, οἷον τὸν ἀέρα, ὑπὸ τούτου δὲ συνεχοῦς ὄντος κινεῖται 
~ , » 2 
6 τὸ αἰσθητήριον. οὐ γὰρ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγει Δημόκριτος οἱό- 
3 ’ ‘ Ἃ - e o θ ih ? ῪᾺ Ν 
μενος, εἶ γένοιτο κενὸν τὸ μεταξύ, ὁρᾶσθαι ἂν ἀκριβῶς, καὶ 
εἰ μύρμηξ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἴη" τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. πά- 
σχοντος γάρ τι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ γίνεται τὸ ὁρᾶν" ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ 
Α oy ~ € - / LOU ? on e ‘ 
μὲν οὖν TOD ὁρωμένου χρώματος ἀδύνατον: λείπεται δὴ VITO 
τοῦ μεταξύ, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖόν τι εἶναι μεταξύ: κενοῦ δὲ γενο- 20 
μένου οὐχ ὅτι ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως οὐθὲν ὀφθήσεται. 
5 ἃ ‘ μὰ 9 2“ Ν a > ω 3 VN € ἡ 
7 Ov ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τὸ χρῶμα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶσθαι, 
¥ “ δὲ 3 3 a“ en XN 3 é \ 3 ? 
εἴρηται. πῦρ dé ἐν ἀμφοῖν ὁρᾶται, Kal ἐν σκότει καὶ ἐν φωτί, 
‘ a 3 > 4 Ἁ Ν ὃ Ν € Ν ’ ‘a 
καὶ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης" τὸ yap διαφανὲς ὑπὸ τούτου γίνεται 
\ 
8 διαφανές. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ψόφου Kal ὀσμῆς 25 
ἐστίν: οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενον τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ποιεῖ τὴν 
¥ θ 9 3 € “A δ 3 ao Ἀ ’ A ‘ 
αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ μὲν ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου τὸ μεταξὺ κι- 
~ € \ δὲ ’’ “ 3 θ , € ᾽ « + ὃ᾽ > 3 
νεῖται, ὑπὸ δὲ τούτον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑκάτερον- ὅταν δ᾽ ἐπ 
9 ‘4 3 θη ‘ 3 θ 4 Ἁ “~ A \ »*¥ 9 4 
αὐτό τις ἐπιθῇ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ ψοφοῦν ἣ τὸ ὄζον, οὐδεμίαν 
3» θ ? ‘ δὲ ε fal % 4 dl ‘ 
αἴσθησιν ποιήσει. περὶ ὃὲ ἀφῆς Kal γεύσεως ἔχει μὲν 30 
£ id 3 , δέ ὃ > a δ᾽ > 9 y »¥ A 
ὁμοίως, ov φαίνεται δέ: δι’ ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν, ὕστερον ἔσται δῆλον. 
\ ‘ [4 
οτὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφων μὲν ἀήρ, ὀσμῆς δ᾽ ἀνώνυμον’ κοινὸν 
Ν ὃ / Χθ 5. 5. 35,3 Ν “ὃ / 3 Ψ Ν 
γὰρ δή τι πάθος ἐπ’ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ τὸ δια- 
XN - Φ ”~N ¥ 9 ᾽ν 9 
φανὲς χρώματι, οὕτω τῷ ἔχοντι ὀσμὴν ὃ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις 


με 
am 


5. κέρας] κρέας coni. Chandler, Sugg. and emend., p. 7 || λοπίδες ἘΠ, Aewldes etiam 
Them. Philop. Soph. || 7. ὁρατά E, ὁρᾶται etiam Them. Philop. Soph. ἢ 9- Kal om. 
EUW Soph. || αὐτὸ W Trend., αὐτῷ etiam Them. Soph., tuentur Prantl, Arist. ἃ}. ἢ, 
Farben, p. 93, adn. 2, Barco p. 57, αὐτὸ ἦν pro ἦν αὐτῷ coni. Essen II, p. 45 || τὸ] τῷ 
W, om. S Them. || 10. post xp. εἶναι virgulam om. Bek. Trend. || iy δὴ ET Wy, δὲ 
ἤδη Them., δὲ etiam Simpl. Soph. || 16. virg. post ἀκριβῶς posuit Diels || 16. et 17. καὶ 
εἰ] καὶ εἰ etiam Soph. 83, 32, κἂν εἰ Philop. 350, 8 || 17. ἐστιν ἀδύνατον SU X, ἀδύνατόν 
ἐστιν Soph. || 18. αἰσθητηρίου VW et, ut videtur, Philop. 350, 13, αἰσθητικοῦ etiam 
Soph., αἰσθήσεως in paraphr. Them, 62, 14 || 19. δὴ ET W, δὲ reliqui ante Biehlium 


CH. 7 419 a 5—419 a 34 SI 


the heads, scales and eyes of fishes. But in no one of these cases 
is the proper colour seen. Why these objects are seen must 
be discussed elsewhere. At present this much is clear, that the 5 
object seen in light is colour, and this is why it is not seen without 
light. For the very quiddity of colour is, as we saw, just this, that 
it is capable of exciting change in the operantly transparent 
medium: and the activity of the transparent is light. There is clear 
evidence of this. If you lay the coloured object upon your eye, you 
will not see it. On the contrary, what the colour excites is the 
transparent medium, say, the air, and by this, which is continuous, 
the sense-organ is stimulated. For it was a mistake in Democritus 6 
Necessity ἴθ Suppose that if the intervening space became a void, 
ofa im even an ant would be distinctly seen, supposing there 

were one inthesky. That is impossible. For sight takes 
place through an affection of the sensitive faculty. Now it cannot 
be affected by that which is seen, the colour itself: therefore it 
can only be by the intervening medium: hence the existence of 
some medium is necessary. But, if the intermediate space became 
a void, so far from being seen distinctly, an object would not be 
visible at all. 

We have explained the reason why colour must be seen in 7 
light. Fire is visible both in light and in darkness: and necessarily 
so, for it is owing to fire that the transparent becomes transparent. 
The same argument holds for sound and odour. For no sound 8 
or scent produces sensation by contact with the sense-organ: it 
is the intervening medium which is excited by sound and odour 
and the respective sense-organs by the medium. But, when the 
body which emits the sound or odour is placed on the sense-organ 
itself, it will not produce any sensation. The same holds of touch 
and taste, although it appears to be otherwise. The reason for this 
will be seen hereafter. The medium for sounds is air, that for odour 9 
has no name. For there is assuredly a common quality in air 
and water, and this quality, which is present in both, stands to 
the body which emits odour in the same relation as the transparent 
omnes, etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 20 wovr’...neratd om. S Ὁ X, leg. Soph. (cf. Prisc. 
L. 10, 10) |] 22. δι ἣν...25. διαφανές unc. incl. Susemihl et Essen || 23. σκότωι E, 
σκότῳ Soph. || 29. τις ἐπιθῇ om. pr. E || τὸ ante αἰσθ. om. E || 32. codd. hoc loco non 
variant, vulgatam leg. etiam Philop. Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 84, 11, sed Them. 
interpretatur: τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφου καὶ ὀσμῆς ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ, unde Brandisius coni. Them. 
legisse τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφων καὶ ὀσμῆς ἀνώνυμον, Torst. coni. ab Arist. haec fere scripta 
fuisse: τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφου μὲν καὶ ὀσμῆς ἀήρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ' τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἀνώνυμον" Kowwdr..., 
vulgatam defendit Barco, p. 58, τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ...Ὁ, 3. λεχθήσεται unc. incl. Essen |] 33. δή 


om. SUVWXy || 34. χρώματος P || post ὀσμὴν virgulam posuit Rodier |] ὃ ἐν} ὃν SX, 
ov ἐν Pi ἐν ΤΥ. 


H. 6 


82 DE ANIMA II CHS. 7, 8 


~ , 
ὑπάρχει τούτοις: φαίνεται yap καὶ τὰ ἔνυδρα τῶν ζῴων 35 
A Ν ~ ΜᾺ 
ἔχεν αἴσθησιν ὀσμῆς. ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶν πεζῶν 4το 
ὅσα ἀναπνεῖ, ἀδυνατεῖ ὀσμᾶσθαι μὴ ἀναπνέοντα. ἡ δ᾽ αἰ- 
τία καὶ περὶ τούτων ὕστερον λεχθήσεται. 
8 Νῦν δὲ πρῶτον περὶ ψόφου καὶ ἀκοῆς διορίσωμεν. ἔστι 
A \ ε / ε μὴ Ν, 9 7 ξ δὲ ὃ , 
δὲ διττὸς ὁ ψόφος: ὁ μὲν yap ἐνεργείᾳ τις, ὁ δὲ δυνάμει: 5 
ἈΝ Ν δ Ψ ¥ ’ Φ / κά ἐν 
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ov φαμεν ἔχειν ψόφον, οἷον σπόγγον, ἔρια, τὰ 
δ᾽ ἔχειν, οἷον χαλκὸν καὶ ὅσα στερεὰ καὶ λεῖα, ὅτι δύνα- 
A “Ὰ > 3 Ἁ 3 A ‘ ‘\ “Ἂ > an 
ται ψοφῆσαι. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ Kal τῆς ἀκοῆς 
5 ~ , Ψ , ? 3 ε ? 5. ἢ , 
2 ἐμπουῆσαι ψόφον ἐνεργείᾳ. γίνεται δ᾽ ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ψό- 
dos ἀεί Tivos πρός τι καὶ ἔν τινι" πληγὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ποι- τὸ 
ΧΆ 4 \ 3 # e A ¥ ? , Ψ 
οὖσα. διὸ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἑνὸς ὄντος γενέσθαι ψόφον: ἕτερον 
γὰρ τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον: ὥστε τὸ ψοφοῦν πρός τι 
» “ δ᾽ 3 , + “~ Ψ δ᾽ » 
ψοφεῖ! πληγὴ ὃ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φορᾶς. ὥσπερ δ᾽ εἴπομεν, 
3 ΡᾺ ¢ N e / 3 7 ἈΝ ἊΝ ‘a 
οὐ τῶν τυχόντων πληγὴ ὁ ψόφος" οὐθένα yap ποιεῖ ψόφον 
¥ λ A ἢ Ν ‘ . ¢ A ‘ a 
ἐρια ἂν πληγῇ, ἀλλὰ χαλκὸς καὶ ὅσα λεῖα καὶ κοῖλα, τς 
ε \ ‘4 Ψ ~ Ν XN “ ~ 3 4 
ὁ μὲν χαλκός, OTe λεῖος: τὰ δὲ Kotha TH ἀνακλάσει πολ- 
λὰς ποιεῖ πληγὰς μετὰ τὴν πρώτην, ἀδυνατοῦντος ἐξελθεῖν 
~ - ¥ 3 4 3 id Ν Ψ ? > 
τοῦ κινηθέντος. ἔτι ἀκούεται ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, ἀλλ᾽ ἧττον' 
8οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ψόφου κύριος ὁ ἀὴρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ: ἀλλὰ δεῖ 
A ‘\ - ‘ ¥ ‘ ‘ ‘ 27 
στερεῶν πληγὴν γενέσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα. 20 
~ \ ᾽ y ¢ A Ν 7% 
τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ὑπομένῃ πληγεὶς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ μὴ δια- 
a ‘ Ἃ ~ “ ~ 
χυθῇ. διὸ ἐὰν ταχέως καὶ σφοδρῶς πληγῇ, ψοφεῖ: Set γὰρ 
\ A φ᾿ 
φθάσαι τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ῥαπίζοντος τὴν θρύψιν τοῦ ἀέρος, 
9 3 Ν A € Ν “ ’ Ϊά 
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σωρὸν ἢ ὁρμαθὸν ψάμμου τύπτοι τις φερόμε. 
4 vov ταχύ. ἠχὼ δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος ἑνὸς γενομέ- 25 
ὃ μ δ 3 “ ‘\ ὃ ’ ‘a ~ 
vou διὰ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τὸ διορίσαν καὶ κωλῦσαν θρυφθῆναι 


410 Ὁ, 1. ὀδμῆς et 2. ὀδμᾶσθαι ET || ἀλλ᾽..,4.. διορίσωμεν) ex Themistii et Sophoniae 
interpretationibus Torst. coni. Arist. haec fere scripsisse : ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἄν θρωπος καὶ τῶν πεζῶν 
ὅσα ἀναπνεῖ ἀδυνατεῖ ὁσμᾶσθαι μὴ ἀναπνέοντα, τὰ δὲ ἔνυδρα ὀσμᾶται καὶ μὴ ἀναπνέοντα. ἡ δ᾽ 
αἰτία καὶ περὶ τούτων ὕστερον λεχθήσεται. νῦν δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον τί ἐστιν ὄψις. μετὰ 
δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον περὶ ἀκοῆς καὶ ὀσφρήσεως" καὶ πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ψόφον καὶ ἀκοῆς διορίσωμεν, 
Simplicium vulgatam legisse et ex interpret. huins loci et quae p. 138 de Alexandro dicit 
certum est, vulgatam defendit Wilson, Trans. of Ox. Philol. Soc. 1882/3, p. 6 || 4. ἀκοῆς] 
ὀσφρήσεως E WX y εἰ Soph., reliqui ἀκοῆς, etiam Them. || 5. ἐνεργείας (ie. casu dativo) 
E (Trend.) et δυνάμει E Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. Torst., ἐνέργεια et δύναμις reliqui 
ante Torst. omnes || ris post ἐνεργείᾳ om. Soph., leg. Them. Simpl. || 7. χαλκὸς T, 
χαλκὸν etiam Them. Soph. || 8. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὲν...9. ἐνεργείᾳ unc. incl. Essen {I ro. post 
rive addendum πλήττοντος censet Chandler || 11. γίνεσθαι X Soph,, probat Susemihl ἢ 
τὸν ψόφον E, τὸν om. Soph. || 13. ἔριον ἢ πατάξαν ἢ πληγέν, ἀλλὰ VX et margo U, 


CHS, 7, ὃ 419 a 35—419 Ὁ 26 83 


to colour. For the animals that live in water also appear to have 
the sense of smell. But man and the other land-animals which 
breathe are unable to smell without inhaling breath. The reason 
for this, too, must be reserved for future explanation. 

Let us now begin by determining the nature of sound and 8 
Soundangd hearing. There are two sorts of sound, one a sound 
hearing. which is operant, the other potential sound. For some 
things we say have no sound, as sponge, wool; others, for ex- 
ample, bronze and all things solid and smooth, we say have sound, 
because they can emit sound, that is, they can produce actual 
sound between the sonorous body and the organ of hearing. When 2 
actual sound occurs it is always of something on something and 
in something, for it is a blow which produces it. Hence it is 
impossible that a sound should be produced by a single thing, 
for, as that which strikes is distinct from that which is struck, that 
which sounds sounds upon something. And a blow implies spatial 
motion. As we stated above, it is not concussion of any two 
things taken at random which constitutes sound. Wool, when 
struck, emits no sound at all, but bronze does, and so do all smooth 
and hollow things; bronze emits sound because it is smooth, while 
hollow things by reverberation produce a series of concussions after 
the first, that which is set in motion being unable to escape. 
The Further, sound is heard in air and, though more faintly, 
medium. in water. It is not the air or the water, however, which 3 
chiefly determine the production of sound: on the contrary, there 
must be solid bodies colliding with one another and with the air: 
and this happens when the air after being struck resists the impact 
and is not dispersed. Hence the air must be struck quickly and 
forcibly if it is to give forth sound; for the movement of the striker 
must be too rapid to allow the air time to disperse: just as would 
be necessary if one aimed a blow at a heap of sand or a sandwhirl, 
while it was in rapid motion onwards. 

Echo is produced when the air is made to rebound backwards 4 

like a ball from some other air which has become a single 


Echo. . . - “1° - . 
mass owing to its being within a cavity which confines 


vulgatam leg. sine dubio Philop. 359, 23 et fort. Soph. 84, 33 ἐν (ν.]. ef) πληγῇ || 18. ἐν] 
pay ἐν coni. Torst. || ἀλλ᾽ ἧττον unc. incl. Torst., om. Soph., videntur legisse Them. 
63, 20 Simpl. 140, 15 Philop. 359, 28 || 19. οὔτε TW, οὔτε δὲ E, οὐδὲ etiam Simpl. 
Soph. || 20. καὶ] Torst. coni. ἢ καὶ, quod iam Steinhart coniecerat, vulgatam tuentur 
Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 21. ὑπομείνηι E et fort. Simpl. 140, 27. 141, 6, ὑπομένῃ Soph. || 
24. ὥσπερ ἂν...25. ταχύ unc. incl. Susemihl || 24. ἂν om. STU X, leg. Soph. || σωρὸν 
ἢ delendum censet Essen ἢ tis} τὸ coni. Essen || 25. τάχει P || ἀπὸ τοῦ om. SUVX 
Torst., leg. Soph. et Alex. de anima 48, 1 (sed ὑπὸ pro ἀπὸ) || γινομένου U VW X Soph. 


6—z2 


84 DE ANIMA II CH. 8 


“A ν ~ 
πάλιν ὁ ἀὴρ ἀπωσθῇ, ὥσπερ σφαιρα. , 
4 5 N Ἃ 
ἠχώ, GN οὐ σαφής, ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει γε ἐπι τοῦ ψόφον 
a / Ν ‘ Ν La > _N 3 a 
καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ rod φωτός- Kal yap τὸ φῶς ἀεὶ ἀνακλᾶ 
/ a“ 9 Ν , ad “Of 
ται (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο πάντῃ φῶς, ἀλλὰ σκότος ἔξω τοῦ 3 
“Ὁ Ψ > 7? ὦἡᾧ 
ἡλιουμένου), GAN οὐχ οὕτως ἀνακλᾶται ὥσπερ ἀφ᾽ ὕδατος 
ν ‘ οὐ 
ἢ χαλκοῦ ἢ Kab τινος ἄλλου τῶν λείων, ὥστε σκιὰν ποιεῖν, 
/ - a 
59 τὸ φῶς ὁρίζομεν. τὸ δὲ κενὸν ὀρθῶς λέγεται κύριον τοῦ 
wn 5 χὰ > 93 ἈΝ ε a 
ἀκούειν. δοκεῖ yap εἶναι κενὸν ὃ ἀήρ, οὗτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν 
ων ‘\ Ν ἊἊ 5 Ν ΝΗ ‘\ “ 
ἀκούειν, ὅταν κινηθῇ συνεχὴς καὶ εἷς. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ψαθυρὸς 35 
ἷ Ὶ i, ἂν μὴ λεῖον ἢ τὸ πληγέ ὅτε δὲ εἷς γί. 420a 
εἶναι οὐ γεγωνεῖ, ἂν μὴ λεῖον ἢ τὸ πληγέν. TO γί- 4 
Ν “Ἂ 7 5». Ὁ 
νεται ἅμα διὰ τὸ ἐπίπεδον' ἕν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ λείου ἐπίπεδον. 
> e A > - ‘al 
6 ψοφητικὸν μὲν οὖν TO κινητικὸν ἑνὸς ἀέρος συνεχείᾳ μέχρις 
nw a Ν 3 5. ¢ 
ἀκοῆς. ἀκοῇ δὲ συμφνὴς ἀήρ" διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀέρι εἶναι, κινουμέ. 
~ ~ / Ν ”~ 3 4 
vou τοῦ ἔξω ὁ εἴσω κινεῖται. διόπερ οὐ πάντῃ TO ζῴον ἀκούει, 5 
Ν, 4 ¥ >? ‘ 
οὐδὲ πάντῃ διέρχεται ὁ arjp* ov yap πάντῃ ἔχει ἀέρα TO KL- 

, / \ > N Ν or A εξ 3. Ἀ 
νησόμενον μέρος καὶ ἔμψυχον. αὐτὸς μὲν δὴ ἀψοῴφον ὃ ἀὴρ 
ὃ Ν, \ ¥ . id δὲ λ An θ ’ θ ε » 

ιὰ τὸ εὔθρυπτον: ὅταν δὲ κωλυθῇ θρύπτεσθαι, ἢ τούτου 
, , ᾿ ε δ᾽ 3 a 2 ON > δά Ν \ 
κίνησις ψόφος. ὃ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐγκατῳκοδόμηται πρὸς τὸ 
3. 4 > ν > a > θ id “ Ν ὃ 
ἀκίνητος εἶναι, ὅπως ἀκριβῶς αἰσθάνηται πάσας τὰς δια- το 
a ΓᾺ > 

φορὰς THs κινήσεως. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ Kal ἐν ὕδατι ἀκούο- 

ν > 3 / \ > A ‘ ~ Ff . ἰλλ᾽ 
μεν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσέρχεται πρὸς αὗτὸν τὸν συμφνῆ ἀέρα' a 
οὐδ᾽ eis τὸ οὖς διὰ τὰς ἕλικας. ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο συμβῇ, οὐκ 
3 / ὑδ᾽ λ ε a E 7 4 \% 3 _N μῃ , δέ 
ἀκούει" οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἡ μῆνιγξ κάμῃ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κόρῃ δέρ- 

oY ? > ‘ ‘N “ ως 9 2 A x 4 
μα [ὅταν κάμῃ]. ἀλλὰ καὶ σημεῖον τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ μὴ τὸ 15 


ἔοικε δ᾽ ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι 


30. ob} STU VX Them., οὐδὲ etiam Soph. || 33. ἢ] ᾧ scripsit Torst. e solo Philop., 
ἡ etiam Soph. || 33. τὸ δὲ ..35. εἷς partim corrupta partim alieno loco posita esse 
putat Torst., vide eius comment. crit. p. 148, tuentur Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 
420 a, x. Torst. suspicatur Arist. scripsisse τότε δὲ εἷς γίνεται καὶ dua ἀφάλλεται, 
διὰ τὸ ἐπίπεδον, similiter in interpret. Them. et Philop., vulgatam leg. etiam Soph. { 
2. dua γὰρ διὰ U, ὅλος γὰρ ἅμα κινεῖται Philop. in paraphr. 363, 27 || 4. ἀκοῇ 
δὲ συμφυὴς ἀήρ WPy Simpl. Philop. Prisc. Lyd. τό, 22 Soph. Torst. Kampe, 
Erkenntnissth. d. Ar., p. 75. Bon., Ind. Ar. 720 a, τὶ Rodier, ceteri libri et scripti 
et impressi ἀκοὴ dé συμφυὴς ἀέρι, etiam Them. 64, 16sq., sed 64, 17. 28 τῇ μήνιγγι 
συμφυὴς || διὰ τὸ ἕνα ἀέρα εἶναι coni. Steinhart, quod iam Iul. Pacius coniecerat, fort. 
recte, probat Beare, διά re τὸ, virgula ante διὰ posita, coni. dubitanter Susemihl, textum 
tuentur Simpl. Philop. | 5. τὸ SUVX Bek. Trend., ὁ leg. etiam Them. Philop. 
Torst. {ἔσω SU || xwe? STV W Bek. Trend., κινεῖται etiam Philop. Simpl. vet. 
transl. Torst., cui assentitur etiam Hayduck, progr. Gryph. 1873, p. 2 || πάντα τὸ f gor 
ἀκούει, ἀλλ᾽ ὠσίν, οὐδὲ πάντα διέρχεται 6 ἀήρ P, παντὶ μέρει τὸ ἔῷον ἀκούει ἀλλ᾽ ὠσίν" 
οὐδὲ πανταχοῦ τοῦ σώματος διέρχεται" οὐ γὰρ Wy, similia habent et Them. et Philop., 
fluxisse e priori editione putat Torst., sed nihil nisi interpretamentum est, vulgatam 
tuentur Soph. Simpl. || 6. ὁ ἀὴρ unc. incl. Torst., leg. Soph. || ἀέρα, ἀλλὰ τὸ κ΄ coni. 


CH. ὃ _ 419 b 27--4208 15 35 


it and prevents its dispersion. It seems likely that echo is always 
produced, but is not always distinctly audible: since surely the 
same thing happens with sound as with light. For light is always 
being reflected ; else light would not be everywhere, but outside the 
spot where the sun’s rays fall there would be darkness. But it 
is not always reflected in the same way as it is from water or 
bronze or any other smooth surface; I mean, it does not always 
produce the shadow, by which we define light. 
Void is rightly stated to be the indispensable condition of § 

Conditions hearing. For the air is commonly believed to be a void, 


of reson- *, 3 . - . . 
ance and and it is the air which causes hearing, when being one 
hearing. and continuous it is set in motion. But, owing to its 


tendency to disperse, it gives out no sound unless that which is 
struck is smooth. In that case the air when struck is simultaneously 
reunited because of the unity of the surface; for a smooth body 
presents a single surface. 
That, then, is resonant which is capable of exciting motion in 6 

a mass of air continuously one as far as the ear. There is air 
naturally attached to the ear. And because the ear is in air, when 
the external air is set in motion, the air within the ear moves. 
Hence it is not at every point that the animal hears, nor that the 
air passes through: for it is not at every point that the part which 
is to set itself in motion and to be animate has a supply of air. Of 
itself, then, the air is a soundless thing because it is easily broken 
up. But, whenever it is prevented from breaking up, its movement 
is sound. But the air within the ears has been lodged fast within 
walls to make it immoveable, in order that it may perceive exactly 
all the varieties of auditory movement. This is why we hear in 
water also, because the water does not pass right up to the air 
attached to the ear, nor even into the ear at all, because of its 
convolutions. Should this happen, hearing is destroyed, as it is 
by an injury to the membrane of the tympanum, and as sight is by 
an injury to the cornea. Further, we have evidence whether we 
hear or not, according as there is or is not always a ringing sound in 
Torst., ἀλλὰ non leg. Philop. Soph. || 7. ἔμψυχον etiam Philop. Soph., ἔμψοφον coni. 
Torst., cui assentiuntur Hayduck et Dittenberger, Ὁ. 1615, ἔμψυχον, ὥσπερ ἡ κόρη τὸ 
δγρόν" αὐτὸ WP y et margo U vet. transl. et, ut videtur, Philop. 366, 9. το. tx, non leg. 
Soph., καὶ yap πρὸς ἔμψνχον αὐτὸς, puncto post μέρος posito, legendum censet Essen || 
αὐτὸς e Them. scripsit Torst., cui assentiuntur Biehl et Rodier, ceteri αὐτὸ || 7. αὐτὸς μὲν 
67)...9. ψόφος ante 419 Ὁ, 33.76 δὲ transponenda coni, Steinhart, Susemihl vero, mutato δὴ 
in yap, fort. ante 419 Ὁ, 25. ἠχὼ || το. ἀμετακίνητος coni. Hayduck || 12. τὸν συμφυῆ... 
13. ἕλικας unc. incl. Torst., leg. Simpl. Philop. Soph. {{ 14. οὔτ᾽ ET {| 15. ὅταν κάμῃ 


unc. inclusit Biehl, om. ET W Py Soph. || ἀλλὰ usque ad 18. ἔδιος unc. incl. Torst., 
tuentur Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. 


7 


ὃ 


9 


86 DE ANIMA II” CH. 8 


a > ΤΙ δ , . od ‘ > 7 ‘ “ 
ἠχεῖν αἰεὶ τὸ οὖς ὥσπερ τὸ κέρας" ἀεὶ γὰρ οἰκείαν τινὰ κι 
ΜᾺ “w ? > > ε ? 
νησιν ὁ ἀὴρ κινεῖται ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὠσίν: αλλ ὁ ψόφος αλλό- 
~ 9 , Ἂ “ Ν 
τριος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτό φασιν ἀκούειν τῷ κενῷ καὶ 
A a » € id ‘ 39.» ? 
ἠχοῦντι, OTL ἀκούομεν τῷ ἔχοντι ὡρισμένον TOV ἀέρα. πότερον 
A Δ ‘ , A . » , 
δὲ ψοφεῖ τὸ τυπτόμενον ἢ τὸ τύπτον; ἢ καὶ ἄμφω, τρό- 
- ΝᾺ ,ὔ 
πον δ᾽ ἕτερον: ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ψόφος κίνησις τοῦ δυναμένου κι- 
“~ “~ Ν 9 ? > Ν᾿ ω 
νεῖσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὅνπερ τὰ ἀφαλλόμενα amo τῶν 
5 A ἴω id ¥ a“ 
λείων, ὅταν τις κρούσῃ: οὐ δὴ πᾶν, ὥσπερ εἰρηται, ψοῴφεὶ 
@ , 4 / . 
τυπτόμενον καὶ τύπτον, οἷον ἐὰν πατάξῃ βελόνη βελόνην 
A > Ψ \ 27 3 π᾿ 
ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸ τυπτόμενον ὁμαλὸν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸν ἀέρα ἀθροῦν 
δ ΜᾺ 4 
ἀφάλλεσθαι καὶ σείεσθαι. αἵ δὲ διαφοραὶ τῶν ψοφούντων 
Ἢ ΝᾺ 9 Ν + 
ἐν τῷ Kar ἐνέργειαν ψόφῳ δηλοῦνται: ὥσπερ yap ἄνευ 
Ν 3 ee, Ν , 7 IO. ¥ / \ 
φωτὸς οὐχ ὁρᾶται τὰ χρώματα, οὕτως οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ ψόφου τὸ 
a ‘ ‘ 5 Ν 
ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ. ταῦτα δὲ λέγεται κατὰ μεταφορὰν azo 
an ἴω ¥ yy ἢ 
τῶν ἁπτῶν: τὸ μὲν yap ὀξὺ κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐν ὀλίγῳ 
ΝᾺ 3 4 5» 
χρόνῳ ἐπὶ πολύ, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ ἐν πολλῷ ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον. οὐ δὴ 
ταχὺ τὸ ὀξύ, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ βραδύ, ἀλλὰ γίνεται τοῦ μὲν 
διὰ τὸ τάχος ἡ κίνησις τοιαύτη, τοῦ δὲ διὰ βραδυτῆτα. 
.»Ἂ»ν 9 ὔ ¥ “~ ‘ Ν ε Ν 5 “~ ‘ 4 
καὶ ἔοικεν ἀνάλογον ἔχειν τῷ περὶ τὴν ἁφὴν ὀξεῖ καὶ ἀμ- 
βλεῖ: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀξὺ οἷον κεντεῖ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀμβλὺ οἷον ὠθεῖ 
ὃ “ δὴ α᾽ δ Ν 3 5 7 ‘ δὲ 3 Xr “ Y 
la TO κινεὺν TO μὲν ἐν ὀλίγῳ TO O€ ἐν πολλῴ, WOTE συμ- 
/ \ Ν ‘ Ν \ Ν > 
βαίνει τὸ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ δὲ βραδὺ εἶναι. 
περὶ μὲν οὖν ψόφου ταύτῃ διωρίσθω. ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ψόφος τίς 
ἐστιν ἐμψύχου" τῶν γὰρ ἀψύχων οὐθὲν φωνεῖ, ἀλλὰ Kal” ὁμοιό- 
7 nA - ΔΝ NV \ 7 ag ¥ ma 374 
Tyra λέγεται φωνεῖν, οἷον αὐλὸς καὶ λύρα καὶ ὅσα ἀλλα TOV ἀψύ- 
3 id »Ἤ N ? ‘ , y¥ Ν bd 
χων ἀπότασιν ἔχει καὶ μέλος καὶ διάλεκτον. ἔοικε yap ὅτι 
Ἀν ςε Ἁ a> ἊΨ Ν δὲ A rd 3 ¥ 
kat ἡ φωνὴ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει. πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἔχουσι 
φωνήν, οἷον τά τε ἄναιμα καὶ τῶν ἐναίμων ἰχθύες. καὶ 
m~ 3 3 » 
TOUT εὐλόγως, εἴπερ ἀέρος κίνησίς Tis ἐστιν ὁ ψόφος. GAN 
16. αἰεὶ ante τὸ om. SVX, leg. Them. Soph. || del γὰρ] καὶ γὰρ coni. Essen ἢ 
17. 6 ante ἐν om. STU WX, leg. Soph. || τὸ. τὸν om. SUVX, leg. Simpl. || 
22. ἁλλόμενα SVX, ἀφαλλόμενα Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 23. κρούσῃ] ἐπικρούσῃ 
coni, Essen || 24. καὶ τύπτον om. SUVX, leg. Philop. Simpl. Soph. (qui ἢ pro 
καὶ habet) || 25. ἀβρόον STUVWX || 26. ψόφων Ty Them. Soph. Theoph. ap. 
Prisc. 17, 25, Ψοφούντων etiam Philop. Simpl. || 31. ἐπ΄ om. SUV Wy, leg. Them. 
Philop. Simpl. || οὐ δὴ] ὥστε οὐχὶ TW Soph., ὥστε οὐδὲ V, οὔτω X, οὐ δὴ etiam 
Simpl., οὐ δὴ...38. βραδυτῆτα unc. incl. Susemihl, adversatur Rodier II, 299 | 
33- κίνησις] αἴσθησις coni. Essen || 420 Ὁ, 2. pro ἀμβλὺ οἷον habet βαρὺ ὥσπερ P || 


3: συμβαίνειν ES, συμβαίνει Simpl. Philop. Soph. || 8. yap] δὲ SU V, γὰρ etiam Soph. 
post yap virgulam posuit Rodier || το. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὰ ἔναιμα πάντα, οἷον ἰχθύες P || post 


20 


25 


30 


420b 


5 


CH. ὃ 420 8. 16----420 Ὁ 11 87 


the ears, 85 in ἃ horn: for the air imprisoned there is always moving 
with a proper motion ofits own. But sound is something of external 
origin and is not native to the ear. And this is why it is said that 
we hear by means of what is empty and resonant, because that by 
which we hear has air confined within it. 

Does that which is struck emit the sound or that which strikes? 7 
Is it not rather both, but each in a different way? For sound is 
motion of that which is capable of being moved in the same 
Ianner as things rebound from smooth surfaces when struck 
sharply against them. Thus, as above remarked, it is not everything 
which, when struck or striking, emits sound: supposing, for instance, 
a pin were to strike against a pin, there would be no sound. The 
thing struck must be of even surface, so that the air may rebound 
and vibrate in one mass. 

The varieties of resonant bodies are clearly distinguished by the 8 
sound they actually emit. For, as without light colours are not seen, 
so without sound we cannot distinguish high and low 
or acute and grave in pitch. These latter terms are used 
by analogy from tangible objects. For the acute, that is, the high, 
note moves the sense much in a little time, while the grave or low 
note moves it little in much time. Not that what is shrill is 
identically rapid, nor what is low is slow, but it is in the one 
case the rapidity, in the other the slowness, which makes the 
motion or sensation such as has been described. And it would 
seem that there is a certain analogy between the acute and 
grave to the ear and the acute and blunt to the touch. For 
that which is acute or pointed, as it were, stabs, while the blunt, 
as it were, thrusts, because the one excites motion in a short, the 
other in a long time, so that per accidens the one is quick, the other 
slow. Let this account of sound suffice. 

Voice is a sound made by an animate being. No inanimate 9 
thing is vocal, though it may by analogy be said to be 
vocal, as in the case of the pipe, the lyre and all other 
inanimate things that have pitch and tune and articulation : for these 
qualities, it would seem, the voice also possesses. But many animals 
have no voice: that is to say, all bloodless animals and, among 
animals that have blood, fishes. And this is what we might 
expect, since sound is a movement of air. Those fishes which 


Pitch. 


Voice. 


ἰχθύες et post 11. ψόφος virgulas ponendas et xal...11. ψόφος post 13. τοιούτῳ trans- 
ponendum censet Susemihl || 11. εἴπερ... «ψόφος fortasse corrupta esse putat Torst., leg. 
Philop. Soph. Them. (qui pro ψόφος habet φωνή) j| τίς om. SUVX et in paraphr. 
Them. Philop., leg. Soph. || 11. @AX’...13. τοιούτῳ unc. incl. Torst., leg. Them. Philop. 
Soph., defendunt Wilson, Phil. Rundschau 1882, N. 47, Trans. of Ox. Phil. Soc. 1882-3, 
p- 9 et Susemihl. 


88 DE ANIMA Il CH. 8 


ἮΝ ΓΝ 3 aA 9 ? ra A 
οἱ λεγόμενοι φωνεῖν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Αχελῴφ, ψοφοῦσι τοῖς 
Ἁ 9. 5 Ἁ -, ᾽ 
10 βραγχίοις ἢ τινι ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ: φωνὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ ζῴου ψόφος, 
ἴω “A “ / , 
καὶ οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ. GAN ἐπεὶ πᾶν ψοφεῖ τὐπτοντὸς 
a ἃ 9.23 3 4 a 
τινος καί τι Kat ἔν τινι, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀήρ, εὐλόγως ἂν 15 
“Ἂ Ν tad ¥ Ν ον 
φωνοίη ταῦτα μόνα ὅσα δέχεται τὸν ἀέρα. ἤδη γὰρ τῷ 
(on , > N 7 ¥ 7 
ἀναπνεομένῳ καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα, καθάπερ 
A an ‘ / © ε δ 
τῇ γλώττῃ ἐπί τε τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὧν ἡ μὲν 
rs ~ A , e / ¢ > e 
γεῦσις ἀναγκαῖον (διὸ καὶ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχει), ἡ δ᾽ ἑρμη- 
y 5 ιν / ’ Ν 
veiw ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ, οὕτω καὶ τῷ πνεύματι πρός τε τὴν θερ- 20 
4 \ 9 \ εξ 3 Ἂ \ δ᾽ » 3 ξ » > 
μότητα THY ἐντὸς ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον ἐν ἑτέροις εἰ- 
. ε rd \ 5 ¥ 
II ρήσεται) καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνήν, ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ TO εὖ. opya- 
A “ 3 “ € ? e > ? Ἁ Ἀ ᾽ 7 
νον δὲ τῇ ἀναπνοῇ 6 φάρυγξ' οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ pdoptov 
a a ¥ ‘ 
ἐστι τοῦτο, πλεύμων" τούτῳ yap τῷ μορίῳ πλεῖστον ἔχει TO 
θερμὸν τὰ πεζὰ τῶν ἄλλων. δεῖται δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ 25 
a ¥ 
ὁ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος πρῶτος. διὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἴσω ava- 
πνεομένου εἰσιέναι τὸν ἀέρα. ὥστε ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου 
ων ΄ Ν 
ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν κα- 
λουμένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ζῴου ψόφος φωνή 
μένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνή ἐστιν. ov γὰρ πᾶς Ce ος φωνή, 
θά ¥ ¥ ν᾿ Ν ἊἪᾳ λ ra ΝᾺ ΝΥ 
καθάπερ εἴπομεν (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ ψοφεῖν καὶ 30 
ὡς οἱ βήττοντες), ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἔμψυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τύπτον 
μ᾿ δ ? / Ν Ν [έ id 
καὶ peta φαντασίας τινός: σημαντικὸς yap δή τις ψόφος 
3 Ἁ ε ζ΄ Ά 9 “~ > al >/ ν € ‘a 
ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή" καὶ ov τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἡ βήξ, 
3 Ἀ » , Ν 3 “~ 3 a \ 3 ‘4 
12 ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τύπτει τὸν ἐν TH ἀρτηρίᾳ πρὸς αὐτήν. σημεῖον 4218 
‘ \ ‘\ 
dé τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα μηδ᾽ ἐκπνέοντα, 
ἀλλὰ 2 . ΜᾺ Ν , ε rd \ δὲ 
κατέχοντα" κινεῖ γὰρ τούτῳ ὁ κατέχων. φανερὸν δὲ 
\ 
καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθύες ἄφωνοι: ov yap ἔχουσι φάρυγγα. τοῦτο 
Ν 
δὲ τὸ μόριον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ὅτι οὐ δέχονται τὸν ἀέρα οὐδ᾽ ava- ς 
᾿ ὃ 3 ἃ μ᾿ > > # ῳ 4 > 
πνέουσιν. Ov ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος. 


13. post ψόφος Torst. censet excidisse: οὐ πᾶς δέ, vulgatam tuetur Soph. qui 
14. καὶ omisit, οὐ παντὸς δέ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ παντὶ μορίῳ in paraphr. Them. || 15. καί ante 
τι om. TW Soph., leg. Philop. Simpl. || 18. re om. SUV WX, leg. Them. Soph. 
v. L (om. τε cum codd. Hayduck 88, 36) || 19. καὶ om. ET, leg. Them. Soph. ‘II 
20. ἕνεκεν STU VWX || 21. εἴρηται SV WX Soph. et sine dubio Philop. 381, 4 ἢ} 
22. ὑπάρχοι EV, ὑπάρχει TW || 23. καὶ om. ESU Wy || 24. πνεύμων STUVWxXy 
Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || πλεῖον SU VWy Them. Soph., πλέον T || 28. ψυχικῆς 
δυνάμεως πρὸς Wy et Philop., vulgatam tuentur Simpl. Alex. apud Simpl. Soph. { 
80. καὶ prius om. SU VX, posterius EW, leg. καὶ utrobique Soph. || 31. re leg. etiam 
Soph., τὰ SU VX || τὸ τύπτον unc. incl. Essen || 32. δή om. 8 UV WX, leg. Soph. { 
33- ἀναπνεομένου] ἀνάγκῃ ἐκπρεομένου coni. Essen || βῆξις E Ty Them. (sed v. 1. βήξ), 


CH. 8 420 Ὁ 12—421 a 6 89 


are said to possess voice, such as those in the Achelous, merely 
make a noise with their gills or some other such part. Voice is 
sound made by an animal, and not by any part of its body in- 
differently. But, as in every case of sound there is something 
that strikes, something struck and a medium, which is air, it is 
reasonable that only creatures which inhale air should have voice. 
For here nature uses the air that is inhaled for two purposes, just 
as it uses the tongue for tasting and for speech, the former use, for 
tasting, being indispensable and therefore more widely found, while 
expression of thought isa means to well-being. Similarly nature uses 
the breath first as a necessary means to the maintenance of internal 
warmth (the reason for which shall be explained elsewhere) and, 
further, as a means of producing voice and so promoting well-being. 
The organ of respiration is the larynx, and the part to which this 
part is subservient is the lung: for it is this organ, namely, the 
lung, which enables land animals to maintain a higher temperature 
than others. Respiration is also needed primarily for the region about 
the heart. Hence, as we draw breath, the air enters: and so the 
impact upon the windpipe, as it is called, of the air breathed is 
voice, the cause of the impact being the soul which animates the 
vocal organs. For, as we said before, it is not every sound made 
by an animal that is voice. Noise can be produced even with the 
tongue or as in coughing: but it is necessary for voice that the 
part which strikes should be animate and that some mental image 
should be present. For voice is certainly a sound which has signif- 
cance and is not like a cough, the noise of air respired: rather with 
this air the animal makes the air in the windpipe strike against the 
windpipe. A proof of this is the fact that we cannot speak while 
inhaling or exhaling breath, but only while we hold it in: for 
anyone who holds his breath uses the breath so held to cause 
motion. And it is evident why fishes are voiceless. It is because 
they have no larynx. And they are without this part because 
they do not take in the air nor breathe. Why this is so does 
not concern us here. 

βήξ etiam Philop. Simpl. Soph. |] 421 a, 1. τῷ οὕτω τύπτειν coni. Essen || 3. ἀλλὰ 
κατέχοντα om. Ey et Soph. || rofro EV W Bek. Trend., τούτῳ Them. Philop. Simpl. 
Soph. vet. transl. Torst. || δὲ] γὰρ STU VW || 5. ἀναπνέουσιν. ἀλλ᾽ ol λέγοντες οὕτως 
ἁμαρτάνουσιν. δι’ SV W et vet. transl., ἀλλ᾽ of λέγοντες ὅτι φωνοῦσιν οἱ ἰχθύες διαμαρ- 


τάνουσιν. δι’ X, et certe Philoponus legit tale additamentum 384, 11 544. {| 6. μὲν οὖν] 
δ᾽ VX, om. SU || ἔσται SU VX Soph., ἔστω in paraphr. Philop. 


Io 


gO DE ANIMA II CH. 9 


ω 4 ~ 
9 πΠερὶ δὲ ὀσμῆς καὶ ὀσφραντοῦ ἧττον εὐδιόριστόν ἐστι τῶν 
~ “A ΝΑ ε ε 
εἰρημένων: οὐ γὰρ δῆλον ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἡ ὀσμή, οὕτως ὡς ὁ 
, «ἡ \ ΝᾺ ¥ > "4 Ν ͵ἱκά θ - > 
ψόφος ἢ τὸ χρῶμα. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι τὴν αἰσθησιν ταύτην οὐκ 
“ ‘ 
ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ, ἀλλὰ χείρω πολλῶν ζῴων: φαύλως yap 
“~ ~ > “~ 
ἄνθρωπος ὀσμᾶται, καὶ οὐθενὸς ὀσφραίνεται τῶν ὀσφραντῶν 
+ A AR A ΑΣ , e > 3, 9 ΜΝ ~A 3 θ 
ἄνευ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἀκριβοῦς τοῦ alo On- 
ra ¥ 3 a Ν ‘\ λ ᾽ θ λ ~ , 
2Typiov. εὔλογον δ᾽ οὕτω καὶ τὰ σκληρόφθαλμα τῶν χρωμά- 
> 4 Ν ‘ ὃ ὃ ’ > ~ 5 Ν ὃ 
των αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ διαδήλους αὐτοῖς εἶναι Tas ὃια- 
Ν ΜᾺ ᾽ ‘ a“ ΝᾺ ‘ 3 / Ὁ 
φορὰς τῶν χρωμάτων πλὴν τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ ἀφόβῳ- οὕτω 1s 
ΜᾺ Ν 
δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ 


et 


oO 


3 aN ¥ Ν Ν ΜᾺ Ἁ ξ » Ἀ to a 
ἀνάλογον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν Kal ὁμοίως τὰ εἰδὴ τῶν 
χυμῶν τοῖς τῆς ὀσμῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀκριβεστέραν ἔχομεν τὴν γεῦ- 
‘\ XN ἊΝ s = 6N € - ? > -¥ ‘ ¥ 
σιν διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἁφήν τινα, ταύτην δ᾽ ἔχειν THY αἵ- 
‘\ + > 4 > μ᾿ δ ~ + 
σθησιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀκριβεστάτην: ἐν μὲν yap ταῖς addats 20 
λείπεται πολλῶν τῶν ζῴων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν πολλῷ τῶν 
+ / 3 a Ν Ν 4. / 3 a 
ἄλλων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῖ. διὸ Kal φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν 
ζῴων. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ 
Ἂ 3 4 ΝᾺ 5 5 ‘an ‘ 3 a) 5 ¥ 
τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφνεῖς καὶ adveis, παρ ἀλλο 
δὲ δέ € \ Ν / > ‘a Ἁ ὃ , 
ἐ μηδέν: οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, 25 
e Α ’ 9 “~ ¥ 9 4 Ν € ‘ 
30 δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς. ἔστι δ᾽, ὥσπερ χυμὸς ὁ μὲν 
λ ‘ ε δὲ / Ψ Ν 3 / > Ν Ἀ Ν ¥ 
γλυκὺς ὁ δὲ πικρός, οὕτω καὶ ὀσμαί (ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔχουσι 
Ν 3 ? 3 ‘ Ἀ 4 2 Ν ® ΝᾺ 
τὴν ἀνάλογον ὀσμὴν καὶ χυμόν, λέγω δὲ οἷον γλυκεῖαν 
9 ᾿ \ Ν ld Ν, ," > “ € [4 “ ‘ 
ὀσμὴν καὶ γλυκὺν χυμόν, τὰ δὲ τοὐναντίον)" ὁμοίως δὲ Kat 
δριμεῖα καὶ αὐστηρὰ καὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ λιπαρά ἐστιν ὀσμή; 30 
9 ν ¥ 
ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, διὰ TO μὴ σφόδρα διαδήλους εἶναι τὰς 
Ν ψ 
ὀσμὰς ὠσπερ τοὺς χυμούς, ἀπὸ τούτων εἴληφε τὰ ὀνόματα 
» ξ A ~ 
καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν πραγμάτων: ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλυκεῖα [ἀπὸ 4210 
a“ / “~ [οὶ 
τοῦ] κρόκου καὶ μέλιτος, ἡ δὲ δριμεῖα θύμον καὶ τῶν τοιού- 
4 των. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔστι δ᾽ ὥσπερ 


€ 


Ν, 3 \ “ 4 a io a 
Kal ἢ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ 


8. ἡ om. SUX Philop., leg. Simpl. 151, 33 || ὀδμή ET W, ὀσμή Them. Simpl. 
Philop. Soph. || 9. y. ἢ τὸ φῶς ἢ TWXy Philop. 388, 4 Simpl. et, ut videtur, 
Them. 67, 29, om. ἢ τὸ φῶς Soph. || 10. χείρονα SW Philop. 386, 5 (v. 1. χεῖρον), 
χείρων E, χεῖρον X Simpl. 152, 1 || 11. ὄσφραίνεται ET W vet. transl. Torst., αἰσθάνεται 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes et, ut videtur, Them. 67, 33 || 16. ὀδμὰς ET Wy || καὶ περὶ ras 
ὀσμὰς P, καὶ κατὰ ras ὀσμὰς coni. Christ || 21. πολλῶν] πολλῷ ES UV Bek., πολλῶν 
sine dubio Them. 67, 30 Philop. 388, 19 Simpl. 151, 21. 30, πολλοῖς Soph. οἵ, x || τῶν 
ante ζῴων om. XP || πολλῶ ESTUV Wy, etiam Them., qui 68, 9 σύμπαντα πλεονεκτοῦ- 
μεν τὰ Spa interpretatur, Philop. 386, 6. 388, 19 sq. Soph. 91, 2 Trend. Torst., om. X, 


CH. 9 421 a 7---421 Ὁ 4 ΟἹ 


Of smell and the object of smell it is less easy to speak de- 9 
finitely than of the senses above-mentioned: for the nature of 
odour is by no means so clear as is the nature of sound or of 
colour. The reason is that this sense in us is not exact, but 
Smell in inferior to that of many animals. In fact, man has 
man de- a poor olfactory sense and perceives none of the objects 

of smell unless they be painful or pleasant, which 1m- 
plies that the organ is wanting in accuracy. It is reasonable to 2 
suppose that animals with hard eyes perceive colour in the same 
vague way and do not distinguish the varieties of colour except in 
so far as they do, or do not, inspire fear. And this is the way in 
which mankind perceive odours. For it would seem that, while 
there is an analogy to taste and the varieties of flavour answer 
to the varieties of smell, our sense of taste is more exact because 
it is a modification of touch and the sense of touch is the most exact 
of man’s senses. In the other senses man is inferior to many of 
the animals, but in delicacy of touch he is far superior to the rest. 
And to this he owes his superior intelligence. This may be seen 
from the fact-that it is this organ of sense and nothing else which 
makes all the difference in the human race between the natural 
endowments of man and man. For hard-skinned men are dull of 
intellect, while those who are soft-skinned are gifted. 

As with flavours, so with odours: some are sweet, some bitter. 3 
(But in some objects smell and flavour correspond ; for example, 
Varieties they have sweet odour and sweet flavour: in other 
of odour ~~ things the opposite is the case.) Similarly, too, an odour 
flavour. may be pungent, irritant, acid or oily. But because, as 
we said above, odours are not as clearly defined as the corre- 
sponding flavours, it is from these latter that the odours have 
taken their names, in virtue of the resemblance in the things. 
Thus the odour of saffron and honey is sweet, while the odour 
of thyme and the like is pungent; and so in all the other cases. 
Again, smell corresponds to hearing and to each of the other 4 
senses in that, as hearing is of the audible and inaudible, and 


πολλῶν nulla codicum, quos quidem contulit, auctoritate Bek., confirmat P || τῶν ἄλλων 
om. X |{ 23. καὶ τὸ EST W, om. καὶ X. || 27. ὀδμαί et 28. et 29. ὀδμὴν E || 27. adda... 
29. τοὐναντίον in parenth. ponenda censet M. Alford, post 27. ὀσμαί et post 29. τοὐναντίον 
punct. vulg. || 29. τὰ δὲ τοὐναντίον ante 28. λέγω SU VX, eodem loco, quo vulgata, etiam 
Them. Philop. || 30. ὀδμή sine articulo E (Bhl.) || post ὀσμή punct. vulg. || 32. ὀδμὰς E || 
421 Ὁ, t. ἀπὸ τοῦ solus E vet. transl. Bek. Trend. Biehl, ἀπὸ τοῦ unc. incl. Rodier, 
om. reliqui, etiam Simpl. 153, 34 Torst., qui virgulam post γλυκεῖα et post 2. δριμεῖα 
posuit || 2. καὶ τοῦ uw. T Bek. Trend., τοῦ om. Simpl. || 4. καὶ ἢ om. SU VX, καὶ om. 
W Them. Bek. Trend., ἡ ἀκοὴ exstingui vult Madvig. 


92 DE ANIMA If CH. 9 


ΝᾺ ‘ 9 ’ \ ¢ ¥ 
καὶ ἀνηκούστου, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου, καὶ ἢ ὄσφρη- 5 
“A > +f \ Ν Ν 
σις τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ καὶ ἀνοσφράντον. ἀνόσφραντον δὲ τὸ μὲν 
Ν ‘ Ψ δύ » 9 , \ δὲ ἃ ¥ ν 
παρὰ τὸ ὅλως ἀδύνατον ἔχειν ὀσμήν, TO OE μικρᾶν EXO 
Ν Ν, 4 ξ , δὲ \ Ν 3 λέ 
καὶ τὸ φαύλην. ὁμοίως ὃὲ καὶ TO ἀγευστον λέγεται. 
Δ rd Ὁ a? a 
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, οἷον ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος" 
ὶ γὰρ τὰ ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁμοίως καὶ το 
καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁμοίως 
Ν > a 9.9 ‘ Ν, 
ἔναιμα καὶ ἄναιμα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ αέρι: καὶ γὰρ 
δ Ἃ \ ν᾽ 
τούτων ἔνια πόρρωθεν ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ὕποσμα 
4 N ε / 
γινόμενα. διὸ καὶ ἄπορον φαίνεται, εἰ πάντα μὲν ὁμοίως 
Ἃ 3 ¢ XN 
ὀσμᾶται, ὃ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ἀναπνέων, μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ 
- “κ᾿ ¥ 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκπνέων ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται, οὔτε 15 
πόρρωθεν οὔτ᾽ ἐγγύθεν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ μυκτῆρος ἐντὸς τεθῇ" 
ἴω - 9 7 
καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἀναίσθητον 
» ‘ ,ὕὔ 3 Ν \ » A > ΝᾺ Ν 3 θ f 
εἶναι κοινὸν πάντων" ἀλλὰ τὸ avev τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθά- 
ΝᾺ ψ 
νεσθαι ἴδιον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων" δῆλον δὲ πειρωμένοις" ὥστε 
¥ > » 
τὰ ἄναιμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀναπνέουσιν, ἑτέραν ἂν Ti αἴσθησιν 20 
» Ἁ Ν , 9 9 δύ » ~ > ~ 
ἔχοι Tapa tas λεγομένας. ἀλλ᾽ advvarov, εἴπερ τῆς ὀσμῆς 
3 δ ε \ “~ 3 ‘a ¥ Ν ὃ IO 
αἰσθάνεται: ἣ yap Tov ὀσφραντοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ δυσώδους 
καὶ εὐώδους ὄὀσφρησίς ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται 
εν aA 3 A > A e7> @ ¥ a 5 , 
ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ὀσμῶν ὑφ᾽ ὦνπερ ἄνθρωπος, οἷον daddh- 
του καὶ θείου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὀσφραίνεσθαι μὲν οὖν ἀναγ- 25 
ῪᾺ 3 9 3 3 ? ¥ s ἌΝᾺ 9 ᾽ ¢ 
καῖον, GAN οὐκ ἀναπνέοντα. ἔοικε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διαφέ- 
9 , A \ \ LA ¥ , y 
pew τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ὥσπερ 
Ἀ ¥ Ἁ \ nn / ‘ \ ‘ ¥ 
τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς τὰ τῶν σκληροφθάλμων: τὰ μὲν yap ἔχει 
la “ ¥ ¥ Ν , Δ Ν a 
φράγμα καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰ βλέφαρα, ἃ μὴ κινήσας 
μηδ᾽ ἀνασπάσας οὐχ dpa: τὰ δὲ σκληρόφθαλμα οὐδὲν 30 
»Ἤ “ 3 > θέ e ΜᾺ ‘ / 3 “ 
Exel τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθέως δρᾷ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ δια- 
™ > 
φανεῖ: οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον τοῖς μὲν 


ἀκάλυφες εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ ὄμμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἀέρα δεχο- 4228 


2 ¥ 3 / a 3 ‘4 > 4 
μένοις ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα, ὃ ἀναπνεόντων ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι, 
8 διευρυνομένων τῶν φλεβίων καὶ τῶν πόρων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο 


5. καὶ τοῦ ἀνηκ. TX || καὶ τοῦ ἀορ. TX, utroque loco om. τοῦ Them. || 4 om, 
SVX, leg. Them. || 6. καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσῴρ. ST UX, om. τοῦ Them. || 7. ὀδμήν EW ἢ 
8. τὸ ante φαύλην om. S WX Bek. Trend., leg. Them. || 10. ὀδμῆς E || ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 
SUVX Philop. Bek. Trend., ὁμοίως καὶ E (Trend.) et TW || rx. τὰ ἔναιμα καὶ τὰ ἄν. 
SUVX Bek. Trend. Philop., τὰ ἔναιμα Soph. 92, 14 (--καὶ τὰ dvaipa> a Soph. omissa 
add. Hayduck) || 13. καὶ om. E || rq. et 15. ddu. E ἢ 14. μέν post ἀναπνέων SUV X 
Bek. Trend., μὲν ὀσμᾶται W, μὲν om. etiam Them. || 2} ἀναπνέων δὲ om. SU VX, leg. 
Them. || 15. ἀλλ’ ἐκπνέων om. Wy Them. || τό. post τεθῇ τό. et post πειρωμένοις το. cola 


CH. 9 421 Ὁ 5—422a 3 93 


sight of the visible and invisible, so smell is of the odorous and 
inodorous. By inodorous may be meant either that which is wholly 
incapable of having odour or that which has a slight or faint odour. 
The term tasteless involves a similar ambiguity. 

Further, smell also operates through a medium, namely, air or 5 
The water. For water animals, too, whether they are, or 
medium. are not, possessed of blood, seem to perceive odour 
as much as the creatures in the air: since some of them also 
come from a great distance to seek their food, guided by the 
scent. 

Hence there is an obvious difficulty, if the process of smell is 6 
Inhalation CVerywhere the same, and yet man smells when in- 
a neces. | haling but does not smell when instead of inhaling he 
dition in is exhaling or holding his breath, no matter whether 
=e the object be distant or near, or even if it be placed 
on the inside of the nostril. The inability to perceive what 
is placed immediately on the sense-organ man shares with all 
animals: what is peculiar to him is that he cannot smell without 
inhaling. This is made plain by experiment. Consequently blood- 
less animals, since they do not breathe, might be thought to have 
a distinct sense other than those commonly recognised. But, we 
reply, that is impossible, since it is odour which they perceive. 
For perception of odour, be it fragrant or noisome, constitutes 
smelling. Moreover, it is found that these bloodless animals are 
destroyed by the same powerful odours as man, such as asphalt, 
brimstone and the like. It follows then that they do smell, but 
not by inhaling breath. 

It would seem, again, that in man the organ of this sense 7 
differs from that of the other animals, as his eyes differ from those 
of hard-eyed animals. Man’s eyes have, in the eyelids, 
a sort of screen or sheath and without moving or open- 
ing them he cannot see: while the hard-eyed animals have nothing 
of the kind, but at once see whatever is taking place in the trans- 
parent medium. So, too, it seems, the organ of smell in some 
animals is unenclosed, just as is the eye, but in those which take 
in the air it has a curtain, which is removed in the process of 
inhaling, by dilatation of the veins and passages. And this is the 8 


Nostrils. 


ponenda censet Hayduck, progr. Gryph. 1873, p. 3, recte || 19. pro ἀνθρώπων legi vult 
ὀσφραντῶν Hayduck, quod probant Susemihl, Jen. Lit. Zt. 1877, p. 7o8 Rodier II, 312 
Beare, p, 150, adn. I {| 21. ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον a sensu suspecta videntur Trend., leg. Soph. et 
sine dubio Them. || 23. δὴ Ey, δὲ etiam Them. || 29. φράγμα] πῶμα W, quod ex priore 
editione huc illatum esse suspicatur Torst. || 31. εὐθὺς S UV X et in interpret. Them. 
Soph., εὐθέως Simpl. || 422 a, 3. φλεβῶν ET Them., φλεβίων etiam Philop. 


94 DE ANIMA Il CHS. 9, 10 


A A oe A 9 A \ 
τὰ ἀναπνέοντα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται ἐν τῷ ὕγρῳ' ἀναγκαῖον yap 
» A ἰοὺ 9 “Ἂ € ΜᾺ 
ὀσφρανθῆναι ἀναπνεύσαντα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ 5 
~ “ Ψ ε \ Ὁ: a 
ἀδύνατον. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ ὀσμὴ τοῦ ξηροῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ χυμὸς τοῦ ὑγροῦ, 
7 a 
τὸ δὲ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον δυνάμει τοιοῦτον. 
on 3 ¥ ~ X 
10 =‘ Td δὲ yevordy ἐστιν ἅπτόν τι" καὶ τοῦτ᾽ αἴτιον TOU μὴ 
3. 3 ry \ a A tAX / ¥ a , 
εἶναι αἰσθητὸν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματος 
950." Ἁ ε ε ’ Ν \ A δὲ 3 @ ε ‘4 \ 
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀφή. Kal TO σῶμα ὃὲ ἐν ᾧ ὃ χυμός, TO γευ- τὸ 
? 3 ε ~ oe aN . ~ > ε , ὃ \ aN > 9 
στόν, ἐν ὑγρῷ ws ὕλῃ" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἅπτόν TL. διὸ κἂν εἰ ἐν 
ὕδατι ἦμεν, ἠσθανόμεθ ἂν ἐμβληθέντος τοῦ γλυκέος' 
3. a \ A , »\\ 4 a 
χοὐκ ἦν δ᾽ ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις ἡμῖν διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, ἀλλὰ τῷ 
~ “ ΝᾺ ~ ~ ‘N ‘ ΝᾺ 
μειχθῆναι τῷ ὑγρῷ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποτοῦ. τὸ δὲ χρῶμα 
ae) “ \ “ Fa 
οὐχ οὕτως ὁρᾶται τῷ μείγνυσθαι, οὐδὲ Tals ἀπορροίαις. ὡς 15 
4 δι \ ‘ "θέ 5 ε δὲ A Ve , y 
μὲν οὖν τὸ μεταξὺ οὐθέν ἐστιν. ὡς δὲ χρῶμα τὸ ὁρατόν, οὕτω 
τὸ γευστὸν ὁ χυμός. οὐθὲν δὲ ποιεῖ χυμοῦ αἴσθησιν ἄνευ 
ε , 5.3 ¥ 3 , rN , ε / @ ‘ 
ὑγρότητος, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει ἐνεργείᾳ 7) δυνάμει ὑγρότητα, οἷον τὸ 
ἁλμυρόν: εὐτηκτόν τε γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ συντηκτικὸν γλώττης. 
3 ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄψις ἐστὶ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου (τὸ 20 
γὰρ σκότος ἀόρατον, κρίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ὄψις), ἔτι τοῦ 
λίαν λαμπροῦ (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀόρατον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ 
, ε 7 δὲ νι ς 3 Ν / Ν ΜᾺ ἐν 
σκότους), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ψόφου τε καὶ σιγῆς, ὧν 
\ Ἀ > ‘ N δ᾽ > 9 4 Ἀ , a 
TO μὲν ἀκουστὸν τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀκουστόν, Kal μεγάλου ψόφου, 

, e Κ n A Ψ \ ς ‘ , 
καθάπερ ἡ ὄψις τοῦ λαμπροῦ (ὥσπερ γὰρ 6 μικρὸς ψόφος 25 
ἀνήκουστος, τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ὁ μέγας τε καὶ ὃ βίαιος), ἀό- 

\ Ν »" μ id ν ‘ > > » ‘ 
parov δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅλως λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων τὸ 
"δύ \ 5? oN . ἊΝ » a ‘\ ¥ 
ἀδύνατον, TO ἐὰν πεφυκὸς μὴ ἔχῃ ἢ φαύλως, ὥσπερ 
τὸ ἄπουν καὶ TO ἀπύρηνον' οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τοῦ γευστοῦ 
τε καὶ ἀγεύστου, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μικρὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἔχον χυμὸν 30 
ἢ φθαρτικὸν τῆς γεύσεως. δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τὸ ποτὸν καὶ 
7. αἰσθ. τὸ ὃ. SUX Them., τὸ om. Soph. || 10. δὲ om. SUX, leg. Simpl. | 
τα. ὕλη E (Trend.), ὕληι E (Bek. Bus.), ὕλῃ etiam ceteri codd. et Them. 70, 33 et Simpl. 
et Philop. et ap. Philop. Alex., qui etiam ὕδατι pro ὕλῃ legi tradit || car] καὶ SU VW X, 
κἂν etiam Them. || 12. εἶμεν solus E, sed e in rasura positum, videtur subfuisse ἦμεν 
(Trend.), εἶμεν Bek. Torst. {| 12. αἰσθανοίμεθ᾽ solus Ἐν Bek. Torst., alcOaviued’ T et, ut 
videtur, Them. 70, 24, ἦμεν et ἠσθανόμεθ᾽ leg. Philop. Soph. Trend. ‘‘essemus et 
sentiremus” vet. transl. || 17. αἴσθησιν χυμοῦ SU V, χυμοῦ αἴσθ. etiam Soph. || 18. ἄλλ... 
ὑγρότητα om. E, post ἁλμυρόν ponit T, vulgatam tuentur Them. Simpl. Soph. || 19. τηκτόν 
SUX Soph. || γλώσσης SUV || 20. de hoc loco ὥσπερ...31. γεύσεως vid. Bon. stud. 
Arist. If, III, 43, quem in distinguendis singulis enunciationis membris, praeeunte 
Biehlio, secutus sum || 20. re om. EW, leg. Them. Philop. Soph. || rod ante dop. om. 


STU Wy, leg. Them. Philop. Soph. || 26. virgulam post ἀνήκουστος Bon. et Madvig, 
Advers. crit. I, Ὁ. 472, et iam Them. hunc locum ita interpretatus est. vost τινὰ Rek. 


CHS. 9, 10 4228 4—422a 31 95 


reason why animals which breathe cannot smell in the water. For 
it is necessary for them to take in breath before smelling and 
this they cannot do in the water. Odour is included under that 
which is dry, as flavour under that which is moist, and the organ of 
smell is potentially dry also. 

The object of taste is a species of tangible. And this is the 10 
reason why it is not perceived through a foreign body 
as medium: for touch employs no such medium either. 
The body, too, in which the flavour resides, the proper object of 

taste, has the moist, which is something tangible, for its 
has no - . . . 
external matter or vehicle. Hence, even if we lived in water, 
medium. we should still perceive anything sweet thrown into the 
water, but our perception would not have come through the 2 
medium, but by the admixture of sweetness with the fluid, as is 
the case with what we drink. But it is not in this way, namely, by 
admixture, that colour is perceived, nor yet by emanations. 
Nothing, then, corresponds to the medium; but to colour, which is 
the object of sight, corresponds the flavour, which is the object of 
Moisture vaste. But nothing produces perception of flavour in the 
indispens- absence of moisture, but either actually or potentially the 
ante: producing cause must have liquid in it: salt, for instance, 
for that is easily dissolved and acts as a dissolvent upon the tongue. 

Again, sight is of the invisible as well as the visible (for dark- 3 
ness is invisible and this, too, sight discerns as well as light) and, 
further, of that which is exceedingly bright, which is likewise in- 
visible, though in a different way from darkness. Similarly hearing 
has to do with noise and silence, the former being audible, the latter 
inaudible, and, further, with loud noise, to which it is related as 
vision is to brightness, a loud and a violent sound being in a manner 
just as inaudible as a faint sound. The term invisible, be it noted, 
is applied not only to that which it is wholly impossible to see, 
which corresponds to other cases of the impossible, but also when 
a thing has imperfectly or not at all its natural properties, answer- 
ing to the footless and the kernel-less. So, too, taste has for object 
The object mot only that which can be tasted, but also the tasteless, 
of taste. = by which we mean that which has little flavour or hardly 
any at all, or a flavour destructive of the taste. Now in flavour 
this distinction is supposed to start with the drinkable and the 


Torst. Trend. || 27. <mh ἔχον xp@ua> post ὅλως addendum censet Essen || 27. ὥσπερ... 
28. ἀδύνατον in parenth. posuit Rodier || 28. ἂν E || 29. ἁπτὸν 5, ἁπλοῦν EB, ἄπουν 
Philop. Simpl. || 7d ante dtp. om. ETU Simpl. || δὲ ETUW Simpl., δὴ etiam 
Them. 71, 7 et Soph. 94, 28 videntur legisse || 30. καὶ τοῦ dy. SV Them., om. τοῦ 
Simpl. || 7] καὶ VX. 


Taste 


96 DE ANIMA JI CHS. I0, 11 


A ; 3 Ν Ν Ν f 
ἄποτον: γεῦσις γάρ τις ἀμφότερα' ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φαύλη 
Ν Ν a ΄ Ν δὲ ἈΝ , 4 δὲ 
4 καὶ φθαρτικὴ τῆς γεύσεως, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν. ἔστι O€ κοι- 
‘ cya \ 4 Ν i 3 ‘\ δ᾽ ς Ν x / 
νὸν ἁφῆς Kal γεύσεως TO ποτόν. ἐπεὶ ὁ ὑγρὸν TO γευστόν, 
a ¢e N > 3 
ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτοῦ μήτε ὑγρὸν εἶναι ἐντελε- 422b 
/ / ε an 
χείᾳ μήτε ἀδύνατον ὑγραίνεσθαι. πάσχει yap τι ἡ γεῦ- 
κι + 
σις ὑπὸ TOD γευστοῦ, ἡ γευστόν. ἀναγκαῖον apa ὑγρανθῆναι 
7 ‘ ξ ν / Ν 
τὸ δυνάμενον μὲν ὑγραίνεσθαι σωζόμενον, μὴ ὑγρὸν δέ, τὸ 
γευστικὸν αἰσθητήριον. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτε κατάξηρον οὖσαν 
‘\ a) 9 ; 4 / εξ / y δ ξ ‘ 
τὴν γλῶτταν αἰσθάνεσθαι μήτε λίαν ὑγράν" αὐτὴ yap ἀφὴ 
“ον 
γίνεται τοῦ πρώτου ὑγροῦ, ὥσπερ ὅταν προγευματίσας τις 
ἰσχυροῦ χυμοῦ γεύηται ἑτέρου" καὶ οἷον τοῖς κάμνουσι πικρὰ 
πάντα φαίνεται διὰ τὸ τῇ γλώττῃ πλήρει τοιαύτης ὑγρό- 
ΜᾺ a) ¥ 
5 τητος αἰσθάνεσθαι. τὰ δ᾽ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν, ὥσπερ Kal ἐπὶ το 
τῶν χρωμάτων, ἁπλᾷ μὲν τἀναντία, τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ 
᾽ 3 ’ δὲ “A \ ‘\ λ / a“ δὲ Ν ἐλ 7 
πικρόν, ἐχόμενα δὲ τοῦ μὲν τὸ λιπαρόν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἁλμυρόν" 
Ἁ Ν 3 4 Ν \ Ν 3 N Ν 4 
μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων τό τε δριμὺ Kal τὸ αὐστηρὸν καὶ στρυφνὸν 
καὶ ὀξύ' σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διαφοραὶ χυμῶν. 
4 
ὥστε TO γευστικόν ἐστι TO δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, γευστὸν δὲ TO ποιη- 


rn 


μι 


5 

Ν 9 4 3 A 
TUKOV ἐντελεχείᾳ αὑτοῦ. 

Ἢ . ne A \ ν. δε) a ε "ΛΝ , 3 \ ε 
11 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ περὶ ἀφῆς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος" εἰ γὰρ ἡ 
ε A Ἅ a 3 A ¥ 5 Ν “ 9 Ἂ N ‘ 
aby μὴ pia ἐστὶν αἴσθησις ἀλλὰ πλείους, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ 
ε Ἁ 9 Ν , > ¥y Ss 9% , 4 r 
ἁπτὰ αἰσθητὰ πλείω εἶναι. ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν πότερον πλείους 
εἰσὶν ἣ μία, καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ, πότερον 20 
ε Ν ‘ 3 a IND \ > ») Ἂ ¥ 3 ‘ “A 
ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο 
, 3 ‘ , Ν δὲ ΝᾺ 5 , x” , 
μέν ἐστι τὸ μεταξύ, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον ἄλλο τί 
2 ἐστιν ἐντός. πᾶσά τε γὰρ αἴσθησις μιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι 
ὃ ~ 5" » an’ ‘ 4 N 3 Ν ? ¢ N 
oKel, οἷον ὄψις λευκοῦ Kal μέλανος Kat ἀκοὴ ὀξέος καὶ 
βαρέος καὶ γεῦσις πικροῦ καὶ γλυκέος: ἐν δὲ τῷ ἁπτῷ ες 
‘ » > 4 \ / ‘ ε ’ 
πολλαὶ ἔνεισιν ἐναντιώσεις, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, 

λ ‘ λ 7 ‘ A ¥ v4 a) ¥ ὃ id 
σκληρὸν μαλακόν, Kal τῶν ἄλλων σα τοιαῦτα. ἔχει d€ 
τινα λύσιν πρός γε ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 

32. ἀμφοτέρου coni. Trend. || 422 Ὁ, 1. καὶ om. Ξ5ΞΤΝΧ Them. || 4. μὲν om. 
SUV WX, leg. Philop. et, ut videtur, Them. 71, 34 || 6. γλῶσσαν Ὁ Ὁ Ν ΝΥ {{ αὕτη] 
coni. αὐτοῦ Torst., tuentur airy Philop. Simpl. Soph. || yap ἡ ἁφὴ E Simpl., ἡ om. 
Philop. Soph. || 8. χυμοῦ om. E, leg. Them. Soph. || 9. τὴν γλῶτταν πλήρη TWy ἢ 
13. τὸ ante aver. om. SV W || 16. post αὐτοῦ excidisse putat οἷον αὐτό Torst., ac re 
vera in interpret. habent οἷον αὐτό et Them. et Philop. || 17. καὶ περὶ] καὶ SU V X Soph., 


καὶ τῆς W et fort. Simpl., καὶ περὶ ἁφῆς etiam Philop. Torst. |] 20. τὸ ante τοῦ om. 
SVX Simpl. || darixod omnes codd. praeter W, qui ἁπτοῦ habet, ἁπτικοῦ etiam Simpl. 


CHS. I0, II 422a 32—422b 28 Q7 


undrinkable. Both are tastes of a sort, but the latter is poor or 
destructive of the faculty of taste, while the former is naturally 
adapted to it. The drinkable is the common object of touch and 4 
The of taste. But, since the object of taste is moist, the 
orm sense-organ which perceives it must be neither actually 
moist nor yet incapable of becoming moist. For taste is acted 
upon by the object of taste as such. The organ of taste, then, 
which needs to be moistened, must have the capacity of absorbing 
moisture without being dissolved, while at the same time it must 
not be actually moist. A proof of this is the fact that the tongue 
has no perception either when very dry or very moist. In the latter 
case the contact is with the moisture originally in the tongue, just 
as when a man first makes trial of a strong flavour and then tastes 
some other flavour; or as with the sick, to whom all things appear 
bitter because they perceive them with their tongue full of bitter 
moisture. 

As with the colours, so with the species of flavour, there are, 5 
Species of firstly, simple flavours, which are opposites, the sweet and 
flavour. the bitter; next to these on one side the succulent, on 
the other the salt; and, thirdly, intermediate between these, the 
pungent, the rough, the astringent and the acid. ‘These seem to 
be practically all the varieties of flavour. Consequently, while the 
faculty of taste has potentially the qualities just described, the 
object of taste converts the potentiality into actuality. 

The same account is to be given of touch and the tangible. 11 
If touch is not a single sense but includes more senses 
than one, there must be a plurality of tangible objects 
also. It is a question whether touch is several senses or only 
Is ita one. What, moreover, is the sense-organ for the faculty 
single of touch? Is it the flesh or what is analogous to this 

in creatures that have not flesh? Or is flesh, on 
the contrary, the medium, while the primary sense-organ is 
something different, something internal? We may argue thus: 2 
every sense seems to deal with a single pair of opposites, sight 
with white and black, hearing with high and low pitch, taste with 
bitter and sweet; but under the tangible are included several 
pairs of opposites, hot and cold, dry and moist, hard and soft and 
the like. A partial solution of this difficulty lies in the con- 


Touch. 


Soph. et, ut videtur, Them. 73, 12, ἁπτοῦ ἁπτικόν de coniect. scripsit Bek., quem secuti 
sunt Trend. Torst. || 21. ἡ om. SUVW, leg. Them. Simpl. Soph. |] 23. τε om. X, 
huic re respondet 25. δὲ, cf. Bz. Oestr. Gymn. Zeitschr. 1867, p. 680 || 26. εἰσὶν 
STUVX. 


H. 7 


98 DE ANIMA IT CH. 11 


, « 3 “ 3 
ἄλλων αἰσθήσεών εἰσιν ἐναντιώσεις πλείους, οἷον ἐν φωνῇ οὐ 
Ἅ ’ἤ 
μόνον ὀξύτης καὶ βαρύτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότης 30 
A . pa AJ gy 3 N \ 
καὶ λειότης Kal τραχύτης φωνῆς καὶ τοιαῦθ᾽ ἕτερα. εἰσὶ δὲ 
‘ “ ~ N ων Ψ 3 Ν ,’ λὰ \ ἃ 
καὶ περὶ χρῶμα διαφοραὶ τοιαῦται ἕτεραι. adda τί τὸ ἕν τὸ ὑπο- 
’, y 3 Ἂ a σ΄ ma € “Ἂ 3 ¥ ¥ ὃ λ 
κεΐμενον, ὥσπερ ἀκοῇ ψόφος, οὕτω τῇ ἁφῇ, οὐκ ἐστιν ἐνδηλον. 
’ δ᾽ > ‘N A 3 θ id 3 - “ἡ » LNA. 3 
3 ΠΟΤΈΡΟΡ ἐστι TO αἰἱσὔητηριον EVTOS, Ἢ OV, a ευ- 
a A > ¥ 
θέως ἡ σάρξ, οὐδὲν δοκεῖ σημεῖον εἶναι τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν al- 4238 
» Ἃ ᾽ 
σθησιν ἅμα θιγγανομένων. καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἴ τις περὶ τὴν σάρ- 
ms ¥ 
κα περιτείνειεν οἷον ὑμένα ποιήσας, ὁμοίως THY αἴσθησιν εὐ- 
θέως ἁψάμενος ἐνσημαίνει: καίτοι δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ 
‘ > ᾽ 3 \ \ 4 ? ἴω ¥ 
476 αἰσθητήριον: εἰ δὲ καὶ συμφυὲς γένοιτο, θᾶττον ἔτι δι- 
" ¥ \ Ν “ ¥ 
uxvoir ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις. διὸ τὸ τοιοῦτο μόριον TOV σώματος ἔοι- 
9 “Ὁ 
κεν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ κύκλῳ ἡμῖν περιεπεφύκει ὁ 

> > a“ ‘ aA ¢ » > / Ν ’ Ν 

ἀήρ: ἐδοκοῦμεν γὰρ ἂν évi τινι αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ψόφου καὶ 
~ ¥ LO 
χρώματος καὶ ὀσμῆς, καὶ pia τις αἴσθησις εἶναι ὄψις ἀκοὴ 
¥ a \ δ \ , > δ΄ 2 ς , 
ὄσφρησις. νῦν δὲ διὰ τὸ διωρίσθαι dv οὗ γίνονται αἱ κινήσεις, 10 
\ Ν 3 , 3 θ ΄ Ψ y 3. N de ‘a crea 
φανερὰ τὰ εἰρημένα αἰσθητήρια ἕτερα ὄντα. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς 
~ ων ¥ > >/ N ‘ a“ Ψ > - 
τοῦτο νῦν ἄδηλον: ἐξ ἀέρος μὲν yap ἢ ὕδατος ἀδύνατον 
ΜᾺ Ἁ “ 
συστῆναι τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα" δεῖ γάρ τι στερεὸν εἶναι. λείπεται 
δὲ Ν > ἰοὺ N , ὧν @ nN ον € ‘ 

ὲ μεικτὸν EK γῆς Kal τούτων εἶναι, οἷον βούλεται «εἶναι» ἡ σὰρξ 
καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον: ὦστε ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ 15 
- a ΄ ὃ > κ᾿ ΄ ε 3 θ 4 , Ὁ 
ἅἁπτικοῦ προσπεφυκός, δι᾽ οὗ γίνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις πλείους οὖ- 

ὃ λ αν δ᾽ Ψ λ “4 [2 > Ν᾿ ~ », ε ᾿ é é 
Saat. δηλοῖ ὃ ὅτι πλείους ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης ἁφή" ἁπάντων 
γὰρ τῶν ἁπτῶν αἰσθάνεται κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον καὶ χυμοῦ, 

3 Ν μὰ ΝΥ Ν 9 id ~ on δ. / a € 
εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σὰρξ ἡσθάνετο τοῦ χυμοῦ, ἐδόκει ἂν ἡ 

oN Ἀ / > » ς a \ ¢ ε ΄ Ὰ Ν 
αὐτὴ καὶ μία εἶναι αἴσθησις ἡ γεῦσις καὶ ἡ ἁφή; νῦν δὲ 20 
δύο διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν. 


33. δῆλον SU VX, & δῆλον Ἐ, ὃν δῆλον T, ἔνδηλον etiam Simpl. Philop. ἢ 
423 8, I. post σάρξ signum interrogationis Bek. Trend., virguiam Torst. || r& E || 
2. vivom. 5 U V, leg. Them. || 4. ἁψάμενον P, ἁψαμένοις in interpret. Them., ἁψαμένοις vel 
ἁψαμένῳ coni. Trend., dyapévov coni. Torst. || ἐνσημήνεις X, ἂν ἐνσημαίνει T || 6. τοιοῦτον 
STUV WX, τοιοῦτο Philop. Them. (v.1. τοιοῦτον) || 9. ὀδμῆς ET ΝΥ, ὀσμῆς Philop. || 
to. κινήσεις καὶ al αἰσθήσεις U, αἰσθήσεις yp. S et Them. 73, 18, textum tuetur Soph. ἢ 
12. τοῦτο μὲν viv ET W, om. μὲν etiam Simpl. || γὰρ] οὖν coni. Essen {| x 3. pro ἔμψυχον 
coni. μεταξὺ ὃν Susemihl, Burs. Jahrb. IX, 351 || 14. δὴ VW Them. Bek. Trend. ἢ 
post βούλεται excidisse εἶναι καὶ coni. Torst., εἶναι e Themistio et Sophonia recepit 
Biehl, nihil desiderandum censet Rodier || 15. ἀνάλογον εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα αἴσθησις διὰ τοῦ 
μεταξύ, καὶ ἡ ἁφή Ald. Basil., quod additamentum e Themistio (cf. 73, 27) fluxisse 
recte iudicat iam Basil. in margine || ἀναγκαῖον καὶ] ἀναγκαῖον εἴναι καὶ ἘΣ, om. καὶ U 
Torst. || τὸ σῶμα εἶναι] εἶναι τὸ σῶμα U || τὸ ante μεταξύ TXy Them. Simpl. Torst., 


CH. II 422 Ὁ 29—423 a 21 99 


sideration that the other senses also apprehend more than one pair 
of opposites. Thus in vocal sound there is not only high and low 
pitch, but also loudness and faintness, smoothness and roughness, 
and soon. In regard to colour also there are other similar varieties. 
But what the one thing is which is subordinated to touch as sound 
is to hearing is not clear. 

But is the organ of sense internal or is the flesh the immediate 3 
what organ? No inference can be drawn, seemingly, from 
is the the fact that the sensation occurs simultaneously with 
organ? contact. For even under present conditions, if a sort of 
membrane were constructed and stretched over the flesh, this would 
immediately on contact transmit the sensation as before. And yet 
it is clear that the organ of sense is not in this membrane; although, 4 
if by growth it became united to the flesh, the sensation would be 
transmitted even more quickly. Hence it appears that the part 
of the body in question, that is, the flesh, is related to us as the 
air would be if it were united to us all round by natural growth. 
We should then have thought we were perceiving sound, colour 
and smell by one and the same instrument: in fact, sight, 
hearing and smell would have seemed to us in a manner to con- 
stitute a single sense. But as it is, owing to the media, by which 
the various motions are transmitted, being separated from us, the 
difference of the organs of these three senses is manifest. But in 
regard to touch this point is at present obscure. 

In fact, the animate body cannot consist of air or water 
singly, it must be something solid. The only alternative is that 
it should be a compound of earth and of these elements, as flesh 
and what is analogous to flesh profess to be. Consequently the 
body must be the naturally cohering medium for the faculty 
of touch, through which the plurality of sensations is communi- 
cated. That they are a plurality is made clear by touch in the 5 
case of the tongue, for the tongue perceives all tangible objects, 
and that at the same part at which it perceives flavour. Now, if 
the rest of the flesh also had perception of flavour, taste and touch 
would have seemed to be one and the same sense: whereas they 
are really two, because their organs are not interchangeable. 


quod probat etiam Steinhart, om. τὸ reliqui ante Biehlium omnes || 18. αἴσθεται STU | 
19. καὶ om. S Ὁ, leg. etiam Them. Simpl. 


7—2 


100 DE ANIMA If CH, II 


nw » a) 5 ‘ 
6 ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἂν τις, εἰ Tay σῶμα βάθος ἔχει, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ 
\ / , ® 2 3 Ἀ , f Ν μον , 
τὸ τρίτον μέγεθος: av δ᾽ ἐστὶ δύο σωμάτων μεταξὺ σῶμά τι, 
> 9 7 “ 3 ‘4 4 ‘ δ᾽ ε 4 > ¥ 
οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα ἀλλήλων ἅπτεσθαι" τὸ δ᾽ ὑγρὸν οὐκ ἐστιν 
¥ rd Oe \ ὃ ΄ 9 λ᾽ 3 a "ὃ > vA ¥ 
ἄνευ σώματος, οὐδὲ TO διερόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ εἶναι ἢ ἔχειν 25 
»Ν-» ‘ ΜᾺ ¥ 
ὕδωρ' τὰ δὲ ἁπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, μὴ ξηρῶν τῶν ἄκρων 
¥ > σι "ὃ » 4 = > » λ \ Y¥ . 
ὄντων, ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ ἔχειν μεταξύ, οὗ ἀνάπλεα τὰ ἔσχατα 
εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθές, ἀδύνατον ἅψασθαι ἄλλο ἄλλου ἐν ὕδατι, 
\ >. UN \ / Ν > ἊΜ +7 ε ? “ ¥ ε aN 
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι (ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει ὁ ἀὴρ 
Ν Ν > > ~ Ἅ Ν “ὃ ‘\ ‘ > ne "ὃ λ 
πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, λαν- 30 
, A a ε a) > Ἁ N > a y aa 
θάνει δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ Kal τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ζῷα, 
7 εἰ διερὸν διεροῦ ἅπτεται)" πότερον οὖν πάντων ὁμοίως 423b 
ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἢ ἄλλων ἄλλως, καθάπερ νῦν δοκεῖ ἡ 
Ν a) N ε ε Ἀ “ Ψ e 3 ¥ A 
μὲν γεῦσις Kal ἡ ady τῷ amterOa, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι ἄποθεν. 
4 > > ¥ 3 Ν δ \ 4 \ ‘ \ > 
τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ TO σκληρὸν Kai TO μαλακὸν δι 
ς 9, 3 / ν Ἀ Ἁ Ἂ Ν XN Ξε Ν 
ἑτέρων αἰσθανόμεθα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ψοφητικὸν καὶ τὸ δρατὸν 5 
Α \ 3 - 3 \ ‘ ‘ 4 Ν > 5 [4 Ν 
καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντόν: ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐγγύθεν. διὸ 
λανθάνει" ἐπεὶ αἰσθανόμεθά γε πάντων διὰ τοῦ μέσου" ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐπὶ τούτων λανθάνει. καίτοι καθάπερ εἴπαμεν καὶ πρότερον, 
aA 3 > ε 2 3 ΄ ~ € ΝᾺ ξ ᾽ ? 
Kav εἰ δι’ ὑμένος αἰσθανοίμεθα τῶν ἁπτῶν ἁπάντων λανθά- 
γοντος ὅτι διείργει, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τὸ 
τῷ ὕδατι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι: δοκοῦμεν γὰρ νῦν αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαι 
8 καὶ οὐδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσον. ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τὸ ἁπτὸν τῶν dpa- 
τῶν καὶ τῶν ψοφητικῶν, ὅτι ἐκείνων μὲν αἰσθανόμεθα τῷ 
Ν Ἶ : ε Ρ μ τῷ 
τὸ μεταξὺ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ ἁπτῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ με- 
ταξὺ ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα τῷ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ ὁ δι’ ἀσπίδος πληγείς" 15 
οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀσπὶς πληγεῖσα ἐπάταξεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅμ᾽ ἄμφω 
~ ν 3 ΜΆ 
9 συνέβη πληγῆναι. ὅλως δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἣ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, ὡς 


22. ἀπορήσειε...423 Ὁ, 3. ἄποθεν. De hoc loco vid. Torst. et Bon., stud. Arist. II, III, 62, 
quem in interpungendis singulis enunciationis membris, praeeunte Bieblio, secutus sum || 
23. δύο om. SU VX, leg. Soph. || 24. αὐτὰ EWy, ταῦτα Them. Soph. || 25. ὕδατος 
SVX, leg. ὕδωρ Simpl. |] 27. of] 6S TU VX, οὗ Them. Soph. |] 28. post ὕδατι punct. 
Bek. Trend. Torst., colon posuit Biehl || 30. τὸ om, T et E (Trend.), leg. Soph. ἢ} 
ἐν αὐτῷ τῶ ὕδ. ET Wy, ἐν αὐτῷ 85. Soph., reliqui et scripti et impressi ἐν τῷ ὕδ, || 
31. ἡμᾶς ὁ ἀὴρ pro ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ coni. Rodier II, 328 || ante καὶ, omisso ὥσπερ, legisse 
videtur τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι Philop. 428, 26, fortasse etiam Soph. 98, 5 || post tga vulg. 
virg. sustulit Rodier || 423 Ὁ, 1. ἁπάντων SUVW || 2. ἄλλως; καθ. Torst., ἄλλως, 
καθ. Bek. Trend. Bon. || 3. μὲν γεῦσις] μὲν γὰρ γεῦσις W, γεῦσις, omisso μὲν, P ἢ 
ἄποθεν; τὸ Trend., ἄποθεν. τὸ Bek. Torst. Bon. || 5. ψοφητὸν SX, ἔχον ψόφον Ῥ ἢ 
6. τὸ SVX || τὸ ΞΌΝΧ, τὰ utroque loco Soph. τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ λίαν ἐγγὺς λανθάνει P Ι 
ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν...7. λανθάνει interpolata esse censet Rodier II, 328 || post ἐγγύθεν 


CH. II 423 a 22—423b 17 IOI 


Here a question arises. All body has depth, this being the 6 
third dimension, and, if between two bodies a third body is inter- 
Contact posed, the two cannot touch one another. Now that 
in water which is fluid is not independent of body, nor is that 
and in air. . - σι « . - . 

which is wet: if it is not itself water, it must contain 
water. But when bodies touch one another in the water, since their 
exterior surfaces are not dry, there must be water between them, 
the water with which their extremities are flooded. If, then, all 
this be true, no one thing can possibly touch another in the water, 
nor yet in the air: for the air stands to the objects in the air 
as water to the things in water, but this fact we are more apt 
to overlook, just as aquatic animals fail to notice that the things 
which touch one another in the water have wet surfaces. The 7 
question then arises: is the mode of perception uniform for all 
objects or does it differ for different objects? According to the 
prevalent view, taste and touch operate by direct contact, while 
The the other senses operate at a distance. But this view ts 
medium. incorrect. On the contrary, we perceive the hard and the 
soft also mediately, just as much as we do the resonant, the visible, 
the odorous. But the latter are perceived at a distance, the former 
close at hand: and this is why the fact escapes us, since we really 
perceive all objects through a medium, though in touch and taste 
we fail to notice this. And yet, as we mentioned above, even if we 
perceived all objects of touch through a membrane without being 
aware of its interference, we should be just in the same position 
as we are now with regard to objects in the water or in the air: 
for, as it is, we suppose that we are touching the objects them- 
selves and that there is no intervening medium. But there is 8 
this difference between the tangible on the one hand and visible 
and resonant things on the other: the latter we perceive because 
the medium acts in a certain way upon us, while tangible objects 
we perceive not by any action upon us of the medium, but con- 
currently with it, like the man who is struck through his shield. 
It is not that the shield was first struck and then passed on the 
blow, but, as it happened, both were struck simultaneously. And, 9 
generally, it would seem that the flesh and the tongue are related 


colon Torst. || 7. post λανθάνει virgulam Bek. Trend., colon Torst. |] verba 7. ἐπεὶ... 
8. λανθάνει unc. incl. Essen || 8. εἴπαμεν solus E, reliqui codd. εἴπομεν excepto P, qui 
ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον habet || 9. ἠισθανοίμεθα E, αἰσθανώμεθα STU VX, αἰσθανοίμεθα 
etiam Them. || 11. ἐν om. SV Wy || »νῦὧν om. SU VX Bek. Trend. Torst., leg. etiam 
vet. transl. || 12. ὁρατικῶν ET y || 13. τῶν om. EPy Soph. || ἐκεῖνα ESTUVX, 
ἐκείνων P, etiam Soph. || μὲν om. P || τό. ἀλλ᾽ ἅμ᾽ ἄμφω e codd. solus E, etiam Them. 
Sc ph. vet. transl. Torst., az’ om. reliqui ante Torst. omnes || 17. γλῶσσα STU VXy. . 


102 DE ANIMA JI CH. II 


YA 2 4 SLA 
ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς THY ὄψιν καὶ THY ἀκοὴν καὶ THY 
4 \ 3 di ¥ 
ὄσφρησιν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς TO αἰσθητήριον ὥσπερ 
Aw ἴω 3 / ¢€ - 
ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίον απτομένου 20 
~ ἴω » a » Ὰ 
οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖ οὔτ᾽ ἐνταῦθα γένοιτ᾽ ἂν αἴσθησις, olov εὐ τις σῶμα 
a) ; ¥ “ Ν ων 
[τὸ] λευκὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄμματος θείη τὸ ἔσχατον. ἢ καὶ δῆλον 
A“ ΝᾺ ῳ A a 
ὅτι ἐντὸς τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν. οὕτω yap ἂν συμβαΐνοι 
4 A s AN “~ ¥y 3 ἢ νὴ >, A “ 3 θ 4 
ὅπερ Kal ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων' ἐπιτιθεμένων yap ἐπὶ TO αἰσθητή- 
> , 
ριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένων αἰσθά- 25 
ε ΜᾺ e ’ 
νεται; ὥὦστε τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ. 
e ‘ ‘ 4) > A ε ὃ Ἁ “ ? ἐν ΜᾺ . λ ? 
10 drat μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν at διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ἢ σῶμα" λέγω 
~ ld ‘ 
δὲ διαφορὰς at τὰ στοιχεῖα διορίζουσι, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν 
Ν 
ὑγρόν, περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν στοιχείων. 
XN \ > 4 9 -~ ‘\ ε ᾽ A 3 & e 7 

Ir τὸ δὲ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἀἁπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη 30 

adn ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις πρώτῳ, τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι μόριον. 
ad a) ® 
τὸ yap αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἐστίν. ὦστε τὸ ποιοῦν οἷον αὐτὸ 4248 
ἐνεργείᾳ τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ δυνάμει ὄν. διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως 
“~ “ a < a \ “~ > ? / 

θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ ἣ σκληροῦ Kal μαλακοῦ οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, 
3 Ν ~ ε ~ ε “~ 3 4 e ,ὔ A 
ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος 
οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει 5 
τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν" γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον 

3 A ? A yy ‘N “~ ᾽ν Ἁ ? 4 
αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων' καὶ δεῖ ὥσπερ TO μέλλον αἰσθή- 
σεσθαι λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος μηδέτερον αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, 

4 “~ 

δυνάμει δ᾽ ἄμφω (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), Kal ἐπὶ τῆς 
e lal ‘ 

12 ἀφῆς μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρόν. ἔτι δ᾽ ὥσπερ ὁρατοῦ καὶ τὸ 
3 } > e ε 4 δ ‘ ε ‘ ΜᾺ > 
ἀοράτον ἣν πως ἡ ὄψις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ai λοιπαὶ τῶν ἄντι- 

Y N © εν 

κειμένων, οὕτω Kal 7 ἀφὴ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ Kal ἀνάπτου' ἄναπτον 

3 5 N é “\ ¥ 4 ”~ A 
δ᾽ ἐστὶ τό τε μικρὰν ἔχον πάμπαν διαφορὰν τῶν ἁπτῶν, 

ΠῚ , ε 5 Ν σι ε A ee 2 4 
οἷον πέπονθεν ὁ ἀήρ, Kal τῶν ἁπτῶν ai ὑπερβολαΐί, ὥσπερ 

“ θ + θ᾽ ξ 4 A oy ~ 9 θ 4 ¥ 
τὰ φθαρτικά. Kal ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴρηται τς 
τύπῳ. 

20, ἁπτομένων ὌΝ X || 21. τὸ ante σῶμα e priori editione suscepit Torst. |] 22. τὸ ante 
λευκὸν om. 5 U VX, une. incl. Biehl || ἢ W, om. S U V, ἢ etiam Simpl, |} 23. αἰσθητήριον 
TW, αἰσθητικόν etiam Simpl. || 24. ὥσπερ SUVX || xalom. STUVWXy || 27. ἁπτὰ 
TUV Philop. Soph., αὗται P, ἁπταὶ etiam Simpl. 158, 23 sed αὗται ad hunc locum 
etiam in interpr. 164, 17. 18 || 28. αἷς SU V X et fort. Soph. roo, 28 || 29. περὶ τῶν στ. 
ET y Philop., τῶν om. Simpl. Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. || 31. ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις πρώτῳ 
E Simpl. 158, 25, ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις καὶ πρώτω TW, αἴσθησις πρώτως y, “in quo sensus 
vocatus tactus” vet. transl., αἴσθησις om. reliqui codd., etiam Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. 


Torst. || 424 a, 2. post ἐνεργείᾳ vulg. virgulam sustuli || τὸ δυνάμει ὅν e prima editione 
scripsit Torst. || 2. ὁμοίαυ TUX, ὁμοίως etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 3. καὶ prius] ἢ 


CH. II 423 Ὁ 18—-424a 16 103 


to the true sense-organ as are air and water to the organs of sight, 
hearing and smell respectively. But neither in the one case nor in 
the other would sensation follow on contact with the sense-organ; 
for instance, if a body that is white were placed on the outer 
surface of the eye: which shows that the instrument that appre- 
hends the tangible is within. We should then get the same result 
as in the case of the other senses. What is placed on the sense- 
organ we do not perceive: what is placed on the flesh we do 
perceive: therefore flesh is the medium for the faculty of touch. 
It is, then, the distinctive qualities of body as body which are 
the objects of touch: I mean those qualities which determine the 
Tangible Clements, hot or cold, dry or moist, of which we have 
qualities. previously given an account in our discussion of the 
elements. And their sense-organ, the tactile organ, that is, in 
which the sense called touch primarily resides, is the part which has 
potentially the qualities of the tangible object. For perceiving is 
a sort of suffering or being acted upon: so that when the object 
makes the organ in actuality like itself it does so because that organ 
is potentially like it. Hence it is that we do not perceive what 
Sense is just as hot or cold, hard or soft, as we are, but only 
ἃ mean. the excesses of these qualities: which implies that the 
sense is a kind of mean between the opposite extremes in the 
sensibles. This is why it passes judgment on the things of sense. 
For the mean is capable of judging, becoming to each extreme 
in turn its opposite. And, as that which is to perceive white and 
black must not be actually either, though potentially both, and 
similarly for the other senses also, so in the case of touch the 
organ must be neither hot nor cold. Further, sight is in a manner, 
The in- as we saw, of the invisible as well as the visible, and 
tangible. in the same way the remaining senses deal with oppo- 
sites. So, too, touch is of the tangible and the intangible: where 
by intangible is meant, first, that which has the distinguishing 
quality of things tangible in quite a faint degree, as is the case 
with the air; and, secondly, tangibles which are in excess, such as 
those which are positively destructive. Each of the senses, then, 
has now been described in outline. 
SUW Them. Soph. || ἢ] «at V || καὶ] ἢ SUV Them. Soph. || 5. καὶ om. E, leg. 


Soph. || 6. αἰσθητήρια STUX, αἰσθητά etiam Philop. Soph. || 9. οὕτω... ἄλλων ἴῃ 
parenth. Torst. || δὴ SU W Bek. Trend., om. X || ἐπὶ ante τῆς om. ST VX. 


Io 


I2 


104 DE ANIMA II CH. 12 


> v4 ον ‘al Ψ ε 
10 Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὁτι ἡ 
“A > “ IQA 7 ~ 
μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς 
ia) 4 ¥ “ 4 A ~ 
ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ 
a “~ / \ Ν ΜᾺ KA ‘ 
χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ TO 20 
a “ 5 2 3 ὧν Ν “Ὁ fa, ε la \ 
χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἣ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός ὁμοίως δὲ 
‘ n ψΨ mn my 
καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ 
@ 3 ? ᾽ 3 > 
ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἣ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ 
3 ᾿ \ a“ > 
2 ἢ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν 
> A 3 ἰοὺ Ψ 
ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἔτε- 25 
> \ / 
pov: μέγεθος μὲν yap ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον: ov μὴν τό 
ἰ D εἶ ὑδ᾽ ἡ atod ἐγεθός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λό- 
γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι οὐδ᾽ ἡ αἴσθησις μέγεθός ; 
3 / Ν Ν 
8γος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου. φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ 
Ἵ ἣν αἰσθητῶν at ὑ hat φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητή- 
τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσ ητή 
> a“ / € “ “ 
ρια' ἐὰν γὰρ ἢ ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ κίνησις, λύε- 30 
“A ἐν ¥ Ψ ‘ € 
ται ὃ λόγος (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν ἡ αἴσθησις), ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συμ- 
- rant ΤᾺ Ὰ ‘ 
4 devia καὶ 6 τόνος κρουομένων σφόδρα τῶν χορδῶν" καὶ διὰ 
/ ? 
Ti ποτε TA φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχι- 
A “ ‘ \ 4 
κὸν Kal πάσχοντά TL ὑπὸ TOV ἁπτῶν αὐτῶν: Kal yap ψύχε- 
Ν [4 ¥ δ Ἁ ᾿ ¥ / δὲ 2 b 
ται καὶ θερμαίΐνεται' αἴτιον yap TO μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ 424 
, > ‘ ν Ν [ὃ δέ θ ἰφὶ 3 θ a SAN 
τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οἵαν τὰ εἴδη δέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀ 
, Ν A λ > ’ δ᾽ ¥ > {0 » 
5 πάσχειν μετὰ τῆς VANS. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἂν τις εἰ πάθοι av 
e > 3 ΜᾺ ‘ LOU 3 θῇ A c€  N , A 
τι UT ὀσμῆς TO ἀδύνατον ὀσφρανθῆναι, ἢ ὑπὸ χρώματος TO 
ἊΜ “ ¥ > ‘ 
μὴ δυνάμενον ἰδεῖν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ 5 
~ ¥ € 3 Ν᾿, “ 
τὸ ὀσφραντὸν ὀσμή, εἴ TL ποιεῖ, THY ὄσφρησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ποιεῖ" 
~ Ὄ ¢ 
ὥστε τῶν ἀδυνάτων ὀσφρανθῆναι οὐθὲν οἷόν τε πάσχειν ὑπ 
ὀδμῆς" ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων: οὐδὲ τῶν δυ- 
~ ‘ Kd 
νατῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ αἰσθητικὸν ἕκαστον. ἅμα δὲ δῆλον Kal οὕτως. 
a ¥ ‘ \ ἮΝ 
οὔτε γὰρ φῶς καὶ σκότος οὔτε ψόφος οὔτε ὀσμὴ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ 
Ν [4 9 3 3 εν > rf a 7% € ἝΝ ~ 
τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, οἷον ἀὴρ ὃ μετὰ βροντῆς 
6 διστησι τὸ ξύλον. ἀλλὰ τὰ ἁπτὰ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ ποιοῦσιν" εἶ 


= 


0 


18. εἰδῶν om. SUX Soph. Torst., leg. Them. et sine dubio Simpl. Philop. ἢ 
10. ὁ om. ETy, leg. Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 23. ἐκείνων] ἐκείνινον coni, 
Essen || 24. τὸν om. E (Trend.), τοιονδὶ κατὰ λόγον Soph. || 25. ταὐτό Ty Torst., 
ταὐτά SX, ταὐτόν Them. Philop. Simpl. || 26. τι ety] ἣν X || 28. ἐκεῖνο ἘΣ, ἐκείνου 
etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. {| 31. qv om. ET Wy, leg. Them. Soph. || τοῦτο.. αἴσθησις 
in parenth. Torst. |} 34. τι om. SUX Them. || ἁπτῶν αὐτῶν" καὶ ET ὟΝ, αὐτῶν om. 
ceteri codd. Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. Biehl in ed. pr. || 424 Ὁ, 2. δέχεσθαι τὰ 
εἴδη SVX, textum tuetur Them. || 4. τί om. ET Wy Torst., leg. etiam Them. {| édu4s 
ET || 6. ὀδμή ἘΠῚ virgulam post ποιεῖ omissam post ὄσῴρησιν ponit Bek., correxit 


CH. 12 424 a 17----424 Ὁ 12 105 


In regard to all sense generally we must understand that sense 192 
What is that which is receptive of sensible forms apart from 
sense is. their matter, as wax receives the imprint of the signet- 
tion: seal ring apart from the iron or gold of which it is made: it 
“pon we*- takes the imprint which is of gold or bronze, but not gué 
gold or bronze. And similarly sense as relative to each sensible is 
acted upon by that which possesses colour, flavour or sound, not in 
so far as each of those sensibles is called a particular thing, but 
in so far as it possesses a particular quality and in respect of its 
Faculty character or form. The primary sense-organ is that in 2 
and organ. which such a power resides, the power to receive sensible 
forms. Thus the organ is one and the same with the power, but 
logically distinct from it. For that which perceives must be an 
extended magnitude. Sensitivity, however, is not an extended 
magnitude, nor is the sense: they are rather a certain character or 
power of the organ. From this it is evident why excesses in the 3 
sensible objects destroy the sense-organs. For if the motion is too 
violent for the sense-organ, the character or form (and this, as we 
Saw, constitutes the sense) is annulled, just as the harmony and the 
pitch of the lyre suffer by too violent jangling of the strings. It is 4 


Why evident, again, why plants have no sensation, although 
piants | they have one part of soul and are in some degree af- 


sensation. fected by the things themselves which are tangible: for 
example, they become cold and hot. The reason is that they have 
in them no mean, no principle capable of receiving the forms of 
sensible objects without their matter, but on the contrary, when 
they are acted upon, the matter acts upon them as well. It might 5 
be asked whether what is unable to smell would be in any 


Senuible way acted upon by an odour, or that which is incapable 
thins of seeing by a colour, and so for the other sensibles. But, 
without if the object of smell is odour, the effect it produces, if it 


sensation ἢ . . 
produces an effect at all, is smelling. Therefore none 


of the things that are unable to smell can be acted upon by odour, 
and the same is true of the other senses: nor can things be acted 
upon when they have the power of sensation, except as they 
individually possess the particular sense required. This may also 
be shown as follows. Light and darkness do not act upon bodies 
at all; neither does sound nor odour: it is the things which possess 
them that act. Thus it is the air accompanying the thunderbolt 
which rives the timber. But, it may be said, things tangible and 6 


Trend., quem secutus est Torst. || ἢ UW, om. SVX || ὀδμὴ E | 7. ὑπ᾽ ὁδμῆς om. 
SUX |l 9. ἑκάστου pro ἕκαστον fort. legendum esse censet Rodier II, 336 || 11. ὁ ἀὴρ 5, 
ὁ ἀὴρὸ U WX, ἀὴρ. 


τοῦ DE ANIMA Il CH. I2 


᾿ \ ¥ ‘\ 3 a) 
yap μή, ὑπὸ τίνος ἂν πάσχοι τὰ aya καὶ ἀλλοιοῖτο; 
4 Fal ἴω A A € 3 3 A 
dp οὖν κἀκεῖνα ἐμποιεῖ; ἢ ov πᾶν σῶμα παθητικὸν UT ὀσμῆς 

Ν ® 
καὶ ψόφου: καὶ τὰ πάσχοντα ἀόριστα, καὶ ov μένει, οἷον 15 
>? ¥ \ ν 7 ᾽ “3. 3 Ν \ 9 ΓᾺ 
ἀήρ' ὄζει yap ὦσπερ παθών τι. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι 
\ ~ Ἁ 
παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, 6 
\ 

δ᾽ ἀὴρ παθὼν ταχέως αἰσθητὸς γίνεται. 

14. ἐμποιεῖ ETWy Biehl, ἐμποιήσει U, ποιεῖ Philop. in lemmate 443, 9, ποιήσει 
reliqui ante Biehlium omnes || post ἐμποιεῖ interrogationis punctum om. Biehl in ed. alt. 


Rodier ἢ ὀδμῆς ET V |] τό. et 17. τι om. SUX || 17. καὶ ante αἰσθάνεσθαι ex solo E 
(Bus.) addidit Torst., xa? om. Philop. 


CH. 12 424 Ὁ 13—424b 18 107 


flavours do so act: else by what agency are inanimate things acted 
upon or changed? Shall we, then, conclude that the objects of the 
other senses likewise act directly? Is it not rather the case that 
not all body can be affected by smell and sound, and that the 
bodies which are so affected are indeterminate and shifting; for 
example, air? For odour in the air implies that the air has been 
acted upon in some way. What then is smelling, besides a sort of 
suffering or being acted upon? Or shall we say that the act of 
smelling implies sense-perception, whereas the air, after it has been 
acted upon, so far from perceiving, at once becomes itself per- 
ceptible to sense? 


ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ Γ. 


N ‘ - ed 
1 Ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις Erépa παρὰ τὰς πέντε (λέγω 22 
Α [4 ¥ 3 ‘4 ¥ ~ ε 4 ) > 4 ων 
δὲ ταύτας ὄψιν, ἀκοήν, ὄσφρησιν, γεῦσιν, ἀφὴν), ἐκ TOUT 
Oo ‘ ¥ cys ‘ 
πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις. εἶ yap παντός, οὗ ἐστὶν αἴσθησις apy, Kat 
“A \ ‘ ma κε ~ @® ε Ἁ / 
νῦν αἴσθησιν ἔχομεν (πάντα yap Ta τοῦ ἁπτοῦ ἢ ἁπτὸν πάθη 25 
ΜᾺ e “ ε “A 3 θ ᾽ὔ 3 3 ’ 3 ¥ 3 λ / EL 
τῇ ἀφῇ ἡμῖν αἰσθητά ἐστιν), ἀνάγκη τ᾽, εἴπερ ἐκλείπει Tis 
aa) / \ \ 
αἴσθησις, Kat αἰσθητήριόν τι ἡμῖν ἐκλείπειν - καὶ ὅσων μὲν 
" A cym ¢ 3 a 
αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι αἰσθανόμεθα, τῇ ἀφῇ αἰσθητά ἐστιν, ἣν 
’ ¥ Ψ μ᾿ \ an ‘ \ \ 9 
τυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες, ὅσα δὲ διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ καὶ μὴ αὐ- 
a Ἂ ® ‘ ¥ 
τῶν ἁπτόμενοι, τοῖς ἁπλοῖς, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι" 30 
Ν ¥ 

2 ἔχει δ᾽ οὕτως, dot εἰ μὲν Ov ἑνὸς πλείω αἰσθητὰ ἕτερα ὄντα 
> ’ ΜᾺ 2 3 4 Ἃ ¥ ‘ a > ,. 
ἀλλήλων τῷ γένει, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔχοντα TO τοιοῦτον αἰσθητή 

3 ἊἪ 3 θ δ εν ® > 39 5.4 3 ‘ \ 3 θ 
ριον ἀμφοῖν αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι (οἷον εἰ ἐξ ἀέρος ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθη- 
> ‘ a 

τήριον, καὶ ἔστιν ὃ ἀὴρ καὶ ψόφου καὶ χρόας), εἰ δὲ πλείω 

A an} ae ‘ ? ¥ ‘ 
τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χρόας Kal ἀὴρ Kal ὕδωρ (ἄμφω yap δια- 4258 
φανῇ), Kat ὁ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἔχων μόνον αἰσθήσεται τοῦ δι᾽ ἀμ- 

κι A \ o£ A 3 7 , 3 ͵ 7 3 , 

3 pow τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν ἐκ δύο τούτων αἰσθητήρια μόνον ἐστίν, 
9 3? Ἁ Vd ξ ἢ A ‘a “ὃ ε δ᾽ 3 ᾿ 
ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος (ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόρη ὕδατος, ἡ δ᾽ ἀκοὴ 

“ a A a 

ἀέρος, ἢ δ᾽ ὄσφρησις θατέρου τούτων), τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἣ οὐθενὸς ἢ 5 
‘ ΄ 92 Ν \ ¥ A ’ 3 θ ΜᾺ δὲ 
κοινὸν πάντων (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἄνευ θερμότητος αἰσθητικόν), γῆ δὲ 
A - ‘ , 3 
ἢ οὐθενός, ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀφῇ μάλιστα μέμεικται ἰδίως" διὸ λείπουτ 
4 ἂν μηθὲν εἶναι αἰσθητήριον ἔξω ὕδατος καὶ dépos: ταῦτα δὲ 
22. Hine etiam cod. L || 23. τούτων EW Soph., τῶνδε δῆλον SX, τῶνδε Bek. Trend. 
Torst. Biehl in ed. pr., etiam Them. || 24. huius enunciationis εἰ γὰρ... apodosin incipit 
ab ὥστε 4258, 11. Torst., ab a, 9. rica: dpa Bon., quod iam Simpl. fecerat, in inter- 
pungendis singulis comprehensionis membris, praeeunte Biehlio, secutus sum Bon. | 
25. ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν STU W, vulgaiam tuentur Alex., ἀπ, καὶ λύσ. 89, 27 et Simpl. | 
27. Te om. L, post ἡμῖν ponit W, αἰσθητήριόν τι etiam Alex. et Simpl. {{| ἐκλιπεῖν 
pr. E (Bek.) nunc ἐκλείπειν (Trend.), ἐκλείπειν etiam Alex. go, 15 Them. Simpl. | 
28. αὐτοὶ T Wy Alex. 89, 30 et 90, 21, αὐτῶν etiam Simpl. 178, 29. 187, 21 et 
Soph. || 30. ἁπλοῖς διαστήμασι Δ. TW et margo U, ἁπλοῖς ἀποστήμασι Simpl., 


vulgatam tuentur Alex. 89, 32. 90, 23 Philop. Soph. || 32. ἀλλήλων ὄντα τῷ γένει 
STUVWy, textum receptum tuentur Alex. 90,.35 et Simpl. | 7) om. TU y Simpl., 


DE ANIMA. Boox III. 


That there is no other sense distinct from the five, by which 1 
No sixth I mean sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, anyone may 
sense. convince himself on the following grounds. Let us 
assume that, as a matter of fact, we have sensation of every 
sensible object for which touch is the appropriate sense, all qualities 
of the tangible, as such, being perceptible to us through touch. 
Let us further assume that, when any sense is lacking to us, an 
organ of sense must also be lacking; and further, that whatever 
we perceive by actual contact is perceptible by touch, a sense 
which we do possess, while whatever we perceive mediately and 
not by actual contact is perceptible by means of the elements, 
namely, air and water. And here are implied two cases. Suppose, 2 
first, we have perception by one and the same medium of two several 
things, different in kind from one another, then whoever possesses 
the appropriate sense-organ must be percipient of both: as, for 
example, if the sense-organ consists of air and air is also 
the medium of both sound and colour. Next suppose several 
media to transmit the same object, as both air and water 
transmit colour, both being transparent, then he who possesses 
one of these alone will perceive whatever is perceptible through 
both media. Now, of the elements, air and water are the only 3 
two of which sense-organs are composed. For the pupil of the 
eye is of water, and the ear is of air, and the organ of smell 
is of one or the other, while fire, if present anywhere, enters into 
all, since nothing can be sentient without warmth. Earth, again, 
belongs to none of the sense-organs, or, at most, is a constituent 
peculiar to touch. It follows, then, that outside water and air there 
is no sense-organ. Now sense-organs composed of air and water 4 


leg. etiam Alex. go, 36 Il 425 a, 2. τοῦ δι τοῖν L, om. SUVX et pr. E Philop. 
452, 21 Bek., τοῦ δι᾽ T Wy Simpl. vet. transl. Trend. Torst. || 6. γῆ δὲ] ἡ δὲ γῆ SU W, 
γῇ δὲ etiam Them. Philop. || 7. ἢ prius om. pr. E (Trend.) W, leg. Simpl. Philop. 
453, I Soph. 106, 39, ἢ οὐθενὸς ἢ om. SUV, une. incl. Essen {|ἐδίως om. LU VXy, 
leg. Simpl. || διὸ in rasura Ἐπ (Bhl.), om. LS UVX || λίποιτ᾽ Ἐπ. λείποιτ᾽ E, (Bhl.). 


110 DE ANIMA IIT CH. I 


καὶ νῦν ἔχουσιν ἔνια, ζῷα: πᾶσαι ἄρα αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἔχονται 
ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀτελῶν μηδὲ πεπηρωμένων᾽ φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ 
ἢ ἀσπάλαξ ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα ἔχουσα ὀφθαλμούς" ὥστ᾽ εἶ μή τι 
ἕτερόν ἐστι σῶμα, καὶ πάθος ὃ μηθενός ἐστι τῶν ἐνταῦθα 
σωμάτων, οὐδεμία ἃ ἂν ἐκλείποι αἴσθησις. 
ς ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι αἰσθητήριόν τι ἴδιον, 
ὧν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τ5 
td > ΝᾺ ε ’ . ~ 
κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ, ἑνός: ταῦτα 
ee ’ 7 Ν 
γὰρ πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα, οἷον μέγεθος κινήσει" ὠστε καὶ 
, Ν ΜᾺ “ 3 3 ~ ae’ x 
σχῆμα" μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα" τὸ δ᾽ ἠρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κι- 
~ ~ “Ἂ ~ Ἂ Ν 50 
νεῖσθαι- ὁ δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς, καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις" 

ξ 4 A A 3 θά » θ 4 on Ψ δύ 
ἑκάστη γὰρ ἕν αἰσθάνεται αἴσθησις. ὥστε δῆλον OTL ἀδύνατον 20 
“ > @ ν 

ὁτονοῦν ἰδίαν αἴσθησιν εἶναι τούτων, οἷον κινήσεως" οὕτω 
a ~ \ ‘ 3 ΄ on 

6 yap ἔσται ὥσπερ νῦν TH ὄψει TO γλυκὺ αἰσθανόμεθα. τοῦτο 

A ¥ a . 9 

δ᾽ ὅτι ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντες τυγχάνομεν αἴσθησιν, ἢ Kal ὅταν συμ- 

/ 9 ΄ 3 δὲ / ὃ “ a Ἰλλ᾽ Ἅ Ν 

πέσωσιν ἅμα γνωρίζομεν- εἶ δὲ μή, οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ 
ψ 

συμβεβηκὸς ἠσθανόμεθα, οἷον τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν οὐχ ὅτι 25 

Κλέωνος υἱός, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι λευκός: τούτῳ δὲ συμβέβηκεν υἱῷ 
, > ~y Se Sy ἤδη ἔ ἔσθ , 

7 Κλέωνος εἶναι. τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἤδη ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν κοινήν, 
3 Ά ᾿ς 3 κ᾽. 3 N POL . δ ἴω “ az 

ov κατὰ συμβεβηκός" οὐκ ap ἐστὶν ἰδία: οὐδαμῶς yap ἂν 

ἠσθανόμεθα ἀλλ᾽ ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴρηται τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν 


μή 


ο 


ει. σπάλαξ ES Bek., πάλαξ y, ἀσπάλαξ Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. Trend. Torst. {| rods 
ὀφθαλμούς TU Wy, τοὺς om. etiam Them. Philop. Soph. || 13. μίαν λέποι EB, μία ἂν ἐλλείΐποι 
Ly Simpl., μία ἂν λείποιτο T, μία ἂν ἐκλείποι E,S Alex. 90, τ Them. Torst., μία ἂν ἐκλίποι 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes || 14. ἀλλὰ...Ὁ, 3. εἶναι. Totum hunc locum transponendo et 
emendando restituere voluit Susemihl, Burs. Jahresber. XXX, 42, aliter vero Essen II, 
79 sqq-, III, 14 || 1§- ὧν καὶ ἑκάστῃ E Torst., καὶ om. ceteri codd. et Simpl. 183, x 
Philop. 457, 19 || ob a Torst. coni. et a Neuhaeusero, Ar. Lehre, ἢ. 36, probatum in 
textum recepit Biehl, quamquam omiserunt omnes codd. et Them. Philop. Simpl., ‘‘non 
secundum accidens” vet, transl., οὐ non necessarium esse iudicant Zeller, Gesch. d. Phil. 
ἃ, Gr. IT, 2, p. 543 Brentano, 1. 1, 82 Kampe, d. Erkenntnistheorie des Arist. ro4 
Rodier || 15. ofov...19. συνεχοῦς in parenthesi ponenda et ante 19. καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις Jacunam 
esse censet Susemihl || 16. post ἀριθμοῦ virgulam posuit Torst., iam Philop. hune locum 
ita interpretatus est 457, 24 || évés om. V || £7. κινήσει prius] κοινῇ e Simpl. scripsit 
Torst., sed et Simpl. 183, 4. 30 habet κινήσει (quod etiam 184, 7 scripsit Hayduck), 
κινήσει etiam Them. et Soph., probat Neuhaeuser, p. 32, τῇ κινήσει Prisc, L. 21, 17, 
addendum ἄλλῃ ante κινήσει censet Essen II, 79 || post οἷον lacunam esse eamque sic 
explendam putat Torst.: κίνησιν " τὸ δὲ, vulgatam leg. Simpl. || 18. μεγέθους coni. Torst., 
μέγεθος ttiam Philop. Soph., defendit Freudenthal, Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 396 || τι καὶ τὸ 
LTW, καὶ om. etiam Philop. Soph. || 21. obrw...24. γνωρίζομεν et 27. τῶν 52..,28. ἰδία 
posterioris, sed 24. εἰ d&...29, εἴρηται prioris recensionis esse iudicat Torst., quod refellit 
Neuhaeuser, p. 32 || 23. καὶ om. praeter E omnes codd. || 24. ἅμα γνωρίζομεν E Simpl, 
Torst., ἀναηνωρίξομεν T Bek. Trend., γνωρίξομεν reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Philop. { 


CH. I 425 8 9---425 a 29 ΣΙ 


certain animals do, in fact, possess. We may infer, then, that all the 
senses are possessed by those animals which are fully developed 
and are not crippled: even the mole is found to have eyes 
beneath its skin. And thus, unless there exists some unknown 
body or some property different from any possessed by any of the 
bodies within our experience, there can be no sixth sense which 
we lack. 

Nor, again, can there be any special sense-organ for the common 5 
Common  Sensibles, which we perceive incidentally by every sense ; 
sensibles- for example, motion, rest, figure, magnitude, number, 
unity. For all of these we perceive by motion. Thus it is by 
motion that we perceive magnitude, and consequently figure, figure 
being one variety of magnitude; while that which is at rest we 
perceive by the fact that it is not moved. Number we perceive 
by the negation of continuity and by the special sense-organs 
also: for each sensation has a single object. Clearly, then, it is 
impossible that there should be a special sense for any one of these ; 
for example, motion: for in that case we should perceive them in 
the same way as we now perceive sweetness by sight (and this we 6 
do because we have a sense which perceives both, and by this 
we actually apprehend the two simultaneously when they occur 
in conjunction). Otherwise we should never have more than an 
incidental perception of them; as of Cleon’s son we perceive not 
that he is Cleon’s son, but that he is a white object, and the fact 
of his being Cleon’s son is accessory to the whiteness. But of the 7 
common sensibles we have already a common perception, which 
is direct and not indirect, so that there cannot be a special sense 
for them. For, if there were, we should never perceive them other- 
wise than in the way in which we said we saw Cleon’s son. 


25. αἰσθανοίμεθα L, αἰσθανόμεθα ET UV Wy Philop. || 26. κλέωνος yap υἱός STV W { 
τοῦτο LVX et, ut videtur, pr. E (Rr.) || 27. τῶν 6é...30. ὁρᾶν post b, 3. elvae trans- 
ponenda censet Dembowski, Quaest. Ar. duae, pp. 85-91, probat Susemihl || 27. ἔχομεν 
ἤδη αἴσθησιν LTUW, ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν ἤδη SVX || 28. οὐ κατὰ...3ο. ὁρᾶν une. incl. 
Essen III, 15. || 28. οὐκ ἄρ᾽] οὐ γὰρ coni. Essen II, 81 || ovdayds...30. ὁρᾶν, quae 
etiam Trend. suspecta‘sunt, ut prorsus hic inepta delenda censet Steinhart, cui assentitur 
Susemihl || 28. γὰρ] ἄρ᾽ coni. Essen 1.1. {| 29. 4.0m. EL TV, leg. Simpl. Philop. |i 
rTov,..dpay unc. inclusit Torst., quod probant etiam Neuhaeuser, Ὁ. 34 et Kampe et etiam 
dubitanter Dembowski, p. 89: sed v. p. 15. 


112 DE ANIMA III CHS. I, 2 


nm ‘ > / 
ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν. τὰ δ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἴδια κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθά- 30 
ε > vd 9 κὰν 3 ad IAX © ? φ 
νονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις, οὐχ ἢ αὐταί, a ἢ μία, ὅταν 
~ ral = \ ¥ 
ἅμα γένηται ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χολὴν τι πι- 425b 
Ν Ἁ 7 > ‘ δ ε 7 Ν > ~ Y ω 
κρὰ καὶ ξανθή" οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἑτέρας γε τὸ εἰπεῖν OTL ἀμῴφω 
ν Ν \ 3 a \ aN > A 4 Mh κά > 
ἕν: διὸ καὶ ἀπατᾶται, καὶ ἐὰν ἡ ξανθόν, χολὴν οἴεται εἶ. 
a > » , Ψν λ / ¥ > θ 4 
Svar. ζητήσειε δ᾽ av τις Tivos ἕνεκα πλείους ἔχομεν αἰσθήσεις, 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μίαν μόνην. ἢ ὅπως ἧττον λανθάνῃ τὰ ἀκολουθοῦντα 5 
e δ 3 2 9 ‘ 
Kat κοινά, οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἀριθμός- εἰ γὰρ 
3. ΓᾺ a 
ἣν ἡ ὄψις μόνη, Kal αὕτη λευκοῦ, ἐλάνθανεν ἂν μᾶλλον 
3 ” 7 
κἂν ἐδόκει ταὐτὰ εἶναι πάντα διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις 
νά Ἂ Α / 6 “Ὁ δ᾽ 9 Ἁ \ 3 ¢ # > 
ἅμα χρῶμα καὶ μέγεθος. νῦν ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ αἱ- 
Ἂ ψ ¥ y 
σθητῷ τὰ κοινὰ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ποιεῖ ὅτι ἄλλο TL ἕκαστον τὸ 
αὐτῶν. 
9 Ν 3 9 / Ψ ε a ‘\ 3 , 3 , 
Q Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγκη 
“ἃ ἊΨ > , Ψ [1 ἴω A ¢ - LAA, ξ > \ ¥ 
ἢ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὁρᾷ, ἢ ἑτέρᾳ. GAN ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται 
a ΄ ΜᾺ 
τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χρώματος. ὥστε ἢ δύο τοῦ 
3 ἣΝΨ» Ὁ > Ἃ εξ “-᾿ » > > Ne sf » ξ a 
αὐτοῦ ἔσονται ἢ αὐτὴ αὑτῆς. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ καὶ ἑτέρα εἴη ἡ τῆς 15 
» ἊΨ x 9 ¥ > a 3 4 Ὺ ce A 
ὄψεως αἴσθησις, ἣ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν ἢ αὐτή Tis ἔσται αὑτῆς. 
ν 9 Ν 
2 ὥστ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης τοῦτο ποιητέον. ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν" εἰ γὰρ 
Ν a » 3 θ ’ θ ., ε a ς “(ἃ δὲ a ral x 
τὸ TH ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν δρᾶν, ὁρᾶται δὲ χρῶμα ἣ τὸ 
μὰ > » a Ν ec” Ν a y μ᾿ ec” A 
ἔχον, εἰ Oweral τις τὸ ὁρῶν, καὶ χρῶμα ἕξει τὸ δρῶν πρῶ- 
Ν , y 3 a Ν ἊΝ 3 / \ 
3Tov. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἕν τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι- Kai 20 
νΝ Ψ Ἧ ε ὉΦῸζζ ΨΥ 
γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν, τῇ ὄψει κρίνομεν καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ 
“ as Σλλ᾽ 3 ε 4 Ψ δὲ Ν XN ς: ἃ » ξ 
τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἔστιν ὧς κε- 
id Ν \ 3 / Ν ἊᾺ 3 ~ » 
χρωμάτισται" τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἄνευ 
30. οὐ ante κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς addendum esse censet Essen || 41. ἣ αὐταί TVW 


Simpl. 186, 5 Torst. Brentano, p. 97 Dembowski, al αὐταί EL, 7 αἱ αὐταί SUy Bek. 
Trend., ἢ αὐταί, ut videtur, Philop. 461, 5 sq. # αὗται X Soph. 107, 29 et v. 1. 
Philop., cf. Prise. 22, 4 οὐχ ἢ μεμέρισται GAN ἣ συνῆπται τῇ μιᾷ || 415 Ὁ, 1. γένηται 
om. SUV [[ χολὴν ὅτι] ὅτι χολὴ STUVWXy, χολὴν ὅτι ἘΦ, sed ν eras. (Trend, 
Bhl.), χολὴ ὅτε Biehl in ed. alt. Rodier, οἷον χολῆς ὅτι Simpl. 186, 12 || 2. ἄμφω ἕν 
ὃν ἄμφω coni. Susemihl || 3. καὶ ἐὰν] διὸ καὶ ἐὰν E, καὶ ἐὰν omisso διὸ etiam Simpl. || 
4. πλείονας T'W Philop., πλείους Simpl. Soph. |] 5. μόνον SUX, μόνην etiam Simpl. |f 
ἧττον μὴ TVWXy, ἦ 5, ἧττον etiam Simpl. Soph. || 7. ἡ om. STUVWX }} 
μόνον L, om. pr. E || αὕτη coni. H. Jackson, αὐτὴ vulg., καὶ αὐτὴ Ἀευκοῦ unc. incl. 
Torst., leg. Philop. Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 108, 25 || av] κἂν E, sed x in rasura 
(Trend.), ἂν etiam Simpl. Soph. || 8. κἂν] καὶ Ey Soph. Bek. Trend., κἂν reliqui 
et corr. Ey (Bhi.) || ταὐτὸν TX Simpl., ταὐτὸ Wy Bek. Trend. Torst., τοῦτο SU, 
ταὐτὰ E (Bhi) LV Soph. || πάντα] πάντως coni. Essen II, p- 82, probat Rodier ΤΊ, 
364 || 9. pro dua coni. det Torst., leg, ἅμα Simpl. Soph. || 12. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ δὲ Them., 
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ Philop. || 13. ἢ τῇ ὄψει] ἤτοι ὄψει Alex., ἀπ. καὶ λύσ. ΟἹ, 26 || ὅτι] εἴ τε 


CHS. I, 2 425 8 30—425b 23 113 


But the various senses incidentally perceive each other’s 
proper objects, not as so many separate senses, but as 


Perception 

per acci- forming a single sense, when there is concurrent per- 
special ception relating to the same object; as, for instance, 
Unity op 4 When we perceive that gall is bitter and yellow. For 
sense. it is certainly not the part of any other sense to declare 


that both objects are one and the same. Hence you are sometimes 
deceived and, on observing something yellow, fancy it to be gall. 

But, it might be asked, why have we several senses, instead of 8 
Why have Only one? I answer, it is in order that we may not be so 
senses likely to overlook the common attributes, such as motion, 
than one? magnitude, number, which accompany the special sen- 
sibles. For, if sight had been our only sense and whiteness its 
object, we should have been more apt to overlook the common 
sensibles and to confuse all sensibles, because colour and magnitude, 
for instance, must always go together. As it is, the fact that the 
common attributes are found in the object of another sense also 
shows that they are severally distinct. 

Inasmuch as we perceive that we see and hear, it must either 2 
Perception be by sight or by some other sense that the percipient per- 
τας ἶνας is ceives that he sees. But, it may be urged, the same sense 
by sense. = which perceives sight will also perceive the colour which 
is the object of sight. So that either there will be two senses to 
perceive the same thing or the one sense, sight, will perceive itself. 
Further, if the sense perceiving sight were really a distinct sense, 
either the series would go on to infinity or some one of the series 
of senses would perceive itself. Therefore it will be better to 
admit this of the first in the series. Here, however, there is a2 
Diffi- difficulty. Assuming that to perceive by sight is to see 
culties. and that it is colour or that which possesses colour which 
is seen, it may be argued that, if you are to see that which sees, that 
which in the first instance sees, the primary visual organ, will 
actually have colour. Clearly, then, to perceive by sight does not 3 
always mean one and the same thing. For, even when we do not 
see, it is nevertheless by sight that we discern both darkness and 
light, though not in the same manner. Further, that which sees 
is in a manner coloured. For the sense-organ is in every case 


Alex. 1. 1. 1} 15. καὶ εἰ E, om. καὶ y || ἡ ante τῆς ex solo E recepit Torst. || τό. ἄνεισιν 
LUWX, πρόεισιν in interpret. Them. || 17. ποιητέον] coni. θετέον vel δοτέον Torst., 
ποιητέον etiam Philop. Soph., δοτέον in interpret. Simpl. 188, 23. 31, vulg. defendit 
Bon., Ind. Ar. 609 a, 23 || 20. καὶ τὸ δρᾶν post ro τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι addenda esse 
censet Christ. 


H. 8 


[14 DE ANIMA 17 CH. 2 


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τῆς ὕλης ἕκαστον. διὸ καὶ ἀπελθόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν eve- 
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4 ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι 
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¥ \ » 
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μὴ ἀκούειν, καὶ τὸ ἔχον ψόφον οὐκ ἀεὶ ψοφεῖ. ὅταν δ᾽ ἐνεργῇ 
τὸ δυνάμενον ἀκούειν καὶ ψοφῇ τὸ δυνάμενον ψοφεῖν, τότε 30 
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> ~ / 9 3 3 » ΝᾺ “~ Ψ A € 
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“aN > 2 5 5 7 \ > 9 @ € , \ ¢ » 2 oN 
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¥ cf - Ν, N Ν ΄ ,ὔ 3 > # 
ἄλλα ὁμοίως: τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν λεγόμενα οὐκ ἀνάγκη: 


25. αἱ om. SWX Them. Simpl. Soph. {[|56. ἡ δὲ...426 Ὁ, 7. φθείρει spuria esse 
suspicatur Susemihl, Oecon. p. 85 || 27. οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐταῖς E (Trend.) 1, Torst., οὐ 
ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς Bek. Trend., αὐταῖς οὐ ταύτόν STUV Wy Soph., αὐταῖς οὐ τὸ αὐτό Them. ἢ 
οἷον ὁ ψόφος 6 EL ΝΥ Soph. Torst., οἷον ψόφος ὁ reliqui ante Torst. omnes || 28. καὶ ἡ 
ἀκοὴ ἡ EL Soph. Torst., καὶ.. ἐνέργειαν om. T, καὶ ἀκοὴ ἡ reliqui ante Torst. omnes ἢ 
80. τότε καὶ ἡ TW || τότε.. “I. γίνεται om. E, sed. in marg. add. (Stapf.) || 426a,1. dv] 
ὥστ᾽ TW, ὥστε καὶ SUV, ὧν leg. etiam Soph. || εἴποιεν EL, εἴποι y Soph., φήσειεν 
SUVX || 2. ed...12. οἷον e duabus recensionibus contaminata iudicat Torst., prioris esse 
9. ὥσπερ...11. αἰσθητικῷ, posterioris 4. ἡ γὰρ...6. κινεῖσθαι || 2. δ' ἔστιν W Bek. Trend., 
δή ἐστιν E (Trend.) et reliqui codd. Soph. Torst. {[|ποιουμένῳ] κινουμένῳ Ald. Bywater, 
J. of Ph., p. 55 || 6. ἐστὶν ante ἐνέργεια EL, post 7. ψόφησις Ty, om. Soph. || 9. ὥσπερ... 
11. αἰσθητικῷ post 6. κινεῖσθαι transposuit Biehl, eodem quo vulg. ordine leg. etiam 
Philop. 474, 16 sqq. Soph. 111, 30 544. || 9. ὥσπερ γὰρ] καὶ ὥσπερ TWy, ὥσπερ 


CH. 


WN 


425 Ὁ 24—426 a 10 II5 


receptive of the sensible object without its matter. And this is 
why the sensations and images remain in the sense-organs even 
when the sensible objects are withdrawn. 
Now the actuality of the sensible object is one and the same 4 
with that of the sense, though, taken in the abstract, 


Identity of - . 
sense and sensible object and sense are not the same. I mean, for 


τ he ace example, actual sound and actual hearing are the same: 
conten. for it is possible to have hearing and yet not hear; again, 
that which is resonant is not always sounding. But 
when that which is capable of hearing operantly hears and that 
which is capable of sounding sounds, the actual hearing and the 
actual sound occur simultaneously, and we might, if we pleased, call 
them audition and resonance respectively. If, then, motion, action 5 
and passivity reside in that which is acted upon, then of necessity it 
is in the potentiality of hearing that there is actual sound and there 
is actual hearing. For the activity of agent and movent comes 
into play in the patient; and this is why that which causes motion 
need not itself be moved. The actuality of the resonant, then, is 
sound or resonance, and the actuality of that which can hear is 
hearing or audition, hearing and sound both having two meanings. 
The same account may be given of the other senses and their objects. 6 
For, just as acting and being acted upon are in the subject acted 
upon and not in the agent, so also the actuality of the sensible 
object and that of the sensitive faculty will be in the percipient 
subject. But in some cases both activities have a name; for 
example, resonance and audition: in other cases one or the other 
has no name. Thus, while the actuality of sight is called seeing, 
that of colour has no name; and, while the actuality of the taste- 
faculty is called tasting, that of the flavour has no name. Now, 7 
as the actuality of the object and that of the faculty of sense are one 
and the same, although taken in the abstract they are different, 
hearing and sound thus understood as operant must simultaneously 
cease to be or simultaneously continue in being, and so also with 
flavour and taste, and similarly with the other senses and their 
objects: but when they are understood as potentialities, there is no 


γὰρ καὶ EL || το. ἀλλ καὶ LTU, ἀλλ᾽ etiam Soph. || οὐκ ἐν) οὐ κὰν E (Rr.) 1} 
1τ. ἐνέργεια. . αἰσθητικοῦ om. TU Wy, tuetur Philop. || 12. μὲν καὶ ὠνόμ. rec. E (Trend.) 
TUWXy Philop., καὶ om. Soph. || ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων δ᾽ L, ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ Them. Soph. | 
16. ἡ ἐνέργεια E Soph. ν. 1. (om. ἡ cum codd. Hayduck, 112, 14) Torst., om. ἡ 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes |} ἡ post évépy. om. TV Wy Soph. || ἡ post καὶ solus 
E, om. etiam Soph. {| 17. dpa $6. ST y, $0. dua L, ἅμα φθ. etiam Philop. Simpl. 
Soph. 
8—2 


116 DE ANIMA ΜΠ CH. 2 


ὃ ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, οὐθὲν 20 
οἰόμενοι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν εἶναι ἄνεν ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυ- 
μὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τῇ δ᾽ οὐκ dp- 
Gs: διχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, 
τῶν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, ἐπὶ τούτων 
μὲν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων οὐ συμβαΐνει. 25 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἁπλῶς ἔλεγον περὶ τῶν λεγομένων οὐχ ἁπλῶς. 

9 εἰ δὴ συμφωνία φωνή τίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ καὶ 
ἀκοὴ ἔστιν ὡς ἕν ἐστι, [καὶ ἔστιν ws οὐχ ἕν τὸ αὐτό], λό- 
γος δ᾽ ἡ συμφωνία, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν λόγον τινὰ εἶς 
ναι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ φθείρει ἕκαστον ὑπερβάλλον, καὶ TO 30 
ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ, τὴν ἀκοήν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τὴν 
γεῦσιν, καὶ ἐν χρώμασι τὴν ὄψιν τὸ σφόδρα λαμπρὸν ἢ ζο- 426b 
φερόν, καὶ ἐν ὀσφρήσει ἡ ἰσχυρὰ ὀσμὴ καὶ γλυκεῖα καὶ πικρά, 
ὡς λόγου τινὸς ὄντος τῆς αἰσθήσεως. διὸ καὶ ἡδέα μέν, ὅταν 


w) On wn 


εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἀμυγῆ ὄντα ἄγηται eis τὸν λόγον, οἷον τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ 
γλυκὺ ἢ ἁλμυρόν" ἡδέα γὰρ τότε" ὅλως δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ peELK- 5 
τόν, συμφωνία ἢ τὸ ὀξὺ ἣ τὸ βαρύ, ἁφῇ δὲ τὸ θερμαντὸν ἢ ψυκ- 
τόν" ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις 6 λόγος: ὑπερβάλλοντα δὲ λνπεῖ ἢ φθείρει. 

Ὁ ἑκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ 
ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἢ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ 
κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς, οἷον Nev- τὸ 
κὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις. 
ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ 


20. πρότεροι ὌΝ ΜΝ, πρότερον Them. Soph. |] 24. περὶ EST V, ἐπὶ etiam Simpl. 
Soph. || 27. δὴ E (Trend.) SX y Simpl. Plutarch. ap. Simpl. Philop. Trend. Rodier, 
δὴ ἡ W, δ᾽ ἡ reliqui codd. et Bek. Torst. Biehl, εἰ δ᾽ ἡ φωνὴ συμφωνία rls ἐστιν 
mavult Trend., probat Bywater, p. 55, secutus Prisc., qui praebet p. 22, 24: 7 φωνὴ 
συμφωνία εἴρηται παρὰ τῷ ‘Aptor., ac sane in interpret. habet ἡ δὲ φωνὴ συμφωνία 
τις Soph. || ἡ post καὶ om. LSTUVXy Philop. 476, το, leg. Soph. 112, 30 sq. ἢ 
28. ἐστι post ἕν solus E, om. etiam Philop. Soph. || καὶ ἔστιν.. αὐτό unc. incl. Torst., 
quem secutus est Biehl in ed. alt., leg. etiam Soph., tuetur Rodier || τὸ αὐτὸ tantum 
in priore ed. unc. incl. Biehl, non legisse videtur Philop., ἢ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ST Xy, οὐδὲ 
τὸ αὐτὸ V, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ coni. Susemihl || 30. καὶ post τοῦτο om. LW, leg. Simpl. 
Soph. || 31. ὁμοίως d¢om. S$ TUV WXy, leg. Soph. || 426b, τ. 979¢.STUVWXy, 
τὸ om. etiam Soph. || 2. πικρά] λιπαρά EL et fortasse Philop. 476, 30, πικρά etiam 
Soph. || 3. διὸ om. SX et pr. Ὁ, διὸ καὶ om. V || 4. ἀμυγῇ ὄντα] ἀμιγῆ E Bek. Trend., 
ἀμιγῇ ἢ ὄντα L, ἄμικτα ὄντα STV WXy et in paraphr. Simpl., ἀμυγῇ ὄντα U Soph. 
Torst. || ἄγεται EL, ἄγηται post 3. ὅταν STU VWXy || 6. ante συμφωνία addendum 
esse el censet Essen, <el év> συμῴφωνίᾳ coni. Susemihl, <derep> συμφωνία vel <a > 
συμφωνίᾳ <dy> Shorey, A. J. Ph. XXII, p. 162, fort. ἀκοῇ μὲν ante συμφωνία intelligas 


CH. 2 426 a 20—426b 12 117 


such necessity. On this point the earlier natural philosophers were 
Mistake in error, when they supposed that without seeing there was 
of earlier neither white nor black, and without tasting no flavour. 

Their statement is in one sense true, in another false. 
For the terms sensation and sensible thing are ambiguous. When 
they mean the actual sensation and the actual sensible thing, the 
statement holds good: when they mean potential sensation and 
potential sensible, this is not the case. But our predecessors 
used terms without distinguishing their various meanings. 

If, then, concord consists in a species of vocal sound, and if vocal 
sound and hearing are in one aspect one and the same, [though in 
another aspect not the same|, and if concord is a proportion, it 
follows that hearing must also be a species of proportion. And 

this is the reason why hearing is destroyed by either 
As in . . .- ὃ. 
hearing,so excess, whether of high pitch or of low. And similarly, 
generay in the case of flavours, excess destroys the taste, and in 
ΤΟΤΕ ΤΟ colours excessive brightness or darkness destroys the 
sight, and so with smell, whether the excessive odour be 
agreeable or pungent. ΑἹ] this implies that the sense is a proportion. 
Hence sensibles are, it is true, pleasurable when they are brought 
into the range of this proportion pure and unmixed; for example, 
the shrill, the sweet, the salt: in that case, I say, they are pleasur- 
able. But, speaking generally, that in which ingredients are blended 
is pleasurable in a higher degree, accord more pleasurable to the 
ear than high pitch or low pitch alone, and to touch that which 
admits of being still further heated or cooled. The due proportion 
constitutes the sense, while objects in excess give pain or cause 
destruction. 

Now each sense is concerned with its own sensible object, being 
resident in the organ, gué sense-organ, and judges the specific 
differences of its own sensible object. Thus sight pronounces upon 
white and black, taste upon sweet and bitter, and so with the rest. 


licet {{συμφωνία..-«ψυκτόν unc. incl. Torst., qui colon post μεικτόν posuit, ἀφῇ... ψυκτόν 
eici, sed συμφωνία... βαρύ retineri et post μεικτόν virgulam poni vult Dittenberger, p. 1614, 
totum locum interpretantur Simpl. Philop. || a¢7...yuardy post 5. ἁλμυρόν transposuit 
Biehl, quod iam Dittenberger 1.1. voluerat || ἢ τὸ βαρύ E (Trend.), καὶ τὸ βαρύ L, καὶ 
βαρύ U VW, reliqui ante Biehlium omnes ἢ βαρύ || post βαρύ virg. Trend., vulg. 
punctum |} ἀφῇ y Philop. Trend., ἁφὴ ἘΣ (Bhl.) reliqui codd. et Bek., Soph. 113, 15 
interpretatur τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἷον τῶν τῆς ἁφῆς, unde ἁφῆς eum legisse 
suspicatur Biehl, ἁφῆς probat etiam Steinhart, ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ in interpr. Simpl., ἀλέα δ᾽ ἢ pro 
ἁφῇ δὲ coni. Madvig, p. 473 || θερμαντικὸν et ψυκτικόν WX, vulgatam tuentur etiam 
Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 7. 60m. SU Vy [λυπεῖ] λύει Soph. Bywater, p. 55. € Prisc. 22, 
27 Ἵ 12. καὶ post δὲ om. TU V Wy. 


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13 


= \ Ν ὃ , , δὲ S27 a 5 ΄ a 
14 εἰναι μὲν γὰρ ἰαϊρέετον, TOTM OE Και ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον. ω) 


118 DE ANIMA 17 CH. 2 


A y 
λευκὸν καὶ TO γλυκὺ Kal ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἐκαστον 
4 / ‘ > / θ Ψ ὃ [ή . 3 “ or 3 
κρίνομεν, τίνι καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει; ἀνάγκη δὴ at- 
’, 3 Ν , 3 «@ ‘\ Onn oY ε Ν 3 ¥ 
σθήσει: αἰσθητὰ γάρ ἐστιν. F καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ἔστι 15 
aN Fd “~ 
τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον: ἀνάγκη yap ἣν ἁπτόμενον αὐτοῦ 
“A ’ Ψ 
κρίνειν τὸ κρῖνον. οὔτε δὴ κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι 
ἕτερον τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ Evi τινι ἄμφω δῆλα 
εἶναι. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῦ δὲ σὺ aicbor%, 
δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. δεῖ δὲ τὸ Ev λέγεινᾳ ὅτι 20 
Ψ ν Ν ‘N λ Ν mn λ a λέ ¥ Ν > » 
ἕτερον: ἕτερον yap τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ. λέγει ἄρα τὸ «αὐτό. 
date as λέγει, οὕτω καὶ νοεῖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται. ὅτι μὲν οὖϊτῥ οὐχ 
οἷόν τε κεχωρισμένοις κρίνειν τὰ κεχωρισμένα, δῆλον" ὅτι 
δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν κεχωρισμένῳ χρόνῳ, ἐντεῦθεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ 
λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, οὕτω καὶ OTE Od. 25 
τερον λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον καὶ θάτερον (οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὼς τὸ 
ὅτε' λέγω 8, οἷον νῦν λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον, οὐ μέντοι ὅτι νῦν ἔγχε. 
INN Ψ λέ ‘ A \ ¢& A ᾽ν ” ey 
pov: ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω λέγει, Kal νῦν, καὶ OTL νῦν)" ἅμα ἄρα. Wore 
> “ No 9 / / > \ \ "δύ δ ρ 
ἀχώριστον καὶ ἐν ἀχωρίστῳ χρόνῳ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον; dua 
τὰς ἐναντίας κινήσεις κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ ἀδιαίρετον Kat ἐν 30 
9 / 4 3 Ν 4 ¢ Ν o~ ‘ ¥ 
ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ. εἰ yap γλυκύ, wdt κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν 
ἢ τὴν νόησιν, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν ἐναντίως, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἑχέρως. 4278 
dp οὖν ἅμα μὲν καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώρρδτον τὸ 
κρῖνον, τῷ εἶναι δὲ κεχωρισμένον; ἔστι δή πως,“ὧς τὸ διαι- 
ρετὸν τῶν διῃρημένων αἰσθάνεται, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς “ἢ ἀδιαίρετον" τῷ 


in 


14. τινὰ L, τινὶ Soph. Bek., Τίνι sine dubio Them., correxit Trend., qui post 
διαφέρει interrogationis signum posuit, secutus est Torst. |} rive καὶ] τινὶ κοινῷ coni. 
Essen || 16. yap ἂν ἦν W Torst., ἂν om. reliqui, etiam Philop. Soph. || αὐτοῦ] αὐτὸ 
coni. Essen, cui assentitur Susemihl || 19. yap] ἔχει LV, γὰρ ἔχει EE (Trend.), legit 
οὕτω μὲν yap κἂν ef etiam Them. 85, 15 || 20. verba δεῖ,..21. λευκοῦ post., 21. λέγει... 
22. αἰσθάνεται pr., recensionis esse indicat Torst. || 21. λέγει dpa τὸ αὐτό ut inertem 
repetitionem ejecta vult Trend., legit etiam Philop. in interpr. 483, 14 || 22. καὶ om. 
STV || νοεϊ] φρονεῖ UX, cui lectioni favet Rodier II, 386, καὶ νοεῖ etiam Philop. || 
24. ἐν] eve E, οὐδ᾽ évt ἐν in textum recepit Torst., reliqui οὐδ᾽ ἐν xey,, etiam Soph. || 
25. τὸ ante κακόν om. ELy || 26. καὶ ante οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς et Them. 85, 25 εἰ 
Philop. 483, 22 legisse suspicatur Rodier || οὐ xa7d...28. ὅτι νῦν in parenth. poni voluit 
Bywater, p. 55. || 30. διαίρετον pr. E (Trend. Bus.), ἁ addidit antiqua manus (Trend.) ἢ 
31. τὸ γλυκύ TW et rec. E Bek. Trend., defendit etiam Barco, Pp: 94, τὸ om. pr. E 
et reliqui || 4278, t. ἢ] καὶ rec. E in rasura (Rr.) ST W || 4. dp’ οὖν...3. κεχωρισμένον 
post., 3. ἔστι δή...5. ἀδιαίρετον pr., editionis esse iudicat Torst., quod refellit Neuhacuser, 
Pp. 40 || 2. καὶ post μὲν om. W, leg. καὶ etiam Alex., ἀπ. καὶ Ado. O4, 12 || ἀριθμῷ ἐν 
ἀδιαίρετον pr. E (Trend. Bus.), ἐν ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον rec. E (Trend. Bus.), ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαί- 


CH. 2 426 Ὁ 13—427a 5 [10 


But, since we compare white and sweet and each of the sensibles 
Compari- With each, what in fact is it by means of which we 
seo rewue perceive the difference between them? It must be by 
sensibles. sense, for they are sensibles. And thus it is clear that 11 
the flesh is not the ultimate organ of sense; for, if it were, it would 
be necessary that that which judges should judge by contact with 
the sensible object. Nor indeed can we with separate organs judge 
that sweet is different from white, but both objects must be clearly 
presented to some single faculty. For, if we could, then the mere 
fact of my perceiving one thing and your perceiving another would 
make it clear that the two things were different. But the single 
faculty is required to pronounce them different, for sweet and white 
are pronounced to be different. It is one and the same faculty, then, 
which so pronounces. Hence, as it pronounces, so it also thinks 12 
and perceives. Clearly, then, it is not possible with separate organs 
to pronounce judgment upon things which are separate: nor yet 
at separate times, as the following considerations show. For, 
as it is one single faculty which pronounces that good and bad 
are different, so when it judges “A is different from &” it also 
judges “SB is different from A” (and in this case the “when” is 
not accidental; J mean, accidental in the sense in which I may 
now say “Such and such things are different” without saying that 
they are different now. On the contrary, it pronounces now and 
pronounces that 4 and & are different now). That which judges 
judges, then, instantaneously and hence as an inseparable unit in an 
inseparable time. But, again, it is impossible for the same thing, in 13 
so far as indivisible and affected in indivisible time, to be moved at 
the same instant with contrary motions. For, if the object be sweet, 
it moves sense or thought in such and such a way, but what is bitter 
moves it in a contrary way, and what is white in a different way. 


A pro- Is, then, that which judges instantaneous in its judgment 
Maneiaes and numerically undivided and inseparable, although 
thesis. separated logically? Then it is in a certain sense that 


which is divided which perceives divided objects; in another sense it 
is gud indivisible that the divided perceives them: that is to say, logi- 
cally it is divisible, locally and numerically it is indivisible. Or is 14 


perov etiam Alex. 1. 1. || Καὶ χρόνω ἀχώριστον U y et το. E in litura (Trend. Bus.) Philop. 
484, 10, καὶ τόπῳ ἀχώριστον coni. Susemihl, textum receptum tuetur Alex. L 1. et vet. 
transl. || τὸ κρῖνον om. corr. E (Trend. Bus.) || 3. δή] δέ 5 U Alex. || pro τὸ διαειρ. coni. 
ὃν διαιρ. Steinhart ||°4. ὡς om. T W, leg. Alex. || ἢ] τὸ X, om. Alex. || διαιρετόν pr. E, 
adialperoy etiam Alex. |] 5. τόπῳ δὲ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ΤΊ, καὶ χρόνῳ non habent Alex. 
Them. Simpl. Philop. || οὐ διαιρετόν T, ἀδιαίρετον etiam Alex. Simpl. Philop. 





120 DE ANIMA Ill CHS. 2, 3 


3 as , ‘ Ν Ν >A ‘ 10 7 3 
οὐχ οἷόν τε; δυνάμει μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὖτο καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τά- 
“ ~ , ‘ 
ναντία, τῷ δ᾽ εἶναι ov, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνεργεῖσθαι διαιρετόν, Kat 
> Ὁ» Φ \ N 4 > 4 3 δὲ Ν to 
οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα λευκὸν Kal μέλαν εἶναι, WOT OVOE TA εἰδὴ 
A nw ¥ \ oe , 3 3 
15 πάσχειν αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ νόησις. ἀλλ 
ω ? © ’ἤ «“λ ΄ , 
ὥσπερ ἣν καλοῦσί τινες στιγμήν, ἢ μία ἢ δύο, ταύτῃ 
"5. \ “ , & 
καὶ διαιρετή. ἣ μὲν οὖν ἀδιαίρετον, EV τὸ κρῖνόν ἐστι καὶ apa, 
“4 Ν ‘ -~ > a -~ la 
ἡ δὲ διαιρετόν, οὐχ ἕν ὑπάρχει: Sis γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ χρῆται σημείῳ 
κυ 3 ων ~ 2 / ‘“ 
ἅμα' ἢ μὲν οὖν δυσὶ χρῆται τῷ πέρατι, δύο κρίνει καὶ κεχωρι- 
aa ΄ ἃ "ὦ \ 
σμένα ἔστιν ὡς κεχωρισμένῳ" ἢ δ᾽ ἑνί, «ἕν; Kat ἅμα. περὶ 
Ν ἣν A 3 A @ \ \ a 3 θ δ > ὃ 
μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢ φαμὲν τὸ ζῷον αἰσθητικὸν εἰναι, διω- 
ρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. 
“~ ᾽ν ,᾿ 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο διαφοραῖς δρίζονται μάλιστα τὴν ψυχήν, 
nm wn Ὰ ‘4 A 
κινήσει TE TH κατὰ τόπον καὶ τῷ νοεῖν καὶ τῷ κρίνειν Kat 
3 ἰσιὺ A ‘\ ‘ a) ‘\ \ ~“ "4 
αἰσθάνεσθαι, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ 
3 4 / εν 3 > (4 Ν, 4 [4 ς 
αἰσθάνεσθαί τι εἶναι (ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι ἡ 
ων gy ΤᾺ Ν 
ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων), καὶ οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρο- 
~ Ν ‘ 9 , > Ν > / Y \ 3 
νεῖν Kat τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν, ὥσπερ Kal ᾽Ἐμ- 
~ y CC 4 4 \ “~ 3 7 2 7 
πεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε “πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώ- 
” 2 » ες Ψ / 208 Ν \ A 
Tow καὶ ev ἄλλοις “ὅθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν 
3  Ἂ id 33 Ν 3 > ‘ / 4 ‘ Ν 6 ld 
ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται," τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται Kat τὸ Ὁμής- 
a A ~ 
2 pov “τοῖος yap νόος éoTiv,” πάντες yap οὗτοι TO νοεῖν σωμα- 
‘ Ψ ‘XN 3 4 € A Ν 3 ? 
τικὸν ὥσπερ TO αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, Kai aio Odve- 


6. καὶ ἀδιαίρετον] διαιρετὸν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον U Wy Torst., καὶ διαιρετὸν καὶ ἀδιαέρετον 
Them., οὐ διαιρετὸν καὶ διηρημένον T, ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διηρημένον rec. Τὸ in marg. (Rr-) X, 
textum receptum tuetur Alex. 94, 16 et vet. transl., defendit Neuhaeuser, p. 42 ἢ τἀναντία] 
kal τἀναντία EU, om. y et, ut videtur, Them. 86, 12 Torst., leg. τἀναντία (omisso καὶ) 
etiam Alex. Philop. et vet. transl., καὶ τοὐναντίον coni. Susemihl || 7. διαιρετόν] διαιρεῖται 
coni. Torst. (quod quidem habet Philop. in interpr. 484, 21), ἀδιαίρετον Susemihl || 
lo. ὥσπερ ἣν] ὥσπερ ὃν coni. Trend. || ἢ μία ἢ δύο E, ἢ μία καὶ δύο L, ἢ μία καὶ ἢ δύο Bek. 
Trend. Torst., ‘aut unum aut duo” vet. transl., ἢ μέαν ἢ δύο Alex. 94, 20, ἡ μία al δύο 
in codd. Alex. 96, το, ἡ μία, ἦ δύο coni. Rodier |} rz. καὶ om. L, καὶ ἀδιαίρετος καὶ 
διαερετή, quod in interpret. habent Them. et Simpl., in textum recepit Torst., vulgatam 
tuetur Alex. 1. 1. et vet. transl. || 9 μὲν...14. ἅμα e duab, rec. contam., post. rr. ἢ 
μὲν...18. dua, pr. 13. ἢ μὲν...τ4. dua iudicat Torst., cui adversatur Neuhaeuser, p- 40 | 
Ir. ἀδιαίρετος E, sed s in litura (Trend.), STU Alex. || cat ἅμα om. y || 12. διαιρετὸν 
ὑπάρχει οὐχ ἕν Ald. Sylb. Basil. Torst., διαιρετὸν οὐχ ὃν ὑπάρχει Ep (Β81.) Ty 
Soph., “non unum ” vet. transl., ox ἕν om. reliqui codd. et Alex. 94, 21 Bek. Trend., 
quibus assentitur Neuhaeuser, p. 45 || dis γὰρ τῷ Ey T W vet. transl. Ald. Sylb. Basil. Torst., 
διὸ γὰρ τῷ y et, omisso γὰρ, Soph., γὰρ om. reliqui codd. et Alex. Bek. Trend. ἢ 13. 
ἅμα] μα pr. E, add. ἅ rec. E (Rr.) || ὡς δυσὶ coni. Trend. et Torst. | virgulam a Bek. post 
χρῆται positam sustulerunt Trend. Torst. || ante κεχωρισμένα add. τὰ rec. E (Rr.) || 
Iq. κεχωρισμένῳ] ita EL T Torst. Belger, reliqui codd. aut κεχωρισμένων aut καχωρισμένα, 
τῷ κεχωρισμένῳ Alex., κεχωρισμένον Soph. 114, 38 || 7 δὲ ἕν, ἑνὶ T Wy Alex. Simpl. vet. 


- 


CHS. 2, 3 427 a 06—427a 27 121 


this impossible? For the same indivisible unity, though in poten- 
tiality each of two opposites, in the order of thought and 
being is not so, but in actual operation is divided: it is 
impossible that it should be at the same time both white and black, 
and hence impossible that it should receive at the same time the 
forms of white and black, if reception of the forms constitutes 
sensation and thought. Rather is the case parallel to that of 15 
Analogy the point, as some describe it, which is divisible in so 
of the far as it is regarded as one or two. Well then, in so far 
ἌΝ as the faculty which judges is indivisible, it is one and 
judges instantaneously; but, in so far as it is divisible, it is not 
one, for it uses the same point at the same time twice. So far as 
it treats the boundary-point as two, it passes judgment on two 
separate things with a faculty which in a manner is separated into 
two; so far as it treats the point as one, it passes judgment on 
one thing, and that instantaneously. So much, then, for the principle 
in virtue of which we call the animal capable of sensation. 

There are two different characteristics by which the soul is princi- 3 
pally defined ; firstly, motion from place to place and, secondly, 
thinking and judging and perceiving. Both thought and intelli- 
gence are commonly regarded as a kind of perception, since the 
soul in both of these judges and recognises something existent. 
Sensa- The ancients, at any rate, identify intelligence and per- 
tion and ception: thus, in the words of Empedocles: “Wisdom 
thought . . . . . . 
of old for mankind is increased according to that which is 
identihed. present to them”: and again “Whence they have 
also continually a shifting succession of thoughts.” Homer's 
meaning, too, is the same when he says: “Such is the mind of 
men.” In fact, all of them conceive thought to be corporeal 2 


Objection. 


transl. Bek. Trend. Torst., évt om. pr. Ὁ, ἢ δὲ ἑνὶ ἅμα, omisso καὶ, etiam Soph., fort. ἡ δὲ 
ἑνί, ὃν Christ || 15. αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι rd Sov ST U || δρίσθω E (Bek., etiam Bhi.) ὡρίσθω E 
(Rr.), διωρίσθω E, Soph. || 18. καὶ τὸ κρίνειν καὶ νοεῖν W, καὶ τῶ νοεῖν καὶ τῷ ppovetvS UV; 
τῷ κρίνειν καὶ νοεῖν Torst., vulgatam tuentur etiam in interpr. Simpl. 202, 8 sq. Philop. 
489, 13 Soph. 115, 18 [| 19. annotat in margine Bas.: post αἰσθάνεσθαι deesse videntur, 
quae Argyropylus reddidit his verbis: considerandum est, si quid intersit inter intelligere 
ac sentire. cui opinioni assentitur Torst., negat excidisse quicquam Bon., stud. Arist. 
II, III, r3x, qui cum Plutarcho, Philopono, Simplicio apodosin, quam iam Alex. apud 
Philop. 489, 9 desideraverat, ab 427 Ὁ, 6. ὅτι μὲν οὖν incipit ; in interpungendis singulis 
membris, praeeunte Biehlio, secutus sum Bon. || 19. δὲ] yap coni. Susemihl || καὶ post δὲ 
om. LT || 20. γὰρ] τε yap ES Ὁ, τε om. etiam Soph. |! κρίνει re ἡ ψυχὴ T, ἡ ψυχὴ 
κρίνει τι SUV Wy, ἡ ψυχὴ κρίνει τε X, vulgatam tuetur etiam Soph. |] 21. ye corr. E, 
re SUV || 23. ἐναέξεται E,, nunc αὔξεται (Bhil.), déferac etiam Them. Philop. 485, 24 
Soph. || 25. τὸ δ᾽ adrd...b, 6. ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι in parenth. ponenda putat Susemihl, Oecon., 
p. 85 | 25. βούλεται τούτοις STUV Wy, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο sed post o rasura Ἐφ (Bhl.) | 
27. ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ SUV. 


122 DE ANIMA III CH. 3 


? ΑἉ “ “A ε , Ν a ? Ν 3 ~ 

σθαΐί τε Kai φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ TO ὅμοιον, WOTEP καὶ ἐν τοῖς 

, » Y δ \ 

κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς λόγοις διωρίσαμεν: καίτοι ἔδει ἅμα Kal περὶ 

a / Ν , 

τοῦ ἠπατῆσθαι αὐτοὺς λέγειν, οἰκειότερον γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις, 427b 
Ν 4 / 3 / ὃ λ ~ ε / ὃ Ἀ > », 

καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖ ἡ ψυχή" O10 ἀνάγκη 

» Ψ » ? la Ν / > aN Qn 

ἤτοι, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆη, 

nw 5 “~ ‘ ’ “ 

ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου θίξιν ἀπάτην εἶναι, τοῦτο yap ἐναντίον τῷ 

\ Ψ ~ εξ [4 iC - ὃ a) δὲ Ν ε 3 4 ‘ 

TO ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνωρίζειν: δοκεῖ OE Kal ἢ ἀπάτη καὶ 


σι 


ΡᾺ 5 4 Ν δὰ 
3) ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτόν 
3 \ 3 ’ὔ ‘ ‘ ~ / ~ \ 
ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν, φανερόν. Tov μὲν 
Ν A / a δὲ 2\ 2 ~ ’ a ὑδὲ Ν 
γὰρ πᾶσι μέτεστι, τοῦ δὲ ὀλίγοις τῶν ζῴων. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ 
“ 3 ἘΞ 3 Ν ‘93 ΜᾺ Ν Ν Ν 2 aA \ \ > a 
νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς, TO μὲν ὀρθῶς 
Ν Ν Ν ΜᾺ 
φρόνησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα ἀληθής, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς 


A 3 Ν ‘ “~ 9 4 ε 
τἀναντία τούτων, οὐδὲ τοῦτο [δ᾽] ἐστὶ ταὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι" ἡ 


μὶ 


Ο 


\ δ ¥ A 207 2\ 9 , Ν κ᾿ e+ 

μὲν yap αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθής, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρ- 

ΜᾺ ἴω ~~ 3 3 id N ame) ‘ 

χει τοῖς ζῴοις, διανοεῖσθαι δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται Kal ψευδῶς, Kal 

9 Ἁ ε ’ ® ‘\ N / , “ Y “ 

4 οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει @ μὴ Kal λόγος. φαντασία yap ἕτερον καὶ 
αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας: αὐτή τε ov γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθής- 15 

ν » , > ¥ e+ 4 » 5 ¥ 

σεως, καὶ ἄνεν ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις. ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν 

ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ 

᾿ » [3 € ων > 4 Ψ 4 ‘ 9 ,ὔ ‘ 
πάθος ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων yap 
ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἷ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ 
εἰδωλοποιοῦντες), δοξάζειν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ 20 

4 Ὁ 3 / ¥ ‘ 4 μ᾿ [4 ’ 
ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν. ἔτι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν 

A 4 3 ‘ ‘4 e / N "ἃ 
τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρρα- 
λέον: κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ 
5 θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς 
" ε f a 3 ᾽ ‘\ é N / ‘ 
τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις Kai 25 
τἀναντία τούτων, περὶ ὧν τῆς διαφορᾶς ἔτερος ἔστω λόγος. 

29. καίτοι...Ὁ, 2. ἡ ψυχή unc. incl. Essen III, p. 7 || 427 Ὁ, 2. τούτοις ST Vy, τούτῳ 
etiam Simpl. Soph. || 4. τῷ] τὸ 5, @ L, om. TU |] 5. τὸ ὅμοιον τῶ ὁμοίω STUVXy 
et E (Trend. Bhl.), τῶ ὁμ. τὸ ὅμ. TW Bek. Trend. Torst. || δοκεῖ δὲ οὕτω coni. Susemihl 
B.J. XXX, 47 || 6. ὅτι...τ6. ὑπόληψις. Hunc locum restituere tentat Essen III, 17 sqq. || 
6. ταὐτόν] τὸ αὐτό pr. E (Trend.) y || 9. μὲν γὰρ ὀρθῶς TU Wy et rec. E, om. γὰρ etiam 
Soph. || 11. δ᾽ om. y Philop., δ᾽ delendum esse censet etiam Vahlen, Oest. Gymn. 
Ztschr. 1868, p. 256 || ταὐτὸν L Philop., τὸ αὐτὸ STU VWX || 14. post λόγος punctum 
posui, vulg. colon || φαντασία yap...24. θαρραλέα ab hoc loco aliena esse iudicat Freudenthal, 
p. 11, cui assentitur Susemihl, Phil. Woch. 1882, p. 1283 || @ μὴ καὶ φαντασία" ἕτερον 
γὰρ (sc. ἡ pay.) καὶ κτλ. coni. Steinhart || 15. δὲ pro re coni. Susemih] || 16. ὅτι 3’...25. 
διαφοραί unc. incl. Essen III, p. rg || 17. ἡ ante αὐτὴ delendum esse censet Schneider, 


Rhein. Mus. 1866, p. 448, unc. incl. Rodier || véyors] om. y, quod probat Madvig, p. 473, 
φαντασία margo U, quod probant Susemihl Chaignet, Ess. sur la Psych. d’Ar. p. 445, in 


CH. 3 427 a 28—427 Ὁ 26 123 


like sensation and hold that we understand, as well as perceive, 
like by like: as we explained at the outset of the discussion. 
This view [πᾶν ought, however, at the same time to have dis- 
refuted. cussed error, a state which is peculiarly characteristic 
of animal life and in which the soul continues the greater part 
of its time. It follows from their premisses that either all pre- 
sentations of the senses must be true, as some affirm, or contact 
with what is unlike must constitute error; this being the converse 
of the position that like is known by like. But, as the knowledge 
of contraries is one and the same, so, too, it would seem, is error 
with respect to contraries one and the same. 

Now it is clear that perception and intelligence are not the 3 
same thing. For all animals share in the one, but only a few 
in the other. And when we come to thinking, which includes right 
thinking and wrong thinking, right thinking being intelligence, 
knowledge and true opinion, and wrong thinking the opposites of 
these, neither is this identical with perception. For perception 
of the objects of the special senses is always true and is found 
in all animals, while thinking may be false as well as true 
and is found in none which have not reason also. Imagination, in 4 
fact, is something different both from perception and from thought, 
and is never found by itself apart from perception, any more than 
is belief apart from imagination. Clearly thinking is not the same 
thing as believing. For the former is in our own power, whenever 
we please: for we can represent an object before our eyes, as do 
those who range things under mnemonic headings and picture them 
to themselves. But opining is not in our power, for the opinion that 
we hold must be either false or true. Moreover, when we are of 
opinion that something is terrible or alarming, we at once feel the 
corresponding emotion, and so, too, with what is reassuring. But 
when we are under the influence of imagination we are no more 
affected than if we saw in a picture the objects which inspire terror 
or confidence. There are also different forms even of belief; know- 5 
ledge, opinion, intelligence and their opposites. But the difference 
between these species must be reserved for another discussion. 
textum recepit Biehl in ed. alt., reliqui codd. νόησις, etiam Simpl. Philop. || 19. ἔστι τι 
E, receperunt Biehl Rodier, om. Ὁ, ἔστι τι etiam Soph., τὶ om. reliqui omnes || 20. 2 om. 
STUWXy, leg. Soph. |] 21. δοξάζωμεν LSU W, δοξάσωμεν etiam Philop. Soph. | 
22. κἂν] καὶ ἐὰν Ty, κἂν ἢ L, καὶ ἐὰν 7 SU VW X Soph., κἂν etiam Them. |} 23. ef] οἱ 
TW Bek. Trend. Torst., ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ etiam Simpl. 221, 3 Soph. 118, 32, ὥσπερ θεώμενοι 
πάσχομεν in paraphr. Them., ‘‘sicut si essemus considerantes” vet. transl., ef recepit 
Biehl {| 24. ἢ E Simpl. 221, 4 et Soph., reliqui codd. καὶ || εἰσὶ dé...26. Adyos ab hoc 


loco aliena et fort. spuria esse putat, Susemihl || καὶ αὐτῆς] αὐτῆς καὶ Essen |] 25. xat 
τἀναντία τούτων unc. incl. Essen || 26. τὰ ἐναντία SUV WX || ἔσται X. 


124 DE ANIMA III CH. 3 


περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, 
ἴω > Ν \ ε , 
τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις, 
\ 4 7 
περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ θατέρου λεκτέον. 
4 ΄ 
6e δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμα τι 4288 
a Ν ? 
ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἴ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, 
a , 9 [4 δύ ‘A vy θ᾽ Δ / Ν 
μία τίς ἐστι τούτων δύναμις ἢ ἕξις, καθ᾽ ἣν κρίνομεν καὶ 
¥ , 
ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα. τοιαῦται δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἴσθησις, δόξα, 
a “5. » ἰοὺ 
7 ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ 5 
ἴω ¥ Ν Ν, ¥ , A 3 © ¥ 
τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν yap ἦτοι δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις 
, 4 
καὶ ὅρασις, φαίνεται δέ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος Tov- 
~ a ΕΣ A ’ A - 
των, οἷον τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. εἶτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πάρεστι, 
vd > ¥ 3 \ ~ > ? Ν 5 f “~ x 9 
φαντασία δ᾽ οὔ. εἶ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἂν ἐν- 
A re a ¥ @ 
δέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν: δοκεῖ δ᾽ ov, οἷον τὸ 
᾽ὔ aA 4 a vd > ¢€ Ν aN θ a“ > 74 
μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ ἢ σκώληκι. εἶτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεις aici, 
» 3 > Ν 
ai δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται at πλείους ψευδεῖς. ἔπειτ᾽ οὐδὲ λέ- 
7 3 a 3 A Ν Ν 3 θ / Ψ vd 
γομεν, ὅταν ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαΐί- 
~ en ¥ > Ν a Ψ ἈΝ 3 
νεται τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος: ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁταν μὴ ἐναρ- 
‘A ‘ a , ¢ Ν 
yas αἰσθανώμεθα [τότε ἢ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής). καὶ ὅπερ δὲ 
‘ 
8 ἐλέγομεν πρότερον, φαίνεται Kat μύουσιν ὁράματα. ἀλλὰ 


μι 


5 


μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ἀληθευόντων οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον ἐπιστήμη ἢ 
νοῦς" ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής. λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ 
δόξα' γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής. ἀλλὰ 
δόξῃ μὲν ἔπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς 20 
δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, 


27. τοῦ αἶσθ. E, sed nunc v eras. (Stapf.), τοῦ etiam Simpl. 221, 6 || 4284, 1. ἡ om. 
W et pr. E, leg. Soph, || 2. γενέσθαι ST VX, ἐγγίνεσθαι Wy Them. 89, 30 || 3. '‘negatio 
aut certe dubitatio in hac apodosi desideratur’’ Trend., ante ula addendum esse fyraper 
εἰ coni. Bywater, p. 56 || καθ᾽ as coni. Torst., καθ᾽ ἣν etiam Philop. Soph. || καὶ] 9 
ESU WX, καὶ etiam Soph. | 4. ἢ] καὶ ESTUW, ἢ etiam Soph. {τοιαῦτα SV y, 
ταῦτα LWX, τοιαῦται etiam Them. Philop. || 5. νοῦς ἐπιστήμη STUWX Philop., 
ἐπιστήμη νοῦς etiam Them. Simpl. Soph., ἐπιστήμην pr. E sed nunc v eras. (Rr.) || οὖν 
om. SU X, leg. Them. Soph. || 6. αἴσθησις μὲν...15. καὶ ὅπερ. Hune locum restituere 
tentat Essen JII, 21 || 6. μὲν om. y, leg. Soph. || 7. ante φαίνεται aliquid excidisse 
censet Freudenthal, p. 55 || τούτων ὑπάρχοντος STU VWX Soph. || 8 legendum 
proponit Torst., Jahrb. f. Phil. 1867, p. 246: αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ «τοῦ »- παρόντος ἐστί, 
φαντασία δ᾽ οὔ, quod improbat Freudenthal, qui pro ἀεὶ legi vult πᾶσι (quod probat 
Susemihl) et ὑπάρχει pro πάρεστι, p. 12 et Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 400, utrique adver- 
satur Schieboldt, De imag. disquis., p. 12, αἴσθησις μὲν ἡ δυνάμει ἀεὶ πάρεστι coni. 
Christ || 11. σκόληκι pr. E (Rr.) || Torst., Them. et Soph. secutus, scripsit: οἷον μύρμηκι 
μὲν ἢ μελίττῃ, σκώληκι δ᾽ of, quod etiam Belger in alt. ed. Trend. recepit et, omisso 
μὲν, Rodier, quibus assentitur Schieboldt, p. 9, ac profecto Them. ita legisse videtur, 


CH. 3 427 Ὁ 27----428 a 21 125 


To turn to thought: since it is different from sense-perception 
Imagi- and seems to include imagination on the one hand and 
nation. conception on the other, we must determine the nature of 
imagination before we proceed to discuss conception. If, then, 6 
imagination is the faculty in virtue of which we say that an image 
presents itself to us, and if we exclude the metaphorical use of the 
term, it is some one of the faculties or habits in virtue of which we 
judge, and judge truly or falsely. Such faculties or habits are sensa- 
Not tion, opinion, knowledge, intellect. It is clearly not 7 
sensation = sensation, for the following reasons. Sensation is either 
a faculty like sight or an activity like seeing. But we may have an 
image even when neither the one nor the other is present: for 
example, the images indreams. Again, sensation is always present, 
but not so imagination. Besides, the identity of the two in actuality 
would involve the possibility that all the brutes have imagination. 
But this apparently is not the case ; for example, the ant, the bee and 
the grub do not possess it. Moreover, sensations are always true, 
but imaginings prove for the most part false. Further, it is not 
when we direct our energies closely to the sensible object, that we 
say that this object appears to us to be a man, but rather when 
we do not distinctly perceive it [then the term true or false is 
applied). And, as we said before, visions present themselves even 
if we have our eyes closed. ; 

Neither, again, can imagination be ranked with the faculties, 8 
nor like knowledge or intellect, which always judge truly : it 
opinion, may also be false. It remains, then, to consider whether 
it be opinion, as opinion may be true or false. But opinion is 
attended by conviction, for it is impossible to hold opinions 
without being convinced of them: but no brute is ever convinced, 


quamquam suspicionem movet vocabulum tows, quod addidit 90, 8, et fort. Alex., qui 
scribit De An. 647, 2: καὶ αἰσθήσεως μὲν πάντα μετέχει τὰ ζῷα, φαντασίας δὲ οὐ δοκεῖ, ws 
τά τε ὀστρεώδη τῶν θαλασσίων καὶ of σκώληκες, et Soph. alieno loco, p. 55, 27, haec 
verba habet: μύρμηξι καὶ μελέτταις καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις... ἀνἀγκη παρεῖναι φαντασίαν ..., σκώληκες: 
δὲ καὶ μυῖαι... ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὅλως ἔχειν ἢ ἄμυδράν τινα, similiter Philop. ad 413 b, 22. et 
ad 414 b, 33. (258, 32), hoc vero loco diserte vulgatam lectionem agnoscit et interpretatur, 
quare neque ex Philop. neque ex Soph. lectionem a Torst. receptam confirmari posse 
iudicat Biehl ; vulgatam tuentur praeter omnes codd, etiam Simpl. hoc loco et p. 308, 19: 
et vet. transl. et Barco, p. 62; cf. ad hunc locum 4348, 4 |} 12. ἔπειτ᾽] ἔτι T et corr. E, 
ἔπειτα leg. etiam Soph. || 14. ἐνεργῶς E, ἐναργῶς etiam Them. Soph. || 15. 7] om. pr. Ἐς, 
καὶ Ὁ, καὶ ἢ Ty, καὶ ἡ SV |] ἢ] καὶ ἡ SV || τότε ἢ ad. ἢ ψ. unc. inclusit Torst., quod 
probat etiam Madvig, leg. Soph. et vet. transl. |} 67 5Τ ΟΝ Xy Soph. Bywater, p. 56 || 
19. ἀλλὰ...24. δ᾽ οὔ ε duab. ed. contam. indicat Torst., cui assentitur Freudenthal, 
Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 405, pr. 22. ἔτι mdoy...24. δ᾽ οὔ, post. 19. ἀλλὰ...22. πολλοῖς | 
21. δοκεῖ] δοξάζει 1, Ὁ W Philop. s00, 20, δοκεῖ etiam Them. Soph. 


126 DE ANIMA III CH. 3 


A ἌᾺ ’ 
φαντασία δ᾽ ἐν πολλοῖς. ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις, 
A a \ 
πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι, πειθοῖ δὲ λόγος: τῶν δὲ θηρίων 
3. ἢ [4 Ἀ εξ / , 3 ¥ XN ’ 
9 ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ᾽ ov. φανερὸν τοίνυν 
ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι’ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμ- 25 
» 
πλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως φαντασία ἂν εἴη, διά τε 
ταῦτα καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλον τινός ἐστιν ἡ δόξα, ἀλλ᾽ 
3 7 3 A ὌΝ Λε ἊΨ ᾽ δ᾽ 9 ἊΜ ΜᾺ .Ὰ , 
ἐκείνου ἐστὶν οὗ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις λέγω δ᾽, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ δό- 
Ν 3 4 ὲ ᾿ / 3 4 9 Ν ‘\ 
Ens καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἡ συμπλοκὴ φαντασία ἐστίν: ov yap δὴ 
3 A , ‘ an ~ > θ la > A Ζ΄ δὲ fan Pa) 
ἐκ τῆς δόξης μὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, αἰσθήσεως OE τῆς τοῦ 30 
λευκοῦ" τὸ οὖν φαίνεσθαί ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ὅπερ αἰσθάνεται 428b 
\ ιν , ’ \ ‘\ ΝᾺ ᾿ Ν 
τομὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ, περὶ ὧν 
Kd ε / 3 a Ψ ε' , \ c ¥ 
ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὃ HALOS πο- 
διαῖος, πεπίστευται δ᾽ εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης: συμβαΐί.- 
>} » > , Ν ε ~ 3 A ? ἃ > 
νει οὖν ἤτοι ἀποβεβληκέναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀληθῆ δόξαν, ἣν εἶχε, 
σωζομένου τοῦ πράγματος, μὴ ἐπιλαθόμενον μηδὲ μεταπει- 
? a) > -»¥ » > + ‘ > Ν > a > 4 
σθέντα, ἢ εἰ ἔτι ἔχει, ἀνάγκη THY αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ 
ψευδῆ. ἀλλὰ ψευδὴς ἐγίνετο, ὅτε λάθοι μεταπεσὸν τὸ 
πρᾶγμα. OUT ἄρα ἕν τι τούτων ἐστὶν οὔτ᾽ ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία. 
Ir ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἔστι κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ το 
τούτον, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ 
αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησίς 
3 » δὲ ᾽ θ 7 ε \ ἌΝ > Ζ “~ 9 , 
ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθή- 
} > 
σεως, Kal ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν 
, ¥ 
αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ al- 15 
σθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ Kar αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν 
‘ 4 ἈΝ ¥ ‘ > ‘ ΕῚ “~ \ A 
καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. 


σι 


22. δ᾽ ἐν EL, δὲ ἐν Soph., ἐν om. reliqui ante Biehlium omnes || verba ἔτι... 24. δ᾽ οὐ unc. 
inclusit Biehl || πάσῃ] εἰ πάσῃ S ΧΎ, εἰ insert. Ey (Bhl.) || 26. ἡ φαντ. coni. Torst. || virgulam 
post εἴη delevit, post 27. ταῦτα posuit Rodier, Simpl. 212, 12. 28 Philop. 504, 31 et Them. 
90, 32 secutus. Idem Rodier dubitanter διά γε ταῦτα coni. || διά τε ταῦτα...28. αἴσθησις 
ante 24. φανερὸν poni vult G. Schneider, Rhein. Mus. 1866, p. 449 ll 27. καὶ ὅτι 
{omisso δῆλον») vel καὶ ὅτι δῆλον ὅτι et ἔσται pro ἐστιν coni. Shorey, p. 180 {{ ἄλλη τις 
ΘΎΝ, ἄλλης y, ἄλλου etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || # om. SVX {|{| 28. ἐκείνη ST, 
ἐκείνης y, ἢ ἐκείνη Philop. || ἐστὶν} ἥπερ ἐστὶν S, ἧσπερ ἐστιν y, εἴπερ ἐστὶν TW Torst., 
vulgatam tuetur vet. transl. || οὗ καὶ ἡ] οὗ καὶ EL Bek. Trend., καὶ ἡ y, οὗπερ ἐστι καὶ ἡ 
UV, οὗ καὶ ἡ 5ΤΎ Χ, scripsit Torst., οὗπερ ἐστίν, ὁμοῦ καὶ ἡ Simpl. || ἐκ] ef V Trend. 
Ὁ. Schneider, ὅτε ἐκ y, vulgatam tuetur vet. transl. || 29. ἦ συμπλοκὴ une. incl. Torst. {} 
428 Ὁ, 1. ἔσται coni. Trend., scripsit Torst., cui assentitur G. Schneider, ἐστι etiam 
Philop. et vet. transl. || 2. δὲ] dé ye STU VW Χ νυ, fort. recte, iudice Biehlio { 3. ἔχειν 
ES |} wodcos pr. E || 4. πέπεισται ST UX Torst., πιστεύεται L || μείζων LU WX. Bek. 
Trend., μείζω EST Vy Torst. Biehl Rodier || 5. αὐτοῦ EL || ἀληθῆ post εἶχε SU WX { 


CH. 3 428 a 22—428 Ὁ 17 127 


though many have imagination. Further, every opinion implies 
conviction, conviction implies that we have been persuaded, and 
persuasion implies reason. Among brutes, however, though some 
have imagination, none have reason. It is evident, then, that 9 
imagination is neither opinion joined with sensation nor opinion 


nor through sensation, nor yet a complex of opinion and sen- 


opinion sation, both on these grounds and because nothing else 
with is the object of opinion but that which is the object of 


sensation. . ~, s oe 
sensation: I mean, it is the complex of the opinion of 


white and the sensation of white, not surely of the opinion of good 
with the sensation of white, which alone could constitute imagina- 
tion. To imagine, then, will be on this supposition to opine directly, 
not indirectly, that which we perceive. But there are false imagin- Io 
ings concerning things of which we hold at the same time a true 
conception. For example, the sun appears only a foot in diameter, 
but we are convinced that it is larger than the inhabited world: 
in this case, therefore, either, without any alteration in the thing and 
without any lapse of memory on our part or conversion by argument, 
we have abandoned the true opinion which we had about it; 
or else, if we still retain it, the same opinion must be both true and 
false. It could have proved false only in the event of the object 
having changed without our observing it. It is not, then, either 
one of the two, opinion and sensation, singly, or a combination 
of the two, which constitutes imagination. 

Now when one thing is moved, something else can be moved II 
by it. And imagination is thought to be a species of motion and 
not to arise apart from sensation, but only in sentient beings 
and with the objects of sense for its objects. Motion, again, may 
It is a be produced by actual sensation, and such motion must 
movement resemble the sensation which caused it. From all this 
tosensa- it follows that this particular motion cannot arise apart 
mon. from sensation nor be found anywhere except in sentient 
beings: and in virtue of this motion it is possible for its possessor to do 
and experience many things: imagination, too, may be both true and 


6. ἐπιλανθανόμενον LT UV WX || 7. τὴν αὐτὴν om. pr. Ἐς ante ἀνάγκη ponunt LW y | 
post εἶναι addendum πιστεύειν censet Essen III, p. 23 || 8. ἐγίνετο E, sed in litura 
(Trend.), LSUVXy Torst., ἐγένετο reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Susemihl, B. J. 
XXX, 47 |] ἀλλὰ...9. πρᾶγμα Torst. suspecta sunt, non legisse videntur Them. Simpl. 
Soph., leg. etiam Philop. || 9. οὐκ ἄρα ELT Wy || το. τοῦδε SU Vy || 11. ad verba ἡ δὲ... 
12. αἴσθησίς ἐστιν annotat Torst.: vereor ne, etsi sunt Aristotelis, in posteriore edit. non 
fuerint scripta, leg. etiam Simpl. Philop. || 12. αἰσθήσεις εἰσίν Τ U V W et, omisso verbo, S, 
numerum singularem αἴσθησίς leg. etiam Philop. 512, 24 Simpl. 218» 3 Soph. rro, 34 ll 
15. αὐτῆς E || 16. ὑπάρχει E || κατὰ ταύτην EL, κατ᾽ αὐτὴν etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. 
Soph. || cat om. TVX y, tuentur etiam Them. Soph. 


128 DE ANIMA III CH, 3 


Ψ “a ‘ 2Q 7 9 ,’ 
12 τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τάδε. ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἀληθής 
a / (a) 
ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα Td ψεῦδος. δεύτερον δὲ τοῦ 
2 a Ν 3 00 "ὃ 3 δέ ὃ 2 
συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα' καὶ ἐνταῦθα yon ἐνδέχεται ὀὁιαψεύ- 20 
> Ν ἴω 
δεσθαι: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ ψεύδεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευ- 
n A Ν 9 
κὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ψεύδεται. τρίτον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἑπομένων 
wn ΄ @ ε ΄ bs ἴὸ . λέ δ᾽ ® , 
τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ ἰδια" λέγω οἷον κί- 
ἃ / a ’’ ΝᾺ > θ “ ‘\ A 
vnoi Kal μέγεθος, ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, περὶ ἃ 
, » y 9 θῇ \ ‘ ¥ 6 ε δὲ , 
13 μάλιστα ἤδη ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν. ἡ δὲ κί- 25 
van) 4 “~ > / 
νῆσις ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας γινομένη διοίσει [τῆς αἰσθήσεως] 
ΜᾺ ων \ εΕ Ν 7 
ἡ ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τριῶν αἰσθήσεων. Kal ἡ μὲν πρώτη πα- 
4 ΜᾺ > ’ 3 θ la ς δ᾽ J ‘\ vA \ 
povons τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθής, αἱ δ᾽ ἕτεραι καὶ παρούσης Kal 
> 2 > K ὃ a Ν aN Ψ 2 μ 3 θ 
ἀπούσης εἶεν ἂν ψευδεῖς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν πόρρω τὸ αἰσθη- 
> ma ¥ ἣ, ν᾿ A ε 
τὸν ἢ. εἰ οὖν μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο ἔχοι ἢ τὰ εἰρημένα ἡ φαν- 30 
, aA > 9 \ \ , ¢ ΄ 4 ¥ ΄ 
τασία, τοῦτο ὃ ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθέν, ἡ φαντασία ἂν Ein κίνησις 4298 
τ4 ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ 
κά ὔ » ’ 3 Ν \ » 3 \ nn ? ¥ 
ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι, Kal TO ὄνομα ἀπὸ TOU φάους εἴ. 
“A Ἁ 
15 Ander, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν 
Ν ς ’ > “~ > ’ Ν > > N , 
καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ αὐτὰς πράτ- 5 
‘\ a“ Ν ‘ ὃ Ν ‘“ Ν ¥ ω ec ‘\ A ‘id 
Tee τὰ Coa, τὰ μὲν διὰ TO μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, 
Ν δ ‘ A 3 4 ‘ a > ἢ 10 A ΄ 
τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσοις 
A Y Q © δ Ν > , ,o9 
ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον ot ἄνθρωποι. περὶ μὲν οὖν φαντασίας, τί ἐστι 
A [ων 
καὶ διὰ τί ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον. 


19. τῶ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα E (recte Bus., sed τῶ sine ἐ adscript.), τοῦ συμβεβηκότος Χ, 
τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκε καὶ ταῦτα Ald. Sylb. Basil. et vet. transl., Them. interpretatur: δεύτερον δὲ 
τῶν ὑποκειμένων τοῖς ἰδίοις καὶ ols ἐκεῖνα συμβέβηκε, ex Simpl. et Philop. interpr. colligit 
Biehl, eos legisse aut τοῦ συμβεβηκότος aut τοῦ ὃ συμβέβηκε τούτοις, quod scriptum esse ab 
Arist. coni. Torst., pro ταῦτα coni. τούτῳ Steinhart, fort. legendum ταῦτα τούτῳ censet 
Rodier || 20. v. ad b, 24 || διαψεύσασθαι E, διαψεύδεσθαι etiam Them. || 21. room. ES VX, 
leg. Philop. || 22. τι et 24. ἃ ante συμβ. om. STU V WX || 23. τοῖς... ἴδια unc. incl. Essen 
III, p. 25, οἷς.. ἔδια delenda censet Maier, Syllogistik des Arist., p. 9 in adn., Simpl. et 
Philop. videntur legisse καὶ τὰ ἴδια, fort. οἷς.. «τὰ ἴδια non leg. Them. [ 24. ἃ,. αἰσθητοῖς 
unc. inclusit Torst., post 20. ταῦτα transponenda censet Bywater, p. 58, cui assentitur 
Susemihl, B. J. LXVIT, τος, in parenth. posuit Rodier || 25. δὲ] δὴ TU Rodier, δ᾽ ἡ W || 
26. τῶν αἰσθήσεων T, τῆς αἰσθήσεως unc. inclusit Torst., fort. transponendum esse post 
ἐνεργείας putat Biehl, et iam idem G. Schneider suaserat; etiam facilius post γινομένῃ 
traici posse censet Susemihl, Oecon. p. 86 || 27. ἧἡ...αἰσθήσεων om. SU VW, leg. etiam 
Philop., pro ἡ sine ullo cod. scripserunt τῆς Bek. et Trend., ἢ coni. Christ, ἡ delendum 
censet G. Schneider, Zeitschr. f. Gym. 1867, p. 631 || 29. αἰσθητήριον TUVWX ἢ 
30. μὲν om. ST UV WX Philop. || ἔχοι ἢ E, recepit Biehl, ἔχοι Ly et Philop. cod. D, 
ἔχει, Omisso ἢ, reliqui omnes, etiam Torst. Zeller Rodier || Nescio an ἢ τὰ εἰρημένα unc. 
includenda sint, nisi forte, deserto cod. E, totus locus ita est purgandus: εἰ οὖν μηθὲν 
ἄλλο ἔχει τὰ εἰρημένα [ἢ φαντασία, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθέν], ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη Kré. || 


CH. 3 428 Ὁ 18—-429 a 0 129 


false. The reasons for the last conclusion are as follows. Perception 12 
of the objects of the special senses is true, or subject to the minimum 
of error. Next comes the perception that they are attributes: and 
at this point error may come in. As to the whiteness of an object 
sense is never mistaken, but it may be mistaken as to whether 
the white object is this thing or something else. Thirdly, there 
is perception of the common attributes, that is, the concomitants 
of the things to which the special attributes belong: I- mean, 
for example, motion and magnitude, which are attributes of 
sensibles. And it is concerning them that sense is most apt 
to be deceived. But the motion which is the result of actual 13 
sensation will be different according as it arises from one or other 
of these three kinds of perception. The first kind, so long as the 
sensation is present, is true: the other kinds may be false, whether 
the sensation is present or absent, and especially when the object 
perceived is a long way off. If then, imagination possesses no 
tmagi- other characteristics than the aforesaid, and if it is what 
nation | it has been described to be, imagination will be a motion 
generated by actual perception. And, since sight is the 14 
principal sense, imagination has derived even its name (φαντασία) 
from light (φάος), because without light one cannot see. Again, 15 
because imaginations remain in us and resemble the corresponding 
sensations, animals perform many actions under their influence ; 
some, that is, the brutes, through not having intellect, and others, 
that is, men, because intellect is sometimes obscured by passion 
or disease or sleep. Let this account of the nature and cause of 
imagination suffice. 


ὁ] solus E, 7 LSTUVXy, ἢ ἡ ἊΝ Rodier, ‘‘si igitur nihil aliud habet ea quae dicta 
sunt quam phantasia” vet. transl., ἢ μὴ Bek. Trend., secuti edit. Sylburgianam, vel 
potius eiusdem typothetarum errorem, ἢ ἡ φαντασία une. incl. Torst., non legisse Philop. 
514, 32 idem Torst. censet || φαντασίαν S Bek. Trend.; scriptum fuisse ab Arist.: εἰ οὖν 
μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο ἔχει τὰ εἰρημένα, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔχει, ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις coni. Torst. || 
4298, τ. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστι Biehl, etiam Them. 93, 22 || ταὐτὸ δ᾽ ἐστὲ sive ταὐτὸ δ᾽ ἔχει coni. Christ || 
2. γιγνομένη pr. E (Trend.) Ly Them. Philop. Simpl. vet. transl. Trend. Torst., quod etiam 
probat Zeller, p. 545, γιγνομένης reliqui codd., etiam Bek. || 3. ἐστι om. STUV WX | 
5. ὁμοίας E, sed as in rasura (Bhl.), TUX Them. Simpl. vet. transl. Torst., ὁμοίως 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes || κατὰ ταύτας ELy, κατ᾽ αὐτὰς etiam Them. Simpl. ἢ 
πράττειν E || 7. νόσω TUV, νόσοις etiam Them. Simpl. 221, 12 || 9. διότε E Soph. 
121, 20. 


H. . 9 


130 DE ANIMA III CH. 4 


~~ A nl ~ ea 4 e 
4 Περὶ δὲ rod popiov τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει TE Ἢ τὸ 
ἮΝ τ » ‘ ‘ ΜᾺ 
ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος ELTE καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ 
7 3 » 
κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τὶν ἔχει δια- 
“ 3 Ν ΝᾺ 
2 φοράν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν. εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν 
x + ε ‘\ rN ~ 
ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν TL ἂν εἴη ὕπο TOU νοητοῦ 7 
~ ον Ν Ν A ¥ 
4τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. ἀπαθὲς dpa δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἴ- 15 
a N “Ἂ Ne , ¥ 
Sous καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, 
N rd Ψ \ ΝΆ \ 
ὦσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς 
~ OR y 
τὰ νοητά. ἀνάγκη apa, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, wo- 
\ 3 / “4 ἰοὺ “Ἂ δ᾽ 3 Ν Ψ 
περ φησὶν ᾿Αναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἵνα γνω- 
7 , Ν 4 Ἁ 3 , Ἁ > 
ρίζῃ" παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει TO ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντι- 20 
Ψ 9 > φὶ 5 ’ ’, 9 2 J 
φράττει' wore μηδ᾽ αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ 
¥ ta A ~ 
ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν. 6 apa καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς 
(λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἧ ψυχή) 


[᾿ 
4 ΜᾺ 


3 ls 3 3 ¥ Ν “ ὃ \ ὑδὲ " A 
4 οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν. διὸ οὐδὲ μεμεῖχθαι 
4 Ν “Δ é “Ἃ 
εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι' ποιός τις γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἢ ψυ- 25 
¥ ¥ a σι 
xpos ἢ θερμός, ἢ κἂν ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ: 

A > 22 » νι 5 ON εὰ 2 Ν \ > , 
νῦν δ᾽ οὐθέν ἐστιν. καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τό- 
Tov εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ᾽ ἡ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελε- 

΄ 3 Ν 7 Ν Ld 4 δ᾽ 3 ε - € 3 (θ 

5 χείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη. ὅτι δ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀπάθεια 

τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητικοῦ, φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων 30 

\ ἴω 3 ΄ ε \ ‘ ¥ 3 4 2 ΄ 
καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις οὐ δύναται αἰσθάνε- 

“Aw “~ ry ~ 

σθαι ἐκ Tov σφόδρα αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων 429b 
ψόφων, οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν οὔτε 

e ΤᾺ y > wn 3 > € A Y 4 / 
ὁρᾶν ovre ὀσμᾶσθαι" add’ ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα von- 

4 3 κ᾿ a ‘ ε a > ‘\ ‘ a \ 
TOV, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ TA ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ Kal μᾶλλον" τὸ 
6 μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὃ δὲ χωριστός. ὅταν ς 
δ᾽ οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ὃ ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὃ κατ᾽ ἐνέρ. 

“ δὲ id ν , 3 ~ > € “" 
γειαν (τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι’ αὑτοῦ), 


Io. τοῦ ante τῆς om. 5 TU WX Philop., τοῦ τῆς ψνχ. μορίον y, leg. τοῦ Them. { 
11. καὶ post εἴτε om. E (Bus.) et Simpl. || 14. τι ὅτε EL, τι leg. Philop. Soph. Simpl., hoe 
loco et p. 264, 17 || 15. dpa tuentur omnes codd. et Them. Simpl. Philop. || 18. ἀνάγκη... 
27. οὐθέν ἐστιν e duab. rec. contam. iudicat Torst., pr. a2. ὁ dpa...27. ἐστιν, post. 
18. dvdryin.,.22. δυνατόν, quod negant Noetel, Ztschr. f. Gymn. 1864, p. 140 et 
Dittenberger, Gotting. gelehrte Anzeigen 1863, p. 1610 || x8. ἐπειδὴ SUVWKXy 
Them. || 20. κωλύσει coni. Essen, Beitr. z. Lés., P- 44, Scripsit II. Jackson, Texts to 
illustrate, p. 93 || ἀντιφράζει SVX, ἀντιφράξει UWy Essen 11. Jackson, ἀντιφράττει 
leg. etiam Soph. || 25. γὰρ ἄν rs LSTU V WX, ποιός τις ἂν γίγνοιτο Soph. || ἡ ψ. ἢ 9. 
E, any. STUVWX Philop., ἢ θ. ἢ ψ. y, ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμός Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. { 


CH. 4 420 εἰ το---420 Ὁ 7 131 


As to the part of the soul with which it knows and under- 4 
Intellect stands, whether such-part-be separable spatially, or not 
‘or Mind. —_ separable spatially, but only in thought, we have to con- 
sider what is its distinctive character and how thinking comes about. 
Now, if thinking is analogous to perceiving, it will consist in a2 
being acted upon by the object of thought or in something else of 
this kind. This part of the soul, then, must be impassive, but recep- 3 
tive of the form and potentially like this form, though not identical 
with it: and, as the faculty of sense is to sensible objects, so must 
intelfect be related to intelligible objects. The mind, then, since 
it thinks all things, must needs, in the words of Anaxagoras, be 
unmixed with any, if it is to rule, that is, to know. For by 
‘intruding its own form it hinders and obstructs that which is 
alien to it; hence it has no other nature than this, that it is a 
A poten- capacity. Thus, then, the part of the soul which we call 
Tithe clace intellect (and by intellect I mean that whereby the soul 
of forms.’” thinks and conceives) is nothing at all actually before 
it thinks. Hence, too, we cannot reasonably conceive it to be4 
mixed with the body: for in that case it would acquire some par- 
ticular quality, cold or heat, or would even have some organ, as the 
perceptive faculty has. But as a matter of fact it has none. There- 
fore it has been well said that the soul is a place of forms or ideas: 
except that this is not true of the whole soul, but only of the soul 
which can think, and again that the forms are there not in actuality, 
but potentially. But that the impassivity of sense is different from 5 
that of intellect is clear if we look at the sense-organs and at 
sense. The sense loses its power to perceive, if the sensible object 
has been too intense: thus it cannot hear sound after very loud 
noises, and after too powerful colours and odours it can neither 
see nor smell. But the intellect, when it has been thinking on 
an object of intense thought, is not less, but even more, able to 
think of inferior objects. For the perceptive faculty is not in- 
dependent of body, whereas intellect is separable. But when the 6 
intellect has thus become everything in the sense in 
which one who actually is a scholar is said to be so (which 
happens so soon as he can exercise his power of himself), even 


In habitu 


26. ἢ κἂν] καὶ κἂν S, κἂν TW Soph. Susemihl, Occon. p. 86, cai U VX || 29. ὅτι ὃ ...30. 
ψοητικοῦ unc. incl. Essen III, Ὁ. 38 || 429 b, x. οἷον τοῦ YW. ST VX y, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ y. EH, ἐκ 
τοῦ ψόφου τοῦ μεγάλου [ἢ] τῶν μικρῶν ψόφων Them. 104, 34 || ἐκ om. E, οἷον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν 
μεγ. Ψ. etiam Soph. || 4. verba ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον interpolata esse censet Torst., Jahrb. f. Phil. 
1867, p. 246, leg. etiam Them. || 5. ὁ δὲ νοῦς xwp. y et in interpr. Soph., om. voids etiam 
Them. 105, 4 || 6. ὁ post ὡς om. 5 W Theoph. ap. Prisc. 31, 8 Bek. Trend. || ὁ ante 
κατ᾽ om. SU V WX Theoph. ap. Prisc. 31, 9- 


Q-—2 


32 DE ANIMA 11 CH. 4 


1532 


» ‘ Ν ld ad 3 Ν ε ’ Ν Ἁ 
ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν 
~ A ε a“ \ 9 \ δὲ ΕΝ / δύ ΜᾺ 

μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν: καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὕτον τότε δύναται νοεῖν. 
Ν > 
7 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ μέγεθος Kai τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι καὶ το 
ὕδωρ καὶ ὕδατι εἶναι (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρων πολλών, ἀλλ᾽ 
Ν 3. 
οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων" ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι), τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι 
καὶ σάρκα [καὶ] ἢ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει: ᾿ γὰρ σὰρξ 
οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ τὸ σιμόν, τόδε ἐν τῷδε. τῷ 
μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικῷ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν κρίνει, καὶ ὧν τς 
¥ Ν ¥ ~ Ἄ ε ε 
λόγος τις ἡ σάρξ' ἄλλῳ δὲ ἤτοι χωριστῷ ἢ ws ἡ κεκλα- 
κι Ν > 
σμένη ἔχει πρὸς αὑτὴν ὅταν ἐκταθῇ, τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι κρί. 
’ > 5 N an 3 3 ᾽ ¥ \ 34 ξ A 
Sve. πάλιν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντων τὸ εὐθὺ ὡς τὸ 
n > 4 ὃ" 
σιμόν μετὰ συνεχοῦς γάρ' τὸ δὲ τί ἣν εἶναι, εἰ ἔστιν ἕτερον 
% 3 ἴω <>) Ν \ 200 Ἷὰλλ . ¥ Ν ὃ , ¢. 4 
τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι Kat τὸ εὐθύ, ἄλλο: ἔστω yap duds. ἑτέρῳ 20 
Ν 
dpa ἢ ἑτέρως ἔχοντι κρίνει. καὶ ὅλως ἄρα ὡς χωριστὰ τὰ 
κι \ “A 
ο πράγματα τῆς ὕλης, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν νοῦν. ἀπορήσειε 
> »* > ε a e a > A ν 2 \ ‘ Ν 
δ᾽ ἂν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἁπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθενὶ 
\ ¥ / ν Ν 3 / ω », 3 \ 
μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν ᾿Αναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ 
® 3 ω 
νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστιν. ἢ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ 25. 
τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ νοητὸς καὶ αὐτός. 
«Ὁ ᾿ ~ »» a € / > \ 5 ¥ 3 4 
ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ Kar ἄλλο αὐτὸς 
’ a δέ Ν Ν lo a rd 4 
νοητός, ἕν δέ τι TO νοητὸν εἴδει, ἢ μεμειγμένον TL ἕξει, 
> Ἂ \ 
τι ποιεῖ νοητὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τἄλλα. ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ 


8. μὲν] μὲν οὖν LW Theoph. 1. 1, 31, 10 Them. || καὶ τότε E m. pr. y Them. 
Philop. Torst., καὶ τότε ὁμοίως insert. E, (Rr.), ὁμοίως καὶ τότε reliqui ante Torst. 
omnes || ὁμοίως om. SUX, leg. Them. Simpl. Theoph. 1. 1. 31, rr || 9. ἢ] καὶ 
Theoph. 1. 1, || 6¢ αὑτὸν] δι’ αὑτοῦ coni. Bywater, J. of Philol. XIV, p. 40, cui 
assentitur Susemih], Oecon., Ὁ. 86 || 11. καὶ rd ὕδατι E, sed τὸ expunct. (Stapf), τὸ 
om. reliqui omnes || οὕτω 6¢...12. ταὐτόν ἐστι in parenth. Bon., Stud. Arist. LV, 376 | 
rr. οὕτω δὲ om. LT, leg. Them. || 12. ταὐτό E (Trend.) || colon post ἔστι omissum 
post 13. σάρκα ponit Bek., corr. Trend., iam Them. hunc locum recte interpretatus 
est 96, 6 sqq. || 13. καὶ ἢ ἄλλῳ solus E, receperunt Biehl Rodier, καὶ ἄλλῳ y, 
ἢ ἄλλῳ, omisso καὶ, reliqui || ἔχοντι om. LS UV, leg. Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. et 
insert. Ey || κρίνει ὁ νοῦς L et E, sed ὁ νοῦς exp. (Bhl.) || 14. virgulam post σιμόν a Bek. 
Trend. omissam ponunt Torst. Bon. |} 15. αἰσθητῷ pro αἰσθητικῷ legi vult Brentano, 
p. 134 || τὸ ante ψυχρ. om. EL || 16. ὁ λόγος E, ὁ om. etiam Simpl. Philop. || 17. αὐτὴν 
y et E (Trend.) || εἶναι καὶ κρίνει LS, καὶ om. etiam Simpl. || rg. e/...20. εὐθύ une. incl. 
Essen III, 40 || 20. virgulam post εὐθύ om. Bek., corr. Trend. || ἄλλο TVX et Bon. 
1.1., ἄλλῳ reliqui ante Bon. omnes, quod defendere studet Torst., Jahrb. f. Phil. 1867, 
p- 245 || 21. καὶ οἵα. LSTUVX et, ut videtur, Philop. 532, 12 || dpa om. pr. E, leg. 
etiam Philop. || 23. ἀπαθὴς pr. E (Bus.), verba καὶ ἀπαθὲς in interpr. ignorare videtur 
Them. 97, 8 sq., delenda esse censet Hayduck, progr. Gryphisv. 1873, p. 4, cui assentitur 
Susemihl, Phil. Anzeig. 1873, p. 683, pro ἀπαθὲς coni. ἀμιγὲς Zeller, p. 568 || 24. ἔχων 


CH. 4 420 Ὁ 8—429 Ὁ 29 133 


then it is still in one sense but a capacity: not, however, a capacity 
in the same sense as before it learned or discovered. And, more- 
over, at this stage intellect is capable of thinking itself. 

Now, since magnitude is not the same as the quiddity of 7 
magnitude, nor water the same as the quiddity of water 


How the 

Oty (and so also of many other things, though not of all, the 

is appre- thing and its quiddity being in some cases the same), 
ended. 


we judge the quiddity of flesh and flesh itself either with 
different instruments or with the same instrument in different 
relations. For flesh is never found apart from matter, but, like 
“snub-nosed,” it is a particular form in a particular matter. It is, 
then, with the faculty of sense that we discriminate heat and cold 
and all those qualities of which flesh is a certain proportion. But it 
is with another faculty, either separate from sense, or related to it as 
the bent line when it is straightened out is related to its former self, 
that we discriminate the quiddity of flesh, Again, when we come 8 
to the abstractions of mathematics, the straight answers to the 
quality “snub-nosed,” being never found apart from extension. But 
the straightness of that which is-straight, always supposing that the 
straight is not the same as straightness, is something distinct: we 
may, for instance, assume the definition of straightness to be 
duality. It is, then, with another instrument or with the same 
instrument in another relation that we judge it. In general, there- 
fore, to the separation of the things from their matter corresponds 
a difference in the operations of the intellect. 

The question might arise: assuming that the mind is something 9 


Some simple and impassive and, in the words of Anaxagoras, 
ee has nothing in common with anything else, how will it 
sidered. think, if to think is to be acted upon? For it is in 


so far as two things have something in common that the one of 
them is supposed to act and the other to be acted upon. Again, ro 
can mind itself be its own object? For then either its other objects 
will have mind in them, if it is not through something else, but in 
itself, that mind is capable of being thought, and if to be so capable 
is everywhere specifically one and the same; or else the mind will 
have. some ingredient in its composition which makes it, like the rest, 
an object of thought. Or shall we recall our old distinction between 11 
two meanings of the phrase “to be acted upon in virtue of a 


SUV || νοήσειεν TV X || 26. δ᾽ om. pr. E |] 27. 6 νοῦς ST U WX Philop. Bek. Trend. 
Torst. {| 29. de verbis 4...31. νοῇ vide Torst., cui mutila et corrupta videntur; tuetur 
etiam Simpl., defendit Brentano, p. 137. 


134 DE ANIMA Ill CHS. 4, 5 


κοινόν τι διήρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πώς ἐστι TA νοητὰ 30 
ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ" δευνάμ;ει δ᾽ οὕτως 
ὦσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμ- 4308 

12 μένον: ὅπερ συμβαΐίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστιν 
ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι 
τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον" ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ 
τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν. τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ νοεῖν τὸ 
αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστόν 
ἐστι τῶν νοητῶν. ὥστ᾽ ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρξει νοῦς (ἄνευ 
γὰρ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ νοῦς τῶν τοιούτων), ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὸ νοη- 
τὸν ὑπάρξει. 

5 Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστί τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη το 
ἑκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὃ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ 
τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἢ τέχνη 
πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν 
ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς. καὶ ἔστιν ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα 


wi 


ω A Ν 
γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς" 15 
/ / ‘ \ A a ‘ / ¥ , 
τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώ- 
ματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. καὶ οὗτος ὃ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ 
A 
2 ἀπαθὴς καὶ duuyys, TH οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνέργεια. ἀεὶ yap τιμιώτε- 
ων > 
pov τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ H ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης. τὸ ὃ 
αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι: ἡ δὲ 20 
Ν ὃ , ., 7 ᾽ 3 ὌἊ ςςεφ . δὲ 3 / 
κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ OV χρόνφῳ' 
3 3 3 e Av ‘ me Ν > 9 ΜᾺ Ἁ > 3 ‘ 7 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δ᾽ οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ᾽ ἐστὶ μόνον 
A ν 3 ’ Ν a , 52 ἢ ν 53. 3 
τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον. οὐ 


30. puncto post κοιρόν re posito, pro διήρηται leg. διὸ εἴρηται Ald., quam secutus 
est Wallace || 31. av] ἂν μὴ LVW et inter versus UX, ἂν insert. Ἐπ, πρὶν νοεῖν 
Simpl. Prisc. 35, 33, πρὶν ἂν voy etiam Them. || post voy vulg. punctum || δυνάμει 
coni. Cornford, δεῖ reliqui et scripti et impressi omnes || post οὕτως excidisse ὑπο- 
λαβεῖν coni. Torst. || 4308, 1 ¢om. ESUVXy et vet. transl. || ὑπάρχειν SU VX | 
καταγεγραμμένον L et E, sed xara expunct. (Bhl.), γεγραμ. etiam Them. || 2. post yeypap- 
μένον punctum Bek. Trend., colon posuit Torst., sustulit Rodier || 4. ἡ ante de. om. E, leg. 
Them. Simpl. || 6. μόνον ἕκαστον y Ald. Sylb. || 8. δύναμίς ἐστιν ὁ LS UV WX |] το. ἐπει- 
δὴ coni. Essen ITT, p. 43, cui assentitur Susemihl, Phil. Woch. 1893, p. 1321 πάσῃ ΤΥ 
Theoph. ap. Them. 108, 20 Simpl. 240, 1 in lemmate, ef. tamen 241, 27, ἁπάσῃ etiam 
Philop. §39, 13 Them. 103, 1 Soph. 125, 15 || 11. ὃ] ὅτι UV X, om, y, ὃ etiam Soph. | 
ἐκεῖνο Ἐν, o in a mutat. E, (Bhl.), ἐκεῖνα etiam Philop. Soph. || 12. καὶ τὸ π. 10 ἊΝ || τῷ] ὃ τῶ 
LTX |] 17. οὗτος] οὐχ ὡς S || 18. ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἁπαθὴς STU VW Χ γ Philop., ἀπαθ. καὶ 
ἀμιγὴς E Them, Simpl. || ἐνέργεια ex Simpl. restituit Torst., idem habent etiam Simpl.cod. 
Marcianus A in Phys. 1162, 3 Theoph. ap. Prisc. 28, 12. 29, 28 Bon., Ind. Ar. 491 Ὁ 4, 
ἐνεργείᾳ omnes codd., etiam Them. 106, § Philop. Soph. || 19. τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό...21. δὲ οὗ χρόνῳ 


CHS. 4; 5 429 Ὁ 30—430a 23 135 


common element,” and say that the mind is in a manner 
potentially all objects of thought, but is actually none of them 
until it thinks: potentially in the same sense as in a tablet which 
has nothing actually written upon it the writing exists potentially ἢ 
This is exactly the case with the mind. Moreover, the mind itself 12 
is included among the objects which can be thought. For where 
the objects are immaterial that which thinks and that which is 
thought are identical. Speculative knowledge and its object are 
identical. (We must, however, enquire why we do not think always.) 
On the other hand, in things containing matter each of the objects 
of thought is present potentially. Consequently material objects 
will not have mind in them, for the mind is the power of becoming 
such objects without their matter; whereas the mind will have the 
attribute of being its own object. 
But since, as in the whole of nature, to something which serves 5 

Intellect as matter for each kind (and this is potentially all the 
passive members of the kind) there corresponds something else 
and active. . - . 

which is the cause or agent because it makes them all, 
the two being related to one another as art to its material, of 
necessity these differences must be found also in the soul. And 
to the one intellect, which answers to this description because it 
becomes all things, corresponds the other because it makes all 
things, like a sort of definite quality such as light. For in 
a manner light, too, converts colours which are potential into 
actual colours. And it is this intellect which is separable and 
impassive and unmixed, being in its essential nature an activity. 
For that which acts is always superior to that which is acted upon, 2 
the cause or principle to the matter. Now actual knowledge is 
identical with the thing known, but potential knowledge is prior 
in time in the individual; and yet not universally prior in time. 
But this intellect has no intermittence in its thought. It is, how- 
ever, only when separated that it is its true self, and this, its 
essential nature, alone is immortal and eternal. But we do not 
alieno loco posita esse iudicant Kampe, p. 282 Bruno Keil, Analect. Isocrat. spec., p. 52 
Susemihl, Phil. Woch. 1884, p. 784: cf. Alex. ap. Philop. 558, 5 544. |} 19. τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό 
EL, etiam Soph., αὐτὸ δ᾽ reliqui codd. {| 21. οὐ E Philop. Bek. Trend., οὐδὲ insert. E, 
(Rr.) et reliqui codd. Soph. Torst. (cui assentitur etiam Zeller, p. 571) Rodier, οὐδὲ ἐν 
Them. ror, 23. 28 || post χρόνῳ virgulam poni vult Zeller, p. 572 in adn., posuit Rodier || 
22. οὖχ om. Wy Plut. ap. Philop. 535, 13 Simpl. 245, 34 et 263, 8 Soph. Torst. Kampe, 
p. 282 Susemibl], Phil. Anz. 1873, p. 690, Oecon., p. 86 Siebeck, Gesch. ἃ. Psych. I, 2, 
p. 64, οὐχ leg. Them. 101, 24 et 99, 35 Philop. et ap. Philop. Alex. Plotinus Marinus 
vet. transl., retineri malunt etiam Zeller, p. 571 Brentano, p. 182 Schlottmann, das 


Vergingliche und Unverg. in der Seele nach Arist., p. 43 || 23. ἀΐδιον καὶ ἀθάνατον ΝΥ, 
ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. 


i 


136 DE ANIMA III CFS, 5, 6 


‘\ > 4 € Ν Ν 
μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς 
3 Δ λ a 
νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὖθὲν νοεῖ. 25 
r~ ro 4 “ A 3 
6 Ἢ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις, περι ἃ οὐκ 
σι a ων Ν ‘\ 3 4 , 
ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος. ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος Kal τὸ ἀληθές, σύν- 
¥ , 3 
θεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἕν ὄντων, καθάπερ ᾿Εμπεδο- 
ἌᾺ e ἴω 3 ,ὕ 3) 
κλῆς ἔφη “ἢ πολλῶν μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν, 
ἴω 7 \ “~ ᾿ 
ἔπειτα συντίθεσθαι τῇ φιλίῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα 30 
a ΝΕ , . 2 Ν 
2 συντίθεται, οἷον τὸ ἀσύμμετρον καὶ ἡ διάμετρος' ἂν δὲ γενο- 
A ? Ν, 
μένων ἣ ἐσομένων, τὸν χρόνον προσεννοῶν καὶ συντιθείς. τὸ 4300 
ον “A > θέ 3 / “ Ν KR Ν λ μ \ 
yap ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί: Kal yap ἂν τὸ λευκὸν μὴ 
‘ 4 
λευκόν, τὸ μὴ λευκὸν συνέθηκεν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ Kai διαίρεσιν 
ΜᾺ “ἡ > 
φάναι πάντα. ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἔστι ye ov μόνον τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ ἀλη- 
θές, ὅτι λευκὸς Κλέων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἣν H ἔσται. τὸ δὲ ἐν ς 
A A A ’ Ν a Ἃ 
3 ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὃ νοῦς ἕκαστον. τὸ δ᾽ ἀδιαίρετον ἐπεὶ διχῶς, ἢ 
“a + 
δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐθὲν κωλύει νοεῖν τὸ ἀδιαΐρετον, ὅταν 
an ΝᾺ / ἃ / 3 
von τὸ μῆκος (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ), καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἄδιαι- 
Ν 
ρέτῳ: ὁμοίως γὰρ ὃ χρόνος διαιρετὸς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος τῷ 
μήκει. οὔκουν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει τί ἐννοεῖ ἑκατέρῳ" τὸ 
a 3 A 7 N 3 
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν, ἂν μὴ διαιρεθῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ δυνάμει. χωρὶς ὃ 
e Ὰ ω Ψ 
ἑκάτερον νοῶν τῶν ἡμίσεων διαιρεῖ καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἅμα." τότε 
3 ε δ 4 3 3 ε 3 3 “~ δ 3 ~ / δ 
δ᾽ οἱονεὶ μήκη. εἶ δ᾽ ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ 
3 95 3 -~ Ν A Ν Ν Ν > ᾽ὔ bd Ν ΜᾺ ¥ 
4 ἐπ᾿ ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴ- 
24. μνημονεύομεν...431 Ὁ, 16. ἐκεῖνα desunt E, folio exciso inter folia 200 et 2οι || 
a7. καὶ om. L || ψεῦδος ἤδη καὶ STU VW X yet, ut videtur, Them. 109, 9 |] 27. ἐν 
ols δὲ,..Ὁ, 5. ἔσται 6 duabus ed. contam., pr. Ὁ, τ. 70...5. ἔσται, post. a, 27. ἐν οἷς... 
b, 1. προσεννοῶν, indicat Torst., quod refellit Vahlen, Aristotel. Aufsdtze I, p. 4 sqq. 
et Noetel, Zeitschr. f. Gym. 1864, p. 140 || 30. φιλίᾳ, οὕτω Vahlen, p. 6, φιλίᾳ. οὕτω 
Bek. Trend. Torst. || 31. συντίθεσθαι STV Wey || post διάμετρος addunt ἢ τὸ σύμ- 
perpoy καὶ ἡ διάμετρος W Simpl. Torst., quod additamentum reicit Vahlen, p. 7 sq., 
om. etiam vet. transl. || γινομένων VWX Bek. Trend., γενομένων etiam ‘hem. 
Simpl. Torst. Vahlen Steinhart || 430 Ὁ, 1. πρὸς ὃν νοῶν LX, προσεννοῶν etiam 
Simpl. et sine dubio Them. 109, 18 || καὶ συντιθείς unc. incl. Torst., leg. Simpl. 
Philop. Soph. et defendit Vahlen, p. 9 sqq. || 3. τὸ (kal τὸ solus T) μὴ λευκὸν 
συνέθηκεν omnes codd., rd μὴ λευκὸν unc. incl. Trend. in prima edit., cui assentitur 
Dittenberger, Gott. gel. Anz., p. 1613, in alt. ed. scripsit Belger de coniectura Roeperi, 
Philologus VII, p. 324: τὸ μὴ λευκὸν λευκὸν cuv., quod iam Torst. coniecerat, « καὶ 
AevKoy> τὸ μὴ λευκόν, συνέθηκεν coni, Vahlen, p. 12, <kal> τὸ μὴ λευκὸν <deuKdy>, 
συνέθηκεν Biehl, quod legisse videtur Philop. 548, 10 sq., “si album non albo aut si non 
album albo componit” vet. transl. || évdéyerac...4. πάντα fort. post 5, ἔσται transponenda 
censet Maier I, p. 30, in adn. || 3. καὶ διαίρεσιν] καὶ κατὰ (vel κατὰ) διαίρεσιν coni, 
Chandler, p. 8 || 4. pro πάντα coni. ταῦτα vel τοιαῦτα Torst., leg. πάντα etiam 


Them., ἄμφω in interpr. Philop., πάντα defendit Vahlen, p. 14 sq. || ye eici vult Torst., 
def. Vahlen, p. 17 || verba od μόνον post ἀληθές transponi vult Torst., cui adversatur 


CHS. 5, 6 430 a 24—430b 14 137 


remember because this is impassive, while the intellect which can be 
affected is perishable and without this does not think at all. 

The process of thinking indivisible wholes belongs to a sphere 6 
Judgment from which falsehood is excluded. But where both 
comes truth and falsehood are possible there is already some 
rates. combining of notions into one. As, in the words of 
Empedocles, “where sprang into being the neckless heads of 
many creatures,” then afterwards Love put them together, so these 
notions, first separate, are combined ; as, for instance, the notions 
incommensurable and diagonal. And, if the thinking refers to the 2 
past or to the future, the notion of time is included in the com- 
bination. Falsehood, in fact, never arises except when notions 
are combined. For, even if white be asserted to be not-white, not- 
white is brought into a combination. We may equally well call every 
statement a disjunction. But at any rate under truth and false- 
hood we include not only the assertion that Cleon is white, but 
also the assertion that he was or will be. And the unifying prin- 
ciple is in every case the mind. | 

Since, however, the term indivisible has two meanings, accord- 3 
Single ing as a whole is not potentially divisible or is actually 
howappre. Undivided, there is nothing to hinder us from thinking 
hended. an indivisible whole, when we think of a length (that 
being actually undivided), or from thinking it in an indivisible time. 
For the time is a divisible or indivisible unit in the same way as 
the length thought of. We cannot therefore state what the mind 
thinks in each half of the time. For, if the whole be undivided, 
the half has only potential existence. But, if the mind thinks 
each half separately, it simultaneously divides the time also. And 
in that case it is as if the parts were separate lengths. If, how- 
ever, the mind conceives the length as made up of the two halves, 
then the time may be regarded as made up of corresponding 
halves. 

Again, that which is not quantitatively but specifically an 4 


Vahlen || 5. δὴ UX || 6. ἑκάστοτε coni. H. Jackson || 7. τὸ ἀδ.] τὸ διαιρετὸν 7 ἀδιαίρετον 
coni. Torst., potest tale quid legisse Philop. 540, 18, τι ἀδιαίρετον coni H. Jackson || ὅταν» 
οἷον ὅταν coni. Torst., ὡς ὅταν Steinhart || 8. dd...dvepyelg in parenth. Torst. || post γὰρ 
addendum rt δυνάμει ἔσται censet Essen ITI, p. 49 |l 9. ὁμοίως...2ο. μήκει e duab. rec. 
contam. iudicat Torst., pr. 17. @vegrt...20. μήκει, post. 0. duolws...10o. μήκει, quod negant 
Noetel et Dittenberger |] 9. καὶ 46.) καὶ od διαρρετὸς T, om. X et pr. ὟΝ, καὶ ἀδιαίρετος 
etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. || ro. ἐνόει L Torst., ἐνόεις y, ἐννοεῖν T U W, tempus praesens 
etiam Them. Simpl. || 12. τῶν ἡμίσεων ante νοῶν SU, om. TX || 14. τὸ δὲ μὴ...15. ψυχῆς 
post 20. καὶ μήκει transponenda censet Bywater, p. 58 || 14. κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν TX || διαιρε- 
τὸν pro ἀδιαίρετον coni. Wallace, cui adversatur Susemihl, Oecon., Ὁ. 86. 


138 DE ANIMA Ill CHS. 6, 7 


/ \ 3 7 “A a. 
Ses νοεῖ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς 
a ἴω LA ® o 
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ, Kal οὐχ ἣ ἐκεῖνα διαιρετά, ᾧ νοεῖ 
ὶ ἐν ᾧ χρό IN ἡ ἀδιαίρετα: ἔνεστι γὰρ Kav τούτοις 
καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, GAN ἢ ἀδιαίρ γὰρ 
9 ’ 39 > ¥ > f ἃ a ¢ Ν ra 
τι ἀδιαίρετον, GAN ἴσως οὐ χωριστόν, ὃ ποιεῖ Eva TOY χρό- 
ἴω 4 “w iad 
νον Kat TO μῆκος. καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐν diravTi ἐστι τῷ TUVEXEL 
Α Ν ΝᾺ a ἃ 
5 καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ μήκει. ἡ δὲ στιγμὴ καὶ πᾶσα διαίρεσις, καὶ 
ιν \ & 
τὸ οὕτως ἀδιαίρετον, δηλοῦται ὥσπερ ἢ στέρησις. καὶ OMOLOS 
ε / 5. Ν ca + “ μ᾿ Ν , Ἃ 
ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον πῶς τὸ κακὸν γνωρίζει ἢ 
“ ΄ ~ 9 ’, 4 ’ ῪᾺ Ν , 
67d μέλαν: τῷ ἐναντίῳ γάρ πως γνωρίζει. Set δὲ δυνάμει 
> \ / \ 32 A 3 5. A 3 δέ ς᾽. 3 
εἶναι τὸ γνωρίζον καὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ. εἰ δέ τινι μή ἐστιν 
\ ‘N a b ‘ 
ἐναντίον [τῶν αἰτίων), αὐτὸ ἕαυτο γινώσκει Kal ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστι 
Ψ ς 
7 καὶ χωριστόν. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν φάσις τι κατά τινος, ὥσπερ ἢ 
κατάφασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἣ ψευδὴς πᾶσα ὃ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, 
ἀλλ᾽ 6 τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι ἀληθής, καὶ οὐ τὶ 
Ζ 3 3 ν \ ε Ἂ a ἰδί aN θέ > > ¥ 
κατά τινος" GAN woTEp TO ὁρᾶν τοῦ ἰδίου ἀληθές, εἰ ὃ αἂν- 
δ N A ΄ 9 3 \ > “ ν ¥ Y 
θρωπος τὸ λευκὸν ἢ μή, οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀεί, οὕτως ἔχει ὅσα 
ἄνευ ὕλης. 
‘\ 3 Ὁ, 3 ε > 5» 2 3 v4 “A , 
7 Τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό ἔστιν ἡ Kat ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πραγ- 
a , ¢ 
part. ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως 
δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ: ἔστι γὰρ ἐξ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος πάντα τὰ γι- 
χρονῷ γὰρ ἐχειᾳ οντος Y 
/ / de \ Ά >. \ > ὃ / ¥ nw 
γνόμενα. φαΐνεται δὲ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος τοῦ 
αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ποιοῦν" οὐ γὰρ πάσχει οὐδ᾽ ἀλλοιοῦται. 


15. ψυχῆς νοήσει κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς sine interpunctione TV, νοήσει etiam legisse 
videtur Them. 110, 19, γοεῖ leg. Simpl. || 16. mallem hoc loco οὐχ 7 [ἐκεῖνα] et 
17. ἀλλ᾽ ἡ <éxeiva> || virgulam post διαιρετὰ Bek. Trend. Bywater, Ὁ. 58, post ἐκεῖνα 
Torst. Biehl Rodier || ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἐκεῖνα ἀδιαίρετα, 
ᾧ νοεῖ καὶ coni. Christ || ᾧ] ᾧ τε coni. Torst., re om. Simpl., ὃ cum Vicomercato Bywater, 
Ῥ. 59 || @ voet...17. χρόνῳ interpolata esse censet Wilson, Trans. of Ox. Phil. Soc. 
1882/3, p. £0, cui adversatur Susemihl, B. J. XXXIV, 29 || 17. ἀλλ᾽ ἡ 46. unc. incl. 
Torst. Biehl, totam hance enunciationem a Torst. sanatam esse agnoscit etiam Hayduck, 
progr. Gryph. 1873, Ὁ. 5, contra Bywater haec verba, ut necessaria, retinere vult, p. 59, 
etiam Maier I, p. 32 in adn., leg. Simpl., sine uncis etiam Rodier, qui tamen ἄλλῃ pro 
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ scripsit || 19. καὶ τὸ μῆκος interpolata esse censet Wilson, 1. 1., probat Susemihl || 
καὶ Tovd’...20. μήκει post το. μήκει transponenda esse censet Susemihl, B.J. XXXIV, 29 | 
21. καὶ Swotos...23. μέλαν delenda esse censet Hayduck, p. 6 || 24. γνωρίζειν V || ἐνεῖναι 
SU y Simpl. Philop. Bek. Trend. Brentano, p. 115, ὃν εἶναι L. TV W X vet. transl. Biehl, 
καὶ ph ἕν εἶναι αὐτῶν coni. Torst., ἐναντίον εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ coni. Bywater, p. ὅο || ἐν ante 
αὐτῷ om. solus W Biehl, leg. etiam Simpl. || 25. αἰτίων] ἐναντίων S, αἰτίων etiam Them. 
Philop. Simpl. Brentano, p. 183 Bullinger, Arist. Nus-Lehre, p. rr, vel ἐναντίων vel 
ὄντων coni. Torst., cui assentitur etiam Kampe, p. 275, adn. 1, ἀδιαιρέτων coni. Essen, 
νοητῶν dubitanter coni. Rodier II, 487, τῶν αἰτίων delenda esse censet Zeller, p. 578, cui 
assentiuntur Susemihl et Bywater, p. 60, unc. inclusi || ἐνέργεια fort. Them. 112, 3 Simpl. 
258, 27. 31 || 26. τι] τις L, unde ris φάσις κατά τινος coni. Rodier II, 489, ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν 


15 


4318 


CHS. 6, 7 430 Ὁ 15—431 a 5 139 


indivisible whole the mind thinks in an indivisible unit of time and 
by an indivisible mental act. Per accidens, however, such specific 
unity is divisible, though not in the same way as they, the act of 
-thought and the time required for the act, are divisible, but in the 
same way as they are whole and indivisible. For in these specific 
unities also there is present a something indivisible, though certainly 
not separately existent, the same as that which constitutes the 
unity of both the time and the length. And, as with time and 
length, so in like manner with whatever is continuous. But the 5 
point and every division and whatever is an undivided whole in 
the same sense as the point is clearly explained by the analogy 
of privation. And the same explanation holds in all other cases. 
How, for instance, is evil apprehended, or black? In some 
fashion by its contrary. But that which apprehends must poten- 
tially be, and must contain within itself, the contrary which it 
Hypothe- apprehends. If, however, there be something which has 
thinuing no contrary [some one of the causes|, then it is itself the 
thought. content of its own knowledge, is in actuality and is 
separately existent. 

Now every proposition, like an affirmative proposition, predi- 
cating something of something, is true or false. But with thought 
Intellect this is not always so, When its object is the What in 
sometimes the sense of the quiddity and there is no predication, 

thought is in every case true. But, as the perception by 
sight of the proper object of sight is infallibly true, whereas in the 
question whether the white object is a man or not, perception by 
sight is not always true, so is it with immaterial objects. 

Now actual knowledge is identical with the thing known. But 7 
potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual, and yet 
not universally prior even in time. For it is from something 
actually existent that all which comes into being is derived. And 
manifestly the sensible object simply brings the faculty of sense 
which was potential into active exercise: in this transition, in 
fact, the sense is not acted upon or qualitatively changed. Conse- 


κατάφασίς τι κατά τινος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις coni. Torst., vulgatam tuentur etiam Simpl. 
Philop. 556, 8 || ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ W Torst., καὶ non leg. Simpl. {| ὥσπερ ἡ κατάφασις, καὶ 
unc. incl. Essen || 27. ἢ] καὶ L |} 28. καὶ unc. incl. Essen |} 29. ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ...3ο. ἀληθὲς 
def unc. incl. Essen ITI, Ὁ. 51 || 29. ὁρᾶν -« ἐπὶ: coni. Beare, p. go, adn. 2 || 30. post 
οὕτως in lemmate add. δὲ Simpl. cod. A || 431 a, 1. τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ...7. τετελεσμένον alieno 
loco posita esse iudicat Torst., cui assentitur Zeller, p. 571, leg. veteres interpretes, 
nisi quod τὸ δ᾽ avrd,..3. γιγνόμενα praeterit Them., in quibus etiam Alex. ap. Philop. 
offendit || 1. τὸ αὐτὸ δ᾽ TUVXy || 2. τινὰ τῶν βιβλίων ἔχουσιν ὅλως, τινὰ δὲ ἁπλῶς 
annotat Philop. 


140 DE ANIMA 11] CH. 7 


ao € ‘ a “~ 9 ΜᾺ 

διὸ ἄλλο εἶδος τοῦτο κινήσεως" ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς 
ἊΝ fan) “~ 4 

ἐνέργεια ἣν, ἡ δ᾽ ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα ἢ Tov τετελεσμένον. 

a ΝᾺ , td ‘ ~ . 

τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν 

a “ “ 5 ἴω , 

ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, διώ- 
~ \ 3 

κει ἢ φεύγει: καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι Kai λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνερ- 
A A ‘ \ > \ ry 2 πε 

γεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ τοι- 

ΜᾺ ε 3 3. », 
αῦτα. καὶ ἣ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦτο ἢ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, 
\ 9 Ψ :Ν 9 Ν Ν 4 » > UA. aN » 

καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ φευκτικόν, οὐτ ἀλλήλων οὔτε 

“~ Ky + a“ A o ἴω 

τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ: ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο. τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ 

a , 4 ‘A 3 Ν 

τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει. ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν 
᾿ ΠῚ Ν > / 

ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει (διὸ οὐδέποτε 

A ¥ / ε ‘4 φ δὲ ε ἮΝ Ν ᾽ 

νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἣ ψυχή), ὥσπερ ὃὲε ὃ αὴρ τὴν κό- 

3 y “ € 3 Ν ε , 

pyv τοιανδὶ ἐποίησεν, αὕτη δ᾽ ἕτερον, καὶ ἣ ἀκοὴ woav- 

Ν 9 <> > ~ 

τως, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἕν, καὶ pia μεσότης, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι αὐτῇ 

, Ν \ ; ¥ 

4 πλείω. τίνι δ᾽ ἐπικρίνει τί διαφέρει γλυκὺ Kat θερμόν, εἰ- 

\ \ , , Se δ eS ¥ Ἢ Ψ 

ρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, λεκτέον OE καὶ WOE. ἔστι yap ἐν 

Coed Ἁ Ν ε φ N ~ a ἰὴ 3 aN A 

τι, οὕτω δὲ Kal ws ὄρος. καὶ ταῦτα, ἕν τῷ ἀνάλογον ἢ 

a 5 “ὦ ¥ Ἁ ε 4 ε > ὦ Ν 3 . 

τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὄν, ἔχει πρὸς ἑκάτερον, as ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα 

δὰ ΜᾺ Ν, \ € A ? Ἂ 

τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἀπορεῖν πῶς τὰ μὴ ὁμογενῆ κρίνει ἡ 


6. εἶδος om. SX, post τοῦτο TUVy Them. 28, 36, post κινήσεως W, vulgatam 
tuetur Simpl. || 7. ἦν om. LS UVX Them. 28, 37 et Simpl. || 4 post ἑτέρα om. L, 
leg. Them. 29, 1 || post τετελεσμένου lacunam esse iudicat Susemihl, Burs. Jahresb. 
IX, 351 || 9. ὅταν] ὅτι coni. Essen III, p. 58 || 10. ἢ Aur. ΤΌΝ Simpl. || 
11. πρὸς τὸ ante τῇ transponendum putat Essen, 1.1. || 7 τοιοῦτο L, om. X, ἢ τοιαῦτα 
etiam Philop., ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα Simpl. || 12. δὴ SU WX, om. TV || ravrav T, τὸ αὐτὸ 
LV Rodier, ταὐτὸ scripsit Biehl, τοῦτο reliqui et Bek. Trend. Torst., qui conicit τὸ 
αὐτὸ τοῦτο, velteres interp. quomodo legerint, incertum est || 7 om. V, aut delendum 
aut 7 scribendum censet Trend., unc. incl. Rodier |} 13. καὶ τὸ ¢. L et interpret. Them. 
Simpl. || 14. τῇ δὲ diav....17. ἡ ψυχή in parenth. ponencla et fort. ante 431 b, 2. τὰ μὲν 
οὖν εἴδη transponenda censet Cornford |} 15. αἰσθήματα) αἰσθητὰ coni. Schell, Einh. ἃ, 
Seelenleb. p. 19 || 15. Srav...16. διώκει post 17. ψυχή ponenda esse iudicat Susemihl ἢ 
16. φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ solus L, uncis incl. Torst., καταφήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ y, φησὶν ἢ ἀπόφησι 
TX, κατάφησιν ἢ ἀπόφησι U, ἐστι κατάφησιν ἢ ἀπόφησιν V, ἐστι καταφήσειν ἢ ἀποφήσειν 
corr. 5, κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις W, Philop. 559, 31 interpretatur τὰ ὑποκείμενα οἱονεὶ 
καταφάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἀποφάσεις || καὶ φεύγει STU VWX, ἢ φεύγει γ || 16. διὸ...17. ψυχή 
secludenda esse coni. Torst., in parenth. posui || 17. totum hune locum ab Gorwep...b, 1. 
λευκόν are proposita alienum esse iudicat Torst., non interpretatur Them., recte explicat 
Neuhaeuser, p. 51 sqq. || post ἡ ψυχή virgulam Bek. Trend., punctum Torst. Biehl Rodier ἢ 
δὲ] yap coni. Essen || 18. αὐτὴ UV Wy Bek. Trend., αὕτη etiam Simpl. Soph. Torst. || 
δ᾽ unc. incl. Essen || 19. post ὡσαύτως colon Bek. Trend. Rodier || airg om. SUV X | 
20. post πλείω signum enunciati non absoluti cum Torst. posuit Biehl, adversatur Rodier 
II, 499, etiam Simpl. et Philop. hoc loco desiderant apodosin, putant autem eam ex 
praecedentibus supplendam esse; νεῦρα 17. womep...20. πλείω post 21. et 22. ἕν re trans- 
ponenda et apodosin sic conformandam esse: οὕτω δὴ καὶ ταῦτα (omissis verbis καὶ ὡς 8pos) 


Le] 


5 


20 


CH. 7 4318. 6—431a 24 141 


quently this must be a different species of motion. For motion is, 
as we Saw, an activity of that which is imperfect; but activity in 
the absolute sense, that is, activity of that which has reached 
perfection, is quite distinct. 

Sensation, then, is analogous to simple assertion or simple 2 
Sense apprehension by thought and, when the sensible thing 
affirming is pleasant or painful, the pursuit or avoidance of it by 
or denying, . . 
pursues the soul is a sort of affirmation or negation. In fact, 
or avoids: to feel pleasure or pain is precisely to function with 
the sensitive mean, acting upon good or evil as such. It is 
in this that actual avoidance and actual appetition consist: nor 
is the appetitive faculty distinct from the faculty of avoidance, nor 
either from the sensitive faculty ; though logically they are different. 
So, too, But to the thinking soul images serve as present sen- 3 
the mind. sations: and when it affirms or denies good or evil, it 
avoids or pursues (this is why the soul never thinks without an 
image). To give an illustration: the air impresses a certain quality 
on the pupil of the eye, and this in turn upon something else, and 
so also with the organ of hearing, while the last thing to be impressed 
is one and is a single mean, though with a plurality of distinct 
aspects. 

What that is by which the soul judges that sweet is different 4 
from warm has been explained above, but must be restated here. 
The unity It is a unity, but one in the same sense as a boundary 
of sense point, and its object, the unity by analogy of these two 
restated. . : ἢ . : 

sensibles or their numerical unity, is related to each of the 
two in turn as they, taken separately, are to each other. For what 
difference does it make whether we ask how we judge the sensibles 
that do not fall under the same genus, or the contraries which do, 


censet Freudenthal, Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 398, cul assentitur Susemihl, Burs. Jahresb. XVIT, 
p. 264 et Phil. Wochenschr. 1882, p. 1283 || 21. ὧδε] νῦν T Wy et in interpret. Simpl. 
Philop. || ἔστι yap...23. ἄλληλα ante 20. tive transponenda censet Essen IT, Ὁ. 88 || 22. καὶ 
ws] καὶ ὁ Xy, ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ ὁ T, om. cum ipso ὅρος LV, in interpret. ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὅρος 
Simpl., ὥσπερ ὅρος Philop., qui ἡ στιγμὴ non legerunt; οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ ὅλως 
ὁ ὅρος de coniectura scripsit Torst. || post ταῦτα virgulam posuit Rodier || ἐν ΤΟΥ Χ 
Trend., ὃν etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph. in marg. Bek. Torst. || 22. et 23. ἢ τῷ] 
ἢ τῷ Ly, ἢ UVWX Simpl., om. S, καὶ τῷ T Philop. Bek. Trend. Torst. Biehl 
Rodier || 23. ὄν] ὅν omnes libri scripti et ante Biehlium impressi, ὃν restituerunt 
Freudenthal, 1. 1. et Neuhaeuser, confirmant Simpl. et vet. transl., quae vertit es || 
kat ταῦτα ἕν τᾷ ἀνάλογον. καὶ τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἕν ἔχει πρὸς ἑκάτερον ws in scholis coni. 
H. Jackson || ἑκάτερα Simpl., post ἑκάτ. excidisse ἐναντίον coni. Torst., cui assentitur 
Frendenthal |} ὡς.. «ἄλληλα unc. incl. Torst., legit etiam Simpl. et fort. Philop., defendit 
Neuhaeuser, p. 57 || ὡς] ἡ Simpl. || 24. μὴ om. TV Wy Simpl. Bek. Trend., leg. etiam 
Philop. Soph. vet. transl. 


3 


142 DE ANIMA 11] CH. 7 


© δὴ by lA ¥ ᾽ν ε μ᾿ Ν 
τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν; ἔστω δὴ ὡς τὸ Α τὸ 
\ N ‘ e 9 ~ 
λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ Β τὸ μέλαν, τὸ Τ' πρὸς τὸ A [ὡς ἐκεῖνα 
4 3 Ν ‘\ e oN ¥ 
πρὸς ἄλληλα]: wore καὶ ἐναλλάξ, εἰ δὴ τὰ TA evi εἴη 
ν N Ν \ > AN ‘ 
ὑπάρχοντα, οὕτως ἔξει ὦσπερ Kal τὰ AB, τὸ avTo μέν 
N Ψ \ δ᾽ ὧν 3 Ν 3 έ 9 ~~ e , ε δ᾽ 3 Ν 
καὶ ἕν, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, κἀκεῖνο ὁμοίως. ὃ O αὖτος 
» Ν \ \ / 
λόγος καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν A τὸ γλυκὺ εἴη, TO δὲ B τὸ λευκόν. 
4 a , ~ 
τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη TO νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, 
‘ e 3 9 4 4 9 ~ A ὃ “ ἃ / 
Kai ws ἐν ἐκείνοις ὥρισται αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτόν, 
~ 7d \ ΜᾺ , > 
Kat ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ἢ, 
wn a μὰ ἰφὺ “ 
κινεῖται" οἷον αἰσθανόμενος τὸν φρυκτὸν ὅτι πῦρ, [τῇ κοινῇ] 


6 γνωρίζει, ὁρῶν κινούμενον, ὅτι πολέμιος. ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ 


ΓᾺ 2 A 4 ? ε ΝᾺ ¢ N 
ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἣ νοήμασιν ὥσπερ ὁρῶν λογίζεται καὶ 
ς » 
βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα: καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ 
~ “ K 

ὡς ἐκεῖ TO ἡδὺ ἢ λνπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει, 
καὶ ὅλως ἐν πράξει. καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως, τὸ ἀληθὲς 
Ἁ ‘ a) 3 ΤᾺ > “A ‘4 9 Ἂ ἊΝ 3 ~ Ν ΝᾺ 
καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ: 


ἀλλὰ τῷ γε ἁπλῶς διαφέρει καὶ Twi. τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαι- 


/ / A“ 9 KA 3 Ν / ® ‘ / 
ρέσει λεγόμενα νοεῖ ὠσπερ ἂν εἰ TO σιμὸν, ἢ μεν σιμόν, 
@ A ¥ , 3 
οὐ κεχωρισμένως, ἢ δὲ κοῖλον, εἴ τις ἐνόει ἐνεργείᾳ, ἄνευ 
τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει ἐν ἢ τὸ κοῖλον: οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικὰ 


a YY aA a Ψ 
8 ov κεχωρισμένα ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ, ὁταν νοῇ ἐκεῖνα. ὅλως 


δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα [νοῶν]. dpa 
δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται τῶν κεχωρισμένων τι νοεῖν ὄντα αὐτὸν μὴ κε- 
χωρισμένον μεγέθους, ἢ οὔ, σκεπτέον ὕστερον. 


25. τἀναντία S WX y Bek. Trend., τὰ ἐναντία etiam Soph. Torst. || 26. ὡς...27. ἄλληλα 
interpolata esse iudicant Christ, Stud. in Ar. libb. met. coll. (in thes.) Freudenthal et 
Baeumker, Ὁ. 74, unc. incl. Biehl Rodier, leg. Philop. 561, ro || 27. ὃν Ty || 28. καὶ τὰ] 
καὶ τὸ STV, κἂν ef τὰ coni. Torst. || 29. pro κἀκεῖνο, quod etiam leg. Vhilop., coni. 
κἀκεῖνα Jul. Pacius Torst. Brentano || 431 b, 1. καὶ] κἂν SO VX Simpl. || μὲν τὸ 
SUVWX || 3. ὥριστο Ὁ X et corr. S, etiam Simpl. || 4. αἰσθ. ὃν ὅταν 8 TU VX, αἰσθ. ὧν 
ὅταν Wy || 5. φευκτὸν TUVWX, φρυκτὸν etiam Simpl. Philop., de Them. codd. v. 
Hayducki ap. crit. ad rr4, 1 || ὅτε πῦρ unc. incl. Torst., leg. Philop. Simpl. {| τῇ κινήσει 
Basil. in marg., scripsit Torst., τῇ κοινῇ reliqui, etiam Simpl. Philop., delendum censet 
Bywater, p. 61, cui assentitur Susemihl, cf. Praechter, Berl. Phil. Woch., p. 196 sqq., unc. 
inclusi || 9. post ἐνταῦθα excidisse τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν coni. Torst. || 10. ὅλως] οὕτως coni. 
Trend. || καὶ ante τὸ ἀληθὲς leg. Simpl. in lemmate || rx. τὸ om. L et fort. Philop. in 
interpr. 562, τὸ || cal τῷ κακῷ LUX, ἢ τῷ W, τῷ om. etiam Simpl. || 12. -yeom. S Wy || 
rz. τὰ 6€...19. ὕστερον a re proposita aliena et 12. τὰ S¢...16. ἐκεῖνα corrupta esse iudicat 
Torst., locum ita restituit Bywater, p. 62: τὰ δ᾽ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα νοεῖ, ὥσπερ dy, 
εἴ <rus> τὸ σιμὸν 7 μὲν σιμὸν οὔ [Kexwpicuévws], 7 δὲ κοῖλον [εἴ ris] ἐνόει, ἐνεργείᾳ 
-«-νοῶν» ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει ἐν ἢ τὸ κοῖλον, οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικὰ κτέ. || 12. ἐν om. 
STU Χ Them., leg. Simpl. Philop. || 13. ἂν om. SVX, leg. etiam Philop. || 14. 9 δὲ 
κοῖλον] ef δὲ καμπύλον X, καμπύλον in interpret. etiam Simpl. Philop., κοῖλον Them. || ef 


25 


431b 


5 


CH. 7 431 a 25—431 Ὁ 10 143 


like white and black? Suppose, then, that as A, the white, is to 5, 
the black, so Cis to D [that ts, as those sensibles ave to one another). It 
follows, coxvertendo, that “4 isto Casto D. If, then, C and D are 
attributes of a single subject, the relation between them, like that be- 
tween A and B, will be that they are one and the same, though the 
aspects they present are distinct: and so, too, of their single subject. 
The same would hold, supposing A were the sweet and & the white. 
Thus it is the forms which the faculty of thought thinks in 
Images mental images. And, as in the region of sense the objects 
move to of pursuit and avoidance have been defined for it, so also 
outside sensation, when engaged with images, it is moved 
to action: as, for instance, you perceive a beacon and say “ That is 
fire’; and then [dy the central sense], seeing it in motion, vou 
recognise that it signals the approach of an enemy. But at other 
times under the influence of the images or thoughts in the soul 
you calculate as though you had the objects before your eyes and 
deliberate about the future in the light of the present. And when 
you pronounce, just as there in sensation you affirm the pleasant or 
the painful, here in thought you pursue or avoid: and so in action 
generally. And, further, what is unrelated to action, as truth and 
falsehood, is in the same class with the good and the evil. Yet in 
this, at any rate, they differ, that the former are absolute, the latter 
relative to some one concerned. 


5 


But the abstractions of mathematics, as they are called, the 7 


Mathe- mind thinks as it might conceive the snub-nosed ; 
matical gué snub-nosed, it would not be conceived apart from 
objects, 


how con- flesh, whereas gué hollow, if anyone ever had actually so 

conceived it, he would have conceived it without the flesh 
in which the hollowness resides. So, too, when we think of mathe- 
matical objects, we conceive them, though not in fact separate 


from matter, as though they were separate. And, speaking 8 


generally, mind in active operation is its objects [when ἐξ thinks 
them). The question, whether it is possible for the mind to think 
anything which is unextended without being itself unextended, 
must for the present be postponed. 


ris] ef τε Ly Simpl., om. X, εἴπερ coni. Trend. || ἐννοεῖ S, ἐννόει V || ὥσπερ ἄνευ coni. 
Torst., quod refellit Vahlen, Oest. Gymn. Ztschr. 1867, p. 722 [| 15. ἂν secludendum esse 
coni. Susemihl, Oecon., p. 86 || é 7 om. SUV, leg. Simpl. || 16. ὡς κεχ.] ὡσεὶ xex. T, 
τῇ ὑποστάσει L, τῇ ὑποστάσει ws κεχ. W, alteram quoque lectionem ferri: οὗ κεχωρισμένως 
ὡς κεχωρισμένως commemorat Simpl., ὡς κεχωρισμένα etiam Philop. Simpl. et, ut videtur, 
Them. 114, 22 || voy <g> ἐκεῖνα legendum proponit Bon., cf. Oest. Gymn. Ztschr. 
1867, p. 722 || 17. νοῶν om. Τί Ὁ pr. E et Torst., uncis incl. Bon., Ind. Ar. 4918, 61 
Susemihl, B. J. XLII, 240 Busse, Hermes XXVIII, 271, legit Simpl. et vet. transl., 
non leg. 566, 22—24 neque ad 402 Ὁ, 7 (37, 26sq.) Philop. || 18. αὐτὸν ὄντα SV W Xy. 


144. DE ANIMA Ill CH. 8 


4 
8 Νῦν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαν- 20 
3, ’ἤ 9 , 
τες, εἴπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστιν' πᾶντα 
\ “Ἁ 3 Ν Ν » Ὁ A ¥ δ᾽ ε 9 ΄ ‘ 
yap ἢ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν 
Ἁ 3 4 € δ᾽ » θ ‘ 9 θ 4, ΜᾺ δὲ a 
τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις τὰ aloOyTa: πῶς O€ τοῦτο, 
A 5 e ¥ 3 Ν᾿ 
2 δεῖ ζητεῖν. τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ 
4 ξ Ν ὃ ? 3 ἈΝ ὃ / εξ δ᾽ 3 λ 
πράγματα, ἡ μὲν δυνάμει Els τὰ δυνάμει, ἢ ἐντελε- 25 
, 3 Ν 3 / ~ δὲ a“ Ν 3 θ Ν Ν 
χείᾳ εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχείφ. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ 
τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταῦτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν τὸ 
‘ 3 4 > ᾿ δ᾽ A 3 Ν a Ν to iy 3 Ν 
δὲ αἰσθητόν. ἀνάγκη δ᾽ ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἰδὴ εἶναι. αὐτὰ 
va “A \ \ Ξ- 
μὲν δὴ οὗ: οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. ἀλλα TO εἰἶ- 
Ν Ν ε Ν 
δος' ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν: καὶ yap ἡ χεὶρ 4328 
ΝᾺ 5 wn y¥ 
ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὃ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἵ. 
5 3 A 9 ON \ IQ A 524 2 3 
ϑ83σθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθέν ἐστι 
΄΄ ‘ 
παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, Ta αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον, ἐν 
τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαι- 5 
4 f \ 4 “A 9 θ “Ἂ ῳ \ LO) 
ρέσει λεγόμενα, καὶ doa τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. 
‘ ὃ \ ἴω ¥ ‘ > θ 7 θὲ ὑθὲ “Ἄν, (0 
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι 
ἡ δὲ ἕξ / . 7 θ a 3 / ψ φ » 
οὐδὲ ξυνίοι: ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φαντάσματι 
» Ἁ ν 
θεωρεῖν: τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, 
XN ¥ 4 ¥ 3 ξ ΄ Ψ ᾽ Ν 
πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ φαντασία ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ 
> ’ ‘ 4 4 3 Ν \ > ‘\ aA 
ἀποφάσεως: συμπλοκὴ yap νοημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ 
ψεῦδος. τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τίνι διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαν- 
, εν x ὑδὲ 3 3 3 > ¥ 
τάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ τἄλλα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ 


-_ 


ο 


φαντασμάτων. 


21. εἴ 22. ex solo E ἐστιν" πάντα γὰρ ἢ scripsit Biehl, leg. etiam Soph. 138, 33 (ἢ in 
uno Soph. cod. A), ἐστι (τὰ X) πάντα. ἣ “γὰρ (om. γὰρ 1.) αἰσθ. reliqui codd., etiam Them. 
Philop. 567, 17 vet. transl. Bek. Trend. Torst. Rodier, qui tamen pro puncto post πάντα 
colon posuit, ἐστι πάντα. πάντα yap ἢ coni. Torst. || 22. δ᾽ δὴ EL, δὲ ἡ Them. Soph. || 
24. «- τρόπον τινὰ τῷ ἀνάγεσθαι. els coni., vel potius interpr., Essen, Beitr. z. Lis. ἃ. ar. 
Frage, p. 34, els om. L Soph., insert. Ἐν (Stapf.), ὡς coni. Susemihl, B. J. IX, 352, qui 
etiam ὡς pro 25. et 26. eds scribi vult, B. J. XXXIV, 30; cf. tamen Susem. ibid. XLII, 
238, LXVII, 104, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ πράγ. coni. Torst. || 25. ἡ prius re. E in ras. || duvduecs 
et 26. évrehexelas Let pr. E Torst. Biehl, τὰς δυνάμεις et τὰς ἐνεργείας Soph., τὰ δυνάμει 
et τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ reliqui codd. omnes (praeterquam quod etiam SX ras évredexelas 
praebent), etiam Them, Simpl. Philop., qui τὰ ἐνεργείᾳ interpretantur, et vet. transl. 
Bullinger, Metakr. Gange, p. 6, Nus-Lehre, p. ry Susemihl, B. J. XXXIV, 30 
Marchi, p. 18, els δυνάμεις et εἰς ἐντελεχείας scribarum errore ex els δυνάμει et els 
ἐντελεχείᾳ (Sc. πράγματα) orta esse suspicatur Christ || 27. τὸ om. ELSUVX, leg. 
Soph. || ταὐτόν EL Bek., ταὐτά corr. Ἐς, (Bhl.), scripsit Biehl in ed. alt., ταῦτα corr. Ey 
(Rr.), ταῦτα etiam Soph. et vet. transl. || ἐπιστητὸν] ἐπιστημονικὸν S U V et 28. αἰσθητικόν 
5. unde ταῦτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ ἐπιστητόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν τὸ αἰσθητόν 
scripsit Torst., τὸ μὲν «τὸ: ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ «-τὸ:» αἰσθητόν coni. Hayduck, ἐπιστητῷ et 


CH. 8 431 Ὁ 20—432a 14 145 


And now let us sum up what has been said concerning the soul 8 
Summary by repeating that in a manner the soul is all existent 
ofresults. things. For they are all either objects of sensation or 
objects of thought; and knowledge and sensation are in a manner 
identical with their respective objects. How this is so requires to be 
explained. Knowledge and sensation, then, are subdivided to 2 
correspond to the things. Potential knowledge and sensation 
answer to things which are potential, actual knowledge and sensa- 
tion to things which are actual, while the sensitive and the cognitive 
faculties in the soul are potentially these objects; I mean, object of 
sensation and object of cognition respectively. It follows that the 
faculties must be identical, if not with the things themselves, then 
with their forms. The things themselves they are not, for it is not 
the stone which is in the soul, but the form of the stone. So that 
there is an analogy between the soul and the hand; for, as the 
hand is the instrument of instruments, so the intellect is the form 
Nihilestin of forms and sensation the form of sensibles. But, since, 3 
inteliectu apart from sensible magnitudes there is nothing, as it 
prius in would seem, independently existent, it is in the sensible 
senses forms that the intelligible forms exist, both the abstrac- 
tions of mathematics, as they are called, and all the qualities and 
attributes of sensible things. And for this reason, as without 
sensation a man would not learn or understand anything, so at the 
very time when he is actually thinking he must have an image 
before him. For mental images are like present sensations, except 
that they are immaterial. Imagination, however, is distinct from 
affirmation and negation, for it needs a combination of notions 
to constitute truth or falsehood. But, it may be asked, how will 
the simplest notions differ in character from mental images? I 
reply that neither these nor the rest of our notions are images, 
but that they cannot dispense with images. 


αἰσθητῷ Chandler, τὸ μὲν τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν εἶδος Essen, Ὁ. 72, vulgatam 
tuetur etiam vet. transl. || 29. γὰρ ante δὴ STUX Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst., om. 
etiam Philop. et vet. transl. || ὁ om. EL Them. Philop., leg. Soph. || 432 a, 2. νοῦς 
ἐστὶν SV y, νοῦς δὲ TW |] εἶδος om. E, ἐστὶν εἶδος marg. ἘΣ || 5. ἐν om. ELSUV 
Them. Philop., leg. Simpl. || 7. αἰσθανόμενον L et E (Trend.) || 8. ξυνίη LS Xy Philop., 
ξυνίοι reliqui codd. Trend., ξυνείη Bek. Torst. || δὲ TUV || φαντάσματα SV WX, 
φαντάσματι E, « in rasura, etiam Them. Philop., scripsit Biehl, reliqui ante Biehlium 
omnes φάντασμά τι, etiam Simpl. vet. transl Bek. Trend. Torst. || 9. αἰσθήματα) 
αἰσθητά coni. Kampe, p. ror || ro. et τι. καὶ ἀποφάσεως om. 5 ὌΝ, leg. etiam Soph. |] 
ΣΙ. ἐστι νοημάτων SUV || 12. τίνι EL, reliqui τί, etiam Them. Philop. 569, 21 et ad 
403 8, 8 (45, 22) || φάντασμα E, φαντάσματα etiam Them. Philop. || 13. τἄλλα] ταῦτα 
Them. 116, 18 (sed τἄλλα ex Arist. scripsit Hayduck) Ald. Torst. Freudenthal, p. 13, 
τἄλλα vel τὰ ἄλλα etiam Simpl. et Philop. 569, 28 et ad 403 a, 8 (45, 23). 


H. To 


9 


2 


9 


4 


146 DE ANIMA Ill CH. 9 


4 , 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ δύο ὥρισται δυνάμεις ἡ τῶν 
~ Ἁ Ν 3 / 
ζῴων, τῷ τε κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ Kal αἰσθήσεως, 
\ » A A \ ‘\ ; , ‘ \ 3 4 
καὶ ἔτι τῷ κινεῖν THY κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν, περὶ μὲν αἰσθή- 
“ \ A ΜᾺ a) 
σεως Kat νοῦ διωρίσθω τοσαῦτα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ κινοῦντος, 
ἴω ~ 4 
τί ποτέ ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς, σκεπτέον, πότερον EV TL μόριον 
3. ΜᾺ Ν a aA / “Ὁ / “Ὁ ~ ς ΄ 
αὐτῆς χωριστὸν ὃν ἢ μεγέθει ἢ λόγῳ, ἢ πᾶσα ἡ ψυχῆ, 
“ 5» / 4 id ¥ ‘4 ‘ \ 3 / , 
κἂν εἰ μόριόν τι, πότερον ἴδιόν τι παρὰ τὰ εἰωθότα λέγε- 
Ν ‘ > Ld A ᾽ A ¥ δὲ 3 ? 
σθαι καὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, ἢ τούτων ἕν τι. ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν 
> \ *~ A ᾽ 2 ΝᾺ “ A ᾽ 
εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα. 
y 
τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄπειρα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἃ τινες 
λέγουσι διορίζοντες, λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητι- 
’ἤ ε A Ν᾿ ’ ¥ \ \ xd ‘ ‘ \ 
κόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ TO aroyov' κατὰ yap τὰς 
‘ > ἃ A , Ν ¥ A 
διαφορὰς δὲ ds ταῦτα χωρίζουσι, καὶ ἄλλα ὠφανεῖῦται 
μόρια μείζω διάστασιν ἔχοντα τούτων, περὶ ὧν καὶ νῦν εἴ. 
pyta, τό τε θρεπτικόν, ὃ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ 
ΝᾺ “ , Ἁ Ν 3 ’ aA 3 [ ¥ δ 
πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογον οὔτε 
ἕ a μι [4 μή c / ¥ \ \ / 
ws λόγον ἔχον Dein av ris ῥᾳδίως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ φανταστικόν, 
ὃ τῷ μὲν εἶναι πάντων ἕτερον, τίνι δὲ τούτων ταὐτὸν ἢ ἔτε- 
ρον, ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, εἴ τις θήσει κεχωρισμένα μό- 
a las) N \ 4 Ν 3 4 a ‘\ ? 
pla τῆς ψυχῆς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ὃ Kal λόγῳ 
“N 5 4 Ψ Ἃ δό 5 4 N ¥ on 
καὶ δυνάμει ἕτερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πάντων. καὶ ἄτοπον δὴ 
Ἁ an ¥ ~ ΝᾺ 
τὸ τοῦτο διασπᾶν" ἐν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, 
κ ὶ 3 "Ὰ λό ε 3 θυ ία \ oe θ ΕΝ 2 δὲ / ¢ 
ai ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία Kat ὁ θυμός: et δὲ τρία ἡ 
, 59 © + ¥ ¥ \ δ ‘ \ a on ¢ 
ψυχή, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσται ὄρεξις. καὶ δὴ Kal περὶ οὗ νῦν ὃ 
λόγος ἐνέστηκε, τί τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον τὸ ζῴόν ἐστιν; τὴν 
\ ‘ > ¥ “ - ’ Ψ ξ / 
μὲν γὰρ Kar αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν κίνησιν, ἅπασιν ὑπάρχου- 
\ “" 
σαν, τὸ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον δόξειεν ἂν κινεῖν τὸ γεννητικὸν καὶ 
θρεπτικόν: περὶ δὲ ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ἐκπνοῆς καὶ ὕπνου καὶ 
9 
ἐγρηγόρσεως ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον" ἔχει γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα πολ- 


\ 3 ? 9 \ Ν ~ \ ? ra ΄ ‘ 
5 Anv ἀπορίαν. ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως, Ti TO 


15. ἡ ante τῶν om. L et pr. E (Bus.) Soph. || 20. ἢ post ὃν om. SU W Soph., leg. 
Simpl. || 23. re] wore W, om. L, re leg. Soph. || de7] δὴ E (Trend.), δεῖ corr. E | 
λέγειν ψυχῆς X, ψυχῆς λέγεν STUVWy Soph. || 27. ταύτας EL, ταῦτα etiam 
Soph. || galveraa TUWXy, φαίνονται LSV, φανεῖται etiam Soph. || 29. τε om. 
STUVWX, δὲ y, τε etiam Soph. || 8 om. SUV, leg. Them. || 30. ὃ om. UV | 
432 b, 1. ὃ om. E Them. 117, 15 Philop. 574, 22 in lemmate, leg. etiam Soph. || 
τὸ EL, τῷ leg. Them. Soph. || τινὶ Bek., τίνε etiam Philop. Soph. || 4. πάντων om. W y, 
leg. etiam Them, Soph. || xat ante ἄτοπον om. TUVWy || δὴ τὸ τοῦτο] δὲ τοῦτο T Vy, 
δὲ τὸ τοῦτο W, δὴ τὸ τοῦτο ἘΞ Soph., artic. τὸ etiam Them. Simpl., reliqui ante Torst. 
omnes δὴ τοῦτο, etiam Bek. Trend., δὴ τὸ, uncis includens τοῦτο, Torst. |] 9. αὔξην E 


15 


20 


40 


432b 


το 


CH.Q ᾿ 4328 15--432 Ὁ 13 147 


The soul in animals has been defined in virtue of two faculties, 9 
Animal lo. not only by its capacity to judge, which is the function 
comotion. of thought and perception, but also by the local move- 
ment which it imparts to the animal. Assuming the nature 
of sensation and intellect to have been so far determined, we 
have now to consider what it is in the soul which initiates 
motion: whether it is some one part of the soul, which is either 
locally separable or logically distinct, or whether it is the whole 
soul: and again, if a separate part, whether it is a special part 
distinct from those usually recognised and from those enumerated 
above, or whether it coincides with some one of these. A question 2 
at once arises in what sense it is proper to speak of parts 


Digression 
oorts of of the soul and how many there are. For in one sense 
the soul. there appear to be an infinite number of parts and not 


merely those which some distinguish, the reasoning, passionate and 
concupiscent parts, for which others substitute the rational and the 
irrational. For, if we examine the differences on which they base 
their divisions, we shall find that there are other parts separated 
by a greater distance than these; namely, the parts which we 
have just discussed, the nutritive, which belongs to plants as 
well as to all animals, and the sensitive, which cannot easily be 
classed either as rational or irrational. Imagination, again, is 3 
logically distinct from them all, while it is very difficult to say 
with which of the parts it is in fact identical or not identical, if we 
are to assume separate parts in the soul. Then besides these there 
is appetency, which would seem to be distinct both in concept and 
in capacity from all the foregoing. And surely it is absurd to split 
this up. For wish in the rational part corresponds to concupiscence 
and passion in the irrational. And, if we make a triple division of 
soul, there will be appetency in all three parts, 

To come now to the question at present before us, what is it 4 
that imparts to the animal local movement? For as for the 
motion of growth and decay, which is found in all animals, it 
would seem that this must be originated by that part of soul 
which is found in all of them, the generative and nutritive 
part. Inspiration and expiration of breath, sleep and waking, 
subjects full of difficulty, call for subsequent enquiry. But to5 
return to locomotion, we must enquire what it is that imparts 


(Trend.), αὔξησιν etiam in interpret. Them. Philop. Soph. || ἅπασιν ὑπάρχουσαν E et 
Soph., 4 πᾶσιν ὑπάρχουσα W, at πᾶσιν ὑπάρχουσι reliqui codd. |] 10. καὶ θρεπτικόν om. 
EL, leg. etiam Them. Soph., καὶ τὸ Op. S |] rx. καὶ ante tervov'om. E || 13. τί om. E, 
leg. etiam Them. Soph. 


IO——2 


148 DE ANIMA III CH. 9 


A \ / 4 Ψ ΝΑ > 
κινοῦν τὸ ζῴον THY πορευτικὴν κίνησιν, σκεπτέον. OTL μὲν οὖν 
> ε \ ’ ΜᾺ > » Ά Ψ ‘4 € 4 
οὐχ ἡ θρεπτικὴ δύναμις, δῆλον" ἀεί τε yap ἕνεκά TOV ἡ κίνησις 15 
Ψ ‘ A ‘ ? A 3 7 , > θὲ Ν 
αὕτη, καὶ ἢ μετὰ φαντασίας ἢ ὀρέξεώς ἐστιν: οὐθὲν γὰρ 
‘ 3 , “Ὁ, “A om INA, a / ¥ A \ 
μὴ ὀρεγόμενον ἢ φεῦγον κινεῖται ἀλλ ἢ βίᾳ. ἔτι κἂν τὰ 
δ᾿ a Ν ᾿ 
φυτὰ κινητικὰ ἣν, κἂν εἶχέ τι μόριον ὀργανικὸν πρὸς τὴν 
/ f εξ / δὲ ὑδὲ Ν 3 θ la λ Ν » 
6 κίνησιν ταύτην. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν: πολλὰ γάρ 
9 [οὶ 7 A ¥ θ Ν ¥ / δ᾽ > Ν Ν 5. 2 
ἐστι τῶν ζῴων ἃ αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχει, μόνιμα δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκί- 20 
\ 3 On ε 7 “ ~ / \ 
νητα διὰ τέλους. εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μήτε ποιεῖ μάτην μηθὲν 
μήτε ἀπολείπει τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, πλὴν ἐν τοῖς πηρώμασι 
Ν 3 a) 3 7 δ Ἁ ΄ὰ a 4 2 AY 
Kat ἐν τοῖς ἀτελέσιν: τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων τέλεια Kat 
Y 
οὐ πηρώματά ἐστιν: σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι ἔστι γεννητικὰ καὶ ἀκμὴν 
ν ον aN nw 
ἔχει καὶ φθίσιν: wor εἶχεν ἂν καὶ τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη τῆς 25 
, 3 Ν Ν 9 ‘ Ν Ν Ν ε 2 “~ 
πορείας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ TO λογιστικὸν καὶ 6 καλούμενος νοῦς 
5 \ e ἴω . ξ ‘ Ν θ SN ἡ θὲ ἴω , Oe 
ἐστὶν ὁ κινῶν: ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν νοεῖ πρακτόν, οὐδὲ 
λέγει περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ διωκτοῦ οὐθέν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἡ κίνησις ἢ φεύγον- 
“Ὁ, », 7 ,»» » 3 9Q> ἢ “ A 
τος ἢ διώκοντός Ti ἐστιν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον, 
+ a @ a“ 
non κελεύει διώκειν ἢ φεύγειν, οἷον πολλάκις διανοεῖται 30 
φοβερόν τι ἣ ἡδύ, οὐ κελεύει δὲ φοβεῖσθαι, ἡ δὲ καρδία 
~ jf ν , 
8 κινεῖται, ἂν δ᾽ ἡδύ, ἕτερόν τι μόριον. ἔτι καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος 4338 
A A Ν [4 ~ - / aA - 9 
τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λεγούσης τῆς διανοίας φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν οὐ κι. 
~ 3 Ν Ν Ν 3 , , ® ¢€ 3 / 
νεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οἷον ὁ ἀκρατής. 
N “ON δὲ ε ΝᾺ Ψ ε ¥ \ > ‘ > 3. ΜΔ ς 
καὶ ὁλως O€ ὁρῶμεν OTL ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἰατρικὴν οὐκ ἰᾶται, ὡς 
΄ ¥ ΜᾺ 
ἑτέρου τινὸς κυρίου ὄντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλ᾽ 5 
3 ~ 3 , Ἰλλὰ ‘\ 0 e -» , 2 ΡῈ 
οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡ ὄρεξις ταύτης κυρία τῆς 
, € ‘ 3 vad 
κινήσεως" οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες οὐ 
a %® ¥ Ν » 9 9. 9 ω “ ad 
πράττουσιν wy ἔχουσι THY ὄρεξιν, GAN ἀκολουθοῦσι τῷ νῷ. 


15. re ET, om. reliqui codd., leg. etiam Philop. 581, 39 Soph. || ἡ ante κίνησις 
om. pr. E (Trend.) || 16. ἢ post καὶ om. SW Soph., leg. Philop. Simpl. || 21. διὰ 
τέλους] διατελεῖ Wy || εἰ ofv...unGev] hic variant SVWX, vulgatam tuentur etiam 
Simpl. Soph. || 22. τὸ EV, om. reliqui codd. et Simpl., leg. etiam Them. Philop. 
Soph. || 23. ἐν om. LTV Them. Simpl., leg. etiam Soph. || 24. ἔστι solus E, om. 
reliqui codd., etiam Them. Soph. || 27. κινῶν] ἐκείνων pr. E | θεωρεῖ EL et, αἱ 
videtur, Them. 118, 9, voe? legisse videtur etiam Soph. 41, 4 || 28 ἡ δὲ W 
Bek. Trend. Torst., ἀεὶ δὲ ἡ STUVXy et vet. transl., ἡ insert. E, (Bhl.) | 
φεύγοντός τι ἢ διώκ, τί omnes libri et scripti et ante Biehlium impressi exceptis E 
et Soph., τί prius om. Biehl || 30. φεύγειν ἢ διώκειν, exceptis EL et vet. transl., omnes 
scripti et ante Biehlium impressi || 31. re φοβερὸν TU V | φοβεῖσθαι" ἡ δέ ye καρδία 
coni. Torst. || 433a, 3. πράττειν E (Trend.) et y || ὁ om. STUXy, leg. Them. || 
4- 60m. L, leg. Them. Soph. || riv om. TW, leg. Them. Soph. || οὐκ expellendum 
esse censet Christ. 


CH. 9 432 Ὁ 14—433 a 8 140 


to the animal progressive motion. That it is not the nutritive 


The cause ἰδοῦν is clear. For this motion is always directed to 


f 1 - νι bed - a Φ 

οὗ ottan an end and is attended either by imagination or by 
τ th * . Φ . - 

ΤΟ ΗΝ appetency. No animal, which is not either seeking or 

faculty, 


avoiding something, moves except under compulsion. 
Moreover, if it were the nutritive faculty, plants also would be 
capable of locomotion and thus would have some part instrumental 
nor in producing this form of motion. Similarly it is not 6 
Senses the sensitive faculty, since there are many animals which 
have sensation and yet are throughout their lives stationary and 
motionless. If, then, nature does nothing in vain and, except in 
mutilated and imperfect specimens, omits nothing that is indis- 
pensable, while the animals we are considering are fully developed 
and not mutilated—as is shown by the fact that they pro- 
pagate their kind and have a period of maturity and a period of 
decline,—it follows that, if locomotion was implied in sensation, 
they would have had the parts instrumental to progression. Nor, 7 


nor again, is it the reasoning faculty or what is called 


intellect, = intellect that is the cause of motion. For the specula- 


tive intellect thinks nothing that is practical and makes no assertion 
about what is to be avoided or pursued, whereas motion always 
implies that we are avoiding or pursuing something. But, even if 
the mind has something of the kind before it, it does not forthwith 
prompt avoidance or pursuit. For example, it often thinks of some- 
thing alarming or pleasant without prompting to fear ; the only effect 
is a beating of the heart or, when the thought is pleasant, some other 
bodily movement. Besides, even if the intellect issues the order and 8 
the understanding bids us avoid or pursue something, still we are 
not thereby moved to act: on the contrary, action is determined 
by desire; in the case, for instance, of the incontinent man. And 
generally we see that, although a man possesses a knowledge of 
medicine, it does not follow that he practises; and this implies 
that there is something else apart from the knowledge which deter- 
mines action in accordance with the knowledge. Nor, 
nor ap- . . . . . ° 
petency again, is it solely appetency on which this motion de- 
pends. The continent, though they feel desire, that is 
appetite, do not act as their desires prompt, but on the contrary 
obey reason. 


150 DE ANIMA III CH. τὸ 


a Y AOA ν 
10 Φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα «τὰ» κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ 
\ Ν \ 
τις THY φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα" πολλὰ yap Tapa Io 
‘ 3 ’ 9 “Ἂ ΜᾺ , \ 9 a ἫΝ 
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς αλ- 
ν᾿ / 
λοις ζῴοις οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. 
+ ¥ ΜᾺ Ν Ν / a) ‘ » 
ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, 
A \ ε Ψ , / x ¢€ ’ . ὃ ? 
νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός: διαφέρει 
δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἕνεκά του πᾶσα" οὗ τ5 
γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ" τὸ δ᾽ ἔσχατον 
3 Ν οι / ν 3 , [φὶ δύ ? Ν 
ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. ὥστε εὐλόγως ταῦτα δύο φαίνεται τὰ 
Ἂ Ἁ 
κινοῦντα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική; τὸ ὀρεκτὸν γὰρ κι- 
a) \ \ ~ ¢ f Ἂ Ψ 3 Ν 393 OA 3 ‘ Ν 
νεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστι τὸ 
> ‘4 ‘ ε , ἂν “ 3 ~ ¥ 5 , 
3 ὀρεκτόν. Kal ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέ- 20 
A pay \ 
ἕεως. ἕν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. εἶ yap δύο, νοῦς Kal 
» > » \ Ν ¥ » 9 Τὸ “ δὲ ε Ν 
ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινὸν ἄν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος. νῦν O€ ὁ μὲν 
”~ 3 id ΜᾺ ¥ 9 ? c ‘ 4 ¥ 
νοῦς ov φαΐνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως: ἡ yap βούλησις ὄρεξις" 
Ψ Ν ‘ > Ἅ ΜᾺ ‘ ‘ , 
ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κι- 
A ε 3. Ὁ a) Ά XN / é \ 3 
νεῖται. ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις κινεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν" ἡ yap ἐπιθυ- 25 
/ » , ’ 3 ἰῳ \ > A 3 / 3 ¥ 
4 μία dpekis τίς ἐστιν. νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός ἐστιν' ὄρεξις 
\ Ν ’ \ 3 ‘\ \ > > / δὴ > ' “Ἂ Ν 
δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. διὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν 
A > ‘4 > \ ~ 3 3 Ἁ “Ὁ. ἃ > Ἁ A ‘ f 
TO ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ TOUT ἐστὶν ἢ TO ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον 
> ? > a δὴ 3 ‘ ‘ \ 9 ᾿ Ν 3 
ἀγαθόν! οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. πρακτὸν ὃ 
3 “ \ 3 a N cll ¥ 
ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. 30 
ν A εν e - , “~ ~ A“ ε ψ, 
5. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ καλουμέ- 
, A 
vn ὄρεξις, φανερόν. τοῖς δὲ διαιροῦσι τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, 433b 
\ \ 
ἐὰν KaTaras δυνάμεις διαιρῶσι καὶ χωρίζωσι, πάμπολλα γίνεται, 


9. ταῦτα δύο E L, δύο ταῦτα etiam Them. Soph. et vet. transl., post ταῦτα addendum τὰ 
coni. Bywater, p. 64, -- τὰ» recepi || 10. θείη W Philop. || πολλὰ] πολλοὶ coni. Bywater, 
cui assentitur Susemihl, Β, J. LXVII, 110 || 12. οὐ νόησις] βούλησις videtur habuisse 
pr. E(?) (Rr.) || οὐ] οὐχ ἡ L, ἡ ST VX Essen ΠῚ, p. 56 || οὐδὲ] οὐ TV X et pr. HE Essen, 
vulgatam utrobique tuentur Simpl. Philop. || 14. colon post πρακτικός sustulit et 15. δὲ 
unc, incl. Essen III, p. 56 || 15. οὗ yap...16. νοῦ post., 18. τὸ dpexrdv...20. dpexréy pr. 
edit. esse iudicat Torst., quod negat Noetel, p. 540, et refellit Pansch, Philologus XXI, 
Pp. 543, qui, ut Torstrikii contaminationem evitet, legendum proponit: οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις 
αὐτὴ || τό. αὐτὴ X || 17. δύο ταῦτα STUVXy Them. || τὰ om. E, insert. Ie, {} 
18. διάν, ἡ mp. TX || ὀρεκτὸν E Them. vet. transl., ceteri codd. ὀρεκτικὸν || 20. ὀρεκτόν 
EL Them. vet. transl., reliqui codd. ὀρεκτικόν || κινεῖ om. pr. E (Trend.) || 21. τὸ ante 
κινοῦν unc. incl. Essen III, p. 57 || ὀρεκτόν EL W Them. et fort. Philop. 585, 17 
(cf. Hayducki ap. crit. ad loc.), et dpexréy et ὀρεκτικόν legi commemorat Simpl. 207, 
31 56.» ὀρεκτικόν corr. E, et Torst., ὀρεκτόν defendere studet Pansch, 1. 1., cui assentitur 
Belger in alt. ed. Trend. || 22. εἶδος ἐκίνουν SUV W Xy et Simpl., εἶδος secludendum 
esse coni. Torst. || post νῦν δὲ addendum ἐπεὶ censet Essen, l. 1. || 2 5. Κινεῖ καὶ Philop. et 


CH. 10 4338. 9—433b 2 I51 


The motive causes are apparently, at any rate, these two, either 10 
Appe- appetency or intelligence, if we regard imagination as 
tency, how one species of thinking. For men often act contrary to 
practical knowledge in obedience to their imaginings, while in the 

other animals there is no process of thinking or reason- 
ing, but solely imagination. Both these, then, are causes of loco- 
motion, intelligence and appetency. By intelligence we mean that 2 
which calculates the means to an end, that is, the practical intellect, 
which differs from the speculative intellect by the end at which 
it aims. Appetency, too, is directed to some end in every case: for 
that which is the end of desire is the starting point of the practical 
intellect, and the last stage in this process of thought is the start- 
ing point of action. Hence there is good reason for the view that 
these two are the causes of motion, appetency and practical thought. 
For it is the object of appetency which causes motion; and the 
reason why thought causes motion is that the object of appetency is 
the starting point of thought. Again, when imagination moves to 3 
action, it does not move to action apart from appetency. Thus there 
is one single moving cause, the appetitive faculty. For, had there 
been two, intelligence and appetency, which moved to action, still 
they would have done so in virtue of some character common to both. 
But, as a matter of fact, intellect is not found to cause motion 
apart from appetency. For rational wish is appetency ; and, when 
anyone is moved in accordance with reason, he is also moved 
according to rational wish. But appetency may move a man in 
Opposition to reason, for concupiscence is a species of appetency. 
While, however, intellect is always right, appetency and imagina- 4 
tion may be right or wrong. Hence it is invariably the object of 
appetency which causes motion, but this object may be either the 
good or the apparent good. Not all good, however, but practical 
good: where by practical good we mean something which may 
not be good under all circumstances. 

It is evident, then, that motion is due to the faculty of the 5 
soul corresponding to this object—I mean what is known as ap- 
petency. But those who divide the soul into parts, if they divide 
it according to its powers and separate these from one another, 
will find that such parts tend to become very numerous: nutritive, 
fort. Them. 119, 13 sq., scripsit Torst. || 26. νοῦς μὲν... ἐστιν unc. incl Essen III, p. §7 Il 
26. ὀρθός ἐστιν" dp. et 27. μὲν κινεῖ STUVWXy, ὀρθός ἐστιν etiam E, (Bhl.), cued μὲν 
etiam Them., om. éorw Bek. Trend. Torst. || 27. καὶ φαντασία] κατὰ φαντασίαν coni. Essen, 
1.1. || 31. κινεῖ] κοινὴ W Essen, 1. 1. || 433 Ὁ, 1- τοῖς δὲ διαιροῦσι...4. θυμικόν alieno loco 


inserta iudicat Torst., p. 216 || τὰ μέρη τῆς ψνχῆς sive post κατὰ transponenda sive delenda 
censet Essen ITI, p. 58. 


152 DE ANIMA Ill CH. 10 


, 3 - 4 λ ld » Ὁ 4 . 
θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, νοητικόν, βουλευτικόν, €TL ὀρεκτικὸν 
a \ ἃ 
ταῦτα γὰρ πλέον διαφέρει ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμι- 
ΜᾺ A 
6 κόν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὀρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ 
συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ἐναντίαι ὦσι, γίνεται 
“Ἂ “ \ \ 
δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν (ὃ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς dia τὸ 
μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη" φαί.- 
A \ ¥ OU Ν e οὶ OU ‘ 3 Ac ε λῷ 
νεται γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἁπλῶς YOU καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, 
᾽ν δ εκ \ , [ὃ Ν ἃ a + ‘\ ἰφὶ \ 
διὰ TO μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον), εἴδει μὲν Ev ἂν εἴη TO κινοῦν TO 
ὀρεκτικόν, ἢ ὀρεκτικόν, πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν (τοῦτο 
γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι), ἀριθμῷ 
XN / ‘ “A 3 Ν > 5 \ a a \ Ν mn 
7 δὲ πλείω τὰ κινοῦντα. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τρία, ἐν μὲν TO κινοῦν, 
δεύτερον δ᾽ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἔτι τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον" τὸ δὲ κινοῦν διττόν, 
τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν 
ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ 
ὀρεκτικόν (κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ἣ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ 
» a / / 3 A "» 92 \ A 4 ‘ “~ 
ὄρεξις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ ἐνέργεια), TO δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον" 
ᾧ δὲ κινεῖ ὀργά ἡ ὄρεξις, HO υ ἦν ἐ . διὸ 
ἡ vel ὀργάνῳ ἢ ὄρεξις, NON τοῦτο σωματικὸν ἐστιν" OLO 
ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ 
8 αὐτοῦ. νῦν δὲ ws ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς 
μ᾿ 3 Ἁ \ Ἅ \ 9 / “« ε “ > 
ὅπον ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ TO αὐτὸ, οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός' ἐν- 
ΜᾺ \ Ν Ν ἃ ‘\ ~ Ν N Ν νι 3 
ταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ ὃ 
9 va ‘ ἃ \ > “A Ἁ Ἀ -~ ‘a ‘ ¥ 
ἀρχή! διὸ TO μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα 
μά ΄ 3 > , 7 Ν, ¥ ‘ Y 
ὄντα, μεγέθει δ᾽ ἀχώριστα' πάντα yap woe. καὶ ἔλξει κι- 
ad ὃ Ἁ ὃ “~ ν 3 id 4 Ν Ψ ~ ¥ 
νεῖται. διὸ δεῖ ὥσπερ ἐν κύκλῳ μένειν τι, Kal ἐντεῦθεν ap- 
3. vonrixdv unc. incl. Essen, 1.1. || BouAeurexdy τι coni. Essen, 1.1. {{ἀἔτε δὲ 5 ΟΝ ΣΧ, 
dé insert. Ey, δὲ om. Simpl. || 4. πλεῖον LSU, πλείω TVWXy Them. || ἀλλήλων ἢ] 
ἢ ἀλλήλων in interpr. Simpl. 299, 16 || τὸ om. L et E (Trend.) || §. γίν. καὶ ἐν, SUV 
Them., καὶ om. etiam Soph. et, ut videtur, Philop. 586, 18. 21. 23 || 6. ὅταν ὅ τε 
λόγος καὶ al ἐπιθυμίαι E (Bhl.) || 8. ἀνθέλκει, κελεύει δ᾽ ἡ coni. Essen IIL, p. 6o | 9. ἤδη 
insert. E,, leg. sine dubio Them. || το. μὲν] μὲν οὖν insert. E,(Rr.), μὲν οὖν TV Xy Them., 
μὲν ὃ W, οὖν om. etiam Simpl. || ἂν εἴη ὃν SU W, ἂν ὃν εἴη Simpl. || 11. parenthesin a 
πρῶτον ordiendam putat Bywater, p. 64, cui assentitur Susemih], B. J. LXVII, rio || 
13. ἐπεὶ Ey Simpl., ἐπειδὴ etiam Philop. et ap. Philop. Alex. et Plut. Athen. {| 14. ἔτι 
τρίτον E (Trend.) LS Torst., καὶ ἔτι τρίτον TX y Philop., ἔτι om. UV W Bek. Trend. ἢ 
15. κινοῦν καὶ om. E, leg. etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. |{ δὲ] δὴ coni. Susemihl, 
Oecon. p. 86 || 16. τὸ post κιν. om. ELSUV || 17. ὀρεκτόν corr. E (Trend.) ἢ} 
ὀρεγόμενον T Xy vet. transl. Torst. Belger in alt. ed. Trend. Biehl, κινοῦν sine dubio 
Philop. s91, 12 (v. quae ad loc. adnotavit Hayduck), reliqui κινούμενον, etiam Simpl. 
Bek. Trend., quibus assentitur Pansch, p. 545 || 18. κίνησις ὄρεξις EL et, ut videtur, 
Them. 120, 31 sq. Bek., ὄρεξις κίνησις etiam Simpl. vet. transl. Trend. Torst., ὄρεξις ἢ 


κίνησις Philop. || τίς om. TW Xy, leg. Simpl. || ἡ ἐνέργεια E (Bek. Stapf.), 7 ἐνέργεια 
E (Β81.), ἢ ἐνέργεια U Philop. Rodier, καὶ ἐνέργεια Them., ἢ ἐνέργεια Bek. Trend., etiam 


25 


CH. τὸ 433 Ὁ 3—433 Ὁ 26 153 


sensitive, intelligent, deliberative, with the further addition of an 
appetent part: for these differ more widely from one another than 
the concupiscent does from the passionate. Now desires arise 6 
Conflict of Which are contrary to one another, and this occurs when- 
desires. ever reason and the appetites are opposed, that is, in 
those animals which have a perception of time. For intelligence 
bids us resist because of the future, while appetite has regard 
only to the immediate present; for the pleasure of the moment 
appears absolutely pleasurable and absolutely good because we do 
not see the future. Therefore, while generically the moving cause 
will be one, namely, the faculty of appetency, as such, and ultimately 
the object of appetency (which, without being in motion itself, causes 
motion by the mere fact of being thought of or imagined), numeri- 
cally there is a plurality of moving causes. 

Now motion implies three things, first, that which causes motion, 7 
How the Secondly, that whereby it. causes motion, and again, 
animal thirdly, that which is moved; and of these that which 
mess causes motion is twofold, firstly, that which is itself 
unmoved and, secondly, that which both causes motion and is 
itself moved. The unmoved movent is the practical good, that 
which is moved and causes motion is the appetitive faculty (for 
the animal which is moved is moved in so far as it desires, and 
desire is a species of motion or activity) and, finally, the thing 
moved is the animal. But the instrument with which desire moves 
it, once reached, is a part of the body: hence it must be dealt with 
under the functions common to body and soul. For the present, 
it may be enough to say summarily that we find that which 
causes motion by means of organs at the point where beginning 
and end coincide; as, for instance, they do in the hinge-joint, for 
there the convex and the concave are respectively the end and the 
beginning, with the result that the latter is at rest, while the former 
moves, convex and concave being logically distinct, but locally in- 
separable. For all animals move by pushing and pulling, and 
accordingly there must be in them a fixed point, like the centre in 


oO 


Simpl., qui tamen et ἢ évepy. scribi (immo, id quod H scribebatur legi) posse dicit, ἡ ἐν- 
€pyela scripsit Torst., els ἐνέργειαν coni. Chaignet, p. 433 || 21. αὐτῶν ἘΞ (Trend.) y, 
€tiam, nisi fallor, LU VW, quorum scripturam errore, ut videtur, typographico, Bek. 
αὑτῶν esse rettulit, αὐτοῦ etiam Them. Soph. et, ut videtur, Simpl. 303, 15 sq. || 22. ὅπου 
ay ἀρχὴ EW Soph. || γινγλυμός E et Trend., γιγλυμός X, γιγλυσμός STV, γιγγλισμός 
UW X, γιγγλυσμός Soph., γίγγλυμος Simpl. Philop. et ap. Simpl. Alex. et Plut. Athen., 
γεγγλυμός Them. (v. 1. γειγγλυσμός) Bek. Torst. || 23. καὶ rd κοῖλον X et rc. E (Bus.) 
Soph., recepit Biehl, reliqui ante Biehlium omnes om, τὸ, etiam Bek. Trend. Torst. | 
γὰρ ante τελευτὴ insert. E, (Rr.) || 24. διεὸ., κινεῖται in parenth. et post 25. ἀχώριστα 
punctum posuit Bywater, p. 64, cui assentitur Susemihl, B. J. LXVIT, rio. 


154 DE ANIMA Ill CHS. 10, II 


“\ Pd + “ > ν » Ἔ 5 Ν 
9 χεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἢ ὀρεκτικὸν 
ω a Ν Ν 9 ¥ 
τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ ἑαυτοῦ κινητικόν: ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ dav- 
4 , 4 ΝᾺ “ἡ Ν A 3 θ ’ 4 
τασίας" φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική. ταύ- 


5 \ Ὁ ἰφὶ ΄ 
της μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει. 30 
“~ , ~ 3 [4 
11 Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν, τί τὸ κινοῦν ἐστίν, 


¥ , 9 , 
ols ἀφὴ μόνον ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαν- 4348 
aA ¥ Ν ‘4 4 Ἃ 
τασίαν ὑπάρχειν τούτοις, ἣ οὔ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. φαίνεται γὰρ 
~ »Ὁ»Ἄ Ν [4 3 / 
λύπη Kai ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνάγκη. 
ow οἱ 9 - 
φαντασία δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐνείη; ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῦται ἀορίστως, 
Ν a> ἣ ? > / δ᾽ » ς \ > 3 θ \ 
2 καὶ TAUT EvEoTL μέν, ἀορίστως δ᾽ ἔνεστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ ς 
~ ¥ , ε 
φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπαρ- 
A a) la Ν 4 
χει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον yap πρά- 
/ “Ὁ / a »¥ 5 \ ¥ \ 3. 9 e N 
fe. τόδε ἣ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον: καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ 
A Ν "Ἢ Ν ὃ , 4 δύ A > λ , 
μετρεῖν: τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει. ὥστε δύναται ἕν ἐκ πλειό.- 


/ ~ Ν » ΜᾺ “Ἂ δά A ὃ 
VOV φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν). Και QLUTLOY TOVUTO TOV όξαν μη O- IO 


μι 


ΝᾺ » 4 ἈΝ 3 “~ 9 ¥ 4 \ 9 4 
κειν ἔχειν, OTL τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὐτη δὲ ἐκεί- 
μ ‘ N 3 ¥ ξ κά ίφ 3  », 

ϑνην. διὸ τὸ βουλευτικὸν οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὄρεξις: νικᾷ δ᾽ ἐνίοτε 
Ν ΝᾺ ᾿ 4 € A 3 3 μά 4 ν ΝᾺ 6 
καὶ κινεῖ; τὴν βούλησιν, ore δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα, ἡ 
¥y Ν » 4 3 ’ / ’ \ 3 αὶ € 
ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται' φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ 
ἄνω ἀρχικωτέρα καὶ κινεῖ: wore τρεῖς φορὰς ἤδη κινεῖσθαι. 


μι 


5 


28. ἑαυτοῦ V Them., δ᾽ αὐτοῦ EL Soph., reliqui ante Biehlium omnes αὑτοῦ || 
81. καὶ om. E, leg. Soph. || ἀτελῶν etiam Them. Simpl. Soph., ἄλλων L, ἁπλῶν y | 
4344,1. αἴσθ. ἡ αἴσθησις E, ἢ αἴσθησις L, ἁφὴ μόνη αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει Simpl. |i 
2. καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν unc. incl. Essen || 3. ἔχουσα E, ἐνοῦσα etiam Them. || 4. εἴη 
LSUVW || ἢ om. ES | ἀόριστος exceptis ES reliqui codd. omnes, ἀορέστως etiam 
Them. {| 5. τούτοις LX et, ut videtur, Philop. 592, 26 Soph. 144, 37, ταῦτ᾽ xeliqui et corr. 
E || ἀόριστος y et fort. Simpl. in interpr. 307, 24. 308, 3 Soph. 144, 38, ἀορίστως etiam 
Them. 122, 11 Philop. || 6. φαντασία] ὄρεξις coni. Essen III, Ρ. 62 || ddéyos T Wy 
Them. 121, 21, ἄλλοις etiam Simpl. in lemmate 308, 2 et, ut videtur, Philop. 592, 22: 
cf. tamen τὰ ἄλογα 593, 5 || 7. ἡ δὲ BovAeuTiKh...10. ποιεῖν in parenth. posuit Rodier || 
7. πότερον...το. ποιεῖν in parenth. posui || 7. λογικοῖς Wy || 8 ἐστιν ἤδη L 1} ἔργον 
ἐστίν y || ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ μετρεῖν ἑνί W, vulgatam tuentur etiam Them. 121, 24 Philop. in interp. 
592, 30 || 8. καὶ ἀνάγκη... τι. ἐκείνην unc. incl. Essen || 9. πλεόνων E, πλειόνων Them, 
Simpl. Philop. || το. καὶ atriov...12. ὄρεξις mutila vel corrupta esse censet Torst., leg. 
Simpl. Philop. et, ut videtur, Them. 121, 29 5644. || 10. τοῦτο τοῦ] τούτον τὸ corr. E, (Rr.), 
quod legisse videtur Philop. in interpr. 593, 4 || 11. post οὐκ ἔχει add. «τἄλλα fGa> et αὕτη 
δὲ ἐκείνην hoc loco delevit Bywater, αὕτη δὲ κιν εἶ, coll. a, 19, coni. Cornford || 12. διὸ -«- ἢ 
τὸ βουλευτικὸν.. «νικᾷ [δ᾽] ἐνίοτε... βούλησιν, [ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην] ὥσπερ σφαῖρα -- σφαῖραν > 
coni. Essen IIT, p. 62 || 13. τὴν βούλησιν om. SV W | post βούλησιν colon vulg. || ὁτὲ δὲ 
κινεῖ Ὑ αὑτήν pro ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην coni. Cornford ll σφαῖραν y || 13 et 14. ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρ. 
coni. Trend., ἢ υἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρ. coni. Chandler, totum Jocum sic restituendum esse: νικᾷ δ᾽ 
ἐνίοτε καὶ x. τ. βούλησιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται" ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην" ὁτὲ δ᾽, ὥσπερ σφαῖραν 
σφαῖρα, ἡ bp. τὴν ὄρ. coni. Torst., νικᾷ δ' ἐν. καὶ x. τ. B., ὅταν ἀκρ. y-, ὁτὲ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ἢ 


CHS. I0, II 433 Ὁ 27—434 a 15 155 


a circle, and from this the motion must begin. Thus, then, in 9 
general terms, as already stated, the animal is capable of moving 
itself just in so far as it is appetitive: and it cannot be appetitive 
without imagination. Now imagination may be rational or it may 
be imagination of sense. Of the latter the other animals also have 
a share. 

We must also consider what is the moving cause in those im- 11 
The low. perfect animals which have only the sense of touch. Is 
crite how it possible that they should have imagination and desire, 
moved. or is it not? It is evident that they feel pleasure and 
pain: and, if they have these, then of necessity they must also 
feel desire. But how can they have imagination? Shall we say 
that, as their movements are vague and indeterminate, so, though 
they have these faculties, they have them in a vague and indeter- 
Delibera- minate form? The imagination of sense, then, as we 2 
tive imagi- have said, is found in the other animals also, but delibe- 

rative imagination in those alone which have reason.— 
For the task of deciding whether to do this or that already implies 
reasoning. And the pursuit of the greater good necessarily implies 
some single standard of measurement. Hence we have the power 
of constructing a single image out of a number of images.—And 
the reason why the lower animals are thought not to have opinion 
is that they do not possess that form of imagination which comes 
from inference, while the latter implies the former. And so ap- 3 
petency does not imply the deliberative faculty. But sometimes it 
overpowers rational wish and moves to action; at other times the 
latter, rational wish, overpowers the former, appetency. Thus one 
appetency prevails over another appetency, like one sphere over 
another sphere, in the case where incontinence has supervened. 
But by nature the upper sphere always has the predominance and 
is a moving cause, so that the motion is actually the resultant of 
three orbits. 
ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρ. coni. Steinhart, βούλησιν ὥσπερ σφαῖρα <éré μὲν αὕτη ἐκείνην Ξ- ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη 
ταύτην ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρ. coni. Bywater, p. 67: cf. ad a, 11, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ 
«πἿ dvw> σφαῖρα «-τὴν κάτω, ὁτὲ δ᾽: ἢ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρ. ὅταν axp. y. (φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ 
ἢ ἄνω ἀρχικ. καὶ xw.), ὥστε coni. Zeller, p. 587, adn. 4, φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ ἄνω ἀρχικ." 
καὶ κινεῖ ἡ ὄρ. τὴν 8p. ὅταν ἀκρασία yév., wore coni. Busse, Hermes XXIII, 460 sq., 
νικᾷ δ᾽ ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ ἣ ἄνω σφαῖρα 
(φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ ἄνω ἀρχ. καὶ κιν.) ὁτὲ δ᾽ 4% ὄρ. τὴν ὄρ., ὅταν ἀκολασία γένηται" ὥστε 
coni. Susemihl, Β. J. LXVII, 11, vulgatam Rodier et certe Simpl. et vet. transl., 
vulgatam legisse videntur etiam Them. 121, 33 sqq- Soph. 145, 11 sqq., «ὁτὲ D> 
ante ὥσπερ de coniect. inseruit Biehl || 14. ἐνῇ EL, etiam Philop. 593, 12, v. 


Hayducki ap. crit. ad loc., γένηται corr. Ey || 15. wore κατὰ τρεῖς διαφορὰς coni. 
Essen III, p. 63. 


156 DE ANIMA III CHS. 11, 12 


A \ > ε \ 
4 τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιστημονικὸν ov κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ μένει. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ μὲν 
io > ¢ ε \ 
καθόλου ὑπόληψις Kal λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα (ἡ μὲν 
6 rn ΝΥ ε ¢ 
γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι 
¥ Ψ ~ e 
τόδε τοίνυν τοιόνδε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε), NON αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ 
δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου: ἢ ἄμφω, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἠρεμοῦσα μᾶλ- 20 
λον, ἡ δ᾽ οὔ. 
Ν Ἁ 3 N A 9 / A ¥ rd 
12 Τὴν μὲν οὖν θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἔχειν ὅτι 
Ὁ ~ \ ‘\ ¥ > N , Ὰ 2 θ a 
περ ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχει ἀπὸ γενέσεως καὶ μέχρι φθορᾶς 
‘ Ν ‘ 
ἀνάγκη yap τὸ γενόμενον αὔξησιν ἔχειν καὶ ἀκμὴν Kat 
/ a > >» a 9Q 7 > 7 » 2 Ἂ 
φθίσιν, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἄνευ τροφῆς advvaTov' ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐνεῖναι 25 
A “Ὰ ἃ 
τὴν θρεπτικὴν δύναμιν ἐν πᾶσι Tots φυομένοις καὶ φθίνουσιν. 
“αἴσθησιν δ᾽ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ζῶσιν" οὔτε γὰρ 
we Ν a ε ῳ 2 , ε Ἀ Ν ¥ vd 
ὅσων τὸ σῶμα ἁπλοῦν, ἐνδέχεται ἁφὴν ἔχειν, [οὗτε ἄνευ 
@ o“ Ν ΜΆ 
ταύτης οἷόν τε οὐθὲν εἶναι ζῷον] οὔτε ὅσα μὴ δεκτικὰ τῶν 
9 αὶ ¥ Ἂ Ψ Ν , a 3 “Ὰ » ¥ 
5 εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης. τὸ δὲ ζῷον ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν ἔχειν, 30 
εἰ μηθὲν μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις. ἕνεκά τον γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρ- 
χει τὰ φύσει, ἢ συμπτώματα ἔσται τῶν ἕνεκά TOV. εἰ οὖν 
πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικόν, μὴ ἔχον αἴσθησιν, φθείροιτο ἂν καὶ 
els τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἔλθοι, ὅ ἐστι φύσεως ἔργον' πῶς γὰρ θρέ- 434b 
ψεται; τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις ὑπάρχει τὸ ὅθεν πεφύκασιν. 
ᾳοὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ σῶμα ἔχειν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν κριτικόν, αἵ- 
Ν \ » Ν / μέ Ν »;, 3 Ν ‘ 
σθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, μὴ μόνιμον ὄν, γενητὸν δέ, [ἀλλὰ μὴν 
3. 9 2 Ν , Ν Y a Ν - αὶ / 
οὐδὲ adyévyrov:| διὰ τί γὰρ ἕξει; ἢ yap τῇ ψυχῇ βέλτιον ς 
ἢ τῷ σώματι. νῦν δ᾽ οὐδέτερον: 7 μὲν γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον νοήσει, 
μ 3 afr ¥ ων 9. 5 ἴω 5 \ ὃ » 4 
τὸ δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἔσται μᾶλλον δι ἐκεῖνο. οὐθὲν dpa ἔχει ψυχὴν 
σῶμα μὴ μόνιμον ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως. 
16. κινεῖ TWX, vel κινεῖ vel κινεῖταε hic legi commemorat Simpl. 311, g sq. || 
17. ἕκαστον Ey Them. || 19. τοίνυν] τὸ νῦν E, sed ita ut lacuna sit minuta inter 
τὸ et vw (Trend. Bus.) Bek. Trend., νῦν Xy, om. LSTUVW, τοίνυν Simpl. 
Torst. || 19. ἢ δὴ atry...20. καθόλου, ἢ ἄμφω coni. Spengel in com. ad Ar. rhet. 
IT, 300 || 20. καθόλου; ἢ scripsit Torst. {| 23. καὶ ἔχειν coni. Christ, ἔχῃ Xy Bek. Trend., 
ἔχει etiam Philop. Torst., ἔχειν videtur legisse Them. 122, 22 || catom. TUVXy 
Bek. Trend. || 27. alios ζῶσιν, alios ζῴοις legere tradit Philop. 598, 17 sq. || 28. ὅσων] ὧν 
EL Philop., ὅσων etiam Simpl. 320, 38 et, ut videtur, Them. 122, 29 sq. || odre...29. ζῷον 
suspecta erant Trend., unc. incl. Torst., leg. Simpl., non videtur legisse Them. Philop. 
Soph. || 29. οὐθὲν οἷόν re LT W, οἷόν re οὐθὲν etiam Simpl. || 30. τὸ δὲ ξῷο»] τὶ δὲ ζῶν 
coni. Essen ΠῚ, p. 64 || 31. μη-} exit E || ἅπαντα LT VX |] 33. pro πᾶν coni. Torst. 
εἴη vel γένοιτο, cui assentitur Dittenberger, p. 1615, pro ἔχον coni. Trend. ἔχοι, quod 
probant Steinhart et Susemihl, Oecon. p. 86, post πορευτικόν virgulam posuit Biehl ἢ 


434}, 2. τὸ] ταῦτα W, τοῦτο ST UV X y Trend. || ὅθι Ὁ, ὅτι SV X, ὅθεν etiam Philop. 
Simpl. || 4. γενητὸν et 5. ἀγένητον Simp]. Them. Philop. ex cod. Ὁ Hayduck Torst., reliqui 


CHS. 11,12 434 a 1τ6----434 Ὁ 8 157 


The cognitive faculty, however, is not subject to motion, but is 4 
rhe at rest. The major premiss is universal, whether judg- 
practical ment or proposition, while the minor has to do with a 
syllogism. particular fact: for, while the former asserts that such and 
such a person ought to do such and such an act, the latter asserts 
that a particular act is one of the sort and that I am such a person. 
Now it is the latter judgment which at once moves to action, not the 
universal, Or shall we say that it is both together, but the one is 
akin to the unmoved movent, the other is not? 

Every living thing, then, must have the nutritive soul and in fact 12 
Teleology; has a soul from its birth till its death. For what has 
nutritive been born must necessarily grow, reach maturity and 
cessary. decline, and for these processes nutriment is indispens- 
able. It follows, then, of necessity that the nutritive faculty is 
present in all things that grow and decay. But sensation is not 2 
necessarily present in all living things. For wherever the body is 
uncompounded there can be no sense of touch [ yet without this sense 
animal existence 1s impossible|: nor, again, in those living things 
which are incapable of receiving forms apart from matter. But 3 
sensation the animal must of necessity possess sensation, if nature 
necessary makes nothing in vain: for everything in nature sub- 
to animals. - . 

serves an end or else will be an accessory of things 
which subserve an end. Now every living body having the power 
of progression and yet lacking sensation would be destroyed and 
never reach full development, which is its natural function. For 
how in such a case is it to obtain nutriment? Motionless animals, 
it is true, have for nutriment that from which they have been 
developed. But a body, not stationary, but produced by genera- 4 
tion, cannot possibly have a soul and an intelligence capable of 
judging without also having sensation. [lVetzher can tt, tf τῇ be not 
genevated.| For why should it have the one without the other? 
Presumably for the advantage either of the soul or of the body. 
But neither of these alternatives is, in fact, admissible. For the 
soul will be no better able to think, and the body will be no 
better off, for the absence of sensation. We conclude, then, that no 
body that is not stationary has soul without having sensation. 
ante Torst. omnes γεννητὸν εἰ ἀγέννητον, etiam Them. v.l. Philop. ed. Trincavelli || ἀλλὰ .. 
5. ἀγένητον unc. inclusit Torst., leg. quidem omnes libri scripti et impressi, etiam Them. 
Philop. 599, 32 Soph. et apud Simpl. et Philop. Alex. et Plut. et vet. transl., omisit Simpl., 
qui annotat 320, 28: ἔν τισι δὲ ἀντυγράφοις πρόσκειται τὸ ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον || 4. οὐ μὴν 
ἀλλὰ dry. coni. Essen III, p. 65 || 5. γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει TUV Wy Plut. apud Simpl. εἰ apud 
Philop. et vet. transl., om. οὐχ reliqui, etiam Them. Philop. Alex. || verbis διὰ ri γὰρ ἔξει (sc. 


τὸ μόνιμον); ἢ yap...7. 5: ἐκεῖνο parenthesi inclusis apodosin sententiae conditionalis εἰ οὖν 
πᾶν ab οὐθὲν ἄρα ἔχει incipere statuit Christ || 7. τῷ LW, τὸ etiam Them. 


5 


6 


7 


9 


158 DE ANIMA “27 CH. 12 


3 > A ε ἰῳ 
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε αἴσθησιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὸ σῶμα εἶναι ἢ ἁπλοῦν 
@ δ δ ψ ¥ \ 
ἢ μεικτόν. οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ ἁπλοῦν: ἁφὴν γὰρ οὐχ ἔξει, ἔστι δὲ τὸ 
A a“ oN ‘\ 
ἀνάγκη ταύτην ἔχειν. τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ἐπεὶ yap τὸ 
D DLA € ἦν ἐ Hua δὲ ἅπαν ἁπτόν, ἁπτὸν δὲ τὸ 
ζῷον σῶμα ἔμψυχόν ἐστι, σῶμα ὃὲ ἀπαν a ὸ 
ἊᾺ 3 Ν Ν ΡΜᾺ , ~ € Ν, 
αἰσθητὸν ady, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα ἀἁπτικὸν 
> in nd 
εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον. αἱ yap ἄλλαι aio ly- 
> ¢ 2 9 θά τ » » 3. ᾿ς 
σεις δι ἑτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὄσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή" 15 
ε - ? 9 ‘ Ψ » > ὃ ¢ Ν ‘\ 
ἁπτόμενον δέ, εἰ μὴ ἔξει αἴσθησιν, ov δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν 
φεύγειν τὰ δὲ λαβεῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀδύνατον ἔσται σώζε- 
θ ὃ lw διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἁφή TIS’ τρο- 
σθαι τὸ ζῷον. διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἀφὴ τις" TPO 
~ 7 , € δὲ \ ‘ “~ XN € ? ? δὲ 
φῆς γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἁπτόν. ψόφος dé 
νΝ ων \ 93 ‘ 3 / Oe wn » 3 ¥ » 
Kal χρῶμα καὶ ὀσμὴ οὐ τρέφει, οὐδὲ ποιεῖ οὔτ᾽ αὔξησιν οὔτε 20 
φθίσιν. ὥστε καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν ἀνάγκη ἀφὴν εἶναί τινα, διὰ 
τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι" αὗται μὲν οὖν 
ἀναγκαῖαι τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ 
ς ΓΟ 3. ae ξ δὲ tN ΜᾺ 5 Ψ \ , 
ἁφῆς εἶναι ζῷον. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τοῦ τε εὖ ἕνεκα καὶ γένει 
¥ > ~ / 9 Ν [4 Os ἊΝ ~ 
ζῴων ἤδη ov τῷ τυχόντι, ἀλλὰ τισίν, οἷον τῷ πορευτικῷ 25 
5» 9 ε 7 . 3 ‘\ f / > 4 ὃ μᾺ 
ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν εἰ γὰρ μέλλει σώζεσθαι, οὐ μόνον δεῖ 
ε , 9 θά θ aN Ν ΟΝ» θ “ δ᾽ a ¥ 
ἁπτόμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄποθεν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἂν etn, 
3 ὃ ‘ ~ ξὺ 3 θ ὸ » ~ 5» ἊΝ ‘ € Ἅ “ 
εἰ διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ αἰσθητικὸν εἴη τῷ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ 
~ ~ > 3 
αἰσθητοῦ πάσχειν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, αὐτὸ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ exeivov. ὥσπερ 
γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον μέχρι του μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ, 30 
S na FY [οὶ 
καὶ τὸ ὦσαν ἕτερον ποιεῖ ὥστε ὠθεῖν, καὶ ἔστι διὰ μέσου ἡ 
κίνησις, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κινεῖ καὶ ὠθεῖ οὐκ ὠθούμενον, 
\ δ᾽ Ψ id oO Ὁ 9 > ‘ δὲ , » 
τὸ ὃ ἐσχατον μόνον ὠθεῖται οὐκ ὥὦσαν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἄμφω, 
πολλὰ δὲ μέσα, οὕτω «καὶ; ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοιώσεως, πλὴν ὅτι μένοντος 4354 
3 A 3 a ? aN “A e 3 > δὴ / ed 
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ ἀλλοιοῖ, οἷον εἰ eis κηρὸν βάψειέ τις, 
μέχρι τούτου ἐκινήθη, ἔως ἔβαψεν' λίθος δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ 


9. ἔχοι L, om. SUV |] 9. ἀνάγκη...13. ἁφῇ unc. incl. Essen || 17. ἐστι Τ' Χ, ἔσται etiam 
Philop. |} 18. διὸ xal...19. ἁπτόν post., 21. ὥστε...22. εἶναι pr., edit. esse iudicat Torst. |{ 
19. post ἁπτόν addendum καὶ θρεπτικόν censet Bywater, p. 67 || 24. τὸ ζῷον L, τὸ om. 
Them. |} 27. σώζεσθαι TWX, αἰσθάνεσθαι etiam Soph. || 30. τον Torst. et, ut videtur, 
Them. 124, 30, Soph. interpretatur μέχρι τινός, τούτου S, reliqui ante Torst. omnes τοῦ || 
31. ὦσαν} ὠσθὲν coni. Torst., doay etiam Simpl. Soph. et, ut videtur, Philop. 605, 1 ἢ 
καὶ ἔστι...32, κίνησις] καὶ ἔστι ταῦτα διὰ μέσου coni. Torst., vulg. tuetur Soph. || 32. καὶ rd 
μὲν rp. W Torst., τὸ δὲ wp. L, καὶ τὸ mp. μὲν TX, καὶ μὲν δὴ τὸ wp. SU, καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν πρ. 
Vy Bek. Trend. || κινεῖ καὶ ὠθεῖ Ly Soph., reliqui ante Biehlium omnes κινοῦν ὠθεῖ, 
κιψοῦν unc. incl. Torst. || 33. ὥσαν] ὠθοῦν X || 435 a, 1. οὕτω δὴ ἐπ᾽ vel οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπ᾽ 
coni. Torst., οὕτω vel οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. vet. transl., om. καὶ 
omnes codd., «καὶ; in textum recepit Biehl || μένοντα VWX Trend., μένοντος etiam 


CH. 12 434 Ὁ 9—435 a 3 159 


But, further, the body, assuming that it has sensation, must 5 
Touch be either simple or composite. But it cannot be simple, 
necessary for then it would not have touch, and this sense is indis- 
for self- . . . . . 
preserva- pensable. ‘This is clear from the following considerations. 6 
son The animal is an animate body. Now body is always 
tangible and it is that which is perceptible by touch which is tan- 
gible: from which it follows that the body of the animal must have 
tactile sensation, if the animal is to survive. For the other senses, 
that is to say, smell, sight, hearing, have media of sensation, but 
a being which has no sensation will be unable when it comes into 
contact with things to avoid some and seize others. And if 
this is so, it will be impossible for the animal to survive. This 7 
is why taste is a kind of touch, for taste is of nutriment and 
nutriment is body which is tangible; whereas sound, colour and 
smell afford no nourishment and promote neither growth nor 
decay. So that taste also must be a kind of touch, because it is 
a sensation of that which is tangible and nutritive. These two 
senses, then, are necessary to the animal, and it is plain that 
without touch no animal can exist. 

But the other senses are means to well-being, and are necessary, 8 
The higher not to any and every species of animal, but only to cer- 
necessary tain species, as, for example, those capable of locomotion. 
pressive For, if the animal capable of locomotion is to survive, it 
animals. must have sensation, not only when in contact with any- 
thing, but also at a distance from it. And this will be secured if it 
Amedium can perceive through a medium, the medium being capable 
for sense. Of being acted upon and set in motion by the sensible 
tion. object, and the animal itself by the medium. Now that 9 
which causes motion from place to place produces a change oper- 
ating within certain limits, and that which propels causes the thing 
propelled to propel in turn, the movement being transmitted 
through something intermediate. The first in the series initiates 
motion and propels without being itself propelled, while the last 
is simply propelled without propelling; the numerous middle 
terms of the series both propel and are propelled. So it is also 
with qualitative change, except that what is subject to this 
change remains in the same place. Suppose we were to dip 
something into wax, the movement in the wax would extend just 


so far down as we had dipped the object, whereas in the like case 


Philop. et, ut videtur, Them. 124, 28 || 2. ἀλλοιοῖ, οἷον] ἀλλ᾽ οἷον 5 Poppelreuter, zur 
Psych. d. Ar., p. 17 || 3. τοῦ UX. 


160 DE ANIMA III CHS. 12, 13 


ὕδωρ μέχρι πόρρω; ὁ δ᾽ ἀὴρ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον κινεῖται καὶ 
“ ‘ ® 3 \ ‘ Ν 3 
ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει, ἐὰν μένῃ καὶ εἷς ἧ. διὸ καὶ περὶ ἀνα- 5 
, “~ 3 Ἁ 9 
κλάσεως βέλτιον ἢ τὴν ὄψιν ἐξιοῦσαν ἀνακλᾶσθαι, τὸν ἀέρα 
A Ν vd / @ 
πάσχειν ὑπὸ TOV σχήματος Kal χρώματος, μέχρι περ οὗ 
“Ὁ ~ “ἃ > ON δὲ “ λ 7, 3 Ν @,. 8 Ν aN e Ν ¥ 
ἂν ἢ els. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ λείου ἐστὶν εἷς" διὸ πάλιν οὗτος THY ὄψιν 
A ~ ae “ / 
κινεῖ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ ἐν τῷ κηρῷ σημεῖον διεδίδοτο μέχρι 
τοῦ πέρατος. 
1. Ὅτι δ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἁπλοῦν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα, 
/ / 5 @ / aK 3 ¥ A Ν 
φανερόν, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον πύρινον ἢ ἀέρινον. ἄνευ μὲν yap 
ε ran 3 , 3 4 + Ψ ¥ Ἁ ‘ 
ἁφῆς οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἔχειν: τὸ γὰρ 
σῶμα ἁἅπτικὸν τὸ ἔμψυχον πᾶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. τὰ δὲ 
¥ ¥ ΜᾺ 3 θ 7 Ν “Ὁ, / 4 δὲ ΝᾺ 
ἄλλα ἔξω γῆς αἰσθητήρια μὲν ἂν γένοιτο, πάντα δὲ τῷ τς 
> ε», > θά θ “ Ν ¥ θ ἃ ὃ Ν on 
dv ἑτέρου αἰσθάνεσθαι ποιεῖ THY αἴσθησιν καὶ διὰ τῶν με- 
7 ε > ε Ν a > A ᾽ , 53 Ἁ Ν ¥ 
ταξύ. ἡ δ᾽ ἁφὴ τῷ αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαί ἐστιν, διὸ καὶ τοὔνομα 
“A ¥ ’ὔ \ Ν AON > A , ι Lon 3 θ , 
τοῦτο ἔχει. καίτοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια ἀφῇ αἰσθάνε- 
3 Ν > € Ff Ψ Ἃ “ 7 > ec A Ψ ΜᾺ 
ται, ἀλλὰ δι ἑτέρου: αὕτη δὲ δοκεῖ μόνη du αὑτῆς. ὥστε τῶν 
A - [4 9 Ν A » “A ῪᾺ / > Ν ‘ 
μὲν τοιούτων στοιχείων οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη σῶμα τοῦ ζῴον. οὐδὲ δὴ 
γήϊνον. πάντων γὰρ ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν ἁπτῶν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ μεσότης, 
καὶ δεκτικὸν τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐ μόνον ὅσαι διαφοραὶ γῆς 
5 ’, 3 Ν, Ν A A ΝᾺ \ Ἂ 4 ε ΝᾺ ε ᾽ὔ 
εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπτῶν ἀπάν- 
των. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ὀστοῖς καὶ ταῖς θριξὶ καὶ τοῖς τοι- 
4 , 9 3 2 ῳ ΝΜ 3 , Ν Ν Ν 
οὕτοις μορίοις οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅτι γῆς ἐστίν. καὶ τὰ φυτὰ 25 
ὃ Ν a“ 3 / ¥ ¥ Ψ ἰοὺ 3 / ¥ \ ς 
lad τοῦτο οὐδεμίαν ἔχει αἴσθησιν, ὅτι γῆς ἐστίν: ἄνευ δὲ a- 4350 
“ 0 / as Υλλ ε , “ δὲ ‘ > θ / 
φῆς οὐδεμίαν οἷόν τε ἄλλην ὑπάρχειν, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αἰσθητήρι- 
ον οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε γῆς οὔτε ἄλλον τῶν στουχείων οὐδενός. 
λ φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μόνης ταύτης στερισκόμενα 
τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὰ ζῷα ἀποθνήσκειν: οὔτε γὰρ ταύτην 5 
é ει as ‘ ζῷ ¥ ζῷ ‘A *r ¥ 
xew οἷόν te μὴ ζῷον, οὔτε ζῷον ὃν ἄλλην ἔχειν 
3 Ν A Ν Ν, “~ ‘\ ἢ ¥ > “‘ 
ἀνάγκη πλὴν ταύτης. Kal διὰ τοῦτο Ta μὲν ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ 
A ε λ aA > ὃ θ ΄ Ν a ΤᾺ διὰ 
ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς οὐ διαφθείρει τὸ ζῷον, οἷον χρῶμα 
Ἀ ‘4 Α > 4 3 Ν᾿ ld Ν 3 ᾽ ra ») 
καὶ ψόφος καὶ ὀσμή, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ αἰσθητήρια, av μὴ 


4. post πόρρω punctum Bek. Trend. Torst., colon Biehl, virgulam Susemihl B. J. 
IX, 352 || 5. μείνη SUXy Them. Philop., μένῃ etiam Soph. || mept ἀνακλάσεως unc. 
incl. Torst. Essen III, p. 66, leg. Them. Philop. Soph. || 6. ἀνακλᾶσθαι LW Them. 
Soph. Trend. Torst., reliqui ante Trend. omnes κλᾶσθαι || 7. ἂν ot ἢ εἷς L, οὗ ἂν ἢ els 
T WX Soph. Biehl, reliqui ante Biehlium omnes οὗ ἂν εἷς 7 || 8. τοῦ λείου] τελείου Xy || 
πάλιν om. L, leg. Them. Philop., πάλιν καὶ W || 9. ἐκίνει X || 13. ἄλλην ἐνδέχεται SU V | 
17. ἁπτῶν W, τῶν ἁπτῶν y, αὐτῶν etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. 148, 21 || 18. καίτοι... 
1g. αὑτῆς unc. incl. Essen ITI, Ὁ. 67 || 19. ἑτέρων LV || 438b, 1. αἴσθησιν ἔχει LW | 
εἰσίν TVX || 2. ἄλλην οἷόν re V Wy, οἷόν τε ἄλλην etiam Soph. || 6. οἷόν re μὴ ζῶον ὃν 


Io 


to 


Oo 


CHS. 12, 13 435 a8 4—435b 9 161 


a stone is not moved at all, while water is disturbed to a great 
distance and air is disturbed to the farthest extent possible and acts 
and is acted upon as long as it remains unbroken. And, to revert 
to the reflection of light, that is why, instead of holding that the 
visual ray leaving the eye is reflected, it would be better to say that 
the air is acted upon by the shape and colour, so long as it is one 
and unbroken. This is the case over any smooth surface: and ac- 
cordingly the air acts on the organ of sight in turn, just as if the 
impress on the wax had penetrated right through to the other side. 

It is evident that the body of an animal cannot be uncom- 
A mixture pounded; I mean, it cannot consist entirely of fire, for 
of Several instance, or of air. An animal, unless it has touch, can 
pee ae, have no other sense, the animate body being always, as 
mal body. we have remarked, capable of tactile sensation. Now the 
other elements, with the exception of earth, would make sense- 
organs: but it is always indirectly and through media that such 
organs effect sensation. “Touch, however, acts by direct contact 
with objects: hence its name. The other sense-organs, it is true, 
also perceive by contact, but it is by indirect contact: touch alone, 
it would seem, perceives directly in and through itself. Thus, then, 
no one of the three elements referred to can constitute the body of 
the animal. Nor indeed can it be of earth. For touch is a sort 
of mean between all tangible qualities, and its organ is receptive 
not only of all the distinctive qualities of earth, but also of heat 
and cold and all other tangible qualities. And this is why we 
do not perceive anything with our bones and our hair and such 
parts of us, namely, because they are of earth. And for the same 
reason plants, too, have no sensation, because they are composed 
of earth. Without touch, however, there can be no other sense; 
and the organ of this sense does not consist of earth nor of any 
other single element. 


13 


Thus it is evident that this is the only sense the loss of which 2 


necessarily involves the death of the animal. For it is not possible 
for anything that is not an animal to have this sense, nor is it 
necessary for anything that is an animal to have any other sense 
Why besides this, And this explains another fact. The other 
tangibles sensibles—I mean, colour, sound, odour—do not by their 
in excess . . 

destroy excess destroy the animal, but only the corresponding 
_ sense-organs: except incidentally, as when concurrently 


ἔχειν ὟΝ, οἷόν τε ἔχειν μὴ ζῴον ὅν y, οἷόν τε μὴ ζῷον ἔχειν αὐτὴν Soph., μὴ ἔχον οἷόν re εἶναι 
ζῷον coni. Steinhart, οἷόν re μὴ ἔχειν ζῷον coni. Hayduck, progr. Gryph. 7 || ὃν ante 
ἄλλην om. SU Vy Soph., igor ὃν delendum esse censet Hayduck 1.1. || 7. ταύτην UXy 
et T (supra posito s). 

H. II 


162 DE ANIMA Ill CH. 13 


ΕΥ gy ww é > Ea 
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷν ἂν ἅμα τῷ ψόφῳ ὦσις γένηται 
Ν Ψ a) 
καὶ πληγή, καὶ ὑπὸ ὁραμάτων Kal ὀσμῆς έτερα κινεῖται, 
~ \ € ‘\ ‘ © Y , 
ἃ τῇ ἀφῇ φθείρει. καὶ ὃ χυμὸς δὲ ἢ apa συμβαίνει 
ε \ yy ? θ ? [2 δὲ ~ ε lan e λ , 
ὠὡπτικὸν εἶναι, ταύτῃ φθείρει. ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀπτῶν ὑπερβολή, 
“~ o~ on 9 ~ \ ἴω 
οἷον θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ σκληρῶν, avaiper τὸ ζῷον' 
μ᾿ \ Α e ‘ > θ ΤᾺ 3 ~ “ > θ a 
παντὸς μὲν yap ὑπερβολὴ αἰσθητοῦ ἀναιρεῖ TO αἰσθητήριον, 
4 Ν Ν, ε δ ‘ ε ΄ ’, δὲ 7 Ν ΝᾺ 
ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἁπτὸν τὴν ἀφήν, ταύτῃ OE ὡρισται τὸ ζῆν' 
» ‘ ea 2 id 2Q 7 > οὶ ὃ ‘\ ε 
ἄνευ γὰρ ἀφῆς δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι ζῷον. διὸ ἡ 
ἴω ε “~ € ‘ > 7 ‘ > fa 4 5 νῚ 
τῶν ἁπτῶν ὑπερβολὴ οὐ μόνον τὸ αἰσθητήριον φθείρει, ἀλλὰ 

ἉἍ μὴ ~ μά 3 4 4 ¥ ? ‘ 5 Ψ 
καὶ τὸ ζῷον, ὅτι ἀνάγκη μόνην ἔχειν ταύτην. τὰς δ᾽ ἄλ.- 

ν » 9 Ξ 
λας αἰσθήσεις ἔχει τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ τοῦ εἶναι 
Ψ 9 ‘ A > e ¥ > ON 3 we \ 5 
ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὖ, οἷον ὄψιν, ἐπεὶ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, 
κά ε ΜᾺ cd 3 3 Ἁ 3 ~ -~ Ν Ν ‘ 
ὅπως ὁρᾷ, ὅλως δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἐν διαφανεῖ, γεῦσιν δὲ διὰ τὸ 
εῶν ‘ Ld Ψ 3 9 \ 3 \ 3 ~ 
ἡδὺ Kat λυπηρόν, ἵνα αἰσθάνηται τὸ ἐν τροφῇ καὶ ἐπιθυμῇ 

A a) 9 Ἁ \ Vd / - 9 ΨᾺ “ 
καὶ κινῆται, ἀκοὴν δὲ ὅπως σημαίνηταΐί τι αὐτᾷ, γλῶτταν 

\. & , 
δὲ ὅπως σημαίνῃ τι ἑτέρῳ. 

158. ὑπερβολὴ αἰσθητοῦ L.W Them. Soph., recepit Biehl, αἰσθητικοῦ ὑπερβολὴ ΤΌΝ, 
reliqui ante Biehlium omnes αἰσθητοῦ ὑπερβολὴ || 16. διώρισται STU X, ὦρισται etiam 
Soph. || ζῶον TX, quam lectionem probat H. Jackson, ζῆν etiam Soph. || 22. ὅπως ὁρᾷ 
post διαφανεῖ transponendum esse dubitanter coni. Susemihl, Oecon. Ὁ. 86 || δὲ διὰ] τε 
διὰ T Vy Bek. Trend., δὲ etiam Soph. Torst. || 24. σημανῇ TUX, σημαίνη SVWy 
Soph. Bek. Trend., σημαίνηται (om. tt) 1, Torst., σημαίνηταί re etiam sine dubio Them. 


et vet. transl. || αὐτῷ restituit Torst., vulgo αὑτῷ || 24. yAOrrav...28. ἑτέρῳ unc. incl. 
Torst. Essen ITI, p. 68, leg. Them. Philop. Soph. et vet. transl. 


Io 


μὲ 


5 


20 


25 


CH. 13 435 Ὁ 10—435 Ὁ 25 163 


with the sound some thrust or blow is given, or when objects of 
sight or smell move something else which destroys by contact. 
Flavour, again, destroys only in so far as it is at the same time 
tactile. Tangible qualities, on the other hand, as heat, cold and 3 
hardness, if in excess, are fatal to the living animal. For excess 
of any sensible object is fatal to the organ, and so consequently 
excess of the tangible object is fatal to touch. And it is by this 
sense that the life of the animal is defined, touch having been 
proved to be indispensable to the existence of an animal. Hence 
excess in tangible qualities destroys not only the sense-organ, but 
also the animal itself. For touch is the one sense that the animal 


The cannot do without. The other senses which it possesses 
higher . . . 
senses are, as we have said, the means, not to its being, but to 


to well, its well-being. Thus the animal has sight to see with, 
being. because it lives in air or water or, speaking generally, 
in a transparent medium. It has taste on account of what is 
pleasant and painful, to the end that it may perceive what is 
pleasant in food and feel desire and be impelled to movement. It 
has hearing in order that information may be conveyed to it, and 


a tongue, that in its turn it may convey information to its fellow. 


11-2 


CODICIS E FRAGMENTA RECENSIONIS 
A VULGATA DIVERSAE. 


lib. II, 4128, 3—12. E. fol. 186 v9. 
‘ o~ “‘ ra) » 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, 
ῪᾺ ¥ Fal 
ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἕκαστος ἀπεφήνατο τῶν πρότερον, εἴρηται σχεδόν, 
κ᾿ , 
νῦν ὥσπερ ἐξ apyns πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν πειρώμενοι διορίσαι 
4 3 ¢ A \ 4 Ἃ » λό 3 gn ‘4 . 
τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἂν Ely λόγος αὐτῆς κοινότατος 
~ ~ ¥ 
χωρίζομεν δὴ τὰς μὲν οὐσίας ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων τῶν ἄλλων" 5. 
- 5 e 
τῆς δὲ οὐσίας TS μὲν ws ὕλην λέγεσθαι τίθεμεν, ὃ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ 
X 3 Ὁ ὃ Ν δὲ ε 9 ᾿ς ὃ᾽ 5 ΄ 
«μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, τὸ» δὲ ἡ μορφὴ, τὸ ἐκ τούτων. 
cy >» 
ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δυνάμει, TO δ᾽ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, αὕτη ὃ 
ΜᾺ aA ε \ ἴα 
ὑπάρχει διχῶς, ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἢ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν, 
A Ν 
οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστα δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τὰ σώματα καὶ τούτων τὰ το' 


φυσικά: ἀρχαὶ yap.... 


11. 


lib, II, 414b, 139--ατὖό 8, 9. E. fol. I, r°. 
ε Ν Ἃ A + 7 ΕῚ ’ / Ψ 
Ο δὲ χυμὸς ὥσπερ ἤδυσμα τούτοις ἐστίν: διόπερ ὅσα 
¥ ΜᾺ ΄ ε rd ΜᾺ ε \ » Ἃ δὲ 
ἔχει τῶν ζῴων ἁφήν, πᾶσιν ὕπάρχει καὶ ὄρεξις. περὶ δὲ 
+ ΓᾺ 
φαντασίας ἄδηλον καὶ ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐνίοις δὲ ταῦτά 
τε ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἔτι πρὸς 
τούτοις διάνοια καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ς 
A ¢ rat rat 
ζῷον erepov ἐστι τοιοῦτον ἢ Kal τιμιώτερον. δῆλον οὖν 
ε ε a 4 Ἧ ~ 4 x » / ¥ 
ὡς ὁμοίως σχήματος Kal ψυχῆς Ets ἂν εἴη λόγος. οὔτε 
Ν 9 ΝᾺ ΜᾺ \ , / > Ν Ν 3 a ἊΨ > 
yap ἐκεῖ σχῆμα Tapa τρίγωνόν ἐστι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς, οὔτ 
9 ΄Ν Ν Ἀ Ν 3 - ’ 3 ‘ aN 
ἐνταῦθα ψυχὴ παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. γένοιτο δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ 
᾽ A 
TOV σχημάτων λόγος, ὃς ἐφαρμόσει «μὲν; πᾶσιν, οὐκ ἔσται το. 


I, 7. μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, τὸ supplevit Torst. || II. 5. τούτοις καὶ E (Bus.) || 8. παρὰ 
τὸ Tp. coni. Torst. || ro. μὲν om. E. 


FRAGMENTA 165 


, io 9 \ ? ε ‘4 μ᾿ 9" ΝᾺ 9 
μέντοι ἴδιος οὐθενὸς σχήματος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρη- 

- a ὃ Ν “ Ὁ. ἈΝ μ 4 Ἁ 9. 9 
μέναις ψυχαῖς. ὁιὸ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ ἐπ 
DON νι 3A 4 a 9 ¥ "0 Ν ΜΆ ¥ to 
ἄλλων Kal ἐπὶ τούτων, ὃς οὐκ ἔσται οὐθενὸς τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος, 
οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἄτομον εἶδος, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀφέντας. 
παραπλησίως δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων, ἔχει καὶ τὰ τ5 
πε t ny us - . > ON Ν 3 a 3 En € # ὃ 7 \ ’ 

ρὲ τὴν ψυχήν ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότε- 
ρον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, λέγω δ᾽ ὥσπερ 
ἐν τετραγώνῳ μὲν τρίγωνον, ἐν αἰσθητικῷ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικόν. ὥστε 

Ν > ὦ “~ ~ a ¢ ε a ? es ’ ~ 
καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δεῖ ζητεῖν ris ἣ ἑκάστου ψυχή, οἷον Tis φυτοῦ 

N [4 3 θ , Ἀ ’ὔ θ ld ὃ Ἀ ‘4 δ᾽ 5.» 2 δὴ 
καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου καὶ τίς θηρίου. διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν τῷ 20 
ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχουσι, σκεπτέον. ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ οὐ- 

θ »» 3 3 θ 7 “~ 3 3 o~ , Ἂς 

έν ἐστιν αἰσθητικόν" τοῦ δ᾽ αἰσθητικοῦ χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτι- 

᾽ eS 3 -~ a f > » “ns ε ΝᾺ 9 ‘4 
KOV, οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ᾽ ἄνευ TOD ἁπτικοῦ οὐδεμία 

΄--ς » a 
τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, ἁφὴ δ᾽ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει" 

“ A 
πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τῶν ζῴων, ἃ ovr ὄψιν ἔχει οὔτ᾽ ἀκοήν. καὶ 25 
τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δὲ κίνησις τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει τοῖς δ᾽ οὐχ 
ἤ ΤᾺ e 
ὑπάρχει" τελευταῖον δὲ διάνοια καὶ λογισμός" οἷς μὲν yap 
ὑπάρχει λογισμός, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων, 
Ὁ δ᾽ 3 , ῳ 3 ΄“ ε , ᾿ 3 \ ‘ 
ois ὁ ἐκείνων EKaOTOY, OV πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει λογισμός. ἀλλὰ τὰ 

‘ δὲ [4 ¥ / Ψ A “3. ε ‘ , 
μὲν ovde φαντασίαν ἔχει μόνον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁ περὶ τούτων 30 
ε ’ 4 3 7 Ν ἊΝ > 4 ~ 
ἑκάστου λόγος οἰκειότατος περὶ ψυχῆς ἐστί, δῆλον. 

2 4 Xv ‘ Ν [4 , " rd 
IV. ᾿Ανάγκη δὲ τὸν περὶ τούτων μέλλοντα πραγματεύεσθαι 
λαβεῖν τί ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστίν, εἶθ᾽ οὕτω περὶ τῶν ἐχο- 

’, Ν A ¥ aa) G ‘ >? > δὲ ὃ ~ 
μένων Kat τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖσθαι THY ἐπίσκεψιν. εἰ OE ὃὲεὶ 
λέγειν τί ἕκαστον, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τί τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ 35 
θρεπτικόν, πρότερον λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι: 
αἱ γὰρ πράξεις καὶ at ἐνέργειαι πρότεραι κατὰ τὸν λόγον 
> N ~ 4 3 \ Ἁ ¥ ~ / » 
εἰσὶ τῶν δυνάμεων. ἄλλα μὴν εἴ γε ταῦτα πρότερον ἔτι 
τούτων διοριστέον τὰ ἀντικείμενα, οἷον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αἰ- 
σθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ὥστε πρῶτον 40 

Ἁ ΤᾺ Ν 4 , Ψ ‘ € “ ‘ 
περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον: αὕτη yap ἡ ψνχὴ καὶ 

~ 4 ε ? A μ᾿ μ - ἔφυ 3 Ἀ [4 
τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, πρώτη δὲ καὶ κοινοτάτη ψυχῆς ἐστὶ δύ- 

a ΝᾺ Ὄ >’ 
vapis, καθ᾽ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν πᾶσιν. ἧς ἔργον ἐστὶ γέννη- 
σις καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι τροφῇ τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον μάλιστα φυσικὸν 
πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα μὴ ἀτελῇ ἢ πηρώματά ἐστιν, ἢ avTO- 45 
ματον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν, τὸ ποιῆσαι οἷον αὐτὸ ἕτερον, ζᾷον 


20. 21. τὸ ég. E || 42. πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη ψυχῆς δ᾽ ἐστὶ E. 


166 RECENSIONIS DIVERSAE 


μὲν ζῷα, φυτὸν δὲ φυτά, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ Kal τοῦ θείου μετέχῃ ἕκα- 
στον ὃν δύναται τρόπον: πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, κἀκείνου 
6 Ν 
ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, 
τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ δὲ @* ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ τῇ συνεχείᾳ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ 50 
? 2 ΜᾺ 3 Ν 3 δέ A 2 oN o> N 35 θ en 
θείου δύναται κοινωνεῖν: ov γὰρ ἐνδέχεται TO αὐτὸ ἄει ἀριθμῷ 
> 3 \ ω ΜᾺ ἃ , 3 , A Ψ 
εἶναι οὐθὲν τῶν φθαρτῶν: ὃν τρόπον ἐπιβάλλει, τοῦτον ἕκαστον 
, \ \ πὰ Ν δὲ e . Ν ὃ / 3 > “2 
θιγγάνει, TO μὲν μᾶλλον, TO OE ἥττον" καὶ ὀιαμένει οὐκ αὑτό, 
3 > - > 72 9 θ ΜᾺ Ν 3 ν to δ᾽ Ψ ¥ δ᾽ ε 
ἀλλ᾽ οἷον αὑτό, ἀριθμῳ μὲν οὐχ ἐν, εἰὃῪι ἕν. ἐστι ὃ ἢ 
Ἅ 9 ‘\ ~ “ 4 9 3 e > ‘ Ν ‘ » 
ψυχὴ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀρχὴ καὶ TO αἰτιον 55 
ial ἴων € + - ὁ 4 ‘ o~ 4 > »ἢ 
λέγεται πολλαχῶς. ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἡ ψυχὴ τοὺς τρεῖς τρόπους αἰτία 
τοὺς διωρισμένους: καὶ yap ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα 
A ε 3 ΄ a 3 4 a 3 ‘ € 7 Ψ XN 
Kal ὡς οὐσία τῶν ἐμψύχων σωμάτων ἐστὶν ἢ ψυχή. OTL μὲν 
οὖν ws οὐσία δῆλον: τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αἴτιον πᾶσι, 
Ν \ ΜᾺ αἱ ΜᾺ Ἁ > f 3 ¥ Ν Ἁ 3 \ ε 
τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ ἡ 60 
Ἁ 4 3 , 4 ‘\ A ξ ‘ ὃ ξ - 
ψυχὴ τούτου ἐστίν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὡς TO οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ ψνχή: 
gy a) ν 
καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ ὠσπερ G νοῦς, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ 
¥ } Δ Ν ’ Ν ε Ν ἰφ > Os \ 
ἔστιν αὐτῆς τὸ Téhos. καὶ ἢ Ψψυχὴ τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ 
φύσιν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον τῇ ψυχῇ" ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ 
ΜᾺ ᾿ Ν A 4. ay > ‘ X Ἀ ¢ ε a 
τῶν ζῴων, Kat TO τῶν φυτῶν. adda μὴν καὶ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις 65 
πρῶτον ἡ κατὰ τόπον, τοῦτό ἐστι ψυχή: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πᾶσι τοῖς 
td ε ,’ 4 a a ¥ 3 > 7 Ἀ ¥ 
ζῴοις ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπάρχει δύναμις. ἔτι δ᾽ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ av&y- 
‘ ‘4 € A ‘ ¥ ΝᾺ 3 - 
σις κατὰ ψυχήν: ἡ μὲν yap αἴσθησις δοκεῖ τις ἀλλοίωσις 
εἶναι, μὴ ἔχον δὲ ψυχὴν οὐθὲν ἂν αἴσθοιτο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 
περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως ἔχει: οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐξάνεται οὐδὲ 70 
4 ΝᾺ ‘ , +O\ a \ ~ 
φθίνει φυσικῶς μὴ τρεφόμενον, οὐδὲ τρέφεται μὴ ζωῆς pe- 
2 3 ‘ ~ 3 ἴω 9 » 8 A \ 
τέχον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ᾽᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς οὐκ εἴρηκεν ὀρθῶς, προστιθεὶς 
‘ ¥» , a A , 4 \ . 4 
τὴν αὔξησιν συμβαίνειν τοῖς φυτοῖς κάτω μὲν διὰ τὸ τὴν 
A A Ψ / 6 ¥ δὲ ὃ Ν Ν A y A 
γὴν φύσει οὕτω φέρεσθαι, ἄνω δὲ διὰ τὸ πῦρ. οὔτε yap 
΄ ¢ ‘ ¥ id 3 ΝᾺ > Ν > 3 \ «ε 4 
τὸ κάτω καὶ ἄνω λαμβάνει ὀρθῶς: οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάστου 75 
Ν y Ἀ Ν ’ “ ΝᾺ la 9 > .ε ε Ν “ 
TO ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τοῦ παντός" ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν 
ζῴ ν e er “~ ~ 9 ’ . A δὲ > 4 ὃ ~ λέ 
ῴων, οὕτως ἡ ῥίζα τῶν φυτῶν ἐστίν' τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ δεῖ λέγειν 
¥ © A > \ > \ ¥»¥ ¥ ἃ 4 Ν 5 
ὄργανον, ὧν ἂν ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον. ἔτι δὲ τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς 
τἀναντία φερομένων; τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τὸ τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ 
ΝᾺ 3 δὲ 4 Oe , ὃ 
τροφῆς" εἰ ὃὲ μή, οὖὗθεν κωλύσει OL — —. 80 


50. οὖν et ovry incerta Torst., γοῦν οὐκέτι (?semideletum) Bus. || 56. ὅμως E |] 
61. (ἢ, δᾶ g15b, 14 || 65. ἡ ante κίνησις om. E. 


FRAGMENTA 167 


ITI. 


lib. II, 4218, 5—422a, 23. E. fol. IT, το, 
ῳ 9 4 δ 5.4. 9903 3 4 3 ἃ > 
ὅτι ov δέχονται τὸν ἀέρα οὐδ᾽ ἀναπνέουσιν: δι ἣν ὃ 
2. » 9 » Ν 3 “~ , ἈΝ, , 323 eed \ 
αἰτίαν ἕτερος ἔσται περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος. Περὶ δὲ ὀσμῆς Kat 
τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ οὐκ ἔστι ῥᾷδιον διορίσαι ὁμοίως τοῖς εἰρημέ- 
3 » »ἤἢ 3 ξ 3 Ν Ψ ε ε ? “ A “~ 
vous αἰσθητοῖς, τί ἔστιν ἢ ὀσμὴ οὕτως ὡς ὁ ψόφος καὶ TO φώς, 
¥ > + > ¥ 3 ~ , \ ¥ 3 \ 
αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ 5 
χείριστα ὀσμᾶται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ζῴων, καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἄνευ 
ΜᾺ ΜᾺ ‘\ εξ a f > lA 39 4 € ΡᾺ 3 
τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος δύναται αἰσθέσθαι ὀσμήν, ὡς τοῦ αἰ- 
’ "4 9 2 nl y » ~ Ud 
σθητηρίου ὄντος οὐκ ἀκριβοῦς. ὥσπερ οὖν τοῖς σκληροφθάλ- 
μοις ἀδήλους εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν χρωμάτων καὶ 
‘a 3 X ~ o~ Ν ~ 3 7 7 » 
συγκεχυμένας, ἀλλὰ τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ τῷ ἀφόβῳ διορίζειν μόνον, τὸ 
οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ Tas dopas τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπεὶ ἔοικέ 
τε ἀνάλογον ἔχειν πρὸς γεῦσιν καὶ ὅμοια τὰ εἴδη τῶν 
χυμῶν τοῖς τῆς ὀσμῆς, ἀλλὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ἔχομεν ἀκριβεστέραν 
Ν ‘ » € 4 > - 4 5 ¥ ‘\ ¥ 
διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἁφήν twa αὐτήν: ταύτην δ᾽ ἔχει τὴν αἴ. 
3 4 ¥ 9 ‘ ‘ ~ ἐμ 
σθησιν ἀκριβεστάτην ἄνθρωπος" ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις 15 
λείπεται πολλῶν ζῴων, τῶν δ᾽ ἁπτῶν αἰσθάνεται μάλιστα 
ἀκριβῶς. διὸ καὶ φρονιμώτατον τῶν ζῴων ἐστίν. σημεῖον 
΄ Ἁ ‘ 9 ~ ~ 43 F 3 ~ ε > 9 ~ 
δέ: Kal yap αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων evdveis, ot δ᾽ adverts 
3 Ν 3 Qn > ‘4 y 9 Ν ‘ ~ = 
εἰσὶ παρ᾽ οὐδὲν αἰσθητήριον ἕτερον ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦτο. ὦν 
Ἁ Ἁ ε Ἁ ’ 3 ~ ε Ν / 3 ΝᾺ 
μὲν γὰρ ἡ σὰρξ μαλακή, εὐφυεῖς, οἱ δὲ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς 20 
\ ed ¥ > F A ε Ἁ Ἅ ε ‘ rd 
τὴν διάνοιαν. ἔστι δ᾽ ὥσπερ χυμὸς ὁ μὲν γλυκὺς ὁ δὲ πικρός, 
\ 3 ἈΝ Ν, > Ns »ἭἍ. f > Ν ‘ ‘ ¥ “ 
καὶ ὀσμαὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχουσαι τρόπον. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὴν 
> 2 3 ᾿ Ν / ‘ δὲ 3 ΄ ε rd δὲ ν 
ἀνάλογον ὀσμὴν καὶ χυμόν, τὰ ὃὲ τοὐναντίον. οΟμοίως OE καὶ 
δριμεῖα καὶ αὐστηρὰ καὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ λιπαρά ἐστιν ὀσμή. 
ἐν 
ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴρηται διὰ τὸ μὴ σφόδρα διαδήλους εἶναι 25 
Ν 3 ‘\ ? “ A ? ᾿ς - » ‘\ > 4 
Tas ὀσμὰς ὥσπερ τοὺς χυμούς, ἀπὸ τούτων εἴληφε TA ὀνό- 
ματα καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν πραγμάτων: ἡ μὲν γλυκεῖα κρό- 
κου καὶ μέλιτος, ἡ δὲ δριμεῖα θύμου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων" 
[οὶ Ψ 
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔστι δ᾽ ὥσπερ 
καὶ ἢ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων τοῦ τε ἀκουστοῦ 30 
κι " 
καὶ ἀνηκούστου καὶ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου, καὶ. ἢ ὄσφρη- 
m~ 59 ~ \ 9 , 3 ‘4 δὲ x ‘ 
σις TOU ὀσφραντοῦ καὶ ἀνοσφράντον. ἀνόσφραντον δὲ TO μὲν 


ILI. 14. ταύτην om. E. |} 19. τοῦτο] ταύτην E || 20. ἡ σὰρξ E (Bus.), ἡ om. E 
(Torst.) || 26. ἀπό re E || 27. καὶ ὁμοιότητα E. 


168 RECENSIONIS DIVERSAE 


“A Ν a 3 4 ¥ 9 ΄ Ν δὲ ‘A » 
παρὰ τὸ ὅλως ἀδύνατον ἔχειν ὀσμήν, τὸ δὲ μικρὰν ἔχον 
ΝΌΟΝ ΄ ν . » ε , λέ ¥ Se 
καὶ τὸ φαύλην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄγευστον ὡσαύτως λέγεται. ἔστι δὲ 
\ Ν»Ἡ ὃ ‘ A , Ὁ “ὃ 39 . Ἁ 
καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, οἷον ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος: καὶ 35 
γὰρ τὰ ἔνυδρα φαίνεται αἰσθανόμενα ὀσμῆς, καὶ τὰ ἐναιμα 
καὶ ἄναιμα ὁμοίως, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι' καὶ γὰρ 
τούτων ἔνια πόρρωθεν ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν αἰσθανό.- 
μενα τὴν ὀσμήν" διὸ καὶ ἔχει ἀπορίαν εἴ πάντα μὲν ὡσαύτως 
ΕἼ ἴω e 3 ¥ 3 la id “ > ? + 
ὀσμᾶται, 6 δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ἀναπνέων μέν, μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ 40 
> 9 aA - ‘ “~ KA > 3 3 9 “ » 
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα ἢ ἐκπνέων οὐκ ὀὄσμαται, οὔτε 
᾽ὔ » > 3 4 5 5 A ϑ ΜᾺ 3 Ν ΡᾺ 3 4 
πόρρω ovr ἐγγύς, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐπιθῇ τις εἰς τὸν μυκτῆρα ἐντός. 
καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ τιθέμενον ἀναίσθητον 
5. Ν , > δ ν ΓΚ a 3 κι \ 5 , 
εἶναι κοινὸν πάντων: ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθά- 
¥ 2 oN ~ 3 , 3 ΄ ΜᾺ δὲ 4 
νεσθαι ἴδιον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν: τοῦτο δὲ πειρωμένῳ 45 
δῆλον. εἶ οὖν τὰ ἄναιμα μὴ ἀναπνεῖ, ἑτέραν ἄν τινα ἔχοι 
» ‘ ‘ od > 3 ¥ -~ 3 ~ 3 - 
αἴσθησιν παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας. ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ τῆς ὀσμῆς αἰσθά. 
2907 . ε \ A 3 a \ 9 7 \ , 
νεται ἀδύνατον᾽ ἡ yap TOU ὀσφραντοῦ καὶ εὐώδους καὶ δυσώ- 
ὃ » θ κά rd > » δὲ ‘ θ / 
ovs αἰσθησις ὀσφρησίς ἐστιν. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ φθειρόμενα 
e \ ~ > A 4 ~ e > Ὁ . ¥ “ν 5 # 
ὑπὸ TOV ἰσχυρῶν ὀσμῶν ὑφ᾽ ὦνπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος, οἷον ἀσφάλ- 50 
του καὶ θείου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὀσφραίνεσθαι μέντοι νῦν ἀναγ- 
“~ 9 > > Ψ A“ > 3 ¥ - Ν, 3 A 
καῖον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀναπνεῖν. ἀλλ᾽ ἔοικε διαφέρειν τὸ αἰσθητή- 
a [αι] > vd Ν ‘ ΡᾺ » - Ψ 
ριον τοῦτο τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ὥσπερ 
‘ ν κ᾿ δ ‘ A , ‘ ‘ ‘ 
καὶ τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς Ta TOV σκληροφθάλμων' τὰ μὲν yap 
¥ A \ 9 ¥ ‘ , A ah Ν 
ἔχει πῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰς βλεφαρίδας, ἃς ἂν μὴ 55 
a a i ; ὑχ Opa: Ta δὲ σκληρόφθαλ ; 
νασπάσῃ καὶ κινήσῃ, οὐχ Opa: Ta ὃδὲ σκληρόφθαλμα οὐκ 
» 3 3 3 \ e A Ὁ aA ~ 3 wn ~~ ῳ 
ἔχει, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς ὁρᾷ, ὅτι ἂν τεθῇ ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ! οὕτω 
Ν XN > \ 3 ΄΄ A ‘\ > », > 
καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον Tots μὲν ἀκάλνφον εἶναι, 
9 κι ca 
ὥσπερ τὸ ὄμμα, τοῖς δὲ δεχομένοις τὸν ἀέρα ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα, 
a 3 ’ 9 , Νὴ ων ~ 
6 ἀναπνεόντων ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι, διευρυνομένων τῶν φλεβῶν 60 
Ν Ἁ 
καὶ τῶν πόρων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ἀναπνέοντα ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ 
3 3 ca ig > 74 > , > ~ 3 ‘ 
οὐκ ὀσμᾶται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἀναπνεύσαντα ὀσφρανθῆναι, ἐν δὲ 
τῷ ὑγρῷ ἀδύνατον τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ ὀσμὴ τοῦ ξηροῦ 
bd e “A “ ε a ‘ 3 3 ἈΝ 3 7 
ὥσπερ ὁ χυμὸς TOV ὑγροῦ: τὸ δ᾽ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον 
δυνάμει τοιοῦτον. 65 
\ δ 
To δὲ γευστόν ἐστιν ἅπτόν τι καὶ τοῦτο αἴτιον τοῦ 
᾿ > Ν 3 
μὴ εἶναι αἰσθητὸν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλοτρίον ὄντος σώμα- 
. ὑδὲ \ e ε , \ \ A 3 ® ε , \ 
TOS' οὐδὲ yap ἡ ady. Kal TO σῶμα, ἐν ᾧ ὁ χυμός, TO γευ- 


40. μέν om. E || 62. ἀναπγεύσαντος E || 63. τοῦτο om. E || 64. τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ Suv. E. 


FRAGMENTA 169 


3 ε ~ ε ῳ “w 
στόν, ἐν ὑγρῷ ws ὕλῃ' τοῦτο δ᾽ ἁπτόν τι. διὸ κἂν εἰ ἐν 
» 3 
ὕδατι εἴημεν, αἰσθανόμεθα ἐμβληθέντος γλυκέος, οὐ διὰ 
τοῦ μεταξὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἀλλὰ τῷ An D ὑγρῷ 
μ ἡμῖν ἢ nous, ἀλλὰ τῷ μειχθῆναι τῷ ὑγρῷ, 
Ld ΡῪΜΆ ‘ ‘A ΝᾺ ἴω - 
ὥσπερ ποτῷ' τὸ δὲ χρῶμα οὐχ οὕτως δρᾶται τῷ μείγνυσθαι 
δὲ ἰοὺ 3 ΄, ε Ἀ x \ Ν 5202 3 ε 
οὐδὲ ταῖς ἀπορροίαις. as μὲν οὖν τὸ μεταξὺ οὐθέν ἐστιν" ὡς 
Se A Noe , Ψ ‘ , “5 Δλὰ 4 nN ψΨ 
ἐ χρῶμα TO ὁρατόν, οὕτω γευστὸν χυμός. οὐθὲν δὲ ποιεῖ aio On- 
AN + ε 7 3 
σιν χυμοῦ avev ὑγρότητος, GAN ἔχει ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ δυνάμει ὑγρό- 
eS A ε la 
THTA, οἷον TO ἀλμυρόν' τηκτόν TE yap αὐτὸ Kal συντηκτικὸν 
“ XO 9 δὲ ν ἐ» 3 \ ῳ ε ἰω A 
τῆς γλώττης. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄψις ἐστὶ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ Kal 
a , € ον »Ὁἅ 
τοῦ ἀοράτου (ὁ γὰρ σκότος ἀόρατος, κρίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτον ἡ 
5» ¥ ~ - “A Ν \ a + > 7 
ὄψις), ἔτι τοῦ λίαν λαμπροῦ (Kat yap τοῦτό πως ἀόρατον, 
‘4 Ἀ 
ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ 6 σκότος), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ψόφου 
κν 
τε καὶ σιγῆς, ὧν τὸ 


IV. 
lib. II, 423b, 8—424b, 18. E. fol. 196 r° 
¥ , id N 5» e ? a , 9 4 
εἴρηται πρότερον ὅτι Kat du ὑμένος ἂν πάντων αἰσθανοί- 
θ ΜᾺ € a“ aA 5 X θ 4 ὃ 7 ε ’ A » 
μεθα τῶν ἁπτῶν, κἂν εἰ λανθάνοι διείργων, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοι- 
9 ΝᾺ ΤᾺ ~ A 
μεν ὥσπερ νῦν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι" δοκοῦμεν yap 
> ~ 7 ‘ > A 4) ‘\ rd > ‘ 4 [4 
αὐτῶν θιγγάνειν καὶ οὐθὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου. ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τούτῳ 
XN ε ‘ a) € [ω ‘ a“ φ 3 - 3 » 
τὰ ἁπτὰ τῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ ψοφητικῶν, ὅτι ἐκείνων αἰσθανόμεθα 
ΜᾺ \ ξὺ ~ ec 7m a δ᾽ ε as > ¢ Ἁ ~ 
τῷ τὸ μεταξὺ ποιεῖν TL ἡμᾶς, τῶν δ᾽ ἅπτῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ TOU με- 
ταξὺ ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα τῷ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ οἱ διὰ τῆς ἀσπίδος πλη- 
Ζ . 59. \ e 9 ‘ a > “ 53. λ3 Ὁ > 
γέντες" οὐδὲ yap ἡ ἀσπὶς πληγεῖσα ἐπάταξεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα ap- 
~ ld oN "4 > ¥ \ ςε ‘\ x 6 ΝᾺ 
φοῖν συνέβη πληγῆναι. ὅλως δ᾽ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, 
ε ξ aN Ἃ Ἃ ῳ ‘ ‘“ »¥ Ἁ ‘ > Ἁ . 
ὡς 6 ἀὴρ καὶ TO ὕδωρ πρὸς THY ὄψιν καὶ THY ἀκοὴν Kat 
ὄσφρησιν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὧσ- 
Ψ ~ ἴω 
περ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἁπτομένου 
ys SOA ¥ 3 5 ΄ὰὦ 4 > ἃ » Ὄ » δ 
ovr ἐκεῖ out ἐνταῦθα γένοιτ᾽ ἂν αἴσθησις. οἷον et τις τὸ 
~ Ν Ν 9. Ν a ΚΞ» ἤ \ Y» Ζ' Ν on 
σῶμα τὸ λευκὸν ἐπὶ TOV ὄμματος Dein TO ἔσχατον. ἢ καὶ δῆλον 
Ψ 9 \ δ ~ ε wn 3 id Ψ Ν ΓΝ , 
ὅτι ἐντὸς TO TOV ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν. οὔτω yap ἂν συμβαΐί.- 
Ψ ».ν δ 5 . 3 , \ 2 NN 9 , 
vou ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν addov’ ἐπιτιθεμένου yap ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητή- 
> 5 - > A ὃ A Ἁ ’ 3 θ 4 > θ ? 
ριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένον αἴσθα- 
» ν \ » δ ε m €¢ f ε ‘ .} = 
νεται" ὥστε μεταξὺ Apa TOD ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ. ἁπταὶ μὲν οὖν 
> ἃ ε ὃ ‘ ἊΜ , © “A m λέ δὲ ὃ ΄ 
εἰσὶν at διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ἢ σῶμα λέγω ὃὲ διαφοράς, 


70. αἰσθανοίμεθ᾽ ἂν coni. Torst. || 74. τὸ γευστὸν coni. Torst. || IV. 8. οὐδὲ] οὔτε E. 


70 


ωι 


170 RECENSIONIS DIVERSAE 


“ Ν μ Ν 
at τὰ στοιχεῖα διορίζουσι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ 
ὔὕ Fan’ Μὰ »ἤ Ν 
ὑγρόν, περὶ ὧν εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν στοιχείων. τὸ δὲ 


@ 


2 4 > a ΛΝ ἃ , Ν 9 € λ , ε \ ε ΄ 
αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἁπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη ἀφὴ ὑπάρ- 
“ »͵Φᾳῃ Ἁ ‘ 
χει πρώτῳ, TO δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι μόριον: TO yap αἰσθά- 
a \ 
νεσθαι πάσχειν Ti ἐστιν᾽ ὦστε TO ποιοῦν οἷον αὗτο ἐνεργείᾳ, 
τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ ἐκεῖνο τὸ δυνάμει ὄν. διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ 
ἢ ψυχροῦ ἢ σκληροῦ ἢ μαλακοῦ οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀλλὰ 
ων A A Ων 4 / 
τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ws ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος 
“~ ~ “~~ Ἀ ~ 
οὔσης THs ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Kpi- 
4 Ν 
νει τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν" γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς 
ΜᾺ o~ a“ Ψ 
ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων: καὶ δεῖ ὥσπερ τὸ 
᾽ A 5 , a 2 δέ > 3 
μέλλον λευκοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἣ μέλανος μηδέτερον εἶναι ἐνερ- 
- 3 ΄ς ὃ rd y on; ‘ > oN o LAX s > A“ A 
yeia, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς 
ε a rd Ν 4 7 ¥ δ᾽ Ψ ΎἌᾺ ε “ Ν 
ἁφῆς μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρόν. ἔτι δ᾽ ὥσπερ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ καὶ 
~ 93 , > e » ε / δὲ Ν e » A 5 
τοῦ ἀοράτου ἣν πως ἢ OWLS, ὁμοίως OE καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τῶν aVTL- 
κειμένων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀφὴ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ ἀνάπτου' ἄναπτον 
»» Ν ae ἊΜ “" 
δὲ τό τε μικρὰν πάμπαν ἔχον διαφορὰν τῶν ἅπτῶν, οἷον 
᾿ θ ς 3. Ff Ἁ ε ε λ Ν ων ε ~ Ψ Ν 
πέπονθεν 6 ἀήρ, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ 
φθαρτικά. καθ᾽ ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν εἴρηται ὡς ἐν 
τύπῳ εἰπεῖν. 
Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ 
‘ + θ ΄ 3 Ἂς ὃ Ἅ oO > ~ “ἢ a 
μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι TO δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄνευ τῆς 
nN es e ‘\ ἴω ὃ λί ¥ ΡᾺ ὃ 7 ‘ aa 
ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου Kal TOD 
A δέ \ a) r 4 δὲ ‘\ λ “~ « 
χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χαλκοῦν ἢ χρυ- 
~ a TAA 3 δ λ ‘ A , € ra δὲ 
σοῦν σημεῖον, ἃ οὐχ ἢ χαλκὸς ἢ χρυσός. ὁμοίως δὲ 
ων ε ¥ ε 7 εξ A ~ » ΝᾺ ms 4 
καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ ψόφον 
a δὶ 7 3 3 > e °F 3 ’ ’, 3 3 
ἢ χυμὸν πάσχει, ἀλλ οὐχ ἢ ἐκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ 
' i ὃ Ν ‘\ Ν λό 3 θ / δὲ a“ > 
ἢ τοιόνδε καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον, ἐν 
® ε - δύ ¥ 4 > Ν ΕῚ ’ Α δ᾽ > Ψ 
ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν TO AUTO, τὸ O εἶναι ἔτε- 
¥ ¥ 
pov: μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ av τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον: οὐ μέντοι 
ἐν 
τό γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι ἢ αἰσθήσει μεγέθει ἐστὶν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ λό- 
Ν δύ 3 / \ δ᾽ 3 od % ὃ Ν 
γος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου. φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ 
’ ~ 3 “~ e € ‘ 4 A 3 ’ 
τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰς αἰσθή- 
᾿ λ \. ,5 na 
σεις" ἂν yap ἢ ἡ κίνησις ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου, λύε- 
ε ra ”~ 3 > » ε ‘ € 
ται ὁ λόγος, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἣν αἴσθησις, woTEpavet ἣ συμφω- 
20. αἷς E || 24. οἷον om. E. || 27. ὡς ἂν τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου τῆς αἰσθήσεως E || 29. κριτικόν " 
γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς om. E || 32. δὴ] δὲ E || 37. ἁπτῶν ἄναπτοι ὥσπτερ E || 54. ἦν ἢ coni. Torst- 


20 


40 


45 


FRAGMENTA 171 


, N  ¢€ ; ὃ / ‘ad δῶ Ν τ 
via καὶ 6 τόνος σφόδρα κρουομένων τῶν χορδῶν. καὶ διὰ 55 
\ Ἁ 
τί ποτε τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχι- 
κὸν καὶ πάσχοντα ὕπο τῶν ἁπτῶν. καὶ γὰρ ψύχεται καὶ 
¥ 
θερμαίνεται" αἴτιον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ τοιαύ- 
> la Ψ δ LO ΝᾺ > θ a δέ > ‘ 
THY ἀρχήν, olay Ta εἰδὴ τῶν αἰσθητῶν δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ 
Ἂ »“ > 
μετὰ τῆς ὕλης πάσχειν. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἂν τις, ἄρα πάθοι ἂν 60 
aa Ν ΜᾺ 
tr ὀσμῆς τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον ὀσφρανθῆναι, ἢ ὑπὸ χρώματος τὸ 
Ν ὃ ’ iO a, ΚΕ ΄ δὲ Ν 39. δ “~ ¥ 3 > ¢ 
μὴ δυνάμενον ἰδεῖν᾽ ὁμοίως δὲ Kai ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δ᾽ ἡ 
ὀσμὴ τὸ ὀσφραντόν, εἴ τι ποιεῖ, τὴν ὄσφρησιν ποιεῖ ὀσμή. 
gy 3 Ἅ a ~ 2 4 Pd [δι] ε 2 3 
ὥστε οὐθὲν πάσχειν τῶν ἀδυνάτων ὀσφρανθῆναι. ὃ δ᾽ αὐὖ- 
τὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ τῶν δυνατῶν, ἀλλ᾽ 7-65 
2 Ν Ld Ψ “ “~ ‘ Y ¥ ‘ 
αἰσθητικὸν ἕκαστον. apa δὲ δῆλον Kat οὕτως. οὔτε γὰρ 
’ ¥ \ “A \ 4 ¥ ¢ 3 bs 29% ey 4 
ψόφος οὔτε TO φῶς Kal σκότος οὔτε ἡ ὀσμὴ οὐθὲν ποιεῖ τὰ 
΄ > > 3 ae 3 - a aN ε A o~ ΜᾺ 
σώματα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, οἷον ἀὴρ ὃ μετὰ τῆς βροντῆς 
, ν δ) N\A QL _V_E Ν Ye . κι . 9 
διέστησε τὸ ξύλον. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ ATTA καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ ποιοῦσιν᾽ εἶ 
Ν ’ ε s id 4 ‘\ ¥ a) > on Φ > 
yap μή, ὑπὸ τίνος ἂν πάσχοι τὰ ἄψυχα ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο; ap 70 
> fan) “ oa ΡᾺ ν᾿ 3 
οὖν κἀκεῖνα ποιεῖ; ἢ οὐ πᾶν σῶμα παθητικὸν ὑπ᾽ ὀσμῆς 
\ ἤ Ν Ν # > / Ἁ Φ ? 4. 
καὶ ψόφου: καὶ τὰ πάσχοντα ἀόριστα, καὶ οὐ μένει, οἷον 
3 / + ‘ & 4 ’ > 2 Ν ἈΝ > ~ “ 
ἀήρ: ὄζει γὰρ ὧς παθών τι. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ 
Ν »,; A “‘ ‘ 2 “a θ 4“ 3 θ ? Q e€ δ᾽ 
τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὃ 
ἀὴρ παθὼν τοῦτο ταχὺ αἰσθητὸς γίγνεται. 75 


59. οἷον E || 61. 7 om. E || 63. ἡ ὀσμή coni. Torst. || 71. ἢ om, E |] 74. καὶ] ac E. 


NOTES. 


Book I. CHAPTER I. 


402 a 1—22. In this introductory chapter A. first touches upon the 
importance and utility, especially for physics, of an enquiry into the soul, and 
next enlarges upon the difficulties besetting such an enquiry. Its object is to 
determine the nature of the soul and its essential attributes [§ 1]. There is the 
general logical difficulty, viz., the absence of any uniform recognised method of 
obtaining definitions and the uncertainty as to the premisses from which the 
investigation should start [§ 2]. 

402a I τῶν...4 τιθείημεν. Universam hanc periodum sic recte inter- 
preteris: Quarum rerum cognitio pulchra et honore digna est, earum etiam 
investigatio est pulchra et honore digna: quarum igitur illa magis est honore 
digna, earum et haec. At pulcherrima facile est animae cognitio: pulcherrima 
igitur etiam investigatio e1us quid sit (Torstrik, p. 112). According to Philop. 
(24, 3 sqq., 17 sqq.) these apparently harmless propositions caused Alex. Aphr. 
so much perplexity that he condemned as spurious the whole passage a I μᾶλλον 

..3 εἶναι and explained δὲ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα as διὰ τὸ καλὴν καὶ τιμίαν εἶναι. If the 
report is correct, Alexander’s suspicions must have been aroused because he 
supposed the supremacy of metaphysics to be challenged and even the place 
claimed for psychology among the natural sciences to be inconsistent with 
such passages as, eg., #f#. Mic. 1141 a 33—b 2. See note on 402 a 4 ἐν 
πρώτοις. 

al. τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν. The partitive genitive becomes a 
predicate here after ὑπολαμβάνοντες. This is fairly common with εἶναι, e.g. 
infra 402 a τὸ ἐστὶ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων, 417 a 24, 4228. 6. Soalso with γίγνεσθαι, 
Pod. 1304 a τό γενόμενος τῶν ἀρχόντων, as in other writers ; with ποιεῖν, Rez, 11. 
23 ὃ ΤΊ, 1398 Ὁ 13 Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χίλωνα τῶν γερόντων ἐποίησαν ; with τιθέναι, 
τίθεσθαι, γράφειν [Kiihner-Gerth, Gr. Gr. ὃ 418, p. 375]. After ὑπολαμβάνειν 
A. omits upon occasion the infinitive [here εἶναι), thus converting the verb into 
one of incomplete predication, and assimilating its construction to that of τιθέναι 
(405 Ὁ 18, 26), τίθεσθαι (405 a 15), ποιεῖν (404 Ὁ 10, 31, 405 Ὁ 13 Sq., 19), καλεῖν 
(405 b 28 sq.) when similarly used. Thus, to confine ourselves to I., c. 2, the 
infinitive εἶναι after ὑπολαμβάνειν is found 403 Ὁ 31, 404 a 8, 22 sq. and omitted 
404 Ὁ 8, 405 a5, 20, 7. The same freedom of construction is permitted with 
λέγειν, See 404 a 5, 21 compared with 26. For τιμίων cf. 430 a 18 sq., De Part. 
Av. 1. 5, 644 Ὁ 22-645 al, Metaph. 1074 Ὁ 21 (where it is an attribute of vows), 
26, 30 (where it is applied to the object of thought). 

The rare word εἴδησις 15 apparently used by A. here only. It may be his 
own coinage, for, though occurring in Theophrastus (e.g. /rag. LXXXIX. § 4), in 
scholiasts on Homer and Sophocles, and, as might be expected, in commentators 
like Philop., it seems to have found little favour. Later it was affected by 
Clement of Alexandria and Sextus Empiricus. Hesychius explains it by γνῶσις, 
and like γνῶσις, 402 a 5, it is a comprehensive, general term for knowledge of 


174 NOTES I. I 


any and every kind. Cf. Jud. dr. 158 Ὁ 42 pro synonymis vel in eodem 
sententiae contextu vel in iisdem formulis γνωρίζειν, γιγνώσκειν, γνῶσιν hapBa- 
νειν, μανθάνειν, εἰδέναι, ἐπτίστασθαι leguntur. In 402 Ὁ 16 sqq. γνῶναι, θεωρῆσαι, 
κατιδεῖν, εἰδέναι, γνωρίζειν are used in succession. Like other verbal nouns in -ἰς 
εἴδησις is strictly the act or process of knowing, as νόησις is thinking, ποίησις 
producing, ἄκουσις hearing, ὄρεξις longing, αὔξησις growing, σύνθεσις combining, 
though sometimes the strict sense is not maintained, ὄψις and αἴσθησις being 
notoriously ambiguous. 

84 1, 2. μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἑτέραν ἑτέρας. Supply τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων. Cf. Mefaph. 
996 b 16 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον [int. εἰδέναι φαμέν]. A. is fond of 
arranging kinds of knowledge in a scale of increasing dignity or intrinsic worth. 
Thus in Metaph. 980a 27—981a12 and dxal. Post. Il. 19, 99b 34—100a 9 
we have such a scale of knowledge rising from sense-perception through 
memory and experience to art, and finally to science (ἐπιστήμη). The sciences 
themselves are variously classified. See Axal. Post. 1. 13, 78 Ὁ 34—~79 a 6. 
In Metaph. 1026 a 18—23 a scheme of three theoretical sciences is projected in 
outline,—First Philosophy (called θεολογική) 15 the highest, next comes Mathe- 
matics, next Physics, 1064 Ὁ 1—6. Cf. Zog. VIII. 1, 157 a ὃ τὸ δὲ διαιρεῖσθαι 
τοιοῦτον οἷον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης βελτίων ἢ τῷ ἀκριβεστέρα εἶναι ἢ τῷ 
βελτιόνων. 

a2 κατ᾽ ἀκρίβειαν. The meaning of the term varies according as it is 
applied to ἀπόδειξις or ἐπιστήμη. (1) Therigorous accuracy of a demonstration 
depends upon the correctness of the reasoning and the truth of the premisses, 
In sciences which deal with the contingent it often happens that premisses and 
therefore conclusions are only general, not universal, truths. The rigorous 
accuracy of mathematical proof is not to be looked for in ethics (27%. NVZc. 
1094 Ὁ 11—27) because the premisses are contingent, Cf. 1104 a 1—6. In this 
sense all scientific reasoning and all theoretical science is exact, and to ἀκρι- 
βέστερον δεικνύναι, Metaph. 1064 a 6 54., is opposed μαλακώτερον δεικνύναι, to 
reason loosely or inconclusively. But (2) in another sense ἀκριβῆς is applied 
to a science or knowledge in respect not of the proof but of the method 
of treatment employed. It then means “abstract,” like ἁπλοῦς, and it is 
implied that the objects with which such a science deals are themselves 
by comparison more abstract, more simple and logically prior; for ἀκρίβεια 
is a relative term. Thus of First Philosophy, the highest of the sciences, 
and also the most abstract, A. says (Wefaph. 982 a 25): ‘Those amongst 
the sciences are most exact which have especially to do with the first 
causes, for the sciences which start from fewer premisses are more exact 
than those which are complicated with additional determinations: Arith- 
metic, for example, is more exact than Geometry.” On this Bonitz ad loc., 
“ἀκρίβειαν sive exactam et omnibus numeris perfectam cognitionem tum maxime 
possumus Consequi, cum in simplicissimis versamur notionibus. Simplicissimae 
autem notiones eaedem maxime sunt universales et summae et sua natura 
primae...Itaque ἀκρίβειαν praecipuam qui tribuunt sapientiae [i.e. First Philo- 
sophy], eam referre debent ad prima et simplicissima rerum genera.” Jb. 1078a9 
καὶ ὅσῳ δὴ ἂν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ drAoverépar [Sc. ἐπιστήμη ἐστί], τοσούτῳ 
μᾶλλον ἔχει τἀκριβές" τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐστίν. ὥστε ἄνευ τε μεγέθους μᾶλλον ἢ 
μετὰ μεγέθους, καὶ μάλιστα ἄνευ κινήσεως. ἐὰν δὲ κίνησιν, μάλιστα τὴν πρώτην" 
ἁπλουστάτη γάρ, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ὁμαλή. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ἁρμονικῆς καὶ 
ὀπτικῆς- οὐδετέρα yap 7 ὄψις ἢ Govt θεωρεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἣ γραμμαὶ καὶ ἀριθμοί: οἱκεῖα 
μέντοι ταῦτα πάθη ἐκείνων. καὶ ἡ μηχανικὴ δὲ ὡσαύτως. First Philosophy con- 
siders its objects, gvé existent, as possessing but one attribute, that which is 


1.01 402 a 1---402 8 4 175 


postulated in all the rest; Arithmetic regards its objects as numerable, but 
takes no account of extension; Geometry complicates its investigations by 
regarding its objects, ἐκ προσθέσεως, not only as numerable, but also as ex- 
tended. All mathematical sciences are more abstract than the physical sciences, 
for the former treat their objects as unmoved, while physics takes account 
of motion. Optics does not deal with the physiological properties of vision, 
nor harmonics with those of voice: the former treats the ray of light as a line, 
the latter a chord as the ratio of two numbers: and so on. It often happens 
that the more abstract science discovers the cause which is necessary to explain 
the facts investigated by a more concrete science. Amal. Post. τ. 27, 87 a 31 
᾿Ακριβεστέρα δ᾽ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ mporépa (1) ἣ re τοῦ ὅτι καὶ διότι ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ 
μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι, καὶ (2) ἡ μὴ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου, οἷον 
ἀριθμητικὴ ἁρμονικῆς, καὶ (3) ἡ ἐξ ἔλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως, οἷον γεομετρίας 
ἀριθμητική. λέγω δ᾽ ἐκ προσθέσεως, οἷον μονὰς οὐσία ἄθετος, στιγμὴ δὲ οὐσία θετός" 
ταύτην ἐκ προσθέσεως. Of these three conditions it is easy to see that the 
last 1s the most fundamental and that the others rest upon it. Trendelenburg’s 
translation “quod vel acrius ingenii acumen requirit” has no sort of justifi- 
cation, and the discrepancy which he discovers between these words and 
aro is imaginary. First philosophy is at once the most abstract and the 
most difficult of the sciences (AWefapA. 982 a 24 Sq.), and psychology presents 
more difficulties than the other biological sciences precisely because it is 
more abstract than the rest. Its ἀκρίβεια is relative. In Anal. Post. τι. 19, 
99 Ὁ 33 A. speaks hypothetically of a (δύναμις) τούτων τιμιωτέρα κατ᾽ ἀκρίβειαν, 
and 7.99 Ὁ 27 of ἀκριβεστέρας γνώσεις ἀποδείξεως. Of course as a matter of 
fact (100 Ὁ 8) οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον. Plato, Pkzlebus 59D, uses of νοῦς 
and φρόνησις the words d γ᾽ ἄν τις τιμήσειε μάλιστ᾽ ὀνόματα and ἀπηκριβωμένα. 

δι. 2 ἢ τῷ...3 εἶναι. The subject-matter (τὸ ἐπιστητόν, the province or γένος 
with which the science deals) also helps to determine the place of a science in 
the scale, quite independently of the question whether the treatment is abstract 
or concrete. For this reason in the realm of Nature the sciences which deal 
with the πρῶτον στοιχεῖον, ἄφθαρτον, ἀγένητον, κύκλῳ φορητόν, rank higher than 
the rest: De Cael. 111. τ, 298 b6sqq. Cf. Mefaph. 1026 ἃ 21 καὶ τὴν τιμιωτάτην 
(sc. ἐπιστήμην) δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. Jb. 1064b5 βελτίων δὲ καὶ 
χείρω» ἑκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστητόν. The genitive of relation ex- 
pressing the object of a cognition, as of any other mental act, may be freely 
illustrated from the terminology of this treatise in reference to sensation and 
the sensible object. Cf, eg., 418 a 13, 26, 421 Ὁ 4—6, 422 a 20—29, 422 Ὁ 23— 
25, 424 a 1ὸ---12, 426 Ὁ 8, 434 Ὁ 18. 

8.3. 8 ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, “for both these reasons,” i.e. for its exactitude 
(ἀκρίβεια) and for the importance of its subject-matter. In this treatise our 
subject is τὸ ἔμψυχον ζῷον 7 ἔμψυχον, and we deal preeminently with the form 
(which is ἀκίνητον) not with the matter; and in proportion as we do this 
we regard the ἔμψυχον (Gov not concretely as made up of σάρξ, ὀστοῦν, νεῦρον, 
and the like, but abstractly as living, moving, perceiving, thinking, these 
attributes being due to soul as cause. Cf. motes zmf. on a 9. 

a4. ἱστορίαν loco nostro non esse eandem ac τὴν εἴδησιν, sed significare 
indagationem et investigationem, ex universi prologi ratione intelligitur : omnia 
enim spectant ad viam ac rationem qua ad animae cognitionem perveniatur 
(Torst.). A. modestly styles the science which he is inaugurating a study: an 
enquiry concerning soul. As applied to his Natural History, ἱστορίαι περὶ 
(dev, the term denotes researches undertaken and materials collected to serve 
as the basis of a future science. 


176 NOTES ΤΙ 


a4. ἐν πρώτοις, relatively to other natural sciences. Cf. De Cael. Ill. 7, 
306 a 27 sq., where mathematics are styled ai ἀκριβέσταται ἐπιστῆμαι. The only 
conceivable ground on which absolutely first rank can be claimed for psychology 
is the doctrine of νοῦς χωριστός 430a 17, but I cannot see that A. makes the 
claim. 

a5. πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν. How necessary it is for practical philosophy 
can be seen from £74. ic. 1.13. (Cf. Them. 1, 20—2, 6 H., 2, 18—28 Sp.) 

a 6. πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, to the study of nature, of which biology was and isa 
main department. The importance of soul as πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ πάσης κινήσεως, 
ἴσως μὲν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασι, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν (Them. l.c.), 
will be greatest to the science, viz. φυσική, which treats its subject-matter so 
far as it is capable of motion [AZezap~h. 1026a 12]. ἔστι γὰρ, sc. ἡ ψυχή. οἷον 
ἀρχή. More explicitly 413b 11 ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ 
τούτοις ὥρισται, θρεπτικῷ, αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσει. For the proof see 
415 Ὁ 8—416a 18, where the various senses in which soul is τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος 
αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή are discriminated and we are plainly told that the bodies of 
animals and plants are instruments of the soul (415 b 18 sq.). Why οἷον ἢ 
Confuse legentis (Zabarella): cf. 414a 9 οἷον ἐνέργεια. The mode of expression 
should mislead no one: A. firmly holds that soul is ἀρχή; as that health Lc. is 
ἐνέργεια. It remains to be seen in what precise sense soul is ἀρχή. If we 
compare the expression ras ἐν ὕλης εἴδει αἰτίας applied to the ἀρχαί of the Ionian 
philosophers (AZetph. 984 a 17), we may perhaps see a characteristic reserva- 
tion for which the vagueness of the prevailing views (cf. I., c. 2) 1s responsible. 

a 7 ér{yrotpev...10 ὑπάρχειν. In this section A. maps out his enquiry. 
If there is a science of soul it must conform to the conditions laid down in 
Anal. Post. for all sciences and particularly for all physical sciences, as it is 
plainly a branch of physics. On the formal side the main work of the enquirer 
will be to delimit his province, to define it and to deduce the essential properties: 
Anal. Post. 1. 7. 75 Ὁ 7sq., Metaph. 1004b 7 ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιστήμης (ἐστὶ) καὶ ri 
ἐστι γνωρίσαι καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτοῖς. 

a7. θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνώναι. Καὶ explicative=“that is,” γνῶναι being the 
more general term. As to θεωρεῖν see Imad. Ar. 328a 40 apud animum con- 
templari. The precise and specialised meaning can be best gathered from 
De A. itself, esp. 417 a 21--- 26 and 432a 8sq.: in particular, to apply know- 
ledge already acquired, ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην 412 ἃ 9—II1, 25 sq., 417 a 
28 sq.,b5sq. Here, however, the verb is used more generally without any such 
implication, the two terms @. and y. being as nearly synonymous as in 402 Ὁ 17 
except that even in this unrestricted sense θεωρεῖν is always an active operation, 
not a latent capacity. It is the act of apprehending by mental vision (and so 
σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπισκοπεῖν are synonyms): eg. PAys. 111. 5, 204 Ὁ 4, 10 λογικῶς 
μὲν oxomoupévos...puotkas δὲ Gewpoiow..., Melaph. 1003 a 21, 23, 1004 b 1 sq. 
Cf. Anal. Post. τ. 18, 81b 2 ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι᾽ ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐπεὶ 
καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἔσται δι’ ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν. 

a 8. καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, “that is to say, its essence”: καὶ again explicative. 
Ind. Ar. 545b 23 pariter atque εἶδος vel λόγος cum οὐσία syn conjungitur φύσις, 
Metaph. 1014b 36, 1070a 9, 12, Io31a 30, bi, De Part. An. il. 1, 6468 25 sq. 
De Cael. 11. 4, 286b τὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῇ φύσει, Phys. 11. τ, 1938. 9 ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ 
οὐσία, Metaph. 1053b 9 κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν, 26. l019a 2 κατὰ φύσιν 
καὶ οὐσίαν, 1064b 11. Our first task is to discover τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή. We 
must obtain a definition which will express its “essential nature.” This last 
expression, retained in modern writings, attests how completely φύσις and οὐσία 
in the sense here intended are synonymous. 


1.1 402 a 4—a 8 177 


a8. @0’=next in order. Z. contrasting 415 a 14—16 remarks: hic loquitur 
de ordine doctrinae, ibi de-via, non de ordine. Z. further maintains that this 
programme is so far carried out that the whole of De A. treats properly of the 
τί ἐστι, the nature of soul, its συμβεβηκότα or accidents being reserved for the 
Parva Naturalza, appealing to De Sensu 436a1—5. But Z. is obliged to admit 
that in 111. cc. 4—8 the treatment of intellect is exhaustive, including properties 
as well as essential nature. There is no need to lay such stress on this formal 
division of the task before us. Every science must delimit its yévos, and define 
its subject, before it can proceed to deduce the essential properties: Metaph. 
1003 a 2I—26, b 19-22, 1004 Ὁ 5-8, lo—17, 1025 Ὁ 3 sqq., esp. Ὁ 5—13 and 
1063 Ὁ 36—1064 a 7, which is a convenient summary of Mezaph/. E. τ. 

a8. ὅσα συμβέβηκε, 1.6. all essential attributes, often styled ra καθ᾽ αὑτὰ συμβε- 
βηκότα and (Anal. Post. and Metaph.) τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα, also (402 a 15) τὰ 
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἴδια (=properties). The usual example is the property of a 
triangle that its angles are equal to two right angles (402 b 20). This forms no 
part of the definition, but can be deduced from it. Jud. Ar. 713 Ὁ 43 inde 
συμβαίνειν, συμβεβηκέναι, συμβεβηκός id dicitur, quod cum non insit 1051 alicuius 
rel notioni, tamen concludendo ex ea necessario colligitur. It is not enough 
that a science should delimit its province and obtain a definition. From this 
definition it must deduce all the essential properties of the subject under investi- 
gation. We shall presently see (402 b 16—403 a 2) that essence and properties 
are mutually implicated, and that in some cases the study of the property is the 
best road to the determination of the essence. In this treatise there are various 
designations and enumerations of the attributes of soul (or, more correctly, 
of the animate being which possesses the soul gzdé animate), e.g. ἔργα καὶ πάθη 
(409 Ὁ 15, cf. 407 b 18), ἐνέργειαι καὶ πράξεις (415 ἃ 19), παθήματα (403 a τ; cf. 
403 a5—7, 16—18, 4114 26--Ὁ 5. Cf. De Sensu 1, 436a1—18. They are 
seldom styled συμβεβηκότα. See, however, 409 b 14. In general terms, what- 
ever the possessor of soul does or suffers in virtue of such possession, 411 b 2 sq. 
ποιοῦμέν τε καὶ πάσχομεν (cf. 403 a 6 Sq. πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν), A. regards as a 
“function” or operation of soul. 

In this well-established sense συμβεβηκός Ξε συμβ. καθ᾽ αὗὑτός But the term is 
ambiguous, and is more commonly used by A. to denote something quite 
different, i.e. an accident, a purely fortuitous attribute, white and musical in 
man being the stock instances (Jmd. Ar. 714420). AS συμβεβηκότα in this 
latter sense are never necessary, are neither universal nor even general attri- 
butes, they do not fall under demonstrative science. Jfefaph, 1025 al4 συμβεβηκὸς 
λέγεται ὃ ὑπάρχει μέν τινι καὶ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ 
πολύ, οἷον εἴ τις ὀρύττων φντῷ βόθρον εὗρε θησαυρόν : 1026 Ὁ 27---37. Compare 
for the two meanings PAys. 1. 3, 186 Ὁ 17 εἰ γὰρ μὴ ὅπερ ὅν τι, συμβεβηκότα 
ἔσται. ἢ οὖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἣ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑποκειμένῳ..-.συμβεβηκός Te γὰρ λέγεται 
τοῦτο, ἢ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν [accident proper, non-essential 
attribute], ἢ οὗ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχει τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ 6 λόγος ὑπάρχει 
ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, οἷον τὸ μὲν καθῆσθαι ὡς χωριζόμενον, ἐν δὲ τῷ σιμῷ ὑπάρχει ὃ λόγος 
ὁ τῆς ῥινὸς 7 φαμὲν συμβεβηκέναι τὸ σιμόν. Anal. Post. 1. 22, 83 Ὁ 17—-24 
ὑπόκειται δὲ ἕν καθ᾽ ἑνὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι, αὐτὰ δὲ αὑτῶν, ὅσα μὴ τί ἐστι, μὴ κατη- 
γορεῖσθαι. συμβεβηκότα γάρ ἐστι πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καθ᾽ αὗτά, τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ ἕτερον 
τρόπον" ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς κατηγορεῖσθαί φαμεν, τὸ δὲ συμβε- 
βηκὸς οὖκ εἶναι ὑποκείμενόν rt. οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τίθεμεν εἶναι, ὃ οὐχ ἕτερόν 
τε ὃν λέγεται ὃ λέγεται, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ ἄλλοις, καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα καθ᾽ ἑτέρου [1.6. ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ 
sc. τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἄλλοις SC. συμβεβηκέναι φαμὲν καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα καθ᾽ ἑτέρου 
sc. κατηγορεῖσθαι]. Cf Phys. VII. 5, 256 Ὁ 9 sq. οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ συμβεβηκός, 

Ἡ. 12 


178 NOTES I. I 


ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι. ἐὰν οὖν θῶμεν τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συμβήσε- 
ται, Ψεῦδος δ᾽ ἴσως. περὶ αὐτήν, ig. τὴν ψυχήν. The usual construction with 
συμβαίνειν as with ὑπάρχειν is the dative, 402 Ὁ 18 ταῖς οὐσίαις. Properties 
belong to or go with the things of which they are predicated. For the variant 
with περὶ c. acc. cf. Mefaph. 997 a 29 περὶ ἕκαστον γένος, 33 περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, 
De Part. An. 1. 5,645 Ὁ τ τὰ συμβεβηκότα περὶ ἕκαστον γένος, ὅσα καθ᾽ αὑτὰ... 
ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις. . ἝΝ 

ag. ὧν τὰ pev...d0xet. As ἃ logical term πάθος, like συμβεβηκὸς and ὑπάρχον, 
denotes an attribute: J/e¢afh. 1037 Ὁ 16 ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ [sc. θατέρῳ θάτερον] καὶ 
πάθῃ τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον : Cf. 403217, 25, 403 Ὁ 17 and notes. Regarded as 
attributes of a subject, ὑποκείμενον, the active operations, no less than the 
passive affections, of soul are ἴδια πάθη, as they are συμβεβηκότα καθ᾽ αὑτά : and 
this applies to all the acts or operations enumerated 411 a 26 56. See also 
417 4 14 544ᾳ. Ὁ 12 sqq., 431 a6sq. On the surface the words before us imply 
that there are thought (δοκεῖ to be properties of soul which are not properties 
of the animal to whom the soul belongs. Whatare they? ζῷον ΞΞἔμψυχον σῶμα; 
and when the question arises below (403 a 310) A. inclines to the view that 
there are none such. 

ag. τὰ δὲ δι᾽ ἐκείνην καὶ Tots ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν. This is the normal type of attri- 
butes of soul, whether active operations or passive states. As expressed below, 
403 a 3—10, the body as well as the soul shares in them, and therefore their 
definition ought to take account of the body (403a 16—27), and psychology 
becomes a branch of physics (403 a 27—b 7); in other words this second class 
of attributes or “states” of soul are ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζῴων 
(403 b 17). If so, the subject, ὑποκείμενον, to which they belong is properly 
the animal (ζῷον ἔμψυχον), and we are often reminded that such is really the 
fact, e.g. 408 Ὁ 13—15, 411 b 2 ποιοῦμεν ἢ πάσχομεν, 415 Ὁ 8, 11, 416 b 22, 
434 Ὁ 12; cf. Metaph. 1038 Ὁ 5 διχῶς ὑπόκειται, ἢ τόδε τε ὃν ὥσπερ τὸ ζῷον τοῖς 
πάθεσιν, ἢ κτέ. 

alo. ἐστὶ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων, i.g. ἐστὶ χαλεπώτατον. This predicative use 
of the partitive gen. has become a mere trick of style, e.g. Pol. 1339 ἃ 17 ταῦτα 
γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων ἀλλ᾽ ἡδέα. Cf. τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν, Pol. 
1287 Ὁ 22, 1204 a I, 1329293 ἐστὶ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, 20. 1273 ἃ 32. Occasion- 
ally the fuller form is retained as below, 406 ἃ 2 ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων. Cf. Pol. 
1291 a 8, 1332 Ὁ 32, 1340 Ὁ 23 sq.; Jud. Ar. 149 Ὁ 2; Waitz ad Zop. Iv. 2, 
121 b 36. 

all. λαβεῖν τινὰ πίστιν. As generally, λαβεῖν means to “get,” “ascertain” or 
“find out,” just as ἔχειν ξεῖο have as a result of enquiry (cognovisse). πίστις, 
like Latin fides, is trustworthy information, or “ ground of belief.” 

all καὶ ydp...12 ἑτέροις. Why the enquiry is so difficult is now explained ; 
yap introduces the reason, which, stated in the briefest terms, is the absence of 
any uniform logical method of obtaining a real definition. The complaint is 
familiar to the readers of AmaZ. Post., much of Bk 11. of that work being devoted 
to pointing out the defect and proposing various ways of remedying it. πολλοῖς 
ἑτέροις, masculine, other enquirers, distinct from ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐπισκοπῶν. 

8. 12. τοῦ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι, 55. ζητήματος, λέγω having no effect 
upon the construction. καὶ is again explicative, οὐσία is now glossed by τὸ τί 
ἐστι as just before (a 7) by φύσις. τί ἐστι has become a sort of indeclinable 
noun. Cf. ri ἦν εἶναι and various prepositional phrases, e.g. καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, 
καθόλου nd. Ar. 763 Ὁ 10 qui quaerit τί ἐστι is ipsam rei naturam quaerit, 
non quaerit eius accidentia. ad eam quaestionem, qua respondetur formula τὸ 
τί ἐστι nomMiInis vim induit, cuius usus eandem habet varietatem, ac verbi εἶναι et 


I. I 402 a 8—a 15 179 


nominis οὐσία. But the answer to the question ri ἐστι is wider than a true 
definition. It might be any rough description sufficient to identify the thing in 
question provided it excluded everything merely unessential or accidental, 
leaving only what is ἀναγκαῖον. Thus the genus will answer the question τί 
ἐστι, but without the differentia would not be a complete definition. See below 
a 23, where the summa genera are meant, and 7of. 1. 5, 102a 31—35. Compare 
Lup. Vi. 5, 142 Ὁ 27 τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν, καὶ πρῶτον ὑποτίθεται 
τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λεγομένων. Or again, either ὕλη or τὸ σύνολον ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους 
would answer the question τί ἐστι, but would not furnish the definition we seek. 
We arrive at the true definition when we have collected all that can be thus 
predicated of the thing ἐν τῷ ri ἐστιν, and arranged these various parts in the 
proper order. 7222. Ar. 763 Ὁ 47 si quis τὰ ἐν τῷ Ti ἐστι κατηγορούμενα et omnia 
compleverit et suo ordine posuerit, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι vel τὸν δρισμόν constituit. 
Anal. Post. 1. 22, 82 Ὁ 37 sqq., Zop. VI. 3, 153 a 15—21, Anal. Post. 11. 6,92 a7 
τὸ Ti ἦν εἶναι τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ἴδιον (Wz., ἰδίων Bk.). Cf also De A. 430 Ὁ 28. 
In the foregoing the definition of a ΖζΖ7ι᾽ is made prominent. But science has to 
investigate and define attributes and properties as wellas things. Thus we may 
enquire ri ἐστι λεῦκον; τί ἐστε τρίπηχυ; τί ἐστε κίνησις; and so through all the 
categories. Hence τὸ τί ἐστι as a noun may denote any of the categories, 
Metaph. 1030 a 18—20. It belongs ἁπλῶς to οὐσία, and in a derivative sense to 
the rest, just as εἶναι itself does: zd. a 20 ὥσπερ yap καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δ᾽ ἑπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἁπλῶς 
μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις. And the same applies to τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: 26. 
1030 Ὁ 4—-7. Lastly, there is a further case, of which λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος is ἃ 
type. This, too, has its τί ἐστι and can be defined, though again in a different 
sense from either ἄνθρωπος or λευκόν: 7, 1030 Ὁ 12 56. 

a 13. μία τις εἶναι μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων. A single method, it might be 
thought, applies to all the objects which we seek to define scientifically. The 
natural expectation that there is some such universal method of finding a defi- 
nition which all the sciences may adopt proves to be without foundation (see Azad, 
Post. τι. cc. 3—7. Cf. 2b. τι. ας. 13). The ordinary procedure of the sciences as 
they existed in A.’s time was to assume the definition or to collect it by induc- 
tion on the evidence of the senses, J/efaph. 1025 Ὁ ὃ πᾶσαι αὗται [sc. ai ἐπιστῆμαι] 
περὶ ὄν τι Kal γένος τι περιγραψάμεναι περὶ τούτου πραγματεύονται;.. οὐδὲ TOU τί 
ἐστιν οὐδένα λόγον ποιοῦνται, GAN ἐκ τούτου [sc. τοῦ γένους] αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσει 
ποιήσασαι αὐτὸ δῆλον, αἱ δ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν λαβοῦσαι τὸ τί ἐστιν, οὕτω τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ 
ὑπάρχοντα τῷ γένει περὶ ὅ εἶσιν ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ ἀναγκαιότερον ἢ μαλακώτερον. 
διόπερ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐσίας οὐδὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης 
ἐπαγωγῆς, ἀλλά τις ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς δηλώσεως" ὁμοίως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἔστι τὸ 
γένος περὶ ὃ πραγματεύονται οὐδὲν λέγουσι, διὰ τὸ τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι διανοίας τό τε 
τί ἐστι δῆλον ποιεῖν καὶ ei ἔστιν. In mapping out a new province of knowledge, 
and in projecting the organisation of a new department of enquiry, the defect 
here mentioned, the want of a short and easy road to definitions, would naturally 
be felt. κατὰ c. gen. is used after εἶναι and ὑπάρχειν, and even after κοινόν, in 
much the same sense as after verbs of predication, λέγεσθαι, κατηγορεῖσθαι, the 
technical expressions καθόλου and κατὰ παντὸς (Anal. Post. 1. 4, 73 a 28 sqq-) 
being evidence how wide this usageis: Eucken, Uder die Praeposttzonen, p. 40, 
observes that éwic. gen. et dat., περί c. gen. et acc. are almost equivalent. 

a Is. ὥσπερ.. ἀπόδειξι. The nature and functions of demonstration or 
demonstrative proof are the subject of Avzaz. Post. 1., where they are fully 
treated. Very briefly, A.’s position is that, since all extension of knowledge 
depends upon previous knowledge, demonstration implies undemonstrated 


I2-—2 


180 NOTES I. t 


premisses or principles, from which by syllogistic reasoning conclusions true 
and necessary are obtained in a particular province. Geometry is the typical 
demonstrative science, and Euclid’s elements illustrate its application to the 
extension of knowledge. Cf. Amal. Post. τ. 7, 75 a 39 τρία γάρ ἐστι τὰ ἐν ταῖς 
ἀποδείξεσιν, ἕν μὲν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον τὸ συμπέρασμα: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον 
γένει τινὶ καθ᾽ αὑτό [the κατὰ συμβ. ἴδιον of our present lemma. Cf. Them. 
5, 14 sq. H., 3, 11 Sp., Philop. 31, 22 sq., Simpl. 9, 33 sq.], ἐν δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα" 
ἀξιώματα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν. τρίτον τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὗ τὰ πάθη Kai τὰ καθ᾽ 
αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα δηλοῖ ἡ ἀπόδειξις. Occasionally A. twits those whom he is 
criticising with ἀπαιδευσία on the ground that they have not mastered the true 
nature of demonstration with its three indispensable elements, the yévos or 
περὶ 6, the premisses ἐξ ὧν and the conclusion, so that they irrationally demand 
a proof of everything, e.g. AZetaph. 1006 a 5—-11, 1005 Ὁ 2—4. As to the con- 
junction of ἴδια and κατὰ συμβεβηκός, the latter must be taken in the sense 
explained above (on a 8) ὅσα συμβέβηκε ; otherwise they could not be demon- 
strated: Azal. Post. τ. 6, 75a 18 τῶν συμβεβηκότων μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ.. οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική, 20. 1. 30, 87b19sqq. The passage in 702. V. 1, 128b 16 566. 
(cf. 2. 3, 131 a 27, Ὁ 1—6), where ἴδιον is divided into (1) καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ dei, and 
(2) πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ποτέ, belongs to dialectic not science, and the examples given 
of (2) lie outside theoretical science in which all the attributes demonstrated 
must be ἀΐδια καὶ ἀναγκαῖα. Cf. Mefaph. 1025 a 30 λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως συμβε- 
βηκός, οἷον ὅσα ὑπάρχει ἑκάστῳ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα... καὶ ταῦτα μὲν 
ἐνδέχεται ἀίδια εἶναι, ἐκείνων δ᾽ [accidents proper, τῶν μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτά] οὐδέν. Asa 
technical term of logic ἴδιον is defined, Zo. I. 5. 102 ἃ 18 ὃ μὴ δηλοῖ μὲν τὸ τί 
fv εἶναι, μόνῳ δ᾽ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος (1.6. eius notionis, 
cui tamquam ἴδεον tribuitur; /zd. Ar. 330 Ὁ 18). Contrast Zog. 1. 5, 102 Ὁ 4—26. 
Cf. Mfetaph. 1025b 7—13: each separate science having marked off its province, 
γένος, and somehow empirically obtained or provisionally assumed a definition 
of it, proceeds to deduce the essential attributes of that γένος, τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ 
ὑπάρχοντα τῷ γένει, here called ἴδια. 

a 18 δεήσει ydp...19 τίς ὁ τρόποςς If we assume that there are various 
methods of arriving at a definition, the difficulty is increased, because in investi- 
gating any single department (περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων) we must first ascertain 
which of these various methods is appropriate to that department (ris τρόπος 
οἰκεῖος: Them. 2, 18 H., 3, 16 Sp.): cf. Philop. 32, 2 ποίᾳ μεθόδῳ eri ποίων 
πραγμάτων χρηστέον. 

arg. ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν ἢ. Philop. 32, 5 τοῦτο ὡς ἐν ὑποθέσει λέγει. This 
suggestion seems reasonable. A. himself would not seriously identify the 
method of obtaining definitions with ἀπόδειξίς τὶς or διαίρεσις. See next notes. 
What he now urges is that the application as well as the choice of the method 
is attended with difficulty. Simpl. 10, 4 sqq. thinks the whole sentence an expla- 
nation (ἐξήγησις) of the words (a 18 sq.) δεήσει yap λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τίς 6 τρόπος. 
The problem of determining which method is applicable to a special case is the 
problem of discovering from what principles we must start in framing the 
appropriate definition. Simpl. 10, 7 émerae yap καὶ τούτοις ζητεῖν, ἐκ τίνων 
ἀρχῶν ὁ ἴδιος ἑκάστου ἀποδοθήσεται ὁρισμός. 

8 19. πότερον ἀπόδειξίς τίς ἐστιν. Tis quod in quibusdam libris omittitur, id 
casu factum est. Nam quoniam (8 15) posuimus demonstrationem esse τῶν κατὰ 
cupBeBnxds ἰδίων, si demonstratio etiam est τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ τί ἐστιν, erit sane 
alia species demonstrationis, ἀπόδειξίς ris. Metaph. 1059 a 30 εἶ yap περί ye τὰ 
συμβεβηκότα ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν, περὶ τὰς οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστιν. 997 a2 Sqq. e quibus. 
haec opponimus, (a 25) ἔτι δὲ πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία μόνον ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ 


1.1 402 a 15--τ- 21 ISI 


περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα ταύταις...εἰ μὲν yap τῆς αὐτῆς, ἀποδεικτική τις ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ τῆς 
οὐσίας- ov δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις εἶναι (Torst. p. 113. Cf. Wetaph. 
1025 Ὁ 14 διόπερ Φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐσίας οὐδὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς 
τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς, ἀλλά τις ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς δηλώσεως. Stapfer, Kyzt. Sind, 
Ῥ. 28, urges that the alternatives would be more sharply defined if, with E, we 
omit τις, contrasting the use of the pronoun, “richtig gesetzte tis,” 402 a 13, 20. 
But, in view of Torstrik’s citations, even the hypothetical mention of ἀπόδειξις 
in this connexion needs some qualification, and ris=“ of a sort” is half ironical, 
half apologetic. The relation of demonstration to definition is fully discussed 
in “μας. Post. 11. cc. I—11. The two processes are wholly dissimilar. It is 
impossible to demonstrate essence or to obtain a definition by demonstration 
alone. All such attempts involve a petitio principit. Ci. Anal. Post. τι. 3, 
especially 90 Ὁ 18—91 a 8, 2d. 11. 7, 92 Ὁ 35—39, ΖΦ. 11. 8, 93 bi5—20. But 
where to know what a thing really is is the same as to know why it is (Az. 
Post. 11. 2, 90 a 15, 31), and the question, “ What is the real nature of a thing?” 
can be interpreted to mean, “‘ What is the cause which makes the thing what it 
is?,” then the search for definitions becomes virtually a search for causes in 
which demonstration and the syllogism play an important part: Amal. Post. 
11. 8, 93 a I—15 (the passage ends with the words: otros μὲν οὖν ὁ τρόπος--- 
this method of defining—sr: οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀπόδειξις εἴρηται πρότερον. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι 
λογικὸς συλλογισμὸς τοῦ τί ἐστιν), Ζ6. II. 10, 93 Ὁ 38—94 a 10. This subsidiary 
use of demonstration is illustrated 413 a 16—20. Similarly at the end of III. 3 
A. claims to have ascertained at once the essence and the cause of imagination; 
having explained the process from its causes, 428 Ὁ 10 sqq., he has been able to 
define it: 429 ἃ ὃ περὶ μὲν οὖν φαντασίας, τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἔστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ 
τοσοῦτον. No logical instrument demonstrates that a combination of certain 
elements makes up the essence to be defined, Azal. Post. 11. 5, ΟἹ Ὁ 24 sqq., 
iWetaph. 1037 Ὁ τὸ sqq.: all we show is that (ὅτι), or why (δεότι) an attribute can 
be predicated of a subject. In other words, given a knowledge of the facts 
(τὸ ὅτι) and the cause (τὸ διότι), the definition can be discovered and recognised 
as such, and the practical rules laid down employ demonstration, especially 
demonstration @ posteriore of the cause from the effect, and demonstration that 
the elements of the definition are essential attributes of the definiend. 

a 20. ἢ διαίρεσις. Analysis of a genus into its species, of these into their 
sub-species, and so on until we come to the lowest or ultimate species containing 
only individuals. This process of obtaining a definition is employed by Plato, 
e.g. in Sofhist and Poltticus. A. criticises the process (Amal. Prior. 1. 31, 
46 a 32 sq., Anal. Post. Il. 5, 91 Ὁ 14 Sqq.), pointing out that it always involves 
a petttio principiz. But in his own practical rules A. employs division as a 
subsidiary process, 2d. 11. 13, 96 b 25 566. ἢ καί τις ἄλλη μέθοδος. If these 
suppositions are not seriously meant, it is unimportant what the reference 
is. In Amal. Post. 11. 6 A. rejects the claims of hypothetical proof of definition 
and proof by definition of the opposite. When all false claims are disallowed 
we fall back presumably upon sense-perception and induction: see woze on 
a 13. A.’s own method as elaborated in Anal. Post. is designated by Them. 
(2, 20 H., 3, 19 Sp.) σύνθεσις μᾶλλον. Zabarella calls it via compositiva. 

4 2:1. πλάνας. Cf Zrth. Nic. 1094 Ὁ 15 τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην. 
A favourite Platonic term for mental perplexity and error, e.g. Rep. 444 8, 16. 
δος C, Phaedo 81 A, Parm. 135 Εὶ τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν. ἐκ τίνων Set ζητεῖν. 
The search for a definition may start from a higher genus: Philop. 32, 12 
τουτέστιν ὑπὸ ποῖον γένος ἀνάξομεν τὸ προκείμενον πρᾶγμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ἕν γένος 
τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ δέκα......22 ζητοῦμεν οὖν, φησίν, ὑπὸ ποῖον γένος ἀνάγεται τὸ 


182 NOTES 1.1 


προκείμενον (πολλῶν γὰρ τὸ γένος ἀμφισβητήσιμον), ἵνα εὑρόντες τοῦτο καὶ διε- 
λόντες εἰς τὰς οἰκείας διαφορὰς οὕτω τοὺς δρισμοὺς ἀποδῶμεν. Or, again, it may 
start from particulars and proceed by induction, though this procedure will 
require subsidiary processes ; see the rules laid down in dzal. Post. Il. 13 and 
Top. νι. 1. The procedure in De A. IL, c. 1 resembles in the main the former, 
though with peculiarities of its own. 

ἄλλαι γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρχαί. The definitions of the unit and of number as 
the sum of units (τὸ ἐκ μονάδων συγκείμενον πλῆθος) belong to discrete quantity 
(διωρισμένον ποσόν), whereas those of surface and of line belong to continuous 
quantity (τὸ συνεχές). Such definitions form the starting-points or principles 
of the respective sciences. To the conclusions of the science they are related 
as cause to effect (διὰ ri): PAys. 11. 7, τοῦ a 16—18 ἢ γὰρ eis τὸ τί ἐστιν ἀνάγεταε 
τὸ διὰ τί ἔσχατον ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, οἷον ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν (εἰς ὁρισμὸν yap τοῦ 
εὐθέος ἢ συμμέτρου ἣ ἄλλου τινὸς ἀνάγεται ἔσχατον) ἢ εἰς τὸ κινῆσαν ττρῶτον, οἷον διὰ 
τί ἐπολέμησαν. See also 2026 on 402 b 18 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι. 

402 a 23—b 8. The problems which more particularly concern the 
definition of soul and the investigation of its essential properties are: (1) To what 
category does the soul belong? (2) Is it potentially or actually existent? [§ 3] 
(3) Is it divisible or indivisible? (4) Is it throughout homogeneous? If not, 
does the difference between soul and soul amount to a difference of genus or 
only of species? In contemporary discussion the soul of man stands for soul in 
general [§ 4]. (5) Does soul, like animal, admit of a single definition, or must 
we rest content with definitions of the several species of soul? [§ 5]. 

a23. πρῶτον δ᾽ ἴσως. If we mean to proceed with the task of defining the 
soul, there are certain problems to be solved which A. now states explicitly, 
though, contrary to his usual custom, he omits the arguments for and against, 
except in the case of the last, 403 a 3, and even then the discussion is of the 
briefest. Jud. Ar. 347 b 32 saepe ἴσως non dubitantis est, sed cum modestia 
quadam asseverantis. Cf., e.g., 405 Ὁ 31. διελεῖν, “distinguish” or rather 
“determine.” Jud. Ar. 180 a 22 ex distinguendi significatione [cf. 2. 179 Ὁ 54 
distinguere genus aliquod in species] διαιρεῖν abit in notionem disputandi, 
explorandi, explicandi. Cf. Pol. 1339 a 14 οὔτε yap τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν ῥάδιον περὶ 
αὐτῆς διελεῖν, 26. 1299 a 12, 1300 Ὁ 18, 1341 b 31. On Pol. 1321 b 4 Newman 
remarks, ‘‘ Acaipeiv seems here to be used in the sense of διορίζειν, as in 1289 Ὁ 12 
and elsewhere.” τῶν yevov=(a 25 and 410 a 15) τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν, 
the table of the ten categories being at once a classification of predications or 
attributes predicated of a subject and the swzzu2a genera of all that exists (γένη 
τοῦ ὄντος). Ultimately these ten δε) genera may be reduced to two, viz. 
substance on the one hand, and its appendages quality, quantity, relation, etc. 
on the other. See A@efaph. 1028 a lo—b 7, 1045 b 27-—32, 1069 a 18—~24. 
καὶ τί ἐστι. καὶ explicative, as also in the following line τόδε re καὶ οὐσία : Simpl. 
10, 27 προστέθεικε Kal τί ἐστι σαφηνίζων τί δηλοῖ τὸ ἐν γένει εἶναι, ὅτι καθ᾽ 6 τί ἐστιν 
(i.e, in what respect it is something), ὥσπερ ἐν διαφοραῖς καθ᾽ ὃ τοιόνδε: Philop. 
33, 16 ἐκ διαιρέσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν αὐτῆς τὸ γένος, ὅπερ γένος ἐν τῷ ri ἐστι κατηγορεῖται. 
Philoponus, anticipating 11.) c. 1, means that soul will ultimately be found under 
the category of substance, τὸ ri ἐστιτετόδε τι καὶ οὐσία. 

8. 24 λέγω δὲ...25 κατηγοριῶν. Simpl. 10, 28 ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς, 
εἰ τὸ γένος αὐτῆς οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν. Simplicius thinks that substance, 
quality and quantity are explicitly mentioned because they found support in 
the views current at the time: e.g. the Pythagoreans and Plato made soul 
a substance, the theory of harmony (I. 4) made it a quality and Xenocrates 
a quantity. But the enumeration of Categories takes precisely the same form 


I. 402 a 21—b 2 183 


in 410 a 14 sq., where there is certainly no such allusion. It is indeed quite 
a common form of citing the categories, being found in eight other passages, 
while in six more these three most important categories are specified without 
the addition of “et cetera.” See Apelt, Bettraige zur griech. Philosophie, 
p. I40 sq. 

a25 ἔτι 8t...26 ἐντελέχειά ris. To explain this second problem we must 
bear in mind that of the four significations of the ambiguous term Being or ὄν 
the last 15 possible and actual being (Mefaph. 1017 b1). This distinction 
concerns merely the modality of Being in whatever category it is found, and 
A.’s examples are in fact drawn from various categories. He gives ὁρῶν, ἐπί- 
στασθαι, npepoty 1017 Ὁ 2 sqq., τὸ θερμὸν 1046 a 26, οἰκοδομεῖν 1046 b 30 Sqq., 
βαδίζον 1047 a 23. Simpl. 11, 3—6 equates ἐντελέχεια with εἶδος, and supposes 
ἐν δυνάμει ὄν to include not only ὕλῃ but also τὸ σύνθετον ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους. 
A. had the category of substance chiefly in view, but his statements ought to 
admit of extension to the other categories. Cf. Them. (2, 38 H., 4, 16 Sp.) 
δεύτερον ἡνίκα ἂν τὸ γένος διακριθῇ, ἐπειδὴ διχῶς ἕκαστον λέγεται γένος.. εἴπερ οὖν 
τὴν οὐσίαν εὕροιμεν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν τίνι τῶν διαφορῶν τούτων ἀποτμηθήσεται, ἄρ᾽ ὡς 
δύναμις ὑποκειμένη καὶ πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχουσα εὐφυῶς, ἢ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐντελέχεια; the 
addition of τις points to the probability that further qualification is necessary : 
Simpl. 11, 15 ὅτε μὴ ἀπροσδιορίστως καὶ ἁπλῶς ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἀλλ᾽ ὑποβεβηκότως, 
though I should not go so far as Them. (3. 4—-6 H., 4, 26—28 Sp.), who sees a 
distinct anticipation of 412 a Io sq., 22—28. 

402 b1I. pepior? ἢ apepys. This question, to which A. returns 411 Ὁ 5—30, 
413b 1I—4144a I, 432 a 22—b 7, does not admit of an unqualified answer. It 
depends upon the meaning we assign to the term part and its correlative whole 
(cf. Metaph. A. 25 sq.). Speaking generally, μέρη = εἰς a διαιρεῖται καὶ ἐξ ὧν 
σύγκειται τὸ ὅλον, but A. is careful to add (1023 Ὁ 20) ἢ τὸ εἶδος ἢ ἢ τὸ ἔχον τὸ εἶδος. 
Any quantity (ποσόν) has quantitative parts: in this sense part is not applicable 
to the soul, if it is neither μέγεθος (407 a 25q.) nor ποσὸν at all (410a 21). Cf. 
Alex., De A. 30, 29 ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐ μόνον οὐχ as μέγεθος, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἀριθμός ἐστι 
pepiory. But non-quantitative wholes may be broken up by logical analysis, 
genera into species, species into sub-species: cf. 430 Ὁ 14, Them. (3, 7 H., 5, 
1 Sp.) καὶ εἴπερ φανείη μεριστή, πότερον ὡς σῶμα καὶ ὄγκος, ἢ ὡς τέχνη Kal ἐπιστή- 
μη. Further, the definition has parts (τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ δηλοῦντι ἕκαστον) more 
general than itself, JZefafh. 1023 Ὁ 24, cf. 1034 Ὁ 20 58)4ᾳ. Hence, when A. 
returns to this question 413 b 13 sqq., 4298 11, he contrasts the logical dis- 
tinctness of the parts, their separateness to thought (λόγῳ ἕτερα, χωριστά) with 
spatial distinctness, the separateness of extended objects (κατὰ τόπον, xara 
μέγεθος χωριστά). 

bi. πότερον ὁμοειδὴς. Them. (3, 16 H., 5, 13 Sp.) τέταρτον ἂν εἴη ζήτημα τῶν 
εἰρημένων; ἄρα ὁμοειδὴς πᾶσα ψυχὴ πρὸς πᾶσάν ἐστιν; ἢ οὐδαμῶς, καὶ εἴπερ ὑφ᾽ 
ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἄρ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἕν γένος; οἷον 7 ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππον" εἰ δὲ μὴ 
ταὐτὸν ἔχουσιν. εἶδος ψυχῆς, dp’ οὐδὲ γένος ταὐτόν ; ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵπτπτος 
ὑπὸ τὸ (Gov, ai ψυχαὶ δε αὐτῶν οὐκέτι καὶ ὑφ᾽ ἕν γένος ψυχῆς; ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε 
διακρῖναι τὰ προβλήματα μὴ περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς ἐπισκοπουμένους, ὅπερ ἕνιοι τῶν 
πρότερον παρεώρων. The term ὁμοειδὴς is applied to air (4118. 21: cf. 8 17, 18) 
and to the other elements, e.g. water, Wefaph. 1014a 308q., fire, De Caelo 1. 8, 
276 b 5 sq.: again, to the plurality of mathematical objects, JZezaph. 1002 Ὁ 14-——21 
(with πόλλ᾽ ἄττα ὁμοειδῆ cf.987b 17 πόλλ᾽ ἄττα ὅμοια), The great examples 
are arithmetical units, which are ἀδιάφοροι, 409a 1 sq.: cf. 4098 18—2o. 

b2 ἅπασα. Atticorum more, sicut πᾶσα, unaquaeque; cf. Heind. ad 
Pl. Phaed. p. 1088. Neque enim quaeritur, ut ex sequentibus patet, an animus 


184 NOTES I. I 


totus similes in se partes habeat sed potius an animae eandem inter se speciem 
referant (Trend.). Heindorf’s note is as follows: “ἅπας φεύγει. Sic, de quo vir 
doctus dubitabat, ἅπας, wnusgutsgue, pro was positum et Polztic. 259C βασιλεὺς 
ἅπας. De Legg. τ. 628 ὃν μάλιστα μὲν ἅπας ἂν βούλοιτο μηδὲ γενέσθαι ποτέ, εἰς. 
Eurip. Bacch. 70 στόμα τ᾽ εὔφημον ἅπας ὁσιούσθω." Cf. Them. (3, 16 H., 5, 14 Sp.) 
πᾶσα πρὸς πᾶσαν... (cited above); Simpl. 12, 2 ἀλλήλαις αἱ ψυχαὶ πᾶσαι. Philop. 
36, 9 αὗται οὖν, φησίν, αἱ ἐν πᾶσιν ἁπλῶς τοῖς ἐμψύχοις ψυχαί. But in πᾶσα ψυχὴ 
ἀθάνατος the word is hardly distributive, rather “all soul” or “soul in all its 
forms.” This meaning need not be excluded here. Cf 4118 18sq. 

b2. πότερον εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ yéve. On the terms ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει, ἔτερον τῷ 
γένει see Metaph. 1057 Ὁ 35—1059a 14. If we assume a plurality of souls more 
or less unlike corresponding to the plurality of animals (cf. Ὁ 9 πολλαὶ ψυχαῖ), 
and if we further assume that they belong to a variety of species, is this the 
limit of the difference between them, or are they so unlike that they are 
incapable of being brought under the same genus? Any two things ἕτερα 
τῷ εἴδει must belong to the same genus, Metlaph. 1057 Ὁ 37 τὸ yap τοιοῦτον γένος 
καλῶ, ὃ ἄμφω év ταὐτὸ λέγεται μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχον διαφοράν, εἴθ᾽ ὡς ὕλη ὃν 
εἴτ᾽ ἄλλως. Thus, if these conditions are fulfilled, there would be a genus soul. 
If however the soul in some cases is immortal, in others mortal, these souls 
could hardly belong to the same genus, cf. 413b 26. 

b3. νῦν. Cf. Ath. Nic. 11446 21, Pol. 1268a τα and zo7e on 408 b 20. 

Ῥ 4. περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης, int. ψυχῆς. It is implied that they neglected the 
phenomena of life in all its other forms, including plants. Obviously the 
solution of the present problem presupposes a comparative study of all species 
of animals and (cf. 411} 2754.) plants. For A.’s own procedure the precept 
given 414 Ὁ 32 is ὥστε καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ζητητέον, τίς ἑκάστου Ψυχή, οἷον τίς φυτοῦ καὶ 
τίς ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου. Alex. Aphr. apud Philop. 36,13 and Simpl. 12, 31 564. 
think the criticism is aimed at Plato, especially in the 7¥«ezs, where, however, 
the soul even of the plant is distinctly recognised (77 A, B), and everything 
which partakes of life is declared to be a (gov and to have some sort of soul. 
Philop. 36, 16sqq. takes the reference to be general, including Democritus and 
the other physicists. 

b5 πότερον εἷς...8 ἢ ὕστερον. Knowledge is of the universal, definition 
of the universal, 1.6. the form (JZefaph. 1036a 28sq.). Particular souls and 
particular animals differ, but all animals belong to the genus animal, though 
they also belong to different species, horse, man, dog. Is, then, the genus 
animal the type of universality by which soul is known and defined, or shall we 
seek distinct definitions of the species? The settlement of this question will 
have a direct bearing on procedure. If we take the first alternative, a study of 
the genus, in which are united all the common characteristics of soul, will 
precede the study of the different varieties. If we favour the second alternative, 
the study of the varieties should come first, for the genus is a logical entity and 
not the constitutive form of any of the particulars of which it is predicated. It 
is part of that form and part only. There is another view of the passage. 
Some take it that the preceding question is presumed to be decided in the 
sense that the difference between souls is a specific and not a generic difference, 
so that it only remains to consider what is the nature of the genus to which 
they all belong. It may be (1) such that they are, in technical language, 
συπώνυμα (ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ 6 λόγος ὁ αὐτός, Caz. τ. τὰ 6). If not, they 
are either (2) ὁμώνυμα, having nothing in common but the name, or (3) πρὸς ἐν 
λεγόμενα, forming a γένος κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν, of which ἕν and ὃν are examples. It is 
assumed that animal cannot illustrate both alternatives : it cannot, as genus, be 


I. I 402 Ὁ 2—b 5 185 


the object of a single definition and at the same time be the non-existent or 
posterior universal of particulars which admit of several definitions. Hence it 
is inferred that in the second alternative animal replaces soul and that what is 
said of it is only true of animal in a supposed and not an actual case: in other 
words, that soul, unlike animal, is not a genus, because souls form a series, 
and such a class is destitute of true generality. Alex. Aphr. first gave this 
explanation, though he afterwards modified or retracted it. He tells us (ἀπ. καὶ 
Avo., pp. 22, 23 544.) that in his lost commentary on De A. he had shown that 
A. may possibly have used ζῷον as an example to illustrate the different species 
of soul regarded as related in a definite order of succession (22, 24sq.). If so, 
Alex. considered, the example chosen would be fictitious. If man, horse, dog 
were not ὁμογενῆ, were not, as they are, species of the one genus ζῷον, each of 
them would require to be separately defined, and either the common term 
“animal” as applied to all of them would denote no characteristic nature (οἰκεία 
φύσις), but would be employed in an ambiguous or equivocal sense, or, if there 
were anything objective corresponding to it, it would be like a term of various 
meanings, of which one is always prior to the other, τὰ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα ἐν ois 
ἐστὶ τὸ wpdrepoy καὶ ὕστερον, or classes arranged in series having a definite order 
of succession. [Examples are found in the numerical series 2, 3, 4, etc., in 
rectilinear figures (AZefaph. 999 a 6sqq.) and in constitutions (207. 1275 a 
34 566.) : probably also in such notions as ὑγιεινὸν and ἀγαθόν. The common 
characteristic is present in varying degrees in different members of such a class, 
being hardly discernible in some: Pol. 1275 a 37 ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδ᾽ ἔνεστιν, ἦ 
τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, 7 γλίσχρως.] Alex. continues (23, 13) τὸ δ᾽ ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον 
καὶ ὕστερόν ἐστιν, ἀναιρουμένῳ τῷ πρώτῳ ἔχοντι τὸ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ σημαινόμενον συναναι- 
ρεῖται, διὸ οὐκέτι πρῶτον ἀλλ᾽ ὕστερον γίνεται. τοιοῦτον δὲ δείξει καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄν. 
This, the earlier explanation of Alex., is accepted amongst others by Zabarella, 
who argues that in Book 11. A. declares soul to be commune guid analogum., 
and therefore its generic definition is insufficient: -we need the specific 
definitions of the several parts of soul in order to complete our knowledge. 
According to him, animal is genus wnivocum, soul is genus analogum with 
nothing objective answering to it except the name and the individual souls. 
Hence the definition of animal gives some information, though incomplete ; 
the generic definition of soul gives no knowledge, unless accompanied by the 
knowledge of the several parts of soul. The obvious defect in this explanation 
is the choice of a fictitious example. To remedy this defect Alex. proposes 
to show (ἄπ. καὶ Avo., 21, 19; 23, 21) that after all A.’s words ἢ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἢ 
ὕστερον are true of animal and of. genera properly so called, provided that we 
carefully distinguish between ζῷον Ξε οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική, which is something 
existent, a thing with attributes (ὄν τι πρᾶγμα), and τὸ ὡς γένος ζῷον, animal as 
genus or universal, which is properly nothing but merely an attribute of things 
(τινῶν ὄν, συμβεβηκὸς πράγματι, σύμπτωμα ἐπί τινε γινόμενον πράγματι). Strictly 
the genus is not ὄν τι, but, if by courtesy we include it among ὄντα, it is 
decidedly posterior logically to the individual members which belong to it. 
This Alex. proves in the usual way. Suppose the genus animal annulled in 
thought, this would leave unaffected the existence of particular animals, whereas 
the destruction of the members of the genus necessarily implies that the genus 
ceases to exist. Here, it will be observed, he comes to a conclusion concerning 
the true genus diametrically opposite to that which he had previously reached 
in his commentary on the De A., viz. (23, 11) τὸ μὲν yap ὡς γένος τινῶν κατηγο- 
ρούμενον dvaipotpevoy ovvavape αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ ὑφ᾽ αὑτό, ὧν οὐδενὶ ἀναιρουμένων 
συναναιρεῖται, διὸ πρῶτον τῇ φύσει. It may perplex some to find the problem 


186 NOTES I. 1 


first stated for soul, animal being adduced as an illustration, while afterwards 
A. goes on to speak of animal, the illustration, leaving soul out of sight. But 
to lose the immediate subject in the illustration is quite in A.’s manner. Cf. 
403 a 12sqq., 4318 178qq. Further, there is good reason why he should begin 
with soul and continue with animal; for the latter term is in his view equally 
applicable to both; at any rate he allows such a view to be tenable. Cf. 
Metaph. 1043a 34 καὶ ζῷον πότερον ψυχὴ ἐν σώματι ἢ ψυχή... εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐπ᾽ 
ἀμφοτέροις τὸ ζῷον, οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ λεγόμενον ἀλλ᾽ ὡς πρὸς ἕν. The possibility of 
such a double application is impartially admitted Mefaph. 1036a τ6---το, 24 56.» 
1037a 5—-10. When we speak of defining, it is always with the tacit assumption 
that the particular, as such, the compound of form and matter which 15 perish- 
able and subject to change, is incapable, properly speaking, of being defined : 
Metaph. 1039 Ὁ 20—1040a 7. If animal denoted an infima species instead of a 
genus, the identity of animal and soul for the purpose of definition would be 
complete ; but this is not the case. Animal, as universal, like man as universal, 
denotes a class which, like its individual members, is a σύνολον or compound of 
form and matter, form capable, matter incapable, of definition: Aefadh. 1035 b 
27—30, 1037a 5-7. Such a class is not οὐσία (1035b 28, 1038b 8—16, 35), 
for it denotes not τόδε rt but τοιόνδε (1039 a 1 Sq., 16). This is what A. means 
by ἢ οὐδέν ἐστιν τεοὺκ ἔστιν οὐσία τοῦ ζῴου τοῦ καθόλουι As a mere universal 
notion or class-name, animal denotes the common characteristic or charac- 
teristics by which species are combined in a genus; and similarly man, as 
mere universal, denotes the common characteristic or characteristics by which 
particular men are combined in an infima species. In other words, animal is 
neither ἐν παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ nor ἕν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, but simply ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν or κοινῇ 
κατηγορούμενον (402 Ὁ 8). Nevertheless, it is ὅν τῷ a logical entity, owing its 
existence to thought: cf. Philop. 38, 3 ἔχει yap τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι, ὡς 
μέντοι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὑφεστηκὸς οὐδέν ἐστι. As thus described, it is ὕστερον, posterior 
to every member of the class, to every possessor of the characteristic or charac- 
teristics which it predicates as held in common: for πάθη are necessarily 
posterior to ovata; otherwise they would exist independently, apart from οὐσία 
(Metaph. 1038 Ὁ 23—29). 

But it may be urged that elsewhere καθόλου is described as κατὰ παντός, καθ᾽ 
αὐτό, 7 αὐτό, Anal. Post. τ. 4.73b 26sq., whereby it is given a place ἐν τῷ ri 
ἐστιν, and that γένος is part of the definition and, as such, prior to the definition 
of which it is a part (Wetaph. Z. c. 10, especially 1034. Ὁ 31Sq., 1035b 14—2z20). 
We cannot define man, horse, dog, if we do not know animal, which forms part 
of the definition of each of these species. A. himself allows full weight to this 
objection : 1039a 14—23. But, instead of modifying his view of the universal 
as μὴ οὐσία and therefore posterior, he is content with the remark that an 
objection which, if true without qualification, would make definition impossible, 
must somehow admit of qualification (1039a 21sq.). He held that, strictly 
speaking, infimae species were alone capable of definition, because to them 
alone belongs the form or quiddity (1030a 11), which we define (Adyos ris 
οὐσίας) by collecting the essential, and excluding the accidental, characteristics 
shared by the members of the infima species. Thus we obtain a single 
definition for the entire species: Jfetaph. 998b 12. This method of comparing 
individuals and obtaining a καθόλου or common predicate is an aid to defining 
and well adapted to the conditions under which human knowledge is acquired : 
but the community of predication has really nothing to do with οὐσία. If the 
species were reduced to a single member, the specific form would continue to 
be the quiddity of the sole survivor; whereas the genus, e.g. οὐσία ἔμψυχος 


I. I 402 b5 187 


αἰσθητικὴ ΟΥ̓ τὸ τριχῇ διάστατον, is but the matter of a definition and requires to 
be informed by a differentia before it can express the quiddity of any actual 
particular: JZefaph. 1038 a 5 544.) 1043 Ὁ 30—33, 1o45a 3454. It is because it 
is τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν, ὡς ἴδιον ὑπάρχον τῷ πράγματι, inhering in the particular and 
informing it, that form or quiddity is defined ; and not because it is shared in 
common by a certain group of particulars. This may be seen if we either 
enlarge or contract the groups (1) by including horse and dog under the logical 
entity quadruped, man and fowl under biped, or (2) by setting up a similar 
logical entity in the artificial groups pointer, pony, albino. When we have 
reached ἄτομα τῷ εἴδει either from above or below, the end of classification has 
been attained. 

I have assumed that animal, here called τὸ καθόλου, is a genus. We know 
from .JZefaph. 992 Ὁ 12 sq. that in some cases it is impossible for the universal 
to be a genus (e.g., the highest universals, ἐν and ὄν, are not genera in the same 
sense as biological classes: 998b 22, cf. Anal. Post. τι. 7, 92b 13). Not that 
all the things called ὄντα are homonyms without any link of connexion save 
this common predicate: on the contrary, they are all so called from their 
relation to οὐσία, substance or Being proper, (efaph. 1003 Ὁ 5—15. There 
can, however, be no doubt that animal is a true genus and man, horse, dog 
true coordinate species or mutually exclusive classes. Yet animal is the 
example which A. takes when examining the claim of the universal to rank 
as οὐσία, Wetaph. Z. c. 13, and his emphatic rejection of the claim, 1038b 
10—1039a 2, has been referred to above. 

In this chapter A. simply states his problems without solving them. This 
one is solved in 414 Ὁ 20Sqq., whence it appears that there is a single definition 
of soul, as of rectilinear figure, number and, we may add, of animal or any other 
genus (quadruped, biped, etc.), more general than the infima species. But in all 
these cases the definition obtained by comparison of individuals is imperfect 
and inadequate. It needs to be supplemented by the study of the species. 
I agree with Mr Innes that A. does not base his argument on τὸ ἐφεξῆς at all 
(Cl. Rev. XVI., Ὁ. 462): it would be just as valid if the different types of soul 
were mutually exclusive, like biological classes. In fact, A. studies them as if 
they were mutually exclusive: he treats, not of the soul of the plant, the jelly- 
fish, the non-stationary animal, the rational animal, but of θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, 
ὀρεκτικόν, νοητικόν. 

b 5 πότερον εἷς ὁ λόγος...6 αὐτῆς ἐστί. If souls belong in all cases to the 
same genus, as all animals to the genus Animal, there will be a single definition 
of Soul the genus, as there is of the genus Animal. Them. (3, 23 H., 5, 23 Sp.) 
ἡμῖν δὲ τὴν καθόλου φύσιν ἐπισκεπτέον, dpa eis δρισμὸς καὶ ἕν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι πάσης 
ψυχῆς, } ἄλλος μὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἄλλος δὲ τῆς τοῦ ἵππου; Philop. 36, 25 
ἀττοδοθείη δ᾽ ἂν εἷς δρισμός, εἰ ἔχοιεν [int. ai ψυχαὶ) κοινὸν γένος, ὥσπερ τοῦ ζῴου 
γένους ὄντος ἵππου καὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰδῶν εἷς ὁρισμὸς ἀποδίδοται, 
Simpl. 13, 3 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁμοειδεῖς πᾶσαι, εἷς ἔσται πάσης λόγος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀνθρώπου 
καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς ἔφη ζῴου, εἰ δὲ ἀνομοειδεῖς; καθ᾽ ἕκαστον εἶδος érepos ἀποδοθήσεται 
λόγος. The unity of the definition depends on the unity of that which is 
defined : Metaph. 1045a 12 6 δ᾽ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστὶν eis οὐ συνδέσμῳ καθάπερ ἡ 
Ἰλιάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑνὸς εἶναι, cf. 1037 b 24---26. But this unity in the object, in the 
thing to be defined, must have a cause, 1037a 19sq. The //iad is one by the 
stringing together of the parts, the definition because it signifies a natural 
whole, of which the parts are held together, not by the coherence of matter, 
or by coacervation, or by external force, but by an immanent form (ἐντελέχεια 
καὶ φύσις ris ἑκάστη, Metaph. 10444 9), distinctive and peculiar: Poef. 20. 1457a 


188 NOTES I. I 


28—30, Metaph. 1052a 16—25. This form or quiddity of an infima species is 
the object of definition, and strictly speaking, the only thing that can be 
defined: Jfetaph. 1037b 25 ὁ yap ὁρισμὸς λόγος ris ἐστιν εἷς Kal οὐσίας, ὥσθ᾽ 
ἑνός τινος δεῖ αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον" καὶ yap ἡ οὐσία ἕν τι καὶ τόδε τι σημαίνει, ws φαμέν, 
[030a 11---ξ13,) τΟ388 19 ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πρράγματος ἔσται καὶ ὁ 
ὁρισμός. The reader is referred to JdezapAh. Ζ. 12 and H. 6. 

b6. καθ’ ἑκάστην, restored from the first hand of E by Torstrik who 
remarks: Quanquam enim notum est substantiva cuiuslibet generis si re- 
petuntur per pronomina vel adiectiva pronominalia, haec posse neutro quod 
vocamus genere poni, id tamen hoc loco minus commode factum erat: nam 
καθ᾽ ἕκαστον vult quidem illud referri ad animam, quum vero ζῷον interiectum 
esset, verendum erat ne ad (ov videretur referendum. Accuratius igitur et 
ab omni ambiguitate remotum καθ᾽ ἑκάστην. Cf. 414b 32, where the neuter 
involves no ambiguity, and 418a 17, zofe. The question here raised aporetically 
recurs 414 Ὁ 20—33, where, as above remarked, it receives its solution. 

b7. θεοῦ. This should cause no surprise. Jog. V. 4, 132b IOsq. τὸ μὲν 
ζῷον ἐπιστήμης μετέχον ἀληθεύεται κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ (cf. 128 Ὁ 19 sq.), Metaph. 1023 Ὁ 32 
οἷον ἄνθρωπον, ἵππον, θεόν, ὅτι ἅπαντα ζῷα, 1072 Ὁ 28 56.) 1088 a 10 εἰ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος 
καὶ ἵππος καὶ θεός, ζῷον tows: Plato, Phaedrus 246 Ο, Ὁ. ΟἹ τὰ ἀίδια τῶν αἰσθητῶν 
as gods, cf. 1074} 2 5644.. το2Ζό 8 18 566. 

Ῥ 7. τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου The genus of which man, horse, etc. are species. 
Like all the rest of the series, this problem is proposed tentatively, as if A. 
himself had not taken sides in the controversy. His own views on the relation 
of genus to species are laid down in the Wetaphyszcs. See for instance 1038 a 5. 
Two alternatives are possible, (1) that the genus simply does not exist apart from 
its species, (2) that it does exist, but ὡς ὕλη; 1038 b 34—1039 a 3, 1039 a 30---Ὁ 2 
and Z. c. 14 generally ; 1040b 26 δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπάρχει παρὰ τὰ 
καθ᾽ ἕκαστα yapis; 1041a 3—5. See also H. MSL. Innes, Ou the Universal 
and Particular tn Artstotles Theory of Knowledge. 

b 7. ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον. So Aletaph. 1042a 21 ἔστι τοίνυν οὔτε τὸ 
καθόλου οὐσία οὔτε τὸ γένος, where A. is recapitulating the results obtained in Z, 
especially c. 13. Zabarella insists that essenfra, not exvisteztia, is intended. He 
adds “existentiam A. ut notam supponit.” An instructive parallel is JlefapA. 
10384 καὶ εἰ οὖν τὸ γένος ἁπλῶς μὴ ἔστι παρὰ τὰ ὡς γένους εἴδη, ἢ εἰ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὕλη 
δ᾽ ἐστίν (ἡ μὲν γὰρ φωνὴ γένος καὶ ὕλη, ai δὲ διαφοραὶ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐκ 
ταύτης ποιοῦσιν). The coalescence of genus and last differentia in the definition 
is parallel to the union of matter and form in the particular. For γένος ὡς ὕλη, 
cf. 1024 Ὁ 8, 1043 Ὁ το, 1058 a 23 sq.: perhaps also De A. 4174 27. 

Ὁ 8. ὁμοίως δὲ Kdv...caryyopotro. This appears to mean that whatever 
difficulty is raised by the genus animal or the genus soul attaches similarly 
to any common predicate or universal [καθόλου Ξε καθ᾽ ὅλον κατηγορούμενον], 
e.g. to body (cf. Metaph. 1069a 25—30. I cite (a 26) of μὲν οὖν viv ra 
καθόλου οὐσίας μᾶλλον τιθέασιν" τὰ yap γένη καθόλου, ἅ φασιν ἀρχὰς καὶ οὐσίας 
εἶναι μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ λογικῶς ζητεῖν" οἱ δὲ πάλαι τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν, 
ἄλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ κοινὸν GHpa) : Or to geometrical figure, σχῆμα. Inthe parallel passage 
(414 Ὁ 22—28) what A. says is that “in the case of kinds of soul as in that of 
geometrical figures, the only general notion which will fit all is one which is not 
proper to any particular kind of soul or any particular figure, and that it is absurd 
to look for a general notion in these ὧς zm other cases without investigating 
the znjimae sHecies” (see Innes, Class. Rev. XVI. 462). Cf. Metaph. 1038) 11 τὸ 
δὲ καθόλου κοινόν. τοῦτο yap λέγεται καθόλου, ὃ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. τίνος 
οὖν οὐσία τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται, ἢ γὰρ ἁπάντων ἣ οὐδενός. ἁπάντων δ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τε Kré. 


1.1 402 Ὁ 5--- 15 189 


402 b 9—16. Further, if instead of a plurality of souls, we recognise a 
plurality of parts of a single soul, we have to decide whether our study should 
begin with the whole soul or with the parts, and how these parts are severally 
distinct; whether the study of the parts should be preceded by a study of their 
functions [§ 6]; and, if so, whether we should begin with an examination of 
the objects with which the several faculties and their functions are respectively 
concerned [§ 7]. 

bog. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ μὴ.. «ἀλλὰ μόρια. We return to the fourth problem πότερον 
ὁμοειδὴς ἅπασα Ψυχὴ ἢ οὔ. The intervening passage (402 Ὁ 2 εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδής... 
8 κατηγοροῖτο) has traced the consequences of assuming the negative, μὴ ὁμοειδὴς 
ἅπασα ψυχή, or, which is the same thing, of assuming a variety of kinds of soul 
(πολλαὶ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἀνομοειδεῖς). The alternative now taken is to assume a variety 
of parts (πολλὰ μόρια) in the one kind of soul: cf. 413b 13 πότερον δὲ τούτων 
ἕκαστόν ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ μόριον ψυχῆς κτέ.. Simpl. 13, 27 Ei μὴ πολλαὶ ψυχαί, φησιν, 
τουτέστιν εἰ μὴ κατ᾽ εἶδος ἀλλήλων διαφέροιεν αἵ τε ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ τῷ 
ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλὰ μόρια τὸ διάφορον οὐ κατ᾽ εἶδος ἔχοντα διὰ τὸ ἑνὸς εἶναι μόρια, ἀλλὰ 
κατὰ λόγους, ὡς τὸ κοῦφον καὶ φωτιστικὸν τοῦ πυρὸς. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν ἑνὸς ζῴου 
εἴτε ἀνθρώπου εἴτε τινὸς ἄλλου ἀληθές, ἵνα μία ἡ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ἦ ψυχή. εἴτε οὖν 
μόρια εἴτε δυνάμεις τὰς πολλὰς ἐν ἑκάστῳ λεκτέον ζῳάς, ὁμοειδεῖς μὲν κατὰ λόγον 
δὲ διαφερούσας ῥητέον. The unity of each particular soul is safeguarded, but 
the diversity between soul and soul is attributed to a plurality of parts which 
may or may not all be found in any two diverse particular souls selected for 
comparison. Them. (4, 12 H., 7, 2 Sp.) confines his attention to the individual, 
citing Pl. 7heae¢. 184 Ὁ for the absurdity that each of us carries several 
souls as it were in a Trojan horse: dpa πολλὰς θετέον ψυχὰς ὑπάρχειν τῷ ζώφ 
οἷον φυτικὴν θρεπτικὴν ὀρεκτικὴν Stavonrixny, ἐφ᾽ ὧν καὶ αὗται (quae quidem 
animalia has quoque habent), ἢ πολλαὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ ψυχαί... μιᾶς δὲ 
ὅλης αὐτῆς ὑπαρχούσης τὰ μόρια διενήνοχε. 

Ὁ τὸ χαλεπὸν. ἀλλήλων. Τούτων --τῶν μορίων. Them. (4, 17 H., 7,9 Sp.) 
καὶ εἰ μιᾶς θετέον μέρη, χαλεπὸν τὸ διορίσαι, ποῖα καὶ πῶς" οἷον εὐθύς, ap’ ἕτερον τὸ 
θρεπτικὸν τοῦ αὐξητικοῦ καὶ ἄμφω τοῦ γεννητικοῦ; ἢ τῷ λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα, τῷ δ᾽ 
ὑποκειμένῳ ταὐτά; The limits between thought and imagination or sense and 
intellect are hard to determine, and A.’s predecessors did not recognise all parts 
of the soul. 

bi5 τὰ ἀντικείμενα. Ch 415a20. The examples given—ro αἰσθητόν, τὸ 
vonrov—explain the meaning clearly. When we perceive by sense or think, we 
perceive something and think something, viz. the sensible object or the object 
of thought, but why these objects are said to be ἀντικείμενα is not so clear: 
Bonitz associates this application of the term with the local sense by which 
one thing is said to be over against or opposite to another, /zd. Ar. 64a 15 
sensu locali, De Cael. τ. 8, 277 a 23 ἡ κύκλῳ [sc. φορά] ἔχει πὼς ἀντικείμενα τὰ 
κατὰ διάμετρον (“circular motion virtually has opposite limits in the two ex- 
tremities of the diameter of the circle” 1.6. the circle travels from one end A 
of the diameter to the other end #, and back again]: 76. 11. 2, 284 Ὁ 21 sq. τὸ 
πρόσθεν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον (cp. Ὁ 32 ὄπισθεν). Ad hunc usum v. ἀντικεῖσθαι refe- 
rendum videtur, quod res sensibus obiectae ἀντικείμενα nominantur De A. 402 b 
15, 26.4154 20. At first this seems simpler than the old explanation which 
refers the term to the opposition of relatives, Them. (4, 36 H., 3, 7 Sp.) καὶ yap 
ἀντίκειται ὧς τὰ πρός τε TO μὲν νοητὸν πρὸς τὸν νοῦν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητὸν πρὸς THY 
αἴσθησιν. Philop. 39, 36; Simpl. 14,17—21. This is one of the four subdivisions. 
of logical opposition or contrast as laid down in Caz. 10. 11 Ὁ £7: λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον 
ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ (1) ὡς τὰ πρός rt, ἢ (2) ds τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ (3) ὡς στέρησις: 


190 NOTES I. I 


καὶ ἕξις, ἢ (4) as κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις [cf. JZetaph. 1018 a 20 sq. ]...60a μὲν οὖν 
ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως, 
πρὸς αὐτά, οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστίν, ἑτέρου διπλάσιον λέγεται" τινὸς γὰρ 
διπλάσιον. καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, καὶ λέγεταί 
γε ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ. καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δὲ αὐτὸ ὅπερ 
ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον λέγεται, τὴν ἐπιστήμην᾽ τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τινὶ λέγεται 
ἐπιστητόν, τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. As Trend. remarks, (p. 168) if ἀντικείμενον here bears 
its technical meaning, it can only denote the opposition between relative 
terms: hoc loco sola ra πρός re conveniunt. Nam quae percipiuntur, quae 
cogitantur, ad perceptionem et cogitationem duplici modo pertinent, ut hae 
tum ab ills moveantur, tum ad ea regantur. Quo pertinet locus categoriarum 
10. IL b 24 ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ [cited above]. Quo quidem oppositorum 
genere quod res est non tollitur sed servatur. In eo enim, quod scitur, sciendi 
notio manet. But in ἐναντιότης and στέρησις the presence of one opposite 
implies the absence or destruction of the other. Whatever the precise explan- 
ation, it is clear that ἀντικείμενον Ξε 6 object of a mental operation, the external 
thing to which we are attending. We shall presently find ὑποκείμενον used 
in the same way for the object of perception, e.g. 422 Ὁ 32, 426b 8, 10. Thus 
colour is the “subject-matter,” the peculiar province, of sight, sound of hear- 
ing. Plato in the Refudlic (511 D, E) had described the faculties as set over 
against (ἐπ things sensible and things intelligible respectively. 

bi5. πρότερα τούτων, sc. τῶν ἔργων. This we should naturally expect, 
because τὰ ἔργα have just been mentioned. Further in 415 a 20 the same 
question is proposed and solved, where τούτων is clearly the operations τὸ νοεῖν 
καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. So the commentators. Them. (4, 32 H., 8, 2 Sp.) καὶ εἰ 
περὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, dpa περὶ αὐτῶν πρότερον ἢ περὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς évep- 
yeias; Simpl. 14, 17—24, Philop. 39, 35 sqq. Philop. remarks that A. ought 
to have written in Ὁ τό τὸ αἰσθητὸν τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τῆς νοήσεως. 
But if it is once settled that the operation of sense-perception (as better 
known) is to be studied before the faculty, if we further determine to study the 
sensible object before the operation, plainly the sensible object will be studied 
before the faculty. And as the ultimate aim is to arrive at knowledge of the 
obscure (part or) faculty, it is natural enough to speak of the study of the 
sensible object as preliminary to this. 

402b 16—40S3 a @. It would seem that, while the determination of 
the essence or What is of use, as in geometry, for the study of the essential 
properties which follow from it, at the same time the study of these essential 
properties also materially contributes to the knowledge of what a thing really 
is. In fact, when we are in a position to give an account of all or most of the 
properties as they are confusedly and imperfectly presented to us, we shall best 
be able to define what a thing really is, such a definition forming the starting- 
point of all demonstration. Hence definitions which lead to no information 
about attributes are of use for dialectical purposes only and have no scientific 
value [§ 8]. 

Ὁ 16. ἔοικε δ᾽ wxré. This section deals generally with the logic of science 
conceived as an instrument of discovery, in particular with the relative im- 
portance of a study of essence and a study of properties, the two co-ordinate 
parts of the enquiry proposed (402a 7 sq.). The series of problems (a 23 to 
Ὁ 16) is nearly complete. Only one remains (403 a 3 sqq.) ἀπορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει κτέ. 
They have all been propounded with perfect impartiality, no clue being vouch- 
safed as to a future decision; but the alternatives presented in the last 
section (Ὁ 9—16) suggest the possibility that we may have to proceed indirectly 


I. I 402 Ὁ 15-—b 21 Io! 


a posterior? by reasoning from the effect to the cause, and studying the 
properties in order to obtain a definition of the essence. Accordingly A. faces 
this possibility and justifies the procedure in question. The fields of enquiry 
are diverse. Sciences like geometry deduce properties from definitions, else- 
where the study of the properties precedes and contributes to the discovery of 
the definition. In any case, the possibility of deducing properties serves as a 
test of a scientific definition. See moze on Ὁ 26. Cf. Metaph. 1035b 16 ἕκαστον 
γοῦν τὸ μέρος ἐὰν δρίζηται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου ὁριεῖται, ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἄνευ 
αἰσθήσεως. 

Ὁ 17. τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι. Knowledge of the “What” is knowledge of the 
essence, (a 7) τήν τε φύσιν καὶ THY οὐσίαν. (ἃ 13) THY οὐσίαν Kai τὸ Ti ἐστι, and is 
expressed in a definition. This becomes a principle or premiss of demonstra- 
tion (Ὁ 25), and from such principles science deduces the essential properties δι 
ἀποδείξεως. 

Ῥ 17. θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας. Science is the knowledge of causes, 4 πα, Post. 
I. 2271 Ὁ 9—16, b 30 56., I. 6, 758 31—~37, 1. 14, 79a 23 sq. The conclusions of 
a particular science must be demonstrated, 1.6, the facts they state must be 
shown to follow from premisses better known and causally connected with the 
first principles of the science (zd. 1. 2, 71 Ὁ 17 sqq.), the middle term in all such 
syllogisms denoting the cause of the effect stated inthe conclusion. Leaving on 
one side such conclusions as are merely accidental and depend upon extraneous 
causes, the rest are the essential properties of the peculiar province (yévos) of 
the given science, and ought therefore to admit of being demonstrated syllo- 
gistically from the first principles of that science upon which remotely or 
proximately they depend. 

Ὁ 18. τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις, here as below b21, 23, 26, the 
essential properties of things as explained above a 8andais. Them. (5,4 H., 
8, 13 Sp.) θεωρῆσαι τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ πράγματι. Simpl. 14, 30 τὰ καθ᾽ 
αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα θεωρεῖν ταῖς οὐσίαις. Philop. 40, 12 γνῶναι τὰ οὐσιωδῶς ὑπάρ- 
xovra τοῖς πράγμασιν...20 ἡ γνῶσις τῶν xa’ αὑτὸ καὶ πρώτως ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς 
πράγμασι. ταῦτα γάρ φησι συμβεβηκότα ἐνταῦθα. The plural seems to show that 
οὐσίαις means the things with which the science deals and not essences as 
opposed to properties. Thus unit is οὐσία ἄθετος and point is οὐσία θετός, 
Anal. Post. τ. 27, 87a 35 56. 

Ῥ 18. ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι. These definitions of “straight”—‘curved”— 
‘‘line”—and “surface”—illustrate what A. means by the fundamental princi- 
ples of Plane Geometry (a 22 ἀρχαὶ ἐπιπέδων). Similarly the proposition 
that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two nght angles (Eucl. 1. 32) 
excellently illustrates what is meant by a property (συμβεβηκός) to be deduced 
δι᾿ ἀποδείξεως : Anal. Post. τ. 4, 73 Ὁ 30—744 3, I. 5, 74a 25—b 4. 

b 2. τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται. The properties contribute to the know- 
ledge of the essence: exactly how A. does not state, for (Ὁ 22) ἐπειδὰν yap...25 
κάλλιστα 15 just as vague. It is presumed that we are acquainted with certain 
properties of a thing which we have still to define. Our knowledge of these 
properties cannot at this stage be scientific. Them. (5,9 H., 8, 21 Sp.) ἀδύνατον 
yap ἄνευ τοῦ γνώριμον γενέσθαι τὸν δρισμὸν Onpedoai τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων δι 
ἀποδείξεως. Cf. Philop. 43, 3 πῶς γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ ἀποδεικτικῶς εἰδέναι τίνα ἐστὶ 
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα κατ᾽ οὐσίαν τῷ πράγματι τὸν μὴ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ ἐγνωκότα; This 
statement is fully borne out by Azal. Post. τ. 6, τ. 31 and emphasized below 
(Ὁ 25) πᾶσης yap ἀποδείξεως xré. It would seem, therefore, that in such cases 
the properties are better known to us, and we become acquainted with them, by 
sensation and experience before we know that they are deducible from the 


192 NOTES I. I 


definition of the thing ; the method pursued throughout Book II. of the present 
treatise exemplifies this. Philop. 40, 30—41, 6 adduces from the PAyszcs the 
definitions of τόπος, ἄπειρον, κενόν, χρόνος and that of hail from Mezeor. I. 12, 
347 Ὁ 34 566. as obtained in this way. μέγα μέρος. So De Sensu 1, 437 a IVI 
πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται μέρος. Cf. the Latin mzezorem partem. 

b 23. κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν. fd. Ar. 811 a 59: 1.6. κατὰ τοῦτο ὃ φαινεται 
ἡμῖν. This meaning must not be confused, as Trend. appears to confuse it, with 
that which the term bears when used technically for imagination, whether 
operation or result. As Bonitz explains, s.v.: verbo φαίνεσθαι rei obiectae 
species significatur, quatenus sensu animove percipitur ; ex hac duplice vocabuli 
φαίνεσθαι notione explicatur, quod descendens inde verbum φαντάζεσθαι ac 
nomen φαντασία modo speciem rei obiectae significat sive veram sive fallacem, 
1.4. τὸ φαίνεσθαι, modo eam actionem, qua rerum imagines animo informamus. 
For the meaning ‘‘appearance to sense” or simple presentation, whether true or 
false, cf. De 4. 428 Ὁ 3 φαίνεται μὲν 6 ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πεπίστευται δ᾽ εἶναι μείζων τῆς 
οἰκουμένης with the parallel De Jusomin. 2, 460 b 18 φαίνεται μὲν ὃ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, 
ἀντίφησι δὲ πολλάκις ἕτερόν τι πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν ; De Caelo 11. 13, 294 a 7, De 
Sens 3, 439 Ὁ 6 ὥρισται ἡ φαντασία τῆς χρόας, “ἴῃ colour produces a definite 
impression.” Here (402 Ὁ 23) it is used of appearance to the mind, de rebus 
cogitatis Bz, as in 27h. Nic. 1114a 31 56. πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, 
τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι (i.e. οὐκ εἰσὶ κύριοι τοῦ φαίνεσθαί τε ἀγαθόν), where 
φαντασία is used as the verbal of φαίνεσθαι in the sense of the presentation 
or appearance to the mind. Especially in the phrase ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίαν =to 
produce an appearance or impression there is an approximation to the technical 
term imagination: /zd@. Ar. 811 Ὁ 7 ex ipsa formula ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίαν apparet, 
quam prope coniunctus hic usus sit cum eo qui infra proponitur. AZeteph. 1024 Ὁ 
17 πρᾶγμα Ψεῦδος [λέγεται] καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν τῷ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι 
συντεθῆναι.. «οὕτω γὰρ οὐκ ὄντα ταῦτα. τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἐστὶ μὲν ὄντα, πέφυκε μέντοι 
φαίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ οἷά ἐστιν ἢ ἃ μή ἐστιν, οἷον ἡ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνύπνια" ταῦτα γὰρ 
ἔστι μέν τι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὧν ἐμποιεῖ τὴν φαντασίαν [the things exist, but not as they 
are presented ; they produce or convey a false impression]. πράγματα μὲν οὖν 
ψευδῆ οὕτω λέγεται, ἢ τῷ μὴ εἶναι αὐτά, ἢ τῷ τὴν dw αὐτῶν φαντασίαν μὴ ὄντος εἶναι: 
1025 ἃ 5 τὰ πράγματά φαμεν ψευδῆ εἶναι, ὅσα ἐμποιεῖ φαντασίαν ψευδῆ. So also 
in the Zofzcs, eg. 1. 1, 100b 26 οὐθὲν τῶν λεγομένων ἐνδόξων ἐπιπόλαιον ἔχει 
παντελῶς τὴν φαντασίαν (1.6. εὐθὺς φαίνεται ψευδές) : 2ὦ. IX. 4, 165 b 25, IX. 6, 
168 Ὁ 29. In our present passage there is no suggestion that the presentment of 
the συμβεβηκότα is erroneous. It may, however, be imperfect or confused, if we 
compare it with the knowledge of the same συμβεβηκότα obtained by demon- 
stration (δε ἀποδείξεως). Until deduced from the definition of the essence the 
properties can never be known as necessary. In the enquiry concerning soul 
‘the operations are συμβεβηκότα, effects presumably demonstrable from the 
essence or definition if we knew it. But with these operations we are to a 
certain extent familiar, whereas we are still in search of the definition from 
which they ought to be demonstrable. Trend. denies that the properties can in 
this way be known in the full sense of the term: Restat igitur, ut συμβεβηκότα, 
donec a sensibus suscipiuntur neque a principiis demonstrantur, φαντασίᾳ 
tribuantur; nondum enim cognita sunt. Cf. Simpl. 15, 1 ὧν [τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ 
συμβεβηκότων] καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ φαντασία ἀντιληπτική, Them. (5, 10 H.,, 8, 23 
Sp.) ἀλλ᾽ ἑκανὸν καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ 4 φαντασία [sc. οὐ δ ἀποδείξεως}, Philop. 
42, 6 φαντασίαν φησὶ ἤτοι ὁλοσχερέστερον γνῶσιν ἤγουν τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ ἐναργῆ, 
φαντασίαν καλέσας παρὰ τὸ φανερὰ εἶναι. φαντασία seems to be used in the latter 
sense in PAys. IV. 4, 211 b 34. 


I. I 402 b 21—a 2 193 


Tosum up. The fundamental meaning in φαντασία is presentation to the 
mind, first in the act of perception and afterwards when by the faculty of 
imagination in the technical sense this appearance is recalled and again 
presented to the mind. In modern psychology the distinction between the two 
is marked by the two terms presentation and representation, and A.’s technical 
φαντασία or τὸ φανταστικὸν is what would be called a representative faculty, 
though loosely used, as A. includes among its effects the production of the after- 
mage. Etymologically the earlier meaning of φαντασία, as of φαίνεσθαι, is pre- 
sentation or appearance and this, its normal sense in Plato and earlier writers, 
is often retained by A., as here. See further note on 404 a 28. 

b 23. ἀποδιδόναι. Jad. Ar. 80 a 54 amodiddvac sequente enunciatione 
interrogativa syn ὁρίζειν : cf. 406a 27, Eth. Nic. 1095 a 20 περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, 
τί ἐστιν, ἀμφισβητοῦσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. For the 
construction ἀποδιδόναι περί τινος without the dependent question Bz. cites De 
Gen. et Corr. Il. 6, 333 Ὁ 4, Meteor. 1. 1, 339 a 7, Top. 1. 14, 105 Ὁ 26 δρισμῷ 
οὐκ εὐπετὲς ἀποδοῦναι περὶ αὐτῶν. 

b 25. πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως AMetaph. 1034 a 31 ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς πάντων 
ἀρχὴ ἡ οὐσία. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ τί ἐστιν of συλλογισμοί εἶσιν. Simpl. 15, 9 regards this 
as a reason given for trying to discover the definition : “‘We must after all find 
a definition, for without it we are unable to demonstrate any of the properties.” 
Similarly Philop. 42, 15 sqq. τοῦτο δηλῶν ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐναργείας ἔχομέν τινα 
γνῶσιν τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις, ἀλλὰ ταύτην τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχομεν ἐξ αἰσθήσεως 
καὶ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικῆν. ἐὰν δὲ τὸν ὁρισμὸν γνῶμεν, τότε ἐπιστημονικῶς δυνάμεθα τὴν 
γνῶσιν αὐτῶν ἕλεῖν ἀρχαῖς κεχρημένοι τοῖς δρισμοῖς. This was the view of Alex. 
Aphr. apud Philop. 43, 1—8. Οἱ the general notion as an ἀρχὴ cf. Maier, Syllo- 
gistik, Wa, p. 404, n. 2, who has valuable remarks on the synthetic and analytic 
processes of thought. 

b 26 ὥστε...403 a 2 ἅπαντες. From the scientific definition all essential 
properties can be deduced. Hence we are furnished with a test of a good 
definition. A. applies this to previous definitions of the soul, 408 a 3—5, 409 Ὁ 
14—18; cf. Grote, Arzstotle, Ὁ. 452, 2nd edition (Vol 11. p. 179, Ist edition) : 
‘“Aristotle rejects all the theories proposed by antecedent philosophers...he 
pronounces it incorrect to say that the soul is moved at all. He farther observes 
that none of the philosophers have kept in view either the full meaning or all 
the varieties of soul: and that none of these defective theories suffices for the 
purpose that every good and sufficient theory ought to serve, viz. not merely to 
define the essence of the soul, but also to define it in such a manner that the 
concomitant functions and affections of the soul shall all be deducible from it.” 

403a 2. διαλεκτικώς. Philop. 44, I ot φυσικὸν GAN ἁπλῶς πρὸς δόξαν ὁρῶντα 
καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν τε λέγειν. A definition would be sufficient for the purposes of 
debate if it were accepted as valid by the interlocutor. A. opposes dialectic to 
demonstrative science (see ΖοΐΖες, passim); the two agree in employing the 
syllogism and arguing strictly from premisses to conclusion. But the premisses 
of dialectic are not necessarily or invariably true, they may include any current 
opinions (ἔνδοξα) which both the disputants agree to accept. Cf. Mefaph. 
995 Ὁ 23 περὶ ὅσων of διαλεκτικοὶ πειρῶνται σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων μόνον ποιού- 
μενοι τὴν σκέψιν. Philop. 44, 2—11 compares the dialectician’s definition of 
anger given below, a 30 sqq., viz. ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως, with the physicist’s ζέσις 
τοῦ περικαρδίου αἵματος δι’ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως. The former fails to explain the 
accompanying symptoms (τὰ παρακολουθοῦντα πάθη), palpitation (παλμός), rise of 
temperature (θερμότης) and a flushed face. When the abstract logical con- 
sideration of a subject is censured and a preference is expressed for physical 


H. 13 


194. NOTES I. I 


enquiry into things in the concrete, A.’s complaint comes to this, that the 
premisses with which the reasoning starts are not appropriate and the con- 
clusions do not apply to the facts, De Gen. Ax. I. 8, 748 a ὃ of γὰρ μὴ ἐκ τῶν 
οἰκείων ἀρχῶν λόγοι κενοί, ἀλλὰ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκ ὄντες. Yet 
such formal, superficial discussion, λογικῶς ζητεῖν, has its place and A. is content 
to employ it, e.g. AZeZaph. 1029b 13. 

az. κενῶς. Simpl. 15, 22 ὡς τῆς φύσεως καὶ τοῦ βάθους τῶν ὄντων ἀποπίπ- 
τον κενὸν προσαγορεύει: Philop. 43, 34 τουτέστι κατὰ κενοῦ φέρεσθαι καὶ μὴ 
ἐφάπτεσθαι τῆς φύσεως τοῦ πράγματος, μηδὲ olovel ἀπερείδειν τῷ πράγματι τὴν 
πέξαν τῆς διανοίας, ἀλλὰ μετέωρον εἶναι. Cf. Eth. Hud. τ. 8, 1217 Ὁ 21 λογικῶς καὶ 
κενῶς, De Gen. An. τι. 8, 748 a ὃ καθόλου λίαν καὶ κενός, Ath. Nic. 1096 b 20 
μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος, Pol. 1260 ἃ 25 καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτούς. 

403 a 85--10. As regards the attributes or affections of the soul, there is 
the important and difficult problem, whether they are all shared with the body 
or whether the soul has any affection peculiar to itself. The dependence of the 
soul upon the body is apparent in most of its functions, whether active or 
passive, e.g. in anger, desire, sensation. Thinking would seem to form an 
exception, though if it be a species of imagination, or not independent of 
imagination, even thought would be dependent upon the body [8 9]. 

a3. ἀπορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the last 
problem, viz., Are there any properties of soul which are independent of body? 
Its discussion leads to a digression on the subject-matter of various branches of 
science, from which A. returns in the concluding sentence, Ὁ 16— 19. πότερόν 
.«««4 κοινὰς This is best understood if we revert to 402 a 9 sq., where the’ dis- 
tinction drawn must be the same, though the order of the alternatives is 
reversed. Consequently the attributes or properties here said to be shared by 
the possessor of the soul are those referred to in the earlier passage as belong- 
ing to the animal in virtue of the soul (δι ἐκείνην), 1.6. belonging to the animal 
as a whole because it is animate (ἔμψυχον). Such attributes or properties are 
distinguished from those that are peculiar to the soul itself and not shared 
by the body which it animates. As in Mefafh. 1038 b 10 sqq., ἴδιον Ξεὃ οὐχ 
ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ, κοινόν =6 πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. 

a4. τοῦ ἔχοντος. By this we must understand τοῦ ζῴουτετοῦ ἐμψύχου 
σώματος. The two phrases τὸ ζῷον ἔχει ψυχήν and τῷ ζῴῳ ὑπάρχει ψυχή are 
equivalent, cf. Mefafh. 1040 Ὁ 23 οὐδενὶ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἡ οὐσία ἀλλ᾽ ἢ αὐτῇ τε καὶ 
τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οὗ ἐστὶν ovoia. The soul is not the οὐσία of an inanimate or of 
a dead body, 412 Ὁ 25 sq., but of a living body, 415 Ὁ 8 τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος 
αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή, Ὁ τι τῶν ἐμψύχων σωμάτων ἡ ψυχὴ airia. So 412a 15 μετέχον 
ζωῆς πε ἔμψυχον. Parallels may be cited for τοῦ ἔχοντος, e.g. 416 Ὁ 18, 21 τὸ μὲν 
τρέφον ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη ψυχή, τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον τὸ ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα (1.6. τὸ ἔμψυχον 
σῶμα ἡ ἔμψυχον, 20. Ὁ 9 sqq., b 11), 428 Ὁ 17 and 408 Ὁ 26 sq. τουδὲ τοῦ ἔχοντος 
ἐκεῖνο, 7 ἐκεῖνο ἔχει (cf. 408 Ὁ 28 τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ ἀπόλωλεν). As the whole body is 
animate by the presence of soul, so also is any part of it: cf. Wetaph. 1036 Ὁ 30— 
32. See zofe on 422 Ὁ 23, évrds: also De Part. An. UU. τ, 647a 24—31 where, 
a 27, we read τὸ ἔχον πρῶτον μόριον τὰς τοιαύτας ἀρχάς (viz. τὴν αἰσθητικὴν and 
τὴν κατὰ τόπον κινητικήν.. In De Mem. τ. 450a 30 τὸ γιγνόμενον διὰ τῆς 
αἰσθήσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ σώματος τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτὴν the last word 
αὐτὴν may possibly replace αἴσθησιν, but, as the heart or its analogue is the 
bodily part in question, a comparison of Aefagh. 1035 Ὁ 25 sq. would suggest 
that τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτὴν [int. τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ψυχήν] corresponds to ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ 6 
λόγος καὶ ἡ οὐσία, or, in other words, ἡ ψυχή. 

ad. φαίνεται δὲ, sc. ἡ ψυχή. φαίνεται evidentiam significat, non dubitationem. 


1.1 4038 2--- τὸ IQs 


The appeal is to experience, to the facts, especially the evidence of sense. Cf. 
404b 5, 406 Ὁ 24 with the infinitive, as 406a 30, 407a 15 with the participle, δΖ 
saéepe. So also φανερόν ἐστιν. 

a6. πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν. The soul has no passive affection or active 
function, i.e. no passive or active property of its own (ἴδιον) Cf. a τὸ sq. ἔργων 
ἢ παθημάτων, 409b 15 τὰ πάθη xa trad ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς, 411 Ὁ 2 τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον 
ποιοῦμέν τε καὶ πάσχομεν. That the reference to a subject is the more correct 
mode of expression follows from 408 b 13—15. 

a7. Ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. Ci. De Sensu i. 4368 7 κοινὰ τῆς Ψυχῆς ὄντα καὶ τοῦ 
σώματος, οἷον αἴσθησις καὶ μνήμη καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὅλως ὄρεξις, καὶ πρὸς 
τούτοις ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη. A. sums up his own view of sensation thus, De Seszsz 
1. 436 Ὁ 6 ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ὅτι διὰ σώματος γίγνεται τῇ Ψυχῇ, δῆλον. Apparently anger 
and courage, as well as desire, are referred to the sensitive soul, τὸ αἰσθητικόν. 
In Plato, eg. Zim. 69 D, 77 B (cf. 42 A), there is an attempt to distinguish 
two uses of the word αἴσθησις, which in Greek had to do duty for the feeling of 
pleasure or pain as well as for the cognitive element of sensation proper. As 
Professor Beare points out (Greek Theortes of Elementary Cognition, pp. 270, 
Nn. 3, 273, Nn. 3) there was an analogous double use of the English word ‘feeling,’ 
In psychological works of the last century feeling had to do duty for the sense of 
pleasure and pain as well as for the factor of cognition. ὅλως (md. Ar. 505 Ὁ 47) 
ab enumeratis singulis rebus transitum parat ad universum genus. Cf. 429b 21, 
431 b τὸ and 4368 9 quoted above. 

a8. μάλιστα. Join with ἔδιον. καὶ τοῦτο, SC. τὸ νοεῖν. SO ina Q οὐδὲ τοῦτο. 
φαντασία τις. A species of imagination. The term is here used in its technical 
sense, and not as in 402 Ὁ 23. See Ill.,c. 3 and 433a9 εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν 
τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα. 

49. ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας. This more closely approximates to the results 
obtained in III., cc. 4—8, especially 431 a 14sq., 16 sq., 431 Ὁ 2, 4—8, 432 8 8 sq., 13 
sq., De Mem. 1. 449 Ὁ 30 sq. οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν Kré. because φαντασία in the 
technical sense implies antecedent sensation and therefore body. Cf. 427b 15 
αὐτή τε [sc. ἡ φαντασία) od γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, 429 a 1 ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη 
κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς Kar’ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη, 425 Ὁ 24 ἀπελθόντων τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν ἔνεισιν ai αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, Ret. 1370 8. 28 
sqq., De Mem. 1. 450 8 27—32. Memory is the revival of this mental picture, 
and of memory A. says δῆλον yap ὅτι δεῖ νοῆσαι τοιοῦτον τὸ γιγνόμενον διὰ τῆς 
αἰσθήσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ σώματος τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν. οἷον ζωγράφημά 
τι τὸ πάθος, οὗ φαμὲν τὴν ἔξιν μνήμην εἶναι" ἡ γὰρ γιγνομένη κίνησις [1.6. φαντασία) 
ἐνσημαίνεται οἷον τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς δακτυ- 
λίοις. The optative with ἄν expresses the logical consequence, as often, e.g. 
403a II, 12, 406b 4, where it follows 406a 31 εὔλογον, and 32 εἰπεῖν ἀληθές. 

403 a 10—27. This involves the further question of the soul’s separate 
existence. If there is any activity or affection of the soul in which the body 
does not share, its separate existence will be possible: if not, it will not be 
separable from the body. In the latter case its mode of existence is comparable 
to that of the straight line, which has many properties, gwé@ straight, but is never 
found apart from something corporeal on which its existence depends. Ex- 
perience confirms the view that most attributes of the soul are similarly 
dependent upon the body, as the necessary condition of their existence, and 
this is shown quite clearly by such emotions as anger or fear. It follows 
from this that they are forms or notions immersed in matter, i.e. the matter 15 
a necessary condition of their essence, and this dependence upon matter is seen 
when they come to be defined [§ το]. 


I3—-2 


196 NOTES I. ¥ 


8 11. ἴδιον, sc. τῆς ψυχῆς (so a 12 ἴδιον αὐτῆς), i.e. not shared by the body, μὴ 
κοινὸν Kal τοῦ ἔχοντος. χωρίζεσθαι, as in 413 Ὁ 26; cf. 4038 12 οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή. 
This terminology is regularly employed to indicate separate or independent 
existence. 

8 12. οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή. If there is no property or function of the soul 
that is not shared by the body, the soul will not have a separate or independent 
existence. A decision in this sense excludes the possibility which the other 
alternative leaves open. ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ Srzd. Ar. 354 a 26 omittitur 
etiam aliquoties ea enunciatio demonstrativa, ad quam enunciatio a καθάπερ [vel 
ὥσπερ] incipiens referatur, cf. Prob/. 111. 17, 873 b 20 (on De A. 409 a 32 and 431 a 
17, ὥσπερ with no οὕτως apparent, see zo¢es ad loc.). Something must be supplied, 
e.g. περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτως ἔχει. A, pursues the comparison, but does not return 
to the main proposition for the sake of which the comparison Is instituted. 

ai2. τῷ εὐθεῖ ἢ εὐθύ, “the straight line as such,” i.e. the straight line zz 
abstracto as defined in geometry, which is unquestionably the meaning of τὸ 
εὐθύ in als, rectum gud rectum. Qué, the Latin equivalent of 7, was made 
familiar by the schoolmen. By τῷ εὐθεῖ Sophonias understood τῷδε τῷ εὐθεῖ τῷ 
ἐν χαλκῷ ἢ ἐν λίθῳ, the edge of the brazen or stone ruler. To this Bonitz 
(Hermes VII. Ὁ. 416 sqq.) objects as not justified by the language, and incon- 
sistent with the purpose for which the illustration is introduced. As to the 
language: “Soll εὐθύ in dem Dativ τῷ εὐθεῖ eine andere Bedeutung haben, als 
in dem bestimmenden Zusatze 7 εὐθύ, so scheint es ein unerlassliches Erforderniss 
zu sein, dass zu εὐθεῖ noch ein bestimmendes Wort gesetzt sei, aus dem dieser 
Unterschied ersichtlich wiirde, 2. B. τῷ εὐθεῖ ξύλῳ, σώματι, τῷδε τῷ εὐθεῖ ; ohne 
einen solchen Zusatz hiesse es doch mehr als billig ist von dem Leser bean- 
spruchen, wenn er auf den blossen Anlass des 7 unter dem Worte εὐθύ in dieser 
Verbindung verschiedene Begriffe denken soll.” This is a strong argument, but 
not absolutely convincing. Philoponus is right in saying (49, 18 sq.) that τῷ 
εὐθεῖ is ambiguous, and Torstrik satisfied himself that the words might mean not 
only (1) abstractam recti notionem, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, definitionem recti or (2) lineam 
rectam mathematicam, rectum mathematicum quod mathematico corpori insit, 
but also (3) in materia sensili rectum expressum. Further, the mention of the 
brazen sphere is confusing. But when we turn to the purpose of the illustration 
all ambiguity is cleared away. If for the illustrative example we substitute the 
proposition which it is introduced to suggest, we shall have to write with 
Bonitz: τῇ ψυχῇ (not τῷ ζῴῳ), ἧ ψυχή, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν, οὐ μέντοι γ᾽ αἰσθήσεται χωρισθεῖσα αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχή. This implies 
that by τῷ εὐθεῖ as well as by (a 15) τὸ εὐθύ is meant the straight line Ζ2 abstracto 
and not the edge of the ruler or any other concrete object. For the simile is 
introduced merely to show that under certain conditions the soul in itself, and 
not the animate being, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστῆ. Themistius, then, has caught A.’s 
intention in using the simile when with unusual freedom he paraphrases 
(6,34H., 11, 24 Sp.) πῶς οὖν λέγομεν τὴν ψυχὴν φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν καὶ ὀργίξεσθαι; 
πῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὴν εὐθεῖαν ἅπτεσθαι τῆς σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν; οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ἡ 
εὐθεῖα καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν (οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν), ἀλλ᾽ [sc. λέγομεν ὅτι ὃ κανὼν 6 εὐθύς, οὐδὲ ὅτι 
τῆς σφαίρας καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῆς χαλκῆς" ἀχώριστον γὰρ καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ 
σχῆμα τοῦ ξυλίνου κανόνος καὶ τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας, καὶ ἡ κατὰ στιγμὴν aby, μᾶλλον 
δὲ ὅλως ἁφὴ τοῦ συνόλον πρὸς τὸ σύνολον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα 
ἔοικεν εἶναι κοινὰ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος. 

ἃ 13. πολλὰ συμβαίνε. Compare the passage where the nature of the 
objects of mathematics is fully discussed, MWefaph. 1078 a 5 πολλὰ δὲ συμβέβηκε 
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν 7 ἕκαστον ὑπάρχει τῶν τοιούτων;..«ὥστε καὶ ἣ μήκη μόνον 


I. I 403 a II—a I5 197 


καὶ 7 ἐπίπεδα [Sc. πολλὰ συμβέβηκε καθ᾽ αὑτὰ]...17 ὥστ᾽ εἴ τες θέμενος κεχωρισμένα 
τῶν συμβεβηκότων σκοπεῖ τι περὶ τούτων FF τοιαῦτα, οὐδὲν διὰ τοῦτο ψεῦδος ψεύσεται 
sory 21 ἄριστα δ᾽ ἂν οὕτω θεωρηθείη ἕκαστον, εἴ Tis τὸ μὴ κεχωρισμένον θείη χωρίσας. 
Cf. 1077 b 22—30. In these passages μῆκος -ε εὐθεῖα γραμμή Ξετὸ εὐθὺ ἣ εὐθύ. 

8. 13. τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας. So in ALefapfi. 1036 a 21 A. speaks of ἡ χαλκῆ 
ὀρθή. Possibly a sphere and other geometrical figures in brass were familiar 
objects in the lecture room. Cf. also ΖΦ. 997b 35 οὔτε yap ai αἰσθηταὶ γραμμαὶ 
τοιαῦταί εἶσιν οἵας λέγει ὁ γεωμέτρης (οὐδὲν yap εὐθὺ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὕτως οὐδὲ στρογ- 
γύλον: ἅπτεται γὰρ τοῦ κανόνος οὐ κατὰ στιγμὴν ὁ κύκλος, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ Iperaydpas 
ἔλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρας). Note that, 85 there 6 κύκλος without qualification 
touches the ruler, the example of an αἰσθητὴ γραμμή; so here (4034 13) τὸ εὐθὺ 7 
εὐθὺ has the property of touching τῆς χαλκῆς [1.6. αἰσθητῆς] σφαίρας. Protagoras 
objected that the objects of the geometer were not sensible objects. Contact at 
a point, as the point is defined in geometry, is not borne out by sense. 

ἃ 14. οὕτω. So E alone: all the other Mss. have τούτου, which was also the 
text of Philoponus and Simplicius. Whether they join τούτον with χωρισθέν 
or make it governed by ἅψεται is, in the opinion of Bonitz l.c., not clear: Philop. 
49, 34 ἐν δὲ τῷ εἰπεῖν od μέντοι ye ἅψεται τούτου χωρισθὲν τὸ εὐθὺ τὴν εὐθύτητα 
αὐτήν [sc. λαμβάνει]. αὕτη οὖν, φησί, χωρισθεῖσα τοῦ ὑποκειμένου οὐκέτι πείσεται 
τοῦτο, Simpl. 18, 13 οὐ μέντοι ἅψεται τούτου χωρισθὲν τὸ εὐθύ. τούτου μὲν τοῦ 
ὑποκειμένου λέγει, εὐθὺ δὲ νῦν τὸ ὧς χαρακτῆρα καὶ τὸ ὡς εὐθύτητα. Trend. and 
Torst. keep the reading τούτου, which they join with χωρεισθέν. The latter 
indeed pronounces οὕτω to be an error due to the scribe of E (scripturae vitio) 
and adds “‘rotro enim rem sensilem quasi digito monstrat.” But the usual 
Aristotelian pronoun for a concrete thing is ὅδε, not οὗτος, and even then some 
addition is required as in ὅδε ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τόδε τι. On the other hand οὕτω, if 
taken with ἅψεται and as=xara στιγμήν, gives the following sense ; the abstract 
straight line will not touch the brazen sphere at a point, for it has no separate 
existence. The properties of soul may be illustrated by the properties of a 
straight line, one of them being contact with a sphere at a point. To this will 
correspond some active or passive function of soul (e.g. αἴσθησις). But just as 
contact implies concrete bodies, so that the straight line 7 adbs¢racto will only 
have this property as long as it is embodied in something concrete, so the soul 
will cease to exercise its active or passive functions when separated from the 
body. As a matter of fact, the straight line zz adstracto has no separate 
existence apart from the particular concrete things which are straight, Philop. 
50, 3 ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ὑφέστηκε, and, in the hypothetical case we are considering, the 
soul will be like it in this respect. That the comparison of soul to the mathe- 
matical straight line is introduced for a special purpose in working out one of 
the two alternatives suggested by the problem we are considering is clear from 
403b 19 καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμή. 

Δ 15. ἀχώριστον γάρ...τινός ἐστιν. <A.’s doctrine as to the question what are 
the objects of the mathematical sciences is most fully explained in etapd. M. 3. 
See also the excerpts above in the note on a 13 πολλὰ συμβαίνει. It is thus 
summarised /ud. Ar. 860a 50 τὰ μαθηματικὰ ἀχώριστα, χωριστὰ τῇ νοήσει, 
θεωρεῖται ἧ χωριστά. Metaph. 1026a 9 ὅτι μέντοι ἔνια μαθήματα ἧ ἀκίνητα καὶ 
ἢ χωριστὰ θεωρεῖ, δῆλον, 26. 13 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀκίνητα, 
τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἕνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ᾽ ἴσως [ἐστὶν] ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ. 
1059b 13 χωριστὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν [sc. τῶν μαθηματικῶν} οὐδέν. Phys. τι. 2, 193b 24 
καὶ γὰρ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεὰ ἔχει τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα καὶ μήκη καὶ στιγμάς, περὶ ὧν 
σκοπεῖ ὁ μαθηματικός. ἔτι ἡ ἀστρολογία [astronomy in general, both mathematical 
and physical] ἑτέρα ἢ μέρος τῆς φυσικῆς" εἰ γὰρ τοῦ φυσικοῦ τὸ τί ἐστεν ἥλιος καὶ 


198 NOTES 11 


σελήνη εἰδέναι, τῶν δὲ συμβεβηκότων καθ᾽ αὑτὰ μηδέν, ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅτι 
φαίνονται λέγοντες of περὶ φύσεως καὶ περὶ σχήματος σελήνης καὶ ἡλίου, καὶ «“τότερον 
σφαιροειδὴς 6 κόσμος καὶ ἡ γῆ ἢ οὔ. περὶ τούτων μὲν οὖν πραγματεύεται καὶ 6 
μαθηματικός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἦ φυσικοῦ σώματος πέρας ἕκαστον. οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα 
θεωρεῖ Ff τοιούτοις οὖσι συμβέβηκεν. διὸ καὶ χωρίζει: χωριστὰ γὰρ τῇ νοήσει 
κινήσεώς ἐστι, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει, οὐδὲ γίνεται ψεῦδος χωριζόντων, 16. 194a 9 
ἢ μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρία περὶ γραμμῆς φυσικῆς σκοπεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἢ φυσική, ἡ δ᾽ ὀπτικὴ 
μαθηματικὴν μὲν γραμμήν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἣ μαθηματικὴ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ φυσική. This doctrine is 
consistently maintained throughout the De 4. and is the basis of the phrase by 
which the objects of mathematics are often denoted, viz. rd ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντα 
(or λεγόμενα). The relevant passages include 403b 148q., 429 Ὁ 18—20, 432a 
3—6, where see z0/es. 

a 16. πάθη must be understood as in 403a 3 in the wider sense of attributes 
generally (402a 8 zofe) and not restricted to specific emotions (animi pertur- 
bationes, affectus, affectiones) as defined and enumerated by Aristotle, 27%. 
Nic. 1105 Ὁ 20 sqq., and described in detail, Axes. τὶ. cc. 2—11. That the 
word has the wider sense in 403 a 3566. is plain from the mention of αἰσθάνεσθαι 
and νοεῖν (cf. πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν a 6Sq.), and to restrict it now would be fatal 
to the argument. A.’s object in what follows is to prove that every mental 
operation has its bodily concomitant. As many of the bodily changes are 
internal and unperceived, he argues indirectly (σημεῖον δὲ a 19) from the 
difference of temperament in man and man. This difference of temperament 
cannot be due to the object, i.e. the external causes (παθημάτων a 20) which 
tend to excite emotion, for in that case the same slight would rouse all 
men alike to anger, the same terrors would excite fear in all alike, whereas it 
ig notorious that the choleric temper is prone to anger on trivial occasions and 
the melancholic temper so timid that it gives way to groundless alarms, these 
differences between man and man being due to the bodily constitution. Thus 
anger cannot take place without the body, without a concomitant affection of a 
definite part of the body, and this bodily affection cannot take place without the 
soul, for the body in which it takes place is at all events animate: τὸ ἔργον οὐχ 
ὑπάρχει ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως. What is said of anger and fear must be understood to 
apply to all the mental functions. A. chose the emotions to illustrate the wider 
sense of operations or attributes simply because the dependence on the body, 
though nowhere perfectly clear, is more obvious in their case. The analogous 
argument from the dependence of sensation upon sense-organs will be found 
408 Ὁ 20sqq. 

4 18, ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι, 1S in some degree affected simultaneously 
with them, 1.6.5 whenever there is a mental affection, a bodily affection accom- 
panies it. The mental and the bodily processes go together. The bodily 
change may, however, be internal and not capable of direct verification ; hence 
A. resorts to the argument from signs. 

a20. παθημάτων. “Causes of mental change,” Alex. Aphr. De Az. 13, 1 
ἁ ἢ ὀργὴν ἢ φόβον ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν ἤ τι τοιοῦτο πάθος ἄλλο κινεῖν οἷά te. Bonitz, “τ. 
Ar. 5.ν., after saying that the meanings of πάθος and πάθημα in general agree, 
notes as one point of dissimilarity usum voc. πάθος excedit πάθημα, ubi non 
motum et mutationem, sed eius causam significat (554 Ὁ 26 544.) Thus this 
shade of meaning must be distinguished here from that, with which some 
have confused it, of πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά, for which cf. De Resp. 17, 
479 ἃ 15 καὶ μικρῶν παθημάτων ἐπιγινομένων ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ ταχέως τελευτῶσιν. 
The incentives to anger or fear are not necessarily calamities or painful 
occurrences. 


I. I 403 a I15—a 26 Ι99 


8ι 22. ὀργᾷ... ὀργίζηται. The word ὀργᾶν is used of buds swollen to bursting 
(Lat. zuxeescere): but also of the human body, when the blood is up or in a 
ferment, cf. Probl. VII. 2. 8868. 32 ἐὰν dpyav τύχῃ τὸ σῶμα. That A. observed 
the etymological connexion of ὀργίζεσθαι with ὀργᾶν seems plain from the 
context. But the subject to ὀργίζηται must be personal. This is one of many 
instances of subject omitted. The subject omitted can generally be supplied 
from the verb, as 6 ὀργιζόμενος here: cf. 418 a 22, 23 (bis), 428 Ὁ 1, 3, 5, 7; 
430 Ὁ 3, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 22, 23, 431 a 20, 24, Ὁ 6, 7, 8,9, 13. Fora typical case 
see 421 Ὁ 30 ὁρᾷ: cf. 425 Ὁ 13. Sometimes it is safer to supply a subject in the 
neuter, especially with αἰσθάνεσθαι or νοεῖν, on the analogy of 417 8 10 sq., Ὁ 8 
TO φρονοῦν, ὅταν φρονῇ, 426b17 κρίνειν τὸ κρῖνον, 430 Ὁ 24. τὸ yvwpifov. Some- 
times the first person plural has preceded, e.g. 420 ἃ 14, 425 13. There are 
doubtful cases, eg. 423a 18, 429b 13, 430a 25. lad. Ar. 589b 47 tertiam 
personam singularis non addito pronomine ris notum est ad significandum 
subiectum universale (germanice “man”) ita usurpari, ut iam in superioribus 
aliquo modo, veluti in infinitivo (cf. Kruger, gx. Gr. 61, 4, 5) vel in substantivo 
numeri pluralis, a quo ad singularem indefinitum transitur, illud subiectum 
universale contineatur. Hos fines vulgati usus raro excedit Ar. (pleraque 
exempla quae congesserunt Zell. ad £74 NM. ul. τ. 6, Wz. ad Org. 3b 22 a 
vulgari usu non differunt), veluti 27%. Jv7c. 1152 Ὁ 16 dre ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν ai 
ἡδοναί, Kat ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον. Jad. Ar. 7638. 25 in omittendo pron. 
indef. ris, ri Ar. easdem fere leges observat ac reliqui scriptores: ad exempla 
allata insolentioris omissionis adde De Gen. et Corr. 1. 4. 319 Ὁ 11. 

a24. ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται, sc. of ἄνθρωποι, the ellipse so common with 
φασί. The expression ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνεσθαι (cf. Eng. “get in a passion”) is 
an elaboration of the simple verb πάσχειν used above. Cf. Pol. 1287b 3 ἐν 
πάθει ὄντες, De Insomn. 2. 460b 3 ἀπατώμεθα...ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἐν 
ἄλλοις, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς ἐν φόβῳ, ὁ δ᾽ ἐρωτικὸς ἐν ἔρωτι. 

a25. λόγοι ἔνυλοι. Adyos=notion, content of definition, which is opposed, 
precisely as is form or quiddity, to matter. Cf. 403 Ὁ 2, first zofe. The com- 
pound adjective ἔνυλος might conceivably be taken, on the analogy of ἔνυδρος, 
in either of two ways, as (1) immanent in matter, or (2) having matter in it, 
apparently favoured by Alefaph. 1033a 5. Jud. “417. s.v. mentions no other use 
of the compound in A., but it is frequent in the Greek commentators, who 
interpret it according to (1) and in 4308 6 replace A.’s ra ἔχοντα ὕλην (as 
opposed to τὰ ἄνευ ὕλης) by &vAa: Them. 97, 37sq- H., 180, 12 sqq. Sp., Simpl. 
239, 7, Philop. 534, 13- So Alex. Aphr. *Am. καὶ Avo. 55, 9 interprets ἔνυλον 
εἶδος as τό τινος εἶδος. Cf. ad h. 1. Them. 7, 25 H., 13, 8 Sp. ἐν ὕλῃ τὸ εἶναι 
ἔχοντες, Philop. 54, 15 sq-, Simpl. 20, 6. See also 403 b 11 and zode. 

a 26. οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι. In the Rkeforic 1378 a 31 566. anger is defined as a 
painful desire (ὄρεξις) of apparent vengeance, on account of an apparent slight 
done to one’s self or one’s friends, when the slight is unjustifiable. This definition, 
which leaves out the physical aspect, is represented in a condensed form by ὄρεξις 
ἀντιλυπήσεως below. κίνησις. This word covers at once physical movement 
and psychical change. And thus the definition which it introduces includes in 
brief both types of definition, the physicist’s and the dialectician’s, which are 
distinguished below. σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως. By thus adding “or of a 
part or of the faculty belonging to it” Aristotle is providing for those cases 
where the mental process is thought not to affect the body as a whole, but to 
be confined to some particular organ, as seeing to the eye. Such an organ 
operates or functions in virtue of the faculty which resides in it and constitutes 
it an organ or instrument: the organ implies the faculty, the eye vision, as will 


200 NOTES I. I 


be explained 424a 24—28. The physical fact accompanying anger is, as we 
shall see, a ferment of the blood, or of the heat, about the heart. 

a 27. ὑπὸ τοῦδε. The external cause which excites anger is defined in the 
Rhetoric lc. as φαινομένη ὀλιγωρία. ἕνεκα rouse. The final cause of anger is 
defined below as ἀντιλύπησις and in the Rhetoric |.c. as τιμωρία. 

403 a 27—b19. A digression upon the relation of psychology to physics 
or the science of nature. To study the soul as thus dependent upon the body falls, 
then, to the natural philosopher. The emotions would be differently defined 
by the mere dialectician and the mere biologist: e.g. anger to the one 
is a desire of revenge, to the other a ferment of blood about the heart, or the 
like ; just as a house may be defined, on the one hand, by its end, protection 
from the weather, on the other hand, by the particular materials, the stones, 
bricks and timber, of which it is composed. A complete definition, whether of 
anger or of house, must include both end and materials ; it must take account 
of the form as well as of the matter: and such a complete definition alone 
satisfies the requirements of physics, the true science of nature. But what of 
the two incomplete definitions, viz. that which takes account of the form, 
neglecting the matter, and that which deals with the matter to the exclusion 
of the form? The truth is that the properties of things are forms which fall 
for investigation under different branches of science according to the varying 
degrees in which they are implicated in matter. There is no science that investi- 
gates the properties of matter which are not separable, nor even regarded as 
separable, from matter. Physics treats of all the properties of such and such 
bodies and of such and such matter, viz. of natural bodies capable of motion, and 
of sensible matter. When the properties of bodies are not thus regarded, they 
lie outside of physics and in some cases fall within the province of the arts and 
crafts. Properties of bodies which, though really inseparable, are for scientific 
purposes treated as separable, i.e. as not bound up with the particular bodies to 
which they belong, fall under mathematics, while, if they are regarded as 
wholly separate from body and from matter, they fall under First Philosophy 
or metaphysics. 

To returm from this digression. As we were saying, the affections or 
properties of the soul, in so far as, like anger or fear, they are implicated in 
matter, are inseparable from the physical matter of the animal, while at the same 
time, unlike the mathematical properties of bodies, they cannot be abstracted 
and treated as separable in thought [§ 11]. 

a27. διὰ ταῦτα ἤδη, 1.6. because the emotions are “implicit in matter,” 
because they imply bodily movement, or at least modification (ἀλλοίωσες) of a 
faculty of an animal. No sooner is this recognised than an inference can at once 
(ἤδη) be drawn. On this idiomatic use of ἤδη see Cope on Rhetoric I. 1, 1354 7. 

a 28. φυσικοῦ. Cf. AZefaph. 1026a 5 διότι καὶ mepi ψυχῆς ἐνίας θεωρῆσαι τοῦ 
φυσικοῦ, ὅση μὴ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἐστίν, De Part. An. 1. 1. 641a 14~—-32 and the 
remarkably clear discussion 641a 32--- τὸ of the ἀπορία πότερον περὶ πάσης 
Ψυχῆς τῆς φυσικῆς ἐστὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν ἢ περί τινος, terminating in the conclusion 
641 Ὁ 8 δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὐ περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς λεκτέον οὐδὲ γὰρ πᾶσα Ψυχὴ φύσις, 
ἄλλά τι μόριον αὐτῆς ἐν ἢ καὶ πλείω. Cf. De Sensu 1. 4368 17---Ὁ 6, De Juvent. 
27 (De Resp. 21), 480 Ὁ 23 sqq., Phys. VIII. 3, 2538 32—b 9. 

a 28. ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης, int. ἧς τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἶσιν, i.e. soul as the form 
of an animate body, leaving undecided for the present the question as to 
whether there is any faculty of soul independent of body. But the treatment 
of νοῦς in 111.,) cc. 4—8 belongs rather to First Philosophy than to physics, 
if we accept the conclusion of De Part. An. 641 b 8 just cited. 


11 403 a 26—b 2 201 


a 29. φυσικός. To be understood in a narrower and less accurate sense 
than in the preceding line, a 28; the “physicist” popularly so called con- 
cerning himself with the matter only to the neglect of the form. Against this 
limitation of the sphere of φυσικὴ A. protests forcibly (e.g. Phys. 11., De Part. 
An. 1.): compare the question below (Ὁ 7) τίς οὖν 6 φυσικὸς τούτων, and the 
answer (Ὁ 8) ἢ μᾶλλον 6 ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. διαλεκτικὸς. See note on 4038 2 
διαλεκτικῶς supra. As here διαλεκτικός is opposed to φυσικός, so elsewhere 
λογικῶς is opposed to φυσικῶς [see Zeller, Aristotle &c., Eng. Tr. I. 174 7. 21]. 
The definition of the physicist will be scientific; that cited above from the 
kthetoréc is dialectical, for rhetoric and practical philosophy generally, owing 
to the nature of their subject-matter (viz. what is contingent and only generally, 
not universally true), are content with something less than the accuracy (ἀκρίβεια) 
of theoretical science. Maier, l.c. 11. b, p. 61, remarks that, by this contrast, we 
are reminded of Plato’s δεαλεκτικός, who 15 the true philosopher. 

a 31 Céow...32 θερμοῦ. This piece of old-world lore survives in the phrase 
“‘to make one’s blood boil.” Cf De Part. An. 11. 4. 650b 35 θερμότητος γὰρ 
ποιητικὸν ὁ θυμός, Ta δὲ στερεὰ θερμανθέντα μᾶλλον θερμαίνει τῶν ὑγρῶν" ai δ᾽ 
ives [fibrine] στερεὸν καὶ γεῶδες, ὥστε γίνονται οἷον πυρίαι ἐν τῷ αἵματι καὶ ζέσιν 
ποιοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς θυμοῖς. In other words, what is meant is a corporeal expansion 
due to the ξέσις of the blood implied by the idea of “bursting with rage,” which 
finds its external sign in the swelling of the veins. Cf. a 22 ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα, 7102. 
Fear, on the contrary, chills the blood, l.c. 650b 27 sq., ΖΦ. 111. 4, 667 a 13—19, 
IV. 5, 679 a 25. Both ζέσις and κατάψυξις, being ἀλλοιώσεις Or qualitative 
changes, fall under the κίνησις of 403 a 26. 

403 b 2. τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον. The καὶ is explicative, as is obvious 
from the next clause. Cf. PAys. IV. 1, 209 a 21 εἶδος καὶ λόγος τῶν πραγμάτων, 
Metaph. 1044b 12 τὸ & ὡς εἶδος (sc. αἴτιον) ὃ λόγος, ἀλλ᾽ ἄδηλος, ἐὰν μὴ μετὰ τῆς 
αἰτίας ἦ 6 λόγος, 996 Ὁ 8 τὸ δ᾽ εἶδος ὁ λόγος, Phys. 1. 7. 190a 16 τὰ γὰρ εἴδει λέγω 
καὶ λόγῳ [5ς. ἐν] ταὐτόν. The analysis of the concrete particular is sometimes 
mto matter, ὕλη, and form, εἶδος καὶ μορφή, sometimes into matter, ὕλη, and 
notion, λόγος καὶ μορφή: compare 412 a 8 with MefraphA. 1042 a 28 sq., also 
1058 Ὁ 10 6 δὲ Καλλίας ἐστὶν 6 λόγος μετὰ τῆς ὕλης. 

Ὁ 2. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος εἶδος τοῦ πράγματος. The text is uncertain. So far from 
agreeing with Trend. “ εἶδος... εἰ facilius est et rei aptius,” I suspect the word 
(1) because of its inadequate authority, two inferior MSS. U and X, (2) because, 
even if εἶδος had the strongest evidence, the sentence would still be a truism, 
which there seems no sufficient reason for repeating when it has just been 
assumed in the preceding sentence. The great majority of our MSS. read ὅδε 
or ὁ δέ, and this is confirmed by Simpl. and Philop. Obviously the uncial OAE 
is the common source, and this might be read ὅδε, as W. and possibly Them., 
or diviszw 6 δέ, as Simpl. Plutarchus Atheniensis apud Simpl. and Philop. took 
it to be. Simpl. 21, 35 οὐκ ὡς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐξηγεῖται WAovrapyos, ἀντιδιαιρῶν τὸν 
λόγον πρὸς τὸν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὼν τὴν ὄρεξιν τῆς ἀντιλυπήσεως εἶδος erat 
καὶ λόγον, τὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦ πράγματος εἶναί φησι, τουτέστι τὸ εἶδος, καθ᾽ ὃ εἰδοποιεῖται 
ἡ ὀργή. ἐπεὶ δὲ σύνθετος ἡ ὀργή, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ὁρᾶν, εἰ 
ἔσται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐκ ἄνευ ὕλης. It appears to me that Simpl. represents 
our sentence by the words τὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦ πράγματος εἶναί φησι. If we turn 
this back from oblique to direct we get the text of Simpl, viz. 6 δὲ λόγος τοῦ 
πράγματος. That Simpl. did not read εἶδος is clear from his introduction of 
the word after τουτέστι. It would seem, then, that Plutarch, like Philoponus, 
explained “The one definition is the form, the other belongs to the thing,” 
1.6, not to the form, for Plutarch made the two clauses stand opposed. Simpl, 


202 NOTES 1.1 


having precisely the same reading, explained rather differently, “The one 
definition is the form and the form belongs to the thing,” i.e. implies the 
σύνολον of which it is the form. Philop. 59, 15 ὑποστικτέον εἴς τε τὸν yap 
σύνδεσμον καὶ εἰς τὸν δέ, ἵνα ἢ obras: ὁ μὲν yap τῶν ὁρισμῶν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ 
αἰτία ἤτοι τὸ εἶδος τοῦ θύμου, ὃ δ᾽ ἕτερος τοῦ πιράγματός ἐστιν δρισμός, τουτέστι τῆς 
οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ὕλης. That is, Philop. would punctuate 6 μὲν γάρ, λόγος ὁ δέ, 
τοῦ πράγματος. He did not read εἶδος. The evidence of Them., it is true, is 
indecisive: (7, 32 H, 13, 18 Sp.) ὁ μὲν yap λόγος τῆς ὀργῆς ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως. 
ἀνάγκη δὲ ἐγγίνεσθαι τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ rorade* ὥσπερ οἰκίας ὁ μὲν τὸ εἶδος καὶ 
rov εἴδους τὸν λόγον ἀποδίδωσιν, κτέ. Them. means “for the notion of anger is a 
desire of retaliation, but this form must be manifested in matter of a certain 
kind.” This does not prove that he had εἶδος in the first clause, and in the 
second he may have simply substituted τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος for A.’s τοῦτον [sc. τὸν 
λόγον]. as he was quite justified in doing, for A. has in the preceding sentence 
(Ὁ 2) τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον. Whence did Them. get ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως in his first 
clause? Possibly from εἶδος (cf. b 2), but more probably from ὅδε. No weight 
can be attached to Sophonias 8, 35 εἶ yap ἀνάγκη τὸν λόγον τόνδε τοῦ πράγματος 
ἐν ὕλῃ τοιᾷδε εἶναι, for his τόνδε may replace (Ὁ 3) τοῦτον. There is no proof 
that he read εἶδος. If ὅδε is right, A. means “for this (viz. desire of retalia- 
tion) is the notion of the thing,” 1.6. of anger, ὅδε being attracted to the 
gender of Adyos. This gives a satisfactory sense and avoids tautology. 
If we accept εἶδος, the lectio facilior, the question arises, why should A. 
reiterate the identity of λόγος and εἶδος which he had assumed already (403 a 25 
λόγοι ἕνυλοι, b 2 τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸν Adyov)? A. may have done so, being on occasion 
as pleonastic as he is elsewhere elliptical, but, if so, the text of all the Greek 
commentators was faulty in this place. Did A. write simply 6 μὲν γὰρ λόγος rod 
πράγματος (6 μὲν subject, λόγος predicate, the masculine pronoun again by 
attraction), and are ὅδε and εἶδος two divergent supplements to fill a non-existent 


gapr 
b3. τοιᾳδί, of a definite sort (not τῇ τυχούσῃ), i.e. the appropriate matter, 
cf. 412 Ὁ 11, 414 a 26 ἐν...τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὕλῃ. εἰ ἔσται, if it is to exist at all. 


A. uses ἔσται, not γενήσεται, the form being eternal: AZetaph. 1044 Ὁ 21 ἐπεὶ 
δ᾽ ἔνια ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, olov...cat ὅλως τὰ εἴδη καὶ αἱ 
μορφαί, cf. το30}» 26. But A. is not always consistent and freely uses ἐγγίγνεσθαι, 
ἐπιγίγνεσθαι or simply γίγνεσθαι (e.g. Metaph. 1035a 5) of his immanent form. 
οἰκίας. House, like anger, admits of three definitions. The first, σκέπασμα κωλυ- 
τικὸν φθορᾶς xré., is the definition κατὰ τὸν λόγον μόνον, corresponding to ἀγγεῖον 
σκεπαστικὸν κτὲέ, Of AZezaph. 1043a 16. It answers to ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως in the 
case of anger. The second, mentioning only the materials (stones, bricks and 
timber), answers to the ζέσις τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος of 403 a 31; while the 
third, only indicated in outline, is the one which A. accepts and to which he 
refers in Ὁ ὃ ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν [sc. ὁριζόμενος]. cf. Metaph. 1043a 14—19. The four 
causes of a house are specified Mefaph. 996b 6—8. For οἰκοδομική as (@) the 
form, cf. 1070 Ὁ 33; as (δ) the efficient cause (τὸ κινοῦν) 1070b 29, Phys. Il. 4, 
196b 26. 

Ὁ 6. ἕτερος δ᾽, int. φήσει. 

Ῥ 6. ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος ἕνεκα, τωνδί, will give as definition the form residing 
in these, viz. in the materials aforesaid. The third definition takes account not 
only of the matter, ἐν τούτοις, but of the form as well. It goes on to mention 
the “final cause” ἕνεκα τωνδί “with a view to this or that end,” 1.6. protection 
from the weather, Them. 7, 36 H., 13, 24 Sp. ἕτερος δ᾽ ἄμφω συλλαβών, ὅτι 
σκέπασμα τοιονδὶ ἐξ ὕλης τοιᾶσδε, Simpl. 22, 7 ἐν ξύλοις δηλαδὴ καὶ λίθοις 


1.1 403 Ὁ 2--- 8 203 


καὶ πλίνθοις τὸ εἶδος, τουτέστι τὸ σκέπασμα, προσθεὶς καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τοῖς 
τεχνητοῖς διώρισται τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους. Biehl’s omission of the comma after 
εἶδος is confirmed by this remark of Simplicius. The construction ἐν τούτοις 
τὸ εἶδος in A.’s Greek hardly presents any difficulty. It differs from e.g. 429 Ὁ 14 
τόδε ἐν τῷδε Only in being object to φήσει instead of subject to (unexpressed) 
ἐστί. Ἔν τῷδε there must be an attribute as well as ἐν τούτοις here. Compare 
the prepositional phrases with περὶ cited in moze on 402 a 8 περὶ αὐτὴν. 

b7. ὁ φυσικὸς. Which of these three definitions is truly scientific as be- 
longing to φυσικὴ and therefore to be employed by the physicist ἢ τούτων denotes 
those who define, asin br (like ὁ pev,..6 d€...€repos). The man who studies the 
concrete realities of the natural universe, natural bodies, sensible substances, 
things concrete of form and matter, is ὁ φυσικός. His γένος comprises τὰ ἔχοντα ἐν 
ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως. In his treatment of them he will ignore neither the formal 
nor the material cause. The point is frequently urged by A., e.g. PAys. τι. 2, 
I94a I12—27, 194b 9 sqq., Il. 7, 198 a 22 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ai αἰτίαι τέτταρες, wept πτασῶν τοῦ 
φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι, καὶ εἰς πάσας ἀνάγων τὸ διὰ τί ἀποδώσει φυσικῶς, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ 
εἶδος, τὸ κινῆσαν, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς Ev πολλάκις" τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι 
καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἕν ἐστι, τὸ δ᾽ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις πρῶτον τῷ εἴδει ταὐτὸ τούτοις. This last 
remark explains why here in De A. and in PAys. τι. 2, 1.ς., A. confines himself 
to insisting upon attention to the form as well as the matter. Mefagh. 1037 a 14 
ἐπεὶ τρόπον τινὰ τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ δευτέρας φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἡ περὶ ras αἰσθητὰς 
οὐσίας θεωρία: οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τῆς ὕλης δεῖ γνωρίζειν τὸν φυσικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς 
κατὰ τὸν λόγον, καὶ μᾶλλον, Or again, he may adopt a threefold division, 
Phys. τι. 7,198 a 31 ὥστε τὸ διὰ τί καὶ εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἀνάγοντι ἀποδίδοται, καὶ εἰς 
τὸ τί ἐστι, καὶ εἰς τὸ πρῶτον κινῆσαν. περὶ γενέσεως γὰρ μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν 
τρόπον τὰς αἰτίας σκοποῦσι, τί μετὰ τί γίνεται, καὶ τί πρῶτον ἐποίησεν ἢ τί ἔπαθε, 
καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς. In Phys. Il. 9, 200 ἃ 30—b 4 A. returns to the twofold 
division of end and necessary condition, the former taking the place of form, 
the latter being identical with matter. This is also his standpoint in De Par. 
An. 1. I. 

b 8. ἢ μᾶλλον. Here as often ἢ introduces the writer’s answer to his own 
question, i.e. the solution of the problem which he tentatively proposes. This 
solution, however, frequently expresses the full strength of his conviction, so 
that the apparent modesty of the suggestion becomes a mere trick of style, 
like ἴσως which, e.g. 402 a 23, under the veil of “perhaps” implies “ beyond all 
doubt.” Similarly ἢ thus used ceases to be interrogative (“or shall we rather 
say?”) and tends to become frankly affirmative. Jad. Ar. 312 Ὁ 57 quoniam 
ἢ solennis est particula in altero membro interrogationum disiunctivarum idque 
alterum membrum plerumque ad affirmationem vergit, inde factum esse videtur, 
ut saepissime, ubi # usurpatur non antecedente priore interrogationis membro 
a πότερον exordiendo, interrogationis natura fere delitescat eaque enunciatio 
respondentis potius et modeste affirmantis, quam quaerentis esse videatur. 
itaque exposita aliqua ἀπορίᾳ eius λύσις per particulam # induci solet. This 
usage is stereotyped in the treatise entitled from its contents Problems, where 
διὰ τί introducing the problem is regularly followed by ἢ ὅτε introducing the 
solution. Cf. also Pol. 1338b 1 where, as Mr Newman says, instead of ἢ μᾶλλον 
modeste affirmantis we expect ἀλλὰ or ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον (but ἀλλά has preceded). 

b 8. ὁ ἐξ dphotv=6 ἄμφω ταῦτα τῷ ὅρῳ συντιθείς. Cf. Phys. τ. 3, 186 Ὁ 34 
καὶ καθ᾽ οὗ ἄμφω, καὶ ἑκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων λεγέσθω, Metaph. 1043 a 18 οἱ δ᾽ 
ἄμφω ταῦτα συντιθέντες τὴν τρίτην καὶ τὴν ἐκ τούτων οὐσίαν [sc. λέγουσιν. One 
might be tempted to think that the subject to be supplied was ὅρος, which 
is grammatically impossible if we consider Ὁ 7 τούτων (cf. Ὁ 1), Ὁ 8 ἀγνοῶν, to 


204 NOTES I. I 


say nothing of Ὁ 7, 8,9 ὁ περὶ xré. compared with b 13 τεχνίτης, 15 ὁ μαθηματικός, 
16 6 πρῶτος φιλόσοφος. It is, however, the definitions and not their authors 
that are really under comparison, and Simplicius is therefore justified in ex- 
plaining the meaning thus, 22, 9 διακρίνας δὴ τοὺς ὅρους ζητεῖ λοιπόν, τίς ἐκ 
τούτων ὁ φυσικός, καὶ ἐγκρίνει εἶναι τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. For the carelessness of 
expression cf. Cic. De Feu. τι. § 44 Cum Epicuro autem hoc plus est negotii, 
quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, 1.6, Epicurus defines the 
summum bonum so as to include under it two kinds of pleasure ; what Cicero 
says is, “Epicurus is a compound of two kinds of pleasure.” It is just possible 
that if A. had taken the trouble to complete the sentence it would have run 
ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τὴν οἰκίαν ὡς συνεστῶσαν ὄδριζόμενος : but with his love of brevity 
and ad sensu7m construction ὧν is the more natural supplement. 

Ὁ 9. ἐκείνων δὲ, the other two, the proposers of the imperfect definitions 
which give (1) the form without the matter, (2) the matter without the form. 
Is there a branch of science or of enquiry to which one or other of these 
imperfect definitions is appropriate? In other words, what science, if any, treats 
of either (1) the form of concrete things, neglecting the matter, or (2) the 
matter, neglecting the form? There seems no direct answer, unless we suppose 
that, question (1) being dropped, (2) is answered in the clause Ὁ 9 ἢ οὐκ ἔστι... 
ἦ χωριστά, a view which Philop. favours, 60, 28-—31. We have instead, Ὁ 1o—r16, 
four branches of enquiry distinguished. The first three, viz. physics, the pro- 
ductive arts and sciences, mathematics, when they define, certainly include both 
λόγος and ὕλη in the definition. But notallin the same way, and the difference in 
the mode is referred to the different degrees in which “the things are separable 
from the matter,” cf. 429 b 21 sq. With 403 Ὁ 7—16 it is instructive to compare 
429 Ὁ 10O—22, 431 Ὁ 12—19. ἢ οὐκ ἔστι, See on b ὃ ἢ μᾶλλον. 

bio. τὰ πάθη...ἦὗ χωριστά, the inseparable properties of matter which are 
not even regarded for purposes of study as separable: secondary matter 15 
meant, ἐσχάτη ὕλη, iam formata materia, like the stones, bricks and mortar of 
b 5: ὕλη is used in the same sense throughout the discussion of γένεσις in 
Metaph. Z., cc. 7—9. Legebatur τὸ τὰ μὴ χωριστά, μηδ᾽ Ff χωριστά, et recte 
Trend. observavit requiri potius τὰ μὴ χωριστά, 7 τε μὴ χωριστά. At non hoc 
voluit Aristoteles. Delet4 virgula et grammatica ratio constat et philosophica. 
Dicit enim hoc: οὐκ ἔστι τις ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ὕλης ἀχωριστὰ ὄντα μηδ᾽ ἢ χωριστὰ 
τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ποιούμενος, ‘ne ita quidem quatenus separabiles sunt,’ hoc est 
quatenus generales sunt: genus enim a rebus singulis χωρίζεται vel quod nos 
dicimus abstrahitur (Torst.). (Bonitz however, Jad. Ar. 539 a 38, classes 
this with other passages where οὐ or μὴ prefixed to a whole sentence 
negatives one particular word in it: he explains μηδ᾽ ἡ χωριστὰ by καὶ ἧ μὴ 
χωριστά.) Some generalisation there must be in any science, and Ὁ 11 τοιουδὶ, 
τοιαύτης imply as much. Cf. AZetaph. 1033 Ὁ 22 ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε σημαίνει, τόδε δὲ 
καὶ ὡρισμένον οὐκ ἔστιν, 981 a 10 τοιοῖσδε Kar εἶδος ἐν ἀφορισθεῖσι, 1060 b 20 τῶν 
καθόλου καὶ τοῦ τοιουδὲ dist. τόδε τι καὶ χωριστόν. The force of the limiting ἦ with 
a negative prefixed can be easily understood from the following parallels, all - 
from Méetaph. M. 3: 1078 a 14 οὐδετέρα yap ἡ ὄψις ἢ ἦἧ φωνὴ θεωρεῖ, a 26 οὔθ᾽ ἣ 
ἄνθρωπος οὔθ᾽ ἧ ἀδιαίρετος, ἀλλ᾽ F στερεόν, a 2 εἰ συμβέβηκεν αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ὃν ἐστί 
[int. ἡ γεωμετρία), μή ἐστι δ᾽ ἣ αἰσθητά, “if the attribute of being perceptible by 
sense belongs to the objects with which geometry deals, but geometry does 
not deal with them gud perceptible by sense,” 1077 Ὁ 22 μὴ ἢ δὲ αἰσθητά, ἀλλ᾽ 
7 τοιαδί, b 28 οὐχ ἧ κινούμενα, ἀλλ᾽ ἧ σώματα μόνον, Ὁ 19 οὐχ F δὲ τοιαῦτα. Cf. also 
1036a 11 νοητὴ δὲ [ὕλη] ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ἧ αἰσθητά. 

biIo. ἀλλ᾽ ὁ φυσικὸς. The relation of the clause beginning thus to the 


I. 1 403 Ὁ 8—b τὶ 205 


preceding is, I think, misunderstood by Them. (8, 4—6 H., 14, 4-—6 Sp.), Simpl. 
(22, 27-29), Trend. (p. 174), who interpret as if A.’s meaning were “no one, 
except the physicist, treats of the inseparable properties belonging to natural 
bodies and to sensible matter and treats them as inseparable: quae a materia 
separari non possunt (τὰ μὴ χωριστά, MJetaph. 1026a 19, 25 sqq.) ea sunt ipsa 
ila, quae physicus, qui qualis sit qualis corporis natura inquirit, exploranda 
sumit (Trend.). But Torstrik has shown a better way of taking the words τὰ μὴ 
χωριστὰ μηδ᾽ ἣ χωριστά: see last note. According to him,-the physicist is 
excluded from this clause because, though dealing with τὰ μὴ χωριστά, he treats 
of them 7 χωριστὰ when he generalises about them. 

b II. τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης. Of a body of the given 
kind and of the matter implied therein. Physics treats of bodies regarded as 
in motion or capable of motion: in order that they may be in this sense φυσικὰ 
σώματα they must have a certain kind of matter, viz. the matter conditioned by 
this requirement. Cf. AZetaph. 1077 Ὁ 22—24, 30—32; P&ys. Il. 2, 193 Ὁ 35— 
194 a 15, 194 Ὁ 7—9, 9—13. It is owing to the contingent character of their 
matter that, strictly speaking, neither definition nor demonstration is applicable 
to particular physical substances: Mefaph. 1039 Ὁ 27—31, 1036a 2—9. The 
terms φυσικὸν σῶμα, φυσικὴ ὕλη (412 a 12, 403 Ὁ 17) convey no information, 
when the province of physics 1s what we are defining. All natural bodies can 
be described by such attributes as κινητόν, αἰσθητόν, ὑλικόν (cf. Bonitz ad 
Metaph. 1026 a 3). If any single adjective could replace τοιαύτης it would be 
κινητῆς. Cf. Afefaph. 1069 a 36 sq., 1036 a Io, 1026 a 12, 1026 ἃ 2 54ᾳ. It must 
be wider than γεννητῆς καὶ φθαρτῆς, ALetaph. 1042 Ὁ αὶ sq., cf. 1069 b 25 sq. 
All natural bodies are self-moved or have in them an inherent principle of 
motion and rest (De 4. 412 Ὁ τό sq., Mefaph. 1025 Ὁ 20 sq.); this serves to dis- 
tinguish them from the products of art. From the objects of mathematics, again, 
they can be distinguished, in that, whereas the latter, e.g. the circle or the line, 
can be defined apart from the particular matter in which they are found, natural 
bodies are concrete of form and matter and incapable of definition apart from 
the particular matter belonging to them. A.’s favourite phrase for such a con- 
crete thing is τόδε ἐν τῷδε, the particular form residing in particular matter, 
cf. 429 b 13 ἡ yap σὰρξ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, GAN ὥσπερ τὸ σιμόν, τόδε ἐν τῷδε. 
The matter as well as the form of flesh is relatively determinate. τὸ σιμόν 
is not rd κοῖλον wherever found, but only ἐν pwi. The subject-matter of physics 
is less capable of independent existence than the subject-matter of mathe- 
matics, PAys. 11. 2, 193 Ὁ 36 sq. ra γὰρ φυσικὰ χωρίζουσιν ἧττον ὄντα χωριστὰ τῶν 
μαθηματικῶν, as may be seen-if we attempt to define either the subject-matter 
or its attributes in physics and in mathematics respectively. For the several 
mathematical objects will be defined as incapable of motion (1.6. change, ἔσται 
ἄνευ κινήσεως [1.6. ἀκίνητα), but not so the objects of physics, 194 ἃ 5 σὰρξ δὲ 
καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ pis σιμὴ GAN οὐχ ὡς τὸ καμ- 
πύλον λέγεται. They are concrete things, like flesh and bone and man, and 
imply a particular matter as σιμότης implies pis. This is very clearly explained 
Metaph. 1025 Ὁ 28—1026a 7: I will merely cite Ὁ 34 εἰ δὴ πάντα τὰ φυσικὰ 
ὁμοίως τῷ σιμῷ λέγονται, οἷον pis, ὀφθαλμός, πρόσωπον, σάρξ, ὀστοῦν, ὅλως ζῷον, 
φύλλον, ῥίζα, φλοιός, ὅλως φυτόν, where the sentence beginning εἰ δή expresses 
the writer’s own conviction. The fullest explanation of concrete things as ra 
οὐχ ἅπλᾶ ἀλλὰ συνδεδυασμένα is to be found Mefapfh. 1030 Ὁ 14—-1031 a 14, 
1032 a 20 ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἔχει ὕλην" δυνατὸν yap καὶ 
εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ἑκάστῳ ὕλη. καθόλον δὲ καὶ 


¢ z 4 * 
ἐξ ot φύσις καὶ καθ᾽ ὃ φύσις" τὸ γὰρ γιγνόμενον ἔχει φύσιν, otov φυτὸν ἢ 


206 NOTES I. I 


ζῷον" καὶ bp οὗ, ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος λεγομένη φύσις ἡ ὁμοειδήῆς: αὕτη δ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῳ: 
ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν γίγνεται τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τὴν 
φύσιν, το34 ἃ 5 τὸ δ᾽ ἅπαν ἤδη τὸ τοιόνδε εἶδος ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς σαρξὶ καὶ ὀστοῖς 
Καλλίας καὶ Σωκράτης" καὶ ἕτερον μὲν διὰ τὴν ὕλην, ἑτέρα γάρ, ταὐτὸ δὲ τῷ εἴδει" 
ἄτομον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος. Cf. 1036 Ὁ 3 οἷον τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος αἰεὶ ἐν σαρξὶ 
φαίνεται καὶ ὀστοῖς καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέρεσιν - ἄρ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἐστὶ ταῦτα μέρη τοῦ εἴδους 
καὶ τοῦ λόγου; # οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλη, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων ἐπιγίγνεσθαι ἀδυνα- 
τοῦμεν χωρίσαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο δοκεῖ μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι, ἄδηλον δὲ πότε, ἀποροῦσί 
τινες ἤδη καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου καὶ τοῦ τριγώνου, ὡς οὐ προσῆκον γραμμαῖς ὁρίζεσθαι 
καὶ τῷ συνεχεῖ, ἀλλὰ πάντα ταῦτα ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ὡσανεὶ σάρκες ἢ ὀστᾷ τοῦ 
ἀνθρώπου καὶ χαλκὸς καὶ λίθος τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, 1035 al εἶ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ 
δ᾽ εἶδος τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων, καὶ οὐσία ἥ τε ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι μὲν 
ὡς καὶ ἡ ὕλη μέρος τινὸς λέγεται, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ὁ τοῦ εἴδους λόγος. οἷον 
τῆς μὲν κοιλότητος οὐκ ἔστι μέρος ἡ σάρξ (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἐφ᾽ ἧς γίγνεται), τῆς δὲ 
σιμότητος μέρος (SC. ἡ σάρξ), 20. 25—28 ὅσα μὲν οὖν συνειλημμένα τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ 
ὕλη ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ σιμὸν ἢ ὁ χαλκοῦς κύκλος, ταῦτα μὲν φθείρεται εἰς ταῦτα καὶ μέρος 
αὐτῶν ἡ ὕλη. 1036 Ὁ 22 διὸ καὶ τὸ πάντ᾽ ἀνάγειν οὕτω καὶ ἀφαιρεῖν τὴν ὕλην περίερ- 
γον" ἔνια γὰρ ἴσως τόδ᾽ ἐν τῷδ᾽ ἐστίν, ἢ ὡδὶ ταδὶ ἔχοντα, 20. 28 αἰσθητὸν γάρ τι τὸ 
ζῷον, καὶ ἄνευ κινήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι, διὸ οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ τῶν μερῶν ἐχόντων πως. 

Ὁ 12. ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἢ τοιαῦτα, i.e. ὅσα δὲ μὴ θεωρεῖται ἣ τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος καὶ 
τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης ἔργα καὶ πάθη. Legebatur [apud Bekkerum et Trend.] ὁπόσα 
δὲ μὴ ἢ τοιαῦτα : scripsimus ὅσα δὲ μὴ 7 τοιαῦτα, et ὅσα quidem ex codice E, 7 
vero ex Simplicio: (22, 30), μὴ ἧ τοιαῦτα, τουτέστι μὴ ὃ χωριστά: quae inter- 
pretatio, etsi falsa est, de eo quod legerit Simplicius dubitationem non relinquit. 
Ceterum e scriptura unciali HI modo 7 modo ἢ factum est (Torst.). The text of 
Simpl., as given by Hayduck, is (22, 30): ὁπόσα δὲ μὴ ἣ τοιαῦτα, ἄλλος] τουτέστι 
μὴ ἧ ἀχώριστα, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς χωριστά, ἄλλος, but this does not affect Torst.’s argument. 

b 13. περὶ τινῶν μὲν. Philoponus 64, 2 sq. and Sophonias 9, 3 explain τινῶν 
as particulars and Torstrik inclined to the same view, though he was aware 
that, to make this meaning clear, the article τῶν before τενῶν is required. 
There seems no reason why παθῶν should not be understood. It is quite true 
that the physician is concerned with the individual patient (AeZaph. 981 a 15—~ 
24), but it is also true that health and disease are accidents, not essential 
properties, of a natural body, and the physician studies them solely in order 
that he may substitute health for disease. Hence in his case τινῶν Ξε δι ἢ as can 
be produced by νοῦς, τέχνη or δύναμις and not, unless it be ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, by 
matter left to itself (Zetaph. 1032 Ὁ 21—26). Similarly with the carpenter, but 
the properties which he seeks to impart to his materials are even more plainly 
adventitious and artificial, such as could not have been even spontaneously 
produced. Cf. AZetaph. Z., c. 9 throughout, also c. 7, especially 1032 a 32—b 26, 
Them. 8, 11—17 H., 14, 13—-22 Sp. The close connexion between the practical 
science of medicine and theoretical physics is emphasised De Sensu 1. 4368 
27—b 1. τεχνίτης apparently represents any of the constructive arts and 
sciences in which human intelligence, imitating nature, works for an end. See 
note on 406 ἃ 14. 

Ὁ 14. τῶν δὲ μὴ χωριστῶν μέν, sc. παθῶν : the genitive being, like Ὁ13 τινῶν, 
governed by περὶ: or possibly, the preposition being forgotten, the genitive is 
simply one of relation. That none of the objects of mathematics have inde- 
pendent existence is fully established MJefaph. M., cc. 2, 3. Ch 431 b 15 ra 
μαθηματικὰ ov κεχωρισμένα ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ. ἡ δὲ μὴ τοιούτον σώματος, 
but not considered as properties of the concrete body to which they belong. 
Before the mathematician can treat of them he must by abstraction separate 


LI 403 Ὁ 11—b τό 207 


them from their concrete surroundings. It matters not whether the sphere be 
made of brass or of some other material, nor what its size or its position, AZefaph., 
1036 a 31—b 3. Hence the objects of mathematics, e.g. the geometer’s circles 
and spheres, are not sensible but intelligible objects: that is, though they have 
matter, it is intelligible and not sensible matter, MZefadh. 1036.a 2—12, 1036b 32 
—1037a 5: νοητὴ vAn=7 ἐν rots αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ἣ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ μαθημα- 
τικά (1036a 11); quae, licet sit in rebus sensibilibus, tamen non eatenus in iis est, 
quatenus sunt sensibiles (Bonitz ad /oc.), e.g. quantity and extension, ποσὸν and 
συνεχές. Thus the geometer’s circle and sphere cease to be objects of physics, 
whereas the circle or sphere in brass is a natural body which both physicist 
and artist study, but under different aspects: and, as with every other such 
body, its notion or definition must take into account its particular matter, 
Metaph. 1033 a 4 6 δὴ χαλκοῦς κύκλος ἔχει ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὴν ὕλην. Contrast the 
definition of the sphere given by the geometer 1033 b 14 τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου σχῆμα 
ἴσον, which ignores sensible matter. 

b 15. ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως. Sad. Ar. 126b τό ἀφαίρεσις ‘abstractio logica.’? τὰ 
ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα, eae notionis culusque partes, quae cogitatione separari 
possunt (Waitz). Ita praecipue res mathematicae significantur. De Caed. Ill. 1, 
299 a 15 τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λέγεσθαι τὰ μαθηματικά, τὰ δὲ φυσικὰ ἐκ προσ- 
θέσεως, Metaph. 1061 a 28—b 3. See Bonitz δᾶ Mefaph. 982 a 27. Cf. De A. 
429 Ὁ 18 sq., 431 Ὁ 12 sqq., 4328 5 sq., where ra ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντα (λεγόμενα) are 
the objects of mathematics. The opposite of ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως 15 ἐκ προσθέσεως, 
Metabh. 1077 Ὁ 10 ἐκ προσθέσεως yap τῷ λευκῷ ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος λέγεται, for 
by determination, through white, arises the concept of “white man.” See 
Bonitz a@ loc. (p. 533): per τὸ λευκόν, quod additur ad hominem, exsistit homo 
albus. By ἐξ, “ἴθ consequence of,” is expressed the process by which the 
abstract notion is attained: we take away or leave out of account certain marks 
or attributes and fix attention upon those which remain, e.g. the geometer dis- 
regards all sensible properties, weight, hardness, heat, etc. and regards the 
things with which he is dealing solely as quantities and as continuous (1061 a 32 
μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές) and investigates solely the properties 
that belong to them as such (καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ τούτων 7 wood ἔστι καὶ συνεχῆ; 
καὶ οὐ καθ᾽ ἕτερόν τι θεωρεῖ). 

bI5. ἢἣ δὲ κεχωρισμένα, so far as they have a separate existence παρὰ 
τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας. Cf 431 Ὁ 18 τῶν κεχωρισμένων τι, 
Metaph. τοζό ἃ τό ἡ δὲ wpary [φιλοσοφία] καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. Cf. 
1026 a 27—-30 εἶ μὲν οὖν μή ἐστί τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας ἡ 
φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη. εἰ δ᾽ ἐστί τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ 
φιλοσοφία πρώτη. In Metaph. οο6 αι τῇ κεχωρισμέναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν and ἐνυπάρ- 
χουσαι ἐν τούτοις are alternative and mutually exclusive determinations of οὐσίαι 
as applied to mathematicals. J7Zefaph. 103947 ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει. Hence 
that of which First Philosophy treats is ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄν or rather ἐντελέχεια (cf. 
Metaph. 1074a 33 ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἀριθμῷ πολλά, ὕλην ἔχει. εἷς yap λόγος καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς 
πολλῶν...τὸ δὲ τί ἣν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον - ἐντελέχεια γάρ), whereas of 
sensible substance we are told 1040b καὶ τῶν δοκουσῶν εἶναι οὐσιῶν ai πλεῖσται 
δυνάμεις eioi, τά τε μόρια τῶν ξῴων (οὐδὲν yap κεχωρισμένον αὐτῶν ἐστίν - ὅταν δὲ 
χωρισθῇ, καὶ τότε ὄντα ὡς ὕλῃ πάντα, καὶ γῇ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀὴρ kré.). In ΙΟ41 ἃ 8 
First Philosophy is said to be περὶ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας ἥτις ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν, 1.6. 7 ἀκίνητος οὐσία of A., cc. 6---το, cf. 1069 a 33, 1073 ἃ 22—b 3, 
also 1041 a 9—II, 27---21. . 

b16. ἐπανιτέον. Cf Eth. Nic. 1100 a 31 ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπο- 
ρηθέν. Similarly Metaph. 993 a 26 ἐπανέλθωμεν πάλιν, 1038b 1, £27k. Nic. 10974 15. 


208 NOTES ir 


Ὁ 16. ὅθεν ὁ λόγος, sc. μετέβη probably. The words recur JJetaph. 
wooo b 9. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1097 a 24 μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος eis ταὐτὸν ἀφῖκται, 
1144 b 25 54., Pol. 1335 a 4 ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεῦρο μετέβημεν, 1284 Ὁ 35. 
Similarly Plato saepe, e.g. Crat. 438 A ἐπανέλθωμεν δὴ πάλιν ὅθεν δεῦρο μετέ- 
βημεν. The point from which the digression started would seem to be 403 b9Q, 
but it may be the first introduction of ὁ φυσικός 403 a 27. At all events A, 
re-states somewhat more explicitly his proposition 403 a 25 ra πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί 
εἰσιν. 

Ὁ 17 τὰ πάθη...18 ζῴων. The verb to be supplied is probably ὑπάρχει, πάθος 
εἶναι (τῆς ψυχῆς) being equivalent to (τῇ ψυχῇ) ὑπάρχειν. The precise meaning 
of ἀχώριστα is defined by the clause Ὁ 19 καὶ οὐχ. . ἐπίπεδον, “ inseparable and 
yet not in the same way as line and surface are inseparable”: that is, while the 
affections of the soul are inseparable {belong to it as mseparable] from the 
animal body, at the same time they do not belong to it as mathematical objects, 
line and surface, belong to their ὑποκείμενα (viz. the sensible things from which, 
though inseparable in fact, they are abstracted in thought). This qualification 
is necessary, because above (403 a 12—17) the affections of the soul were, for 
a special purpose, compared with the straight line as being inseparable from 
body. The fuller discussion which follows and the digression (403 a 27—b 16) 
have shown that this is not the whole account of the matter, and that the 
physicist’s treatment of soul differs from the mathematician’s treatment of line 
and surface. By τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζῴων is meant the body of the animal. 
Cf. 403 a 16 πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, 403 Ὁ 3 ἐν ὕλῃ τοιᾳδί, b 11 ἅπανθ᾽ ὅσα 
τοῦ τοιουδὲ σώματος καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης. It might be glossed by τῆς αἰσθητῆς 
ὕλης. So Them. 8, 33 H., 15, 14 Sp. ἐλέγομεν δὲ ὅτι τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς 
ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζῴων ἐστί, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμὴν καὶ ἐπίπεδον 
τῷ λόγῳ δυνατὸν ἀποστῆσαι τῆς ὑποκειμένης ὕλης, οὕτω καὶ θυμὸν καὶ φόβον, ἀλλὰ 
δεῖ τοὺς ὅρους τούτους συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς παθήμασι τοῦ σώματος, Simpl. 23, 18—30. 
As to the text, I am not satisfied to follow E blindly (see critical notes): οὔτε 
followed by καὶ οὐκ seems very questionable. In ἀχώριστα we have the general 
sense, even if the precise form of the sentence cannot be recovered. My own 
suggestion ovre...ctre...xal οὐχ is not very unlike De Paré. Az, Iv. 14,697 Ὁ 16 ὡς 
οὐκ ὧν ὄρνις οὔτε πέταται μετεωριζόμενος, καὶ τὰ πτερὰ ov χρήσιμα πρὸς πτῆσιν. 

b 18. ἢ δὴ τοιαῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει, θυμὸς καὶ pdBos. These words tend to define 
the affections of the soul and might perhaps have been introduced immediately 
after Ὁ 17 τῆς ψυχῆς. The expression is unusually precise and full. But cf. 
Metaph. 1078 a § πολλὰ δὲ συμβέβηκε καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν 7 ἕκαστον 
ὑπάρχει τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἣ θῆλυ τὸ ζῷον καὶ ἣ ἄρρεν, ἴδια πάθη ἐστίν. 
A. is more often content to omit the verb as above 403 ἃ 12 sq., b 10 7) χωριστά, 
b 12 7 τοιαῦτα and elsewhere τὸ ὃν ἢ Ov, τὸ ἄπειρον F ἄπειρον. Pol. 1275 a 37 
οὐδέν ἐστιν, 7 τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν. For 7 δὴ Simplicius reads ἦ ye and this is the 
reading of U, but δὴ, in Eucken’s words: vim relativi tantum urguet ‘welcher 
eben,’ ‘welcher gerade.’ Cf. th. Nic. 1158a 10 ἃ δὴ μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά, 
Metaph. 1032 a 19, 986 a 13 ἀλλ᾽ οὗ δὴ χάριν ἐπερχόμεθα, 1000 Ὁ 9 ἀλλ᾽ ὅθεν δὴ ὃ 
λόγος, τοῦτό γε φανερόν, where δὴ and ye each have their proper meaning : 
Pol. 1278 b 38, 1295 b 36 sq., with Newman’s notes; Eucken De Part. Usu, 
Pp. 43. θυμὸς καὶ φόβος recall the longer list a 17, 18 from which they are taken 
as typical instances. They stand here exactly as they stood there in apposition 
to τὰ πάθη. Simplicius 23, 24 explains the words thus: τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη, θυμὸν 
λέγω καὶ φόβον καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, ἃ μηδὲ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὥσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον, 
ἐπινοεῖσθαι δύναται ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ὡς καθὸ τοιαῦτα συνεφελκόμενα τὴν ὕλην, καὶ 
οὐχ ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπίπεδον ἄνεν τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ ὅλως τοῦ ἀντιτύπον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ 


Τ, 2 403 Ὁ τ6----Ὁ τὸ 209 


ἐπίπεδον ὡς τὸ κοῖλον ἔχει ἄνευ ῥινὸς ἐπινοούμενον, 6 δὲ θυμὸς ὡς τὸ σιμόν: τὸ γὰρ 
σιμὸν ἡ ἐν ῥινὶ κοιλότης, ὡς ἡ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις ἀντιλυτπτήσεως ἐν τῇ ζέσει τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν 
αἵματος. , 

b 19. καὶ οὐχ... ἐπίπεδον, Has affectiones a corpore separari non posse, 
(ait A.) nec tamen ut lineam et planum sese habere ; quae quidem ubi exstant, 
materiae adhaerent, sed quarum natura, materia posthabita (ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως) 
mente quasi ab oculis revocata, cognoscitur: in illarum affectionum vi et 
natura corpus in numerum venire (Trend.). The inseparable matter in which 
his objects are presented to the mathematician is wholly indifferent, whether 
e.g. the line is drawn in sand, or presented as the edge of a brass ruler. But 
to the biologist the particular sensible matter is all-important: that of which he 
treats is analogous to σιμόν not to κοῖλον. Alter the matter, and a hand or an 
eye in marble or wood ceases to be a hand or eye at all except equivocally (όμω- 
νύμως); the ἔργα καὶ πάθη of soul can only be studied in living animals when 
ἅμα τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. Mr Shorey neatly sums up as follows (4._//. PA. 
Vol. XXII. p. 152): “The πάθη, gua such; 1.6. gua, e.g. θυμός and φόβος, are 
ἀχώριστα, inseparable even in thought from their material embodiment, and not 
like the line which, gza line, 15 separable in thought from physical matter.” 


CHAPTER ILI. 


The first chapter has introduced to our notice in a somewhat tentative and 
summary fashion the problems and the method of psychology as conceived by 
A. Before going on to his own exposition, he devotes the remainder of the first 
book to a review and criticism of the received opinions on the subject. Sucha 
critical review forms a part of many Aristotelian treatises, the best known 
instances being the first book of the Metaphysics and the second book of the 
Poilttics, and is often of the highest value alike for the information given as to 
the views of other philosophers and for the insight thus afforded into the founda- 
tions of his own constructive theory and the interdependence of its parts. Ina 
subject so obscure and difficult as the present it is not to be expected that much 
can be gathered from the general body of current opinions usually designated 
ἔν δοξα, to which he frequently appeals in a popular treatise like the Vicomachean 
Ethics (403b 25 sq., 29 sq., 404b 17, 28, 405 a 28, b25, 26sqq.). Even cita- 
tions from the poets and remarks of men eminent in other departments of life 
yield very little (404 a 29 sq., 410b 27 sq., 411 a 8). The opinions stated and 
criticised belong almost without exception to the philosophic schools of his 
predecessors. The great physicists of the fifth century—Democritus, Empe- 
docles, Anaxagoras,—on the one hand, and on the other Platonism as presented 
in the 7isaeus, and again as taught by A.’s own fellow-pupil and personal 
friend Xenocrates in the contemporary Academy, receive the fullest treatment, 
while the theory of harmony, familiar to us from the pages of the Phaedo, a 
theory which at first sight bears a remarkable likeness to that of the ente- 
lechy, is also singled out for discussion and refutation (407 b 27 sqq.). Slight 
attention is bestowed upon other thinkers: certain Pythagoreans (404 a 18), 
Thales (405 a 19), Diogenes of Apollonia (405 a 21), Heraclitus (405 a 25), 
Alcmaeon (405 a 29), Hippon (405 Ὁ 2), Kritias (405 b 6): but their contribu- 
tions are obviously regarded as unimportant by comparison, and even the claim 
of Alcmaeon, Hippon, and Critias to rank as philosophers is doubtful. 


H. 14 


210 NOTES I. 2 


A. makes some attempt to classify the divergent theories before him (403 Ὁ 
25 sqq., 405b 11, 409b 19). Starting with the common opinion that both the 
motion and the perception of living creatures are due to soul, the various 
theories may roughly be classified according as they emphasise the one or the 
other of these functions. In the former case, soul is described as the most 
mobile of things, as by the Atomists, who identified it with heat, both fire and 
soul owing their mobility to the small size and spherical shape of their com- 
ponent atoms. If, however, perception and knowledge be taken as the pre- 
eminent functions of soul, and if it be further admitted that hke knows like, it 
follows that soul is a compound of the elements which go to make the world. 
Under these two heads (1) the most mobile substance and (2) the primary 
element or (if there be more than one such) a compound ofthe primary elements, 
there is room for a wide diversity of opinions, for the most mobile substance 
may be taken to be material, e.g. fire, or immaterial, e.g. a self-moving number, 
whilst both the number and nature of the primary element or elements has been 
notoriously open to discussion. There is no general agreement whether they 
are one or many, corporeal or incorporeal. Sometimes the two views’are com- 
bined. Sometimes the substance declared to be soul would seem to have been 
selected because of the fineness of its particles, so that, if not indeed actually 
incorporeal, it would appear such in comparison with grosser matter. Hence 
we have another head (3) the incorporeal, and virtually incorporeal. As a 
general rule, there is a close affinity between the views of various philosophers 
regarding the elements of the universe and the composition of the soul. In this 
respect, however, Anaxagoras forms a notable exception. 

Inc. 2 A.’s attitude is for the most part expository, except that in 405 Ὁ 19— 
23 an objection is raised to the theory of Anaxagoras. The fact is that he 15 in 
partial sympathy with the views expressed under each of the three main heads 
under which he arranges his predecessors. He holds that soul is (1) κενητικόν, 
(2) γνωριστικόν, and (3) ἀσώματον. His quarrel is with the one-sided way in 
which these various characteristics of soul have been presented and with the 
inadequacy of all the formulae hitherto devised for their expression. Thus as 
regards (1) he agrees that soul is κινητικόν but denies that it is κενούμενον (see 
c. 3); as regards (2) he combats the inference that, because soul is that which 
knows, it must therefore be compounded of the elements of the things which it 
knows (see 409b 19 sqq.). Similarly the theories which at first sight would 
seem to make the soul incorporeal are found upon examination (see I., c. 4) to be 
vague or inconclusive. For contributions to a better understanding of A.’s own 
positive view we mayrefer to other later criticisms, e.g. 407 Ὁ 13, 408 a 34---Ὁ 29, 
411ι a 24 566. 

403 b 20—404b 8. Introduction to the critical review of previous 
Opinions on the subject. Motion and perception, the primary characteristics of 
living things, have been taken to be the primary characteristics of soul, and 
motion has been taken to imply mobility (§ 1—2) e.g. by Democritus and 
Leucippus (8 3), by certain Pythagoreans (8 4), and by Anaxagoras. But there is 
a difference between Democritus and Anaxagoras. The former identifies intelli- 
gence with life, νοῦς with Ψυχή, the latter is not so clear. He appears some- 
times to distinguish them, as when he makes intelligence the final cause of 
the universe, sometimes to confound them, as when he attributes intelligence 
to even the humblest of living things (§ 5). 

The important part which the conception of motion played in all previous 
speculation is fully recognised by A. Among other passages we may refer to 
Phys. ΝΠ. 9, 265 Ὁ 17—266a 5. There he starts with the remark that all who 


I. 2 403 Ὁ 20—b 25 211 


have treated of motion (κίνησις) agree in considering spatial motion, φορά, as the 
primary motion. Their first principles are causes of spatial motion. This is 
exemplified by those who explained qualitative change by means of combination 
and separation (probably the Ionians), by Empedocles, whose Love and Strife 
bring about motion in space, and by Anaxagoras and by the Atomists. The 
other kinds of change (κίνησις) they attribute not to the primary elements or 
principles of things, but to the compounds to which they give rise. So, too, 
with those who introduce condensation and rarefaction to explain change. 
A. then continues 265 Ὁ 32 ére δὲ παρὰ τούτους of τὴν ψυχὴν αἰτίαν ποιοῦντες 
κινήσεως" τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φασι τῶν κινουμένων, κινεῖ δὲ 
τὸ ζῷον καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἔμψυχον τὴν κατὰ τόπον ἑαυτὸ κίνησιν. καὶ κυρίως δὲ κινεῖσθαί 
φαμεν μόνον τὸ κινούμενον κατὰ τόπον" ἂν δ᾽ ἡἠρεμῇ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αὐξάνηται δ᾽ ἢ 
φθίνῃ ἢ ἀλλοιούμενον τυγχάνῃ. πῇ κινεῖσθαι, ἁπλῶς δὲ κινεῖσθαι οὔ Gapev. “And 
SO, again, with those who make the soul the cause of movement. For they say 
that the self-movent gives rise to motion in things which are moved. The 
animal and indeed every thing which has life moves itself with local movement, 
And movement in the proper sense of the term denotes only local movement. 
If a thing, while remaining at rest in the same place, grows or decays or under- 
goes qualitative change [i.e. by sense-perception], we say that it moves in a 
certain respect, but not that it moves absolutely.” 

b 20 ἅμα διαποροῦντας...22 συμπαραλαμβάνειν, Properly διαπορεῖν = διέρ- 
χεσθαι τὰς ἀπορίας, Ind. Ar. 187 Ὁ 11. It is one of Α.5 canons that the 
complete enumeration of difficulties is an indispensable preliminary to their 
solution. The implication is, not only must we state the problems but we must 
also take into consideration the attempts of our predecessors to solve them. 
The problems have been stated 402 a 23 sqq- The review of previous opinions 
goes on to the end of the book. In the Mefaphysics, the first book contains the 
review of previous speculation, while a comprehensive statement of ἀπορίαι 
follows in Book 111 (B). The most explicit account of this procedure by stating 
received opinions and discussing difficulties is found in £72. Mic. 1145 Ὁ 2 δεῖ δ᾽, 
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω 
δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ 
κυριώτατα" ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερὴ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον 
ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς. Cf. De Cael. Il. 13, 294} 6—13. For εὐπορεῖν cf. Aetaph. 
993 a 25—27 and especially 995 a 27—b 4. συμπαραλαμβάνειν ie. (Them. 8, 
39 H., 15, 22 Sp.) κοινωνοὺς συμπαραλαβεῖν εἰς σκέψιν. Cf. ALetaph. 987 a2 ἐκ 
μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ παρὰ τῶν συνηδρευκότων ἤδη τῷ λόγῳ σοφῶν τοσαῦτα 
παρειλήφαμεν. 

b 23. ὅπως τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰρημένα xré. This statement of the end in view is 
almost stereotyped. Cf. Pol. 1260b 32 sqq. ἵνα τό τ᾽ ὀρθῶς ἔχον ὀφθῇ Kai τὸ 
χρήσιμον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν re παρ᾽ αὐτὰς ἕτερον μὴ δοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφίξεσθαι 
βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας (sc. πολιτείας], 
διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην δοκῶμεν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον, Metaph. ο83 Ὁ I ὅμως δὲ 
παραλάβωμεν καὶ τοὺς πρότερον ἡμῶν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν τῶν ὄντων ἐλθόντας... Ὁ ς ἢ γὰρ 
ἕτερόν τι γένος εὑρήσομεν αἴτίας, ἢ ταῖς νῦν λεγομέναις μᾶλλον πιστεύσομεν (cf. 993 a 
II sqq., 1073 Ὁ 1το---17). εἰ δέτι μὴ καλώς, SC. εἴρηται. 

Ὁ 24. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ζητήσεως, sc. ἐστί. A more impersonal mode of state- 
ment than “we begin,” cf. Pol. 1274 Ὁ 32 τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι... 
σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, 1325 Ὁ 35 ἀρχὴ τῶν λοίπων εἰπεῖν, De 
Long. Vit. 464 Ὁ 21 ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως ἀναγκαία πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι περὶ 
αὐτῶν. 

b 25. τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦνθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κατὰ φύσιν. By what is called 

14---2 


212 NOTES 1. 2 


hyperbaton μάλιστα has been separated from κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν with which it 
is to be taken and prefixed to δοκοῦντα with which it has nothing todo. Cf. for 
another glaring instance τὴν κατὰ τόπον ἑαυτὸ κίνησιν, Phys. 2664 I cited p- 211 
supra. This constantly recurring idiom Mr Newman explains (see his Polztcs, 
Vol. 111. p. 579) as intended to emphasise the words thus separated from their 
natural place. But sound had always more to do than sense with this trick 
of style: its inventor, Isocrates, used it as one means of avoiding a harsh 
collision of vowels. The natural attributes of soul must be regarded as identical 
with (402 a 8) ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν, some of which we were told (402 a 9) δι᾽ 
ἐκείνην [δοκεῖ] καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν. Adventitious attributes are excluded by 
κατὰ φύσιν, just as they are when καθ᾽ αὑτὸ is added to συμβαίνειν. 

Ὁ 25 τὸ ἔμψυχον...26 δοκεῖ. This is an ἔνδοξον, or prevalent opinion. The 
method of comparing ἔμψυχον and ἄψυχον A. himself adopts 413a 20 566. 
Popular opinion had seized upon two characteristics of animate beings, over- 
looking or confusing with them others which A. distinguishes Lc., as e.g. nutri- 
tion and intelligence. 

Ὁ 26. κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. Though inadequate, this opinion re- 
ceives some countenance from A. himself: see 4278 17 544. and 4328 15 
sqq. From the former passage it appears how vaguely τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι was 
construed, since, as A. remarks in the sequel, the upholders of this view make 
thought a species of perception. In 111. 9 oc. cit. only ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τῶν ζῴων is in 
question, to the exclusion of that of plants. 

b 28. σχεδὸν δύο ταῦτα, “approximately these two characteristics,” i.e. 
κίνησις and τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, which represent, more or less precisely, the qualities 
distinctive of soul in the view of the earlier thinkers. For the addition of τὸ 
ἀσώματον see below 405 Ὁ II sq., 409 Ὁ 20 sq. 

b29. καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως. Lud. Ar. 652 b 33 voc. πρῶτος, πρώτως usus 
philosophicus latissimum habet ambitum...(653 a 27) syn κυρίως, ἁπλῶς, καθ᾽ αὑτό, 
significat ipsam per se rei notionem et naturam (ut quae iam a principio sit et 
rem constituat). Mefaph. 1030b καὶ 6 πρώτως καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁρισμός, 1031 a 14 τὸ τί 
ἦν εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐστίν μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως καὶ ἁπλῶς, Catleg. 5, 2 ἃ τὶ οὐσία δέ 
ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, Eth. Nic. 1157 a 30 φιλία 
στρώτως καὶ κυρίως dist. καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα, cf. ΒΖ. ad Mefaph. τοῖς Ὁ τι. Thus 
πρώτως emphasises the primary notion of soul, the original meaning of the 
term ; its first and foremost characteristic is that itis the movent. There is an 
interesting note by A. himself on the application of πρῶτος and πρώτως to 
motion in Phys. VIII. 7, 260b 16—19. Of the three meanings of priority there 
given—(1) ontological independence or self-dependence, (2) temporal, and (3) 
logical priority—the last seems best to suit πρώτως here. 

Ὁ 29 οἰηθέντες δὲ...30 κινεῖν ἕτερον. That the power to originate motion in some- 
thing else belonged exclusively to objects which themselves move was another 
prevalent opinion which appears in various forms among the earl; phile-opherz, 
Cf. e.g. infra 405 a 24.7 δὲ λεπτότατον, κινητικὸν εἶναι. That Avil net toate 
this view we shall see in the next chapter. 

b 3r ὅθεν Δημόκριτος piv...404.a I αὐτὴν εἶναι. There seems nothing to 
answer μὲν until we come to 4048 16 ἔοικε δὲ, for 4048 5 (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Δεύ- 
Kiros) is parenthetical We have no means of checking this statement, for 
A. is our oldest and most credible authority for this as for most of the opinions 
of the Atomists. The more precise definition of later writers (see Diels, 
Doxographi Graeci, Ὁ. 388) is derived ultimately from A.’s pupil Theophrastus. 
Observe that there are two statements here: (4) that Democritus identified soul 
-with fire or warmth,.(4) that his reason for doing so was the mobility of the 


Ι. 2 403 Ὁ 25—404 a 2 213 


atoms of which fire or warmth consists. A. repeats both statements zn/ra 
405 a 8—13. See zote on 406 b 20 sqq. On A.’s criticisms of Democritus 
generally cf. Lasswitz, Geschichte der Atomistif 1., Dyroff, Demokritstudien ; 
for D.’s psychology Hart, Seelenlehre des Demokrits; for his theory of cognition 
Natorp, £rkenntnissproblenz, and for his theory of matter Baumker, Prodlem 
ader Materie. 

404a I πῦρ τι καὶ Oeppdy...... 2 τὰ σφαιροειδή....... 4 ἀκτῖσιν, ὦν....... 5 λέγει. 
The suspicions of Madvig were first excited by 4048 2 τὰ σφαιροειδὴ πῦρ καὶ 
ψυχὴν λέγει, which he bracketed as well as a44v. This left the comparison of 
atoms with motes untouched. Diels, Fragwente der Vorsokr. p. 363, 18 regards 
the whole of the passage a 2 τὰ odbatpoesdin—a 4 ἀκτῖσιν, ὧν as an interpolation : 
“Die antike Glosse ra oqbacpoesdij—dxtiow benutzt das a17 folgende Beispiel 
der ξύσματα." It must be granted that the omission of this as an intruding gloss 
or marginal summary relieves the construction considerably. As the traditional 
text stands, it is just possible to extract a grammatical sense if by a4 ὧν we 
understand σχημάτων not ξυσμάτων. But καὶ τούτων δὲ also refers to the atoms. 
This is not surprising, the introduction of the parenthetical sentence (a 5) ὁμοίως 
δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος having interrupted the regular course of the sentence which 
might otherwise have run ὧν τὴν μὲν πανσπερμίαν... λέγει, τὰ δὲ σφαιροειδῆ ψυχήν. 
Here at any rate μὲν and δὲ present an antithesis between atoms in general and 
spherical soul-atoms in particular, which is destroyed if with M. Rodier we 
refer ὧν on strictly grammatical grounds to a3 τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα or a2 τὰ 
σφαιροειδῆ (τῶν ἀτόμων). Themistius (9,9 H., 16,6 Sp.) with his usual insight 
has selected the essential clauses in this rambling parenthetical sentence and 
re-arranged them thus: ὅθεν Δημόκριτος πῦρ καὶ θερμόν φησι τὴν ψυχήν ἀπείρων 
γὰρ ὄντων τῶν σχημάτων ἃ ταῖς ἀτόμοις προστίθησι, τὴν μὲν πανσπερμίαν αὐτῶν 
στοιχεῖα ποιεῖ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, τούτων δὲ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ τῆς ψυχῆς xré. But his 
further remarks prove that he, like the other Greek commentators, had the 
simile of the motes in his text and probably in its traditional place. The 
repetitions (a 2, 6) and the parentheses (a 3—4, ἃ 5) can be paralleled in other: 
passages where A. is writing carelessly. It is not imperative that anything 
should be sacrificed, for even against ὧν the case is by no means clear. 
Themistius inserts αὐτῶν after τὴν πανσπερμίαν although ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων τῶν 
σχημάτων has preceded. 

404 τ. ἀπείρων, “unlimited,” 1.6. infinite in number and in variety of 
shapes. Cf. De Sensu 4, 442 Ὁ 21, De Cael. 111. 4, 303 a 5 πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, De 
Gen. et Corr. 1. 1, 314a 21 Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος ἐκ σωμάτων ἀδιαιρέτων 
τἄλλα συγκεῖσθαί φασι. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἄπειρα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ τὰς μορφάς. Here 
(404a 1) the latter seems emphasised. , 

az. σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων, “shapes or atoms,” καὶ, as often, being explana-> 
tory. Sometimes A. calls the infinitesimal solids of the Atomists σχήματα, i.e. 
things which have figure, σχῆμα, 404 a 11, De Gen. εἰ Corr. 1. 2, 315b 6 Anpd- 
κριτος δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος ποιήσαντες τὰ σχήματα THY ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ THY γένεσιν ἐκ 
τούτων ποιοῦσι. Here they are described first by the positive quality of shape 
or figure, and next by the negative quality of indivisibility. Similarly Lucretius | 
(111. 246 et al.) uses fgvrae for atoms. The other qualities Democritus ascribed 
to matter were magnitude, solidity and mobility. 

a2 τὰ σφαιροειδῆ: cf. 405 a 9—13, 406b 20 sqq., De Resp. 4, 472 a 3 λέγει 
δ᾽ ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ταὐτὸν ra πρῶτα σχήματα τῶν σφαιροειδῶν. Other’ 
testimonia: Aetius Pac. IV. 3. 5 (Diels, Doxogr. Gr. p. 388) Δημόκριτος πυρῶδες. 
σύγκριμα ἐκ τῶν λόγῳ θεωρητῶν, σφαιρικὰς μὲν ἐχόντων τὰς ἰδέας, πυρίνην δὲ τὴν. 
δύναμιν, ὅπερ σῶμα εἶναι, i.e. the atoms which constitute soul have spherical 


214 NOTES I. 2 
shapes and a fiery nature, Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. ὃ 22 Democritum...levibus et 
rotundis corpusculis effcientem animum concursu quodam fortuito omittamus, 
Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. c. 2 Δημόκριτος δὲ πῦρ. τὰ yap σφαιροειδῆ σχήματα 
τῶν ἀτόμων συγκρινόμενα πῦρ τε καὶ ἀὴρ ψυχὴν ἀποτελεῖν | Doxogr. Gr. Ὁ. 388° 8, 
cf. Ρ. 49, n. 2]. "Ν 

a3. οἷον κτέ, So far we have had a clear statement, which is resumed at 
4948. 5 τούτων δὲ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ ψυχήν : where the reason why spherical atoms 
were selected is given. But the interspersed simile of the motes in the sunbeams, 
as well as the more general reference to atomism as contained in the words ὧν 
τὴν μὲν πανσπερμίαν τῆς ὅλης φύσεως στοιχεῖα λέγει" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Δεύκιππος, 
tend rather to confuse the exposition ; probably “soul-atoms,” and not atoms in 
general, are compared to motes in the sunbeam : and, if we lay unusual stress on 
φαίνεται, the point of comparison may be, as Them. (9, 13—19 H., 16, 1220 
Sp.) says, that soul, though invisible, may be corporeal, as are the motes which, 
ordinarily invisible, are seen in the sunlight under certain conditions. With 
this Simpl. 25, 30—26, 1 and Philop. 67, 21—28 in the main agree, though 
they lay more stress upon the minuteness than upon the invisibility of the 
atoms. But the atoms are wholly imperceptible to sense; they are not, like the 
motes, though usually invisible, visible under exceptional circumstances. The 
point of the comparison between motes and atoms must be the incessant 
mobility (a 20) and endless multitude of the motes: in Milton’s words “ Shapes 
...aS thick and numberless as the gay motes that people the sunbeams.” The 
fact which Them. advances, their partial and occasional visibility, really makes 
against them as suitable illustrations of the invisible atoms. Lucretius 11. 114— 
141 uses the simile of the motes to illustrate the incessant motion, not of soul- 
atoms but of atoms in general: conicere ut possis ex hoc, primordia rerum | 
quale sit in magno iactari semper inani (121 sq.). We see, he says, the motes, 
impelled by unseen blows, change their course and tumble restlessly, now in 
one direction, now in another, and we must infer that this restlessness and 
change of direction are due to unseen movements of the atoms. For the atoms 
move first of themselves; next those bodies which form a small aggregate are 
impelled and set in movement by the unseen strokes of the atoms, and they next 
in turn stir up bodies which are a little larger, till by little and little they become 
visible and are seen to move in the sun, though why they move is not seen. 

8.4. ὧν, SC. σχημάτων not ξυσμάτων. 

a4. τὴν μὲν πανσπερμίαν. Of πανσπερμία Trend. says vox, ut videtur, Democrito 
in hac re propria. Cf. Phys. 111. 4, 203a 19 ὅσοι δ᾽ ἄπειρα ποιοῦσι τὰ στοιχεῖα, 
καθάπερ ᾿Αναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος, 6 μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν, 6 δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πανσπερ- 
μίας τῶν σχημάτων, τῇ ἁφῇ συνεχὲς τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι φασίν. The word is also used 
of the chaotic mixture of atoms in air, earth and water according to the 
Atomists, De Cae/. Il. 4, 303 ἃ 14 ἀέρα δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τἄλλα μεγέθει καὶ μικρό- 
τητι διεῖλον, ὡς οὖσαν αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν οἷον πανσπερμίαν πάντων τῶν στοιχείων. 
On the other hand it serves to denote on the view of Anaxagoras what others 
call the four elements: De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 1, 314 ἃ 28 of δὲ [sc. of περὶ 
᾿Αναξαγόραν] ταῦτα μὲν [sc. τὰ ὁμοιομερῇ] ἁπλᾶ καὶ στοιχεῖα, γῆν δὲ καὶ πῦρ 
καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα σύνθετα᾽ πανσπερμίαν γὰρ εἶναι τούτων. Cf. also of Anaxagoras 
De Cael. 111. 3, 302b 1 ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ μῖγμα τούτων [flesh, bone, and the like] 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σπερμάτων πάντων εἶναι γὰρ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀοράτων ὁμοιομερῶν 
πάντων ἠθροισμένων. While σπέρματα χρημάτων occurs in the fragments of 
Anaxagoras jr. 4 Diels, we have no such evidence for the use of the word by the 
Atomists. In De Sensu 4, 441a6 πανσπερμία χυμῶν is applied to water as a 
reservoir or receiving-house of all possible flavours. 


I. 2 404 a 2—a 9 215 


a5. Aedxurmos. That a work περὶ νοῦ was ascribed to him we know from 
the single citation of his writings which has come down to us on good 
authority (see Aet. Plac. I. 25, 4, p. 321 Diels, Dorogr. Gr.): A... λέγει ἐν τῷ MWept 
νοῦ “᾿οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης." Diels 
thinks that such a work probably dealt with the soul (35 PAzlol.-Vers., p. 102). 
The Atomists identified νοῦς with ψυχή : see note on 404 a 28 ἁπλῶς xré. What 
information we have about Leucippus is collected by Diels in Fragsuente der 
Vorsokvattker 54, pp. 356—365. Leucippus (in view of Diog. Laert. x. 13, be 
it remarked) is always treated by A. as a historical person, distinct from 
Democritus. 

a5. τούτων δὲ, “of these atoms.” The demonstrative refers to the same 
thing as the relative ὧν, Greek idiom being averse to the repetition of the 
relative. So 4178 καὶ sq. ὧν ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ra συμβεβηκότα τούτοις. 
The pronouns ὧν and τούτοις both replace στοιχεῖα, which has preceded. 

a6. τὰ σφαιροειδῆ. Spherical atoms are asserted to be the constituents of 
fire, zafr. 405 a 11 sqq., De Cael. 111. 4, 3938 12 ποῖον δὲ καὶ ri ἑκάστου τὸ 
σχῆμα τῶν στοιχείων, οὐθὲν ἐπιδιώρισαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον τῷ πυρὶ τὴν σφαῖραν ἀπέ- 
δωκαν, Ζὖὦ. III. 8, 306b 29 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰ πάθη τε καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς 
κινήσεις ἀσύμφωνα τὰ σχήματα τοῖς σώμασιν, εἰς ἃ μάλιστα βλέψαντες οὕτω διένειμαν. 
οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ πῦρ εὐκίνητόν ἐστι καὶ θερμαντικὸν καὶ καυστικόν, of μὲν [the Atomists] 
ἐποίησαν αὐτὸ σφαῖραν, οἱ δὲ [the Platonists] πυραμίδα. ταῦτα γὰρ εὐκινητότατα 
μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐλαχίστων ἅπτεσθαι καὶ ἥκιστα βεβηκέναι, θερμαντικώτατα δὲ καὶ 
καυστικώτατα, διότι τὸ μὲν [the sphere] ὅλον ἐστὶ γωνία, τὸ δὲ [the pyramid] 
ὀξυγωνιώτατον, καίει δὲ καὶ θερμαίνει ταῖς γωνίαις, ws φασίν, De Gen. et Corr. I. 8, 
3268 3 καίτοι τοῦτό γε ἄτοπον, τὸ μόνον ἀποδοῦναι τῷ περιφερεῖ σχήματι τὸ θερμόν. 
ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τοὐναντίον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἄλλῳ τινὶ προσήκειν τῶν σχημάτων. 

a6 διὰ τὸ...7 διαδύνειν. The spherical body meets with less obstruction in 
its course because, as explained in De Caed?. 111. 8, 306b 34 (see last note), its 
contact with an obstacle is confined to the smallest extent of surface, dea τὸ 
ἐλαχίστων ἅπτεσθαι, further it is the least stable of all solid bodies. 

a7. τοὺς τοιούτους ῥυσμούς, such, 1.6. spherical, atomic shapes, “figures.” 
The Ionic ῥυσμὸς was used by Leucippus and Democritus, and the Attic σχῆμα 
was substituted for it by A., as he himself explains A7efaph. 985b 15 διαφέρειν 
γάρ φασι τὸ ὃν prope καὶ διαθιγῇ καὶ τροπῇ μόνον" τούτων δὲ ὃ μὲν propos σχῆμά 
ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ διαθιγὴ τάξις, ἡ δὲ τροπὴ θέσις- διαφέρει γὰρ τὸ μὲν Α τοῦ Ν σχήματι. 
Herodotus uses ῥυθμός of the “shape” of letters, V. 58 μετέβαλον καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν 
τῶν γραμμάτων. But cf. Archil. 7%. 40 οἷος ῥυσμὸς ἀνθρώπους ἔχει : and the use of 
the form ῥυσμὸς by Callimachus proves that the form comes from the earlier 
Epic diction. 

a7 καὶ κινεῖν...8 καὶ αὐτά : cf. zr. 406b 15 sqq. 

a 8 ὑπολαμβάνοντες...9 τὴν κίνησιν : cf. 403 Ὁ 29 τὸ κινοῦν, zufr. 404 ἃ II τῶν 
σχημάτων τὰ παρέχοντα τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν κίνησιν, a 21, 23. 
_ ag. ὅρον, “determinant,” i.e. determining factor or principle, distinctive 
mark. Jxzd. Ar. 529b 44 omnino id significat, quo aliculus rei natura consti- 
tuitur et definitur, De Gen. An. τν. 1, 7668. 31 τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως ὄρος καὶ τῆς ἀδυναμίας 
τὸ πεπτικὸν εἶναι ἢ μὴ πεπτικόν, “potency or impotence is determined by the 
animal having or not having a good digestion”: Pol. 1294a Το ἀριστοκρατίας 
ὅρος dpern: 1294 Ὁ 14 τοῦ δ᾽ εὖ μεμῖχθαι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν ὅρος κτέ. 
This sense of the word is quite distinct from that of the standard to aim at; it 
is more akin to, yet distinct from, that of definition. So Plato, eg. Aes. 551 A 
νόμον τίθενται ὅρον πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικῆς, ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων, Politic. 
292 Α οἰόμεθά τινα τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ὀρθὴν εἶναι τούτοις τοῖς ὅροις ὁρισθεῖσαν, 


210 NOTES I. 2 


ἑνὶ καὶ ὀλίγοις καὶ πολλοῖς, καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ πενίᾳ, καὶ τῷ βιαίῳ καὶ ἑκουσίῳ, 6.5. 
wealth and a paucity of rulers are characteristics which help to determine olig- 
archy. Cf. also Afefaph. 1049 a 5 dpos δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐντελεχείᾳ γιγνομένου 
ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν κτέ. 

Δ 1Ο. τοῦ περιέχοντος, “the surrounding atmosphere”; “‘the physical en- 
vironment” in which animals live. This term seems to have been vaguely used. 
It has a wider sense in Anaxagoras 72. 2 and 14D: and similarly Hippol. ref. 
haeres, 1. 12 [Doxogr. Gr. 564, 29], in what professes to be an account of the 
views of Leucippus, κόσμους δὲ [ὧδε inseruit de coniectura Usener] γίνεσθαι 
λέγει: ὅταν eis μέγα κενὸν ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος [i.e. from the universe outside this 
void] ἀθροισθῇ πολλὰ σώματα καὶ συρρυῇ; προσκρούοντα ἀλλήλοις κτέ. 

ΔῚΣ τῶν σχημάτων τὰ παρέχοντα...12 τὴν κίνησιν, i.e. spherical atoms ; 
V. 5227. 404 a 2, 6, HOLES. 

δι 12. βοήθειαν γίγνεσθαι θύραθεν, i.e. the soul atoms within (ra évumdpyovra) 
are recruited or reinforced by the arrival of fresh soul-atoms from without. The 
function of respiration according to Democritus is further explained in de Resp. 
4. 471 b 30~—472 a 26. I cite 472 a 5 συγκρινομένων οὖν αὐτῶν [the spherical 
soul-atoms] ὑπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐκθλίβοντος, βοήθειαν γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀναπνοήν φησιν. 

8. 15. ovvavelpyovra τὸ συνάγον καὶ πηγνύον, int. τὸ περιέχον (5227. alo 
συνάγοντος γὰρ τοῦ περιέχοντος τὰ σώματα) : cf. De Resp. 4, 4728 31 ἐν γὰρ ταῖς 
ἀλέαις θερμαινόμενοι μᾶλλον καὶ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς μᾶλλον δεόμεθα καὶ πυκνότερον 
ἀναπνέομεν πάντες" ὅταν δὲ τὸ πέριξ ἢ ψυχρὸν καὶ συνάγῃ καὶ συμπηγνύῃ τὸ σῶμα, 
κατέχειν συμβαίνει τὸ πνεῦμα. A. is there urging that the facts are inconsistent 
with this atomistic theory. It is when we are hot that we breathe quickly; 
when the surrounding atmosphere is cold, when it compresses and contracts 
the body, we hold in our breath ; and yet, A. continues, that was the time for 
the external air to enter and counteract the compression (a 35) καίτοι τότ᾽ ἐχρὴν 
τὸ θύραθεν εἰσιὸν κωλύειν τὴν σύνθλιψιν. The verb πηγνύναι is used of com- 
pression by cold or by heat (Qe Gen. An. 11. 6, 743 αὶ 5 συνίσταται καὶ πήγνυται 
τὰ μὲν ψυχρῷ τὰ δὲ θερμῷ) or of pressure generally, as here. . 

αι τό. ἕως ἂν δύνωνται τοῦτο ποιεῖν, 1.6. ἀναπνεῖν. The account in De Resp. 
4.15 more explicit: 472 ἃ 10 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἐκπνεῖν εἶναι τὸ ζὴν 
καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν" ὅταν γὰρ κρατῇ τὸ περιέχον συνθλίβον, καὶ μηκέτι θύραθεν εἰσιὸν 
δύνηται ἀνείργειν, μὴ δυναμένου ἀναπνεῖν, τότε συμβαίνειν τὸν θάνατον τοῖς ζῴοις - 
εἶναι γὰρ τὸν θάνατον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων σχημάτων ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἔξοδον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ 
περιέχοντος ἐκθλίψεως. Though A. does not mention the fact, it is highly 
probable that the Atomists gave a similar explanation of sleep as the partial 
expulsion of warm soul-atoms. Cf. Aet. Plac. ν. 25, 3 (Doxogr. Gr. 437, 13). 

ἃ τό. τὸ παρὰ tov Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον. Note that παρὰ replaces ὑπὸ used 
of the agent. Cf. De Gen. ef Corr. 11. 10, 336} 16 τοῖς παρ᾽ ἡμῶν λόγοις. 
Metaph. 985 Ὁ 22 ἐζητῆσθαι παρὰ τῶν πρότερον, 986 Ὁ 6 δεήρθρωται map’ ἐκείνων. 

8. 17. διάνοιαν. Cf. id. Ar. 5.ν. : διάνοια denotes the sense and meaning of 
aterm, “vis ac significatio vocabuli,” as opposed to the term ὄνομα itself (7 γι, 
Ar. 186b 15): or again (2). 19) the intellectual element of a speech as opposed 
to the language and style (λέξις, λόγος); and so it is used of a writer’s spirit or 
intention as distinct from his words, literally understood, cf. Meath. 985 a 4 
λαμβάνειν πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἃ ψελλίζεται λέγων. 

aig. περὶ δὲ τούτων εἴρηται διότι. Τούτων -οτῶν ξυσμάτων and διότιΞε ὅτι, 
that: Philop. 70, 35 εἴρηται γάρ, φησί, περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅτι ὁρῶνται ἀεικίνητα, κἂν ἢ 
νηνεμία, ὡς οἴκοθεν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνέμου ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν. To whom this state- 
ment is to be attributed is not clear. It may be A. himself, though the fact 
that the constant motion of motes is noticed, Prod/. XV. 13, 913 a 8 sqq., is no 


φ᾿ 


Ι. 2 404 a g—a 28 217 


proof. Or Sophonias may be right in assigning it to the Pythagoreans in 
question, I1, 22 εἴρηται δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ συνεχῶς φαίνεται κινούμενα. Obviously 
he understood διεότε to mean “ because” as did Themistius (9, 30 H., 17, 5 Sp.). 

8. 21. καὶ ὅσοι...τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν, a doctrine of Plato and his school main- 
tained amongst others by Xenocrates, the contemporary head of the Academy, 
who is seldom referred to by name. His theory is sharply criticised z#z/~. 1. 4. 
408 Ὁ 32sqq. Philop. 71,6 probably on the strength of 405 a 29 sqq. also names 
Alcmaeon, αἰνίττεται eis WAdreva καὶ Ξενοκράτην καὶ ᾿Αλκμαίωνα. Philop. adds 
71, 9 Gre δὲ 6 WAdrav αὐτοκίνητον λέγων τὴν ψυχὴν od τὴν κατὰ τόπον ἔλεγε 
κίνησιν, αὐτὸς σαφῶς λέγει ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις, presumably 895 E, 89068Β. The 
passage in the Laws begins thus, 895 Ε ΑΘ. Ὧι δὴ ψυχὴ τοὔνομα, τίς τούτον 
λόγος ; ἔχομεν ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νυνδὴ ῥηθέντα [804 (], τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὑτὴν 
κινεῖν κίνησιν ; KA. Té ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν φῇς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ἥνπερ τοὔνομα, 
ὃ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν ; ΑΘ. ῷημί γε xré. To the same effect Simpl. 
25, I14—24 (citing Pl. Zegg. 894 Ο) and 26, 21---31. As to Plato, the locus 
classicus is Phaedr. 245 C—E, where it is proved μὴ ἄλλο re εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ 
κινοῦν 7 ψυχήν. The tenth book of the Zaws, especially the important section 
894 C—896 E, proves that Plato maintained this doctrine to the last. This is 
recognised by A. in Metafh. 10724 1 ἣν οἴεται ἐνίοτε ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἕξαυτὸ 
κινοῦν, where the context shows that soul is meant. 

a2I ἐοίκασι yap...25 αὐτὸ κινεῖταιι. Here the inference is more apparent 
than in the previous statement, 403 Ὁ 28—31. But the reasoning by which the 
conclusion is reached is A.’s own. He is too fond of interpreting his pre- 
_decessors from his own point of view and too apt to read more into their 
suggestions than was originally intended. 

@ 25 ὁμοίως δὲ. ψυχὴν elvar...26 τὴν κινοῦσαν. The feminine by a curious sort 
of attraction for τὸ κενοῦν the neuter (cf. 403 b 29). Anaxagoras declared νοῦς to 
be the cause of motion which communicated motion to the primitive chaos and 
brought like to like (404a 26 τὸ πᾶν ἐκίνησε νοῦς). (Cf. Anax. Jr. 12 Ὁ καὶ τῆς 
περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν, and 
Jr. 13 Ὁ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ vots κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου παντὸς ἀπεκρίνετο) AS 
the context shows (4044 27 οὐ μὴν παντελῶς γ᾽ ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος), A. is aware 
that the identification of this νοῦς with Ψυχή, as he uses it throughout the 
treatise for the vital force of animals, is not satisfactorily made out. Cf. 22/7. 
405 a 13 and noZe. 

a26. εἴτις ἄλλος. Possibly a reference to Hermotimus of whom we hear 
Metaph.984b 19 αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἔχει πρότερον [sc. ᾿ἀναξαγόρου] Ἑρμότιμος ὁ Κλαζομένιος 
εἰπεῖν. 

8. 27. ἐκεῖνος μὲν yap, sc. Democritus, who is for A. in the background now 
that we are immediately concerned with Anaxagoras. 

a 28. ἁπλῶς ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν καὶ νοῦν, sc. εἶναι λέγει (the latter word must also 
be supplied above with a 27) which A. himself supplies (a 31). The identity 
between ψυχὴ and νοῦς in the Atomic system is again asserted (405 a 8-13) and 
De Resp. 472 ἃ 7 τῶν τοιούτων [sc. σχημάτων] ἃ καλεῖ ἐκεῖνος νοῦν καὶ ψυχῆν. Cf. 
Aet. lv. 5. 12 (Doxogr. Gr. 301) Παρμενίδης καὶ ᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος ταὐτὸν 
νοῦν καὶ ψυχήν, καθ᾽ obs οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ζῷον ἄλογον κυρίως. The Atomists are no 
doubt included by A. among the older philosophers who did not distinguish 
between thought and sense-perception, but explained both as a corporeal 
change. See 427a 21, 26. Cf. Theophr. De Senstbus 58, 72 [Doxogr. Gr. 
515, 22 sqq., 520, 13 sqq.], Aet. IV. 8. 5 [Doxagr. Gr. 394, 26 sqq.] Δεύκιππορ 
Δημόκριτος ras αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς νοήσεις ἑτεροιώσεις εἶναι τοῦ σώματος, 8. τὸ 
(Doxogr. Gr. 395, 25) Δεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Ἔ Ππίκουρος τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴνὶ 


218 NOTES I. 2 


νόησιν γίνεσθαι εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προσιόντων. μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν 
χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος. The identity of νοῦς and ψυχὴ is more completely 
implied in the line of Empedocles Jrag. 110, το D, 313 Karsten πάντα yap ἴσθι 
φρόνησιν ἔχειν Kai νώματος αἶσαν. So far from confining intelligence to certain 
animals only (ζῷα), as did A. (404 Ὁ 5 sq., 427 Ὁ 7 8q., 1 I12—14), Empedocles 
here ascribes intelligence and the power of thought to all things, including, as 
Sext. Emp. adv. Math. Vil. 286 says, even plants. Thus there would be no 
ἄλογα ἕῷα in the strict sense of the term, Aet. IV. 5. 12 (cited above). Again, if 
the identity of νοῦς and ψυχὴ be maintained, the problem εἰ μεριστὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ 
ἀμερής (402 Ὁ 1) must be regarded as foreclosed, Philop. 35, 12 ἀμερῆ γάρ φησιν 
αὐτὴν [sc. τὴν ψυχήν] Δημόκριτος εἶναι καὶ οὐ πολυδύναμον, ταὐτὸν εἶναι λέγων τὸ 
νοεῖν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ μιᾶς ταῦτα προέρχεσθαι δυνάμεως. 

a 28. τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον. This proposition, which recurs as the 
doctrine of “some” thinkers 427 Ὁ 3, is understood by A. to mean the denial of 
objective truth, and to it he opposes his own position, AMfezaph. Io1lob 1 sq. ὡς 
ov πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἀληθές. Democritus is classed with Empedocles as 
holding the doctrine of relativity, 2. 1009 Ὁ 1—17: “the opinion that appear- 
ances are true has been derived by some from sensible things, which do not 
appear the same (e.g. sweet or bitter) to different men at the same time, or to 
the same men at different times, or the same to men as they appear to other 
animals”: 2. 9 ποῖα οὖν τούτων ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ ἄδηλον οὐδὲν yap μᾶλλον τάδε 
ἢ τάδε ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως. διὸ Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν ἤτοι οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ᾽ 
ἄδηλον. ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι 
ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί φασιν: ἐκ 
τούτων γὰρ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ws ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἔκαστος 
τοιαύταις δόξαις γεγένηνται ἔνοχοι. More explicitly of the Atomists alone De Gez. 
et Corr.l. 2. 315 bg ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ᾧοντο τἀληθὲς ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι, ἐναντία δὲ καὶ ἄπειρα τὰ 
φαινόμενα, τὰ σχήματα ἄπειρα ἐποίησαν, ὥστε ταῖς μεταβολαῖς τοῦ συγκειμένου τὸ 
αὐτὸ ἐναντίον δοκεῖν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ μετακινεῖσθαι μικροῦ ἐμμιγνυμένου, καὶ ὅλως 
ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἑνὸς μετακινηθέντος- ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία 
γίνεται γραμμάτων. 

Zeller, Pre-Socraiics, Eng. Tr. Vol. 11. p. 272, points out the inconsistency 
between this supposed tenet of Democritus and the whole tenour of his system, 
especially with his famous distinction between ἡ σκοτίη γνώμη, i.e. sense- 
knowledge, and ἡ γνησίη γνώμη, whereby atoms and void are affirmed to be the 
only reality, for which see frag. 11 ap. Sext. Emp. Vil. 139. Zeller continues: 
“If, therefore, Aristotle attributes to Democritus the opinion that the sensible 
perception as such is true, the statement is founded merely on his own 
inferences; because the Atomistic philosopher did not definitely distinguish 
between the faculty of perception and that of thought, therefore Aristotle 
concludes that he must have put both on the same footing in respect of their 
truth.” Cf Natorp, krkenninissproblem, p.164sqq. The passage I have above 
cited from J@etaph. 1009 Ὁ I—17 is part of A.’s defence of the law of contradiction, 
that a thing cannot be at the same time and in the same respect both A and 
not-A, which we are justified in asserting D. held as firmly as A. himself. 
Cf. further 426 a 20 sqq. Dyroff, however (Demokrtt-Studien, pp. 74, 88), 
inclines to think that D. himself and not A. drew this inference. Dyroff 
thinks A. is right in holding that because αἰσθάνεσθαι = νοεῖν and sense- 
perception is an ἀλλοίωσις (1009 b 13: Zeller and Natorp overlook this), there- 
fore that which appears by means of sense-perception is true. Instead of 
“thought and perception both depend upon body” D. said “thought is 
perception, both are corporeal,” and this, Dyroff thinks, justifies the conclusion, 


I. 2 404 a 28—b I 219 


even if A. drew it. Whether D. did, or did not, deny objective existence 
altogether, his position as regards the sensible qualities of matter is clear. 
He was the first to lay down the distinction between the so-called “ primary ” 
and “secondary” qualities. The atoms have no secondary qualities. Thus 
colours, flavours, smells 267 se have no objective existence: they, at all events, 
are subjective affections of the percipient. Colour belongs not to the atoms, 
but to the natural objects which are produced by the aggregation of atoms, and 
15 due to the order, shape and position of the atoms in such aggregates, whereby 
they act upon our sense and qualitatively alter it. Cf. Theoph. De Senstbus 63 
πάντα πάθη τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀλλοιουμένης, ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τὴν φαντασίαν, 69 τὸ δὲ 
γλυκὺ καὶ ὅλως τὸ αἰσθητὸν πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις, ὥς φησιν, 64 τὰ περὶ τοὺς 
χυλοὺς ἀναφέρων τὴν φαντασίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. For the doctrine of universal 
relativity as applied to sense-perception by the followers of Heraclitus and 
Protagoras the locus classicus is Pl. Theaet. 153—157, where again the salient 
example is colour (156 C—E), though all sensible qualities are expressly in- 
cluded, 156 B, E. 

a 30. “Exrwp κεῦτ᾽ ἀλλοφρονέων. The actual words do not occur in our text 
of Homer. In //. 23, 698 however the word ἀλλοφρονέοντα in the required sense 
of “swooning” is used of Euryalus after the boxing-match (κὰδ δ᾽ ἀλλοφρονέοντα 
μετὰ σφίσιν εἶσαν ἄγοντες), while in 77. 22, 330 it is said of Hector in his last 
fight with Achilles that he “‘fell in the dust” (ξριπε & ἐν xovino’) and then at 337 
that “faint and weak he bespake Achilles” (τὸν δ᾽ ὀλιγοδρανέων προσέφη). 
Cf. Metaph. 1009 Ὁ 28 φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν 
δόξαν [the theory of relativity ὅτι τοιαῦτ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ ὄντα οἷα ἂν ὑπολάβωσινΊ, 
ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν “Ἕκτορα, ὧς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς. κεῖσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα, ὡς 
φρονοῦντας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταὐτά. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι, εἰ ἀμφότεραι 
φρονήσεις, καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἅμα οὕτω τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει. Sense as well as thought 
suffered from the blow, so that φρονεῖν and ἀλλοφρονεῖν must be understood of 
consciousness in the widest sense. (On aic@dvecGar=to be conscious, an 
extension of meaning not really analogous, see 425 Ὁ 12, zoze.) Democritus had 
firmly grasped the dependence of the normal consciousness upon the healthy 
physical condition alike of the body and the equally material soul. This point 
is brought out by Theophrastus De Senszdus 58 (Diels, Doxogr. Gr. 515, 23 566.) 
γίνεται [int. τὸ φρονεῖν) συμμέτρως ἐχούσης ris Ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν [Schneider's 
corr. for μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν)" ἐὰν δὲ περίθερμός τις ἢ περίψυχρος γένηται, μεταλλάττειν 
φησί. διὸ καὶ τοὺς παλαιοὺς καλῶς τοῦθ᾽ ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶν " ἀλλοφρονεῖν. In 
Hector’s case the chill of approaching death is the disturbing cause. 

a 30 οὐ δὴ χρῆται...31 νοῦν. χρῆται, sc. Democritus. The divergence between 
his use of the term νοῦς and A.’s comes out more clearly here. To A. νοῦς isa 
distinct faculty, one of several concerned with truth, cf. 428 a 17 sq., a 3—5, £7¢A. 
Nic. 1139 Ὁ 15 ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἣ ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν 
ἀριθμόν" ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία vows’ ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ 
ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι. That neither φρονεῖν nor νοεῖν can be identified with 
αἰσθάνεσθαι is argued succinctly 427 Ὁ 6---14. Democritus (and Leucippus, if 
the work Περὶ νοῦ is rightly ascribed to him) has not so differentiated the term, 
but employs it in the older and vaguer sense for soul in general as the 
animating principle or part. This is the usual meaning of νόος in Homer and 
the older poets (ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἀτάρβητος νόος ἐστίν, εὐμενεῖ νόῳ) frequent in 
Hdt., e.g. VII. 97 ἐκ παντὸς νόου, and at all periods in the phrase κατὰ νοῦν. 

404 bI. ἧττον διασαφεῖ. A. is perfectly sure that Democritus uses νοῦς and 
Ψυχὴ as interchangeable terms. That Anaxagoras did so is not so clear. Cf. 
note on 404a 25. Here A. argues that the νοῦς which Anaxagoras finds in all 


220 NOTES 12 


living things must be what A. himself means by ψυχή, and that it cannot be 
ὁ κατὰ φρόνησιν νοῦς : but below (405 a 13) he decides that by νοῦς Anaxagoras 
intended something different from ψυχή, thus widely diffused through all 
animate beings. Cf. bi πολλαχοῦ pév...2 ἑτέρωθε Se. wept αὐτῶν, Le. περὶ ψυχῆς 
καὶ νοῦ. Both terms are found in frag. 12 D καὶ ὅσα ye Ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ μείζω καὶ 
ἐλάσσω, πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ, where ψυχὴν ἔχειν τκεἔμψυχα εἶναι as in frag. 4D 
καὶ ἀνθρώπους τε συμπαγῆναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα (ha ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει. Pl. Ογαΐζ. 400 A 
joins ψυχὴ with νοῦς when he refers to the principal doctrine of Anaxagoras: 
καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων φύσιν οὗ πιστεύεις ᾿Αναξαγόρᾳ νοῦν re καὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι 
τὴν διακοσμοῦσαν καὶ ἔχουσαν. 

b2. τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς, sc. ἔχειν. The view that Anaxagoras 
regarded νοῦς as the cause of the beautiful and orderly arrangement in the 
world is also expressed in MJetaph. 984b 8—23, esp. 15 νοῦν δή τις εἰπὼν ἐνεῖναι, 
καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης 
οἷον νήφων ἐφάνη map’ εἰκῇ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον. Cf. frag. 12 D καὶ τὰ 
συμμισγόμενά τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς. καὶ ὁποῖα. 
ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὁποῖα ἣν, ἅσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὁποῖα ἔστι, πάντα διεκόσμησε 
νοῦς, καὶ THY περιχώρησιν ταύτην, ἣν νῦν περιχωρέει τά τε ἄστρα καὶ 6 ἥλιος καὶ ἢ 
σελήνη καὶ ὃ ἀὴρ καὶ 6 αἰθὴρ of ἄποκριν όὀμενοι. 

Ὁ 2. ἑτέρωθι δὲ...Ψψυχήν. The γάρ of the following sentence seems to show 
that this identification of νοῦς and ψυχὴ is A.’s inference from the fact that 
Anaxagoras declared νοῦς to be everywhere present in all living things. He 
cannot have meant 6 κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς; he must therefore have 
meant what A. calls ψυχή. 

3. ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν rots ζῴοις. αὐτὸν --τὸν νοῦν. See frag. 12 D 
καὶ ὅσα...πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ (cited above 22. on 406 Ὁ 1 περὶ αὐτῶν). But in this 
fragment it is not clear that κρατεῖ bears out A.’s ὑπάρχειν, in other words, 
whether, according to Anaxagoras, the intelligence which rules all animate 
beings is, or is not, immanent: in 429 a 19 A. himself glosses ἵνα κρατῇ by 
iva γνωρίζῃ. 

Ὁ 5 οὐ φαίνεται...6 τοῖς ζῴοις. This 15 one of the premisses from which the 
conclusion is drawn that Anaxagoras uses νοῦς in the sense of ψυχή. By 
φαίνεσθαι an appeal to the facts is introduced. Cf. 4038 5 mofe, 414 ἃ 24 καίπερ᾽ 
οὐδὲ φαινομένου, De Cael. I. 13, 294b 4 νῦν δ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. In 
ὁ κατὰ φρόνησιν νοῦς, the preposition has a determining sense, cf. 417b 9 τὸ μὲν᾽ 
οὖν eis ἐντελέχειαν ἄγον ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος κατὰ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ φρονοῦν, 412 Ὁ 10 sq. 
οὐσία ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον : also such common phrases as κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἕν, κατὰ 
δύναμιν, κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, κατά τι (as opposed to ἁπλῶς or ὅλως), καθ᾽ αὗὑτό, κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός. That φρονεῖν, φρόνησις as more precise should be used to define 
νοεῖν, νοῦς May appear surprising: see, however, 427 a 17—-27 where the two 
terms are used indifferently, 427 Ὁ 8 τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ... φρόνησις, καὶ ἐπιστήμη ᾿ 
καὶ δόξα ἀληθής, 4298 10 ᾧ [3ς. τῷ νῷ] γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ. The state- 
ment of our text that νοῦς is something rare and exceptional if we look at the 
animal world as a whole recurs in 415 a 7—11, 427 Ὁ 8. 

404b 8—405b 10. The other view, which regards soul as that which 
perceives and knows, identifies soul with the constituent elements of things 
perceived or known (1.e. of the universe), because like is known by like. Thus’ 
Empedocles (8 6), Plato in the 7¢wzaeus, in Ta περὶ φιλοσοφίας and elsewhere 
(§ 7). Others [i.e. Xenocrates], combining motion and perception, have defined’ 
the soul as a self-moving number (§ 8). We have thus classed together 
philosophers whose views as to the nature and number of the constituent 
elements of things are widely different, some considering them as corporeal, 


Ι, 2 404 Ὁ 1—b 12 221 


others as incorporeal (§ 9), some admitting but one ultimate principle, others 
a plurality. But the view taken of the soul and the view taken of the universe 
will be found to agree (§ 10). This agreement is exemplified in Democritus 
(88 11, 12). The views of Anaxagoras (§ 13), Thales (§ 14), Diogenes of 
Apollonia (8 15), Heraclitus (8 16), Alcmaeon (§ 17), Hippon (8 18), Critias 
(8 19) are briefly stated. 

Ῥ 8. ὅσοι δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, SC. ἀπέβλεψαν. 
Here A. passes from the conception of soul as moving principle to the con- 
ception of soul as cognitive or perceptive. 

bg. οὗτοι 8. Note the resumption after otro: of the δὲ already expressed 
at Ὁ 8, ὅσοι δέ, and cf. Jud. Ar. 166 b 58 ubi demonstrativa enunciatio sequitur 
relativam, non raro particula δὲ relativo addita iteratur apud pronomen (ad- 
lectivum, adverbium) demonstrativum: De Gen. ef Corr. 1. τ, 314a 8 ὅσοι μὲν 
ἕν τι τὸ πᾶν λέγουσιν εἶναι... τούτοις μὲν ἀνάγκη...ὅσοι δὲ πλείω THY ὕλην ἑνὸς 
τιθέασιν... τούτοις δὲ ἕτερον. 

bro. οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες [ταύτας], οἱ δὲ μίαν ταύτην. I follow Bek., 
Trend., Torst., Diels in bracketing ταύτας, which is omitted in E. The other 
authorities vary. See critical notes. M. Rodier who retains ταύτας rightly, on 
his view, places a comma before the word and another before Ὁ I1 ταύτην, thus 
making the text a condensed expression for of μὲν πλείους ras ἀρχὰς ποιοῦντες 
ταύτας εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, of δὲ μίαν τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιοῦντες ταύτην εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν 
λέγουσιν. But, though this is unambiguously expressed later on (405 Ὁ 17--- 10) 
it is not necessary to anticipate it here. 

bir. ὥσπερ "Hpredoxdjjs μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, Sc. λέγει THY ψυχὴν εἶναι. 
By τὰ στοιχεῖα πάντα are meant the four so-called elements or σώματα dda of A., 
earth, water, air (=aiéjp of Empedocles), and fire, as well as the two moving 
forces, attraction and repulsion, personified as Love and Strife. As Zeller shows 
(Pre-Socratics, Eng. Tr. 11. pp. 167 sqq.) this is A.’s inference and involves a mis- 
conception : “A. concludes in his usual manner that according to Empedocles 
the soul is composed of all the four elements, an assertion which is then 
repeated by his commentators. It is, however, incorrect. Empedocles did not 
hold that the soul is composed of the elements: but what we call the activity of 
the soul he explained by the elementary composition of the body; a soul 
distinct from the body he did not assume. Thought, ‘like all other vital 
activities, arises from and depends upon the admixture of substances in the 
body....It is in the blood especially, because there the elements are most 
completely mingled, that thought and consciousness have their chief seat, and 
particularly in the blood of the heart [/rag. 105, 3 Ὁ]. But other parts of the 
body are not excluded from participation in thought, provided the elementary 
particles are tightly compressed and mixture is homogeneous. If the right 
admixture is limited to certain parts, the result is sense-organs with their special 
endowment.” What Empedocles meant is best seen in the case of the special 
senses. As our sense-organs are composed of the very same elements as the 
objects outside the organism, knowledge of these objects is obtained through 
these organs. Thus the fire in the eye enables us to see fire, and so on. 

Ὁ 12. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων. This also is A.’s inference. If 
soul is compounded of the elements and a part of each element enters into its 
composition, then, in virtue of being such part, any one of the elements may be 
said to be a soul. De Gen. et Corr. 11. 6, 3348 9 ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ εἰ ἣ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν 
στοιχείων ἢ ἕν τι αὐτῶν. A. is there dealing with Empedocles and continues 
3348 10 al yap ἀλλοιώσεις αἱ ris Ψυχῆς πῶς ἔσονται, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν εἶναι καὶ 
πάλιν ἄμουσον, ἢ μνήμη ἢ λήθη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἰ μὲν πῦρ ἡ ψυχή, τὰ πάθη ὑπάρξει 


222 NOTES I. 2 


αὐτῇ ὅσα πυρὶ ἣ wip: εἰ δὲ μικτόν, τὰ σωματικά" τούτων δ᾽ [1.6, the ἀλλοιώσεις, τὸ 
μουσικὸν εἶναι καὶ πάλιν ἄμουσον ἢ μνήμη ἢ λήθη] οὐδὲν σωματικόν. In the latter 
case, the properties of the compound may be different from those of the 
constituents, although still of course properties of a corporeal substance. Cf. 
Zeller, of. cit. p. 137, #. 1. The inference is virtually repeated 410 b 2 sq., 710 
and, as Simpl. remarks, it rests on the assumption already formulated by A. 
that “that by which we know anything whatever is soul” (27, 36) ov μόνον τὸ ἐκ 
πασῶν μῖγμα ψυχὴν λέγοντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑκάστην ἀρχὴν γνωστικὴν οὖσαν τοῦ ὁμοίου - 
τὸ γὰρ γνωστικὸν ὁτουοῦν ψυχὴν εἶναι. 

b 13 γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ...15 λυγρῷ: Frag. 109 Ὁ (ll. 321---323 K) cited also in 
Metaph. 1000 Ὁ 6 sqq. and by later writers, e.g. Sext. Emp. αν. Math. τ. 303, 
VII. 92, 121 with ἀήρ substituted for αἰθήρ in the first citation. 

bI6. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον...ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ. The reference is to the Φυχογονία 
in Timaeus 34 C 566. 

Ὁ 17. γινώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον. That like is known by like is the 
assumption underlying the language of 77. 37 a—c where Plato accounts for 
the generation of “sure opinions and true beliefs” (δόξαι καὶ πίστεις βέβαιοι καὶ 
ἀληθεῖς) as well as of νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη. Plato with his immaterial principles 
gives a wholly original application to the maxim ‘like is known by like.” Here 
he stands quite apart from all his predecessors, although no doubt in his theory 
of vision (777. 45 B—46C) he followed Empedocles. 

bry. ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων. In our context στοιχεῖα and ἀρχαὶ are synonymous 
terms, and we might fairly infer that this was so in the latest speculations of 
Plato and in those of his immediate followers. A. expressly asserts this of those 
who held the ideas to be numbers, MWefaph. 1087 Ὁ 12 rds ἀρχὰς ds στοιχεῖα 
καλοῦσιν. Cf. 1086 Ὁ 37—1087 a 4. 

bx8. τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. What are here called mpdy- 
ματα are to Plato γιγνόμενα, though he also, as well as A., sometimes calls 
them ὄντα. As to the principles from which “things” or phenomena are 
derived, see 7722. 27 Ὁ sqq.: ideas are the causes of phenomena, of the entire 
sensible universe with all things included therein. 

Ὁ 19. ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις. The form of this reference would 
suggest a treatise entitled Περὶ φιλοσοφίας. But our authorities inform us that 
certain oral lectures of Plato’s are intended, of which A. and possibly other 
disciples of Plato had made summaries or compendia (cf. Heitz, Die werlorenen 
Schriften des A. pp. 180, 211). In PAys. 11. 2. 194a 36 εἴρηται δ᾽ ἐν rots περὶ 
φιλοσοφίας the reference, on the other hand, is to a dialogue written by A. 
himself. διωρίσθη. With what follows cf. Zefaph. 1090 Ὁ 20—24. 

b 19. αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῷον, sc. the universe, which is explicitly termed a 
“living thing” or “organism” (¢dov) in the Tzsmaeus (cf. eg. 308 τόνδε τὸν 
κόσμον ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν re, and many other passages). Cf. Them. 12,1 H., 
21, 10 Sp. τὸ μὲν οὖν αὐτοζῷον, τουτέστι τὸν κόσμον τὸν νοητόν, ἐκ τῶν πρώτων 
ἐποίουν ἀρχῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους [sc. ζῷα] ἐκ τῶν ὑφειμένων" ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ 
ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ἰδέας αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔχειν. 

Ὁ 20. τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας, the idea of the One. In Greek mathematics ἡ 
one, though an ἀρχὴ ἀριθμῶν, is not itself a number (Mefaph. 1088 a 4—8): 
τὸ ἐν καὶ of ἀριθμοὶ is a stereotyped phrase. τοῦ πρώτου μήκους. The idea- 
number Two: as Three is the πρῶτον πλάτος and Four the πρῶτον βάθος. 
In this phase of Platonism the attempt was made to derive the three di- 
mensions of space from the idea-numbers Two, Three and Four. Metaph. 
992a Io sqq.: cf. 992 Ὁ 13 sqq., 1085 a 7 sqq., and, most explicitly, 1090 Ὁ 21 


ποιοῦσι yap (Sc. οἱ ras ἰδέας τιθέμενοι] τὰ μεγέθη ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ἐκ μὲν τῆς 


I. 2 404 Ὁ 12----Ὁ 23 223 


δυάδος τὰ μήκη, ἐκ τριάδος δ᾽ ἴσως τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ δὲ τῆς τετράδος τὰ στερεὰ ἢ καὶ ἐξ 
ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν. Them. 11, 30H., 20, 26 Sp. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ δεῖ 
πάντως τὰς ἀρχὰς παρεμφαίνεσθαι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, ὁ δὲ αἰσθητὸς ἐκ μήκους ἤδη καὶ 
πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τοῦ μὲν μήκους ἰδέαν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ἀπεφήναντο δυάδα- ἀπὸ 
γὰρ ἑνὸς ἐφ᾽ ἕν τὸ μῆκος, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ σημεῖον" τοῦ δὲ μήκους ἅμα καὶ 
πλάτους τὴν πρώτην τριάδα- πρῶτον γὰρ τῶν ἐπιπέδων σχημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ τρίγωνον. 
Cf. Metaph. 1036b 13 καὶ τῶν τὰς ἰδέας λεγόντων οἱ μὲν αὐτογραμμὴν τὴν δυάδα, οἵ 
δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς γραμμῆς" ἔνια μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὰ τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὗ τὸ εἶδος, οἷον δυάδα 
καὶ τὸ εἶδος δυάδος: ἐπὶ γραμμῆς δ᾽ οὐκέτι. Duality is assumed by A. as an 
equivalent for the formal cause of the straight line 429 b 20 ἔστω γὰρ δυάς 
[sc. τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι]. 

ὍΖ2ΖΙ:. τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα. If we may follow TZiwzaeus 30C, D these will be the 
genera and species of living things included in the universe οὗ δ᾽ ἔστι τἄλλα ζῷα 
καθ᾽ ἕν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια, τούτῳ πάντων ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τιθῶμεν. τὰ γὰρ 
δὴ νοητὰ ζῷα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὅδε ὃ κόσμος ἡμᾶς 
ὅσα τε ἄλλα θρέμματα ξυνέστηκεν ὁρατά. Them. 12, 1 H., 21, 10 Sp. τὸ μὲν οὖν 
αὐτοζῷον... ἔχειν [cited above in note on Ὁ 19 αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῷον]. 

b2z. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως: τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτον λόγον μετήεσαν is the supplement of 
Them. (12, 5 H., 21, 14 Sp.). The world of objects which the soul knows having 
been derived from idea-numbers it remained to show that the faculties which 
soul is assumed to employ for apprehending these objects admit of a similar 
deduction, in other words that soul has vots in it from the idea of Unity, 
ἐπιστήμη from the idea-number Two, δόξα from Three, Sense-perception from 
Four. The soul which knows, as well as the things which are known, is 
ultimately constituted by idea-numbers. Mr Shorey (4. /. PA. XXII. 152) 
protests against associating these ‘ fooleries of Xenocrates,’ as he calls them, 
with the teaching of Plato himself. 

Ὁ 22. povaxas. Philop. 79, 26 glosses μοναχῶς by οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. In 
Euclid’s language there can only be ove straight line between any two points: 
in other words, from any point there is only ome way of going to any other 
single point (ἐφ᾽ ἕν), Them. 11, 33 H., 21, 2 Sp. ἀπὸ yap ἑνὸς ἐφ᾽ ἕν τὸ μῆκος, 
τουτέστιν ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ σημεῖον as already cited on Ὁ 20 sufra, 26. 12,8 H., 
21, 18 Sp. τὴν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἐκ τῆς πρώτης δυάδος [sc. τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν 
δεωρίζοντο])- ἀφ᾽ ἑνὸς γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἕν καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν προτάσεων ἐπὶ τὸ 
συμπέρασμα. Cf. 407 8 26—9. 

Ὁ 23. τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν. Cf. Them. 12,9 H., 21, 21 Sp. τὴν δόξαν 
δὲ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης τριάδος, ὅσος ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμός. According to Them. 
(12, 10 H., 21, 22 Sp.) this was because the triangle is the first, or most 
elementary of plane figures: τῆς yap δόξης ἤδη καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ Ψεῦδος 
ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων. So Philop. 79, 28 566. τὸν δὲ τρία ἀριθμὸν τῇ δόξῃ ἀπένειμεν - 
ov γὰρ μοναχῶς ἡ δόξα γίνεται ὥσπερ ἡ ἐπιστήμη- ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἀληθὴς δόξα καὶ 
ψευδής, ἐπιστήμη δὲ πᾶσα ἀληθής. 

b 23. αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ. Cf. Them. 12, 11 H., 21, 24 Sp. αἴσθησιν 
δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης τετράδος ἐξ Hs καὶ ἡ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος ἰδέα" περὶ yap τὸ 
τοιοῦτον σῶμα ἡ αἴσθησις. At first this explanation seems strangely out of 
keeping with what precedes. But a clue to its meaning and at the same time a 
proof of its correctness is furnished by Zaws 894 a. Plato asks, “ What are 
the conditions of all becoming?” and replies δῆλον, ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα 
αὔξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης eis τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι 
τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἴσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις. μεταβάλλον μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ 
μετακινούμενον γίγνεται πᾶν" ἔστι δὲ ὄντως ὄν, ὁπόταν μένῃ" μεταβαλὸν δὲ eis 
ἄλλην ἕξιν διέφθαρται παντελῶς. The mathematical character of the language 


224. NOTES I. 2 


would be apparent even if A. had not told us that Plato eschewed the term 
“point” and preferred to speak of “origin of a line,” ἀρχὴ γραμμῆς (Wetaph. 
992 a 21), just as modern geometry calls a point the “origin” of coordinates. 
The point, receiving increase, grows or developes into the line, the second stage 
or μετάβασις ; from that it passes to the next stage, for a line by its motion 
generates a superficies (409a 4 sq.): by the fourth stage it reaches three 
dimensions and is perceptible to sense. Here, as in 7272. 53 C—57 Ὁ, Plato 
substitutes a mathematical deduction of body for a physical deduction. The 
world of becoming is a fleeting show, a phantasmagoria: all the reality in 
which it shares is derived from its πέρατα, point, line, surface and solid (We/aph. 
1028 Ὁ 16 sqq.). By what arguments this conclusion was recommended may 
still be seen in Mefaph. toot Ὁ 26—I1002a 14. Cf. also Metaph. 1089 a 31 sqq. 
φαίνεται δὲ ἡ ζήτησις πῶς πολλὰ τὸ ὃν τὸ κατὰ Tas οὐσίας λεγόμενον - ἀριθμοὶ yap 
καὶ μήκη καὶ σώματα τὰ γεννώμενά ἐστιν. Bonitz in his commentary (p. 576) 
assumes that Plato is here criticised. How much of the views criticised in 
Metaph. M., cc. 6—10, N., cc. I—6 belongs to Plato himself, how much to his 
school, it is very hard to determine. 

Ὁ 24 of μὲν ydp...25 ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων. Cf. Metaph. 1078 Ὁ 9—12, 1o80a 12— 
14, where it is implied that in Plato’s teaching there was first a period in which 
the ideas were quite distinct from numbers, and later a period in which they 
were presented as virtually numbers. Of this later phase there is apparently no 
trace in the extant dialogues. The subject of εἰσὲ is still οὗ ἀριθμοί. We might 
paraphrase thus: The numbers were affirmed to be just what the ideas had 
(always) been, and, whereas other philosophers had chosen material principles 
as principles of all existence, Plato made them numbers, only they were not 
ultimate, but were themselves constituted of component elements (στοιχεῖα). 
This phase of Platonism, in which the idea is a number and at the same time, 
as an-idea, the cause of being for particulars Is attested JZefaph. 10904 5 εἴπερ 
ἕκαστος τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέα τις, ἡ δ᾽ ἰδέα τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι dv δή ποτε τρόπον " 
ἔστω γὰρ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς τοῦτο. A. himself admits there the efficiency of 
the ideas as causes on this view (20. a 4) τῷ μὲν yap ἰδέας τιθεμένῳ mapéxovrai 
τιν᾽ αἰτίαν τοῖς οὖσιν. This is probably an exaltation of Plato at the expense of 
Xenocrates, who is the object of the polemic 1o90a 7—15. A. usually mentions 
two στοιχεῖα of idea-numbers. The first is always unity, the second, the μὴ ἕν 
(Metaph. 1001 b 23), is variously called the indeterminate or the unequal two, 
ἀόριστος δυάς (Metaph. 1081 a 14 sq.), ἄνισος Suds or ἄνισον (Metaph. 1087b 5, 7, 
11, 1089 Ὁ 1o sqq.), appearing sometimes as great-and-small, sometimes as 
much-and-little etc. according as magnitude or number is the product. By 
these elements or ultimate causes of the ideas or idea-numbers, however 
designated, we may understand unity and plurality: AZefaph. 1001 Ὁ 19 ἀλλὰ μὴν 
καὶ εἴ τις οὕτως ὑπολαμβᾶνει ὥστε γενέσθαι, καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες, ἐκ TOU ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ 
καὶ ἄλλου μὴ ἑνός τινος τὸν ἀριθμόν, οὐδὲν ἧττον ζητητέον διὰ τί καὶ πῶς ὁτὲ μὲν 
ἀριθμὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέγεθος ἔσται τὸ γενόμενον, εἴπερ τὸ μὴ ἕν ἡ ἀνισότης καὶ ἣ αὐτὴ 
φύσις ἦν. One consequence of assuming elements from which the idea-numbers 
were derived did not escape criticism: being derived, the idea-numbers are 
posterior to the elements from which they are derived, and A. objects that there 
are entities ἃ μᾶλλον βούλονται εἶναι.. «τοῦ ras ἰδέας εἶναι : cf. Metaph. 1079 a 14— 
19, 990 Ὁ 17—~22. 

Ὁ 25. κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα. This distinction of four faculties correlating 
with four classes of object is found in slightly varying forms in several Platonic 
dialogues. In the Repudlic 509 E—511 E the main division is into νοητὰ and 
ὁρατὰ and thus the former are divided into objects of pure reason (νόησις) and 


I. 2 404b 23—405a 3 225 


objects of understanding (διάνοια), while things visible or, more comprehensively, 
sensible objects, are subdivided into objects of belief (πίστις) and objects of 
conjecture (εἰκασία) : where, however, πίστις and εἰκασία seem to be but species 
of δόξαι Thus in the Republic at any rate the spheres of opinion (δόξα) and 
sense-perception (αἴσθησις) are not regarded as mutually exclusive. When we 
get to the 77szaeus we have again, first, a dual division of objects (51 Β sqq.), 
intelligible realities and sensible phenomena, inferred from the irreconcilable 
distinction between νοῦς and δόξα ἀληθής. The latter class of objects, sensibles, 
are in the same passage (52 A), however, described as apprehended by opinion 
with the help of sense-perception (δόξῃ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως). And in 37 B, C we have ap- 
parently the full fourfold division of faculties νοῦς...ἐπιστήμη τε.. «δόξαι καὶ πίστεις. 

b27. εἴδη δ᾽.. .τῶν πραγμάτων, “forms of things,” in A.’s technical sense of εἶδος. 
A. adds this remark in order to make clearer the nature of the numbers first 
introduced in Ὁ 20 566. : hence otro, “with which we have been dealing in this 
account of the Platonic views.” It adds nothing to the previous remark b 24 
ot μὲν yap ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ καὶ ai ἀρχαὶ ἔλέγοντο, except that τῶν πραγμάτων 
is appended to εἴδη. It seems unlikely at first sight that A. should describe the 
idea-numbers in the terms of his own system as forms of things. But, if we 
give εἴδη the Platonic sense, it is misleading to speak of “ideas of things” 
without qualification. It is true that in Mefapk. 987b 7, 1078b 31, ra τοιαῦτα 
τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσε, Bonitz joins τῶν ὄντων with ἰδέας, but he does so 
without warrant from Alex. Aphr. and τὰ τοιαῦτα is more naturally taken with 
τῶν ὄντων. The more correct phrase πάντων ἰδέας εἶναι τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων 
occurs Metaph. 1078b 33. Cf. 990b 7,12. Them., however, has no scruple in 
writing (11, 27 H., 20, 20 Sp.) εἴδη τῶν ὄντων and even (12, 3 H., 21, 13 Sp.) rds 
ἰδέας αὐτῶν [sc. τῶν αἰσθητῶν. 

b 27 ἐπεὶ δὲ...28 γνωριστικὸν οὕτως. With this punctuation οὕτως Ξετῷ ἐκ τῶν 
στοιχείων εἶναι, so that it limits the sense of γνωριστικόν. Torstrik cites for 
a similar use of οὕτως Metaph. 1053a 13 καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἕν τι οὕτως, οὐχ ὡς 
κοινόν τι τὸ ἕν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴρηται. The punctuation of οὕτως 1051 Ὁ 35, where 
Bekker put the comma before, and Christ after, οὕτως, presents a similar problem. 
Cf. Maier, SyWogzisizk I. p. 20, n. 2. 

Ὁ 28. ἔνιοι, namely Xenocrates: cf. 22/7. 408 Ὁ 32 sqq.: quum substantia 
eorum quae sunt numerus sit, cognoscatur vero simile simili, cognoscat vero 
anima, sequitur ut anima numerus sit (Torst. p. 117). 

Ὁ 30. διαφέρονται δέ. Thus under the conception of soul as cognitive and 
therefore related to the principles of things are collected philosophers as dis- 
similar as Empedocles and Plato. While they agree in reducing the soul to 
elements or principles they are not agreed on the fundamental question what 
these elements or principles are and how many of them must be assumed. 

b3I. τοῖς ἀσωμάτους, int. ποιοῦσι. 

405 34 I. τούτοις, int. δεαφέρονται. ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν, 1.6. from both corporeal 
and incorporeal principles. Empedocles and Anaxagoras are instanced by 
Simpl. (30, 30) and Philop. (82, 20), who consider the Intelligence of the latter, 
as well as the Love and Strife of the former, to be incorporeal. 

a3. ἑπομένως δὲ τούτοις, conformably with these various assumptions, i.e. the 
assumptions made by each philosopher as to the nature and number of the 
principles of things. Their view of the soul was coloured by their view of the 
universe ; the ἀρχαὶ and στοιχεῖα of the one correspond to the ἀρχαὶ and στοιχεῖα 
of the other. A. implies that this correspondence holds, not only when cognition 
is taken to be the primary characteristic of soul, but quite as much when soul is 
regarded, e.g. by Democritus, as the moving principle. 


H. T5 


226 NOTES I. 2 


a4. τό τε γὰρ κινητικὸν τὴν φύσιν τῶν πρώτων ὑπειλήφασιν. With Bonitz 
(Hermes VIL. p. 419 Sqq.) join τῶν πρώτων which is a partitive genitive with 
τὸ κινητικόν and supply after ὑπειλήφασιν τὴν ψυχὴν or τὴν Ψυχὴν εἶναι. By τὸ 
κινητικὸν τὴν φύσιν τῶν πρώτων is Meant ἐκεῖνο τῶν πρώτων 6 ἐστι κινητικὸν τὴν 
φύσιν : they conceived the soul to be that amongst first principles or primary 
elements which is by its nature capable of causing motion, 1.6. they too, as well 
as those who explained the soul from cognition, assumed the soul to be the one 
element or one of the elements of things : they selected an element by its nature 
adapted to produce motion, and declared soul to be that element. The elements 
of the early philosophers, their πρῶτα or ἀρχαί, corresponded more or less exactly 
to A.’s material cause. But sometimes a distinction was drawn between some 
elements which were inert, and one (or more) which was active and able to 
move the rest. The best commentary is furnished by Wefadh. 984b 1 where, 
as here, A. is dealing with the early philosophers, whether they assumed a single 
first principle or a plurality, and remarking the scarcely discernible trace of a 
motive cause in such systems τῶν μὲν οὖν ἕν φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ πᾶν οὐδενὶ 
συνέβη τὴν τοιαύτην [int. τὴν ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίημεν, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς 
κινήσεως} συνιδεῖν αἰτίαν, πλὴν εἰ ἄρα Παρμενίδῃ [in τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, where he 
apparently admits two principles]...(b 5) τοῖς δὲ δὴ πλείω ποιοῦσι μᾶλλον ἐνδέχεται 
λέγειν, οἷον τοῖς θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἢ πῦρ καὶ γῆν χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς κινητικὴν ἔχοντι 
τῷ πυρὶ τὴν φύσιν, ὕδατι δὲ καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις τοὐναντίον. Cf. 983b 7 566. 

An alternative would be to take τῶν πρώτων as predicate with ὑπειλήφασιν, 
by the same construction as that of τῶν καλῶν (4028 1): and so the Greek 
commentators. ‘They supposed that what in its own nature is capable of 
causing motion is one of the primary causes.” If the words are so taken, 
then, since they regarded the soul as capable by its own nature of causing 
motion, it follows that the soul is one of the primary causes: Them. (13, 7 H., 
23, 15 Sp.) εὔλογον yap καὶ λίαν πιθανὸν τὴν κινητικωτάτην αἰτίαν ἐν ταῖς πρώταις 
ἀρχαῖς κατατάττειν. Cf. Philop. 82, 36 and Simpl. 30, 33 sqq. Bonitz objects 
that it is the ἀρχὴ which determines what the soul is, and not the soul which 
determines what the ἀρχή shall be (405 a 3 ἑπομένως Trovros). This is clear from 
the parallel case of those who explained the soul as cognitive. Quite apart 
from this, the passage cited from JZezaph. 984 Ὁ 1 sqq. seems conclusive as 
against such a recognition of the moving principle, at any rate by the earlier 
Ionian philosophers, who nevertheless are subsequently adduced as considering 
soul from the side of motivity, e.g. Thales, Diogenes, Heraclitus. By τῶν πρώτων 
we are to understand the first causes (afria) or principles (dpyai) or elements 
(στοιχεῖα) which the philosophers in question assumed, and these, as we have 
seen above, were generally what A. calls material causes, e.g. the atoms are τὰ 
πρῶτα of Democritus, cf. Jfeteor. 1. 1. 338 a 20 τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια τῆς φύσεως, 
Phys. Vill. 9, 265 Ὁ 27 τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων (sc. κινήσεων) οὐδεμίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πρώτοις 
ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων οἴονται, Metaph. 982 a 26 ἐπιστῆμαι at μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων 
εἰσίν, Anal. Post. 1. 2, 728 6 ταὐτὸ γὰρ λέγω πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχήν, Top. IV. 1, 
121 Ὁ 9 ἣ τε γὰρ ἀρχὴ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχή, Metaph. 1013 a 2 ἀπὸ τοῦ 
πρώτου καὶ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχῆς. Lastly, as to re yap, it is probable that this 
should be added to the passages in A. where re yap=etenim. See Shilleto 
Dem. De Falsa Leg. § 176. Ind. Ar. 750a 13 relinquuntur certe loci quidam, 
in quibus coniunctis particulis re γάρ non aliam apparet vim inesse quam 
simplici γάρ vel καὶ γάρ veluti Pol. 1333 8 2, 1318b 32 sqq., Post. Anal. I. 9, 
5 Ὁ 41, De Part. An. Wl. τ, 661 Ὁ 28. Cf. Bz Zischr. Κ Ost. Gym. 1867, 
‘pp. 672—682. 

ἃ 5. ὅθεν. This must go back to a3 ἑπομένως δὲ τούτοις. The general 


Ι, 2 405a 4—ag 227 


agreement between the choice of ἀρχαὶ and the explanation of soul applies 
particularly in the case of fire. In Metaph. A., c. 8, Aristotle is criticising those 
who assumed a single material principle, corporeal and extended, 988 b 22 ὅσοι 
μὲν οὖν ἔν re τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ 
μέγεθος ἔχουσαν. He remarks that the transformation of the ἁπλᾶ σώματα may 
be regarded as the effect either of σύγκρισις or of διάκρισις. The former view 
requires in strict consistency that fire as being μικρομερέστατον and λεπτότατον 
should be taken for the primary element, 988b 32 τὰ μὲν γὰρ [sc. τῶν ἁπλῶν 
σωμάτων] συγκρίσει, τὰ δὲ διακρίσει ἐξ ἀλλήλων γίγνεται, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τὸ πρότερον 
εἶναι καὶ ὕστερον διαφέρει πλεῖστον. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἂν δόξειε στοιχειωδέστατον εἶναι 
πάντων ἐξ. οὗ γίγνονται συγκρίσει πρώτου, τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ μικρομερέστατον καὶ 
λεπτότατον ἂν εἴη τῶν σωμάτων. διόπερ ὅσοι πῦρ ἀρχὴν τιθέασι μάλιστα ὅὁμολογου- 
μένως ἂν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ λέγοιεν. mip εἶναι, Int. τὴν ψυχήν. 

a6 λεπτομερέστατόν τε καὶ...7 ἀσώματον, int. ἐστίν. Kaliexplicative. A. cannot 
mean that fire is incorporeal absolutely or in the strict sense of the term, but 
only that it is so relatively to the other three ἁπλᾶ σώματα air, water and earth. 
The same meaning must be given to 405a 7 ἀσώματον, 405b 12 ἀσωμάτῳ and 
409 21 τὸ ἀσωματώτατον τῶν ἄλλων. Cf. Philop. 83, 27 ἀσώματον δὲ εἶπε τὸ πῦρ, 
ov κυρίως ἀσώματον (οὐδεὶς γὰρ αὐτῶν τοῦτο ἔλεγε), ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐν σώμασιν ἀσώματον 
[fort. leg. ὃν] διὰ λεπτομέρειαν. 

a7. ἔτι δὲ κινεῖταί τε καὶ κινεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πρώτως. Not only is fire the element 
most suitable for ἀρχὴ or material principle, if we put ourselves in the position 
of the early philosophers accepting their presuppositions and the explanation of 
γένεσις by σύγκρισις : it further appears (ἔτι) that fire satisfies the condition laid 
down above (403 Ὁ 29) καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν, which, as 
we there saw, under the same presuppositions involved the assumption τῶν 
κινουμένων τι τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι. For πρώτως see on 403b 29. 

a8. γλαφυρωτέρως. The term implies praise (Philop. 84,9). It is used of 
Charondas Pol. 1274 Ὁ 8 Χαρώνδας τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ 
τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν, and the Cretan constitution is said to be “less neatly finished” 
than that of Sparta 1271 Ὁ 21 ἧττον γλαφυρῶς ἔχει, for which cf. 1271 Ὁ 24 ἧττον 
διήρθρωται: De Part. An. τι. 4. 650b 18 συμβαίνει δ᾽ ἔνιά ye καὶ γλαφυρωτέραν 
ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν τοιούτων, in certain animals intelligence attains a more 
finished perfection. A. was fully alive to the relative superiority of Democritus 
so far as purely physical explanations are concerned. Cf. De Gen. εἴ Corr. 1. 2, 
2158 34—b1, 316a 5 sqq., 325a 28. In Zellers words “he explained all 
phenomena in a strictly scientific manner from the same principles.” Cf. 
Dyroff, of. ct#t., Ὁ. 79, pp- 1160—I22. 

8.9. Sid τί τούτων ἑκάτερον, int. συμβέβηκεν (as in 413b 10): why the soul 
(1) is Aerropepécrarov and (2) κινεῖταί τε καὶ κινεῖ, The common view that the 
power to impart motion implies mobility (cf 403b 29) was shared by the 
Atomists (404a 7—9), so that these two attributes need not be separated: 
but the fineness of the texture or structure of a body has a limit in the 
indivisibility of the atoms of which it is composed. This I take to be the 
point of the words alo, τοῦτο &...caudrev. Having thus proved (1) A. goes 
on to prove (2), 810---13 κινητικὸν S€...rip. The Greek commentators were 
divided. Simpl. (31, 8 544.) apparently took τούτων to mean τοῦ γνωριστικοῦ καὶ 
τοῦ κινητικοῦ, a view adopted by Zeller, PAzl. der Griech. 1.5 p. 902, n. 4. When 
we find below (405 a 17) that A. himself uses ἄμφω and adds an explanation τό 
τε γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, it is natural to explain ἑκάτερον here in the same way, 
viz., cognition and motivity. But the plain sense of ag—13 excludes this 
explanation, nothing being there said of cognition, while both the motive and 


I5—2 


228 NOTES I. 2 


mobile qualities of fire and of the soul dare there attributed to the minuteness 
and the spherical shape of the atoms of which they are composed. On the 
other hand Them. (13, 11 566. H., 23, 20 sqq. Sp.) and Philop. (84, 10 544.) under- 
stand ἑκάτερον to mean simply (1) τὸ κινεῖν and (2) τὸ κινεῖσθαι : and the proof 
of these attributes is certainly contained inag—13. The words of Them. are 
Anp. ἑκάτερον...ἐδείκνυ, τὸ μὲν κινεῖν διὰ τὴν σμικρομέρειαν, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ 
σχῆμα’ ἄμφω γὰρ οἴεται ὑπάρχειν ταῖς σφαιροειδέσιν ἀτόμοις. But the superiority 
of Atomism over other physical theories is that it can explain both facts: the 
finest atoms account for the fineness of a material structure, spherical atoms for 
mobility and therefore for motive power. 

ἃ τὸ, τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναι..-.σωμάτων. The neuter τοῦτο seems influenced by the 
preceding ταὐτό. Cf. 430a 23, where the change from masculine to neuter is due 
to τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστέ. To insert the preposition ἐκ after εἶναι with some MSS. 
would, as Torstrik explains, not so well accord with the view expounded 4048 
1o—16: nam id quod constat ex elementis, quodammodo diversum est ab lis: 
elementa enim plura, hoc unum est. At Democritus animam esse voluit potius 
ipsa rudia elementa nullo unitatis vinculo comprehensa. The atoms are now 
designated σώματα, above (404 a 2, 7) they were called “shapes” or “figures,” and 
below (406 Ὁ 20 sq.) they are called “indivisible spheres.” 

a Il. λεπτομέρειαν. If this is the genuine reading, we may trace a con- 
nexion with the view of Democritus as reported by Theophrastus De Senszbus 
75 (Diels Doxogr. 521, 24), probably in reference to the fusing of metals, that 
things which are red hot are not so hot as those at a white heat (θερμὸν yap τὸ 
λεπτόν), the rapid motion of the finest particles thus generating both white 
colour and intense heat. Philop. 84, 21—85, 16 conjectures that in making 
spherical atoms μικρομερέστατας Dem. was guided by the geometrical pro- 
position that of all solids with equal surface the sphere encloses the greatest 
mass. 

δι 12. τοιοῦτον, 1.q. σφαιροειδές. Cf. 4048 2, 6. 

8 14. πρότερον, viz. 404 b 1—6, where see notes. χρῆται δ᾽ ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾷ 
φύσει: ἀμφοῖν refers to ψυχή and νοῦς, which according to 404 Ὁ 1—3 Anaxagoras 
sometimes distinguished, sometimes confused. Here A. virtually admits that 
Anaxagoras treated them as identical, as two different terms for one and the 
same objective entity. The word φύσις in A. sometimes denotes vaguely an 
entity or thing, eg. Aefafh. 1052b 12 πρᾶγμά τι καὶ φύσις. It is used of a 
faculty in the soul, £th. Mic. 1102 Ὁ 13 ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος, of 
A.’s causes, especially the material cause, 983b 13, 17, 988b 22, and the final 
cause 988 b 12, of the category of relation 1089 Ὁ 7, 1089 a 13, even of Not-being 
itself 1089a 19 ταύτην τὴν φύσιν λέγει τὸ οὐκ Sv. Sometimes it is almost peri- 
phrastically joined with a genitive, e.g. 27/7. 405 Ὁ 7 τὴν τοῦ αἵματος φύσιν, the 
entity which is blood, 416a9 ἡ rot πυρὸς φύσις. There is a close parallel to 
the language here in Melaph. 985 a 33 οὐ μὴν χρῆταί ye [sc. Empedocles] 
τέτταρσιν; ἀλλ᾽ ὡς δυσὶν οὖσι μόνοις, πυρὶ μὲν καθ᾽ αὗτό, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀντικειμένοις ὡς 
μιᾷ φύσει, γῇ τε καὶ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι. 

δ 15. πλὴν ἀρχήν ye. In his own account of the evolution of the world from 
chaos Anaxagoras uses the term νοῦς and not ψυχή (as to Plato Crat. see note 
on 404b 1 sufr.). From Mezaph. 984 Ὁ 20—22 of μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνοντες 
«τοῖς οὖσιν it appears that A. regarded this νοῦς of Anaxagoras as at once 
a final and a moving cause, though at the same time he complains (985 a 
18—20) of the inadequate use which Anaxagoras made of his principle. 

8. 15. μάλιστα πάντων. I take this, with Simpl. 31, 18 and Philop. 85, 34, asa 
stronger μάλιστα (cf e.g. Mefaph. 991 a 8, loo1a 2z2and πάντων ἥκιστα 1088 a 23), 


I. 2 405 a 9---ἃ 20 229 


just as sravros μᾶλλον is an emphatic μᾶλλον, both expressions being favourites 
with Attic writers, especially Plato. Themistius, however (13, 16 H., 23, 28 sq. 
Sp.), gives a different turn to the sentences, paraphrasing thus: ἀρχήν φησι σχεδόν 
τι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων. It is quite easy to see how he reached this interpretation. 
If νοῦς is described by Anaxagoras as “divisible and as ‘inhabiting some 
things,’ i.e. all things which have life,” clearly it does not so inhabit all things 
whatever. Thus Them. must have conceived ἀρχή in the sense of internal 
principle, ἐνυπάρχον τι Or στοιχεῖον. It is most improbable, however, that A. 
intended ἀρχή to bear this sense, it must mean what it means below a 18, what 
in 404 Ὁ 2 is expressed by τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς, and ἀρχή standing alone, 
as in ἃ 18, would be sufficient to indicate this. In any case μάλιστα should not 
be separated from πάντων, as if the former word went with τίθεται in the sense 
of potisstmum and the latter with ἀρχή. As to ἁπάντων, the variant of 
codd. Sy, the testimony of Them. is of little weight, as he is very fond of 
changing πᾶς of the text into ἅπας, as anyone may easily verify for himself. 

a 16 μόνον yotv...17 καθαρόν, “at all events he asserts that mind and mind 
alone of all things that are is simple, unmixed and pure.” Cf. Anax. frag. 
12D. This long fragment begins thus: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, 
νοῦς δέ ἔστιν ἄπειρον καὶ avroxparés καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος 
αὐτὸς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλά τεῳ ἐμέμεικτο ἄλλῳ, μετεῖχεν 
ἂν ἁπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμεικτό τεῳ ἐν παντὶ γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἕνεστιν, 
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν | fr. II] μοι λέλεκται. καὶ ἂν ἐκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμ- 
μεμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐόντα ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ. 
ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ 
παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον. καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ μείζω καὶ 
ἐλάσσω, πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ. καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, 
ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἤρξατο περιχωρεῖν, 
ἐπὶ δὲ πλέον περιχωρεῖ, καὶ περιχωρήσει ἐπὶ πλέον. καὶ τὰ συμμισγόμενά τε καὶ 
ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς. καὶ érota ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ 
ὁποῖα ἦν, ἅσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι καὶ ὁποῖα ἔστι, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς, καὶ τὴν 
περιχώρησιν ταύτην, ἣν νῦν περιχωρέει τά τε ἄστρα καὶ 6 ἥλιος καὶ 7 σελήνη 
καὶ ὃ ἀὴρ καὶ ὁ αἰθὴρ οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι. ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις αὐτὴ ἐποίησεν ἀπο- 
κρίνεσθαι. καὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἀπό τε τοῦ ἀραιοῦ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερ- 
μὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διεροῦ τὸ ξηρόν. μοῖραι δὲ 
πολλαὶ πολλῶν εἶσι. παντάπασι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ 
τοῦ ἑτέρου πλὴν νοῦ. νοῦς δε πᾶς ὅμοιός ἐστι καὶ 6 μείζων καὶ 6 ἔλάττων. ἕτερον 
δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὅμοιον οὐδενί, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτων πλεῖστα ἕνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἕν ἕκαστόν 
ἐστι καὶ ἦν. 

To νοῦς as thus described A. returns 77/7. Ὁ 19, 429 a 18—20, Ὁ 22 sqq. and its 
great influence on A.’s own doctrine must be my apology for citing the 
fragment in full. 

a 18. τό τε γινώσκειν. Cf. Anax. frag. 12 D καὶ τὰ συμμισγόμενά τε καὶ 
ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς, and supr. καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ 
παντὸς πτᾶσαν ἴσχει, cited in last note. Cf. 4298 18—2o. καὶ τὰ κινεῖν. Anax. 
ραρ. τ2 Ὃ καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι 
τὴν ἀρχήν, and ,γῶρ. 13 D καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου 
σγαντὸς ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὅσον ἐκίνησεν ὃ νοῦς, πᾶν τοῦτο διεκρίθη: κινουμένων δὲ καὶ 
διακρινομένων ἡ περιχώρησις πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐποίει διακρίνεσθαι. 

alg. Θαλῆς. Cf. 4118 8, Metaph. ο83 Ὁ 20 sqq., ο84 ἃ 2. 

αι 20. τὸν λίθον, sc. τὸν μάγνητα, the Magnesian stone, the magnet or lode- 
stone, so called from the town (probably the Lydian, though according to Pliny 
the Thessalian, Magnesia). Cf. Plat. Jom 533D ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ λίθῳ, ἣν Εὐριπίδης 


230 NOTES I. 2 


μὲν Μαγνῆτιν ὠνόμασεν, of δὲ πολλοὶ Ἑρακλείαν. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ λίθος ov μόνον 
αὐτοὺς τοὺς δακτυλίους ἄγει τοὺς σιδηροῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ἐντίθησι τοῖς δακτυ- 
λίοις, Sor αὖ δύνασθαι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ὅπερ ἡ λίθος, ἄλλους ἄγειν δακτυλίους, 
ὥστ᾽ ἐνίοτε ὁρμαθὸς μακρὸς πάνυ σιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἤρτηται. 
Cf. Lucr. VI. 908 sq. 

quem Magneta vocant patrio de nomine Grai, 

Magnetum quia fit patriis in finibus ortus, 
where see Munro’s note. Diog. Laert. I. 24 "ApiororéAns δὲ καὶ Ἱππίας φασὶν 
αὐτὸν [Thales] καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις μεταδιδόναι ψυχῆς, τεκμαιρόμενον ἐκ τῆς λίθου τῆς 
μαγνήτιδος καὶ τοῦ ἠλέκτρου. 

ει. 21. Διογένης, i.e. Diogenes of Apollonia (Diog. Laert. IX. 57): ἃ town in Crete 
according to Steph. Byz. 106, 13, although Aelian 7. 4. 11. 31 referred him to the 
Phrygian Apollonia. He is ridiculed in the Clouds of Aristophanes, 227 566. 
(cf. Diels in Rhein. Mus. XLII. 12 sqq.), wrote a Περὶ φύσεως, from which Simpl. 
quotes (J Physica 151, 28 sqq., 153, 17, 20), and is criticised by Theophr. 
De Senstbus, 39—45 (Doxogr. Gr. p. 510 sqq.). See further concerning him 
Siebeck, Gesch. der Psych. τ. 82 sqq., 115 sqq., 132 sqq., 150, Burnet, arly 
Greek Phitosophers, Ὁ. 359 sqq., Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, Bk Il. ch. 3, 
p. 370 sqq., Eng. Tr. The latter regards him as an eclectic influenced by 
Leucippus and Anaxagoras (Simpl. Jz PAys. 25. 3) in spite of his antagonistic 
attitude to the main principles of their systems. Cf. Simpl. 7z Phys. 152, 18 
Lyrag. 4 DI ἄνθρωποι γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀναπνέοντα ζώει τῷ ἀέρι. καὶ τοῦτο 
αὐτοῖς καὶ ψυχή ἐστι καὶ Vanes, and Simpl. Phys. I, 152, 22 frag. 5 D] Kai μοι 
δοκεῖ τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὁ ἀὴρ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου 
πάντας καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν: αὐτὸ γάρ μοι τοῦτο θεὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ 
ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφῖχθαι καὶ πάντα διατιθέναι καὶ ἐν avi ἐνεῖναι. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἕν ὅ τι μὴ 
μετέχει τούτου. μετέχει δὲ οὐδὲ ἕν ὁμοίως τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ τρόποι 
καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τῆς νοήσιός εἰσιν. ἔστι γὰρ πολύτροπος καὶ θερμότερος καὶ 
ψυχρότερος καὶ ξηρότερος καὶ ὑγρότερος καὶ στασιμώτερος καὶ ὀξυτέρην κίνησιν ἔχων, 
καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ ἑτεροιώσιες ἔνεισι καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ χροιῆς ἄπειροι κατ. λ. See also 
Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition. 

ἃ 21. ἕτεροί τινες. Cf. Aetii Plac, τν. 3. 2 [Doxogr. Gr. 387 Ὁ 10] ᾿Αναξιμένης 
᾿Αναξαγόρας ᾿Αρχέλαος Διογένης ἀερώδη [int. τὴν Ψυχὴν ἀπεφήναντο), Theodoret 
Graec. aff. Cur. V. τὸ ᾿Αναξιμένης δὲ καὶ ᾿Αναξίμανδρος καὶ ᾿Αναξαγόρας καὶ ᾿Αρχέλαος 
ἀερώδη τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν φύσιν εἰρήκασιν. Aecetii Plac. 1. 3, 4 [Anaximenes frag. 2 Ὁ 
Doxogr. Gr. 2788. 12, Ὁ 87 οἷον ἡ ψυχή; φησίν, ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀὴρ οὖσα συγκρατεῖ 
ἡμᾶς. In Pl. Phaedo ο6 Β the-views πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ 
ὁ ἀήρ, ἢ τὸ πῦρ, are mentioned side by side as familiar to Socrates when engaged 
in the study of nature. A. is reticent about Anaximenes, who, however, is 
credited with this view by later authorities, cf. Tertull. De Amzma c. 9 
(secundum quosdam), Macrob. Somn. Scifion. 1. 14, 20. 

223. γινώσκειν τε kal κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν. That to Diogenes knowledge included 
all forms of sense-perception is clear from the last words of frag. 5 ὅμως δὲ πάντα 
τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ (7 καὶ ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀκούει καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νόησιν ἔχει ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάντα. 
The evidence for κινεῖν is not so obvious from the scanty fragments extant, but at 
the beginning of jrag. 5 the functions of governing and controlling ὑπὸ τούτου 
πάντας κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν appear to be transferred to air from the 
νοῦς of Anaxagoras. This would suffice for Aristotle, who has argued above (404 a 
25 sqq.) that the Anaxagorean νοῦς is κινητικός (cf. 404b 8). The following 
sentence (a 23—5) 7 μὲν πρῶτον. ..κινητικὸν εἶναι reads like an inference drawn 
by A. himself in his constant endeavour to interpret more precisely the vague 
theories of his predecessors. Cf. 404b I ἥττον διασαφεῖ and the notorious 


I. 2 405 a 20—a 30 231 


reconstructions of the Empedoclean and Anaxagorean teaching, Metaph. 993 a 
15 —24, 989 a 30—b 21. 

a 26. εἵπερ: cf. the similar clause about Thales a20. In both cases the 
sentence with εἴπερ gives the ground of an inference drawn by A. τὸν ἀναθυ- 
μίασιν. Probably a term first used by Heraclitus: at any rate the verb occurs 
in frag. 42 Byw., 12 D=Arius Did. (ap. Euseb. in Diels, Doxographi, 471, 
I sqq.) Ζήνων τὴν Ψυχὴν λέγει αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, καθάπερ “Ἡράκλειτος 
βουλόμενος γὰρ ἐμφανίσαι, ὅτι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἀναθυμιώμεναι νοεραὶ ἀεὶ γίνονται, εἴκασεν 
αὐτὰς τοῖς ποταμοῖς λέγων οὕτως- ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα 
καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ" καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται. ἀναθυμίασιν 
μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως τῷ Ἡρακλειτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνει Ζήνων. Hence Bywater 
concludes: est igitur hoc dictum Zenoni tribuendumn, scilicet Heraclitea verba 
libere citanti inque suum usum accommodanti. Thus, according to Heraclitus, 
the soul is vapour or heat rising from moisture (Auch die Seelen diinsten aus 
dem Feuchten hervor, D). As to the grammatical construction, supply from the 
preceding clause εἶναί φησι ψυχὴν. If, according to Heraclitus, all other things 
are derived from vapour, vapour is his ἀρχή: if this vapour be identified with 
soul, then his ἀρχὴ is soul: which is the same thing as saying that the soul 15 
his ἀρχή. συνίστησιν, “constructs,” le. represents as constructed. Cf. supr. 
404b 17 ποιεῖ. Heraclitus also called his ἀρχὴ “fire,” which he does not seem 
to have clearly distinguished from dry air or heat (Latin weafor), Compare 
the well-known dictum ain Ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη, frag. 74 Byw., 118 Ὁ. 

a 27. ἀσωματώτατον, aS above 405 a 7, relatively incorporeal or least 
corporeal. τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ γινώσκεσθαι. A special application of 
the maxim 404 Ὁ 17 γινώσκεσθαι τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον: if the object known be 
in motion, then the soul by which it is known must also be in motion, 
ῥέον ἀεί. 

8. 28. ἐν κινήσει δ᾽ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα. For this doctrine cf. Plato, Craz. 402 A 
λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος, ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων 
τὰ ὄντα λέγει, ὡς δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης. Also Theaet. 180D, 
where the doctrine ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται is ascribed to the later Heracliteans, 
facetiously styled “philosophers in flux” (τοὺς ῥέοντας), 26. 181 A. 

a29. τούτοις, 1.6. Thales, Diogenes of Apollonia, Heraclitus. 

azo. ᾿Αλκμαίων of Croton: physician of the 5th century, of whom we learn 
some interesting particulars, e.g. that he regarded the brain as the seat of 
sensation, Theophr. de Sensibus § 26 (Doxogr. Gr. 507), Plut. Plac. τν. 17 
(Diels, Doxogr. Gr. 407, 2). But he distinguished between sense-perception and 
intelligence, the latter being, according to him, peculiar to man. ἄνθρωπον γὰρ 
[φησὶ] τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρειν ore μόνον ξυνίησι, ra δ᾽ ἄλλα αἰσθάνεται μέν, οὐ ξυνίησι 
δέ (Doxogr. Gr. 506, 26). See Beare, of. οἱζ. p. 251. It is probably Alcmaeon’s 
view which is cited in some detail in Phaedo 96B ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ᾽ 
ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὃ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκουέιν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ 
τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης, λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, κατὰ 
ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. The speech of Eryximachus in Pl. Symp. 186 Β sqq. 
seems to owe not a little to Alcmaeon. 

a 30. ἀθάνατον εἶναι. This tenet is attributed to Alcmaeon by Boethus, 
apud Euseb. Praep. Av. X1. 28. 5, Diog. Laert. VIII. 83, Stobaeus ζω. I. 49 
[Doxogr. Gr. 386b 4 sqq.]: cf. Theodoret Graec. af. Cur. ν. 17 [Doxagr. Gr. 
386 τὸ 6]. On the other hand Alcmaeon held, according to Arist. Prodl. 
XVII. 3, 916a 33, that men are nevertheless perishable beings (ἀπόλλυσθαι) 
because they cannot join their beginning to their end (ὅτε οὐ δύνανται τὴν 
ἀρχὴν τῷ τέλει wmpoodyat). This means, according to Gomperz, that “if old age 


232 NOTES I. 2 


were not merely figuratively but literally a second childhood, men (and animals) 
would be able to live for ever, since a cycle would be created which could be 
constantly renewed. But the series of changes suffered at the various periods 
of human (and animal) life follow a progressive and not a cyclical line” (Greek 
Thinkers, Eng. Tr. I. p. 151). 

405b 1. τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον. This term originally meant the firmament, 
but was naturally employed by philosophers for the world or universe (lke 
κόσμος). In certain passages it is matter of doubt in which of these ways it 
should be interpreted, e.g. Metaph. 986 Ὁ 24 εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ Ev 
εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν (sc. Ξενοφάνης). Cf. the Epicurean criticism in Cic. De Wat. 
Deor. 1. 1. 27 Crotoniates autem Alcmaeon, qui soli et lunae reliquisque 
sideribus animoque praeterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit sese mortalibus rebus 
immortalitatem dare; Clem. Alex. Protrept. 66. 58 P. ὁ γάρ τοι Κροτωνιάτης 
᾿Αλκμαέων θεοὺς ᾧετο τοὺς ἀστέρας εἶναι ἐμψύχους ὄντας. 

bi. τῶν δὲ φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο, int, τὴν ψυχήν. The term 
φορτικός is found in £¢h. Vic. as the opposite of πεπαιδευμένος and χαρίεις, and 
means approximately “vulgar.” As applied intellectually, it serves to censure 
crude thinking or incapacity to seize distinctions. Thus in ἄγ. I. 2, 185 a το, 
3, 186a 8 the theory or reasoning (λόγος) of Melissus is called φορτικός, while 
in Metaph. 986b 27 Melissus himself and Xenophanes are termed ἀγροικότεροι 
as opposed to Parmenides who is μᾶλλον βλέπων. In Metaph. too1b 14 the 
subtler Eleatic Zeno is said φορτικῶς θεωρεῖν. Again, in De Part. Anim. I. 7, 
652 Ὁ 8 those who identify the soul with fire are censured as making a crude 
assumption (φορτικῶς τιθέντες), aS 1s Hippon here. 

Ῥ2. καθάπερ Ἵππων. The fuller form of the name Ἱππῶναξ is preserved 
Aet. Plac. ν. 7.3 (Doxogr. Gr. 419 a 24): cf. Anonymi Londin. Ex Arist. Jatr. 
Menon. eclogae, 11, 22 sqq. “Irm7<ov> [or Ἱππί(ῶναξ)]} δὲ 6 Κροτωνιάτης οἴεται ἐν 
ἡμῖν οἰκείαν εἶν αἱ ὑγρότητα, καθ᾽ ἣν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ ἣ ζῶμεν " ὅταν μὲν οὖν οἰκείως 
ἔχῃ ἡ τοιαύτη ὑγρότης, ὑγιαίνει τὸ ζῷον, ὅταν δὲ ἀν αξηραν θῇ, ἀναισθητεῖ δὲ τὸ ζῶον καὶ 
ἀποθνήσκει. διὰ δὴ τοῦτο οἵ γέροντες ξηροὶ καὶ ἀναίσθητοι, ὅτε χωρὶς ὑγρότητος" 
ἀναλόγως δὲ τὰ πέλματα ἀναίσθητα, ὅτι ἄμοιρα ὑγρότητος. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἄχρι 
τούτου φησίν. ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ βιβλίῳ αὑτὸς ἀνὴρ λέγει τὴν κατωνομασμένην ὑγρότητα 
μεταβάλλειν δι᾽ ὑπερβολὴν θερμότητος καὶ δι᾿ ὑπερβολὴν ψυχρότητος καὶ οὕτως νόσους 
ἐπιφέρειν, μεταβάλλειν δέ φησιν αὐτὴν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον ὑγρὸν ἣ ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον ἢ 
ἐπὶ τὸ παχυμερέστερον ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ λεπτομερέστερον ἢ εἰς ἕτερα, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον οὕτως 
νοσολογεῖ, τὰς δὲ νόσους τὰς γινομένας οὐχ ὑπαγορεύει.Ἡ This important fragment 
shows that Hippon, like Diogenes of Apollonia, Alcmaeon and Philolaus, was a 
physician as well as a philosopher, and, like Diogenes of Apollonia, an eclectic 
adapting one of the older Ionian theories (this time that of Thales) to the 
newer speculations introduced by Parmenides. From Schol. Ven. ad Aristoph. 
Nub. 96 sqq. we learn that Hippon had been ridiculed in the Havéara of 
Cratinus before Aristophanes brought out the CJlowds, so that he must have 
lived in the age of Pericles, and that Cratinus attacked him for his impiety (Schol. 
Clem. Profrepé. I. 422, 23 sq. Dind., Iv. 103 Klotz), and the epithet ἄθεος seems to 
have stuck to him (Philop. ad Aune loc. 88, 23, Simpl. 122 Phys. 23, 22, Clem. Alex. 
Protrept. 24, p. 20P., loann. Diac., Alleg. in Hes. Theog. 116). In Metaph. 
984a 3 A. passes him over scornfully with a sneer at the tenuity of his intellect. 
A better summary is furnished by Hippolytus, Refuz. haeres. 1. 16 [Doxogr. 
Gr. 566] “I. δὲ ὁ Ῥηγῖνος ἀρχὰς ἔφη ψυχρὸν τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ θερμὸν τὸ πῦρ. γενόμενον 
δὲ τὸ πῦρ ὑπὸ ὕδατος κατανικῆσαι τὴν τοῦ γεννήσαντος δύναμιν συστῆσαί τε τὸν 
κόσμον, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἐγκέφαλον λέγει, ποτὲ δὲ ὕδωρ: καὶ γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα εἶναι, 
«:κατὰ;» τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν, ἐξ ὑγροῦ, ἐξ οὗ φησὶ ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι. Croton is 


I, 2 405a 30—bg 233 


more likely to have been his birthplace than either Rhegium or Metapontum 
(Censorinus). According to Aristoxenus apud Censorinum, De de natali, c. 5, 
and Iamblichus Κα Pyth. 267, it was Samos. 

b 3. πεισθῆναι δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῆς yours. A. makes much the same remark 
about Thales, Afetaph. 983b 26. 

b 4. τοὺς αἷμα φάσκοντας τὴν Ψυχήν. Doubtless with special reference to 
Empedocles, frag. 105 D, 317 Καὶ αἷμα yap ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα. 
Hippon’s polemic against Empedocles recalls Diogenes of Apollonia’s correction 
of Anaxagoras, frag. 5 D. 

Ὁ 5. ταύτην, Sc. τὴν γονήν. 

Ῥ6. Κριτίας, the famous Athenian oligarch, leader of the Thirty. There 
seems no reason to question his identity, in spite of the opposite opinion cited 
as Alexanders by Philop. 89, 8 Κριτίαν εἴτε τὸν ἕνα τῶν τριάκοντα, ὃς καὶ 
Σωκράτους ἠκροάσατο, ἢ καὶ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγει, οὐδὲν διαφερόμεθα. φασὶ δὲ καὶ 
ἄλλον Κριτίαν γεγονέναι σοφιστήν, οὗ καὶ τὰ φερόμενα συγγράμματα εἶναι, ὡς 
᾿Αλέξανδρος λέγει: τὸν γὰρ τῶν τριάκοντα μηδὲ γεγραφέναι ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἸΤολιτείας 
ἐμμέτρους. Philoponus in the introduction to his commentary had previously 
referred to Critias as follows: 9, 3 καθόλου δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν of μέν φασιν ἀσώματον 
εἶναι, of δὲ σῶμα’ καὶ τῶν σῶμα οἱ μὲν ἁπλοῦν, of δὲ σύνθετον" καὶ τῶν σύνθετον oi 
μὲν ἐκ συνημμένων σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ ἀσυνάπτων.... 9, 19 of δὲ ἐκ συνημμένων, ὡς 
Κριτίας, 6 εἷς τῶν τριάκοντα" αἷμα γὰρ ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, “ αἷμα yap,” φησιν, 
“ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα." The blunder in the citation of this verse of 
Empedocles as if Critias were the author is attributed to Philoponus himself by 
Diels, Doxogr. Gr. 214. 

Ὁ 7. τοῦτο δ᾽, int. τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. ὕὑπάρχειν, int. τῇ ψυχῆ. διὰ τὴν τοῦ 
αἵματος φύσιν. See on 405 a 14 ὧς μιᾷ φύσει. Here φύσις is virtually οὐσία. 
The parts without blood, e.g. bones and hair, are destitute of sensation, as 
Aristotle points out 410 a 30 sqq. 

b8. πάντα γὰρ...πλὴν τῆς γῆς “have secured the vote of at least one 
adjudicator.” The metaphor, of which A. 15 fond (cf. Meraph. 989 a 6 sqq., 
Pol. 1337 a 42), comes from the method of awarding the prize in dramatic 
contests. Similarly in Mefafz. loc. cit. A. remarks that fire, water and air have 
each been selected by one philosopher or another as the material principle of 
things: τῶν δὲ τριῶν ἕκαστον στοιχείων εἴληφε κριτὴν τινα" ot μὲν yap [sc. τῶν 
ἐν λεγόντων] πῦρ, οἱ δ᾽ ὕδωρ, οἱ δ᾽ ἀέρα τοῦτ᾽ εἶναί φασιν. καίτοι διὰ τί ποτ᾽ οὐ 
καὶ τὴν γῆν λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ; 

bg. ταύτην, int. τὴν γῆν. πλὴν εἴ τις αὐτὴν...10 ἢ πάντα. αὐτήν 1.6. τὴν ψυχήν. 
Empedocles includes earth amongst the four elements of soul (404 Ὁ 13). For 
the difference between ἐκ πάντων εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων and πάντα (εἶναι τὰ 
στοιχεῖα) cf. 404 Ὁ 12 εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων and Torstrik’s remark 
cited in note on 405 alo. The same distinction seems intended by Philoponus 
in the classification of theories given 9, 3 sqq. (cited in note on 405 b 6), 
where he divides those who made the soul σύνθετον into οἱ μὲν ἐκ συνημμένων 
σωμάτων, e.g. Critias, and of δὲ <é&> ἀσυνάπτων, e.g. Leucippus and 
Democritus. Cf. Philop. 9, 16 sqq. 

405 b11-—30. Recapitulating, we may reduce all previous views to 
three heads, according as motion, perception or incorporeality is taken for the 
characteristic of soul. Further, the agreement pointed out between the account 
of the soul given by the several philosophers and their theory of the universe is 
confirmed with modifications in detail, When the soul is defined by perception 
and knowledge, this agreement rests on the assumption that like is known by 
like (§§ 20, 21,23). But here Anaxagoras is an exception, for his principle, intel- 


234. NOTES I. 2 


ligence, is affirmed to be impossible, and to have nothing in common with 
the other elements of the universe (§ 22). 

b IX ὁρίζονται δὲ...τρισὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν...12 τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ. In spite of its position 1 
take ὡς εἰττεῖν with πάντες. A. goes to great lengths with hyperbaton, and 
πάντες is again separated from ὡς εἰπεῖν by three words, 408 a 1. It would 
indeed be possible to take ὡς εἰπεῖν with τρισίν. So Philop. 90, 20 sqq. Cf. 
σχεδὸν δύο, 403 Ὁ 28. But A.’s fondness for constructions of the type πάντες, 
of pév...oi Sé...makes the former view more probable. In any case it comes 
to this, that, since no definition falls outside of the three characteristics (cf. 
Metaph. 988 a 20—23, 993 a 11—15), all are based upon one or more of 
them. ‘l'o ὁρίζονται corresponds the use of ὅρος in 404 8. 9. This triple division 
is repeated 409 b 19 sqq., and seems there to be finally adopted as more precise 
than the twofold division at the opening of the chapter 403 b 25 sqq. The 
present statement must be carefully compared with both the passages referred 
to, to avoid misconception of the meaning. In 409b 20 we have, not κενήσει 
but of μὲν τὸ κινητικώτατον (sc. τὴν ψυχήν) ἀπεφήναντο τῷ κινεῖν ἑαυτό, which 
combines both τὸ κινοῦν and τῶν κινουμένων τι οὗ 403 Ὁ 29 sqq. Instead of 
αἰσθήσει we have in 409 Ὁ 23 (λέγεται) τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων αὐτὴν εἶναι which 
agrees exactly with the inference given 404 Ὁ 8 sq. ὅσοι δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν 
καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν ras ἀρχάς [whether 
these ἀρχαὶ be many or only a single ΟἿ]... «ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν 
στοιχείων πάντων. Finally, τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ, which at first sight would apply only 
to the theories of Plato and Xenocrates, who made the soul immaterial like 
their immaterial ἀρχαί (cf. 404 Ὁ 29-—-405 a 4), 1s proved to bear the elastic 
and relative meaning pointed out in the notes on 405 a 6 and 405 a 27, 
for in 409 b 20 564. the corresponding theory is thus stated, of δὲ σῶμα τὸ 
λεπτομερέστατον ἢ τὸ ἀσωματώτατον τῶν ἄλλων (int. τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεφήναντολ. 
The classification is accommodated to the general theories of τὰ ὄντα and 
their ἀρχαὶ held by A.’s predecessors and reviewed in Mezaph., but even so 
the choice of the term ἀσώματον is unfortunate when we find A. there com- 
plaining that some of these theories have taken no account of ἀσώματα proper 
(e.g. MWetaph. 988 Ὁ 24, τῶν yap σωμάτων τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέασι μόνον, τῶν δ᾽ 
ἀσωμάτων οὔ, ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων: cf. also 989 Ὁ 29-—990 a 8). 

It may be asked, why mavres...@s εἰπεῖν ᾽ Either this is one of the cautious 
expressions with which Δ. habitually guards himself when making a sweeping 
statement (cf. 403 Ὁ 28 σχεδὸν δύο) : or else he may have in view the theory 
of ἁρμονΐα, since in one of the two forms to which he reduces it in I., c. 4 that 
theory cannot easily be made to square with any of his three divisions. 
Philop. 90, 20 comments thus: ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἀνακεφαλαίωσίς ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων. 
ὁρίζονται δὲ οἷον περιγράφουσι καὶ χαρακτηρίξουσι. πρότερον δ᾽ εἰπὼν κινήσει καὶ 
αἰσθήσει γνωρίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, νῦν προσέθηκε καὶ τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ, ὡς ἐκ τῶν 
ἀπηριθμημένων δοξῶν καὶ τοῦτο ἀνακύψαν καὶ εὑρεθέν. τῷ γὰρ εὐκινήτῳ καὶ 
ἀεικινήτῳ συνέπεται τὸ ἀσώματον. ἀσώματον δὲ οὐ τὸ κυρίως λέγει νῦν, ἀλλὰ τὸ 
λεπτομερέστατον. The last remark accords better with 4o9 Ὁ 21 than does 
the paraphrase of Themistius (14, 4 H., 25, 6 Sp.), ingenious as the latter 
undoubtedly is: ἐκ δὴ τῆς ἱστορίας δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι δύο μὲν προτίθενται περὶ τὴν 
ψυχὴν θεωρεῖν κίνησιν καὶ γνῶσιν, ὑποφέρονται δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ ἄκοντες ἐπὶ τρίτον 
ἕτερον τὸ ἀσώματον: οἱ γὰρ λεπτομερέστατον αὐτὴν τιθέμενοι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο 
εὐκίνητον ὀνειροπολεῖν ἐοίκασι ταύτην τὴν φύσιν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἀσώματον. This 
was evidently suggested by Jfetaph. 984 a 18 sq., 984 b 8—11, 993 a 11---24. 

Ὁ 12. τούτων δ' ἕκαστον ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, i.e. we trace the connexion 
with the first principle or principles assumed by the thinker in question. This 


I. 2 405 Ὁ 1I—b15 235 


connexion is most obvious in the theories which start from αἴσθησις and declare 
soul to be τὸ γνωριστικόν : 404 Ὁ ὃ sqq., 404 Ὁ 30—405 a 7. But A. now 
proceeds to show in detail that it can also be traced in the other theories, so 
far at least as concerns the number and nature of the dpyai assumed (404 
Ὁ 30 τίνες καὶ πόσαι). 

Ὁ 13. ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιοῦσι, Sc. τὴν ψυχήν. The inference 
is presented in this twofold form in order to include Diogenes of Apollonia, 
Heraclitus, and Hippon, who, as we have seen, assuming a single στοιχεῖον 
for nature, explained cognition by making the soul consist of this στοιχεῖον- 
Anaxagoras (see next note and that on 405 b Ig) is reckoned with this group be- 
Cause, as was explained 405 a 17, he assigns to his principle Νοῦς both functions, 
τό τε γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν. Empedocles and Critias, on the other hand, 
and, in a very different region, Plato assume a plurality of elements for the 
universe and derive the soul, which is a compound, from these same elements. 

Ὁ 14. λέγοντες, πλὴν ἑνός. The exception is Anaxagoras. He must however 
have been influenced by Heraclitus, who is joined with him by Theophrastus 
De Sensibus ὃ 1 (Doxogr. Gr. 499, τ sqq-) wept δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ai μὲν πολλαὶ καὶ 
καθόλου δόξαι δύ᾽ εἰσίν" of μὲν yap τῷ ὁμοίῳ ποιοῦσιν, of δὲ τῷ ἐναντίῳ. 
Παρμενίδης μὲν καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ ἸΤλάτων τῷ ὁμοίῳ, οἱ δὲ περὶ ᾿Αναξαγόραν 
καὶ Ἡράκλειτον τῷ ἐναντίῳ. But αἴσθησις (and νόησις) regarded as ἀλλοίωσις 
is to these early φυσιολόγοι (cf. 427 a 26, 416 Ὁ 33 54.) merely a particular 
case of activity and passivity in general, the corporeal αἰσθητόν acting upon 
the equally corporeal αἰσθανόμενον or αἰσθητικόν which in turn πάσχει ὑπὸ 
τοῦ ποιητικοῦ. Accordingly in his fuller discussion of αἴσθησις (417 a1) A. 
refers us to De Gen. et Corr. 1. 7, 323 Ὁ 1 564. (see the citation in note 
on 410 a 23) where we find a similar conflict of opinion on the general 
question. A. concludes that two bodies capable of mutual interaction must 
be ἐναντία in his sense of the term, i.e. members of the same genus, but 
belonging to different species of it, so that something may be said for 
each of the two conflicting views. Cf. De 4. 416 Ὁ 6—9. In the special 
application to perception and cognition Anaxagoras consistently adhered 
to the first of the two views set forth in De Gen. et Corr.1. 7, Theophr. De 
Sensibus ὃ 27 ᾿Αναξαγόρας δὲ γίνεσθαι [int. τὴν αἴσθησιν] τοῖς ἐναντίοις" τὸ yap 
ὅμοιον ἀπαθὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου. The inconsistency of those who, like Empedocles, 
supported this view as a physical doctrine, but deserted it when they treated 
of sensation and cognition, is urged 410a 23 sqq. If Anaxagoras was the only 
exception, it would seem that A. did not share the doubt of Theophrastus 
about Democritus, De Sens. 8 49: cf. the admission of Theophr. ὃ 50 τὰ γὰρ 
ὁμόφυλα ἕκαστον γνωρίζειν. In fact, since to the Atomists all sensory processes 
were physical processes and all the senses modes of touching or physical 
contact (De Semsu 4, 442 8. 29), and since, further, all matter was homo- 
geneous, there is no room to doubt that Democritus carried out the principle 
“like is known by like” more consistently than any other of the earlier 
physicists. 

DIS. φασὶ ydp...re ὁμοίῳ. The explicit statement can hardly be substan- 
tiated beyond Empedocles as cited above 404 Ὁ 13—I5. A. and Theophrastus 
are however right in declaring that some such assumption was made by most 
of the natural philosophers who attempted an explanation of cognition starting 
usually with sense-perception. Theophrastus confesses that it was originally 
not so much a philosophic principle as a maxim or saw derived from observa- 
tion and experience, much like the proverbs: “Birds of a feather,” “noscitur 
a sociis,” ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς eis τὸν ὅμοιον. Cf. De Sensibus loc. cit. 


236 NOTES I, 2 


(Doxogr. Gr. 499, 4) τὸ δε πιθανὸν ἔλαβον οἱ μὲν ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τε τὰ πλεῖστα 
τῇ ὁμοιότητι θεωρεῖται καὶ ὅτι σὐμφυτόν ἐστι πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις τὰ συγγενῆ γνωρίζειν, 
ἔτι δ᾽ ὡς τὸ μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαι τῇ ἀπορροίᾳ γίνεται, τὸ δ᾽ ὅμοιον φέρεται πρὸς τὸ 
ὅμοιον. The last sentence alludes especially to the theories of sensation put 
forward, amongst others, by Empedocles and Democritus, who supposed particles 
emanating (dzoppoai) from the object perceived, or as Democritus called them 
δείκελα ({-Ξ εἴδωλα), films, to be brought into contact directly or indirectly with 
the sense-organ (418 Ὁ 15, 422 a 15). For A.’s criticism of the maxim as 
presented by Empedocles, see 410 a 27 sqq., also 427 a 26—b 6, 416 a 29 sqq. 
One consequence of such a theory is that all the senses become modes of 
touching. See De Semsu 442 a 29 sqq. 

br5 ἐπειδὴ yop...19 ποιοῦσιν. A summary recapitulation which helps to 
explain 404 Ὁ 8—11, 405 a2—4. When A. has interpreted in his own fashion 
the theories before him, supplying de suzo the grounds for some of the con- 
clusions reached, he combines them under this general formula. Cf. Them. 
14, 25 H., 26, 8 Sp. τὴν μὲν οὖν παραδοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν ἱστορίαν περὶ ψυχῆς διεληλύ- 
θαμεν, τὰ μὲν οἷς λέγουσιν ἀκολουθοῦντες, τὰ δὲ οἷς εἰκὸς αὐτοὺς βούλεσθαι λέγειν. 

Ὁ 16. συνιστάσιν, as in b 24. Ch a 26 συνίστησιν, 404 Ὁ 17 ποιεῖ. 

b 19 ᾿Αναξαγόρας 8%...21 ἔχειν. We return now to 405b 14 πλὴν ἑνός. The 
passages from the fragments of Anaxagoras cited in notes on 405 a 16 sq. 
sufficiently explain why νοῦς is there said to be ἁπλοῦς, ἀμιγῆς, καθαρὸς and 
here κοινὸν οὐθὲν οὐθενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν (repeated 429 Ὁ 23 sq.). With regard 
to ἀπαθῆ the case is different: the presumption of a verbal citation in 429 Ὁ 23 
raised by ὥσπερ φησὶν ᾿Αναξαγόρας need not extend beyond the words 
immediately preceding καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν. It seems best therefore 
to regard ἀπαθῆ as A.’s own inference. The extant words which most nearly 
approach this idea are frag. 12 Ὁ. ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ᾽ ξαυτοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ μὴ 
γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἦν. ἀλλά τεῳ ἐμέμεικτο ἄλλῳ... ἂν ἐκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμειγμένα, 
ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐόντα ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, but these 
words hardly go beyond the meaning of ἀμιγῆς. A. however had convinced 
himself that Anaxagoras regarded νοῦς as ἀπαθής, see Phys. VIII. 5, 256 Ὁ 20 
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὁρῶμεν τὸ ἔσχατον, ὃ κινεῖσθαι μὲν δύναται, κινήσεως δ᾽ ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει, 
καὶ ὃ κινεῖ μέν, ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου δὲ «κινεῖται», ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ, εὔλογον, ἵνα μὴ 
ἀναγκαῖον εἴπωμεν, καὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶναι ὃ κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ὄν. διὸ καὶ ᾿Αναξαγόρας 
ὀρθῶς λέγει, τὸν νοῦν ἀπαθῆ φάσκων καὶ ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ κινήσεως ἀρχὴν 
αὐτὸν ποιεῖ εἶναι οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως κινοίη ἀκίνητος ὧν καὶ κρατοίη ἀμεγὴς ὦν. 

The meaning of ἀπαθὴς in A. is fairly uniform=6 μὴ οἷός τε πάσχειν, 
incapable of suffering, that cannot be acted upon or affected. The Anaxa- 
gorean νοῦς is so unlike all other things that it cannot be affected by them, 
so 408 b 25, 410 a 23, 29, 416 a 32. The definition need not be pressed, cf. 
Metaph. 1019 a 30 ἀπαθῆ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἂν μόγις καὶ ἠρέμα πάσχῃ διὰ δύναμιν 
καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ τὸ ἔχειν πῶς. In Poetic. 14, 1453 Ὁ 39 ἀπαθές seems to 
mean μὴ ἔχον πάθος When he regarded mind as having nothing in common 
with the other things in the universe which are all material, Anaxagoras was 
on his way to declaring it immaterial, and as we shall see in the sequel 
(e.g. 408 b 29, 430 a 18) A. uses ἀπαθῆς combined with other adjectives like 
θεῖος and ywpiords to express immateriality. 

b2I. τοιοῦτος δ᾽ Sv...22 συμφανές ἐστιν. Cf. 429 Ὁ 22 sqq. where the same 
difficulty recurs in regard to A.’s own theory. 

b23. ὅσοι 8 ἐναντιώσεις ποιοῦσιν. For ἐναντιώσεις ποιοῦσιν Them. sub- 
stitutes τιθέασιν ἐναντίωσιν. Here A. distinguishes between philosophers who 
introduced contrariety in their first principles, e.g. Empedocles (cf. 411 a 3) 


I. 2 405 Ὁ 15—b 28 237 


and those (b 24) who took for their single principle an element which has a 
contrary, e.g. Heraclitus or Hippon. An attentive perusal of P/ys. 1.. c. 5 will 
show that in his view the distinction is not fundamental. In the explanation 
of nature and becoming, he maintains, the upholders of a single principle 
have recourse to contrarieties of some sort (θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, μανὸν καὶ 
πυκνόν, στερεὸν καὶ κενόν). Thus he reaches the conclusion 188 a 26 ὅτι μὲν 
οὖν τἀναντία πὼς πάντες ποιοῦσι Tas ἀρχάς. Cf. Metaph. 1075 a 28 sq., 1087 a 
29 sqq. and 1004 Ὁ 29 τὰ δ᾽ ὄντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἐξ ἐναντίων σχεδὸν 
ἅπαντες συγκεῖσθαι' πάντες γοῦν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας λέγουσιν: οἱ μὲν γὰρ 
περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον [some Pythagoreans], of δὲ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν [Parmenides 
in τὰ πρὸς δόξαν}, οἱ δὲ πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον [the Pythagoreans], of δὲ φιλίαν καὶ 
νεῖκος [Empedocles]. Cf. further Alefafh. 1005a 3 sq., 1061 ἃ 10—15, Phys. 
I. 6, 189 a 13, b 26. In Av’s own system (Jad. Ar. 248 a 27) at ἐναντιώσεις 
tamquam δεύτερον ponuntur inter τὴν ὕλην et τὰ στοιχεῖα, De Gen. et Corr. 
11. I, 329 a 34, 26, 329 Ὁ 18, De Sensu 4, 442 Ὁ 18 τὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔχει 
ἐναντίωσιν. According to A. the lertium guid, matter, solves the difficulty 
noticed Mefaph. 1075 a 29: πῶς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔσται [how from contraries 
as principles existing things can be derived] οὐ λέγουσιν: ἀπαθῆ γὰρ ra ἐναντία 
tm ἀλλήλων. ἡμῖν δὲ λύεται τοῦτο εὐλόγως τῷ τρίτον Te εἶναι. 

b 24. τὴν Ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων συνιστᾶσιν. Philop. (91. 33) gives 
Empedocles as an instance, his four elements and two moving principles 
being contraries. Upon A.’s own physical theory the true contraries are the 
qualities of heat and cold, dryness and moisture, which belong to Empedocles’ 
four elements De Gen. et Corr. II. 1, 329a 31 sqq. If the remark applies also 
to Plato, ἐναντία must be understood in his case as loosely used for dvrexeipeva. 

Ὁ 24. of δὲ Odrepov...26 τιθέασιν. Philop. 92, 2 sqq. cites Heraclitus for 
θερμὸν and Hippon for ψυχρόν. Diogenes of Apollonia probably regarded 
air as ξηρόν, see Theophrast. De Semszdus § 44, where he attributes ro φρονεῖν 
to the dryness of the air inhaled. 

Ὁ 26. διὸ Kal τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν. ud. dr. 26 a 18 ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ 
λόγῳ, τῷ νόμῳ, ταῖς δόξαις, ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν, τοῖς φαινομένοις, Pol. 1295 Ὁ 8, 
1298 a 38, 1273 a 40, £th. Mic. 1137 Ὁ 2, 1139b 19, Metaph. 986 b 31, 990 Ὁ 21. 
Similarly we should expect ὀνόμασιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν to mean “follow the lead of 
names,” “are guided by etymologies.” But this would not suit the context. 
Philop., who (92, 3 sqq., cf. 2, 3) attributes these etymologies to Heraclitus and 
Hippon respectively, says quite correctly ἑκάτερος οὖν τούτων, φησί, καὶ érupo- 
λογεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄνομα πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν, 1.e. Heraclitus derived 
¢nv from ζεῖν while Hippon derived ψυχή from ψυχρόν (6 δὲ ψυχὴν κεκλῆσθαι 
ἐκ τοῦ ψυχροῦ λέγων. They were not guided by etymology when in search 
of a first principle, but having adopted their first principle, they found an 
etymology which would support it. The underlying assumption is of course that 
the name, when its correct derivation is known, unfolds the true nature of the 
thing. The Cratylus of Plato furnishes many similar examples. Cf. 436 A 
εἴ ris ζητῶν τὰ πράγματα ἀκολουθοῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, σκοπῶν οἷον ἕκαστον βούλεται 
εἶναι. Thus what A. means is that they etymologise to suit their respective 
theories, πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν, as Philop. says. 

b 27 of μὲν yap...28 τὸ ζῆν ὠνόμασται. With λέγοντες supply τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι 
and from the participle understand λέγουσιν before ὅτε διὰ rotro= διὰ τὸ θερμὸν 
or διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ θερμὸν τὴν ψυχήν. It would be possible to repeat τοῖς 
ὀνόμασιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν but it would be impossible to connect τοῖς ὃν. ἀκ. with 
the accusative and infinitive clause following oi δέ. 

Ὁ 28. of δὲ τὸ Ψυχρόν, int. λέγουσιν or φασίν. There is no need precisely 


2538 NOTES Ι. 2 


to assimilate the construction of this clause to the foregoing. See critical 
notes. The whole and part construction with the omission of yap would be 
tempting, if it did not require us to translate b 27 ὅτε “because.” But in that 
case the etymology would determine the theory and not, as I consider, be 
adduced in support of it. 

Ὁ 28. Sd τὴν ἀναπνοὴν Kal τὴν κατάψυξιν. The cold air inhaled as breath 
was supposed to cool the blood, De Resp. 8, 474 Ὁ 19. This derivation of 
ψυχὴ 15 given by Plato Craz. 399 Ὁ sqq. οἶμαξ τι τοιοῦτον νοεῖν τοὺς τὴν ψυχὴν 
ὀνομάσαντας, ὡς τοῦτο ἄρα, ὅταν παρῇ τῷ σώματι, αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῆν αὐτῷ, τὴν 
τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν δύναμιν παρέχον καὶ ἀναψῦχον, ἅμα δὲ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ ἀναψύχοντος 
τὸ σῶμα ἀπόλλυταί τε καὶ τελευτᾷ- ὅθεν δή μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸ ψυχὴν καλέσαι. 
As an alternative to this obvious derivation, the Platonic Socrates offers a 
“‘more scientific” derivation, connecting ψυχή with φύσιν ἔχειν. In Aristoph. 
Nid. 627 Socrates uses the oath μὰ τὴν ἀναπνοήν, implying that respiration is so 
essential to life as to be justly deified. 


CHAPTER ITI. 


This chapter begins with a criticism of soul as a thing in motion 
or capable of motion. With the early philosophers, as we have seen in the 
last chapter, this conception of soul is a necessary inference from the belief 
that soul is the cause of animal motion (403 Ὁ 28—31). A., too, shares 
the current belief that soul is κινητικὸν or θ τὸ κινοῦν, but he disproves in a 
series of nine arguments the necessity of the inference that it must be 
τῶν κινουμένων te. There follows a critical examination of the theory of soul 
laid down in the Zimaeus, §§ 11—21 (406 Ὁ 26—407 b 11). The chapter 
closes with some suggestive remarks on the futility of defining soul without 
taking account of the body to which it belongs (88 22, 23, 407 Ὁ 12—-26). 

405 b 31-406 a 4. Our first subject of enquiry is motion. The 
definition of the soul as that which moves itself, or that which is capable 
of self-motion, is false. It has been already stated that the moving cause is 
not necessarily itself in motion. Against the proposition that soul is moved 
the following objections may be urged (which equally apply to the definition 
of soul as that which moves, or is capable of moving, itself). 

406 a 4—12. When anything is said to be in motion this means 
either that the thing moved has a derivative and adventitious motion, or that it 
has an independent motion in and by itself. [The ship moves in the latter way 
in and by itself, the passengers conveyed by it in the former, through being in 
something which is itself in motion, as appears from the fact that they do not, 
in the case supposed, employ their own proper mode of progression with their 
feet.] In accordance with this distinction we proceed to enquire whether the 
soul has an independent motion in and by itself. 

406 a 12—16. (1) Understanding κινούμενον to mean καθ᾽ αὑτὸ 
κινούμενον, and assuming the four species of motion to be qualitative change 
(ἀλλοίωσις), growth (αὔξησις), decay (φθίσις), spatial motion (φορά), we affirm 
that, if the soul is moved καθ᾽ αὑτό, it is moved naturally, φύσει, and if it is 
moved with any of these species of motion the soul must be in space, ἐν τόπῳ. 

406 a 16-22. (2) Further, on the same presuppositions, if it is 
the nature of soul to move itself, there will be a locality in the universe 
towards which as a φύσει κινούμενον it tends to move [but there is none such]. 


I. 3 405 b 28 239 


406 a 22-27. (3) If thesoul is moved naturally, it is also moved by 
constraint, but of such constrained motions it is impossible to form any idea. 

406 a 2'7—S0O. (4) According to the doctrine of De Caelo, that the 
nature of which is to be moved upwards is fire, as earth is that the nature 
of which is to be moved downwards. Consequently the soul must be either 
fire or earth, according as one or other of these rectilinear motions is attributed 
to it as its essential nature. 

406 a 90-» 5. (5) It is a fact that soul sets body in motion, and 
it may be reasonably supposed that the motions produced in the body are those 
to which the soul is itself subject. Hence, convertendo, the motion of the 
soul must be that of the body, viz. spatial motion (dopa), whether the soul 
moves as a whole or by successive movements of its parts, the whole remaining 
at rest. If so, it would be possible for the soul to leave the body and return 
to it, and the resurrection of the dead would cease to be impossible. 

406 b 5—11. (6) It may be maintained that the soul is moved 
indirectly or fer accidens. [A.’s own opinion, see 408 a 30—34.] In that case 
such motions might be imparted to it byexternal agency. Butif this be admitted 
by our opponents, it is inconsistent for them to maintain that something (1) 
has self-motion in its essence, and (2) is at the same time moved by external 
agency, unless the concurrence of the impulses from within and from without 
is merely accidental. The soul however, if it is moved at all, is moved by 
objects of sense. 

406 b 11—15. (7) The self-motion of soul implies not only that 
it causes motion gwé soul and in respect of its essential nature, but also that 
it is subject to motion gzé soul. Now everything subject to motion or change 
in whatever respect undergoes a transition or transformation from one condition 
to another in that respect. If then the soul is moved gzé soul, it is always 
passing out of that condition in which its essential nature consists [in other 
words, in such movement it quits one condition for another—it is dislodged 
from the condition of its existence—and loses its essential nature]. 

406 b 15—25. (8) If it be maintained with Democritus that the 
soul is subject to exactly the same motions which it communicates to the 
body, we shall enquire if the soul’s remaining at rest is due to the same 
causes, a result which seems inexplicable. (9) And, generally, the facts show 
that it is not in this way that the soul moves the body, but through a species 
of purpose and thought. 

As to the method which is followed in the above objections, Bonitz well 
observes, Hermes VII. Ὁ. 421, “Gemeinsamer Charakter der einzelnen zur 
Widerlegung dieser Definition angewendeten Beweise ist, dass Aristoteles 
seine eignen Lehren iiber das Wesen, insbesondere uber die Arten, der 
Bewegung als sichere Grundlage voraussetzt und durch Anwendung derselben 
auf die fragliche Definition zu Consequenzen fiihrt, welche entweder an sich 
unhaltbar sind oder doch der Absicht derer selbst widerstreiten, welche jJene 
Definition aufgestellt haben.” The same method is pursued throughout 
cc. 3—5: A. deduces absurd and inconsistent conclusions by combining the 
doctrines of his own system with the propositions which he undertakes to 
refute. He does not stop to enquire whether those who maintain these 
propositions would have accepted the doctrines of his own system. In the 
present case, there is the further difficulty that the mobility of the soul which 
he is combating is regarded as one and the same tenet when advanced by 
two opposite schools, viz. by the Pre-Socratics, of whom Democritus is the 
type, who considered soul to be something corporeal, and by the Platonists, 


240 NOTES I. 3 


who as emphatically declared it to be incorporeal. The cogency of the 
objections will naturally vary according as they are advanced against the one or 
the other. No doubt he tries to follow the rule which he lays down De Caelo 
Il. 13, 294 Ὁ 10 δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα καλῶς ζητήσειν ἐνστατικὸν εἶναι διὰ τῶν οἰκείων 
ἐνστάσεων τῷ γένει. The supply of objections is inexhaustible: but their 
relevancy to the subject is just what his opponents would dispute. In c. 4 he 
deals with harmony exactly as here he deals with motion. 

405 Ὁ 31 tows yap...406 a 2 κίνησιν. Two propositions are here repudiated 
as untrue and even impossible. The first is the proposition that soul is that 
which moves itself, as defined by Plato in the Zaws (see note on 404 ἃ 21). 
The second is the more general proposition that motion in any sense is an 
essential attnbute of soul. In other words, it is false to say that soul moves 
itself, and further it is false to say that soul is moved at all. The term motion 
is used throughout in a wider sense than in the present day, viz. to express 
several varieties of change. To render it more precise A. often affixes μεταβολή 
(just as Plato does, e.g. Laws 894 A, C, E and 895 A, etc., v. Stallb. ad 893 C, Ὁ. 161, 
894 C, p. 165), κίνησις καὶ μεταβολή, motion, that is to say, change, PAys. IV. το, 
218 Ὁ το μηδὲν διαφερέτω λέγειν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κίνησιν ἢ peraBoAnv. Sometimes, 
however, κίνησις is made a species of μεταβολή: cf. Phys. V. 5, 2298. 31, Ὁ 13 sq. 
As we shall see below (406 a 12) motion includes not only (4) φορά, spatial motion, 
change of place, locomotion, κατὰ τόπον, the meaning which we now attach to 
the term motion, but also (4) αὔξησις, growth and φθίσις, decay, two forms of 
quantitative change, κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, and (¢) ἀλλοίωσις, qualitative change, the 
internal alteration or transformation which the thing changed undergoes when, 
though it remains in being, it is modified in respect of its condition or character, 
κατὰ τὸ ποῖον. These are the three species of motion finally recognised by 
A. in the Physics, where he employs the word as a scientific term and determines 
its connotation. Though his language varies, he must be taken to exclude 
from κίνησις proper the sense of γένεσις καὶ φθορά, generation and destruction. 
See note on 406a 12. For A.’s attempt to reduce the other species to φορά, 
spatial motion, see note ona τό 727. Finally what A. means by motion (κίνησις) 
must be carefully distinguished in another direction from what he means by 
ἐνέργεια, active Operation or actualisation. On this important question there 
will be more to say later, eg. 417 a 15—17, 425 Ὁ 26—q426a 8, 431 a I—7. 

406 a I. ἢ δυνάμενον κινεῖν, int. ἑαυτός Them. 14, 29 H., 26, 14 Sp. ὡς καὶ 
τὸν ὅρον αὐτῆς τοιοῦτον ἀποδιδόναι, ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ ἢ δυνάμενον 
κινεῖν ἑαυτό οὕτω γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῶν Νόμων (viz. 8964). The 
exact words are τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν (see the context cited 
in mole on 404 a 21). 

a 3. πρότερον. Philop. and Them. refer us to the PAysics, where, in VIII. 
5, 256 Ὁ 2356.) itis argued that not everything which causes motion is necessarily 
itself moving: and in the last resort we must postulate a prime movent 
(πρῶτον κινοῦν) itself unmoved. Cf. Wefaph. 1072 a 25, Phys. VIII. 5, 258 b 7 
ἀμφοτέρως συμβαίνει τὸ πρώτως κινοῦν ἐν ἅπασιν εἶναι τοῖς κινουμένοις ἀκίνητον. 
ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ κίνησιν ἀεὶ εἶναε καὶ μὴ διαλείπειν, ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι ἀΐδιον ὃ πρῶτον 
κινεῖ, εἴτε ἕν εἴτε πλείω, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον. Bonitz, however, declines 
to accept this reference. Cf. dnd. Ar. 99a 1 PAys. VII. 5; quod Trdlbg de 
an. 1, 2. 403 Ὁ 29 respici putat, probar: non potest. Them. (14, 33—15, 17 H., 
26, 20—27, 21 Sp.) gives a good abstract of the argument in the Physics. 

a4. διχῶς. The distinction is between independent and derivative motion, 
1,6. change, generally: not primarily, as the illustration might suggest, be- 
tween direct and indirect locomotion (e.g. the free motion of the ship and 


I. 3 405 Ὁ 31---406 a 4 241 


the motion, by conveyance, of the passenger). It is a metaphysical or logical 
(cf. a 10, λεγομένου) not a physical distinction. The principle on which it 
depends can be best understood if we go back to the fundamental antithesis 
between the logical subject and its accidents or attributes. Change or motion 
is predicated of the various substances or things, regarded as particulars. 
Each of these is a distinct something or whole, τόδε rt or ὅλον, and the motion 
predicated of it belongs to it as such, τῷ εἶναι αὐτὸ 6 ἐστι καθ᾽ αὗτό, because it is 
what it is, independently of all other existing things. Thus καθ᾽ αὑτὸ is ex- 
plained by κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. But besides the wholes which thus exist and 
are moved independently, we must take account of parts and accidents, the 
existence of which is conditioned by that of the things to which as parts and 
accidents they belong. Ofsuch parts and accidents motion can also be predicated, 
but their motion, like their existence, will not be independent and unconditioned, 
but dependent, derivative and conditioned. In the Physics this distinction is 
usually expressed by κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινούμενον as opposed to καθ᾽ αὑτὸ 
κινούμενον, where κατὰ συμβ. conveys the idea of accessory, concomitant or 
adventitious. By a vague or extended use of the phrase τὰ κατὰ συμβ. 
κινούμενα are sometimes made to include parts of a whole as well as accidents, 
both parts and accidents being regarded as accessories or concomitants. See 
e.g. Phys. VII. 4, 254 Ὁ 7—12, as contrasted with the more precise distinctions 
of Phys. V. I, 224 a 21—34, and compare Simpl. 27% Pfys. 1207, 15 τὰ yap 
ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς καθ᾽ αὑτὸ κινοῦσιν ἢ κινουμένοις ἢ ὡς μέρη ἢ ὡς πάθη ἢ ὧς ἕξεις 
ἢ ὡς ὄργανα ἢ ἄλλως ὁπωσοῦν, ταῦτα λέγεται κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινεῖν ἢ κινεῖσθαι: 
and Simpl 22 Phys. 554, 23 κυριωτάτη γὰρ ἀντίθεσις τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ πρὸς τὸ 
καθ᾽ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ κατὰ μέρος, ὡς νῦν [Phys. 210 ἃ 27], ἢ τι ἔξωθεν, ὅτε τὸ 
κυρίως κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ποιεῖ. “ Other” may be interpreted to mean a part of 
the first thing, part being distinct from whole, or a second thing wholly distinct 
from the first. Language, we must remember, is apt to designate the whole of 
a thing from its parts (PAys. IV. 3, 211b 1). The choice of καθ᾽ ἕτερον instead 
of κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς enables A. to include the case of the passenger, who is, 
strictly speaking, neither a part nor an accident of the ship which conveys 
him, though, gzdé@ moved, he may be regarded for the time being as one or 
the other, since his motion in the case supposed is as much conditioned by that 
of the ship as if he were the ship’s mast or its tonnage. Cf. Simpl. 22 Phys. 
802, 17 διορίζει πρῶτον ras τῆς μεταβολῆς διαφοράς, τὴν μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 
λέγων ...... ὅταν τὸν ἐν τῇ νηὶ ἠρεμοῦντα πλωτῆρα λέγωμεν κινεῖσθαι, ὅτε ἢ ναῦς, F 
τρόπον τινὰ συμβέβηκεν 6 πλωτήρ, καθ᾽ αὑτὴν κινεῖται καὶ μεταβάλλει. Strictly 
speaking, the ship and its contents, and most probably the man on horseback, 
are artificial systems, each with its own κινοῦν and κινούμενον, just as the ζῷον is 
a similar natural system. See Pfys. VIII. 4, 254 Ὁ 12—17, 27—33. The latter 
passage ends thus: ἔοικε yap ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις καὶ τοῖς μὴ φύσει 
συνισταμένοις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις εἶναι διῃρημένον τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον, 
καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἅπαν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινεῖν. 

a4 καθ᾽ ἕτερον...5 καθ᾽ αὑτό, Der aliud...per se, indirectly...directly. These 
phrases, like κατὰ συμβεβηκός... καθ᾽ αὑτό (fer accidens,..per sé) in the Physics, 
express the manner: they answer the question “How is the thing moved?” 
English has no preposition to express κατὰ in this connexion as distinct from 
ὑπὸ c. gen. (Latin ad), but “in respect of,” “in virtue of” come near to it. The 
attribute whiteness (a 18) is moved in virtue: or in respect of its concomitance 
with the body of which it is an attribute. We may note parenthetically the 
bilateral use of κατά: Phys. V. 1, 2248 23 τὸ δὲ τῷ τούτου re μεταβάλλειν ἁπλῶς 
λέγεται μεταβάλλειν, οἷον ὅσα λέγεται κατὰ μέρη [int. μεταβάλλειν" ὑγιάζεται γὰρ τὸ 


H, 16 


242 NOTES I. 3 


σῶμα, ὅτι ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἢ 6 θώραξ, ταῦτα δὲ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου σώματος. Here, be it 
observed, the whole is “ moved” (e.g. healed) in respect or in virtue of a part. 
Cf. Phys. VIII. 4,254b7—12. Thus, then, κατὰ expresses the logical relation 
of dependence in the order of thought. We can think of the motion of a ship 
without implying motion of a passenger: we cannot think of the motion of the 
passenger from port to port without implying that of the ship. As is pointed 
out by Them. (15, 21 H., 27, 27 Sp.) and by Simpl. (22 P&ys. 802, 19), the 
passengers may be assumed to be at rest in the ship, for in any case their 
walking up and down the deck is not the species of motion with which they 
and the ship are propelled: and it is the latter motion alone with which the 
argument is here concerned. If the passenger misses the vessel, walking, his 
own mode of progression, will not avail him in the water. If this holds when B, 
τὸ καθ᾽ ἕτερον κινούμενον, is a particular thing separately existing, it holds 
a fortéoré when B is a part (whether μόριον συμφυὲς or συνεχές) Of A, τὸ καθ᾽ 
αὑτὸ κινούμενον, by whose motion its own is conditioned: or again when B is 
an accident, whiteness or the height of three cubits (a 18) of A. For, as we 
saw, neither part nor accident can be thought of as existing, much less as being 
moved, independently of the particular thing, οὐσία or τόδε τι, in which it inheres, 
It would be a mistake, then, to treat xara as simply equivalent to ὑπό. See Phys, 
VIII. 4, 254 Ὁ 12 τῶν δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὰ μὲν ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τὰ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου [int. κινεἴται!. 
The passenger might conceivably propel the vessel by rowing, but in that case 
it would still be true of him od καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἕτερον κινεῖται, viz. τῷ ἐν 
κινουμένῳ εἶναι. 

a5. τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ εἶναι. The phrase ἔν τινὶ εἶναι has a wide meaning. 
It could be applied to the parts of a whole or the accidents of a logical subject, 
€.g. λευκόν, τρίπηχυ. Them. 15, 22 H., 28, 1 Sp. οὕτω δ᾽ ἂν φαίης καὶ τὰ 
συμβεβηκότα τοῖς σώμασιν οἷον λευκότητα μελανίαν τὸ δίπηχυ καὶ τρίπηχυ κινεῖσθαι, 
καθ᾽ ἕτερον δέ, τῷ ἐν κινουμένοις ὑπάρχειν: τὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρύπον κινούμενα 
ἐνδέχεται μήτε σώματα εἶναι μήτε προσδεῖσθαι τόπου καθ᾽ éavrd. If the reader 
consults Phys. τν. 3 with the valuable commentary of Simplicius he will not 
merely find a supplement to A.’s vocabulary of philosophical terms, A7efaph. A., 
but will derive considerable assistance for the proper understanding of the 
antithesis between καθ᾽ αὑτὸ and κατ᾽ ἄλλο (érepov), which often recurs, e.g. 
429 Ὁ 27, where it is used to determine the meaning of vonrds. 

a8. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι rod πλωτῆρος οἰκεία ἡ τοιαύτη 
κίνησις (motion of conveyance). If his locomotion were independent and due 
to himself, not accessory and derivative, the passenger would be walking, not 
sailing in the ship. 

aQ. βάδισις, the appropriate species of locomotion, φορά, as distinct from 
πτῆσις, ἔρψις;, νεῦσις, ἅλσις, which are severally appropriate to other animals: De 
Part, An.\. 1, 639b 3, £22. Mic. 1174 a 31. 

ἃ 12. καὶ μετέχει, Probably καὶ is explicative and μετέχει κινήσεως simply 
duplicates κινεῖται. In 4.21 εἴπερ φύσει κινήσεως μετέχει Seems to take up the 
conclusion of (a 15) φύσει ἂν ὑπάρχοι κίνησις αὐτῇ, and it is followed (in a 22) by 
ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ φύσει κινεῖται, as if all three were equivalent phrases. In any case καθ᾽ 
αὑτὴν must be taken with μετέχει as well as with κινεῖται. I follow Trend. in 
rejecting the attempt of Philop. to give a different sense to μετέχει κινήσεως: 
Philop. 98, 10 τὰ μὲν συνουσιωμένην ἔχει τὴν kivnow...as τὰ οὐράνια, τὰ δὲ 
συνουσιωμένην μὲν αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔχει..«.τὴν μέντοι δύναμιν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ φύσει 
ἔχουσιν; aore δύνασθαι μετέχειν τῆς κινήσεως, ὅταν 7 τὸ κινοῦν, ὡς ἡ βῶλος. 

ἃ 12, τεσσάρων. See note on 405 Ὁ 31 supr. where ¢hree distinct species 
of change or motion in the wider sense are enumerated. This is the mature 


i. 3 406 a 4—a 16 243 
view, γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ being excluded, as not properly κίνησις (Phys. V. 1, 
225 a 26, 32): Jud. Ar. 391 Ὁ 36 adduces Phys. 11. 1, 192 Ὁ 14, V. 1, 225 Ὁ 7, V. 2, 
226a 25, VII. 2, 2438. 6, VIII. 7, 260a 27, De Cael. τν. 3, 310a 23, Metaph. 
1068a 10, b17. In spite of τεσσάρων this is virtually the doctrine of the present 
passage. The number “four” is made up by distinguishing “growth” (αὔξησις) 
from “waning” or “decay” (φθίσις): whereas these are merely the positive 
and negative aspects of quantitative change (κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, κατὰ μέγεθος), 1.6. 
increase: and diminution. The reason assigned by Simplicius and Philoponus 
is doubtless correct, viz. that there is no common term in Greek comprehending 
both φθίσις and αὔξησις and so corresponding to ἀλλοίωσις and φορά. In Categ. 
14, 15a 13, the writer by adding γένεσις and φθορά, as two separate species, 
to the four here enumerated constructs a list of six εἴδη κινήσεως. 

8. 13. κινοῖτ ἂν. This chapter affords many instances of the opt. with ἂν 
expressing the logical consequence as a15 ἂν ὑπάρχοι, a 22 κἂν κινηθείη, Ὁ 4 
ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν and ἕποιτ᾽ ἂν, bi2 κινοῖτ᾽ ἂν and b13 ἐξίσταιτ᾽ dv, 407 a 21 ἂν εἴη, 
407 Ὁ 2 ἂν κινοῖτο. Cf. γοέᾶ on 403a 9. For the future indicative as an 
equivalent compare 406 a 18 ὑπάρξει, 407 a ΤΟ νοήσει, 8.14. διέξεισιν, and νοήσει. 

ἃ 14 εἰ δὲ κινεῦται.. 15 atirq. The protasis must follow from the definition 
of soul impugned above (405 Ὁ 31—406a 2). See below 4o6a 16—19. If motion 
is not an accidental or adventitious attribute but belongs to the essence of this 
unknown X, the soul, the soul must be assigned to the domain of nature and 
not to the domain of art. Mlotion is found in both, but what is subject to 
motion is a natural object, a product of nature, only when it contains within 
itself the principle of motion: PAys. 11. 1, 192b 13 τὰ μὲν yap φύσει ὄντα πάντα 
φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως Kal στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ 
κατ᾽ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀλλοίωσιν. Anything which does not possess 
within itself such a principle of motion must be assigned to the products of art 
or manufactured articles, e.g. κλίνη or ἱμάτιον, although the materials of which 
they are made are natural objects: 192 Ὁ 15 κλίνη δὲ καὶ ἱμάτιον, καὶ εἴ τι 
τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ἐστίν, 7 μὲν τετύχηκε τῆς κατηγορίας ἑκάστης καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐστὶν 
ἀπὸ τέχνης, οὐδεμίαν ὁρμὴν ἔχει μεταβολῆς ἔμφυτον, ἢ δὲ συμβέβηκεν αὐτοῖς εἶναι 
λιθίνοις ἢ γηΐνοις ἢ μικτοῖς “ἐκ τούτων, ἔχει, καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φύσεως 
ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρώτως καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ 
μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. To explain μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός A. then gives the illustra- 
tion of the physician who treats himself and so is at the same time ἰατρὸς and 
ὑγιαζόμενος, but it is only κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς and not καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν that 6 ὑγιαζόμενος 
is in this instance ἰατρός : 192 Ὁ 22 λέγω δὲ τὸ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι γένοιτ᾽ 
ἂν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τις αἴτιος ὑγιείας dv ἰατρός: ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὐ καθὸ ὑγιάζεται τὴν ἰατρικὴν 
ἔχει, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκε τὸν αὐτὸν ἰατρὸν εἶναι καὶ ὑγιαζόμενον" διὸ καὶ χωρίζεταί ποτ᾽ 
ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων [int. 6 ἰατρὸς καὶ ὁ ὑγιαζόμενος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον 
τῶν ποιουμένων" οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῆς ποιήσεως, ἀλλὰ τὰ 
μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἔξωθεν, οἷον οἰκία καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν χειροκμήτων ἕκαστον, τὰ δ᾽ 
ἐν αὑτοῖς μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτά, ὅσα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτια γένοιτ᾽ ἂν αὑτοῖς [int. 
τῆς ποιησέως]. Cf. Phys. VIIL 4, 254b 14 τό τε γὰρ αὐτὸ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ κινούμενον 
φύσει κινεῖται, οἷον ἕκαστον τῶν ζῴων" κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ ζῷον αὐτὸ td’ αὑτοῦ, ὅσων 
δ᾽ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς τῆς κινησέως, ταῦτα φύσει φαμὲν κινεῖσθαι. Cf. Pl. Laws 895 C, 

Δ 15. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, int. οὕτως ἔχει. Cf ἃ 32. καὶ τόπος, int. ἂν ὑπάρχοι 
αὐτῆ. 

ἃ 1ό. πᾶσαι γὰρ...ἐν τόπῳ. Otherwise expressed, two of the three species 
of motion (or three of the four above enumerated) imply φορά, spatial motion, 
and therefore cannot take place except in space. For growth and decay 
compare Phys. VIII. 7, 260 Ὁ 13 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ αὐξανομένου καὶ φθίνοντος 


16—2 


244 NOTES I. 3 


μεταβάλλει κατὰ τόπον τὸ μέγεθος. De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 5, 320a 18 τὸ δ᾽ αὐξανό- 
μενον καὶ τὸ φθῖνον [int. φαίνεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης μεταβάλλον κατὰ τόπον], ἄλλον δὲ 
τρόπον τοῦ φερομένου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φερόμενον ὅλον ἀλλάττει τόπον, τὸ δ᾽ αὐξανόμενον 
ὥσπερ τὸ ἐλαυνόμενον: τουτοῦ γὰρ μένοντος τὰ μόρια μεταβάλλει κατὰ τόπον..«τὰ δὲ 
τοῦ αὐξανομένου [int. μεταβάλλει} ἀεὶ ἐπὶ πλείω τόπον, ἐπ᾽ ἐλάττω δὲ τὰ τοῦ 
φθίνοντος. Since ἀλλοίωσις implies an agent and patient, that which produces 
and that which suffers the alteration or transformation, and these two can only 
be brought together in actual contact by spatial motion, it follows that spatial 
motion is also necessarily implied in ἀλλοίωσις. Phys. VIII. 7,260 Ὁ τ ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ 
γε ἀλλοιοῦται, δεῖ τι εἶναι τὸ ἀλλοιοῦν Kal ποιοῦν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει θερμοῦ τὸ [om. τὸ codd. 
E K] ἐνεργείᾳ θερμόν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ κινοῦν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ᾽ Gre μὲν ἐγγύτερον 
ὁτὲ δὲ πορρώτερον τοῦ ἀλλοιουμένου ἐστίν. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἄνευ φορᾶς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται 
ὑπάρχειν, 260 Ὦ 7 ἔτι δὲ πάντων τῶν παθημάτων ἀρχὴ πύκνωσις καὶ μάνωσις... 
πύκνωσις δὲ καὶ μάνωσις σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις, καθ᾽ ἃς γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ λέγεται 
τῶν οὐσιῶν. συγκρινόμενα δὲ καὶ διακρινόμενα ἀνάγκη κατὰ τόπον μεταβάλλειν, 
De Gen. et Corr. 1. 6, 332 Ὁ 9 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δυνατόν, οὐδὲ διακρίνεσθαι 
καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, μηδενὸς ποιοῦντος μηδὲ πάσχοντος...23 οὔτε γὰρ ποιεῖν ταῦτα καὶ 
πάσχειν δύναται κυρίως ἃ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅψασθαι ἀλλήλων...33 ὅμως δὲ τὸ κυρίως 
λεγόμενον [int. ἁφή] ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἔχουσι θέσιν. θέσις δ᾽ οἷσπερ καὶ τόπος. Thus 
rémos=space: Jad. Ar. 767 αι 26, aliquoties pro synonymo χώρα legitur, veluti 
Phys. IV. 1, 208b 7, 209a 8, 2, 209b 15 etc. Properly τόπος is the portion of 
space which a body fills: PAys. IV. 4, 212a 20 τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον 
πρῶτον : οἷ. 212a 14 ἔστι δ᾽ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τόπος μεταφορητός, οὕτω καὶ ὃ τόπος 
ἀγγεῖον ἀμετακίἔνητον. 

8. 20. ᾧ γὰρ ὑπάρχουσιν, int. τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ τρίπηχυ That which has the 
quality white or the length of three cubits may be in motion; and so incidentally 
the quality or quantity in question may be said to be moved. Phys. IV. 4, 
211 a 22 ταῦτα (1.6. ἡ λευκότης Kal ἡ ἐπιστήμη) γὰρ οὕτω μεταβέβληκε τὸν τόπον, 
ὅτι ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχουσι μεταβάλλει. This, be it remarked, is precisely the way in 
which, on A.’s own theory, soul is moved, viz. as being practically the form 
of a concrete living thing (ζῷον ἔμψυχον or σύνολον) which has motion. Cf. 
27:7». 408 a 30—34. 

a2I. οὐκ ἔστι τόπος αὐτῶν. There is no place assignable for the quality 
white or the length three cubits, but only for the concrete things to which they 
respectively belong, i.e. to the existences (οὐσίαι) of which they are, in the widest 
sense, accidents (συμβεβηκότα). τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔσται, int. τόπος. The argument 
amounts to this :—If soul is a thing to which the attribute motion essentially 
or of its own nature belongs, then it will be in space, and, what is more, will 
have a place peculiar to it, a region in the universe to which it tends. Them. 
15, 34 H., 28, 18 Sp. ef δὴ σῶμα ἡ ψυχή, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τόπον οἰκεῖον ἕξει. τίνα 
οὖν τοῦτον; εἰς ἐκεῖνον γὰρ φύσει κινήσεται καὶ γενομένη ἐν ἐκείνῳ φύσει ἠρεμήσει. 
Thus Them. gives τόπος a different meaning here (a 21) from that which it 
has above (a 16). This is plausible, for otherwise, as M. Rodier remarks, 
A. would elaborate a second argument to obtain a conclusion already reached 
almost at a step. 

a 22 ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ...23 καὶ φύσει. Aut scribendum est εἴ τε aut certe intelligendum. 
Quae enim sequuntur ostendunt haec in universum dici, non de sola anima 
(Torstrik). This proposition holds of the four simple bodies, fire, air, earth 
and water; each of which has its natural rectilinear motion, upward from 
the centre of the universe to its circumference, or downward from the circum- 
ference to the centre, according to its own proper region or locality (τόπος 
οἰκεῖος) and yet may be constrained to move in the opposite or some other 


I. 3 406 a 16—a 29 245 


direction. Similarly its tendency to move with its natural motion may be 
counteracted, and it may be thus brought to a standstill. Thus fire (according 
to A.) is a simple body whose natural motion is upwards; but the pressure 
of the air, as in a strong wind, may either cause the flames to go actually 
downwards, or at any rate may hinder them from ascending: βίᾳ = παρὰ φύσιν. 
Cf. Phys. V. 6, 230a 29, De Resp. 4728 18. Or, as each simple body has 
its Own proper motion, a constrained or unnatural motion = that which naturally 
belongs to some other body: De Cael. 1. 2, 269a 7 Bla μὲν yap ἐνδέχεται τὴν 
ἄλλου καὶ ἑτέρου (int. κίνησιν φέρεσθαι), κατὰ φύσιν δε ἀδύνατον, εἴπερ pia ἑκάστου 
κίνησις ἡ κατὰ φύσιν τῶν ἁπλῶν. Our first proposition is stated again De 
Cael. 111. 2, 300 a 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ παρὰ φύσιν ἐστί tis κίνησις, ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ 
κατὰ φύσιν, παρ᾽ ἣν αὕτη" καὶ εἰ πολλαὶ ai παρὰ φύσιν, τὴν κατὰ φύσιν μίαν" κατὰ 
φύσιν μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παρὰ φύσιν δ᾽ ἔχει πολλὰς ἕκαστον. The converse is stated 
De Gen. εἴ Corr. 11. 6, 333 Ὁ 26 ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπεὶ φαίνεται καὶ βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν 
κινούμενα τὰ σώματα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, οἷον τὸ πῦρ ἄνω μὲν οὗ βίᾳ, κάτω δὲ βίᾳ, 
τῷ δὲ βίᾳ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐναντίον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ βίᾳ" ἔστιν ἄρα [the apodosis begins] 
καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖσθαι. Also Phys. τν. 8, 215 ἃ 1 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν [int 
λεκτέον) ὅτι πᾶσα κίνησις ἢ βίᾳ } κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνάγκη δ᾽ ἄν περ ἢ βίαιος, εἶναι 
καὶ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν" ἡ μὲν γὰρ βίαιος παρὰ φύσιν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ὑστέρα 
τῆς κατὰ φύσιν, De Cael. 1. 7, 274 Ὁ 30 ἢ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν κινηθήσεται ἢ βίᾳ 
καὶ εἰ βίᾳ, ἔστιν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν (SC. κίνησις). 

a 23 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ “περὶ ἠρεμίας...26 βίᾳ. Similarly De Cael. 
I. 8, 2768 22 ἅπαντα γὰρ καὶ μένει καὶ κινεῖται βίᾳ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ κατὰ 
φύσιν μέν, ἐν ᾧ μένει μὴ βίᾳ, καὶ φέρεται, καὶ εἰς ὃν φέρεται, καὶ μένει, ἐν ᾧ 
δὲ βίᾳ [sc. μένει], καὶ φέρεται βίᾳ, καὶ εἰς ὃν βίᾳ φέρεται, βίᾳ καὶ μένει. Cf. II. 
13, 295 a 2—7, whence it is argued that, if the earth is at rest βίᾳ, it must 
have been brought into its present position at the centre of the world δινήσει 
(205 ἃ 9 εἰ Bia νῦν ἡ γῆ μένει, καὶ συνῆλθεν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον φερομένη διὰ τὴν Sivnow). 

a 27. οὐδὲ πλάττειν βουλομένοις, “even if we chose to allow fancy free 
play.” Cf. 411 b 18 and De Cael. 11]. 1, 299 Ὁ 16 πῶς διοριοῦσε μὴ βουλόμενοι 
πλάττειν ; frag. 173, 1506 Ὁ 44 οὐδ᾽ ἐγένετο [sc. τὸ τεῖχος}, 6 δὲ πλάσας ποιητὴς 
ἠφάνισεν. There is here an obvious allusion to the Platonic myths. The 
verb πλάττειν is frequent in Plato in this sense, but metaphorically of fashioning 
speech, e.g. Agol. 17 C πλάττοντι λόγους, and in this more extended sense 
of imagining or inventing (fingere animo) as e.g. Phaedy. 246 C amddrropev 
οὔτε ἴδοντες οὔθ᾽ ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες θεόν, Laws 712B πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς 
νόμους, Rep. 588 Β εἰκόνα πλάσαντες τῆς Ψυχῆς λόγῳ, 7271. 26 E μὴ πλασθέντα 
μῦθον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθινὸν λόγον. The passage last cited opposes πλασθεὶς to ἀληθινὸς 
and illustrates the Aristotelian use οὗ πλάσμα and πλασματίας for fiction and 
fictitious. 

a 28. τούτων γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων αἱ κινήσεις αὗται, as explained in De Caed. 
IV., CC. 3, 4, 6.9. 3118 19 φαίνεται πυρὸς μὲν τὸ τυχὸν μέγεθος ἄνω φερόμενον, 
ἐὰν μή τι τύχῃ κωλῦον ἕτερον, γῆς δὲ κάτω. Cf. 20. III. 5, 304. Ὁ 17 ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ 
πῦρ ὅσῳ ἂν πλεῖον γίγνηται, φέρεται θᾶττον ἄνω τὴν αὑτοῦ φοράν, IV. 2, 308 Ὁ 13 
νῦν γὰρ τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἀεὶ κοῦφον καὶ ἄνω φέρεται, ἡ δὲ γῆ καὶ τὰ γεηρὰ πάντα κάτω καὶ 
πρὸς τὸ μέσον. 

a 29. 6 δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν μεταξύ, int. κινήσεων, as Barco saw. 
The elements air and water rise above earth but sink below fire. Their 
motions, then, being directed to quarters of the universe intermediate between 
the extremity and the centre, may be justly termed “intermediate motions.” 
““The same argument” is as follows: if the soul tends to move towards the 
intermediate regions of the universe, it will be composed of either air or 


246 NOTES 1.3 


water, since these are the elements which naturally tend to move towards 
the localities intermediate to the centre and the extremity of the universe. See 
the chapters referred to in the last note, especially De Cael. IV. 4, 311 a 22 
ἄλλως δὲ βαρὺ καὶ κοῦφον, ois ἀμφότερα ὑπάρχει" Kal yap ἐπιπολάζουσί τισι καὶ 
ὑφίστανται, καθάπερ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ᾽ ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδέτερον τούτων κοῦφον ἢ 
βαρύ" γῆς μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω κουφότερα (ἐπιπολάζει γὰρ αὐτῇ τὸ τυχὸν αὐτῶν μόριον), 
πυρὸς δὲ βαρύτερα (ὑφίσταται γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁπόσον ἂν ἢ μόριον), πρὸς ἑαυτὰ δὲ 
ἁπλῶς τὸ μὲν βαρὺ τὸ δὲ κοῦφον" ἀὴρ μὲν γὰρ ὁπόσος ἂν ἢ, ἐπιπολάζει ὕδατι, 
ὕδωρ δὲ ὁττόσον ἂν ἢ, ἀέρι ὑφίσταται. The result is summed up c. 5, 3128 26 
καὶ ὕδωρ μὲν πλὴν γῆς πᾶσιν ὑφίσταται, ἀὴρ δὲ πλὴν πυρὸς πᾶσιν ἐπιπολάζει. 

a 31. κινεῖν τὰς κινήσεις, “move it with those motions,” 1.6. “impart those 
motions.” For the contained accusative with the transitive verb cf. z7/r. 
432 Ὁ 13 τί τὸ κινοῦν τὴν πορευτικὴν κίνησιν and with the middle or passive 
supr. 406 a 13 sq., 2afr. a 32 sq. Ὁ 5 sq., 410 b 20, fad. Ar. 391 a 16—21: 
and for the argument Phys. VIII. 5, 257 Ὁ 25 ἔτι ἣν κινεῖ κίνησιν, καὶ κινοῖτ᾽ dv. 

a 32. ἀντιστρέψασιν, “convertendo,” “conversely,” the logical term which 
denotes the inference of a new proposition, having for its subject the predicate 
and for its predicate the subject of the proposition from which the inference 
is drawn. Thus from the proposition, Some philosophers were Athenians, 
we may infer couverfendo that some Athenians were philosophers. By thus 
converting the proposition we no longer make that which is prior in the order 
of causation prior for knowledge, but conversely ; 1.6. we argue ὦ postertort 
instead of a priort. We have to start with the motions of the body as prior and 
better known to us, 413 a 11 #0Z%e, because that which essentially and in the 
order of nature is prior, viz. the motion of soul, is unknown to us. Cf 
Philop. 106, 18 ἐκ τῶν σαφεστέρων ποιεῖται τὴν διδασκαλίαν καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμωτέρων, 
λέγω δὴ τοῦ σώματος. 

406 bx. τὸ δὲ σῶμα κινεῖται φορᾷ᾽ ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχή. Bonitz (Hermes VI. 
pp. 421---ὃ) thus sums up the argument of a 30—b5: It is a fact (φαίνε- 
rat) that soul sets body in motion. For those who ascribe to soul self-motion, 
it is reasonable to assume that the soul produces those motions in the body 
to which it (the soul) is itself subject. Of the motions of body it is certain 
that they are motions in space. Hence the logical conclusion for the soul is 
ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ. .«-«μεθισταμένη. What (asks Bonitz, l.c. p. 423) do these words 
mean? The two premisses are (1) The motions of soul are those of the 
body, (2) the motions of the body are motions in space. In (2) only φορά, 
a γένος κινήσεως, 15 posited, not the particular species (βάδισις, ἅλσις, πτῆσις. 
Cf. 406a 9 note, and Ind. Ar. 132a 44). There can, then, be no other 
conclusion than this: “Hence the motions of soul are motions in space” 
(es kann mithin nichts anderes erschlossen werden, als: folglich sind die 
Bewegungen der Seele raumliche Bewegungen). The result thus obtained 
seems absolutely incontrovertible. Bonitz goes on to enquire: Can the 
conclusion logically required be found in the words of the text? (Steht 
dies in dem vorliegenden Worten?) It seems to me that this is undoubtedly 
the case if we make a pause after ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ [int. κινεῖται φορᾷ] A. 
sometimes omits the predicate after ὥστε, Jud. Ar. 873a 18 ὥστε sine verbo 
Meteor. 1V. 10, 388 a 22 ὕλη τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, dare ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ’ A few 
examples may suffice: Phys. VIII. 6, 259 Ὁ 18 μεταβάλλει γὰρ τὸν τόπον τὸ 
σῶμα, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ σώματι ὃν Kal τὸ ἐν τῇ μοχλείᾳ κινοῦν ἑαυτό (sc. μεταβάλλει 
τὸν τόπον), Pol. 1252 Ὁ 20 πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, 
ὥστε καὶ ai ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν [int. βασιλευόνται], 1253 a 14 6 δὲ λόγος 
ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ [3ς. ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν] 


I. 3 406 a 29—b 2 247 


τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, Eth. Nic. 1133 a 20 πάντα yap μετρεῖ, Gore καὶ τὴν 
ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν [int. μετρεῖ], πόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ᾽ ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ» 
Metuph. 1039 a 33 ὥστε καὶ τὸ ζῷον [int. ἀνάγκη τόδε τι σημαίνειν xré.], 
1055 a 22 ὅλως τε εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ἐναντιότης διαφορά, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ δυοῖν, ὥστε καὶ ἡ 
τέλειος [sc. διαφορὰ δυοῖν], 1078 a 8 ὥστε καὶ ἣ μήκη μόνον καὶ ἣ ἐπίπεδα [int. 
ἴδια πάθη ἐστίν], 1078 ἃ ΤΙ ὥστε ἄνευ τε μεγέθους μᾶλλον ἣ μετὰ μεγέθους, καὶ 
μάλιστα ἄνευ κινήσεως [int. ἔχει τἀκριβές]. By a similar ellipse here also 
exactly the conclusion which the premisses warrant is left to be understood : 
ὥστε καὶ ἣ ψυχὴ [int. κινεῖται φορᾷ! Cf. Them. 16, 16 H., 29, 15 Sp. ro 
δὲ σῶμα κινεῖται κατὰ τόπον, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τόπον ἤτοι γε ὅλη ἢ κατὰ μόρια 
μεθισταμένη. If so, μεταβάλλοι ἂν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα should not be emended but 
simply excised. It may be objected to the minor premiss that the body under- 
goes not only φορὰ but also ἀλλοίωσες and αὔξησις. The reply is that, as we have 
seen (see zoze on a τό sugr.), both ἀλλοίωσις and αὔξησις imply φορὰ and are at 
any rate ev τόπῳ. 

Ὁ 2. μεταβάλλοι ἂν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, Bonitz l.c., having clearly laid down that 
the conclusion of A.’s syllogism ought to contain a determination of the kind of 
change or motion which belongs to soul, viz. motion in space, examines the 
traditional text to see whether this determination is implied (1) in μεταβάλλοι, 
(2) In κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, (3) in μεθισταμένη. (1) Trend. explains “ μεταβάλλοι ἂν, 1.6. 
τόπον," but, if μεταβάλλειν of itself here meant “to move from place to place,” 
as it unquestionably does in the passages cited, Jzd. Ar. 458 Ὁ 50—54, then 
A. in his conclusion has expressed the general term, change or motion, and left 
the reader to supply for himself the particular kind of change or motion to 
be inferred from the premisses. This seems very improbable. Again, if (2) 
we look for what we want in κατὰ τὸ σῶμα we do indeed find it there, provided 
that the words are understood with Simpl. 37, 4 τουτέστι καθάπερ σῶμα τοπικῶς, 
and that this agreement between the motions of soul and body be construed 
generally, and not as an exact correspondence in every detail, such as is 
implied at Ὁ 15 sq., which would render impossible the further inference that 
the soul may leave the body and return to it. There is no objection on 
the score of language to interpreting μεταβάλλειν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα “to undergo 
the same species of change as the body.” But the expression is almost 
incredibly clumsy, because then the conclusion would be an exact repetition 
of the major premiss, μεταβάλλει κατὰ τὸ σῶμα being identical with ἡ ψυχὴ 
καὶ αὐτὴ ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν κινεῖται ἣν τὸ σῶμα (a 32 Sq.), while there is no 
inference from the minor at all, and in particular no technical term corre- 
sponding to φορά to indicate the kind of change or motion inferred for the 
sou]. Can the missing complement to μεταβάλλοι ἄν be discovered (3) in 
μεθισταμένηϑ The verb is used Jud. Ar. 449 Ὁ 13 proprie de mutato loco. 
But Bonitz replies that the whole meaning of the words μεταβάλλοι av... 
μεθισταμένη would form part of the conclusion from the premisses, whereas 
this whole meaning goes far beyond the premisses. Further, if κατὰ ro σῶμα 
is to be taken with μεθισταμένη, the further inference that soul can leave 
the body and return to it is again rendered impossible. 

Thus failing to obtain from the text the conclusion logically required, 
Bonitz proposed to alter κατὰ τὸ σῶμα into κατὰ τόπον. In support of the 
emendation he urges that, in all places of his paraphrase which correspond 
to the words, Themistius has κατὰ τόπον : 16, 13 H., 29, 11 Sp. ἑπόμενον ἂν οὕτω 
καὶ εὔλογον εἴη καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς κινήσεως τὸν αὐτὸν αὐτήν τε κινεῖσθαι καὶ 
κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα εἶ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκόλουθον, δηλονότι kai ἀντιστρέψασιν ἀληθές, ὡς κιν εἴται 
τὸ σῶμα, οὕτω κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. τὸ δὲ σῶμα κινεῖται κατὰ τόπον, ὥστε καὶ 


248 NOTES 1. 3 


ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τόπον, ἤτοι γε ὅλη ἢ κατὰ μόρια μεθισταμένη (cf. 16,35 54.: 16, 38 H., 
30, 13: 30, 15: 30, 18 Sp.) without ever indicating that these words are an ex- 
planatory inference from another expression. So, too, Philoponus, who twice 
refers to our passage, viz. 106, 19 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα, φησί, φορὰν κινεῖται, καὶ τὴν 
ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη φορὰν κινεῖσθαι, 107, 20 ὥστε καὶ αὐτὴ κινηθήσεται κατὰ τόπον ἢ ὅλη 
4 κατὰ μόρια μεθισταμένη ἴσως, ὅλη μὲν ὅλον κινοῦσα τὸ σῶμα, κατὰ μόρια δε μέρος 
αὐτοῦ κινοῦσα. Neither Them. nor Philop. mentions κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, but the 
words are found in the text used by Simpl. (37, 4), whose explanation of them has 
been cited above. As 1 have already said, the end proposed by the emendation 
is as easily attained by excising μεταβάλλοι ἂν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα from the text 
as a clumsy marginal comment, by which some reader unfamiliar with A.’s 
ellipses supplied what seemed to him to be the missing conclusion. It will 
be observed that the words of Simplicius τουτέστι καθάπερ σῶμα τοπικῶς would 
be equally in point if his lemma stopped short at ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχῆ, while 
the explanation of Philop. (107, 20) favours an elliptical conclusion with ὥστε 
quite as much as does that of Them. (16, 16 H., 29, 15 sq. Sp.), both already 
cited. It would of course be possible to place a full stop after ψυχή, and 
by inserting δ᾽ before ἂν to make a new sentence μεταβάλλοι δ᾽ ay...peOtorapérn. 
This new sentence would not be the conclusion of the syllogism, and so far 
some of the difficulties pointed out by Bonitz would disappear, but others 
would remain. If we must retain and may not emend μεταβάλλοι ἂν κατὰ 
τὸ σῶμα, I am inclined to accept Mr Shorey’s suggestion (4. /. PA. XXII. 153) 
that κατὰ τὸ σῶμα may be taken locally “within the body,” and not in the sense 
given to the words by Simplicius (37, 4. Cf. κατὰ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα 408 a 16, where, 
however, motion is not implied. ‘“ This gives point,” Mr Shorey urges, “to the 
following antithesis: (if it can move in the body) it would follow that it can also, 
καί, go forth from the body and return. The same thought seems to be 
implied in the comparison with the quicksilver,” 406 Ὁ 18 566. 

Ὁ 2. ἢ ὅλη ἢ κατὰ μόρια μεθισταμένη. When it has been proved that the 
soul is subject to spatial motion, κινεῖται φορᾷ or κατὰ τόπον, two alternatives 
present themselves. There are two species of spatial motion. Either the 
whole of a thing may change its place: this 15 motion of translation. Or 
the parts may move relatively to each other while the whole remains in the 
same place, e.g. when a sphere revolves or a top spins. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. 
I, 5, 320A 19 τὸ μὲν yap φερόμενον ὅλον ἀλλάττει τόπον, τὸ δ᾽ αὐξανόμενον 
ὥσπερ τὸ ἐλαυνόμενον. τούτου γὰρ μένοντος τὰ μόρια μεταβάλλει κατὰ τόπον, 
οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ τῆς σφαίρας" τὰ μὲν γὰρ [the parts of the revolving sphere] ἐν 
τῷ ἴσῳ τόπῳ μεταβάλλει τοῦ ὅλου μένοντος, τὰ δὲ τοῦ αὐξανομένου ἀεὶ ἐπὶ πλείω 
τόπον [sc. μεταβάλλει], Pl. Laws 893 C τὰ τὴν τῶν ἑστώτων ἐν μέσῳ λαμβάνοντα 
δύναμιν λέγεις, φήσομεν, ἐν ἑνὶ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἑστάναι λεγομένων κύκλων 
στρέφεται περιφορά, where the rotation οὗ a sphere upon a fixed axis is illustrated 
by a simpler case, viz. the revolution of a circle about a fixed centre. Them. 
and Simpl. do not comment on these words: the.inference is that they found 
no difficulty in them. Philoponus gives an erroneous interpretation (107, 21) 
ὅλη μὲν ὅλον κινοῦσα τὸ σῶμα, κατὰ μόρια δὲ μέρος αὐτοῦ κινοῦσα, possibly 
understanding μεθισταμένη in an active sense, at all events reading into the 
second .clause κατὰ, μόρια μεθισταμένη an alien idea derived from a forced 
interpretation of ὅλη.. μεθισταμένη. Conrad Gesner gave approximately the 
right explanation: “ἢ ὅλη, ut si recta moveretur, ἢ κατὰ μόρια, ut si circulo,” 
which Trend. deliberately rejected: “Minime; neque enim ad motus genus 
pertinet. Haec potius est sententia ; Sequeretur animam vel omnem vel eius 
inter se facultates tanquam partes locum mutare.” For this he is rightly 


I. 3 406 Ὁ 2—b 6 249 


censured by Bonitz, l.c., p. 426, who remarks that to introduce the faculties 
of the soul at this point is quite inadmissible, since the inconsistencies 
which A. deduces from the theory under examination all relate to the nature 
of the soul itself conceived as existing and moving in space. 

Ὁ 3 εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐνδέχεται. In editione A videtur fuisse εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ 
ἂν καὶ ἐξελθοῦσαν εἰσιέναι πάλιν. Torstrik inferred this from the variants of 
the inferior MSS. (see crétzcal notes), and it is actually found in y, of which 
he had not a collation. ΒΖ (lc.) argues that the reading of the inferior 
MSS. ought here to be preferred to E, because it is not a question of possibility: 
that the soul moves 1n space has been demonstrated as necessarily true. Even 
granting this, A. might make a compendiary use of ἐνδέχεται : “If this, as 
already demonstrated, 15 possible, a further possibility will follow, viz. etc.” 
Torstrik himself regarded the variation here between what he calls the two 
editions as due merely to considerations of style: videtur autem correxisse, 
quia paulo ante usus erat formulé e4 quae est εἰ δὲ τοῦτο a 32, an admission 
which goes a long way in the direction of those who see in the so-called 
eadtizo prior of Book 11. merely a paraphrase. 

Ὁ 3 Kal ἐξελθοῦσαν εἰσιέναι πάλιν ἐνδέχοιτ ἄν, int. τὴν ψυχήν. This is 
intended by A. as ἃ reductio ad adsurdum of the supposition that the soul moves 
in space. Such absence from the body and return to it are common in the 
folklore and magic stories of all ages. Cf. Frazer, Golden Bough, ch. 11. § 2, 
“The nature of the soul,” and ch. iv. § 3, ‘‘The external soul in folk-tales.” 
Cf. also Vol. 11., pp. 123—5 (1st ed.), on traces in folk-tales of belief in the 
resurrection of animals. 

Ὁ 4 ἀνίστασθαι. Trend. compares //. ΧΧΙ. 55 ἦ μάλα δὴ Τρῶες μεγαλήτορες, 
οὕσπερ ἔπεφνον, | αὖτις ἀναστήσονται ὑπὸ ζόφου ἠερόεντος. His suggestion 
that the clause is the interpolation of a Christian scribe hardly merits serious 
consideration. That the dead should rise again is to Greek ideas the typical 
instance of an event antecedently incredible as reversing the established order 
of nature. Cf. Hdt. II. 62, cited by Bonitz αὐτὸς... ἔθαψά μιν χερσὶ rior 
ἐμεωυτοῦ. ef μέν νυν of τεθνεῶτες ἀνεστᾶσι, προσδέκεό τοι καὶ ᾿Αστυάγεα τὸν 
Μῆδον ἐπαναστήσεσθαι" εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ, οὐ μή τί τοι ἔκ γε ἐκείνου 
νεώτερον ἀναβλαστῆ. 

Ὁ 5 τὴν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κίνησιν. This really goes back to 4o6a 14 
εἰ δὲ κινεῖται μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The supposition there brought forward has 
now been exhaustively treated. A. next turns to the alternative hypothesis 
and shows that, if the motion asserted of the soul be merely accidental (κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός, not καθ᾽ αὑτὸ or φύσει); such motions may equally well be due to some- 
thing other than the soul itself. Philop. 109, IS τὸ μὲν “γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 
κινούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ δύναιτο ἂν αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως καὶ ὑπ᾽ 
ἄλλου τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην κινεῖσθαι. A movement of the animal is occasioned 
by an impulse of its soul (κατὰ ψυχικὴν ὁρμὴν κινουμένου τοῦ ζῴου) : in this case 
the soul of the animal is adventitiously moved, but by itself (ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς κατὰ 
συμβεβηκὸς xweira). But suppose the animal to be impelled by external 
agency ; in that case it is also adventitiously moved, but by something else. It 
is important to remember that A. is stating his own opinion in the sentence 
before us, supported by the evidence of facts. See the recapitulation, 408 a 
30—34. The body is moved by something external (ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου) and the soul, 
through its inclusion in the body thus moved (406 a 5 τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ εἶναι), is 
also moved, but indirectly, fer acctdens. The optatives with ἂν in Ὁ 6 κινοῖτο 


ἄν, ὠσθείη ἂν are purely potential. 
b 6 κἂν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου, by something else as well as by itself, in the way 


250 NOTES I. 3 


described in 408 a 32 sq.: cf. 408 a 31 κινεῖν ἑαυτὴν (κατὰ συμβεβηκός). Cf. on 
this point PAys. Vill. 6, 259 Ὁ 28 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ κινεῖσθαι κατὰ 
συμβεβηκὸς ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ καὶ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου" τὸ μὲν γὰρ bp ἑτέρου ὑπάρχει καὶ τῶν ἐν 
τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐνίαις ἀρχαῖς (the spirits of the spheres), ὅσα πλείους φέρεται φοράς, 
θάτερον δὲ τοῖς φθαρτοῖς μόνον. 

Ὁ 7 οὐ δεῖ δὲ...8 πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. “ But that which has the 
attribute of self-motion as part of its very nature ought not, except accidentally, 
to be moved by something external.” Jd. Ar. 604a 28 πλὴν εἰ μὴ, pleonastice 
addita negatione Amal. Prior. 1. 27, 43 a 39, Waitz ad loc. “ πλὴν εἰ μὴ pleo- 
nasmus est, qui tamen ferri potest, quum πλὴν saepius non excipiendi vim 
habet, sed definiendi et limitandi.” A. is still objecting to the proposition, 
“The soul is self-moved,” although the ground is shifted from καθ᾽ αὑτὸ 
κινεῖσθαι tO κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινεῖσθαι. Cf. Philop. 109, 11 βούλεται mpds τὸ 
αὐτοκίνητον ἐνστῆναι. The ancient commentators were puzzled by the last 
clause, “except accidentally.” What, we ask, is the exceptional case in 
which that which has the power of self-motion is also per accidens moved 
by something external? Philoponus thinks that the motion communicated 
by external force is never the same as that which the self-moving soul 
possesses in its own nature. But this is doubtful. Themistius and Simplicius 
agree in thinking that it is precisely the concurrence of the external impulse 
with the soul’s self-motion which happens only incidentally. 

b8 ὥσπερ οὐδὲ... ἑτέρου ἕνεκεν. This sentence serves, by two instances, 
to show how much is meant by ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι as an essential attribute. 
The chiasmus should be noted: τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀγαθὸν is opposed to (τὸ) ἑτέρου 
ἕνεκεν, that which is good in itself to that which is so only as a means to 
something else: while (τὸ) δι αὑτὸ is opposed to (rd) δι᾽ ἄλλο. In Z£7h. Nic. 
1096 Ὁ 16 we read καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα Kal povovpeva διώκεται, 
οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι’ ἄλλο τι 
διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. To meet the case of such 
goods we must suppose the qualification εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, which stands 
in the main clause (406 Ὁ 8), to be repeated in the illustration. 

bro τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν. ΥἹ εἴπερ κινεῖται. This statement becomes clearer as 
A.’s own theories of αἴσθησις and ὄρεξις are unfolded in the present treatise. 
As to the former, we may anticipate by a reference to 416 b 33 sq., 4178 13, 17 9q., 
where κινεῖσθαι. πάσχειν and ἀλλοίωσις (a species of κίνησις), are used almost 
indifferently to describe the effect which the αἰσθητὸν produces upon the soul in 
actual perception. Subsequently 417 Ὁ 2 sqq. ἐνεργεῖν is preferred (εἰς αὐτὸ yap 
ἡ ἐπίδοσις καὶ eis ἐντελέχειαν 417b6; cf. 425 Ὁ 26—426a 8, 431 a4—7), and on 
the whole ποιεῖν, πάσχειν are more in favour than κινεῖν, κινεῖσθαι. For ὄρεξις 
it is sufficient to refer to III., cc. 10, 11, e.g. 433 a 18—30, 433 Ὁ 11—18, 
433 Ὁ 27—434a9. Occasionally even the rational soul is said to be ““ moved”: 
e.g. 431 Ὁ 5 and possibly 433 a 24. 

bII ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ κινεῖ...15 αὐτῆς καθ᾽ αὐτήν. Another objection. Motion 
is displacement, and therefore any motion of the soul would mean that the soul 
is displaced or dislodged from its nature, whence we are intended to infer that 
it would cease to be soul. So that the hypothesis of self-motion as belonging to 
the nature of soul is self-destructive. Alex. Aphr. discusses this expression, dz. 
καὶ λύσ. 11. 2. 46, 22—47, 27 (Bruns). 

13. ἕκστασίς ἐστι τοῦ κινουμένου ἢ κινεῖται. This definition is not to be 
found in the PAysécs, but it can be easily deduced from the more abstract form 
of the definition usually given, viz. “the realisation of what is potentially 
existent as such,” or “the actualisation of what is undeveloped.” This may be 


I. 3 406 Ὁ 6—b 21 251 


made clear by considering one or two of the species of motion, e.g. under 
qualitative change (ἀλλοίωσις) a thing which was formerly white becomes black 
and then there is a displacement (ἔκστασις) of the quality “white.” Again, take 
quantitative change: a tree grows to twice its former height, which has thus 
been displaced. Finally, and here the meaning of ἔκστασις is best seen, in the 
case of locomotion (φορά) from 4 to B, the “place” or spatial position of the 
thing which has moved is no longer 4 but 5. 

b13. ἐξίσταιτ᾽ ἂν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. The last three words are added because 
the soul is supposed to move by its very nature. The inference is obtained by 
pressing the analogy with the motion of material things regarded as displacement. 
Take the moving body of the previous note. When at Z it is no longer at A, 
though this change of place leaves it in other respects unaffected: whereas 
ἀλλοίωσις destroys or modifies the former quality when it substitutes a new one, 
and αὔξησις alters the quantity of τὸ κενούμενον. Cf. Phys. VIII. 7, 261 a 20, where 
A. is arguing that φορὰ is less liable to this “ displacement of essence” than the 
other modes of motion: ἥκιστα τῆς οὐσίας ἐξίσταται τὸ κινούμενον τῶν κινήσεων ἐν 
τῷ φέρεσθαι": κατὰ μόνην γὰρ οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει τοῦ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἀλλοιουμένου μὲν τὸ 
ποιόν, αὐξανομένου δὲ καὶ φθίνοντος τὸ ποσόν. Similarly the soul, if self-motion is 
its essential nature, its logical essence, is, gwé@ moved, no longer after motion what 
it was before. It might even be said to have become παρὰ φύσιν. Cf. De Cael. 
I. 3, 286 a 18—20 ὕστερον δὲ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἔκστασίς τίς ἐστιν 
ἐν τῇ γενέσει τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. Cf. Philop. 113, 14 καὶ ἡ ψνχὴ οὖν εἰ 
καθὸ Ψυχὴ ἐστι καὶ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν κινεῖται, ἐκσταίη ἂν τῆς οὐσίας ἑαυτῆς καὶ φθαρήσεται. 
Philop. appeals to Pl. Pkaedr. 245 ἙἘ. He justly remarks (114, 12) that A.’s 
contention is οὐκ αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν κινεῖ, GAN ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ μὲν κινοῦν τὸ δὲ 
κινούμενον. Cf. 409a 10—18. 

bI5 ἔνιοι $...16 ds αὐτὴ κινεῖται.:. This view attributes not merely spatial 
motion in general to the soul but movements corresponding exactly in detail to 
those of the body (406a 31). It might have been held by any pre-Socratic 
philosopher who regarded the soul as a material thing enclosed in the body. 
The view implies (1) the soul is in the body, (2) the soul has definite spatial - 
motions, (3) these it communicates to the body in which it resides. From 
Lucretius III. 370—3 it would appear that atoms of soul and atoms of body are, 
according to Democritus, arranged alternately in the animal, s¢zgula privis 


adpostta. 
Ὁ 17. οἷον Δημόκριτος. Cf 409 a 32—b 4, Aet. IV. 3, 5 (Doxogr. Gr. 388) ὅπερ 
σῶμα εἶνα. Φιλίππῳ. Frag. Com. Gr. 11. 172, fr. 22 Koch. Philippus was a son 


of Aristophanes, and a poet ofthe Middle Comedy. He wrote among other plays 
a Daedalus. Them. (19, 10 H., 34, 27 Sp.) says that Daedalus in this play claims 
to have made a moving Aphrodite: φησὶ yap ὁ Δαίδαλος παρ᾽ αὐτῷ κινουμένην 
ποιῆσαι τὴν ξυλίνην "Adpoditny éyxéas ἄργυρον χυτόν. Cf. Meineke, Prag. Cos. 
Gr. τ. 340 566. ; Philop. 114, 37- 

b20 κινουμένας yap...22 τὸ σῶμα πᾶν. Join διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι μηδέποτε μένειν 
with κινουμένας. Cf. 4048 11 5ᾳ. This quality of restless mobility is due 
ultimately to their shape, 405 a 8—13. The spherical atoms are here designated 
“ indivisible spheres.” Cf. 409 a 12 σφαιρίων, 409b 9 σφαίρας μικράς. Being 
mobile themselves, they communicate motion to whatever they come in contact 
with, in this case the atoms of the body in which they are enclosed. Cf. generally 
404 a 5—I16, 4098 3I—}b 11. 

b2x. στυνεφέλκειν --συγκιενεῖν ἑαυταῖς. This explanation of the motion of the 
body reduces it to a species of push and leverage (Philop. 114, 29 τῷ κιν εἶσθαι 
τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα doe καὶ μοχλείᾳ tevi), which, as Philop. observes, 
is equally involved in the argument adduced above (406a 30—b 5). 


252 NOTES I. 3 


b22 ἡμεῖς 8° ἐρωτήσομεν...23 ταὐτὰ ταῦτας The constant motion of the 
atoms of soul is put forward as the reason why the body moves: what then is 
the cause of its rest? Cf. Phys. VIII. 6, 258 Ὁ 23 δῆλον yap ὡς αἴτιον τοῖς αὐτὰ 
ἑαυτὰ κινοῦσίν ἐστί τι τοῦ ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι ὁτὲ δὲ μή. 

b24 ὅλως δ᾽ οὐχ οὕτω...25 νοήσεως. A general argument, disposing of the 
whole theory that soul moves itself and the body thus mechanically by an 
appeal to the fact (φαίνεται) that man is acted upon by final causes. Cf. the 
sweeping argument De Gen. εὐ Corr. 11. 6, 3348. I0—15. We may paraphrase 
οὕτω “by impact and pressure,” physical causes which imply contact. To this 
mode of causation A. opposes a species of purpose mpoaipecis tis, which he 
subsumes uncer the general notion of thought (νόησις). Cf. 433 Ὁ 11 τοῦτο γὰρ 
fint. τὸ ὀρεκτόν) κινεῖ od κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι. In the full 
discussion of προαίρεσις in Arh. Nic. 111.) c. 2 we are told, amongst other things 
(1112a 15), 7 προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας, and,as Trend. remarks, νόησις in 
the present passage must be taken in this wider and vaguer sense. It does not 
bear the special sense emphasised e.g. in 430a 26, or of the passages in which νοῦς 
θεωρητικός is distinguished from νοῦς πρακτικός. Cf. III, C. 10, esp. 433 a 9---13, 
which shows, if proof were needed, that for irrational animals φαντασία ranks as 
νόησίς τις. Cf. also 429a 4—9. Properly speaking, no irrational animal has 
προαίρεσις. Leth, ic. 1111 Ὁ 8 sq. τοῦ μὲν yap ἑκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τἄλλα ζῷα 
κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν 
δ᾽ ot. Alex. Aphr. neatly sums up De Am Mantissa (106, 11) ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ κινεῖ 
τῷ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἡμᾶς νοεῖν Te καὶ προαιρεῖσθαι: τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθὸν τῷ νοηθῆναι κινεῖ, 7 
δὲ ψυχὴ τῷ νοῆσαι. 

b26. ὁ Τίμαιος. The article denotes the principal speaker in the dialogue 
of Plato. The form of the reference can be paralleled elsewhere in A., e.g. 
Pol. 1342 a 32 ὁ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης, 1261 b 19, 21, 1316a 2 ef Sache. 
Again 26. 1265 a II πάντες of τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι, where by an odd lapse of 
memory A. includes the Zaws, although Socrates is not mentioned as taking 
part in that Platonic dialogue. Similarly 1260a 22—28 there seems to be a 
clear reference to the JZezo, although the practice of Gorgias is merely 
reported in the dialogue, in which he takes no part. We may suppose that 
Plato in putting his views into the mouth of Timaeus, the Pythagorean 
philosopher of Locri in Italy, was in this case guided by the consideration that 
a physical discourse would have been unsuitable in the mouth of Socrates. 
Cf. Xen. A€erzor. τ. 1, §§ 11—15; Pl. «4207, τὸ B—-D, 26Dsqq.; Ar. Metaph. 
987 b I sq. 

b26 φυσιολογεῖ...27 τὸ σώμα, <A. uses φυσιολόγος in nearly the same sense 
as φυσικός. In treating of the history of philosophy he is fond of applying the 
name to the early Ionians, of πρῶτοι φυσιολογήσαντες.ς <ALetaph. 986b 14, 
989 Ὁ 30, 992 b 4. The verb, elsewhere used absolutely, ZeZaph. 988 b 27 
φυσιολογεῖν περὶ πάντων, is here constructed with accusative and infinitive, 
“‘ gives a physicist’s account of the matter to the effect that the soul sets the 
body in motion.” 

b27 τῷ yap κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν...407 a 2 κινήσεις. Here follows an abstract of 
the famous passage, known even in antiquity as the Wuyoyovia of the 7izaeus 
(348 sqq.). The narrative is obviously mythical in form and, partly for this 
reason, has been the occasion of much controversy in all ages. The divergent 
opinions of the ancients may be gathered from Plutarch’s tract De <Animae 
Procreatione in Timaeo Platonis as well as from the commentaries of Proclus 
and Chalcidius on the Zimaeus. A. in the present passage appears to treat 
the account as literal statement of fact, and bases his objections upon this 
interpretation as if there were no other; although, as we learn from Plutarch, 


1. 3 406 Ὁ 22—b 32 253 


contemporary Platonists maintained that the story of creation was not to be 
taken literally. 

Ὁ 27. καὶ τὸ σῶμα κινεῖν διὰ τὸ συμπεπλέχθαι πρὸς αὐτός Cf. Pl. 77772. 34 B and 
36Esqq. The soul is moved (Ὁ 27) of itself {κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν) : this motion it 
communicates to the body, (34 4) κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ κόσμῳ] τὴν τοῦ 
σώματος οἰκείαν, τῶν ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν [1.6. circular 
motion or revolution, περίοδος] : this is because soul is interwoven with body 
(συμπέπλεκται) : Tit. 36E 7 δ᾽ ἐκ μέσου πρὸς τὸν ἔσχατον οὐρανὸν πάντῃ 
διαπλακεῖσα κύκλῳ τε αὐτὸν ἔξωθεν περικαλύψασα. The soul and body are the 
soul and body of the universe (κόσμος Ξεοὐραν ὀςΞετὸ πᾶν. Cf. 406 Ὁ 30, 407 4 3) 
which is a living creature (7777. 30 B) comprehending in itself all particular 
living creatures with souls and bodies (777. 30 C—31 B). 

b28. συνεστηκυῖαν yap ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων. Cf 4o4b17. In 777.35 Α these 
constituents of soul are designated ταὐτό, θάτερον and οὐσία, the last being itself 
a compound of the two former. Cf. 36C, 37 ἃ, B. These στοιχεῖα may have 
had other names in other expositions of Plato’s doctrine, e.g. One, Other, or, 
with the greater importance assumed by the idea-numbers, One, Two. Even 
in the Zzmzaeus the soul can hardly be described as simple or uncompounded. 

b29. μεμερισμένην. The division of the soul is fully described in ZZ. 
35 B—36 B: the “harmonic numbers” being those which determine the great 
musical scale of three octaves. Cf. 374 ἀνὰ λόγον μερισθεῖσα. 

b29. ὅπως αἴσθησίν re σύμφυτον ἁρμονίας ἔχῃ. This purpose seems sufficiently 
indicated by 7772. 37 4, B: but the words αἴσθησιν ξύμφυτον actually first occur 
in 42.4, where they are used of the particular soul. 

b30. Kal τὸ πᾶν φέρηται συμφώνους φοράς. In the 7zviaeus the universe is 
introduced as moving with uniform revolution, 344. When the constitution of 
the soul has been described, we hear of two revolutions in opposite directions, 
viz. in the circle of the Same and in the circle of the Other. The latter consists 
of seven circles, the orbits of the planets, including under the term sun and 
moon. All these revolutions are determined by ratio and harmony kv«Aovs...€v 
λόγῳ φερομένους 36D. They are σύμφωνοι because the circle of the Same 
controls the circle of the Other: 36 κράτος ἔδωκε τῇ ταὐτοῦ Kal ὁμοίου περιφορᾷ. 
The adjustment of the velocities of the planetary orbits is explained 30 B. 

Ὁ 31 τὴν evOvaplav...407a 1 κύκλους. A. has condensed the Platonic account: 
the most relevant passage is Zi. 36 B ταύτην οὖν τὴν ξύστασιν πᾶσαν διπλῆν 
κατὰ μῆκος σχίσας μέσην πρὸς μέσην ἑκατέραν ἀλλήλαις οἷον yt προσβαλὼν 
κατέκαμψεν, εἰς ἐν κύκλῳ ξυνάψας αὐταῖς τε καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐν τῷ καταντικρὺ τῆς 
προσβολῆς, καὶ τῇ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἐν ταὐτῷ περιαγομένῃ κινήσει πέριξ αὐτὰς ἔλαβε, 
καὶ τὸν μὲν ἔξω, τὸν δ᾽ ἐντὸς ἐποιεῖτο τῶν κύκλων...36 Ὁ τὴν δ᾽ ἐντὸς [sc. φορὰν] 
σχίσας ἑξαχῇ ἑπτὰ κύκλους ἀνίσους... κατὰ τἀναντία μὲν ἀλλήλοις προσέταξεν ἰέναι 
τοὺς κύκλους. 

b3I. τὴν εὐθυωρίαν. The preceding participles agree grammatically with 
this word, which obviously refers to the soul, the soul of the universe. The 
same thought might have been expressed by saying that “he bent it” (the 
soul) “from a straight line (ἐξ εὐθυωρίας) into a circle.” As it stands the word, 
which properly means “straight course” or “‘ direction,” must be understood of 
a “straight piece” or “riband” of soul. In Plato it is the mixture (ξύστασις) 
constituting soul which is slit or bent. εἰς κύκλον κατέκαμψεν = κατέκαμψεν, 
εἰς ἕν κύκλῳ ξυνάψας in Ῥ]. 7721. 368 cited above. In Plato the splitting occurs 
first, the bending afterwards. 

b 32. καὶ Stedov...cuvnppévovs. Plato says (doc. czt.) that the Creator, having 
cleft the soul lengthwise in twain, laid the two halves across in the shape of X, 


254 NOTES 1. 3 


bent them round and joined them again at a point opposite to that of their 
original contact (i.e. the centre of X). 

407 aI. τὸν ἕνα. By this is meant Plato’s circle of the Other, comprehending 
the orbits of the sun, moon and the five planets known to the ancients 
(Timaeus 36D cited above). ὡς οὔσας τὰς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰς τὰς τῆς Ψυχῆς 
κινήσεις. The construction is accus. abs. In this identical proposition A. 
probably meant φοράς to be subject. Them. (20, 14 H., 36, 28 Sp.) paraphrases 
the assumption contained in this clause as follows: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κύκλῳ 
κινεῖσθαι τὸν οὐρανόν, ὅτι κύκλος ἦν ἡ ψυχή, that 15, the soul of the universe is 
a circle and therefore the universe itself revolves in a circle. There is ap- 
parently no explicit statement of the kind in the dialogue, but as the universe 
is declared in the strongest terms to be a {gov and to be intelligent in 
virtue of its intellect, which is in soul as soul is in body (30 B), it would seem to 
be implied that, as in the case of other ζῷα, the movements of the universe are 
due to its soul, in fact ave the movements of the soul of the universe. Soul 
governs body, we are told (34 C), and the circular motion first attributed to the 
universe as a whole (viz. τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν 34 A) is repeatedly attributed to 
its soul (36C, E, 37 A). 

407 a 2--b26. Here follow eight objections based upon the details of 
the account in the 77zaezs literally interpreted. (1) Soul is not a magnitude 
(407 ἃ 2—10). (2) If it were, it would be impossible to explain the process of 
thought (407a ro—22). (3) Thought would be infinite if eternal, whereas all 
processes of thought are finite (4o7a22—31). (4) Thought would be a recurring 
cycle (407 a 3I—32). (5) As a fact thought implies rest rather than motion 
(407 a 32-- 2), (6) The inextricable implication of soul with body is a defect 
of the theory (407 b 2—5). (7) No teleological explanation is furnished of the 
motion of the universe (407 Ὁ 5—11). Finally (8) this theory shares with others 
the disadvantage that it fails to account for the dependence of a particular soul 
upon a particular body (407 Ὁ 12—26). 

4078 2. οὐ καλῶς. Int. ἔχει. 

8.3. τὸ λέγειν τὴν Ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι. Cf. 407 8 τό τί δεῖ μέγεθος ἔχειν; A.’s 
own view, that νοῦς is ἀμερὴς and therefore οὐδὲν ἔχων μέγεθος (cf. Phys. VIII. 10, 
266 a 10) comes out clearly in the course of the argument. On μέγεθος see 7 γι. 
Ar, s.v. 445 Ὁ 35. It is either (1) the abstract of μέγας, magnitude, size, exten- 
sion, 1.6. ποσότης (cf. 418 a 18), or (2) something concrete, ποσόν τι, συνεχές, 
διαιρετόν. Thus the term is used sometimes for γραμμή, sometimes for ἐπίπεδον. 
Sed plerumque τὸ μέγεθος ubi ad unam potissimum speciem refertur τὸ σῶμα 
significat, e.g. the atoms of Democritus are ἀδιαίρετα μεγέθη. Cf. 432a4 τὰ 
μεγέθη τὰ αἰσθητά. Lines, surfaces and solids are the three kinds of μέγεθος : see 
701 On 423a 22. The objection implies that the soul is a mathematical object, 
but not necessarily that it is material or corporeal. This consideration has its 
full force whether we interpret the account in the Zvszaeus literally, or treat it 
asa myth. A circle (or a pair of circles meeting in two points) would be μέγεθος 
ὡς γραμμή. We must further remember that Plato and Aristotle differ funda- 
mentally as to the nature and mode of existence of mathematical objects, lines, 
surfaces and solids. To the former they are objective realities and more real 
than the things of sense: to A. they are indeed ὄντα, but οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὄντα, being 
obtained by abstraction from things of sense, by whose existence their very 
existence is conditioned, λόγῳ πρότερα but τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὕστερα. 

a3. τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παντός, int. ψυχήν. Theargumentis as follows. By soul Plato 
must mean thinking soul or νοῦς, and not soul as possessed of perception, anger 
or desire, the movement of which is not circular. But the unity or continuity of 


I. 3 406 b 32—407a 8 255 


thinking mind, like that of thought, is comparable to that of numerable 
quantity, not to that of extended or measurable quantity : in other words is a 
unity of succession (τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἕν), not a unity of co-existence. In Metaph. 
1020 a ὃ quantity is divided into ποσὸν ἀριθμητὸν = πλῆθος and ποσὸν μετρητόν = 
μέγεθος : the former being discrete, the latter continuous. 

a4. δῆλον o71,..6 καλούμενος νοῦς. The subject of βούλεται is ὁ Τίμαιος. A.’s 
characteristic caution appears in τοιαύτην οἷον and ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς. Cf. 429 a 
22, 432 Ὁ 26 with zofes: and for a similar sense of καλούμενος 420 Ὁ 28, 423b 30, 
433 4 31. 

a5. ov γὰρ δὴ...ἡ ἐπιθυμητική. In the 7zaeus these faculties are introduced 
later, with the creation of particular souls, Zz. 424. Cf. Them. 20, 23—6 H., 
37, 1I—16 Sp. In fact, Plato identifies the true nature of soul with reason so 
fully that he adds an explanation of sensation and emotion almost on the 
assumption that they are, so to say, disorders of the reason, the processes of 
pure reason working irregularly under novel conditions (777. 43 Esqq. Cf. 
Phaedo 65 E—66E), the processes of particular, not universal, soul. 

a6. ov κυκλοφορία. Cf. 7777. 43 C—44C. Them. 20, 25 H., 37, 14 Sp. καὶ 
yap ἡ αἴσθησις ὥσπερ κατ᾽ εὐθεῖαν ἐπὶ ra ἔξω καὶ παραπλησίως ἡ ὄρεξις. Philop. 
125. 1 εὐθεῖαι γὰρ τινές εἶσιν [8ς. ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἢ (leg. καὶ) ἡ θυμοειδὴς ἢ ἡ ἐπιθυμη- 
rikn|. αἵτε γὰρ ὄψεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν κατ᾽ εὐθεῖαν ἐκπέμπονται καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς 
ἀνακλάσεσι παλιν δρομοῦσαι κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθεῖαν ἐπανακάμπτουσι (which agrees 
with 7272. 45 C), θυμὸς δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμία πρόοδοι τινές εἶσιν εὐθείας μιμούμεναι. 

a6. ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς καὶ συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ νόησις. Having thus established 
that the soul of the universe is νοῦς alone to the exclusion of other faculties, A. 
proceeds with his usual method (cf. 1.) c. 3 ad init.) to deduce from the proposition 
he is attacking conclusions which contradict it. According to his own physical 
theory, every magnitude is continuous (Piys. IV. 11, 219a 11 πᾶν μέγεθος 
συνεχές, VI. 2, 233 a 11 μέγεθος ἅπαν ἐστὶ συνεχές) and potentially capable of 
subdivision into magnitudes which are continuous, Mezafh. 1020a 10 λέγεται 
δὲ πλῆθος μὲν τὸ διαιρετὸν δυνάμει eis μὴ συνεχῆ, μέγεθος δὲ τὸ εἰς συνεχῆ : its unity 
is due to this continuity. Herein it differs from discrete quantity or number, 
which derives such continuity as it has from succession. Philop. (126, 3) makes 
A. say: ‘So far from allowing νοῦς to be continuous, I should with better reason 
affirm it to be discontinuous (διωρισμένος). If it could be said to be continuous 
at all, it will be so in the same sense as discrete quantity or number, since the 
different numbers follow in a definite order of succession which allows nothing 
else to come between them.’ The proof for νοῦς anticipates the doctrine of IIL., 
cc. 4—8. Νοῦς is taken to be ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν in contradistinction to potential 
νοῦς: Philop. 126, 21 ἐνέργεια δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἡ νόησις, 7 Se νόησις οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστιν ἢ 
τὰ νοήματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ Kar ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθήμαται To the same 
effect Them. 20, 27 H., 37, 18 Sp. μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἅπαν συνεχές, καὶ οὕτως ἕν 
τῷ συνεχὲς εἶναι καὶ τῷ συνάπτειν αὐτοῦ πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον τὰ μόρια" ὁ δὲ νοῦς 
εἷς καὶ συνεχὴς κατ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον, εἰ δεῖ τὸ συνεχὲς ὅλως ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ λέγειν. The 
identity of νοῦς in actuality with νόησες follows from the statement (429 a 24, 
b 31) that νοῦς is nothing in actuality prior to thinking. 

a7. ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα. The process of actual thinking, the ἐνέργεια of 
vous, finds expression in νοήματα, each of which 15 a single notion or conception, 
either as the thought of something indivisible or as the unity of two indivisibles 
in a judgment, whether affirmative or negative. This is further developed and 
explained in IIL, c.6. Cf 11. 8, 432a 8—14. 

a8. ταῦτα δὲ.. ὡς τὸ μέγεθος. The Greek commentators dwell more particu- 
larly on ratiocination : e.g. Them. 20, 34 H., 37, 27 Sp. ὅταν yap τόδε pera τόδε 


256 NOTES I. 3 


νοῶμεν, διωρισμένα μὲν τὰ νοήματα, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις ἔχει, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς ἕν 
πολλάκις τὰ πλείω, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς τὰ λήμματα εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀλλ᾽ 
οὐ τῷ συνεχῆ εἶναι, οὐδὲ τῷ πρὸς ὅρον κοινὸν συνάπτειν. To the same effect 
Philop. 126, 24—29 and Simpl. 42, 13---33. ὙΠΕ train of thoughts passes from 
one discrete item to another; what continuity it has is due to the succession. 
M. Rodier seeks to show that the same holds with single notions: the parts of 
the definition are subordinate, not coordinate; hence the suppression of one 
may involve the suppression of the others but not wzce versa, which also has a 
parallel in the numerical series. In support of this he cites AZefaph. 1035 b 
4—7, Categ. 13, 15a 4 54., 12, 14a 31 588. On the relative priority of One in 
the numerical series see also Metafh. 1084 Ὁ 13—16. Trend. 209 Novara, 
1.6. quae mens excogitavit, unum sunt, quoniam partes lege quadam sese ex- 
cipiunt (τῷ ἐφεξῆς), nulla tam spatii continuitate cohaerentes; sunt igitur, 
quemadmodum numerus, culus partes nec extra se positae neque externo 
vinculo connexae, sed sola cogitationis vi ad unitatem quandam redactae. 
Itaque mens aut partium ignara est aut certe non tanquam magnitudo continua. 
Continuity (and therefore Unity) of succession is a kind of bastard unity, κατὰ 
τὴν ἀναλογίαν συνεχές as Philop. 127, 2 calls it. The problem thus raised involves 
the question, Does mind always think? on which see 4308 5 sq., 430 a 22. 

8. 9 διόπερ...10 ὡς μέγεθός τι συνεχής. The first opinion, as will appear from 
430b 15, 15 A.’s own. This is the negation of μέγεθος ἔχειν Metaph. 1073 a 5 
δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν [Vviz. ἀΐδιος οὐσία 
which is the prime movent and the Deity], ἀλλ᾽ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν. If 
νοῦς be ἀμερής, by another of A.’s physical principles, it is incapable of motion, 
Phys. VI. το, 240 b 30 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἀμερὲς κινεῖσθαι οὐδ᾽ ὅλως μεταβάλλειν. 

a IO πῶς γὰρ δὴ...22 [νόησις]. A new objection. How will Mind think, if it 
be extended? The context shows that what A. means is: “ Granting that the 
movement (κίνησις) of mind is thought, and the movement of a circle revolution, 
what analogy is there between the two to justify Plato in using the one to represent 
the other?” Themistius (21, 4 H., 38, το Sp.) in his paraphrase supplies a neces- 
sary premiss : ‘ How will Mind think, especially if soul and mind need contact or 
contiguity with the object of thought?” εἰ,. ἁφῆς χρεία τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ νῷ καὶ 
πελάσεως πρὸς τὸ νοούμενον. Hence θιγὼν had better be supplied with ὁτῳοῦν 
μορίῳ (407 a 11) and 7d, κατὰ μέγεθος. The evidence for πότερον is the unsup- 
ported first hand of E, except that vet. transl. and Soph. (21, 7 ; 22, 23) point to 
πότερον καθ᾽ ὅλον ἢ which Torstrik accepted, inserting θιγὼν in the text before #. 
I prefer to understand θιγὼν rather than to insert it. Three alternative hypo- 
theses present themselves ; or rather two, one of which is subdivided ; that 1s to 
say (1) that soul thinks by means of its parts severally, whether these parts be (a) 
magnitudes or (4) points, a 11—17, or (2) that soul as a whole apprehends its 
object as awhole,a 17 sq. Difficulties confront us on either hypothesis. Taking 
(1 4) first, point after point of the circle as it revolves comes into contact with 
the object, and as there is an infinity of such points, it will take an infinite time 
for mind to apprehend its object. On the other hand, on assumption (1 a) if an 
extended part (μέγεθος) of the circle comes in contact with the object, the 
process of thinking will involve a constant repetition in which the same object 
is thought again and again: which is contrary to experience. Again, if contact 
by means of a single part is sufficient, the supposed revolutions of the circle and 
the circle itself as merely extended become superfluous. On hypothesis (2) 1.6. 
if the whole circle is required in order to apprehend anything in thought, what 
part is played by the point by point contact? There is a further difficulty on 
either hypothesis, viz. that the procedure is the same whether the object of 


I. 3 407 a 8—a 19 257 


thought be divisible or indivisible. On hypothesis (1) how can what is indi- 
visible be apprehended by what is divisible? On hypothesis (2) how can what 
is divisible be apprehended by what is indivisible? 

8. 12. εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο μόριον εἰπεῖν. Totro=ryv στιγμήν : attracted to the 
gender of μόριον. This assumption A. would not himself concede: Phys. vi. 6, 
237 Ὁ 7 αἴτιον δὲ τούτου τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀμερὲς ἀμεροῦς ἐχόμενον, De Gen. et Corr. 1. 2, 
317 a 10 Sq, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐχόμενον σημεῖον σημείου ἢ στιγμὴ στιγμῆς, De Cael. 11. 
13. 2968 16 οὐθὲν γὰρ στιγμὴ τῶν σωμάτων ἐστίν. According to A. the line is 
potentially, not actually, divisible into points: the point or “unit having 
position” is not the constituent element out of which even the line is com- 
pounded (σύγκειται, Phys. IV. 8, 215 Ὁ 19), much less is it any real part of 
bodies. In every line there are an infinite number of points δυνάμει μέν, 
ἐντελεχείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ. εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ στιγμήν. Supply θιγὼν νοήσει (or θίξεται) as 
above, and similarly below (a 14) with εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος. 

δι 14. πολλάκις, «νοήσει τὸ αὐτό. This follows from A.’s doctrine that ex- 
tended magnitude is divisible into a finite or infinite number of parts, 
each itself a magnitude. The contact with successive parts, which ex hydothesz 
is thinking, will not be a single instantaneous act, the cogitant subject will 
travel over the parts of the extended object, and this will take time. If the 
extended object is infinitely divisible, it may take infinite time over thinking 
that one thing. Cf Simpl. 43, 31 διαιρεῖν yap ἀνάγκη; ἐπειδὴ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ 
κινούμενον ὑπόκειται νοεῖν. τί οὖν ἄτοπον; ὅτι πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσει τὸ αὐτό. 
πολλάκες μέν, εἶ ὡρισμένα τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ ἡ διαίρεσις εἴη, ἀπειράκις δέ, εἰ ἀόριστα, 
τῷ ἀεὶ τὸ δεύτερον τοῦ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἥμισυ φέρε ἣ τρίτον λαμβάνεσθαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν, εἶ 
μέλλοι τῷ ὅλῳ ἡ τοῦ προκειμένου γνῶσις ἐγγίνεσθαι, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις, καὶ διὰ τὸ 
μηδέποτε διεξιέναι ἀδύνατον - τὸ δὲ πολλάκις καὶ αὐτὸ ἄτοπον. 

airs. ἐνδεχόμενον, int. νοῆσαι, in a single instantaneous act of thought, 
according to A., dua νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκε. 

a 18. τίς ἐστιν ἡ τοῖς μορίοις θίξις; What does the contact with the parts 
mean? What is its réle, its raison d’étrer For other instances of a criticism 
conveyed by interrogation cf. De Sensu 2, 437 Ὁ 15 τίς yap ἀπόσβεσις φωτός 
ἐστιν; 438 a 29 τό Te yap συμφύεσθαι τί ἐστι φωτὶ πρὸς φῶς; Metaph. 991 a 23. 
The interrogation implies that little or nothing can be made of the explanation’ 
provided. The ἀπορία of Metaph. 1075 a 5—7 15 not quite the same. 

aIQ dvaykatoy...22 περιφορὰ [νόησις]. A. is aware that his objection may 
be met by drawing a distinction between the soul and the circle in the 77aeus. 
It might be said that the circle is the matter or the necessary condition and 
instrument of the soul. The argument is put clearly and succinctly by Sim- 
plicius, “ον, then, does he infer that mind is this circle? By arguing from 
the following premiss : Things which have their operations identical also have 
identical natures or essences,” Simpl. 46, 11 ὧν af ἐνέργειαι ai αὐταί, τούτων καὶ 
ai οὐσία. The operation of νοῦς is νόησις, the operation of the circle is its 
revolution. Now the revolution of the circle zs declared to be thinking (νόησες), 
and, things whose operation is one and the same being themselves one and the 
same, mind and the circle are identical. A. proceeds (a 21 εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις 
περιφορά), “If then we equate the revolution of the circle with thinking”: the 
implication being that we are justified by the Zzzaeus in doing so. Cf. Zzm1. 
37 A—C αὐτή τε ἀνακυκλουμένη πρὸς αὑτὴν... «λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς xré., 
and this declaration of soul (λόγος) consists of true beliefs, true opinions, know- 
ledge and reason (voids). Cf. 368 αὐτὴ ἐν αὑτῇ στρεφομένη, θείαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο 
ἀπαύστου καὶ ἔμφρονος βίου, 47 Β ἵνα τὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ τοῦ νοῦ κατιδόντες περιόδους 
χρησαίμεθα ἐπὶ τὰς περιφορὰς τὰς τῆς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν διανοήσεως, ξυγγενεῖς ἐκείναις οὔσας. 


H. 17 


258 NOTES I. 3 


Torstrik (p. 121) bracketed νόησις with the following comment :—Ut osten- 
deret hunc Platonis orbem (τὸν κύκλον τοῦτον) esse mentem, id quod diserte Plato 
nusquam dicit (cp. a 3—-5), Aristoteles hanc ponit proportionem : 
κύκλος ; περιφορά-ενοῦς : νόησις. 

Quodsi ἡ νόησις est περιφορά τις, Sequitur ut ὁ νοῦς sit κύκλος τις. Qualis 
vero orbis? nimirum cuius motio talis, 7 τοιαυτή, hoc est νόησις, est. There is 
no trace of νόησις in the ancient commentators. It may be a marginal gloss 
upon 7 τοιαύτη περιφορά. Its retention in the text favours the incorrect inter- 
pretation “the circle of which the revolution described is thought,” but such an 
interpretation misrepresents the argument. 

8. 20. τὸν κύκλον τοῦτον, 1.6, the circle which has been described in the 
Wuxoyovia: see Torstrik as cited in the last note. So Simplicius. It seems 
very doubtful whether οὗτος is ever used, as some have supposed, like ὅδε, techni- 
cally to distinguish a sensible or particular thing from an idea, cf. szf7. (note on 
403a 14). It has been suggested that in the present case it is used deictically, 
that 15 to say, A. may have had a diagram before him. 

a22 ἀεὶ δὲ δή τι...31 πεπερασμένοι. (Objection 3.) The identity of thinking 
mind and the revolving circle having been established, it follows that thought, 
like this revolution, is an endless process. But it can be shown that both 
theoretical and practical thinking, as we know them, have limits, i.e. come to an 
end. 

a22. del δὲ δή τι νοήσει, Bekker and Trend. edited δή τὸ (indefinite pronoun), 
Torstrik restored the interrogative ri, appealing to the sense of the passage and 
to Philop. and Simpl. (Torst. p. 121) Interrogationem esse et ipsa sententia 
ostendit et Simplicius Philoponusque: quorum ille [46, 25] ἐρωτᾷ οὖν, ri det 
vonoe; hic (133, 6 sq.] τί οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν; and this would agree with the form of 
the preceding objections [407 a 10] πῶς γὰρ δὴ καὶ νόησει, ἃ 16 τί δεῖ κύκλῳ κτέ,, 
a18 ἔτι δὲ πῶς, But the position of del and the subsequent argument show 
that the point now raised is whether thought is finite or infinite. We return to 
the object of thought at 407 a 31, 2. The question whether we should read ri 
or τι can hardly be settled by authority. All our MSs., with Sophonias, take re 
indefinitely ; from the nature of the case, this is only the expression of an 
individual opinion by copyist or commentator. Philoponus (132, 26 sqq., 28; 
133, I) interprets τὸ indefinite. It is true that he continues (133, 3) μήποτε 
οὖν τοῦτό φησι ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ dei νοήσει TH μηδέποτε ὅλον νενοηκέναι" ἡ γὰρ ὁμοία καὶ 
ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα περιφορὰ περὶ ταὐτοῦ τινος ἔσται, δεήσει οὖν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸ 
νοούμενον, ὃ οὐδέποτε νενοημένον ἔσται. τί οὖν τοῦτό ἔστιν; ὅτι δὲ οὐδεμία ἐστὶν 
ἄπειρος νόησις διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς ἐπάγει. But, though at first sight the interroyation 
seems to bear out Torstrik’s conclusion, a careful study of the whole context 
convinces me that Philop. is supplying what he regards as a missing link in the 
argument. “ Mind will always be thinking of something which is the same” is 
still (133, 4), as before (132, 26 sqq.), his paraphrase of ἀεὶ δὲ δή τι νοήσει; “if so, 
the object of thought will be something, the thinking of which will never be 
completed (133, 6). What, then, is this object?” [=there is no such object]. 
“Α΄ goes on to prove that there is no such thing as ἄπειρος νόησις. Them. (22, 
15 H., 40, 16 Sp., which will be found cited in note on 407 ἃ 31) takes much the 
same line as Philop. There is a similar uncertainty in Metaph. 989 a 28 ri yap 
dy αὐτὰ πάσχοι τἀναντία, καὶ ris av εἴη pia φύσις ἡ γιγνομένη πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, where 
the indefinite pronouns τὶ, ris have been restored from Asclepius by Bonitz and 
Christ, all previous editors having given ri and ris. Another doubtful case is 
Phys, 11. 2, 104. 11, as we learn from Simpl. iz Phys., who cites Alex. Aphr, as 
evidence for one of the two readings. 


I. 3 407 a I9—<a 20 259 


a 23. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρακτικῶν νοήσεων ἔστι πέρατα. Practical thinking has in 
every case a limit ; it is bounded by the end sought, the τέλος, οὗ ἔνεκα or οὗ 
χάριν : 4334 Τὰ νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός [int. κινητικὸς κατὰ 
τόπον ἐστί]" διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει, Pol. 1257 Ὁ 27 τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ 
τέλος οὐκ eis ἄπειρον, πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πττάσαις. ΝΟΥ can the series of means to 
the end be other than finite, else-the end would be incapable of realisation. 
Such a series of steps necessary to be taken if a given result, e.g. health, is to be 
brought about begins with the end in view and stops at something within the 
agent’s power: see iJZe/aph. 1032 b 5 —23. 

a 24 αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ...25 ὁρίζονται. Thinking which is not practical but specu- 
lative is delimited or determined because it consists of unspoken propositions 
(λόγοι), each of which is delimited or determined. Such mental discourse is 
either definition, which by its very nature is the determination of a concept, or 
deduction which proceeds from a beginning or premiss to an end or conclusion. 
The activity of thought is sometimes indivisible, like its object (430a 26, 
Metaph. 1037 Ὁ 3 sq.), but the analytic or discursive function can be exercised 
even upon such indivisible unities, and their content can only be stated in the 
form of the judgment (rt κατά τινος) OY συμπλοκὴ νοημάτων (430 b 26, 432 a 11), 
which seems to be the only logical process wide enough to embrace both definition 
per genus et differentia and demonstration. Theterms given by Bz. Jad. Ar. 
435 a 26 “ratio, argumentum, ratiocinatio” do not properly apply to ὁρισμός. As 
φάσις and κατάφασις (430 Ὁ 26), so λόγος here = mental statement, i-e., predica- 
tion by which something is thought or predicated of something. 

a27. τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα. Cf. Jud. Ar. 717 a 38 συλλογισμός 
est ea ratiocinatio per quam efficitur τὸ cupmdpacpa...Anal. Prior. 1., cc. 2—4 
ubi συμπέρασμα ἀληθές ubivis ad veritatem conclusionis, non ad formam syllo- 
gismi refertur. Here the two terms συλλογισμὸς and συμπέρασμα approximate 
in meaning. el δὲ μὴ περατοῦνται...28 πάλιν ἐπ᾿ ἀρχήν, 1.6. as the circle returns 
to its starting-point. There may be a chain of syllogisms, the conclusion of the 
last forming a premiss of a new syllogism. The laws of the syllogistic process 
as formulated by A. in Azal. Post. 1., c. 3 exclude reasoning in a circle, as it is 
called, i.e. the demonstration in the course of the series of a proposition previously 
assumed as a premiss (except of course in the case of reciprocating propositions). 

a 29. προσλαμβάνουσαι.... εὐθρυποροῦσιν. The subject to be supplied is ai 
ἀποδείξεις : ἀεὶ probably means “successively” rather than “invariably”: 
μέσον and ἄκρον are the new middle term and extreme term required whenever 
the demonstration is extended by a fresh syllogism. The constituent elements 
assumed in every syllogism are three terms and two propositions or premisses ; 
in the major premiss of the first or normal figure A is affirmed (or denied) of all 
B ;.in the minor, B is affirmed of all C; in the conclusion A is affirmed (or 
denied) of all Ὁ. A and C are now extremes (ἄκρα). If the demonstration 
proceeds to a new syllogism by affirming (or denying) C ofall D and D of all E, 
‘the new conclusion is that C is affirmed (or denied) of all E. We have thus 
‘reached a new extreme E by means of a new middle term D; and soon. Jd. 
Ar. 6478 37 logice προσλαμβάνειν ὅρους, opp. διὰ μέσων, ἐντὸς ἐμβάλλεσθαι. 
Anal. Post. 1. 12, 78 a 14 αὔξεται δ᾽ οὐ διὰ τῶν μέσων, ἀλλὰ τῷ προσλαμβάνειν, οἷον 
τὸ A τοῦ B, τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ T, πάλιν τοῦτο τοῦ Δ, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ eis ἄπειρον. Torstrik 
defends προσαναλαμβάνουσαι which he introduced into the text from E as 
‘follows :—quaeritur solummodo utrum recte ex solo codice E scripserimus προσ- 
αναλαμβάνουσαι. Ac profecto omnibus Analyticorum locis quos quidem in- 
spexerim Ar. dicit mpooA. non προσαναλ. idemque videtur in nostrorum librorum 
editione A scripsisse. Sed optime correxit. In ceteris enim locis, si activo 


17——-2 


260 NOTES I. 3 
utitur, subiectum est homo demonstrans, 6 ἀποδεικνύων, Si passivo, auditur ὑπὸ 
τοῦ ἀποδεικνύντος : hoc nostro loco ipsae demonstrationes sunt subiectum, 
quae minus recte dicuntur adhibere vel adicere, προσλ., optime in se recipere 
vel 5101 adsciscere vel assumere, προσαναλαμβάνειν, quae quasi in itinere suo 
invenerint, novos terminos medios et extremos. 

8. 31. πεπερασμένοι, So Melaph. 1043 Ὁ 35 οὐ yap ἄπειροι οἱ λόγοι (-- ὁρισμοί: 
cf, 76. Ὁ 34). 

a 31 ἔτι...32 νοεῖν τὸ αὐτόςἨ (Objection 4.) Repeated revolution implies repe- 
tition of the same object of thought. This objection seems much the same as 
that advanced alone in 407 a I4, see “0924 on 4o7a 10. Them. 22, 15 H., 4o, 16 
Sp. includes both this and the following argument as essential parts of 
argument 3. In his paraphrase, after noticing parts of argument 2, the last 
being 407a 18, 19, he proceeds ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀέδιος ἡ περιφορά, ἀΐδιος οὖν Kat ἡ 
νόησις. ἢ τοίνυν αἰεὶ νοεῖ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν αἰεί [object. 4], ἢ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο. εἰ 
μὲν γὰρ ταὐτόν, ἠρεμήσει μᾶλλον ἡ τοιαύτη νόησις ἔοικεν [object. 5]: εἰ δὲ ἄλλο καὶ 
ἄλλο... πότε συντελέσει τὴν νόησιν; [object. 3]. Cf. Philop. 135, 31—136, 1 εἰπὼν 
ἕπεσθαι τῇ ἀπείρῳ περιφορᾷ τὴν ἄπειρον νόησιν and 132, 26—133, 7 cited supra 
a 22 ole. 

a 32 ἔτι & ἡ νόησις...33 κινήσει. (Objection 5.) Thoughts (like syllogisms): 
find their analogue in rest rather than in motion. This is, from A.’s point 
of view, ἃ fundamental objection and might well have come first. 

a 33. ἐπιστάσει, 1.6. a halting or dwelling upon anything. So ἔχειν ἐπίστασιν 
Metaph. 1089 b 25=to call for or deserve consideration, like ἄξιον ἐπιστάσεως 
Phys. τι. 4, τοῦ ἃ 36. 

a 34 ἀλλὰ pry...407b I βίαιον. Having urged that rest and not motion is the 
proper analogue of thought, A. proceeds to show that on this assumption the 
universe cannot be the “happy” being (cf. 772. 34 B εὐδαίμονα θεόν) of Plato’s 
description, seeing that its endless activity is forced and constrained. Thus 
regarded, this criticism is not a new objection, but an appendix to the foregoing. 
Philop. 136, 20 admits both possibilities: δύναται τοῦτο καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ εἶναι ἐπιχεί- 
ρήμα καὶ συνῆφθαι τοῖς ἄνω. Ifit is regarded as a separate argument, he continues, 
136, 30: A. having developed the inconsistencies attendant on the hypothesis. 
κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖται ἢ ψυχὴ Now turns to consider what follows εἰ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν 
κινοῖτο. It will then move παρὰ φύσιν and therefore βίᾳ, and its motion, if βίαιος, 
is ov μακάριος. And yet the soul of the universe is required to be μακαρία. 
Philop. is in similar perplexity whether the succeeding argument is to be 
considered independent or not, and explains it on both assumptions. 

407 Ὁ 1. εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς μὴ οὐσία, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν κινοῖτο. αὐτῆς ---τῆς 
ψυχῆς. The text here presents great difficulties. The position of μὴ is unusual, 
though perhaps not more strange than μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. It is clear, however, 
that Them. read εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς οὐσία, and his commentary (22, 
36—23,8 H., 41, 17—29 Sp.) gives the impression that he had before him a fuller 
text, perhaps εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς. <otcia, πῶς νοήσει τὰ ἀκίνητα; εἰ Sé> μὴ; 
οὐσία, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν κινοῖτο. On the other hand the comments of Philop. (137,, 
5—15) and Simpl. (48, 9—14) imply that they had before them our present text, 
which, if sound, must mean that, if motion is not of its essence, its motion would 
be unnatural, from which would follow the inference that it would be constrained 
(βίαιον). The sentence would thus be a justification of the term βίαιον. Or, in 
Mr Shorey’s words (l.c.), “if movement be zoz its essence” in loose writing may 
be taken as the logical equivalent to ‘‘is the negation of its essence.” The 
doubts which will suggest themselves as to the cogency of this reasoning would 
seeni to have been felt by the ancient commentators. Thus Simpl. feels it 


I. 3 407 a 29-- 13 261 


necessary to deal with the obvious objection that, even if motion is not of the 
essence of the universe, yet it does not follow that its motion is unnatural. 
A. often denotes “non-existence,” “ non-existent ” by μὴ οὐσία, μὴ ὄν, e.g. Metaph. 
1087 a 1, 1089 a 14 sqq., but the proximity of αὐτῆς, as well as the unsatisfactory 
sense afforded, forbids us to take the words μὴ οὐσία together here as expressing 
the single idea “negation of essence.” 

b2 ἐπίπονον δὲ...3 ἀπολυθῆναι. (Objection 6.) The inseparable union of the 
soul with the body of the universe is a hardship to the former, and undesirable. 
Cf. Simpl. (48, 24—49, 17), who treats the objection very reasonably from his 
own Neo-Platonic standpoint. Cf. Mefaph. τοῖο Ὁ 26 sq., 1074 Ὁ 28 sq. 

b4. εἴωθέ re λέγεσθαι, int. by the Platonists : cf. Afe/aph. 1033 Ὁ 27, also 991 a 
20 τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι, where Alex. Aphr. 25 ALe¢daph. (100, 2527 H.) gives this 
as an explanation of the phrase “as some understood it,” ὥς reves ἤκουσαν, though 
apparently not favouring it himself. Here the case is clear, for the many who 
approve are obviously distinct from those who make the statement, 407 b 28. 
Torst. (p. 112): Nam τέ---καί a simplici καί ita differt ut simplex καί iubeat 
~Ogitarl res coniunctas tanquam coniunctas, ré—«ai res coniunctas quidem 
lubeat cogitari, sed quatenus distinctae sint. 

b5 ἄδηλος δὲ καὶ...6 ἡ αἰτία. No clear cause is assigned for the circular 
motion of the universe. It does not lie in the nature of the soul of the universe: 
nor again in that of its body, which is rather moved than movent. Nor is it 
stated, as might have been expected, in the 77wzaeus, that there is a final cause 
for this circular motion. 

b7. ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὕτω κινεῖται. According to Themistius, circular 
movement is incidental to the soul because it was imposed upon it by the Demiur- 
gus : 23,14 H., 42,9 Sp. εἰ yap δεῖ προσέχειν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις, οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ψυχῆς 7 
οὐσία κυκλοφορία ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῆς εὐθυωρίας εἰς κύκλον ὕστερον κατεκάμφθη, and this he 
Says is to make the soul of the universe move for the sake of its body, citing 
406 Ὁ 30. But Trend. rightly refuses to regard the motion thus communicated 
to the soul as accidental: est enim motus, qui animae ipsi inditur, licet non 
habeat ab initio. Nothing remains, then, but to consider the statement, with 
Philop. and Simpl. as made by A. from the standpoint of his own system. 
Simpl. 49, 19 ἐλεγχθείσης τῆς τοιαύτης ὑποθέσεως τῆς ὅτι τῷ κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι ἢ 
ψυχὴ αἰτία τῆς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κυκλοφορίας : and (commenting on 407 b 6, 7) 21 ὡς οἵ 
κίνησιν τὴν οὐσίαν οἰόμενοι καὶ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν κυκλοφορεῖσθαι βουλόμενοι καὶ οὕτω 
κινεῖν. μήτε γὰρ κύκλῳ μήτε κινεῖσθαι ὅλως τὴν ψυχήν. τῷ οὖν κινεῖσθαι οὐκ 
ἔσται αἰτία. οὐ γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινεῖται (sc. ἡ ψυχῆ). 
Philop. 138, 13 ὡς δείξας ὅτε ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ κινεῖται καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἀμεγέθης οὖσα καὶ 
ἀσώματος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, λέγει εἰκότως ὅτε ἄδηλος ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν 
λεγομένοις ἡ ποιητικὴ αἰτία τῆς κύκλῳ κινήσεως τοῦ οὐρανοῦ (cf. 4ο6 8. τό 5646. 
b 5 sqq.). 

b9 καίτοι γ᾽ éxpiv.-.II ἄλλως, i.e. in order to insure consistency with the 
teleological principle enunciated by the Platonic Timaeus at the outset of his 
cosmology: Zim. 29 ER sqq. Cf. especially 304 βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν 
στάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν. This criticism echoes that passed 
upon Anaxagoras by Plato in the PAaedo (97 Ὁ sqq.) and by A, himself, 
Metaph. 985 a 17—21. 

b13. ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄτοπον συμβαίνει. Objection 8. Plato’s theory of soul, says 
A., like most others, ignores the intimate relation existing between soul and body. 
This relation A. now takes occasion to explain somewhat in detail: the positive 
statements of doctrine here implied are specially important as leading up to the 
theory of soul as the form of body (407 Ὁ 23 εἶδος καὶ μορφή) laid down in 
Book II. ce. 1, 2. 


262 NOTES I. 3 


DIS οὐθὲν...τ6 τοῦ σώματος, ie. they do not go on to explain the reason why 
a given soul is found in a given body, or what the bodily conditions are which 
render the presence of this particular variety of soul possible, e.g. nutritive, 
sensitive or rational. Them. (23, 25 H., 42, 25 Sp.) adds καὶ τίνα συγγένειαν 
κεκτημένου πρὸς αὐτήν [int. τοῦ σώματος]. 

big. τούτων δ᾽ οὐθὲν...τοῖς τυχοῦσιν. Neither the relation expressed by 
ποιεῖν and πάσχειν nor that expressed by κινεῖν and κενεῖσθαι holds of all things 
indiscriminately. Cf. De Gem. et Corr. 1. 7, 323 Ὁ 29 ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ οὐ τὸ τυχὸν πέφυκε 
πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἢ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἢ ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη Kat τὸ ποιοῦν 
καὶ τὸ πάσχον τῷ γένει μὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ταὐτό, τῷ δ᾽ εἴδει ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐναντίον. 
This conclusion receives further qualification in the course of De Gen. et Corr. 1., 
c. 7 in consequence of the double meaning of τὸ πάσχον as (1) τὸ ὑποκείμενον, 
(2) τὸ ἐναντίον, and again of τὸ ποιοῦν as (1) the agent, e.g. the physician, (2) the 
instrument, eg. wine: 324a 15—-30. Compare further 324a 30—b 3, where 
the parallel between ποίησις and κίνησες is developed, leading to the conclusion 
that, as τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν is ἀκίνητον, 50 τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν is ἀπαθές : and further 
324 Ὁ 3—18. By τὰ τυχόντα are meant “things which happen to meet one,” or, 
as English idiom prefers, ‘‘ which we happen to meet”: here “things taken at 
random,” which mere chance brings together. 

b20. of δὲ... ἡ Ψυχή. Grammatically, the subject understood with οἱ is Adyor 
b 14—15, but the authors of the theories virtually replace the theories themselves. 
Cf. below b 24 ὥσπερ εἴ τις φαίη. 

Ὁ 20 περὶ S€...21 προσδιορίζουσιν. The censure is repeated 414 a 22—25. 

b2x ὥσπερ ἐνδεχόμενον...23 σῶμα. The doctrine of metempsychosis was 
commonly held by the Pythagoreans. The well-known verses of Xenophanes 
apud Diog. Laert. VIII. 36 [/rag. 7 Ὁ, 18 K] put the doctrine into the mouth of 
Pythagoras himself. Herodotus 11. 123 states the Egyptian belief in similar 
terms, os ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος és ἄλλο 
ζῷον αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐσδύεται, and among the Greeks, who according to him 
derived this doctrine from the Egyptians, Herodotus no doubt included 
Pythagoras. Philop. 140, 5 μυθώδη φησὶ καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λόγου τὰ bx’ αὐτῶν (int. τῶν 
ΙΤυθαγορείων) λεγόμενα, citing Empedocles [ frag. 117 D, 380 sq. K]. Them., 
probably on his own conjecture, gives a different turn to μύθους : 23, 33 H., 43, 
6 sq. Sp. οἷς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἐχρῆτο πολιτικῶς, οὗτοι δὲ φυσικῶς [ὑπολαμβάνουσι] κτέ, 

23. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἴδιον ἔχειν εἶδος καὶ μορφήν. The γὰρ must go back 
to b1Q τούτων δὲ... «τοῖς τυχοῦσιν. By ἕκαστον I understand σῶμα ἔμψυχον (the 
qualification is required by 4158 16sq., Ὁ 25 sq.), which is the same as ζῷον. 
That which acts upon body is not τῶν τυχόντων τι, for there is a proper correlative 
to ἕκαστον, i.e. to each species of animal, and again in any given species (as 
man) to each individual. This correlative is then introduced as εἶδος καὶ μορφή. 
The καὶ is explanatory, both terms being used-to express A.’s formal cause. 
Cf. 4128 5 sqq., Ὁ 10 sqq. 

b25. τὴν τεκτονικὴν. Int. τέχνην. ἐνδύεσθαι. A word not very appropriate 
to the relation between the art and the instruments which it employs (b 26), 

e.g. between avAnrixy and αὐλοί. A. simply takes it over from the Pytha- 

- goreans, b 23. 

b25 Set ydp...26 τῷ σώματι. The soul is compared to the art or handicraft, the 
body to the tools or instruments which such an art employs as means to an end 
(De Part. An. 1. 5, 645 Ὁ 14 τὸ ὄργανον πᾶν ἕνεκά του), the end being some work 
or function : the saw is for sawing, the axe for cutting. If the work is to be per- 
formed well or even at all, the tool or instrument must be adapted to its end: 
De Part, An. l. 1,642a9sqq. The implements special to one craft would be 
useless to another which has a different work to perform. The carpenter could 


I. 3 407 Ὁ 15—b 25 263 


not employ flutes in place of his saw and plane. A. applied this analogy 
unreservedly, as the treatise De Part. Ax. testifies. As the whole body is an 
instrument, so every part ofitis a means to a particular function, 74. 1. 1, 642 a II 
ἐπεὶ TO σῶμα ὄργανον (ἕνεκά τινος γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον), 
ἀνάγκη ἄρα τοιον δὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τοιωνδί, εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται. In order to fulfil its functions 
the soul needs a body of a given kind which (De A. 4128 28) is termed ὀργανικόν 
(=fitted with organs). The analogy is imperfect (as is acknowledged when A. 
afterwards illustrates the soul by the axeity of the axe, 412 b 11 sqq.), for the tools 
are separate from the craftsmen who use them, the possessors of the craft, whereas 
soul and body combine in a single ἔμψυχον (gov, and in the animal (nay even in 
the plant) the body, that is the corporeal part of the compound, is merely an 
instrument at the disposal of the soul, which is both form and end (415 Ὁ 18—20). 
Neither the whole animal nor any part can be properly defined unless we take 
account of its function: and this implies that every part, as well as the whole, 
of the body is instinct with soul (ἔμψυχον). Metaph. 1035b 16 ἕκαστον γοῦν τὸ 
μέρος ἐὰν ὁρίζηται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου δριεῖται, ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως 
...Ὁ 23 οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι δύναται χωριζόμενα [int. τὰ μόρια τοῦ σώματος7Ὑ: οὐδὲ γὰρ ὃ 
πάντως ἔχων δάκτυλος ζῴου, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμώνυμος 6 τεθνεώς. See also 1036} 28---32. 


CHAPTER IV. 


This chapter 15 mainly devoted to the consideration of two psychological 
doctrines. The one is that the soul is a harmony (407 Ὁ 27—408 a 28). For 
this part of the chapter the article of Bonitz, eries VII. pp. 428—36, should 
be consulted. The other theory is that soul is a self-moving number (408 Ὁ 30— 
409 a 30), the criticism of which runs on into the fifth chapter. The present 
arrangement of chapters is somewhat disturbing: A. himself clearly indicates a 
halt at 408 a 29 and again at 409 b 19. 

Between the criticisms of these two theories are interposed some valuable 
remarks, starting from an attempt to limit still further the attribution of motion 
to the soul (408 a 29—b 20). 

Upon the doctrine that soul 1s a harmony A. does not waste much time: 
it has already been refuted in Plato’s Phaedo and his own Zudenus. Never- 
theless of all the pre-Platonic speculations it is the one which approaches most 
nearly to his own formula that soul is form (εἶδος, 1.6. πρώτη ἐντελέχεια) of ἃ 
natural body capable of life. How nearly the two approximate may be seen 
from the fact that A. uses the same terms, viz., λόγος and σύνθεσις, to explain 
his own formal cause and this harmony or mixture of contrary elements put 
forth by his predecessors. For σύνθεσις, see Phys. 11. 3, 195 a 20 τὰ δὲ [int. 
αἴτια Or γένη τῶν αἰτίων] ὡς τὸ ri ἦν εἶναι, τό τε ὅλον καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ τὸ εἶδος : 
and for λόγος Ξε εἶδος De A. 403 Ὁ 2, zofe. Wence it needs special care to dis- 
criminate a doctrine which seems at first sight to bear more than a superficial 
resemblance to his own, especially as the examination of it ends with a virtual 
admission (408 a 24—28) that to reject it altogether leaves us confronted with 
formidable difficulties. Cf. Alex. Aphr. De Aminta 26, 22 καθ᾽ ots μὲν yap αὐτὰ 
τὰ συγκείμενά πώς ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή [the Stoics and Epicurus], κατὰ τούτους παρὰ τῆς 
ποιᾶς συνθέσεως τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι τῷ συγκειμένῳ. ἥτις σύνθεσις εἰ ἔστιν ἁρμονία, παρὰ 
τῆς ἁρμονίας ἂν τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι ἔχοι τὸ συγκείμενον. καθ᾽ ὃν δέ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐχ 
ἁπλῶς τὰ συγκείμενα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ Tog τῶν πρώτων σωμάτων κράσει re καὶ μίξει 
δύναμις γεννωμένη, ἡ μὲν κρᾶσις ὕλης ἔξει λόγον κτέ, 


264 NOTES I. 4 


It is obvious that A. is pursuing the same method as in his earlier criticisms 
{see p. 240 supra). When criticising the theory of Xenocrates that soul is a 
self-moving number, he assumes his own doctrine of κίνησις as laid down in the 
Physics,and by its aid deduces consequences from the thesis under examination, 
which are either impossible or inconsistent. Cf. Simpl. 62, 11 ὃ δὲ ᾿Αριστοτέλης 
ἀριθμόν τε τὸ μεριστὸν ἀκούων πλῆθος καὶ κίνησιν τὴν κατὰ συνέχειαν προϊοῦσαν, 
ἀναγκαίως ἄμφω τῆς Ψυχῆς ἀποφάσκει. Similarly in the discussion of harmony 
he assumes his own doctrine of the relation of compound bodies, σύνθετα, to 
the elements or simple bodies, στοιχεῖα, dha σώματα, out of which they are com- 
pounded ; a doctrine laid down in De (672. ef Corry. 1.,c. 10 and elsewhere. He 
distinguishes in the main two modes of composition (1) θέσις, σύνθεσις, παράθεσις, 
in which particles of the constituents are found side by side in the compound 
with their nature unchanged, as when sand is mixed with sugar. The particles 
may be so fine as to elude the senses and the compound may present to sense 
an uniformity and homogeneity which does not really belong to it. The case 
is different with (2) μεῖξις or κρᾶσις, in which the constituents are mingled and 
blended, so that some or all of them have undergone a change in the process of 
mixing, De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 10, 328b 22 ἡ δὲ μίξις τῶν μικτῶν ἀλλοιωθέντων ἕνωσις. 
The qualities of the compound are often different from those presented by the 
original constituents and, when complete or total mixture has been effected, 
they belong to every minutest particle of the new compound, which is thus 
ὁμοιομερές ; Whereas, when sand and sugar are mixed, every separate particle 
of the sand and of the sugar retains its original qualities. Probably the term 
κρᾶσις Should strictly be confined to the case where all the components are 
liquids. The simplest case of μεῖξις proper is found when a solid, salt or sugar, is 
dissolved inaliquid. But, if the fusion of metals be μεῖξις, it is clear that bodies 
ordinarily accounted solid can be constituents of such a mixture. This, however, 
15 an accommodation to popular language and notions: the primary components 
of every mixture are the simple bodies (fire, air, earth, water), or rather the 
primary qualities hot, cold, moist, dry. In our world μεικτὰ properly so called, 
especially the constituents of animal bodies (411 a 10: cf. 429 Ὁ 15 sq.), are 
compounds into which all these four primary qualities enter; they have been 
well called “quaternary compounds.” This fact (as A. assumed it to be) 
facilitates their definition: we have only to determine the proportions in which 
the simple bodies or the primary qualities combine, and we have to our hand a 
formula which defines with quantitative exactness the nature of the compound 
(see zoe on 408 ἃ 14). Such a formula is λόγος τῆς μείξεως, λόγος Meaning ratio 
or combining proportion. Even συμφωνία, a consonance or chord of two or 
more sounds, can be similarly determined by a quantitative formula (426 ἃ 28 sq.). 
It will thus be seen that the true mixture is μεῖξις or κρᾶσις : in σύνθεσις we have 
something which simulates mixture, and how loosely the term can be used is 
evident from 408 a 5 sqq. It would almost seem as if any arrangement of parts, 
which preserve their identity when combined in a natural or artificial whole, 
could be called σύνθεσις, as we speak of a synthesis of parts. Hence σύνθεσις 
never results in a really uniform or homogeneous compound, by which is meant 
one, every minutest particle of which has the essential qualities which characterise 
the whole compound, in the sense in which every particle of flesh and bone is 
homogeneous with every other particle and with the whole, or every~particle 
of water in which salt or sugar has been thoroughly dissolved is salt or sweet. 
See further Alex. Aphr. περὶ κράσεως καὶ αὐξήσεως (Scripta Minora, 11. p. 213 
544.) ed. Bruns), Zabarella, De AZistione (pp. 451-—480 in the Frankfort reprint of 
1617 under the title De Rebus Naturalibus Libri XXX.), and Mr H.H. Joachim 
in Journal of Phil. XXIX., Ὁ. 72 sqq. 


I. 4 407 Ὁ 25---Ὁ 32 265 


407 Ὁ 27. πιθανὴ μὲν πολλοῖς, as e.g. to Simmias in the PAwedo, where, 
renouncing the doctrine, he says (92 C) ὅδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν (sc. 6 λόγος) ἄνευ 
ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις. 
Cf. 407 Ὁ 5 πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ, 

b 28. [λόγους δ᾽... «“δὲ;}». δεδωκυῖα. I have adopted with some misgiving the 
conjecture of Bernays, who has submitted the passage to a searching examination, 
Die Dialoge des Arist., p. 14 sqq. As he points out, there is no variation in the 
stereotyped phrase λόγον (not λόγους) διδόναι to render an account, and if εὐθύνας 
be substituted for λόγον we obtain a phrase technically applicable to the 
magistrate submitting his accounts to audit, but so nearly equivalent in meaning 
that there is no place for the apologetic ὥσπερ. Besides, the antithesis to πιθανὴ 
μὲν..«λεγομένων certainly demands that the clause with δὲ should intimate an 
unfavourable reception of the theory, which is not implied in λόγον διδόναι, but 
often attaches to εὐθύνας (as to the more general δίκας) διδόναι. Cf. Aristoph. 
Pax 1187 ὧν ἔτ᾽ εὐθύνας ἐμοὶ δώσουσιν, Ar. Rhet. 1411 Ὁ 19 καὶ ai πόλεις τῷ ψόγῳ 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδόασιν, “‘pay a heavy reckoning” [or a grievous 
penalty] to (or by) the censure of mankind. See Copead loc. Vol. U1.,p.124. A. 
himself appends to this citation of his unknown authority a remark of his own, 
Viz., ἡ yap εὔθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν, which leaves no doubt as to the sense of 
εὐθύνας either in the Afeforic or here in the De A. The very same metaphor, 
even to the personification of the Adyoz in the dative, is repeated, Bernays thinks, 
in the passage before us. In conjunction with such a metaphor λόγον διδόναι 
would be just as much out of place as the unidiomatic λόγους διδόναι. The only 
defence I have seen suggested for the latter is that of Wallace: “the grammatical 
perversity of the plural may be explained as attracted into the number of the 
following word.” A copyist with λόγον before him might thus assimilate it to 
εὐθύνας, but this is no reason why A. should have done so. An editor convinced 
of the strength of the case which Bernays presents may still hesitate between 
his solution and that of Bergk (Aferiies XVIII. 518) λόγον δ᾽ ὥσπερ καὶ εὐθύνας ὃ. 
This setting of the phrase has the advantage that the metaphor dispenses with 
ὥσπερ precisely as it does in the Akefortc Lc., while ὥσπερ καὶ expresses very 
naturally that not only has the theory been put on its trial, but also that, instead 
of being acquitted, it has been condemned. If, on the other hand, we suppose 
λόγους to be a gloss on εὐθύνας it is a little curious that in the sixth century such 
a gloss should have been current and have been read by Philoponus (145, 19 sq.). 
Them., however, gives no hint of having read Adyous: (24, 14 H., 44, 4 Sp.) 
δεδωκυῖα δὲ εὐθύνας καὶ ἐξητασμένη καὶ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις. The 
last four words show how he took the καὶ before τοῖς ἐν κοιν ᾧ. 

Ὁ 29. τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γινομένοις λόγοι. The dative denotes the court of 
auditors to whom the account is rendered (cf. Zheae?. 183 D ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων 
Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον): the court in this case being “discussions which go on 
in public,” i.e. the dialectical debates of the time, the game so popular in Athens 
in the 4th century, for which A. has laid down rules in his Zopica. The Phaedo 
and the Audemus, which must be taken to be included in the reference, merely 
profess to report such conversations going on in public. 

407 b 32-408 a 28. Here begins A.’s criticism of the theory. 
Harmony (ἁρμονία) may mean two totally different things :-— 


(a) the proportion (λόγος) in which ingredients are blended, 

(5) the combination (σύνθεσις) or exact adjustment of different parts. 
(1) Soul cannot possibly be either. 
(2) Nor can harmony account for the motive power of soul. 


266 NOTES I. 4 


(3) Harmony is a more appropriate expression for health or some other 
corporeal excellence, than for soul. 


(4) It is futile to attempt to derive from this definition the active or passive 
functions of soul. They cannot be adjusted to a harmony of any kind. 


(5) Of the two meanings of harmony the one, viz., exact adjustment of 
different parts, can be easily refuted. If we define the soul by harmony in that 
sense, we cannot point to any harmony of bodily parts which must be either 
intellect or sensation or appetition ; while, if we take the other meaning, the 
combining ratio of bodily parts, we find many such and there will be a plurality 
of souls all over the body [88 1—-6]. This suggests difficulties in the theory of 
Empedocles. We are tempted to ask what is the relation of his combining 
proportion to the soul and to Love, the cause which in his system brings things 
together [8 7]. 

But, although these objections may be urged against the view that soul is a 
harmony of opposites, yet at the same time the rejection of this view has diffi- 
culties of its own. If the soul has nothing to do with the combining ratio of the 
bodily parts, (1) why should the destruction of the flesh and other bodily parts 
involve the simultaneous destruction of the soul, and (2) what is it that perishes 
when the soul leaves the body [§ 8]? 

b 32 ἡ μὲν dppovia....33 ἢ σύνθεσις. This is given more fully below, 
408 a 5—-9 εἰ λέγομεν...λόγον, where the meaning σύνθεσις more naturally 
precedes that of τῶν μειχθέντων λόγος. By λόγος must be understood “ratio” or 
* proportion,” Jd. Ar. 437 a 40, viz. the ratio which expresses the relation to each 
other of component parts. If certain elements go to form a compound or mixture, 
the character of the mixture will vary with the proportion in which they are 
compounded. Cf. 416a 17, 426a 28, b 3, 7, 429b 16. A modern chemical 
formula is just such a λόγος. Cf. 410 a 1—6, and the passages cited in the notes 
ad loc, Metaph. 993 a 15—22, De Part. An. 3. 1, 642 a 18—28, De Gen. An. 1. 2, 
734 Ὁ 28—735 a 4. It is not always easy to determine when λόγος, standing 
alone without τῆς μείξεως, has the meaning of ratio or proportion and when it 
has the meaning of form (403 b 2). In 424 a 31, e.g., the word has been 
variously taken. 

Ὁ 33. τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τούτων. Though no reason is given, 
we are probably justified in assuming with Them. and Philop. that it is because 
soul is a substance (οὐσία): and neither a mathematical ratio nor a combination 
of parts can be this οὐσία: Them. 24, 32 H., 45, 2 Sp., Philop. 146, 23—-26. 
The objection taken below (408 a 11—18) is that from both meanings of harmony 
the result would be a plurality of souls instead of a single soul. 

Ὁ 34 Ψυχῇ 88...408 a 1 ὡς εἰπεῖν. Join μάλιστα with rotro=réd κινεῖν, 
“der Seele dagegen wird dies allgemein als bestimmteste Bezeichnung ihres 
Wesens (μάλιστα) zugeschrieben” (Bz). τοῦτο (1.6. τὸ κινεῖν) μάλιστα τῇ ψυχῇ 
ἀπονέμειν =to define the soul as τὸ κινοῦν, to make motivity its most essential 
attribute. Cf. 403 Ὁ 29. Here os εἰπεῖν goes with πάντες. Cf. 405 Ὁ 11. 

408 a I ἁρμόζει δὲ μᾶλλον....2 ἁρμονίαν. This is one of two objections, 
which, as we learn from Philop. (144, 22 sqq. and 147, 8—10), A. urged in his 
dialogue Eudemwus. Disease, the opposite of health, A. there maintains, is one 
manifestation along with weakness and ugliness of ἀναρμοστία rod ἐμψύχου 
σώματος : more precisely it is ἀσυμμετρία τῶν στοιχείων (frag. 41, 1482 a 6 sqq., 
Philop. 144, 30 sqq.). Health is said to be εὐκρασία rot σώματος De Part. 
An. 111. 12, 673b 26 and in Zo. VI. 2, 139 b 20 sq. it is defined as συμμετρία 
θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν. Cf. Top. V1.6,145 Ὁ 8; also Mefaph. 1032 Ὁ 6—28, a passage 


I. 4 407 Ὁ 32—408 a 6 207 


which implies that uniformity of temperature is part of health. On the close 
connexion between early medicine and early physical speculation, attested by 
De Sensit, 1. τ, 436a 17—b1 (cf. De Resd. 27 (21), 480 Ὁ 22—30), see Gom- 
perz, Greek Thinkers, Book Ul., c. 1, Aug. Tr, p. 275 544. 

a2 καὶ odos....3 ἢ κατὰ Ψυχῆς, 6g. strength and beauty. But, as A. 
remarked in the £zdenzus, Thersites, ugly as he was, nevertheless had a soul 
(Philop. 144, 30—145, 6). 

a3. ἀποδιδόναι... αὶ ἁρμονίᾳ τινί, The terms, τὰ πάθη καὶ ra ἔργα, are conjoined 
in 400} 5, see zoles on 4038 6, 402a8. They denote the functions of soul 
generally, some of which, νόησις, αἴσθησις and ὄρεξις, are specified below a 12 sq. 
᾿Αποδιδόναι, to assign them as ἴδια or essential properties. Cf 4οξ 8 17, 402 b 23 
and, for the construction, De Semsz 2, 438 Ὁ 18 ἀποδιδόναι καὶ προσάπτειν 
ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑνὶ τῶν στοιχείων. 

a5. χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐφαρμόζειν. The verb is chosen for the etymological 
connexion with ἁρμονία. It means to fit or adjust facts to a theory, eg. 
iletaph. 986a 6. Cf. also Anal. Post. τ. 7, 75 b 4 οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν 
ἀπόδειξιν ἐφαρμόσαι ἐπὶ ra τοῖς μεγέθεσι συμβεβηκότα. 

a5 ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ λέγομεν....Σ8 ἁρμονία καὶ ψυχή. Bonitz foc. cif. pointed out 
that, although this argument is introduced by ἔτι δὲ as if it were something new, 
it presents in an expanded form the first of the four arguments so briefly stated 
above, viz. 407 Ὁ 32—4 xairo...rovrwvy. The same two meanings of ἁρμονία are 
proposed and the same conclusion enforced οὐδετέρως μὲν οὖν εὔλογον (a 9 Sq.), 
the difference being that reasons are now given for this conclusion (a 10—18). 
We may say that 407 Ὁ 32—-4 sketches the course of an argument and 408 a 5—18 
presents the same argument amplified and worked out in detail. Most readers 
will agree that no sane author would present the two passages as separate 
co-ordinated proofs. Further, Bonitz pointed out the insuperable objections 
to any critical remedy. We cannot transpose the latter passage to follow 
407 Ὁ 34 because of the remarks upon Empedocles (408 a 18—23), which grow 
out of it: while the excision either of (407 Ὁ 32—4) or of (qo8a 5—18) would 
leave a manifest lacuna. There is nothing to suggest that the two passages 
are not by A. The fault must lie in the editing. 

a5 εἰ Aéyopev....6 ἀποβλέποντες, if we use the term with two meanings 
in view. This implies that we do so use it. ef is almost εἴπερ. This is one 
of many instances where the participle conveys the more important part of the 
predication. The apodosis οὐδετέρως εὔλογον is out of all relation to λέγομεν, 
“we use the term,” and the connexion of the two clauses has perplexed 
everyone. It seems to me to be simply this: “if we look at the two senses 
of the term, we find that neither is applicable to the soul.” Cf. zz. 408b 1 
eis Ta τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, and for the metaphorical sense of ἀποβλέποντες 
404 Ὁ 7, ALetaph. 986 Ὁ 24, and βλέψαντες De Caelo il. 8, 306 Ὁ 31. 

a6. εἰς δύο ἀποβλέποντες -- διχῶς, which Philop. rightly substitutes 148, 7: 
1.6. εἰς does not govern a7 σύνθεσιν or a 9 λόγον as we might at first sight 
suppose; they are governed by λέγομεν. 

a6 κυριώτατα piv....9 ἐντεῦθεν δὲ A. is aware of the etymological con- 
nexion Οὗ ἁρμονία with ἁρμόζειν and emphasises its earlier meaning, which is 
attested by the usage of Homer (e.g. Od. v. 248, 361) and Herodotus (11. 96): 
viz., the close fit or adjustment of component parts. He decides that from this 
is derived the other meaning “ratio” or mathematical proportion between com- 
ponent parts. For κυριώτατα cf. 418 a 2 sq., 418 a 24, 412 Ὁ 9 τὸ κυρίως, int. 
λεγόμενον. 

a6 τῶν μεγεθῶν....7 τὴν σύνθεσιν αὐτῶν. The addition of αὐτῶν Ξ-ετῶν 


268 NOTES I. 4 


μεγεθῶν is superfluous; it is as if a relative clause had preceded, e.g. ὅσα τῶν 
μεγεθῶν ἔχει κίνησιν καὶ θέσιν. Cf. 414 a 29 Sq. τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, although τῶν 
δυνάμεων has preceded. I take τῶν μεγεθῶν as partitive gen. and ¢y=in the 
case of. Philop. 148, 7 λέγομεν γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν, φησί, διχῶς" καὶ Kara πρῶτον 
μὲν λόγον τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν σωμάτων, ὅταν κιτιλ., Them. (25, 1 H., 45, 10 Sp.) 
more freely ἐλήλυθε δὲ αὕτη ἡ δόξα μάλιστα μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγεθῶν, ὅσα ἔχει θέσιν 
καὶ κίνησιν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα, ὅταν οὕτως ἀλλήλοις παρατεθῇ ὥστε μηδὲν συγγενὲς 
παραδέχεσθαι, τότε λέγεται ἡρμόσθαι καλῶς, καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις αὐτῶν ὀνομάζεται ἁρμονία. 
Bonitz (l.c.) “The word ἁρμονία is used by us in two different ways; when used 
of things corporeally extended and situated in space it means that continuity of 
connexion which excludes the reception or interpolation of what is cognate.” 

If τῶν μεγεθῶν is partitive, it is implied that there are μεγέθη which are 
without κίνησες and θέσις, 1.6. τὰ μαθηματικά. See the excellent note by Philop. 
148, 18—24. For θέσις cf. Phys. 1V. 1, 208 Ὁ 22 δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά" οὐκ 
ὄντα yap ἐν τόπῳ ὅμως κατὰ τὴν θέσιν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχει δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερά, ὥστε μόνον 
αὐτῶν νοεῖσθαι τὴν θέσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν φύσιν τούτων ἕκαστον, 1.6. we think them as 
having position in space, though in reality they have not. 

a7 ἐπειδὰν....8 παραδέχεσθαι. Here συναρμόζωσιν is intransitive and plural 
with a neuter plural subject. In order to form components of a larger whole, 
magnitudes must be brought into some sort of connexion. If they are not con- 
tinuous nor in contact, they must at least be arranged in a determinate succes- 
sion. Magnitudes may be (1) continuous, συνεχῆ, when their extremities coincide 
and they are really parts of the same magnitude or (2) merely in contact, 
ἁπτόμενα, like the bricks in a house or the grains in a heap of sand or the sticks 
in a bundle. There is a third case in which the magnitudes are even more 
loosely connected, viz. by being arranged in a definite succession one after the 
other, so as to form a series or pattern. Thus we may build a row of detached 
houses or plant trees in parallel lines to form an avenue, or in a pattern like a 
quincunx. The symmetry of the avenue or the pattern or the row of houses 
would not be affected by the intrusion between the component magnitudes 
of other objects, such as trees or gardens in the case of the houses, provided no 
unit of the series itself were interpolated. Cf. Phys. VI. 1, 231 a 22 συνεχῆ μὲν 
ὧν τὰ ἔσχατα ἕν, ἁπτόμενα δ᾽ ὧν ἅμα, ἐφεξῆς δ᾽ ὧν μηδὲν μεταξὺ συγγενὲς and 
Simpl. ad loc. 925, 25 56.α.. 926, 24 sqq., 927, 11--ς13,) 928, 11---13. A. extends 
the meaning of σύνθεσις so as to include ra ἐφεξῆς, and a fortiori ra ἁπτόμενα and 
τὰ συνεχῆ. Philop. 148, 8 sqq. ὅταν οὕτω παρατεθῇ, ὡς μηδὲν συγγενὲς αὐτῶν σῶμα 
δύνασθαι μεταξὺ ἐμβληθῆναι, οἷον ὅταν οὕτως ἀκριβῶς συντεθῶσιν of λίθοι ἐξ ὧν ἡ 
οἰκία) ὡς μὴ δύνασθαι ἄλλον ἐμβληθῆναι μεταξὺ λίθον ἢ ξύλον ἢ τι τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ 
βαρέων σωμάτων, ἡρμόσθαι λέγομεν τοὺς λίθους, καὶ ἁρμονίαν τὴν τούτων σύνθεσιν. 
Cf. the passage of Them. cited in the last note. Alex. Aphr. goes into further 
details De An. 25, 15 ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης ἁρμονίας [int. τῆς ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων 
συνθέσεως λεγομένης] οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ τῶν ἡρμοσμένων. οὐ 
γὰρ ἐπεὶ καθ᾽ ἁρμονίαν παράκειται τὰ ξύλα ἀλλήλοις τὰ ἐν τῷ βάθρῳ, διὰ τοῦτο. τὸ 
βάθρον ἁρμονία. οὐδ᾽ ἐπεὶ οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶν καθ᾽ ἁρμονίαν συγκείμενοι, ἤδη καὶ ὁ νεὼς 
ἁρμονία ὃ ἐκ τῆς τούτων γεγονὼς ἁρμονίας: The best example of τὸ ἐφεξῆς is 
furnished, not by magnitudes, but by the series of numbers, where interpolation 
of συγγενές τι is impossible; e.g., 44, if inserted between the integers 4 and 5, 
is not really ovyyevés: cf. ALefadh. 1085a 3 ady οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, 
τὸ δ᾽ ἐφεξῆς. 

ag. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ τὸν τών μεμειγμένων λόγον, int. λέγομεν τὴν ἁρμονίαν (a 5). 
Philop. 148, 14 ἐκ δὲ τούτων, φησί, μεταφέρομεν τὸ τῆς ἁρμονίας ὄνομα καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν 
λόγον τῶν μεμιγμένων; οἷον ἔν τε This κεκραμένοις καὶ ἐν τοϊς "κατὰ μουσικήν. See 


I. 4 408 a 6—a 14 269 


above on 407 Ὁ 32. A. is of opinion that the meaning “ratio of component 
parts” is secondary and of later development, but for the theory it is certainly 
the more important of the two. 

δι 9. οὐδετέρως μὲν οὖν εὔλογον, int. ἐστε τὴν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν τινὰ εἶναι (407 Ὁ 30). 

alo. eveéracros, practically equivalent to εὐέλεγκτος as Philop. interprets it, 
148, 32: 1.6. the theory which defines soul as ἁρμονία in the sense of σύνθεσις 
is easy to refute. 

all. πολλαί τε γὰρ.. πολλαχῶς, ἔχουσαι OF συγκείμεναι may be understood 
with πολλαχῶς ; Philop. 149, 14 πολλαὶ μὲν ἐπειδὴ καὶ πολλὰ τὰ μέλη, πολλαχῶς 
δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἄλλο ἄλλως τὴν τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν σύνθεσιν ἔχει. From A.’s own stand- 
point the all-important distinction in the parts of animal bodies is that between 
τὰ ὁμοιομερὴ and τὰ ἀνομοιομερῇὴ: De Part. An. Il. 1, 647 a I τὰ μὲν ἁπλᾶ καὶ 
ὁμοιομερῆ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα καὶ ἀνομοιομερὴ τῶν μορίων ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐστίν. See 
generally the classification of these συνθέσεις in De Part. Au. τι. c. 1, where 
A. starts (646a 12) τριῶν δ᾽ οὐσῶν τῶν συνθέσεων, viz. of the parts ἐξ ὧν 
συνέστηκεν ἕκαστον τῶν ζῴων, and goes on to explain that these three are (1) ἡ 
ἐκ τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων (or rather the elemental qualities, hot, cold, dry, 
moist, etc.), (2) ἡ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσις (a 20), (3) ἡ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν (a 23): 
646 Ὁ το ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων μὲν οὖν τὰ ζῷα συνέστηκε τῶν μορίων τούτων, ἀλλὰ τὰ 
ὁμοιομερῇ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν ἕνεκέν ἐστιν. The former, ὁμοιομερῆ, include bone, 
flesh, blood and the like, or roughly what modern physiologists describe as 
tissues (646 a 20 sqq.), the latter (ἀνομοιομερῆ or ὀργανικὰ μόρια 647 a 3) include 
face, hand, foot, etc., and especially the sense-organs (αἰσθητήρια), structures 
which have their several functions in the animal economy as wholes, but are 
incapable of resolution into parts subserving the same functions. 

a 12. τίνος οὖν.. «σύνθεσιν εἶναι. The soul has been defined as ἁρμονέατε σύνθεσις. 
A. argues that what is true of the whole soul must be true of the parts of soul, the 
principle which he afterwards applies more explicitly as a critic, 411 b 15 sqq., and 
to his own definition, 412 b 22—25. Cf. .WMefaph. 1034 Ὁ 20—24 and the general dis- 
cussion in Z.,c.10. But there are many and various ovv@éceasin the animal body. 
If the unity of soul is to be maintained, these various συνθέσεις must be equated 
to the various parts or faculties of soul. A.selects three of the faculties recognised 
by himself and challenges his opponents to state what are the bodily parts of 
which these faculties are respectively συνθέσεις. Them. (25, 13 H., 45, 27 Sp.} 
γελοῖον yap τοιούτων μορίων [e.g. ὀστῶν, νεύρων] ἢ τὸν νοῦν ἢ τὴν αἴσθησιν σύνθεσιν 
λέγειν. There is a similar argument in 411 b 14—19, where it is assumed that 
if soul is defined as that which holds the body together it will follow that each 
faculty of soul will hold a part of the body together. The objection here would 
be all the greater for νοῦς, because according to A. it has no bodily organ (429 a 
26 sq.). 

a 14 οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν....15 καθ᾽ ἣν ὀστοῦν, int. ἐστὶν or συνέστηκεν. In the 
De Part. An. A. adopts the view tentatively put forward by Empedocles that 
the tissues (ὁμοιομερῆ) are certain specific combinations of the four elements. 
Hence, as Bonitz remarks (l.c.), the words ἡ μεῖξις,.«ὀστοῦν might have been 
found unaltered in an exposition of the view of Empedocles. Cf. De Part. An. 
I. 1, 642 a 18—25 ἐνιαχοῦ δέ που αὐτῇ [the formal cause] καὶ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς 
περιπίπτει, ἀγόμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἀναγκάζεται 
φάναι τὸν λόγον εἶναι, οἷον ὀστοῦν ἀποδιδοὺς τί ἐστιν - οὔτε γὰρ Ev τι τῶν στοιχείων 
λέγει αὐτὸ οὔτε δύο ἢ τρία οὔτε πάντα, ἀλλὰ λόγον τῆς μίξεως αὐτῶν. δῆλον τοίνυν 
ὅτι καὶ ἡ σὰρξ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐστί, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων μορίων ἕκαστον. 
Also Metaph. A., c. το and for A.’s own view 420 Ὁ 16, De Gen. Az. 11. 734. Ὁ 31 


σκληρὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ μαλακὰ καὶ γλίσχρα Kal κραῦρα, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα πάθη ὑπάρχει τοῖς 


270 NOTES I. 4 


ἐμψύχοις μορίοις, θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης ποιήσειεν ἄν, τὸν δὲ λόγον ᾧ ἤδη τὸ μὲν 
σὰρξ τὸ δ᾽ ὀστοῦν, οὐκέτι. ‘So many degrees of “hot” and so many degrees 
of “cold,” combined with so many degrees of ‘“‘moist” and so many degrees 
of “dry,” produce Flesh: whilst less or more degrees of “hot” and “cold,” 
combining with less or more degrees of “moist” and “dry,” produce Boze or 
Gold’ (H. H. Joachim, Journal of Phil. XXIX., p. 76). 

a6. συμβήσεται οὖν.. κατὰ πᾶν TO σῶμα. From Ψυχὰς must be supplied τὸ 
ἔμψυχον as the subject to ἔχειν (or perhaps τὸ ζῷον). This is not very different 
from supplying ὁ ἄνθρωπος or ὁ ὀργιζόμενος out Of ὀργίζηται 403 a 22. 

4 17. εἴπερ πάντα μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων peperypévov. With πάντα supply ra σωμα- 
τικὰ μέρη. It is admitted that all the ὁμοιομερῆ are thus constructed (see above) 
and the ἀνομοιομερῆ; 1.6. the various organs, are built up out of the ὁμοιομερὴ (De 
Gen, Am. 1.1. 715 ἃ 10). The first condition of a true μεῖξις as laid down in 
De Gen. et Corr. 1. 10, 328 a 9 sqq., is that the ingredients must be ὁμοιομερῆ : 
the whole must be like any and every part, ἔξει τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μόριον, 
as each drop of water is truly water. 

8. 18. καὶ, explicative. 

alg. παρ᾽ ᾿Εἰμπεδοκλέους. The examination of ὁ λόγος τῆς μείξεως as an 
interpretation of the harmony by which soul is defined has brought us in contact 
with a well-known tenet of Empedocles, who regarded the peculiar nature of 
those bodies which A. calls ὁμοιομερῇ as determined by the different proportions 
of his four elements (410a 2sqq.). Apparently he had not explained in what 
relation this proportion stood to soul as the vital principle. Hence A. takes 
occasion parenthetically to address three enquiries or dilemmas to Empedocles :— 
(1) How is the λόγος τῆς μείξεως related to ψυχὴ Are they, or are they not, 
identical? (2) Does φιλία, the combining force of the system, produce any and 
every mixture of elements, or only the appropriate one? (3) Is φιλία itself 
identical with the λόγος τῆς μείξεως or not? The inconsistencies which must 
result, whatever answers be given, are left undeveloped. 

8 19. ἕκαστον yap αὐτών. Comparing πάντα μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων μεμειγμένων 
(408 a 17) and (15) ἡ μεῖξις καθ᾽ ἣν σὰρξ καὶ καθ᾽ ἣν ὀστοῦν, we conclude that 
the meaning of αὐτῶν is “those bodily parts” called by A. ὁμοιομερῆ, which 
Empedocles as well as A. supposed to be combinations of the four elements 
in fixed proportions. Empedocles certainly so regarded bone, and, if bone, 
A. argues De Part. An. 1. 1, 642 a 22—24, so also in strict consistency flesh and 
the rest. λόγῳ τινί φησιν εἶναι. Cf. 410a 1 ov γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντα τὰ στοιχεῖα 
τούτων ἕκαστον [man, god, flesh, bone as examples of τὸ σύνολον], ἀλλὰ λόγῳ 
τινὶ καὶ συνθέσει. 

ει 20. ἢ μάλλον ἕτερόν τι οὖσα. The subject is 7 ψυχή, and the gender of 
ἕτερόν τι which is predicative is not assimilated, so that this case is analogous 
to 403 Ὁ 29 and not to 404 a 26. 

a2I. ἐγγίνεται τοῖς μέλεσιν; “or does the soul supervene in the members, 
being something distinct from the ratio?” The verb ἐγγίνεσθαι recurs 408 Ὁ 18, 
414a 27, 426a 5, being in all three passages applied to form becoming immanent 
in this or that matter. 

a 2I ἡ φιλία...22 pelfews. Attraction personified as Love is in Empedocles’ 
system the moving or combining cause which brings the four elements together 
to form particular things, just as Repulsion or Strife (νεῖκος) is the cause of 
segregation, dissolving concrete things into their elements JZe/afA. 985 a 21—3]1, 
988 a 33sq. Such unity as particular things have is brought about by this force, 
φιλία: Metaph. 1oola 14 δόξειε yap ἂν λέγειν τοῦτο [int. τὸ ἔν] τὴν φιλίαν εἶναι" 
αἰτία γοῦν ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ ἕν εἶναι πᾶσιν. Ultimately it will unite all things in the 


Ι, 4 408 a 14-8 25 271 


σφαῖρος. On τῆς ruxovons=fortuitous, see on 407 Ὁ 19: it means any and every 
mixture, die erste beste Mischung. Every mixture implies a ratio of some sort 
between its components. Alex. De dnzma 26, 3—13, Simpl. 56, 5—7. 

8. 22. ἢ τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, that mixture which is determined by the ratio: 
cara=according to. Cf. οὔ 15. καὶ αὕτη, 1.6. ἡ φιλέα. With 6 λόγος supply 
τῆς μείξεως. 

8. 24. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τοιαύτας ἀπορίας. Bonitz has shown (ἦσε. cit.) the 
impossibility of supposing that these words dismiss the parenthetical difficulties 
raised for Empedocles in 408 a 18-23, and has proved that Torstrik was mistaken 
in supposing the next passage 408 a 24—28 to continue a discussion on the same 
lines. Bonitz rightly perceived that the clause before us passes over the 
parenthetical remarks ἃ propos of Empedocles, and sums up all the objections 
urged against ἁρμονία, whichever interpretation we give the term, i.e. it sums 
up the results of the whole passage from 407 Ὁ 32 to 408 a 18 (including 
the ill-coordinated 5th argument 4o8a 5—18 καὶ ψυχή). This can be seen 
from the character of the arguments upon which we are entering 408 a 24 
—28. We dismiss the arguments comfra and consider what is the conse- 
quence of rejecting the theory that soul is harmony of some sort. The 
theory cannot be adopted, but to reject it lands us in fresh difficulties, as A. 
points out. Thus the whole criticism tends to pass into a discussion of anti- 
nomiues similar to those which fill .lZe¢aph. B., where arguments 270 and coztra 
are impartially stated and no decision is given ex cathedra. 

84. 24. εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἕτερον ἡ Ψνχὴ τῆς pelfews. These words bear a superficial 
resemblance to 408 a 20 sq. πότερον..«-μέλεσιν, and it might be thought that A. 
is still dealing with Empedocles and developing the negative side of that enquiry, 
but, as the text stands, this 1s impossible, since εἰ δὲ answers ταῦτα μὲν and 
the clause which the latter words introduce ταῦτα μὲν.. «ἀπορίας must be of a 
general character and cannot without violence be interpreted as restating 
merely the first of the three enquiries addressed to Empedocles. On the 
other hand the words may very well mean “If we reject the definition 
which makes the soul a harmony.” This could have been expressed more 
directly εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἕτερον ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἁρμονίας. But that τῆς μείξεως should 
replace τῆς ἁρμονίας is not strange. A.’s objections aim at reducing ἁρμονία, if 
interpreted in one way directly, if in another indirectly, to μεῖξις (or κρᾶσις or 
σύνθεσις). Given the μεμειγμένα or σύνθετα, the theory of harmony requires 
nothing more. The soul, it asserts, is either the arrangement of these materials 
or the ratio in which they combine, arrangement and ratio being alike implied 
in τὰ μεμειγμένα themselves, of course was ἔχοντα: cf. .Wetaph. 1036 Ὁ 24, 30. 
To assert that this is not all, that some other factor is necessary, is to impugn 
the theory. Properly speaking, σύνθεσις means a mechanical combination or 
parathesis, where the components suffer no internal change from being placed 
side by side, while κρᾶσις always and pet&s often denote what we should call 
a chemical combination, the component parts being modified or even losing 
their identity when they are brought together. Cf. De Gen, et Corr. 1. c. 10, 
especially 328 a 3 sqq. The use of the terms, however, is not always consistent : 
compare Metaph. 1042 Ὁ τό sq., where κρᾶσις is given as an instance of σύνθεσις, 
with 1092 Ὁ 24, 26, where peife: is distinguished from συνθέσει, and 1085b 12 
μίξις ἢ θέσις ἢ κρᾶσις, where these three modes of forming compounds are 
mutually exclusive. 

a 25 τί δή ποτε...26 τοῦ foov. Alex. Aphr. ap. Philop. 152, 3 544, gave two 
interpretations of this sentence. According to the first, which is accepted by 
Simplicius and Philoponus, the question put is: “Why, when the mixture con- 


272 NOTES I. 4 


stituting flesh perishes, do the mixtures which constitute the other bodily parts 
perish also?” Hence Alex. Aphr. concluded that the intention of A. is to prove 
that one mixture must be substituted for the plurality of mixtures or souls to 
which, 4o8a 16, the theory of harmony leads. The second interpretation of 
Alex. Aphr. divided the sentence into two separate questions, punctuating after 
ἀναιρεῖται, and made ἡ ψυχὴ the subject of ἀναιρεῖται, as is done by Themistius 
and the modern editors: (Philop. 152, 10) εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἁρμονία ἡ ψυχή, τί ἅμα 
ἀναιρεῖται τῆς σαρκὸς ἀναιρεθείσης; εἶτα ὥς ἀπὸ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις 
μορίοις ζῴου ἀντὶ <rov> καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις συναναιρεῖται ἑκάστου ἀναιρουμένου. 
The first interpretation is obviously not based on our present text. It is not 
inconsistent with ἅμα r@...cat τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις, but it has not been pointed 
out that it is equally consistent with dua τὸ... καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις, the reading 
actually given by Philoponus both in his lemma and his interpretation (see 
Hayduck’s critical apparatus 151, 8: in the Aldine edition of Philop., however, 
Trincavellus printed ἅμα τῷ). There 1s, moreover, other evidence of such 
a variant, viz. dua τὸ for ἅμα τῷ, a 25, in our cod. V, collated by Bekker, and 
Sophonias, who obviously followed the second interpretation of Alex. Aphr., 
presents in Hayduck’s edition (26, 29) ἅμα τὸ σάρκα εἶναι, though a reference to 
the critical apparatus shows that the MSS. are divided, some having τῷ σάρκα 
and one, A, τὸ capxi. The words of Simplicius, too, (56, 10) πῶς καὶ μιᾶς 
ἀναιρουμένης μίξεως, τῆς καθ᾽ ἣν τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι, καὶ ai τῶν ἄλλων ἀναιροῦνται μίξεις 
μορίων, καθ᾽ ἂς αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι ὡς ζῴου μορίοις are quite as compatible with ἅμα τὸ 
..-καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις aS With ἅμα τῷ..«καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις. Torstrik 
" supposed Alexander’s two interpretations to be based on two different readings, 
in both of which ἅμα was followed by τῷ, the variation only affecting a 26. With 
reference to τῷ before rots ἄλλοις in this line he observes : Alexander, si Philopono 
[152, 3—6] fides, et ro novit et in aliis codicibus neutrum vocabulum videtur 
invenisse [cf. Philop. 152, 10—17], siquidem Al. haec habet: εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἕτερον 
ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς μίξεως, τί δή wore ἅμα τῷ σαρκὶ εἶναι ἀναιρεῖται (int. ἡ ψυχὴ) καὶ (omisso 
τῷ vel τὸ) τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις τοῦ ζῴου; Rectius Themistius (25, 26 H., 46, 18 Sp.) 
πάλιν γὰρ εἰ παντελῶς ἕτερον ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς μίξεως καὶ τῆς κράσεως, διὰ τί τούτων 
φθειρομένων φθείρεται εὐθὺς ἢ ψυχῆ; λυομένου γὰρ τοῦ λόγου τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἑκάστου τῶν τοιούτων λύεται εὐθὺς καὶ ἡ ψυχῆ. On τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι (which is 
one way of expressing τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οἵ σάρξ), form, quiddity or notion of flesh, 
see oles on 429 b 10 sqq., Jud. Ar. 221 a 34 εἶναι cum dativo praedicati notionem 
substantialem significat, 429b 1tosqq. Hence without any predicate attached 
Simpl. 22: Phys. 735, 31 τὸ εἶναι...τὸ συνήθως ὑπὸ τοῦ Wepimdrov λεγόμενον καὶ 
τὸ εἶδος σημαῖνον. For the omission of a second εἶναι with τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις, cf. 
413 b 29 αἰσθητικῷ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ δοξαστικῷ [sc. εἶναι] ἕτερον, Phys. τ. 3, 186 a 
28 ἄλλο yap ἔσται τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ καὶ τὸ δεδεγμένῳ [sc. εἶναι}, Mefaph. 1031 a 
32, Ὁ 8, 9. 

Why, asks A., does the soul itself cease to exist as soon as the form of flesh 
or of some other bodily parts is destroyed? The question assumes that soul 
is perishable: destroy the flesh and other bodily parts, viz. the ὁμοιομερῆ, and 
the soul ceases to exist. How is this to be accounted for, if the theory of 
harmony be rejected? Flesh is probably singled out because it is the necessary 
condition of touch, the one sense which is indispensable for the animal: cf. 
414 Ὁ 3, 413 Ὁ 8 sq., 435 Ὁ 4—19. 

a 26. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις. A second difficulty: not only does the destruction of 
the flesh and other bodily parts imply the simultaneous destruction of the soul, 
but also the body decays as soon as the soul leaves it. The second argument is 
a sort of pendant or complement to the last, and in introducing it Them. (25, 


I. 4 408 a 25—a 34 273 


29 H., 46, 22 Sp.) replaces πρὸς δὲ τούτοις by ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔμτεαλιν (so Philop. 
152, 24 $q.), which gave Torstrik unnecessary trouble. 

a 26 elrrep μὴ exacrov...28 ὁ λόγος τῆς pelEKews. A plurality of souls dispersed 
over the body was proved (a 16 sqq.) to follow from the assumption that soul is 
harmony in the sense of λόγος τῆς μείξεως. In other words, each of the bodily 
parts will in that case have a soul of its own. If we reject this assumption, 
we reject the consequence with it. The εἴπερ μὴ clause supposes the con- 
sequence to be no longer true, the εἰ μὴ clause supposes the assumption on 
which this consequence depends to be no longer true. It remains to see what 
follows. A double conditional clause recurs 409 b 2 sq. 

a 28. τί ἐστιν.. ἀπολειπούσης. If, then, we disallow the theory of harmony, 
the connexion between body and soul so manifestly seen at death is left 
unexplained: we do not see why the destruction of the body involves that 
of the soul, or why the extinction of life (here called the departure of the soul 
or vital principle) involves the disintegration of the body. There is no possible 
way of accounting for the decay and dissolution of the bodily parts which, 
as a matter of fact, follow upon the departure of the soul at death: 411 Ὁ ὃ 
ἐξελθούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται. Cf. De Part. An. 641a18sq. Weare 
now assuming that the soul is not the λόγος τῆς pei~ews. Obviously this λόγος 
itself is not destroyed; for anything that we can urge to the contrary, the 
departure of the soul leaves it unaffected, and it is this which determines the 
existence of flesh as flesh and bone as bone, 4o8a 15 καθ᾽ ἣν [μεῖξιν] σὰρξ καὶ 
καθ᾽ ἣν ὀστοῦν. The objections last urged (408 a 24—28) suggest that when A. 
comes to set forth his own theory he will take into account this mutual con- 
nexion of soul and body. 

408 a 29—b 29. At this point comes a pause in the criticism and 
refutation. The two theores of harmony and circular motion are dismissed, 
but, before A. proceeds to refute the self-moving number of Xenocrates, he 
stops to consider once more if motion can be attributed to the soul and, if 
50, in what sense this is possible [ὃ 9]. This leads him to ask whether the 
functions of soul might not with greater propriety in all cases be referred to the 
animal to whom the soul belongs [88 ro—12], and this in turn leads to a pro- 
visional discussion of intellect or thought, νοῦς, which would seem to be unique 
among such functions [§ 14]. 

408 a 30. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ See 4o6a 4sqq. Such indirect motion is 
there qualified as καθ᾽ ἕτερον (a 5). The general conclusion is PAys. VIL. 6, 
259 Ὁ 16 ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις (int. τοῖς αὐτὰ αὑτὰ κινοῦσιν) κινεῖται τὸ κινοῦν 3 paroy 
καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν bd αὑτοῦ, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μέντοι" μεταβάλλει 
γὰρ τὸν τόπον τὸ σῶμα, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ σώματι ὃν καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ μοχλείᾳ κινοῦν ἕαυτό. 

8.31. καθάπερ εἴπομεν. The reference is not easily made out: Repetuntur, 
quae de animi motu constituta sunt (Trend.). What is here stated explicitly 
is, however, implied more than once in c. 3, e.g. 406a 30 sqq., Ὁ 5—8. ἔστι -- 
ἔξεστι. κινεῖν ἑαυτήν. Self-motion is merely a special case of causing motion, 
if both are κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Every passenger in a boat is moved κατὰ συμβ., 
while the oarsman who helps to propel it indirectly moves himself because he is 
in the boat. Cf P&ys. νι. 6, 259 Ὁ 16—20 just cited. 

a 32. οἷον here, as often, =“that is to say,” or “I mean,” referring to κινεῖν 
ἑαυτήν. Cf. 421 b 9, 429 a 6, 8. 

a 34 ἀπορήσειεν ἄν...408 Ὁ I ἀποβλέψας. The stress is rather on the participle 
than on the finite verb. In discussing the question whether soul is or is 
not moved, it would be more reasonable to fix our attention on the facts now to 
be cited. 


H. ™ 18 


274 NOTES I. 4 


408 b5. τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον, “but this does not necessarily follow,” 
1.6. the generally recognised fact that the psychical processes above mentioned 
are motions {κενήσεις) does not prove that soul itself is moved. Compare the 
demonstrative force of the article before δὲ in 416a 13 τὸ δὲ συναίτιον and 423 Ὁ 4 
τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν. 

Ὁ 6. καὶ ἕκαστον κινεῖσθαι τούτων, i.e. pain, anger, fear, can each of them be 
called a movement, κενεῖσθαι, of a particular sort, as A. goes on to explain: to 
feel pain is to be moved in a particular way, and so on. 

b7. τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαί ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῆς Ψυχῆς, ic. the soul is the efficient cause 
of the movement in question. Cf. 411 a 29 γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις 
τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς. As here εἶναι, so there γίγνεσθαι is followed by ὑπὸ 
and the genitive, which is more common after συμβαίνει or a passive verb. 
Cf. Thuc. 1. 130, ὃ 1 ὧν ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν “Ἑλλήνων : 26. VI. 15, § 3. 

Ὁ 8. τὸ τὴν καρδίαν Hdl κινεῖσϑαι.ι The movement of the heart is of a 
particular kind (@éi) according to the definition, 403 a 25 sqq., 31 sq. The 
efficient cause is the soul, so that ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς must be mentally supplied with 
all three examples ὀργή, φόβος and διάνοια : cf. 432 Ὁ 31 56. 

bg. ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἴσως ἢ ἕτερόν τι. Here τὸ τοῦτο is Bonitz’ conjecture for 
τοιοῦτον οἵ MSS.: τοῦτο and ἕτερόν τι are subjects of κινεῖσθαι understood: see 
his discussion of the whole passage, A7isz7. Stud. I1., pp. 2I—24. “ Discursive 
thought is the movement of this [the heart] or of some other part.” It is true 
that τοιοῦτον (MSS.) and ἕτερόν τι might conceivably be accusatives of manner, 
τὴν καρδίαν being understood as the common subject of κινεῖσθαι. But there 
is no necessity to refer the motions exclusively to the heart, for A. is putting 
hypothetical cases by way of illustration, and the second alternative is not 
seriously intended by A. Possibly <7ré> τοιοῦτον would be enough change. 
Cf. Metaph. 1035 Ὁ 25—27, where, as he is only using an illustration, A. professes 
to be neutral as to the conflicting claims of heart or brain to be the seat of life: 
διαφέρει yap οὐδὲν [for the present purpose] πότερον τοιοῦτον. The bodily change 
accompanying thought must be referred to the φάντασμα (431 a 14 sqq., 432 a 
3—10, De Ment. 2, 453 a 14—31): in the last passage the bodily processes set 
up voluntarily in the effort to recollect something are said to continue auto- 
matically, as it were, after the voluntary effort has ceased, as is proved by the 
fact that something which we have been trying in vain to recollect suddenly 
flashes into the mind when we are no longer thinking about it. 

bg τούτων δὲ.ΟΣΙ κατ᾽ ἀλλοίωσιν. A remark thrown in, which does not bear 
on the main argument, though it serves to show that κινήσεις (Ὁ 6 above) must 
be takenin the generic sense, including φορὰ and ἀλλοίωσις as species of change. 
The beating of the heart and the flow of blood would be instances of φορά, that 
is κινήσεις κατὰ τόπον: while, when in fear the blood runs cold, this illustrates 
qualitative change (ἀλλοίωσις) : und davon tritt das eine ein, indem etwas eine 
Ortsveranderung, das andere, indem etwas eine Qualitaétsverdnderung erfahrt 
(Bz., l.c., p. 23): “and some of these states occur on the local movement, others 
on the qualitative change, of certain [bodily] parts (what parts and how moved 
does not concern us here).” The movements take place, not in the soul Ὁ ας 
infra, but in the animal or composite substance of soul and body. They are 
clearly distinct from the psychical activities, of which they are the corporeal 
conditions. Both psychical activity and corporeal change belong as attributes 
to the composite substance, and the former, like the latter, is often, in default of 
a better term, designated κίνησις. 

bII. ποῖα δὲ καὶ πῶς, int. κιν εἶται supplied from τενῶν κινουμένων. ἕτερός 
ἐστι λόγος, “is another question”: cf. 4198. 7, 422 Ὁ 26.5. Philoponus imagines 


I. 4 408 Ὁ 5—b 17 275 


that the De Part. An. or the De Mot. Ax. may be meant. τὸ δὴ λέγειν. 
Here begins the apodosis to b5 εἰ yap...in the judgment of Bonitz l.c., who 
accordingly adopts δὴ though only found in codd. ST. 

b13 βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως...14 τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ. We are dealing with 
certain ἔργα καὶ πράξεις, or πάθη καὶ ἔργα. We have to determine what is the 
ὑποκείμενον Or logical subject to which they should be attributed. If it is 
absurd to predicate weaving and building of the soul, it can only be partially 
true to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks. The logical subject must be 
the same in the two cases, viz. the man, the ἔμψυχον ζῷον who pities, learns 
or thinks with, in, or by means of, his soul. 

No ground is alleged, but the decision ultimately depends upon the solution of 
the question discussed in I., c. 1, particularly 403 a 3—b 19, whether any functions 
of the soul are independent of the body: whether in short the soul or any part 
of it 15 χωριστόν (cf. 403 a 1ο---12) or οὐσία ris ἐγγινομένη (408 Ὁ 18). In spite 
of the preference which A. avows for the more correct expression he goes on 
using the less correct form of ordinary language throughout the treatise and 
talks like other people (φαμὲν yap 408 Ὁ 1) of the soul as the subject of emotions, 
sensations and processes of thought, just as if he had never laid down this 
canon. But all the time he is aware that the variation concerns only the 
expression and not the thing meant. Cf. eg. 431 b 2—6, 4th. Mic. 1174b 17 
αὐτὴν δὲ [int. τὴν αἴσθησιν) λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέτω. 

Ὁ 15. τοῦτο δὲ μὴ, int. λέγειν. Our meaning must be carefully circumscribed. 
The man is the subject who pities or learns with his soul. To pity and to learn 
is to be moved (κινεῖσθαι 408 Ὁ καὶ sqq.). But we must not imply that the move- 
ment goes on in the soul. Either it starts from the soul as efficient cause 
(ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης, cf. Ὁ 7 ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς): or in sensation it starts from the external 
object and reaches to the soul (μέχρι ἐκείνης), 1.e. to the αἰσθητικὸν which is, as 
we shall see in II. 12, 424 a 27 sq., λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις τοῦ αἰσθητηρίουι This 
αἰσθητικὸν undergoes a change, which, though not strictly either πάθος or 
adAXoiwats, is often so described (417 Ὁ 16—19, taken with 417 Ὁ 5—7, 431 a 4—6). 
The common groundwork of this view of sensation as the transmission of a 
stimulus or impression through the body to the soul is to be found in Plato. 
Cf. Phil. 33 Ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν, Tim. 45 D μέχρι τῆς Ψυχῆς, 64 B ἐπὶ τὸ φρόνιμον, 
67 Β μέχρι ψυχῆς and Theaefef. 191 D, E, the waxen block. 

Ὁ 16. οἷον ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τωνδί, int. κίνησίς ἐστιν. ᾿Απὸ rovdi=dré τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν which are often called τὰ κινοῦντα. The sensible object is the efficient 
cause; it communicates motion to the medium, and the medium to the sense- 
organ, 417 Ὁ 19—2I, 426b 29 sqq. Compare for sensation as κίνησις or 
ἀλλοίωσις 415 Ὁ 24 Sq. 416b 33 54. 417 a 14 Sqq., and for the mechanism 
assumed in the transmission of motion, 6.9. 419 a 7—3I, 431 a 17—20, 434 Ὁ 24— 
435 a 10. 

bry. ἡ δ8᾽ ἀνάμνησις. The subject of De AZem., c. 2 is recollection and its 
relation to memory and imagination as understood by A.: see Zeller, Aristotle 
etc., Eng. Tr. 11. 73 sqq., and Beare, Greek Theories, pp. 312-325. Recollection 
is the conscious reproduction of a memory; it belongs to man and is not shared 
by the brutes, for it involves a process of inference and deliberation: De Aen. 
2,453 a 8—14. To recall what we are in quest of is not always in our power 
(453 a 20), but the search for it is obviously intentional: herein differing from 
memory, i.e. the efficient cause is 6 ἀναμιμνησκόμενος, acting spontaneously, and 
this is here expressed by ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης. The process of recollecting is explained 
De Mem. 2, 4534 22 6 ἀναμιμνησκόμενος καὶ θηρεύων σωματικόν τι κινεῖ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ 
πάθος, and in fuller detail 451 Ὁ το sqq. In it what we are in search of is an 

18—2 


“76 NOTES I. 4 


imagination ; this A. defines as a κένησις, the result, as he explains, of a previous 
sensation, itself a κίνησις, 428 Ὁ 10 566. 

Ὁ 1:8. ἢ μονάς. A correction of κινήσεις to suit the particular case of the 
image recalled to the memory. As explained in the last note, the image is 
a survival from a past sensation (ἀσθενὴς atoOno.s=decaying sense, Afe?z. I. 11, 
1370 a 28). That it should thus persist and remain is a condition necessary 
for memory and recollection. Cf. 425 b 24 sq., "076, 429 a 4 διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν [int. 
τὰς φαντασίας] καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσε, Anal. Post. τι. 19, 99 Ὁ 36 μονὴ τοῦ 
αἰσθήματος, 16. 100a 2, 6,15 sqq. De Afent. 2, 4528 10, Them. 28, 17 H., 51, 
23 Sp. εἰ δὲ μὴ κίνησίν ris λέγοι Ta ἐγκαταλείμματα τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ μονὴν 
μᾶλλον καὶ ἦρεμίαν, πρός γε τὸν παρόντα λόγον οὐδὲν διοίσει, 20. 28; 25 H., 52, 6 Sp. 
ei δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τις κινήσεις, λέγοι, πρὸς τοὔνομα ὅπερ εἶπον καὶ πρότερον 
ov χρὴ Φιλονικεῖν, διορίζεσθαι δὲ, ὅτι εἴπερ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κινήσεις, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερόν γε 
εἶδος τοῦτο κινήσεως, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸς διαρρήδην ἐφεξῆς συγχωρεῖ. He cites 417 Ὁ 
5—7, 12—15, 4318. 4—7. See also Simpl. 58, 33 566. 

408b 18—29. The man, we said, thinks and learms with his soul: 
more precisely, with his intellect, which is an immanent form, indestructible and 
exempt from suffering. True, the process of thinking becomes enfeebled by old 
age, but old age is due to bodily decay. Thinking, like loving and hating and 
remembering, should properly be attributed, not to the soul, but to the indi- 
vidual possessor of the soul, as such. Hence, too, it follows that, when this 
individual ceases to exist, his memory and love cease also. 

Among the difficulties of the passage are (1) the anomalous position of vous 
as οὐσία τις ἐγγινομένη, when the composite substance of the animal already has 
a form, viz. its soul, 407 Ὁ 23 sq.; (2) the argument from the senses, which 
seems to prove too much ; (3) the assumed distinction between διανοεῖσθαι and 
νοεῖν (cf, Them. 30, 24 5464. H., 55, 19 566. Sp.), which appears to me quite 
arbitrary, since either verb may stand for the act of thinking in the individual ; 
(4) the mention of functions not intellectual, memory and love, apparently in 
connexion with the intellect, if that is the meaning of ἐκεῖνο, b26—28. But 
more probably éxetvo=soul, in contradistinction to rotreo=the body, τὸ ἐν ᾧ. 
This use of the pronouns would be regular, for body is better known to us and 
from it we infer soul. 

Ὁ 18. ὁ δὲ νοῦς. Simpl. 59, 14 ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχή, ἣν νοῦν καλεῖ, This 
suggestion would remove the first and the last of the difficulties just stated, but 
it is at variance with A.’s use of the term νοῦς : cf. 4078 6 sqq., 429 a 22 sq., 28, 
431 b26sq. The exact relation of the thinking part to the rest of soul is no- 
where made perfectly clear: cf. 413 Ὁ 24——27, 429 a 10—12, Ὁ 16 sq., 431 b 17— 
10. ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι. Simpl. 59, 16 δηλαδὴ τῷ σώματι, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὡς 
χωριστήν, ὅπερ ἀλλαχοῦ φησιν ἐπεισιοῦσαν, viz, De Gen. An. τι. 3, 736 Ὁ 27 
λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον. Hence ἔοικεν 
expresses A.’s own conclusions objectively stated. Cf. 402 Ὁ τό, 403a 8. The 
discussion in De Gen. An, 11., c. 3 of the origin of life and mind has naturally 
excited no little interest, and strangely divergent views have been current 
respecting “the intellect which is introduced from outside” 736b 275q., ὁ θύραθεν 
vows 744b 21 sq. (Cf. De Jnsomn. 2, 460 Ὁ 2 τοῦ θύραθεν αἰσθητοῦ, the ex- 
ternal sensible.) See Grote, Avzstotle, pp. 480—-2, 2nd edition (II., pp. 2z0— 
223, 1st edition), Kampe, Zr kenninisstheorie des Ar. pp. 3—-50; and on the other 
side Brentano, Psychologie des Ar. pp. 195-—202 (cf. pp. 8—29), Hertling, Mavterie 
und Form, pp. 163—170. A judicious criticism will be found in Zeller, 
Aristotle, Vol. il. pp. 6 mote 2,95 mote 2, 96 mote 1 and pp. 119—123 (Eng. Tr.). 
On p. 100, move 1, after citing 736b 15—25, which concludes with the words 


Ι. 4 408 Ὁ 17—b τὸ 277 


ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐχ οἷόν τε πάσας [all parts of the soul] προὔπάρχειν, φανερόν 
ἐστιν... «ὥστε καὶ θύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον, Zeller continues: “it is obvious that 
according to A. προὔπάρχειν and θύραθεν εἰσιέναι are inseparably connected, 
and that accordingly, if the latter is true of the Nous and of it alone, the former 
must also be true.” In our treatise A. is not specially concerned with the 
question: any reference either to the mortality or immortality, the pre-existence 
or the post-existence, of the soul or any part of it comes in quite incidentally. 

big. οὐσία ms. Simpl. 59, 17 οὐχ Gre μὴ ai ἄλλαι ψυχαὶ οὐσίαι (πᾶσα yap 
ζωὴ οὐσία). ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἄυλον ὑπάρχουσαν καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ὑφεστῶσαν. This εἰκὸς is in 
contrast with that of 4038 8 sqq., where the conditional inference is (403 ἃ 9) 
οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν τοῦτ᾽ [int. τὸ νοεῖν] ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι. Cf. 403a 1ο---ἰ2 εἰ μὲν 
οὖν..-χωριστήῆ. The same attitude of reserve is maintained in the earlier chapters 
of Bk 11., see especially 413 Ὁ 24—27, the solution being reserved for III. c. 5. 

big. καὶ ov φθείρεσθαι, vate z2fr. Ὁ 25 ἀπαθές, Ὁ 29 θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές, 
413 Ὁ 26 γένος ἕτερον, 27 ἀΐδιον, 430 ἃ 17—25. The teaching of the Metaphysics 
is that εἶδος has the best right to be considered οὐσία, and that τὸ σύνολον or 
σύνθετος οὐσία ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους derives its title from the possession of εἶδος, 
which is eternal and immobile and does not come into being or cease to be like 
τὸ otvodoy, Metaph. 1033 Ὁ 5—19, 1039 Ὁ 20—27, 1043 Ὁ 14-23. In concrete 
things, whether products of nature or of art, the form is combined with, or 
in:manent in, the matter. When the concrete thing perishes or ceases to exist 
as such, form and matter part company and the latter is resolved into its 
elements. The question, what becomes of the form, is mentioned and postponed 
in .Metaph. 1043 Ὁ 18—21, 1070a 13—18, 2127. In both passages the view 
is implied that strictly the form of products of art does not survive the destruction 
of these products (unless it be identified with ἡ τέχνη, 1070a 15). In the latter 
passage the instance of a possible survival of form as τόδε τὸ 1070 ἃ 14 (cf. 
χωριστόν, 1043 Ὁ 19) 1s the same as that given here in De A. viz. νοῦς: zd. 
1070 a 24 ef δὲ καὶ ὕστερόν τι ὑπομένει, σκεπτέον. ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων yap οὐδὲν κωλύει, 
οἷον εἶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ πᾶσα ἄλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς" πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατόν ἴσως. 

biIg μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθείρετ᾽ dv...24 καὶ νόσοις. The argument appears to be 
from analogy: cf. 429a 13 sq. The decay of the body through age does not 
imply decay of the sensitive faculty or sensitive soul and, if so, bodily decay 
does not imply a similar decay in the intellect. Not vovs itself, but that in 
which it resides, τὸ ἐν 6, 15 impaired in the same way as the senses suffer when 
the sense-organs are impaired temporarily by intoxication or permanently by 
disease. A. admits the fact that mental power decays as much as sight or 
hearing, 408b 24 (Pol. 1270 Ὁ 40 διανοίας γῆρας). Why, then, may we not 
similarly argue that the sensitive faculty is indestructible? Simplicius 60, 3 
makes the inference depend on the fact that the mind is vigorous just when 
the body is enfeebled : rexpaiperat...éx τοῦ ἀντικειμένως τῷ σώματι ἀκμάζειν αὐτὴν 
(int. τὴν λογικὴν ἐνέργειαν), if it does not grow strong and feeble along with the 
body, neither is it generated and destroyed with the body (26. 60, 3—14). Cf. 
Probl. ΧΧΧ. 5, 955 Ὁ 23 διὰ τί πρεσβύτεροι μὲν γινόμενοι μᾶλλον νοῦν ἔχομεν, 
νεώτεροι δὲ ὄντες θᾶττον μανθάνομεν, where in the course of the discussion it is 
stated Ὁ 31 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ 6 νοῦς τῶν φύσει οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ γήρως ἡμῖν 
μάλιστα παραγίνεται, καὶ τότε ἀποτελεῖται μάλιστα, ἂν μὴ ὑπό τινος πηρωθῇ, καθάπερ 
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ φύσει ὑπάρχοντα. In spite of 408 Ὁ 22 ὥστε, and the dogmatic 
tone of the sentence ὥστε...Ὁ 23 ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ᾧ, the sensitive soul would seem to 
be introduced simply by way of illustration and not to furnish an argument a 
fortior?. The difficulty with νοῦς is that, unlike sense, it has no special bodily 
organ:.429a 27. Cf. 4138 7 διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας. We 


278 NOTES I. 4 


have no definite knowledge of corporeal movements associated with it, as with 
sensation and recollection. 

b 20. dpavpdcews. This explains Ὁ 22 γῆρας, the enfeeblement or in- 
tellectual weakness of old age; cf. Ὁ 24 μαραίνεται. viv δ᾽ tows. Jud. Ar. 
492 a 60 per voc. viv δέ id quod in re ac veritate est ei opponitur, quod per 
conditionem aliquam positum erat, 412 Ὁ 15, cf. 423 a 10, 425 Ὁ 9, 4298 27. 
ὅπερ, elliptical: a second ovpBaivee must be understood, either before ὅπερ 
or after ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων. Contrast the form of the expression with 430 a 2. 
See wolfe on καθάπερ 403 a 12. 

b 22. τοιονδί, of a given kind, adapted for use: 412 Ὁ 11, 16, 27. τὸ γῆρας. 
Supply ἐστὶ or συμβαίνει. γῆρας is pregnant; age and its accompanying mental 
enfeeblement. Vide supr. ἁμαυρώσεως, 408b 20. 

b 23. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ᾧ, 1.6. τὸ ἐν ᾧ, the substratum or ὑποκείμενον of which the soul 
is the form, in short, the living body. Written out in full it would run: ἀλλὰ 
τῷ πεπονθέναι τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν ἡ Ψυχή. 

b 25. ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένου. Steinhart, Progr. von Schulpforte, 1843 
and Bonitz, Arist. Stud. 11. 3, Ὁ. 24 note, object that any corporeal decay must 
take place outside the immaterial νοῦς. “Das kérperliche Organ, welches auch 
immerhin dies sein midge, wird doch natiirlicherweise der geistigen Kraft 
gegeniiber nicht als ein Inneres sondern als ein Ausseres zu bezeichnen sein” 
(Bz.). Νοῦς of course has no bodily organ (429 a 27) in the sense in which the 
eye and the ear are the organs of sight and hearing respectively. The expression 
of the text is intelligible, if ἔσω τ “within the body” or if ἔσωΞκεἔσωθεν, when 
something distinct from νοῦς perishes from internal decay. Cf. De Vita (De 
Luvent.) 4, 459 Ὁ 6—z20, a passage which teaches that life depends ultimately 
upon a certain degree of heat in the central bodily organ, the heart or its 
analogue: (469 Ὁ 13) διὸ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων μορίων Ψυχομένων ὑπομένει τὸ ζῆν, τοῦ 
δ᾽ ἐν ταύτῃ [int. τῇ καρδίᾳ ἣ τῷ ἀνάλογον ψυχομένου] φθείρεται πάμπαν, διὰ τὸ τὴν 
ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν τῆς θερμότητος [τῆς συμφύτου φυσικῆς] ἠρτῆσθαι πᾶσι. αὐτὸ δὲ 
ἀπαθές ἐστιν. Simpl. 60, 22 τὸ νοοῦν δηλαδή, understood from Ὁ 24, τὸ νοεῖν, 
the grammatical subject. Cf. mofe on 403 ἃ 22. atré=“in its own nature,” 
viewed apart from its relation to the body in which it resides and which con- 
ditions its activity. See zofe on ἀπαθές, 429a 15. Here and in Ὁ 29 infra 
“exempt from suffering” implies “indestructible.” 

b 26. ékelvov, int. τοῦ νοοῦντος, see on Ὁ 25 αὐτός So I have translated it, 
following the traditional view. But it would be quite possible, and far more 
satisfactory, to understand it of the soul, τῆς Ψυχῆς, both here and Ὁ 27, 28 zz/ra ; 
cf. Ὁ 15-17 supra, where ἐκείνη =the soul. τουδὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, Viz. τοῦ 
ἐμψύχου σώματος, in so far, A. adds, as it contains the thinking faculty or, more 
probably, the soul. Cf. mofe on 403 a 4. 

Ὁ 27. τούτου φθειρομένον, explained by Ὁ 26 τουδὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο. “This” 
means the particular σύνθετος οὐσία made up of body and soul, which ceases 
to be at death, as it began to be at birth. The present participle and present 
ndicative express invariable coincidence, as in 408 a 28, b 9 sq. 

Ὁ 28. μνημονεύει, int. τὸ μνημονεῦον (1.6. the man himself): and similarly 
with φιλεῖ supply τὸ φιλοῦν. Cf. mote on 403 a 22. To make νοῦς the subject 
of μνημονεύει, aS some have done, implies that memory and love are functions 
of νοῦς as distinct from its individual possessor, and, further, that they belong to 
the thinking part of soul. ἦν might be taken, in spite of Ὁ 29 ἀπόλωλεν, to 
mean “is, aS we saw,” viz. Ὁ 13 566. 

b 28. τοῦ κοινοῦ, 1.6. τοῦ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, Ind. Ar. 399 a 28 ea 
communio, quam κοινὸς significat, cerni potest in mistione plurium elementorum. 


I. 4 408 b 1τ9---Ὁ 34 279 


Cf. Pol. 1254 a 29 ὅσα yap ἐκ πλειόνων συνέστηκεν καὶ γίνεται & Tt κοινόν. Τὸ 
kowdv==7 σύνθετος οὐσία ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους, Mfetaph. 1043 a 29 δεῖ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν 
ὅτι ἐνίοτε λανθάνει πότερον σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα τὴν σύνθετον οὐσίαν ἢ τὴν ἐνέργειαν 
καὶ τὴν μορφήν, οἷον ἡ οἰκία πότερον σημεῖον τοῦ κοινοῦ... ἢ τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ τοῦ 
εἴδους...«καὶ ζῷον πότερον Ψυχὴ ἐν σώματι ἢ ψυχή. It is unnecessary to refute 
Them. who is forced by exegetical exigencies to understand by this term 6 
παθητικὸς νοῦς : see, €.g., 105, 18—22 H., 194, το---τἰό Sp. Or, again, those who, 
restricting φθειρομένου to the present life, explain τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλωλε by saying 
that the old man neither remembers nor loves as he did in his youth : the man 
he was in youth he has already ceased to be. 

b29. θειότερον. Cf. De Gen. An. τι. 3, 736 Ὁ 27 λείπεται δὲ [fort. δὴ] τὸν νοῦν 
μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον " οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινων εἴ 
σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια, 7378 9 τὸ μὲν χωριστὸν ὃν σώματος, Ζὖ. 11. 6, 744 Ὁ 21 
καθάπερ οὖν εἰς τὴν αὔξησιν ὃ θύραθεν ταῦτα ποιεῖ νοῦς, Metaph. 1074b 16and Eth. 
Vie. X. 7, 1177 Ὁ 30 θεῖον 6 νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, where the comparison is, as 
here, between the individual and νοῦς in him, 76. 1177 a 16 τῶν ἕν ἡμῖν τὸ 
θειότατον. Τὸ θεῖον is jomed with τὸ ἀεὶ 415 a 29, Ὁ 3. 

b 30 ὅτι μὲν οὖν...31 ἑαυτῆς. This sentence resumes the conclusion reached 
408 a 29 sqq. The whole passage 408 a 34—b 29 εὐλογώτερον... ἀπαθές ἐστιν 
is more or less of a digression, though of the first importance as rendering 
A.’s views more definite. He passes on to examine the latest form of the 
hypothesis that soul is the principle of motion, viz., that of his friend Xenocrates, 
the contemporary head of the Academy. 

Ὁ 31. td’ ἑαντῆς, int. κεν εἶται. 

b 32 ἀριθμὸν...33 κινοῦνθ᾽ ἑαυτόν. Cf. 404 Ὁ 27—30, Anal. Post. Il. 4, Οἱ ἃ 
35-- 1. 

Ὁ 33. αὐτοῖς, i.e. τοῖς οὕτω λέγουσιν. 

Ῥ34. ἐκ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι, int. τὴν ψυχήν, a pregnant expression for ἐκ τοῦ 
κινουμένην λέγειν : Ch supr. mole on 405 Ὁ 26. 

The criticism of Xenocrates extends from 408 Ὁ 32 to 4οὺ Ὁ 18. His theory 
is open to attack, not only on the old grounds, because it represents the soul as 
in motion, but also on new grounds, because it represents the soul as a number. 
Throughout it is assumed that number means “sum-total of units,” that what 
is true of the number is true of the component units. 

409 a 1-- 30. A. objects: (1) that a unit in motion is inconceivable. 
What, he asks, is the moving cause, and how will the unit be moved? Suppose, 
in the first instance, that the unit is moved by itself, 1.6. is at the same time 
moving and moved: this is impossible, since, as unit, it is without parts and 
differences [§ 16]. 

(2) that, since mathematicians hold a surface to be generated by the motion 
(ῥύσις) of a line and a line by the motion of a point, the movements of the soul 
ought strictly to be lines. For the unit becomes a point if it has position, and 
this condition is fulfilled by the number of the soul [§ 17]. 

(3) Subtract a number or a unit from a number and another number 
remains; but the cutting parted from the parent stem and the segments of 
worms continue to live, showing a soul which is specifically the same as that 
of the parent plant or the worm before division [ὃ 18]. 

A. next endeavours to reduce the self-moving unit to identity with the soul- 
atom of Democritus ; and then to elaborate further objections. The reduction 
implies as above (a) that the number is a plurality of units, (4) that these units 
have position. It will then follow (4) that there is no difference between the 
units having position, of which the soul-number is composed, and the small 


4: 


280 NOTES I. 4 


spherical soul-atoms of Democritus, for the latter might become points, and, 
as long as they remain a discontinuous quantity or aggregate, there will still 
be in this aggregate a factor which moves as well as one which is moved, 
whatever the size of the individual atoms. Similarly the units of which the 
soul as a number is composed will require a moving cause, 1.6. a unit [or units | 
which, so far from being at the same time movent and moved, 1s movent only 
[$ 19]. Wet how can units differ except by position? 

The units will be either the same as, or different from, the points in the 
body.-°(5) If different, they will occupy the same place as the points of the 


_-body : indeed there may be an infinite number of such units at a single point 


[of the animate body] [§ 20]. 

(6) if the units are not distinct from the points in the body and if the 
number which is the soul is the sum of these points, it follows that all bodies 
are animate [§ 21]. 

(7) Further, on this latter view it will be impossible to make soul separable 
from body. Soul is an assemblage of units having position, i.e. points, and the 
points of a body cannot be separated from the body, for geometry teaches that 
a line is not composed of points and consequently cannot be resolved into 
points any more than a surface into lines or a solid into surfaces, all three being 
limits or boundaries but not constituent parts [§ 22]. 

409a 1. μονάδα. A number is a πλῆθος μονάδων, Mefaph. 1053 a 30. 
Cf. 1039 a 12 εἴπερ ἐστὶν 6 ἀριθμὸς σύνθεσις μονάδων, ὥσπερ λέγεται ὗπό τινῶν, 
1085 Ὁ 22 τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος ἀδιαιρέτων ἐστὶν ἀριθμός, tool ἃ 26 sq., 1089b 1,9. If 
the number moves, so also does each of its component units. Philop. 166, το 
56. Simpl. 62, 19 μεριστὸν yap τὸ μεριστῶς ἐνεργοῦν [1.4ᾳ. xevovpevor], ἀμερὴς δὲ 
ἡ μονάς. 

a2. ὑπὸ τίνος. It is conceivable that the number or assemblage of units 
moves because (4) each unit is self-moved, or because (4) some units are movent 
only and others moved only. A. developes (a), leaving (2) for the moment out 
of sight, though it recurs below (409 a 15—18): Simpl. 62, 20 οὔτε yap ὑφ᾽ 
ἑαυτῆς...24. οὔτε ud’ ἑτέρας. 

ἃ 2. καὶ πῶς, int. κινεῖται. In any case this is distinct from the πῶς χρὴ 
νοῆσαι Of the preceding line, which is merely a rhetorical way of affirming that 
the motion of the unit is inconceivable. But the exact meaning of the second 
πῶς is open to doubt. It cannot well refer to the species of motion (ἀλλοίωσις, 
αὔξησις: φορά: Philop. 166, 9), for it is absurd to predicate growth or qualitative 
change of units. If, however, the units are reduced to points (wéde zzfr.) it 
would be pertinent to ask whether they move with rectilinear or circular motion 
in space, φορά (Philop. 166, 8). But Simpl. (62, 26 sq.) interprets differently : 
τὸ οὖν δεύτερον πῶς τῷ ὑπὸ τίνος συντεταγμένον δηλωτικὸν τοῦ μῆτε ὡς ἔμψυχον 
μήτε ἑτεροκενήτως, which he explains by the previous remark (62, 24—26) ἢ γὰρ 
ἂν ἔνδοθεν, καὶ ἔμψυχος ἔσται: οὐδεμία δὲ μονὰς ζωτικῶς ἐνεργεῖ" ἢ ἔξωθεν, καὶ ἢ 
ὥσει ἢ ἔλξει" τὸ δὲ ἀμερὲς οὐδέτερον οἷόν re. If this is right, καὶ πῶς virtually 
repeats the question ὑπὸ τίνος. ἀμερῆ... οὖσαν. On his own principles A. 
has shown, P#ys. VI. 10, 240b 8, ὅτι τὸ ἀμερὲς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι πλὴν κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός. Cf. 241a 6 ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε φανερὸν ὅτι οὔτε στιγμὴν οὔτ᾽ ἄλλο 
ἀδιαίρετον οὐθὲν ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι. If, therefore, the soul-units are reduced 
to mathematical points (409 a 20—30), the difficulty is just as insuperable to A. 

8. 3. κινητικὴ δὲ καὶ κινητή, Them. 31, 10 H., 56, 23 Sp. εἰ μὲν yap ἑκάστη 
ἅμα [int. κιν εἴ τε καὶ κινεῖται] πῶς ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιάφορος οὖσα κινητική τε ἅμα ἂν εἴη καὶ 
kunt. An extended sensible thing, being divisible, may have both attributes 
in respect of different parts of itself. Cf. Phys. VIII. 4, 254 Ὁ 27—33 cited atthe 


I. 4 409 a I—a II 281 


end of moze on 406a 4, διχῶς. διαφέρειν Set, Philop. 166, 12 ἐπειδὴ τὸ κινοῦν, 
καθὸ κινεῖ, ἄλλο τί ἐστε πρὸς τὸ κινούμενον, ἀνάγκη Kat THY μονάδα αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ 
διάφορον εἶναι [Philop. construes δεάφορος with dative. ἑαυτῆς would have been 
more usual]. Thus the unit would cease to be a unit as defined. 

aZ ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπεί dacr...5 γραμμαὶ ἔσονται. Them. 31, 15 H., 57, 3 Sp. 
στιγμῆς δὲ κίνησις γραμμὴν μὲν ποιεῖ, ζωὴν δὲ οὔ. This second objection, like 
the third, is hardly serious. Philop. (166, 26) διαπαίζει δὲ αὐτούς. Anal. Post. 1. 
32, 88a 18 τὰς δ᾽ αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς ἁπάντων εἶναι τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἀδύνατον, 88a 31 
ἕτεραι γὰρ πολλῶν τῷ γένει αἱ ἀρχαί, καὶ οὐδ᾽ ἐφαρμόττουσαι, οἷον ai μονάδες ταῖς 
στιγμαῖς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττουσιν " αἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχουσι θέσιν, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσιν. 

8.7. ἤδη πού ἔστι: Philop. 166, 33 λέγοντες οὖν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν ἐν σώματι 
εἶναι ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὥστε ai μονάδες τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ κεῖνταί που- ἐν τῷ σώματε γάρ. 
If, then, these units are somewhere and have position, they can be treated as 
points, the only difference between the arithmetical unit and the geometrical 
point being that the one has not, and the other has, position. μονάς Ξε στιγμὴ 
aeros, and στιγμή (Or onpetov)=povas θέσιν ἔχουσα, ALetaph. 1016 Ὁ 24 sqq., 
esp. 29 τὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ διαιρετὸν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν στιγμὴ καὶ μονάς, ἡ μὲν eros μονάς, 
ἡ δὲ θετὸς στιγμῆ. Cf. τοῦ4Ὁ 26sq. However, the difference between arith- 
metical units and geometrical points as such is sufficient to constitute them the 
subject matter of separate sciences. 

a8. ἄλλος ἀριθμός. The remainder, in subtraction, is never the same 
number. Further, if one (μονάς) be subtracted, the remainder is unlike in 
species to the original number, odd if that was even, even if it was odd, odd and 
even being the species (εΐδη) of number. Cf. Aetaph. 1043 Ὁ 36—I1044a 2; 
I cite οὐδ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀριθμοῦ ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἣ προστεθέντος, ἐξ ὧν 6 ἀριθμός ἐστιν, 
οὐκέτι ὃ αὐτὸς ἀριθμός ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερος. Cf. Zeno’s argument, “είαῤἧ. 
ΙΤΟΟΙ Ὁ 8 sqq. 

ag. τὰ δὲ φυτὰ... ἢ. These facts are mentioned again, 411 b 19 566. 
Cf. Metaph. 1040 Ὁ 10—13. 

αἴο. τὴν αὐτὴν Ψυχὴν ἔχειν τῷ εἴδει. The soul in the two segments is always 
specifically the same, whereas if it were a number we should expect it to be 
sometimes, if not invariably, of a different species. Philop. may well say 
165, 28 6 δὲ ᾽Αρ., ὡς εἴωθεν, ἔλέγχει τὸ φαινόμενον τοῦ λόγου and (165, 21) οὐκ ἄν 
τις οὐδ᾽ ἄκρῳ δακτύλῳ τῶν μαθημάτων γευσάμενος τοιαῦτα ἂν εἴποι (int. κατὰ τὸ 
haw ὄμενον). 

alo. οὐθὲν διαφέρειν. Simpl. 64, 5 πρὸς τὸ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι. A sum of atoms 
or atomic points will constitute a number just as much as a sum of units. 

all καὶ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν Δημοκρίτου σφαιρίων...13 τὸ ποσόν. The effect will be to 
substitute discontinuous for continuous quantity, a sum of points without mag- 
nitude for an assemblage of globules which fill space. Them. 31, 22 H., 
57, 12 Sp. εἴ ris ὑπόθοιτο τὰς Δημοκρίτου σφαίρας μηκέτε ohaipas, ἀλλὰ στιγμάς, 
μόνον δὲ αὐτῶν τηροίη τὸ ποσόν, Philop. 167, 21 ἐὰν οὖν τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἀτόμων 
ἀφέλῃ τις, ἔσονται στιγμαί...23 οὐδὲν δὲ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν Δημοκρίτου λυμαίνεται τὸ 
ἀφελεῖν τῶν ἀτόμων τὸ συνεχές" οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ τὸ συνεχῆ σώματα εἶναι ἔλεγεν 
αὐτὰ κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν τῇ ἀντωθήσει τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα, because 
there could be no collision of atoms unless there were a number of atoms to 
collide. Similarly, Philop. continues, it is not because the units of Xenocrates 
are indivisible that the soul which is composed of them is in motion, but 
because they are the constituents of a discrete quantity or number, δεότε 
ποσὸν ἣν τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν, 6 ἀριθμός. Simpl. 64, 2 κἂν yap ἐκ σωματίων τινῶν ποιῇ τὸν 
ἀριθμὸν ὁ Δημόκριτος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων διὰ ναστότητα καὶ ἔτι ἀδιαφόρων κατ᾽ εἶδος 
καὶ τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν. ἀριθμὸς οὖν Kar ἀμφοτέρους ἣ ψυχὴ ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων καὶ 


282 NOTES L 4 


ἀδιαφόρων...7 ἀρκεῖ yap τὸ ποσὸν κατὰ πλῆθος λέγειν ἑκάτερον πρὸς τὸ ἔνια μὲν 
κεινητεκὰ ἔνια δὲ κινούμενα ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογεῖν. By ποσὸν in a 13,15 
is meant διωρισμένον ποσόν: Simpl. 64, 10, Philop. 167, 33. Cf. Metaph. 
1089 b 34: “every number denotes a guantfum,’ ποσόν τι σημαίνει. The 
conversion of atoms into points will leave their number unaltered. Probably 
A. used ποσὸν here to avoid confusion with the number of the soul, to keep the 
view of Democritus distinct from that of Xenocrates. For the analogy between 
points and units as discrete cf. Zefaph. 1085 a 3 ἁφὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, 
τὸ δ᾽ ἐφεξῆς, ὅσων μή ἐστι μεταξὺ μονάδων, οἷον τῶν ἐν τῇ δυάδι ἢ τῇ τριάδι. 
That is, the units in numbers do not come into contact, but have a fixed order 
of succession with nothing intervening, e.g. the two units in the number two or 
the three units in the number three follow such an order. Cf. 408a 8. Points 
cannot be in contact any more than units: Amal. Post. τι. 12,95b 5 ὥσπερ οὖν 
οὐδὲ στιγμαί εἶσιν ἀλλήλων ἐχόμεναι, though there is an infinity of such points in 
a line, 95b 8 ὥσπερ οὖν γραμμὴ πρὸς στιγμὴν ἔχει, οὕτω τὸ γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ 
γεγονός. ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἄπειρα γεγονότα ἐν τῷ γινομένῳ. See also Metaph. 1085 Ὁ 
27—34. With μένῃ cf. Melaph. 1061 a 32 μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ πτοσὸν καὶ συνεχές. 

8. 13. ἐν αὐτῷ, i.e. ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τῷ ἐκ τῶν σφαιρίων. This is ἀριθμὸς στιγμῶν, 
the sum-total of the unextended points to which the atoms have been reduced. 
Philop. 168, 3 calls it τὸ ὅλον σύστημα. τὸ μὲν κινοῦν τὸ δὲ κινούμενον. 
These words show that the previous 7: must be a collective: there will be in the 
sum-total of such points (the soul) a part which causes motion and a part which 
is moved. Them. 31, 23 H., 57, 14 Sp. οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς μὲν κινεῖν αὐτῶν, ras δὲ 
κινεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ εἰ σμικρὰ σώματα ἦσαν. Philoponus appeals to PxHys. VII. and 
vill., where A. has proved that it is impossible for the same thing, whether 
continuous or discrete, to cause motion and to be moved κατὰ τὸ αὐτό. 

Δ14. ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ, in that which is not discrete, but continuous, 1.e. 
in an extended magnitude. Before the spherical atoms were reduced to points, 
each soul-atom and the soul (i.e. on the atomist theory, the mass or aggregate 
of spherical soul-atoms) might be described as συνεχές ri, an extended thing, 
possessed of physical coherence and continuity. The interstices of void would 
no more deprive it of this attribute than the holes of a sponge, the type to 
Democritus of all so-called solid bodies, explained by him as really aggregates 
of atoms “with much void between,” even when to sense their texture is as 
impervious as that of steel. The argument implies that A.’s principles of 
mechanical motion as laid down in P£#ys. Vil. apply to all extended bodies of 
whatever size. Thus (ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ such an extended body, if it moves itself at 
all, must according to PAys. vill. be divisible into κενοῦν re and κινούμενόν ti, for 
he has just proved, PAys. Vil. 5, 257 Ὁ 26—258 a 27, that, if it 15 πρώτως αὐτὸ 
αὑτὸ κινοῦν, it does not contain a single part or a number of parts which are, 
like the whole, self-moved. The atoms of Democritus are such extended bodies, 
extremely—we might almost say, infinitesimally—small. A. takes the limiting 
case : he supposes the extremely small magnitudes to disappear, and, in place 
of so many atoms, we get so many points. He argues that the mechanical 
principles apply even in the limit. Because there was κινοῦν rt and κινούμενόν 
τι before, there will be κινοῦν re and κινούμενόν τι after, the conversion into 
points. Thus A. is arguing, not from the atomist standpoint, but from his own 
doctrine of motion which made such an assumption necessary. Res continua 
vero 51 ipsa se ipsam moveat, deprehendi in ea partem quae moveat et partem 
quae moveatur demonstratum est Phys. ©. 5, 2578 31 sqq- (Torstrik, p. 126.) 
Cf. second zofe on 407 a 6. 

8.14. διὰ τὸ μεγέθει διαφέρειν ἢ σμικρότητι. Them. 31, 25 H., 57, 17 Sp. ai 


Ι. 4 409 a IIa 21 283 


μὲν ἔσονται ψυχαί, ai δ᾽ οὔ. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν φυλάττοιεν, ἡ σμικρότης γε αὐτὰς 
οὐδὲν κωλύσει : provided the sum be constant, A. thinks we may reduce the size 
of the atoms as much as we like. 

arI5 διὸ avayxatov...16 κινῆσον τὰς μονάδας. The conclusion that in the 
hypothetical case the atomic points that are in motion will be necessarily 
moved by others is now applied to Kenocrates. The component units of the 
number which is the soul also stand in need of a moving cause, just as much as 
the soul-atoms of Democritus. But the attempt to remedy this deficiency 
encounters fresh objections. διὸ. Philop. 168, 1 ὅτι ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν διωρισμένον 
ποσὸν ποιεῖ τὴν Ψυχὴν αὐτοκίνητον. ὥστε €i τῶν ἀτόμων τῶν ἀριθμῶν οἱ μὲν 
κινοῦσιν, of δὲ κινοῦνται, ἔσται τὸ ὅλον σύστημα αὐτοκίνητον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὅλοι 
ζῷον λέγεται αὐτοκίνητον, καίτοι τοῦ μὲν κινοῦντος τοῦ Se κινουμένου. τὸ κινῆσον. 
Simpl. 64, 12 ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὰς κινούμενας δηλαδή, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἑκάστη μονὰς καὶ τῶν 
Δημοκριτείων σφαιρίων ἕκαστον ἔσται ψυχή (i.e. σα soul-atom or gud soul-unit, 
it 15 soul), 

4 1ό εἰ 8 ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ...18 τὸ κινοῦν μόνον. Them. 31, 11 H., 56, 26 Sp. εἰ δὲ ai 
μὲν κινοῦσι τῶν μονάδων, αἱ δὲ κινοῦνται, οὐ τὸ σύστημα αὐτῶν ὅλον ψυχή, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ 
ἄρα αἱ κινοῦσαι μόνον ἐν τῷ συστήματι. If the number is an assemblage of units, 
some movent, others moved, it will resemble the ζῷον, which is also σύστημα 
ὅλον αὐτοκίνητον καίτοι τοῦ μὲν κινοῦντος τοῦ δὲ xivoupévov. But then it is the 
movent, not the moved, which is the soul of the animal. Hence the movent 
units, not the moved, in the number, constitute its soul. Philop. 168, 5 ἀλλ᾽ 
ὥσπερ ἐν ζῴῳ τὸ κινοῦν ἡ Ψυχὴ καὶ ob τὸ κινούμενον, οὕτω Kal ἐπὶ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς 
ἀριθμοῦ οὐ πᾶς [int. ὁ ἀριθμός] ἔσται ψυχὴ ἀλλ᾽ ai κινοῦσαι μονάδες. 

a 18 ἐνδέχεται 8...21 θέσις. This has been considered a new argument and 
ταύτην has been taken to replace τὴν ψυχήν. But on the theory impugned it is 
the number or πλῆθος μονάδων and not any single unit which constitutes the 
soul: cf. a 25, 26, A. is in fact still pressing his last objection. The point just 
reached is that τὸ κενοῦν in the number corresponds to soul in the animal. 
Plainly in a 18—21 we are dealing with the number and not with the animal. 
If so, ταύτην which is the subject represents strictly τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ κινοῦν and 
not τὴν ψυχήν, being attracted to the gender of the predicate μονάδα (cf. 404 a 
25, wove): “how can this movent part be a unit?” That ταύτην is subject and 
not predicate seems to have been held by Them. 31, 27 H., 57, 19 Sp. μονάδας 
εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, Philop. 168, 18 εἰ οὖν, φησί, μονὰς ἢ ἐκ μονάδων ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, and 
Simpl. 64, 13 φησὶ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι μονάδα εἶναι τὴν κινοῦσαν. Them.and Philop. 
are aware of the difficulty involved in equating ταύτην with τὴν ψυχήν : the 
former evades it by tacitly substituting the plural μονάδας, the latter by a 
bold avowal 168, 18, μονάδα εἶπεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκ μονάδων (cf. Soph. 30, 19 sq.)- 
M. Rodier’s version, “ ἘΠῚ comment est-il possible qu’une unité joue ce réle?”, 
seems to imply that μονάδα is the subject. If one unit is movent and the 
rest of the units in the number are moved, how does the movent unit 
differ from the rest? If the units are converted into points, the only quality 
they acquire is position in space. So far from explaining the difference between 
those which are movent and those which are moved, this quality raises fresh 
difficulties. Philop. 168, 27 καλῶς δὲ εἶπε στιγμῆς μοναδικῆς. εἰ yap ἡ μονὰς 
προσλαβοῦσα θέσιν στιγμὴ γίνεται, ai δὲ μονάδες ἐξ ὧν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν σώματι, στιγμαὶ 
ἄρα ἔσονται. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐχ ἁπλῶς στιγμὰς ἔλεγον ἀλλὰ μονάδας, αὐτὸς δὲ δείκνυσι 
ταύτας στιγμὰς οὔσας, εἰκότως μοναδικὰς στιγμὰς εἴρηκεν. Cf. Simpl. 64, 13—19. 

a2r εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ἕτεραι...22 αἱ μονάδες. A. treats μονάδες and στιγμαὶ as 
convertible terms, and by ai ἐν τῷ σώματι μονάδες here he means not the soul- 
units but the bodily points, precisely, in fact, what he means by ai στιγμαί, καὶ 


284 NOTES L. 4 


being explanatory. From a7 we might indeed infer that soul-units, like the 
soul-number, have position in space, but it is extremely awkward to give ἐν τῷ 
σώματι ἃ Meaning at variance with that which the words bear a25, a 26, b6 sq. : 
and this awkwardness we can avoid if, as I have said, we understand μονάδες 
here to denote points of body, and the sentence to be elliptical, ἕτεραι requiring a 
supplement, “ different [i.e. from the units of soul].”. When used at the end of 
the sentence without any qualification ai μονάδες unquestionably means the 
units of soul. The Greek commentators are most careful to distinguish the 
soul-units from the corporeal points and reserve ai ἐν τῷ σώματι (or ai σωματικαὶ) 
μονάδες καὶ στιγμαὶ for the latter only: Them. 31, 30sqq. H., 57, 24 sqq. Sp.; 
Simpl. 64, 23 sqq.; Philop. 169, 7 sqq.; Soph. 30, 22sqq. A. merely assumes 
that soul is in body. Soul now is an assemblage of unitary points, some movent, 
others moved. But body itself is an assemblage of points, Either the two sets 
of points are different or they are the same. (1) Suppose that they are different, 
i.e. that the soul-units are distinct from the points in the body, the points which 
body as extended in three dimensions presents, whether it be animate or inani- 
mate. Ifthe soul is in body, then the space its units occupy must at least partially 
coincide with that occupied by the points of body. Spatial coincidence of soul 
and body is inevitable. We shall have somewhere in the body a point which is 
not only a point of the body but also a unitary point of the soul. 

a22. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, int. τόπῳ ταῖς “ἐν τῷ σώματι, in the same space as the points 
of body, Philop. 169, 12 ἐφαρμόσουσιν ai τῆς ψυχῆς στιγμαὶ ταῖς τοῦ σώματος. Cf. 
409 b 3 z#fra and for the full phrase “7 εζαφᾶ. 998 a 14, 18. 

8.23. καθέξει γὰρ χώραν στιγμῆς, int. ἑκάστη τῶν μονάδων, each of the soul- 
units which we have agreed to treat as points having position in space. 

a 23 καίτοι...25 καὶ αὐτά. There will be no limit to such spatial coincidence of 
soul-points without magnitude. There may be an infinity of them in any given 
point of the body. Philop. 169, 14 εἰ δὲ pia ἐφαρμόζει ἑτέρᾳ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς τῇ τοῦ 
σώματος καὶ οὐδὲν πλείω τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τί κωλύει καὶ πλείους τῆς Ψυχῆς στιγμὰς τῇ 
αὐτῇ στιγμῇ τοῦ σώματος ἐφαρμόσαι; μυρία γὰρ ἀδιαίρετα συντεθέντα μέγεθος οὐ 
ποιεῖ, A. regarded this coincidence of distinct points as absurd: see 400 Ὁ 4566. 
It is further probable, in view of 409 b 2, that Philoponus (170, 19—28) and 
Simplicius (64, 26—34) are right in surmising an absurd consequence to be 
implied, which follows from this, viz. the possibility on this theory that, all 
psychical activities being concentrated at a single point of the body, atall other 
points the body might be virtually inanimate. But, as Simplicius remarks (64, 
28), this consequence is not here developed. Cf. 427a 5 τόπῳ δὲ καὶ ἀριθμῷ 
ἀδιαίρετον [int. τὸ κρῖνον. 

8.25. καὶ αὐτά, int. ἀδιαίρετά ἐστιν. Possibly this follows from the conception 
of τόπος as laid down in Phys. τν., cc. I—5. Cf. Phys. IV. 4.211a27—9. Each 
thing is equal in extent to the space it occupies. But axioms which hold for 
bodies in space can hardly be transferred to soul-units or points. Them. 
31, 34 H., 58,1 Sp. καὶ αὐτὰ συντιθέμενα διαιρετὸν οὐ ποιεῖ μέγεθος. According 
to Simplicius (64,-33) τόπος means the single point of the body, ὡς καὶ πάσας τὰς 
ψυχεκὰς [int. στιγμὰς} ἐν μιᾷ εἶναι σωματικῇ, ἣν κοινότερον τόπον ἐκάλεσεν ὡς 
δεκτεκὴν ἐκείνων. Philop. 170, 31 εἰ γὰρ ὁ τόπος τῶν ἀπείρων στιγμῶν τῆς Ψυχῆς 
τὸ σημεῖόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώματος, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδιαίρετον, καὶ τὰ ἄπειρα δηλονότι σημεῖα τὰ. 
ἐφαρμόσαντα τῷ σημείῳ τοῦ σώματος ἀδιαίρετα ἔσται" ὡς γὰρ ἂν ἔχῃ 6 τόπος, οὕτω 
καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ" ὥστε ἕν σημεῖον ἔσται ἡ ψυχή, καὶ καθ᾽ ἕν σημεῖον ἔμψυχον τὸ 
σώμα. 

a25 εἰ δ᾽...27 τὰ σώματα; εἰ δὲ answers εἶ μὲν 421. We now take the other 
alternative. Suppose (2) that the points in the body are the same as the units 


1. 4 409 a 2I—a 28 285 


whose sum is the soul. On this view there are not two sets of points. Soul- 
units and points of body are identical. In the words of 409b 5, we deny ὅτι 
διαφέρων tis ἀριθμὸς ἐγγίνεται καὶ ἄλλος τις τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι 
στιγμῶν. It follows that all bodies will be animate: the distinction between 
animate and inanimate disappears. 

a26. ὁ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν ἀριθμὸς, 1.6. πλῆθος, sum-total. Philop. 
171, 10 ἐπαναλαμβάνει τὸν λόγον εἰς τὸ σαφέστερον, Simpl. 64, 36 ἢ κάλλιον φάναι 
τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. 

8. 28. καὶ ἄπειροι. Simpl. (65, 2) thinks another absurd consequence implied 
by the addition of these words. οὐ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει ἐν τῷ σώματι, εἴπερ 
dpa, αἱ στιγμαί: ἄπειροι δὲ αἱ δυνάμει. διὸ οὐδὲ ἀριθμὸς τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν πλῆθος (wemepac- 
μένος γὰρ πᾶς ἀριθμός) πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δυνάμει ποιεῖν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐν 
τοῖς ἐμψύχοις. 

a 28 ἔτι δὲ πῶς...30 εἰς στιγμάς; Death is the separation of the soul from the 
body, the ordinary view being taken for granted here as above (408 a 28). 

But the sum-total of the points in the body 15 inseparable from the body, 
unless, in defiance of geometry, points are asserted to be the elements (μέρη) of 
which lines are composed and into which accordingly they may be resolved by 
separation. (If Xenocrates substituted dropos γραμμὴ for στιγμή, we may perhaps 
see from De Caelo Ill. 1, 299a 5—11 how he would have met this objection.) 
The truth is that points are merely limits (πέρατα) of lines, just as lines are the 
limits which bound surfaces and surfaces the limits which bound solid bodies. 
A. believes that these limits are inseparable from that of which they are limits: 
Phys. 1V. 4. 212 a 30 dua yap τῷ πεπερασμένῳ τὰ πέρατα, Melaph. 1002 Ὁ 8---1| 
ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι ἔχει καὶ περὶ ras στιγμὰς καὶ γραμμὰς καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα" 6 yap 
αὐτὸς λόγος - ἅπαντα γὰρ ὁμοίως ἢ πέρατα ἢ διαιρέσεις εἰσίν, Metaph. 1090b 5 εἰσὶ δέ 
τινες οἱ ἐκ τοῦ πέρατα εἶναι καὶ ἔσχατα τὴν στιγμὴν μὲν γραμμῆς, ταύτην δ᾽ ἐπιπέδου, 
τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ, οἴονται κτὲ, Cf. Top. VI. 4. 141 Ὁ 19—22, Phys. VI. 1, esp. 
231a 24 ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων εἶναί τι συνεχές, οἷον γραμμὴν ἐκ στιγμῶν, εἴπερ 
ἡ γραμμὴ μὲν συνεχές, ἡ στιγμὴ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον (the proof goes on as far as 
231b 10 and holds for any μέγεθος), De Caelo Ill. 1, 2998 6 ἔπειτα δῆλον 
ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ στερεὰ μὲν ἐξ ἐπιπέδων συγκεῖσθαι, ἐπίπεδα δ᾽ ἐκ 
γραμμῶν; ταύτας δ᾽ ἐκ στιγμῶν" οὕτω δ᾽ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ τῆς γραμμῆς μέρος 
γραμμὴν εἶναι. περὶ δὲ τούτων ἐπέσκεπται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγοις, 
ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετα μήκη, where πρότερον probably refers to PAys. V1. 231 ἃ 24, 
cited above. Xenocrates is also refuted PAys. I. 3, 1878 I—10 {see Simpl. eZ 
loc. especially pp. 138, tosqq., 140, 6 sqq.), and apparently Afefaph. 1088 a 15, 
IogI a 14, Ὁ 35, probably also in some parts of A/etaph. M., cc. 8andg. Xenocrates 
as a Platonist affirmed the immortality of the soul. See Philop. 171, 16, 
Theodoret v. 23 [Diels, Doxogr. Gr. 392 t> 3], Olymp. ἐκ Phaed. p. 98, Finckh 
[ Doxogr. Gr. 539 n® 3], 

It may be remarked in passing that, if A. has once succeeded in reducing the 
units (of which according to Xenocrates soul is constituted) to mathematical 
points, it follows on his own principles that they cannot be moved of themselves 
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ or independently. See PAys. Vi. 10, where there is an elaborate 
proof ὅτι τὸ ἀμερὲς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Cf. 241 a 6 5ᾳ. 
But it is highly improbable that either the substitution of points for units 
or the assumption that the number of the soul must be in space (409 a 6 sq.) 
would have passed unchallenged by Xenocrates. Cf. A.’s own admission that 
the ideas are not in space, P&ys. 111. 4, 203 ἃ 9 μηδέ που εἶναι. 


“86 NOTES I. 5 


CHAPTER V. 


409 a31—b 18. Summary of the objections to the view of Xenocrates. 
It implies a plurality of points present in one and the same point, just as the 
corporeal view of soul implies that two bodies occupy the same space [§ 1], and 
further, on this view as on that of Democritus, the soul causes motion in the 
body because it is itself in motion [§ 2]. Moreover the theory under criticism 
is futile, for it gives no insight into the characteristic attributes of soul, such as 
reason, sense-perception, pleasure and pain [§ 3]. 

409 a 31. συμβαίνει 82. The division of chapters is here unfortunate and 
needlessly interrupts the connexion of thought. 

a 31. καθάπερ ἐΐἵπομεν, apparently in 408 Ὁ 33 sqq., where, however, it is not 
the difficulties arising out of the conception of motion, but those connected with 
the attribution of number to the soul that are said to be peculiar (δια). A. is 
not here presenting a fresh objection to the conception of a self-moving number, 
but summing up the results of his previous criticisms. He claims (1) that the 
same consequences follow from that conception as from the theory which 
regards soul as a body of fine particles. The particular consequence of this 
kind adduced below is that soul and body occupy the same space (Ὁ 2 εἴπερ... 
4 ψυχή). This will follow if the soul 15 a collection of points no less than if it 
is a collection of particles. Cf. 409 a 21 sqq. That the reference in καθάπερ 
εἴπομεν is not solely to the opening sentence of the criticism (408 Ὁ 32—409 a 1) 
seems almost certain, for it was only upon subsequent analysis that the con- 
ception of number yielded this result, viz., that soul and the body would occupy 
the same space. Diogenes of Apollonia and Heraclitus seem the best repre- 
sentatives of of σῶμά τι λεπτομερὲς THY ψυχὴν τιθέντες (405 a 21----20). 

a 32. odpd τι λεπτομερὲς. This quality was claimed by Diogenes for his 
element air (405 a 22), and may be presumed to belong to that of Heraclitus: 
cf. 405 a 27 ἀσωματώτατον. The chief representative, however, of this view is 
Democritus. From 404 Ὁ 30—405 a 13 it appears that this particular variety of 
opinion, viz. that the soul consists of a body of fine particles, might be adopted 
either by those who regarded soul as the moving principle (τὸ κινητικόν) or by 
those who considered it cognate with the elements, provided they made the 
elements corporeal. Democritus would come under both heads, a fact which 
bears upon the question of the genuineness of the words ἴδιον τὸ ἄτοπον. 

a 32 τῇ 8°...409 b I τὸ ἄτοπον. A. claims (2) that Xenocrates is involved in 
an absurdity all his own, though it finds a counterpart in Democritus,—pre- 
sumably one to which the supporters of the view that soul is a subtle corporeal 
element, as such, were not exposed. This absurd consequence is developed 
below (409 Ὁ 7—11, with which compare 409 a 10—18). Against Democritus 
the objection had previously been urged (406 b 15—25). With κινεῖσθαι supply 
τὸ (gov (cf. 409 Ὁ 7). The proper correlative to ὥσπερ. .-Ψυχῆς is omitted; 
it would have been οὕτως ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ κινεῖσθαι φάναι (see below 409 Ὁ 7 sq.) 
if this clause had taken the same form as the preceding, but it is replaced, as 
the text stands, by ἴδιον τὸ ἄτοπον, to be taken as subject of συμβαίνει. Cf. 4038 
12 καθάπερ, οΐξ. 

409 bI. ἴδιον τὸ ἄτοπον. Torstrik, in an admirable note (p. 126), contends 
that these words are spurious because (1) the explanation of animal motion 
impugned was not peculiar to Xenocrates, but was shared by him with 
Democritus, (2) the words might easily have been interpolated, owing to the 
construction of the sentence having been misapprehended, an infinitive seeming 


I. 5 409 a 31—b 14 287 


to be required after τῇ δέ. It is easy, Torstrik thinks, to supply this by under- 
standing λέγειν κινεῖσθαι. Such an ellipse is very common both in Plato and 
A. in clauses where a comparison is instituted. The first objection may be met 
in a way: we may reply that Democritus did not say the animal was moved 
by the number, and so far the conception of Xenocrates was peculiar to himself. 
But it is a poor case which admits of no better defence than this. 

Ῥ2. ἐν παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ σώματι. These words mean “in every part of 
the sentient body,” not “in every sentient body.” The view is that sensibility 
is diffused all over the frame, and not lodged in any special part as the brain or 
the heart. 

b3. εἰ σῶμά τι, as assumed by almost all A.’s predecessors excepting Plato 
and his school : at any rate by of σῶμά τι λεπτομερὲς τὴν ψυχὴν τιθέντες. 

b4. τοῖς δ᾽ ἀριθμὸν λέγουσιν, int. τὴν ψυχήν. 

b5. πολλὰς στιγμάς, int. ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι as shown 409 a 18—25. πᾶν 
σῶμα, “all body,” i.e. everything which is corporeal: not to be taken as in παντὶ 
τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ σώματι just above (409 Ὁ 2). The inference was drawn above, 
409 a 25 566. ψυχὴν ἔχειν. See 409 a 27. εἰ μὴ διαφέρων τις ἀριθμὸς ἐγγί- 
νεται, i.e. if the number which is the soul be not something other than the sum 
total of points in the body (ai ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμαί, 409 a 25, 6), as A. goes on to 
explain καὶ ἄλλος... στιγμῶν. For eyyiverac=“supervenes,” cf. 408 a 21 ἐγγίνεται 
τοῖς μέλεσιν. 

b7. συμβαίνει re. The particle which, standing alone, is, according to 
Eucken, De Ar. Dic. Rat. p. 13, comparatively rare in De 4., joins this new 
sentence to b2 εἴπερ yap...7 στιγμῶν. συμβ. is parallel to ἀναγκαῖον (Ὁ 3). Cf. 
410 b 7. 

58. καθάπερ καὶ Δημόκριτον αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν κινεῖν, viz. 403 Ὁ 28 sqq., ie. “in 
his theory.” On this idiom see note on 405 ἃ 26, συνίστησιν. 

bg. τί γὰρ διαφέρει σφαίρας λέγειν μικρὰς. See 4098 10 sqq. The oxymoron 
in μονάδας μεγάλας is purposely grotesque (see #oze on 4098 2). If the dimen- 
sions of the constituents make no difference at all, by all means let us have 
‘‘ large units” (points) as well as small spheres. 

bIO ἀμφοτέρως ydp...II τῷ κινεῖσθαι ταύτας, the round atoms of Democritus 
or units of Xenocrates: cf. 403 Ὁ 24—31, 4048 5—9. These words show 
clearly what the objection taken at the beginning of the chapter, 409 a 32 54. 
really is. A. had criticised in 409a 15 sq. the absence of a moving cause for 
the units of Xenocrates, which is exactly parallel to the complaint he makes 
against the Atomists. Jfefaph. 985 Ὁ 19 wept δὲ κινήσεως, ὅθεν ἢ πῶς ὑπάρχει 
τοῖς οὖσι, Kat οὗτοι παραπλησίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ῥαθύμως ἀφεῖσαν. With τῷ κινεῖσθαι 
ταύτας cf. 403 Ὁ 29—31, 406 Ὁ 20—22. 

biII. τοῖς δὴ συμπλέξασιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸς Cf. 404 Ὁ 28 sqq. 

biz. συμβαίνε. Cf. 2,7». 410b4. Jud. Ar. 713 Ὁ 38 inde (a concludendi 
necessitate) συμβαΐνει usurpatur ubi factis ex aliqua hypothesi conclusionibus 
ipsa hypothesis refutatur. ita συμβαίνειν usurpatur ubi concludendo aliorum 
philosophorum placita refutantur. Cf. Metaph. 989 a 22 and Bonitz ad loc. 

biI3 οὐ γὰρ μόνον...14 συμβεβηκός. Stich a theory affords no help in either 
of the two divisions of our task. Here the point seems to be: “A self-moving 
number can be no proper description of what soul is, of its essence, nor yet 
such a characteristic or property of soul as will contribute to a better definition 
of it.” Cf. again 402 b 16 sqq. 

b1I4. δῆλον δ᾽ εἴ τις ἐπιχειρήσειεν. Cf. the phrase φανερώτατον δ᾽ εἴτις ἀπο- 
διδόναι πειραθείη in 408 a 3, where, as here, it is τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς to 
which reference is made. 


288 NOTES Is 


bi6. ΔΧογισμούς, “ processes of reasoning.” In λογίζεσθαι and its derivatives 
the chief element is that of calculation. The word λογισμὸς is often used, like 
the English “ reflection,” to denote what 1s more precisely expressed by διάνοια. 
Cf. infr. 415 a 8, where λογισμὸς is explained by διάνοια, In .Wetaph. 980b 28 
λογεσμὸς is co-ordinated with τέχνη, as distinguished from ἐμπειρία. 

b17. πρότερον. It is more probable that the reference is still to 402 Ὁ 25-— 
403 a 2 than that it is either to 406a 26 sq. or 408 a 3 566. 

Ὁ 1:8. ἐξ αὐτῶν, int. τῶν λεγομένων. The plural after Ὁ 15 ἐκ τοῦ λόγου 
τούτου need cause no surprise. This gives a satisfactory sense: it is not easy 
even to surmise these attributes of soul (λογισμοὺς etc.) from such a definition. 

big. τριῶν δὲ τρόπων.. ὁρίζονται τὴν ψυχήν. Cf. zofe on 405b 11. Of the 
three modes, two only are given in this sentence. The third is introduced by 
λείπεται δέ (409 Ὁ 23). This is obviously the point where a new chapter should 
have begun. 

Ὁ 20 of δὲ σῶμα....2Σ τῶν ἄλλων. Here it is quite plain that ἀσωματώτατον is 
another way of saying λεπτομερέστατον. The theories of soul which A. has in 
view make it identical with an ἀρχὴ which strictly is not incorporeal at all. In 
some of these theories the other simple bodies or elements are derived from the 
ἀρχὴ by σύγκρισις only. See Mezaph. 988 b 34 sqq. This mode of γένεσις 
would apply to the air of Diogenes of Apollonia and to the fire of Heraclitus. 
The Atomists, however (cf. 405 a 11 sqq.), refused to admit any qualitative 
change in σῶμα, but derived all varieties in concrete things from the different 
shape, order and position of the atoms: Them. 32, 34—37 H., 59, 23—26 Sp., 
Philop. 175, 5—19, Simpl. 66, 6—18. 

409 b 23—411 a7. The greater part of the chapter [8 5—§ τό, 
409 Ὁ 23—-411 a 7] is devoted to a criticism of the third theory, which, starting 
with the functions of perception and knowledge, derives the soul from the 
elements. On this theory soul knows and perceives because it is compounded 
of the elements, and it is further assumed that like is known by hke. To this 
it is objected: (1) that the great majority of concrete things are not single 
elements but compounds [§ 5], and, even if the elements are present in the 
soul, this is not true of the particular compound or of the formula by which it is 
determined [§ 6]. (2) Further, applying the scheme of the categories to the 
term Being, what, we ask, are the elements from which the soul is derived? 
Are quantity and quality included, as well as substance? If they are not in the 
soul, how can the soul know them? If they are, the soul must itself be a 
quantity, quality and substance [§ 7]. (3) Again, if ike knows like, it cannot, 
as Empedocles held, be unaffected by like [ὃ 8]. (4) On Empedocles’ theory 
the corporeal tissues composed of earth, like hair and sinews, should strictly 
have perception of their like, i.e. earthy objects, but this is contrary to fact [§ 9]. 
(5) Empedocles is bound to admit ignorance on a large scale, e.g. the sphere 
which he calls God cannot know Strife, for in it alone of all things strife is not 
present [8 ro]. (6) It is a consequence of Empedocles’ theory that soul should 
be found everywhere, for in all things there are present one or more of the 
elements, and therefore the knowledge and perception which the presence of 
the elements implies [§ 11]. (7) And yet since these elements are material 
elements, there is further need of a unifying cause, and this will be the main 
thing, such superior importance being however inconsistent with the priority 
which Empedocles ascribes to the elements [§ 12]. (8) The theory under 
examination, like that which attributes motion to the soul, fails to apply to all 
forms of soul. Just as plants and some animals are stationary, so plants are 
devoid of perception, and many animals of reason [ὃ 13]. (9) Again plants and 


I. κα 409 Ὁ 16—b 31 239 


some animals do not respire, and so the Orphic theory that soul enters from 
the external universe in the act of respiration is untenable [§ 15]. (10) Nor is it 
necessary to compound the soul of all the elements: as the knowledge of 
contraries is one, it will be sufficient to take one only of a pair of opposite 
elements [ὃ 16]. 

b23 λείπεται δ᾽ ἐπισκέψασθαι...24 αὐτὴν εἶναι. The criticism of these theories 
is accompanied by a fuller exposition, for the preceding notice (404 Ὁ 8-—27) 
merely established the fact that such views were held by Empedocles and Plato. 
πῶς λέγεται means “in what sense the soul is said” to be “composed of,” or 
“derived from,” the elements. The phrase ἔκ revos εἶναι, which has many mean- 
ings, would bear either interpretation. See AlefapH. A., c. 24; also 1044 Ὁ 24 sqq,., 
1092 a 23 Ssqq. One main distinction is that sometimes the elements remain in 
the product or derivative (ἔκ τινος ὧς ἐνυπάρχοντος), sometimes they do not (ἔκ 
τινος μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντος). Thus by μεῖξις a compound is generated quite distinct 
from its components. So Plato, 7272. 35 a, B: the compound soul is quite 
distinct from its elements, Same, Other, Being, just as Being is distinct from 
Same and Other. So, too, bone is a wholly different substance from the earth, 
water and fire, of which, according to Empedocles, it is compounded (410a 2 sqq.). 

b24. λέγουσι μὲν γάρ, int. τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι. ty αἰσθάνηταί 
τε τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἕκαστον γνωρίζῃ, int. ἡ Ψυχή. Here again, as above 400} 8 
(Δημόκριτον αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν κινεῖν), must be understood “according to the theory.” 
They put forward the theory, not, of course, in order that the soul may perceive 
reality, but in order that its perception of reality and knowledge may be 
explained. 

b25 συμβαίνειν...26 τῷ λόγῳ, int. ὃν λέγουσιν (or ποιοῦνται), the theory which 
they put forward. 

Ὁ 26 τίθενται ydp...27 τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες. The assumption underlying all 
these views is that like knows like. See for Empedocles 404 b 13—15, for 
Plato 404 Ὁ 17, for Diogenes of Apollonia 405 a 23, for Heraclitus 405 a 27 sqq., 
and generally of all theories of this kind 405 b 13—19. If the soul consists of 
the elements, it will be capable of knowing all things : Them. 33, 4 H., 60, 3 Sp. 
δεὰ τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν αὐτὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, οἰόμενοι πιάντα αὐτὴν οὕτω τὰ πράγματα 
γνωριεῖν. As A. puts it, they supposed that the assumption “like knows like” 
involved the identification of the soul with all the things which it knows. Cf. 
for πράγματα 404b 18, 25, 27. 

b28. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μόνα ταῦτα. Grammatically ταῦτα should refer to ra mpdy- 
para, which is impossible. It must be ra στοιχεῖα mentioned 409b 23, 24. 
ἔστι is a verb of complete predication=exists. 

b29. τὰ ἐκ τοὐτων-Ξτὰ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, the things compounded of the 
elements. The argument is this: You have to account for the fact of the per- 
ception by soul of e.g. rocks, trees, animals, all of which, even if regarded as 
merely modifications of an assumed first principle or principles, are certainly, in 
their present state, dissimilar from it, and therefore, ex Ayfothest, from soul 
itself: Them. 33, 5 H., 60, 4 Sp. ef μὲν οὖν τὰ στοιχεῖα μόνα ἦν τὰ ὄντα, καλῶς" 
νῦν δὲ πολλῷ πλείω τὰ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων. 

b30. ἔστω-- ἐξέστω. The imperative is an emphatic concessive, “licet,” cf. 
Metaph. 1077 Dd 1. 

b3I. σύνολον. The concrete whole is A.’s favourite term for a particular 
individual thing, e.g. Callias is such a whole, in which soul as form and body as 
matter are united. For the form of the word cf. συναμφότερον. On the theory 
of Empedocles such concrete things are compounds of his four elements 
(410 a, I σύνθετα). 


HH. Ig 


290 NOTES I. 5 


4108 1. οὗὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν, non qualibet ratione, not if taken at random, in any 
casual way. τὰ στοιχεῖα τούτων ἕκαστον, int. ἐστί. By τούτων are meant the 
compounds or derivatives. 

a2. ἀλλὸ λόγῳ τινὶ Kal συνθέσει. The dative is causal, “in virtue of a 
definite ratio and arrangement,” ie. it is because the elements are combined in 
certain proportions and arranged in a certain way that each concrete thing 
comes to be: Avetaph. 1042 b 25—-31. See also the second zrofe on 408 a 24. 
Cf. below 410a 8 and 407 b 32 sq., 4088 6 sqq. with zofes. Inc. 4 λόγος τῆς 
peifews and σύνθεσις are treated as exclusive rather than as complementary. 
In 408 a 18—23, the section which deals with Empedocles, λόγος (int. τῆς 
μεΐξεως) only is mentioned. However, in 408a 24 peté&s apparently stands for 
both modes of combining, when the parts combine without alteration, as well as 
when their distinctive character is lost by their being fused or blended in the 
new whole. Here also, as bone is an example and καὶ explicative, σύνθεσις must 
include the latter mode as well as the former, cf. De Cae/o 111. 2, 300 Ὁ 25—30. 

a3. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. This passage, frag. 96 Τὸ [211214 K], is quoted also by 
Simplicius zz Phys. 11. 2, p. 300, 21 sqq., who gives the further line “Appovins 
κόλλησιν Gpnpdra θεσπεσίηθεν and for εὐστέρνοις of our text substitutes εὐτύκτοις. 
Reference is made in AZetaph. 993 a 17 sq. to the passage for the same purpose 
as here, viz. to show that the composition of bone is determined by the pro- 
portions subsisting between its constituent elements. 

a4. χοάνοισιν. Empedocles is apparently thinking of the hollows of the 
earth, where in geologic ages, as we should say, he must have imagined bones, 
like other tissues, to have been gradually formed when the reign of Strife was 
over. Cf. Simpl. 68, 8 ‘xydava’ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ (Hom. 71. XVIII. 470), ἐν 
ois ἢ τῶν μιγνυμένων γίνεται κρᾶσις, ayyeta...@ καὶ ‘evarepva’ ὡς πλατέα διὰ τὸ 
χωρητικὸν καλεῖ, Philop. 177, 32—178, 1. 

a5. νήστιδος αἴγλης. These words have caused some perplexity. From 
frag. 6, 3 Ὁ [57 K] of Empedocles we gather that Nijores, like Ζεύς, Ἥρα and 
Αἰδωνεύς, was a personification of one of the elements, viz. elemental water or 
moisture. It seems impossible that atyAns should, as M. Tannery supposed 
(Pour Phistotre de la sctence helléne, Ὁ. 333), be an adjective=atyAnécons: and 
though νήστιδος might quite possibly be an adjective, it is more probably a 
substantive here as in the other passage. There is, however, no difficulty in 
taking it as genitive dependent on αἴγλης, “brightness of water” is parallel 
to is ἀνέμοιο. Simpl. and Philop. strangely understand two elements, air and 
water, to be meant, each contributing one eighth: Simpl. 68, 10 μίγνυσι δὲ... -ἕν 
μὲν ἀέρος ἕν δὲ ὕδατος ἃ δὴ ἄμφω “νῆστιν αἴγλην᾽ προσαγορεύει, νῆστιν μὲν διὰ τὸ 
ὑγρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ νάειν καὶ ῥεῖν, αἴγλην δὲ ὡς διαφανῆ, Philop. 178, I—4. 

a7 ot λόγοι...8 καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις. Cf 410a 2. The combining proportions 
are as necessary to knowledge as the materials combined. In his own technical 
language A. would say that for knowledge the formal cause is as important as 
the material cause, since we know a thing only when we know its causes. Cf. 
Metaph. 983.4 24 sqq., 9938 15—22, De Part. An. 1.1, 642 a 18—28. 

a8. γνωριεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον, int. τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ στοιχείων [this is the subject], 
τὸ ὅμοιον τὸ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν [this is the object]. 

ag. οὐθέν, int. γνωριεῖ. οὐθὲν is the subject. There will be nothing in 
the soul to cognise concrete things. εἰ μὴ καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐνέσται. That ταῦτα Ξε 
bone and man is clear from what follows. The elements being supposed in the 
soul, the addition of of λόγοι καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις (410 a 8) is required to convert 
them into particular things. 

Δ ΤΙ, εἰ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λίθος. Cf. 431 Ὁ 29. ‘Some such crude assump- 


I. δ . 410 a I—a 20 291 


tion is at the basis of the earlier theories of perception. The pores of 
Empedocles are channels intended to facilitate the entrance of emanations, 
arroppoai, from the object perceived. So, too, Democritus explained all percep- 
tion by images (δείκελα-τε εἴδωλα) given off by the object and conveyed through 
the body to the equally material soul. 

ai2. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον, int. ἔχε. From instances of concrete things 
(οὐσίαι) A. passes to qualities, or instances of ra καθόλου͵ He might have gone 
on to quantities, relations and the other appendages of substance. 

aI3. ἔτι δὲ πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος. It was conceded at 409 Ὁ 29 that 
the soul knows ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα. But do such elements exist? and what 
are they? The distinction of the categories is ultimate for A., and there can be 
no principles or elements common to them all. 

8 14. σημαίνει yap, int. τὸ ὄν. Cf. ALetaph. 1017 a 7, 22—24. See note on 
402 a 23 τῶν γενών. 

als. πότερον ἐξ ἁπάντων ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ ot; Are we to say that the soul is 
composed of, or derived from, all of these or not? 

a6. GAN οὐ δοκεῖ κοινὰ πάντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα. This is A.’s own conviction, 
frequently expressed. Cf. Afefaph. 992 Ὁ 18—993 a το, 1070a 31--- το, 1088 a 
22—34. Similarly, there are no common principles from which all truth can be 
deduced, Anal. Post. 1. 32, 88a 36 ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν ἀρχῶν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναί τινας, 
ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντα δειχθήσεται. 

4. 17. ἄρ᾽ οὖν ὅσα τῶν οὐσιῶν, int. στοιχεῖά ἐστιν. Vahlen, Beztrige τν. 410, 
De arte poetica’, p. 271, explains differently, He compares ὅσα τῶν οὐσιῶν with 
his own readings of “οδί. 1461 a 27 ὅσα τῶν Kexpapév@y=all mixed drinks, 
and Rel. τι. 8, 1386.a5 ὅσα re γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν. For the 
partitive genitive used predicatively see mote on 4028 1. Jnd. Ar. 149b 
2 564. cites Pol. 1339a 18 ταῦτα γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ᾽ ἡδέα. 
I know no example introduced by ὅσα, for those which Vahlen (IV. 419, cf. 
Bettrdége 11. 271) supposed that he could adduce, viz. 2.262. 11. 8, 1386 ἃ 5, Poet. 
25, 1461 a 27 quoted above, are elusive, as they rest upon his own emendation 
or manipulation of the text, in which subsequent editors decline to follow him. 
ἐκ τούτων μόνον, int. ἔσται ἡ ψυχή : or, as Them. (33, 31 H., 61, 9 Sp.) puts it more 
briefly, ἐκ μόνης τῆς οὐσίας (int. ἡ ψυχή ἐστι. The first category, substance, 15 
contrasted with all the rest. Let us suppose, then, that the elements in the soul 
are the elements of substances only. To this the reply is that the soul will in 
that case know substance but will not know any of the other categories. πῶς 
οὖν γινώσκει, int. 7 ψυχή. It will be impossible for the soul, which has in it the 
elements of substance only, to know the other categories. 

Δ 18 ἢ pijcovew...19 συνεστάνα. To escape from the last conclusion the 
advocates of the theory must admit that the elements of which the soul is com- 
posed include the elements of the other categories besides those of substance. 

a20. ἔσται ἄρα ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν καὶ οὐσία, int. ἡ ψυχῆ. Then these elements 
of which the soul consists will include quantity, quality and substance ; pre- 
sumably also, although A. does not say so, ἔδιαε ἀρχαὶ of the other categories. 

a 20 ἀλλ᾽ dSivarov...21 μὴ ποσόν. If the elements of soul are elements of 
quantity, the soul of which they are the elements will be quantity, not substance. 
The refutation is so elliptical that the final steps are uncertain. It may be left for 
us to infer similarly that soul is quality and not quantity or substance, and again 
that it is substance and not quality or quantity, it being impossible to reconcile 
these inferences. Belger, by transposition, made the final step the preceding 
sentence, hence the soul will be [at the same time] quantity, quality and sub- 
stance. A. of course holds the soul to be οὐσία. He might fairly argue that 

19—2 


202 NOTES IL 5 


those who made it σύνθετον ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων held the same. Cf AfLelaph. 
1029 8 15 Sq. τὸ yap ποσὸν οὐκ οὐσία' ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ᾧ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα πρώτῳ, 
ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία. 

8 21. τοῖς δὲ λέγουσιν ἐκ πάντων, int. τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. 

8. 23. τὸ φάναι μὲν ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου. μὲν is displaced, for 
αἰσθάνεσθαι δὲ is also dependent upon φάναι: ud. Ar. 454 20 μέν interdum 
non ei additur vocabulo, in quo vis oppositionis cernitur. The physical doctrine 
that like cannot act upon like (cf. 416 a 32) is mentioned De Gen. et Corr. 1. 7, 
323b1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. παρειλήφαμεν δὲ παρὰ 
τῶν πρότερον ὑπεναντίους ἀλλήλοις λόγους. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖστοι τοῦτό γε ὁμονοη- 
τικῶς λέγουσιν, ὥς τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πᾶν ἀπαθές ἐστι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν 
μᾶλλον ποιητικὸν ἢ παθητικὸν εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου...τὰ δ᾽ ἀνόμοια καὶ τὰ διάφορα 
ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἰς ἄλληλα πέφυκεν. This was the opinion of Empedocles, 
who made his four elements qualitatively different and (unlike A.’s four ἁπλᾶ 
σώματα) immutable. The opposite view, viz. that like acts upon like, was held 
by the Atomists, who recognised no qualitative distinctions in matter, i.e. in the 
atoms, 26. 323b 10—15 Δημόκριτος δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἰδίως ἔλεξε μόνος xré. 
Though Theophr. De Senstbus § 49 (Doxogr. Gr. 513, 10—15) professes to 
doubt whether they explained sensation τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἢ τοῖς ὁμοίοις, the latter 
assumption is the true one, and is confirmed by Theophr. himself, § 50, where in 
an abstract of the theory of vision according to Democritus he reports him as 
saying: τὰ yap ὁμόφυλα μάλιστα ἕκαστον γνωρίζειν. In fact, both Democritus 
and Anaxagoras (405 Ὁ 14, 19), though taking opposite sides, were consistent in 
applying their theory of physical change to the particular case of perception : 
the former said like acts upon like and like is known by like; the latter said 
that which acts is unlike that which is acted upon, and that which is known is 
unlike that which knows. Empedocles, like all the rest, is open to the charge 
of inconsistency. The two conflicting views reappear in the discussion of 
nutrition, 416a 29—b9. 

a24. αἰσθάνεσθαι. For perception it is enough to refer to 404 Ὁ 13 γαίῃ μὲν 
yap γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν κτέ. γινώσκειν, int. τὸν γενώσκοντα. For knowledge the 
instrument, τῷ ὁμοίῳ, is probably the soul. Cf. above 409 Ὁ 26 with zode. 

a25 τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι...26 καὶ γινώσκειν. Here, and in the similar passages 
424a 1, 4278 20, 4298 14, the question arises whether the indefinite τὶ is in 
agreement with the infinitive taken as a noun, or is the accusative governed by 
πάσχειν. The former construction is preferred by some editors in ζᾶ. iVéc. 
[1428 31 τὸ yap βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. But the evidence of 424b τό, 17 
seems to me decisive in favour of the alternative view, at least here and in 
424a1: cf. also 4o8b 23. The difference of construction hardly affects the 
meaning, ‘“‘ to suffer something” being obviously “a mode of suffering.” The 
common view was that in sensation the percipient is passive. A. starts from 
this in his own discussion (II., ¢. 5). There is little evidence as to the opinion 
of Empedocles about knowledge, but he doubtless assimilated it to sense-per- 
ception : see Theophr. De Senszbus 88 10, 11 [Doxogr. Gr. 502, 7 sqq.]. 

a 28. ὡς rots σωματικοῖς στοιχείοις ἕκαστα γνωρίζεται. Empedocles makes 
the corporeal elements present in living things the instruments of cognition 
(in the verses cited 404 Ὁ 13—-15). Cf. 427 a 26—29. - 

a 29. Kal πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον, an amplification or correction of τοῖς σωματικοῖς 
στοιχείοις = “ with reference to its like,” “by the standard of likeness.” Torstrik 
(p. 128) thinks the words corrupt. Non advocanda sunt quae 416 Ὁ ro leguntur 
ὥστε καὶ ἡ τροφὴ πρὸς ἔμψυχόν ἐστιν: alia enim eius loci ratio. Revocavi igitur 
in quo universus locus versatur καὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον: (cf. etiam bI ὥστε οὐδὲ 


I. 5 410a 20—b 6 293 


τῶν ὁμοίων). He cites Philop. 180, 20, 26, Sophonias 34, 5 as favouring his view. 
This conjecture gives a satisfactory sense. Attempts have been made to connect 
the words with μαρτυρεῖ. Some consider πρὸς adverbial, but this is not probable, 
as in such cases ἔτε 1s joined with πρός : cf. 407 Ὁ 3, 702. IX. 4, 166a 35. Even 
then καὶ after the genitive absolute presents an insuperable difficulty. If we 
shrink from adopting Torstrik’s restoration (for Philoponus and Sophonias may 
after all be paraphrasing our present text when they write ἕκαστα γνωρίζεται καὶ 
τῷ ὁμοίῳ [Philop. ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου] τὸ ὅμοιον), then it seems worth considering 
whether πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον cannot be taken adverbially like e.g. πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, 

8. 290. μαρτυρεῖ τὸ viv λεχθέν. Haec esse corrupta facile apparet. Lacuna 
infuit, quam male suppleverunt additis μαρτυρεῖ τὸ viv λεχθέν, quasi praecederet 
πολλὰς δ᾽ ἀπορίας ἔχειν τὸ λέγειν, NON ἔχοντος τοῦ Aéyeey (Torstrik), It 15 at 
least questionable whether the genitive absolute might not serve as well as the 
infinitive on the analogy of ὡς ὧδ᾽ ἐχόντων τῶνδ᾽ ἐπίστασθαί oe χρή. Torstrik 
continues : Accedit quod nova prorsus ratio additur 30. ὅσα γάρ ἐστιν xkré., 
de qua nondum dictum est. Td λεχθέν vero non significare τὸ λεχθησόμενον, 
quamvis id velint interpretes graeci, nec licere τὸ λεχθησόμενον corrigere, id 
quod quidam faciunt libri scripti [T et corr. Uy], non est quod dicam. Probably, 
when he began the sentence, a27, A. intended to contrast the many difficulties 
already mentioned with some still greater one to come, but the sentence was 
left unfinished, because before he had reached this difficulty another minor 
difficulty occurred to him and he plunged a 30 sqq. into a digression from which 
he never emerged. As to viv, a modern reader cannot pretend to the same 
linguistic appreciation as the ancients. We find, De Parr. An. τ. 1, 639 Ὁ 6, τὸ 
piv ῥηθησόμενον, but with the aorist it would seem at least as obvious to explain 
νῦν Ξενῦν δή, “what was just said” (cf. 432a 28), as to resort to the explanation 
of Philoponus 180, 23 τὸ yap νῦν Ἀεχθέν φησιν ἀντὶ τοῦ τὸ λεχθησόμενον, and 
Simplicius 70, 8 ἐν δὲ τῇ λέξει τὸ μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ λεχθησομένου 
ἀποδεκτέον, as δηλοῖ ἐπιφερόμενος 6 γὰρ σύνδεσμος αἰτιολογικὸς ὦν. Belger’s idea 
that what follows is μαρτυρία and not argument is wholly unfounded. 

a 30. ἐστιν... γῆς, “consist of earth”: genitive of material. Cf. 405 a 10, 
435 a 25, Ὁ 19 3. ἁπλῶς, i.e. “ without admixture of other elements.” 

ΔΙΟ bi. dor οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμοίων, int. αἰσθάνεσθαι δοκεῖ. 

b2. προσῆκεν, i.e. if Empedocles’ theory were true. Them. (34, 10 H., 62, 
1 sq. Sp.) paraphrases καίτοι προσῆκε τῶν γοῦν ὁμοίων ταῦτα αἰσθάνεσθαι. 

b4. πάντα γὰρ τἄλλα, int. ἀγνοήσει. συμβαίνει δ᾽ ᾿Εἰμπεδοκλεῖ. See nose 
on 4000 12. Cf. Metaph. 1000 b 3 sqq., where the same objection is raised to 
the theory of Empedocles. 

Ὁ 5. τὸν θεόν, ie. τὸν σφαῖρον, Emp. frag. 17, 7 Ὁ [94 K], 27, 4 Ὁ [60 Κὶ. 
When the work of the attractive force, φιλία, is completed, all things are united 
except Strife, the force of repulsion, which has been completely banished. Cf. 
Emp. frag. 35, 3 Ὁ [167 K]. 

b6. ἕν goes closely with τῶν στοιχείων. τὰ St θνητὰ πάντα, int. γνωρίζει. 
τὰ θνητὰ is the subject and πάντα, if I mistake not, is accusative, Int. τὰ στοιχεῖα. 
ἐκ πάντων yap ἕκαστον. Both the moving forces, Love and Strife, as well as the 
four elements, are thus represented as στοιχεῖα of every living being. Cf. supra 
404b 13-15. With ἕκαστον supply τῶν θνητῶν. It should be noted that inanimate 
objects are not included: things which have life are also subject to death (θνητά). 
Them. 34, 15 H., 62, 9 Sp. ra δὲ ζῶα καὶ θνητὰ πάντα τῷ πάντων μετέχειν ἅπαντα 
γνωριεῖ. We have no means of testing this statement. It may be A.’s own 
inference from the fact that, unless all the elements were present in animate 
beings, they would be deprived in part of cognition. As Torstrik remarked, all 


2904 NOTES I. 5 


that the argument requires is such a clause as this: τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα καὶ τοῦ 
νείκους μετέχει. Cf. Metaph. 1000 a 28 ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐκ τούτου [int. τοῦ νείκους 
τἄλλά ἐστι πλὴν ὃ θεός. 

Ὁ 9. ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ἐστιν ἕν τι γινώσκειν. The subject is πᾶν in the sense of 
every single thing, ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων. 

ΣΙ. αὐτά, int. τὰ ὄντα. With this argument compare 227, 411 b 5 sqq. 

bx. ὕλῃ. This term is here used in A.’s own peculiar sense of “ material 
cause” which, since matter with him always implies its correlative, form, at once 
suggests another and higher cause (xupidrarov...xpeirrov). 

Ὁ 12. ἐκεῖνο τὸ συνέχον, 1.6. that other unifying cause, τὸ ἑνοποιοῦν, just 
mentioned as needing to be determined. Cf. 4τό 8 6, where it is objected to 
Empedocles that, in his mechanical explanation of the growth of plants, he has 
neglected to provide any unifying principle, τὸ συνέχον. 

b13. ἄρχον. This reflects κυριώτατον. The principle of which we are in 
search may be said to control or govern the material elements. Cf. Pol. 1254.a 34 
τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ Ψυχῆς Kat σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ 
δ᾽ ἀρχόμενον. 

bI4. τοῦ νοῦ, int. εἶναί τι κρεῖττον καὶ ἄρχον. This is said from the stand- 
point of A., who distinguishes between ψυχὴ and νοῦς, unlike some of his 
predecessors. Cf. 404 a 27 sq. 

br5. τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, whereas they, 1.6. Empe- 
docles and philosophers like him, ignore the superior claims of mind and give 
the priority to their elements. For Empedocles these στοιχεῖα are the four 
material elements and the two moving causes, Love and Strife. As elements 
of all that exists, they are elements of νοῦς. Them. 34, 23 H., 62, 19 Sp. of δὲ 
οὐκ αἰσχύνονται Kai TOU νοῦ Ta στοιχεῖα ποιοῦντες στοιχεῖα. 

b τό πάντες δὲ...411 a 2 ὑπειληφότας. A. now objects that not only Empe- 
docles and philosophers like him, but also those who like Democritus explain 
soul as the moving principle, and even the authors of the Orphic cosmogony, 
have had a wholly inadequate and imperfect conception of soul through con- 
fining their attention to animals, indeed to certain species of animals, while 
ignoring other animals and plants altogether. From his own more advanced 
position as a naturalist, who has completed a survey of the animal and vegetable 
kingdoms, he is dissatisfied with the hasty generalisations of his predecessors 
on the vital principle. The objection was foreshadowed 402 Ὁ 3 sqq. Here, 
however, A. points to particular species of soul, the soul of the plant and of the 
stationary animal, which the definitions of the soul as cognitive or as a motive 
principle do not satisfy. 

Ὁ 17. ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, int. εἶναι. οἱ τὸ κινητικώτατον, Int. τὴν ψυχὴν 
λέγοντες εἶναι. 

b 19. φαίνεται γὰρ εἶναι. zd. Ar. 808 Ὁ 46 haud raro φαίνεσθαι c inf 
perinde ac cum part significat ‘apparere, apertum esse.’ Cf. 410 b 22 56. 
411 Ὁ 19. Bonitz cites 414 a 24 (which is not so clear a case), Zrh. Nic. 
1165 a 18, 1123 Ὁ 22. . 

Ὁ IQ μόνιμα...20 κατὰ τόπον. These stationary animals recur 413 Ὁ 2 sq., 415 a 
6 sq., 432 b 19 sqq., 434 Ὁ 2, 4. Those with which A. was acquainted lived in the 
water, e.g. ὀστρακόδερμα and the ἀκαλήφη or sea-nettle: Hzst. Am. 1. 1, 487 Ὁ 
6—8, VIII. 1, 588 Ὁ 7—17, IX. 37, 621 Ὁ 2—5, De Part. An. τν. 5, 681 Ὁ 34 54., 
IV. 7, 683 Ὁ 4—I1I. 

Ὁ 20, ταύτην μόνην τῶν κινέσεων κινεῖν ἡ Ψυχὴ τὸ ζῷον. Ταύτην Ξετὴν κατὰ 
τόπον, πορευτικήν (432 Ὁ 13, 14. The verb here takes a cognate accusative 
of the motion imparted as well as an accusative of the thing moved. Cf. 


I. 5 410 Ὁ 6—b 28 295 


406 a 31, zole, 4338. 17. The argument is well put by Them. 34, 29—35, 2 H., 
62, 29—63, 12 Sp. If, he says, the soul is τὸ κινητικόν, and yet some animals are 
devoid of locomotion, either they must be pronounced ἄψυχα or we must enquire 
why they cannot change their place, though they grow, are nourished, and have 
sensation. Them. continues 34, 34 H., 63, 6 Sp. καίτοι ταύτας μὲν τὰς κινήσεις, 
λέγω δὲ τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, εἰ καὶ κινεῖται ὡς ἔμψυχα, ἀλλ᾽ ody ὑπὸ μόνης 
τῆς Ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ συναίτια γίνεται αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν, τοῦ μὲν τρέφεσθαι τὰ 
τρέφοντα, τοῦ δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὰ αἰσθητά" τῆς δὲ κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως ἡ ψυχὴ 
μάλιστα κυρία εἶναι δοκεῖ. Trend. (p. 236) thought that Them. read μόνη, 
arguing no doubt from ὑπὸ μόνης τῆς ψυχῆς, but Them.’s antithesis between 
ταύτας μὲν τὰς κινήσεις and τῆς δὲ κατὰ τόπον is really quite as strong evidence 
for his having read μόνην. Nor can it be conceded to Trend. that μόνη suits the 
context any better than μόνην : cf. PAys. VII. 9, 265 Ὁ 34—266 a 5, cited above, 
p- 211. 

b2I ὁμοίως δὲ...22 ποιοῦσιν; int. οὐ περὶ πάσης λέγουσι ψυχῆς : in other words, 
as Them. (35, 4 H., 63, 15 Sp.) puts it, ἀμελοῦσι τῆς φυτικῆς, they overlook the 
vegetative soul which is the only principle of life in plants. Having illustrated 
his point as regards those who define soul as “the moving principle,” A. now 
returns to prove it of those who define soul as “the cognitive principle,” and 
therefore derive it from the elements of things. 

Ὁ 23. τά τε φυτὰ ζῆν. On the soul of plants v. z7/ra 411 Ὁ 27 sqq., 413 ἃ 
25—31, Ὁ 7 sq., 16, 4148. 32 Sq., 4248. 32 Sqq., 434 a 25—30. 

Ὁ 24. διάνοιαν οὐκ ἔχειν. Cf. 415 a 7---11. 427b13s8q. In 404 Ὁ 5 58. it is 
ὁ κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς which is said to be frequently absent. 

b24. εἰ δέ τις καὶ ταῦτα παραχωρήσει. The verb is rare. Them.and Simpl. 
explain it by συγχωρεῖν. Ταῦτα may refer to what precedes or to what follows ; 
in either case the effect of the concession must be expressed in Ὁ 25 καὶ θείη... 
26 αἰσθητικόν, i.e. if we make intellect one part of the soul and sensation 
another. What exactly is the view thus obtained? Trend.: Quis sit, 
qui omni animae mentem tanquam partem tribuit, non facile est definire. 
Them., after supplying ᾿Αναξαγόρᾳ with συγχωρήσειεν, decides for Empedocles 
(35, 11 H., 63, 25 Sp.): οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ 6 οὕτω λέγων “ ἤδη 
yap wor ἐγὼ γενόμην κούρη τε κόρος re | θάμνος τ᾽ οἰωνός Te, Emp. 235. 117 sq. Ὁ 
[380 sq. KJ. Simpl. (72, 2 54.) also alludes to Empedocles and the Pythagoreans 
as investing irrational things with rational souls. It is just conceivable that 
mapayopev=*not insist upon,” 1.6. cease to press these cases, and ταῦτα would 
then be the cases of plants which live and of those animals which have not 
διάνοια. 

b 25 τὸν νοῦν...26 τὸ αἰσθητικόν : Them. 35, 10 H., 63, 22 Sp. τὸν νοῦν 
ἐνυπάρχειν ἅπάσῃ Ψψυχῇ..-καὶ πᾶσαν εἶναι Ψυχὴν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων, Simpl. 
72, 4—6. This kind of soul with (1) a rational, (2) a sensitive (acc. to Simpl. 
also a locomotive) faculty would be found, on this view, in every living thing. 

b 26. καθόλου περὶ πάσης. Pleonasm: cf. 424a 17, etaph. 1037 a 22 καθόλον 
περὶ παντὸς [τοῦ ri ἦν εἶναι] εἴρηται, Phys. Vill. 8, 264. ἃ 21 καθόλου μᾶλλον περὶ 
πάσης κινήσεως, 265 a 8 καθόλου περὶ πάσης κινήσεως. 

b 27. οὐδὲ περὶ ὅλης οὐδεμιᾶς. Because, as will be shown in II., c. 3, the various 
faculties or forms of soul are not independent, the higher always presupposing 
the lower. If the view impugned be that described in sofe on Ὁ 25, it obviously 
omits A.w’s θρεπτικόν, and consequently, in his view, fails properly to explain 
αἰσθητικὸν and νοῦς. 

Ὁ 28. ἐν τοῖς ᾿Ορφικοῖς ἔπεσι καλουμένοις. This expression conveys a doubt 
as to the authenticity of the poem. Cf. De Gen. An. 11. 1, 7348 19, Cic. de Nat. 


206 NOTES I. 5 


Deor. τ. ὃ 107 Orpheum poetam docet Aristoteles nunquam fuisse, Bernays, Dze 
Dial. εἶ. Arist. p. 96. So Iamblichus, following A., ap. Stob. Zcl. Phys. τ. 366, 
17 sqq. W., 868 H. Cf. Lobeck, Aglaoph. p. 348 sq., and on the Orphic 
literature generally see O. Kern, De Orphet Epimenidis Pherecydis Theogonis 
guaesti. critz., Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, E.T., Book L, cc. IL, p. 80 sqq., V., 
p- 123 sqq-, Ρ. 537 Sqq-, 545 sqq. 

Ὁ 29. ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου, i.e. the universe. Cf. 2227, 411 a7. εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων. 
Them. (35, 18 H., 64, 5 Sp.) takes this to mean “at birth”: φησὶ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς 
μεταλαμβάνειν τὰ ζῶα παρὰ τὴν πρώτην ἀναπνοήν. But the more natural meaning 
would seem to be “every time they breathe.” 

ΔΙ Αι. εἴπερ μὴ πάντα ἀναπνέουσιν. <A. believed that fishes do not breathe. 
He was not aware of the true function of their gills. Cf. 420 b 9—13. 

a2 εἴ τε δεῖ...3 ἁπάντων: a fresh argument directed solely against those who 
derived the soul from the elements. 

a3. θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως. Here ἐναντίωσις signifies “a contrariety,” 
1.6. a pair of contraries. Cf. 405 b 23, zofe. Also Metaph. 1004 Ὁ 26—1005 a ὃ. 
Most of A.’s predecessors assumed contraries as their principles. See A@efaph. 
1004 Ὁ 29 cited ad 4o5 Ὁ 23: also 1075 a 27—30. 

aq éaurd re κρίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. This follows from A.’s well-known 
principle, which is also Platonic, that the knowledge of contraries is one and 
the same. Cf. 427 Ὁ 5, zofe. He who knows hot (sometimes assumed as an 
element) will know the negation of hot, i.e, A. would argue, its contrary, cold: 
but, unless the two contraries are related as ἕξις and στέρησις (Mezaph. 1004 Ὁ 26 
ἔτε τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία στέρησις), which is not always the case, this 
argument is fallacious, as Simpl. points out (72, 24—73, 1). See Metaph. 
1055 Ὁ 14 sqq. By the carpenters rule we shall only know what 15 circular 
as not straight, exactly as we should know what is straight to be non-circular 
if we applied to it a circular rule. A. uses κρίνειν for the strictly cognitive 
function both of perception and thought. See 4248 5, 426b 10, 428a 3. This 
function is the link which connects sense with thought: 427 a 18 νοεῖν καὶ 
κρίνειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι. The result in either case is a judgment or proposition 
which may be true or false, 428 a 3 sq., 430a 27 Sqq., 4328 II Sq. 

a6. ὁ κανών. Cf. R#ef 1.1, 1354a 26, Metaph. 998 a 3, E7A. Nic. tl13a 33, 
1137 b 30 sq. 

411 a 7-—-26. To the kindred theory that soul is intermingled with the 
whole universe it may be objected (1) that the elements themselves (no less than 
their compounds) will then become living beings, especially as the soul in ele- 
mental air or fire is assumed to be purer than that present in animals [88 17—20]. 
Also (2) the ground for assuming that the elements at large are animated like 
the parts of them which go to constitute particular things is the principle that 
the whole is homogeneous with its parts. But from this principle it must follow 
that the parts of universal soul found in particular things are also homogeneous 
tater sé, which is not the case. If it be admitted that air is everywhere uniform 
and soul is not, it will follow that, though part of the soul may be derived from 
the atmosphere, part of it is not, which is contrary to this theory. Either, then, 
soul is everywhere of the same nature, or it must be admitted that it is not 
uniformly present in every sort of thing [ὃ 21]. 

a7 καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ϑ8έ...23 rot παντός. Here A. makes a transition to a some- 
what different view. Empedocles had said that soul knows, because it is 
compounded of the same elements as the things which it knows. A. has 
argued above that, if this were so, all things would be animate, a reductio ad 
absurdum, ashe thinks. The opinion that soul was everywhere diffused had, 


I. 5 410 Ὁ 28—4I1a τ 297 


however, found supporters, and accordingly he proceeds to examine it. In 
Prof. Bywater’s view the whole passage now commencing as far as 411 a 23 
(§§ 17—21) is connected with 410 b 27—-411 a 2 (§ 15), the intervening section 
411 a 2—7 interrupting the context. On this ground he would alter δὲ to δὴ 
(Journal of Philology, XV. pp. 53, 54). 

a8. ὅϑεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς. Illud iows...aliquid dubitationis relinquit. So 
Trend. Later writers are more explicit. Aetius Pac. 1. 7,11 (Doxogr. Gr. 301) 
νοῦν τοῦ κόσμου τὸν Gedy, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἔμψυχον Gua καὶ δαιμόνων πλῆρες" διήκειν δὲ καὶ 
διὰ τοῦ στοιχειώδους ὑγροῦ δύναμιν θείαν κινητικὴν αὐτοῦ, Diog. Laert. I. 27 τὸν 
κόσμον (int. ὑπεστήσατο) ἔμψυχον καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη. The apophthegm itself was 
well known: Plato, Laws xX. 899 Β ἔσθ᾽ ὅστις ταῦτα ὁμολογῶν ὑπομενεῖ μὴ θεῶν 
εἶναι πλήρη πάντα; Cicero, or his authority, gives it a religious turn, De Legg. 
ur. 11 § 26 “ Thales...homines (dicit) existimare oportere omnia, quae cerne- 
rent, deorum esse plena; fore enim omnis castiores, veluti cum in fanis essent 
maxime religiosis.” 

ag. ἐν μὲν τῷ aépt. From this we learn how A. himself interprets the theory 
that soul is intermingled in the universe. He regards it as meaning that soul 
is present in all the elements, wherever found ; while he would probably have 
agreed with Plato (PAzlebus 29 B sqq.) in thinking that these elements are 
found in the universe (ἐν τῷ παντῇ) in a purer and more potent form than in 
human organisms (zap ἡμῖν) Whether this would have been admitted by the 
supporters of the theory under examination we cannot tell; but from A.’s 
language in the next sentence (ἐπεζητήσειε yap ἄν ris) it seems highly probable 
that they did admit it. 

alo. ἐν δὲ rots pexrots, those compounds of elements which form the bodies 
of animals. In 435 a 11—b 3 A. will prove on teleological grounds that no 
animate body can be constituted out of one or more ἅπλᾶ σώματα; the con- 
stituents must be pecxrd. Such is the constitution of the ὁμοιομερῇ or tissues: 
De Part. An. τι, ς. τὸ Cf. De Gen. et Corr. 1. 10, 328 a 4 εἴπερ καὶ ἔστι σῶμα 
σώματι μικτὸν ὁμοιομερές, ἐδ. a το, Mefeor. IV. 8, 384 Ὁ 30, 26. IV. 12, 389 Ὁ 26 
ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ. Seesupra Ὁ. 264 and modes on 408 a 11, 17. 

Δ 13. συμβαίνει. Torstrik poimted out that 411 a ΣΙ ἐπιζητήσειε...13 adava- 
Twrépa is a parenthesis; (p. 131) ita enim facilius intelligetur quae sequantur 
non ut haec refellantur adiungi sed ut redarguatur principalis adversaniorum 
propositio 7 ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὴν ψυχὴν μεμῖχθαι. 

8. 14. ἀμφοτέρως. Whichever alternative they choose leads to an absurdity. 
It is equally absurd to call fire or air an animal and to deny the title animal to 
that which has soul in it. It should be noted that, although the presence of soul 
does not, according to A., necessarily imply a ζῷον (see e.g. 410 Ὁ 22 sq.), but 
only ζῶν ri, yet the presence of a soul that is βελτίων... καὶ ἀθανατωτέρα would 
imply this. — 

4 15. παραλογωτέρων. Philop., like Them.,in place of this word reads παραβολω- 
tépev, which he explains thus: 189, 11 παραβολώτερος 6 λόγος, τουτέστι τολμηρὸς 
καὶ ἐπικίνδυνος. 

ἃ 16. ὑπολαβεῖν δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν. They seem to have arrived at the opinion that 
the elemental bodies (411 a II ἐν τούτοις -:εὲν ὅλοις τοῖς ἁπλοῖς σώμασιν, Them. 
36, 4 H., 65, 12 Sp. fire and air being examples) contained soul, from observing 
that each of them is homogeneous, the fraction of each element found in our 
bodies not being different in kind or quality from the same element outside of 
us. Compare again Plato P#i/. 29 A—30B. 

8 18. ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς. They are bound in consistency to extend this 
principle, that the whole is homogeneous with its parts, to the case of soul. 


208 NOTES I. 5 


aS. ὁμοειδῆ τοῖς μορίοις. Cf. zzfra a 23 ὁμοιομερῆ. 

ἃ 10 εἰ τῷ ἀπολαμβάνεσθαί τι...20 γίνεται. droA. is passive. Some portion of 
a given element is detached from the surrounding universe (cf. supra 404 a Io) 
and enclosed in the organism, e.g. air during respiration: Them. 36, 7 H., 
65, 15 Sp. ὥσπερ yap τὰ μόρια τῶν ἅπλῶν σωμάτων ἐναπολαμβανόμενα τοῖς ζώοις 
σύνθετα αὐτὰ ἐκ πάντων ποιεῖ, οὕτω καὶ τὰ μόρια τῆς ἑκάστου τῶν στοιχείων ψυχῆς 
ἔμψυχα αὐτὰ ἀπεργάζεται. 

αι 20 εἰ δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀὴρ...21 ἀνομοιομερής. This does not mean, as Them. (36, 9— 
12 H., 65, 1τ9---23 Sp.) supposes, that while there is no difference of kind between 
elemental air as a whole and that part of it which goes to constitute the body 
of an animal, there is a difference of kind between the soul which animates the 
whole element and the soul of the animal, viz. that the former is superior to the 
latter. The use of a different word ἀνομοιομερὴς suggests another meaning. 
Soul is made up of unlike parts or faculties (nutritive, sensitive, etc.) not always 
found in combination. Propositionem quae in refutatione efficienda minor est 
tanquam ab omnibus concessam ne ponit quidem, animam nimirum humanam 
differre ab anima ceterorum animalium, a plantae anima utramque....Anima, 
ait, quae inest corporibus viventibus non est ὁμοιομερής : at debebat esse ut 
aliquam vim haberet adversariorum argumentum quod legimus 16—17 (Torstrik, 
p. 132). 

a2I τὸ μέν τι αὐτῆς...22 τὸ δ᾽ οὐχ ὑπάρξει, int. τῷ ἀέρι. Αὐτῆς Ξετῆς ψυχῆς. 
Whether we do or do not follow Torstrik in considering ὑπάρξει δῆλον ὅτε an 
intrusion from the margin, in any case the main stress rests on the second 
of the coordinated and contrasted clauses. The argument seems to be as 
follows. If the air is ὁμοειδῆς, homogeneous, uniform, then whatever form 
of soul is contained in one part of the air must be contained in all parts of the 
air. Again, since it is by a part of the surrounding air being separated from 
the rest and enclosed in animals that they become endowed with soul, the soul 
in animals should be uniform also, in which case it could be only the lowest 
type found in animals. But, as a matter of fact, higher animals possess in 
addition to the lowest form higher forms, e.g. man has the rational soul (410 Ὁ 16— 
24). These higher types of soul cannot, as above shown, be present in the air. 
Therefore, if the soul is to be present uniformly in the air, it must itself be 
homogeneous: and, if it is not homogeneous, it cannot be present uniformly 
in the air. 

a23. τοῦ παντός. Cf. 411 a7 ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. Them. (36, 20 H., 66, 4 Sp.) and 
Simpl. (76, 6 sq.) understood rot παντός, like ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, of the universe. Philop. 
(192, 10—12) mentions this interpretation, as well as that which understands ἀέρος 
with rot παντός, without deciding between them. Trend., however, favours 
the latter: de singulis elementis et de aére maxime dictum est. As in this 
particular point, so generally in discussing 411 a 7—23, the Greek commentators 
are influenced by their personal philosophical predilections. Thus Simpl. 
(74, 27 564.) ascribes to the elements a diviner life and a higher degree of 
immortality than to men, and repudiates altogether the notion that they are 
without soul. On the other side cf. Philop. 192, 2—9. Them. again (e.g. 36, 
12 H., 65, 22 Sp.) regards the assumption that soul is ἀνομοιομερής (or at least οὐχ 
ὁμοειδῇς) as based upon the belief that there is a better and more immortal soul 
in the elements than that which animates τὰ ζῷα (cf. 411 a II, 13). He de- 
clines to credit A. with this belief, which he does not hold himself. 

a 24 Φανερὸν ovv...26 λέγεται. This sentence dismisses the two main views 
of soul previously maintained ; cf. 403 b 27 sqq. The view that it is composed 
of the elements has occupied us in this chapter, 409 Ὁ 23—411 a 23; the view 


᾿ 5 ΔΙ1 a 18---Ὁ 3 299 


that it is moved was examined 405 Ὁ 31—407 Ὁ 11 and 408 Ὁ 30— 409 b 18. 
The remainder of this chapter discusses questions relating to the unity or 
divisibility of the soul, cf. 402 b 1, 9 sqq. 

411 a26G—b 90. The dismissal of these theories suggests the further 
enquiry whether the various functions of soul, perception, opinion, desire, etc. 
belong to the whole soul or are to be severally assigned to parts of the soul. 
The question may even be raised of life itself. Does it reside in one or more or 
ail parts of the soul, or is it due to some other cause? [§ 23]. Of those who 
make the soul divisible we enquire ‘‘On what does the unity of the soul depend?” 
If there is a principle of unity, a soul of the soul, we go on to enquire whether it 
also has parts? Then what holds ¢esz together? and so on ad ézfinitem [Ὁ 24]. 
Again, if soul as a whole keeps the body together, what share in this process 
must be assigned to the several parts of the soul, e.g. to the intellect [§ 25]? 
Experiment shows that plants and the lower orders of animals continue to live 
for some time after they have been divided ; hence we may infer that the vital 
principle in the two segments is of the same nature; there 15 no reason to 
assume division into parts [§ 26]. This vital principle will be the vegetative 
soul of plants, and the sentient and locomotive faculty of worms [§ 27]. 

a26. dre δὲ τὸ γινώσκειν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ The question which in 411ι a 30 
follows this long enumeration of functions of the soul is perhaps due to the 
suggestion 408 b 11 sqq. that not the soul itself but the man with his soul is the 
true subject of these functions, the ὑποκείμενον to which as ἔργα καὶ πάθη they 
belong. The man is a σύνολον, a compound of body and soul; so that the 
problem of the latter part of c. 1, 403 a 3—b 19, is closely akin to that which is 
about to be discussed. 

8.28, καὶ ὅλως αἱ ὀρέξεις. Cf. 403 47, mote. From 433 a 22 566. it appears 
that βούλησις is a species of ὄρεξις and is opposed to ἐπιθυμία as rational to 
irrational desire. Cf. 432 Ὁ 6 εἰ δὲ τρία ἡ ψυχή, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσται ὄρεξις. 
414 Ὁ 2 ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις. Desire, which was to 
Butler a generic term, is nowadays ambiguous, sometimes used for the genus, 
ὄρεξις, sometimes for the species, ἐπιθυμία, which has pleasure or pleasurable 
sensation for its object (Butler’s “appetite ”). 

4.29. γίνεται St. This is still part of the protasis, which extends to a 30 
φθίσις. It is permissible, in translating such a long preamble, to drop the causal 
conjunction, which is replaced by “hence” or “therefore” where the apodosis 
begins. Cf. οί. τι. 18, 1391 Ὁ 8sqq. with Cope’s note; Bonitz, Arzsfot. 
Studien, il., Il. p. 3 566. ὑπὸ τῆς Ψυχῆς. yiverOar=“to come about” and 
ὑπάρχειν τε “το be attributed to” often serve as passives of verbs of causation 
with ὑπὸ and διά. Cf. 408 Ὁ 7, moze, 417 Ὁ 17. Cf. Eucken, Ueber die Pracpo- 
sittonen, Ὁ. 73, Metaph. 1033 b8, Phys. 11. 8, 199 a 13. 

a30 πότερον ὅλῃ τῇ Ψυχῇ...41τι ἢ 3 ἢ μορίοις. This is the apodosis to ἐπεὶ 
(4ιτ a 26). From the theory sketched in Bk 11.) c. 3 onwards we might too 
hastily infer that A. decides in favour of the second alternative, merely modifying 
the scheme of parts or faculties previously recognised (cf. 432 a 22—b 7, 
433 b1—4). But the hypothesis of unity is evidently favoured by the present 
passage and is supported by still more weighty considerations in 425 a 31, 
426 b 14---427 a 16, 429 Ὁ 13--21, 430 Ὁ 5, 431 a 20 56. 

AIIbI. καὶ πάσῃ, “that is, is it with the whole soul that we think?” Kai 
is explicative, =“that is to say.” 

b3. καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ. And, further, as regards life itself, which is implied in all 
these functions, where, we ask, does it reside? Cf. ᾧ ζῶμεν, 414 a 4 (with which 
again cf. 413 b1, 415 a23—25). Philop. 195, 34—196, 4 rightly interprets ζῆν 


300 NOTES I. 5 


of the barest minimum, the life of the plant, and accordingly refers it to the 
φυτικὴ δύναμις or vegetative faculty. 

b4. ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι αἴτιον, i.e. is there some cause independent of soul, its 
parts or faculties, to which this lowest grade or minimum of life should be 
assigned ? From A.’s own point of view, as set forth in the definition, 11. cc. I—3, 
it is a defect to overlook mere vitality in its lowest grade as belonging to soul, 
just as it is equally a defect in Democritus to equate ψυχή, wherever found, 
with νοῦς, life with mind, and recognise no distinction of kind between this 
lowest grade of vitality and the highest intelligence. 

b5. λέγουσι δή τινες, Plato in the Aepwdlic and the Zzmaeus. Cf. Republic 
434—441 (especially 435 C, 439 B), 442 C, 4448, 7Zmaeus 69C sqq. (cf. Phaedr. 
246A). On the other hand the PAaedo ignores this tripartition, and treats soul 
as a unity in contradistinction to body: PAaedo 78 B—8o B (cf. 66 A—E, 81 D— 
84 B). A. recurs to the Platonic division 413 Ὁ 27, the whole passage 413 b 13—32 
being concerned with the same problem ; and again 432 a 22 sqq., where he has 
his last word on the subject. ἄλλο μὲν νοεῖν ἄλλο δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν. Probably 
these are simply illustrations of alleged “parts,” not intended to be ex- 
haustive; cf. 432 a 25 sq. The division of soul into λογιστικὸν and ἄλογον 
was current in popular opinion before Plato, and is adopted by A. himself 
as the basis of the popular exposition of psychology given in 2. Nic. 
1102 a 26 sqq. 

b6 τί οὖν δή wore...7 πέφυκεν. Cf. 272/72 bg μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ. In his analysis 
of the notion of unity A. begins by classifying the things of which the term 
“one” is predicated. He makes a twofold division into (4) ὧν ἡ κίνησις pia, 
(δὴ) ὃν ἡ νόησις pia. Under (4) he brings τὰ φύσει συνεχῆ, things which possess 
natural continuity (dlefaph. 1016 a 4, 1052 a 35), and wholes, ὅλον, τὸ ἔχον εἶδος 
(1052 a 22), and even admits ὧν τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ εἴδει ἀδιάφορον (1016 a 18). 
Under (4) he places τὸ καθόλου, ὧν τὸ γένος ἕν (1016 a24) and τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, 
ὧν ἢ νόησις ἀδιαίρετος ἡ νοοῦσα τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (τἸοτ6 Ὁ 1). Cf. τοϊ6 ἃ 4 564. 
1052 ἃ 20, 30, 34sqq. Coherence or continuity on the one side, indivisibility on 
the other, are thus the marks of unity. Cf. 420 a 3, xofe. 

A. defines his own position 1045a 8—12. In all things which consist of 
several parts, where the entire thing is not a mere heap or aggregate, but a 
whole distinct from its parts, there is some cause of unity: in corporeal things 
contact, cohesion or some similar property. See also zofe on 402b 5. Hence, 
when examining a divergent theory, he can enquire if it explains why things, 
especially incorporeal things, are one: e.g. what makes the unity of mathe- 
matical magnitudes, Mefaph. 1077 a 20—24, or of the number, 74. 10444 3 καὶ 
τῷ ἀριθμῷ Sei εἶναί τι ᾧ εἷς, ὃ viv οὐκ ἔχουσε λέγειν Tive εἷς, εἴσπτερ ἐστὶν els. ἢ γὰρ 
οὔκ ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ οἷον σωρός, ἢ εἴπερ ἐστί, λεκτέον τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν. CF. 
Metaph. H., c. 6 generally, especially 1045 a 22—b 17, which gives his own 
solution of the problem. Cf. also 410b 1osqq. 

b7. ov yap δὴ τό ye σῶμα, though Democritus amongst A.’s predecessors 
(cf. 404 ag—16) and after him Epicurus held this opinion, while on the other 
hand the Stoics regarded the material body as held together by the equally 
material soul. δοκεῖ yap. A widespread popular view. See Plato Phaedo 80c 
ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι (the last two words, not 
found in the best MSS., were omitted by C. F. Hermann. Considering that 
σήπεται recalis ἂν σαπῇ of Phaedo 80D it seems safe to assume that A. read 
them). τοὐναντίον. Cf. 416 a6—9, where A. insists, against Empedocles, on 
the necessity of a unifying principle, i.e. a soul, to keep together the plant Cf. 
Metaph. 1077 ἃ 21 τὰ μὲν yap ἐνταῦθα ψυχῇ i μέρει ψυχῆς ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ εὐλόγῳ 


I. 5 4ττ Ὁ 3—b 20 301 


{some rational cause]° εἰ δὲ μή, πολλά, καὶ διαλύεται [they become a plurality and 
fall to pieces]. 

bio. ἐκεῖνο, 1.6. that other something, érepdv τι, which holds the soul together, 
and is the cause of its unity. The difficulty is then shifted to this “soul of the 
soul.” 

br3. καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. Impersonal, as in other cases 
where this formula is used; /zd. Ar. s.v. 638 b22sqq. Cf. 425 Ὁ τό, 222. Vee. 
1094 a 20, Mezaph. 1000b 28, 1006a 8 sq. It seems improbable that ὁ λόγος is 
the subject. An infinite regress of this sort A. declares to be in actuality im- 
possible. Azal. Post.1.22,83b6sq. PAys. VIII. 8, 263 Ὁ 3 ὥστε λεκτέον πρὸς τὸν 
ἐρωτῶντα εἰ ἐνδέχεται ἄπειρα διεξελθεῖν ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ ἢ ἐν μήκει, ὅτι ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστε δ᾽ 
ὡς οὔ. ἐντελεχείᾳ μὲν γὰρ ὄντα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, δυνάμει δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται. When an 
opinion under criticism has been shown to involve an infinite regress in actuality, 
A. regards it as disproved by veductio ad tmposstoile. 

b 14. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις. A corollary to the question b6 τί οὖν συνέχει 
τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; Various difficulties attend the working out of 
any theory assigning different functions to different parts of the soul. 

bI5 εἰ γὰρ 7 OAy...16 συνέχει. Supply as a second premuiss “and if the soul 
is divisible” (Ὁ 7). Note also that A. is employing the same mode of argument 
from whole to part as in 408 a 10—13 and 412 b23—25. See woves. 

18. χαλεπὸν καὶ πλάσαι. Cf. 406427, mote. The statement is important 
from its bearing on νοῦς (Philop. 199, 26, 28 μόριον γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ὁ voids), 
which, as we shall see, 429 a 24—27, is independent of the body and employs 
no bodily instrument. Philoponus continues, 200, 2 ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῷ χωρίῳ ὁ 
᾿Αλέξανδρος ἀπορήσας παντελῶς εἰπεῖν τι τοῦ ἰδίου σκοποῦ ἐχόμενον, σιωπῇ παρῆκε 
τὸ χωρίον. καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄρα τῶν ἐνταῦθα λεγομένων δῆλός ἐστιν 6 ᾿Αριστοτέλης 
ἑτέρας οὐσίας εἶναι λέγων τὸν νοῦν καὶ χωριστόν. Perhaps Alex. Aphr. supposed 
that A. is here accommodating himself to the views of his opponents. The 
inference of Philop. is borne out by 413 b 24 sq. 

bIQ φαίνεται δὲ Kal...27 οὔσης. These facts, to which A. again appeals, 
413 b 16—24, are introduced here to suggest that the soul in each separate 
segment resembles the soul of the undivided plant or animal, as in 409 a9 sq.: 
the soul of each segment is not indeed numerically identical with, but is 
specifically the same as, the soul of the entire organism. The view that the soul 
has parts would lead us to expect a fragment of soul, the imperfect or mutilated 
soul, in each of the segments. As Themistius says (37, 36—38, τ H., 68, 23— 
25 Sp.), in the case of plants we do not find one sort of vegetative soul in the 
root, another in the stem and another in the branches. 

b20. ἔνια τῶν ἐντόμων. A. gives a definition of “insects,” Ast. Am. 1. 1, 
487 a 32 καλῷ δ᾽ ἔντομα ὅσα ἔχει κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντομάς, ἢ ἐν τοῖς ὑπτίοις ἣ ἐν τούτοις 
τε καὶ τοῖς πρανέσιν : and again IV. 1, 523 Ὁ 12 sqq., where he remarks that many 
species are included under the term. A.’s “insects” include not only insecta 
proper (A.’s Hexapodous insects), Myriapoda and Arachnida, but also intestinal 
parasites, but they do not include Crustacea. “Segmentation was the main 
character of the group in A.’s estimation. Probably therefore he included 
Annelida in the group, led to this not only by their manifest segmentation, but 
by their retention of life when cut into pieces, a character often mentioned by 
him as specially belonging to insects” (Dr Ogle, Parts of Antmals, Ὁ. 229). 
It is mainly of earthworms that A. is thinking here and in the parallel passages. 
I am informed that in recent years the groups formerly included under Annelida 
have been redistributed, and that a new class, Chaetopoda, has been formed 
under which earth-worms are now included as belonging to Oligochaeta. 


202 VOTES I, 5 


b20. ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα ψυχὴν τῷ εἰδει, εἰ kal μὴ ἀριθμῷ: To numerical 
identity is opposed specific identity. All the members of a class or kind share 
in the characteristic properties which belong to the kind, its specific differences : 
Ind. Ar. 94. ἃ 35 ἕν, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀριθμῷ, dist. εἴδει (λόγῳ), γένει, κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν, Top. 1. 
ς. 7, 103a6sqq. On the four meanings οὗ ταὐτόν, viz. ἀριθμῷ, εἴδει, γένει, κατ᾽ 
ἀναλογίαν, see Metaph. esp. 1016 Ὁ 31—5 with Bonitz’ commentary. Cf. 415 Ὁ 7 
ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἕν, εἴδει δ᾽ ἕν, Philop. 200, 18—20 ὥστε pia καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ Ψυχὴ ἐπὶ 
τούτων πρότερον μὲν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, πρὶν διαιρεθῇ, μετὰ δὲ τὸ διαιρεθῆναι τῷ εἴδει (cf. 
411 Ὁ 25 ὁμοειδεῖς), οὐκέτι μέντοι καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ. 

b23. ὥστε σώζειν τὴν φύσιν, to maintain their nature or being, i.e. to keep 
themselves alive, to survive as natural objects, using their organs and faculties 
to escape destruction. Cf. 416 Ὁ 13 ἡ δὲ τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία [int. τὸ epyvyor), 
τροφήη- σώζει γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ μέχρι τούτου ἐστὶν ἕως ἂν τρέφηται, 416 Ὁ 17 ἡ μὲν 
τοιαύτη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ [i.e. τὸ θρεπτικὸν Or φυτικόν] δύναμίς ἐστιν οἵα σώξειν τὸ 
ἔχον αὑτὴν 7 τοιοῦτον. 

b24. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον, although the segments of the worms fail to maintain 
a separate existence for any length of time. ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν μορίων, in each of 
the segments, i.e. the parts of the body which has been divided. 

b25. ἅπαντ᾽ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς. This brings out the full force of 
b 20 ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα Ψυχὴν τῷ εἴδει. Here μόρια must mean the parts or 
faculties of the single soul, which in the illustration, Ὁ 21, are cited as αἰσθητικὸν 
and κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, in addition to θρεπτικόν, which must also be present, 
as in the cutting of the plant. Probably from the presence of αἰσθητικὸν A. 
would infer ὀρεκτικὸν in its lowest form. A.’s point is that all the faculties 
present in the soul before the division into segments are present after division 
in each of the segments. 

b 25. ὁμοειδεῖς εἰσὶν ἀλλήλαις kai τῇ ὅλῃ. The text here is very uncertain. 
The reading ὁμοειδεῖς.. ἀλλήλαις has the better authority, for though Trend.’s 
note (ed. I, p. xxxiv.) is “ὁμοειδῆ nunc scriptum est in cod. E; quam Bekkerus 
ὁμοειδεῖς lectionem commemoravit, eam subfuisse coniectum est,” there is no doubt 
that the scribe of E first wrote or intended to write ὁμοειδεῖς and then changed to 
ὁμοειδῆ. The former was read by Simpl. and Philop., who are far older witnesses. 
It is possible that ὁμοειδῆ is genuine and was altered to ὁμοειδεῖς to suit τῇ ὅλῃ. 
If ἅπαντα ra μόρια 15 the subject of éuoe87 εἰσίν, it must be taken distributively in 
this sentence, so that τῇ 6Ay=rois τῆς ὅλης μορίοις. Torstrik restored ὁμοειδεῖς 
and he argues in its defence that ὁμοειδῆ could not be applied to τὰ μόρια τῆς 
ψυχῆς understood as faculties: ipsae animae eiusdem generis sunt, non animae 
partes vel facultates : nam τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν opinor ex 8110 genere est ac τὸ αἰσθητικόν, 
et cetera simili modo (p. 133). He has not quoted, but doubtless had in mind, 
All a 18 καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοειδῆ τοῖς μορίοις εἶναι, where the argument requires that 
by τοῖς μορίοις A. should mean not the single faculties, but the entire souls of 
separate individuals. But, if all the parts of the soul in each of the two 
segments are said to be homogeneous (ὁμοειδῆ) with one another, it is possible 
to understand by this not, as Torst. seems to think, that the appetitive part is 
homogeneous with the sensitive part found in the same segment, but rather 
that the sensitive part in the one segment is homogeneous with the sensitive 
part in the other, and so on, and consequently the whole soul made up of these 
faculties in the one segment with the whole soul made up of these faculties in 
the other, and with the whole soul made up of these same faculties in the as yet 
undivided organism. Thus understood, the reading ὁμοιειδῇ.. ἀλλήλοις gives a 
plain sense. Cf. Them. (38, 11 H., 69, 9 Sp.) ἐξ dv ἁπάντων δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι 
ὁμοειδῆ τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἀλλήλοις Kai τῇ ὅλῃ, ἀλλήλοις μὲν τὰ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι 


1. κα 4II Ὁ 20—b 26 303 


τοῖς διῃρημένοις τοῦ σώματος, ὅλῃ δὲ τῇ πρὸ τῆς διαιρέσεως ἐνυπαρχούσῃ τῷ Cau. 
Can as much be said for ὁμοειδεῖς... ἀλλήλαις ἢ Philop., who cites the passage in 
full with this reading (200, 24—26), does nothing to elucidate it, for his com- 
mentary would be more appropriate to ὁμοειδῆ... ἀλλήλοις : (200, 26) τὰ yap μόρια 
τοῦ ἐντόμου, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν, ἑαυτοῖς τέ εἶσιν ὁμοειδῆ, ὅτε οὐ χωριστὰς ἔχουσι 
τὰς δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι αἱ δυνάμεις ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἰσί. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ 
ἀλλήλων μὲν ὡς ov χωριστὰ ὄντα. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ ψυχῇ ὁμοειδῆ τῇ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ 
ζῴου διαιρέσεως. εἰσὶ δὲ αὐτῇ διὰ τοῦτο ὁμοειδῆ, ὡς διαιρετῆς οὔσης τῆς ὅλης εἰς 
ὁμοιομερῆ. The incongruity is noticed by Trend., p. 241 ex quibus etsi verba 
ὁμοειδεῖς εἰσιν ἀλλήλαις laudantur, quid Philop. ipse, cum statim τὰ μόρια subiciat, 
legerit, non satis patere arbitramur. Simplicius seems to have understood 
ἅπασαι ai ψυχαὶ as the subject of ὁμοειδεῖς... τῇ ὅλῃ, as he is at pains to prove 
that each of the faculties could be called a soul: (79, 27) εἰ δὲ ai ἔσχαται ξωαὶ 
ἀμερίστως ἀλλήλαις συνυπάρχουσι, μειζόνως ai κρείττους, καὶ ὁμοειδεῖς εἰσίν, οἷον 
ai ψυχαί, ἀλλήλαις τε καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ" ψυχὰς νῦν οὐ τὰς ἐν πλείοσι ζῴοις καλῶν, ἀλλὰ 
τὰς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ διαφόρους ζωάς, οἷον τὴν φυτικήν, τὴν αἴἰσθητικήν, τὴν λογικήν. 
εἶναι δὲ ταύτας καὶ ἀλλήλαις καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ ὁμοειδεῖς, οὐχ ὅτι τὸ φυτικὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν 
τῷ εἴδει ταὐτόν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀχώριστον πρὸς ἀλλήλας σύμφυσιν. And, commenting 
upon ἀλλήλων μὲν κτέ., he remarks (80, 17) ἡ δὲ λέξις ἡ ἀλλήλων μὲν.. ἀκαταλ- 
λήλως εἴρηται, ὅτι τε ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μόρια μετενήνεκται, καὶ ὅτι ἀντὶ δοτικῆς 
γενικῇ πτώσει χρῆται" δέον γὰρ ἀλλήλαις φάναι, ἀλλήλων εἶπεν. Here Simpl. is 
careful to point out that A. does not go on talking οὗ ἅπασαι ai ψυχαί, but reverts 
once more to ἅπαντα τὰ μόρια, The changes of subject from μόρια expressed to 
ψυχαὶ understood and back again to μόρια are capricious and harsh to the last 
degree. But any inference from this harshness is double-edged: ὁμοειδεῖς may 
have been altered to get rid of it; as I have suggested above, it may have been 
produced by altering ὁμοειδῆ, in order expressly to exclude that interpretation of 
ὁμοειδῆ which Torst. rightly rejects as intolerable and absurd. In any case it 1s 
curious to find that Simpl. and Philop. seem so little alive to the meaning of the 
change of expression. Can they be following an authority who explained ὁμοειδῆ, 
though they themselves read ὁμοειδεῖς ἢ If we have to interpret ὁμοειδεῖς as 
predicate of ai ψυχαί, it seems strange that Simpl. should not have taken the 
obvious meaning of ψυχαί, viz. the complete soul or fraction of soul in each 
segment (cf. 411 Ὁ 20 τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα ψυχὴν τῷ εἴδει), for ὁμοειδής =} αὐτὴ τῷ εἴδει. 
The sentence then becomes parenthetical—“ And each of the two souls in the 
two segments is homogeneous with the other and with the whole soul prior to 
segmentation.” So Bender: “ Jedenfalls hindert das nicht, dass nicht in jedem 
Theil sdmmtliche Theile der Seele enthalten seien, wud diese verschiedenen 
Seelen sind sowohl einander gleichartig, als auch der ganzen Seele.” The 
strong point in favour of dpzoed7...dAdAjAos is that the same subject ἅπαντα ra 
μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς is retained throughout and in the same sense, “all the parts or 
faculties of the soul.” But this advantage is entirely thrown away if we take 
this subject to mean firstly with ἐνυπάρχει the divisions of the soul in the sense 
of faculties and secondly with ὁμοειδῇ as the divisions, or rather divided portions, 
of the whole soul retained by each segment. 1 cannot, therefore, accept 
M. Rodier’s version: “Mais il n’en est pas moins vrai que, dans chacun des 
segments, toutes les parties de ’Ame sont contenues, et que 165 portions de 
Pame ainsi divisée sont spécifiquement identiques entre elles et ἃ PA4me tout 
entiére.” 

b26 ἀλλήλων μὲν...27 οὔσης. Simpl. (80, 17—20) thinks, as we have seen, 
that A. has passed from the souls to the parts and has used the genitive 
(ἀλλήλων, τῆς δ᾽ ὅλης) instead of the dative. This points to a brachylogy for 


304 NOTES I. 5 


ἀλλήλοις μὲν (ὁμοειδῆ) ὡς ἀλλήλων οὐ χωριστὰ ὄντα, τῇ δὲ ὅλῃ Ψυχῇ (ὁμοειδῆ ὄντα) 
ὡς διαιρετῆς οὔσης τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς. I prefer a simpler explanation. The con- 
struction is obscured by the artificial order of the words. ἀλλήλων (which is 
genitive after χωριστά) and τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς (in the genitive absolute with ds) 
reproduce the antithesis suggested by ἀλλήλαις καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ ψυχῇ. The first ὡς is 
followed by accusative absolute: the presence of ἀλλήλων requires that, if any 
absolute case is used, it should be the accusative. The idiomatic terseness and 
antithesis of the text stand out by comparison with a paraphrase such as the 
following: ὡς τῶν μορίων χωριστῶν ὄντων ἀλλήλων μὲν οὔ, τῆς δ᾽ ὅλης ψυχῆς ds 
διαρετῆς οὔσης. The meaning is given more clearly, though in technical 
language, in 413 Ὁ 18 ὡς οὔσης τῆς ἐν τούτοις ψυχῆς ἐντελεχείᾳ μὲν μιᾶς ἐν ἑκάστῳ 
φυτῷ, δυνάμει δὲ πλείονων : the “parts” of the vegetative soul, nutritive, 
augmentative, reproductive, are inseparable from one another, i.e. the vegetative 
soul is in actuality one. But, as it is at the same time potentially plural, it is 
capable of division, 1.6. upon segmentation all the parts of this vegetative soul 
are found in each segment: in the segments of the worm not only τὸ θρεπτικόν, 
but τὸ αἰσθητικόν, τὸ κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον and τὸ épexrixoy reappear in each 
segment, 413 Ὁ 21—23, so that they must be inseparable from each other. 
Thus the soul of a worm is divisible eis ὁμοιομερῆ, like a chemical compound, 
the parts of which, being constituted of the same elements in the same propor- 
tion, are represented by the same formula as the whole. 

b28. ἀρχὴ. Cf. 402 a 6, 413 a 26 δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, 413 Ὁ 1, 12, 
415 b8, 14, 416 Ὁ 18, cited in zoze on Ὁ 23. The comparison shows that either 
the whole soul or any single faculty, part or grade of soul is designated ἀρχὴ 
and airia. We are again being led up to the notion of various grades of soul 
fully expounded below (11, cc. 2, 3), the two here mentioned being the 
“vegetative” and the “ sensitive.” 

b28. ψυχή τις. In Bk IL, cc. 2—4 this ἀρχὴ is occasionally styled a faculty 
(δύναμις) and again a part (μόριον) of the soul. The discussion in 413 b 13— 
414 a3 leaves no doubt in what sense these various terms are applied. 

b30. αἴσθησιν δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἄνευ ταύτης ἔχει. Here we have the characteristic 
feature of A.’s classification of these psychic “ principles” or “faculties.” You 
can have the lower grades of soul without the higher, but you cannot have the 
higher without the lower. Cf. 413 b I—10, 414 a 32 5464. This is all the reply 
we get at present to the further question propounded 411 b 3—5. 


BOOK II. CHAPTER I. 


412a 3—6. In Book 11. A. passes from his historical review of previous 
opinions to direct exposition [§ 1]. 

Alexander’s own De Antiia now becomes a subsidiary aid of great value. 
The commentary of Zabarella is continuous to the end ofc.7. We have no such 
detailed exposition by either of these authors of Book I., cc. 2—5. 

4128 4. ἐπανίωμεν. We return to the questions enumerated in Book I., c. I. 
Cf. the opening words of1., c. 2.(403 b 21) προελθάντας, τὰς τῶν προτέρων κτέ. It 
is important, however, to remember that we are more concerned in this chapter 
to determine how much we include under the term soul, than to establish a 
given theory of soul. We have first to decide one of the questions raised in 1., 
c. I, viz. whether all manifestations of life should be referred to soul, or whether, 
like most of our predecessors, we should restrict soul to certain of the vital 
functions, e.g. motion and cognition. Even at the close of the chapter Aristotle 
is careful not to commit himself to the theory that soul is a separate entity 
(413 a 8 ἔτι δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ κτέ.). 

aS. διορίσαι τί ἔστι. This was the problem proposed in 402 a 8, 402 ἃ 23, 
402 Ὁ καὶ sqq., 402 b 16 sqq. κοινότατος λόγος. Cf. 402 b 5-8, where the 
doubts expressed justify the superlative κοινότατος, as general a definition as 
may be, considering the gradations of soul, already hinted at in Book I. (410 b 
19—27) and to be expounded in cc. 2, 3 of the present book. 

412a 6—413a10. The definition of soul. 

412a 6—I11. Our starting point is substance, which can be analysed 
into matter and form, matter being potentiality and form actuality [§ 2]. 

This, perhaps the most characteristic of A.’s metaphysical doctrines, is fully 
expounded in Meath. Z., H. and A., cc. I—5, where οὐσία is analysed into matter, 
form and a compound of the two. Here, as often, the doctrine is not expounded, 
but taken for granted. - 

a6. γένος & τι τῶν ὄντων. This is fully explained in the Cafegories, cc. 2—5. 
In fact, the doctrine of the Categories is briefly that anything which can be 
spoken of is either substance or one of the appendages of substance, quality, 
quantity and relation being the most important of these appendages. Cf. 
Metaph. 1069 ἃ το Kai yap εἰ ὡς ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν, ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον μέρος" Kat εἰ τῷ 
ἐφεξῆς, κἂν οὕτω πρῶτον ἡ οὐσία, εἶτα τὸ ποιόν, εἶτα τὸ ποσόν. ἅμα δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὄντα ὡς 
ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ποιότητες καὶ κινήσεις. By γένος ἕν τι is Meant simply 
“one class,” while γένος ἕν γέ τε would mean ‘‘some one class.” 

4. 7. ταύτης δὲς Substance is often analysed, as here, into matter and form. 
It may be useful to compare the different statements in Mefapk. 1029 a I—9, 
1035 a I—9Q, 1042 a 26-——31, 1043 a 26—1043 Ὁ 4, 1070 aQsqq. Cf. first zofe on 
403b 2, and generally 403b 2—19 with moves. τὸ μὲν, Int. λέγομεν οὐσίαν. 
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν. This is an instance of μὲν solitarium, as in 4τ8 a 14. 

ἃ 7. τόδε τι, “a determinate something.” A technical expression for a 
concrete particular thing. From this man, this house, this tree, this stone we 


FA 20 


206 NOTES II. 1 


generalize “this something.” The importance of the technical term consists 
in the Aristotelian doctrine that it is m such concrete particulars and not in 
universals that reality primarily resides. Matter considered in itself is inde- 
terminate unless and until it is determined by union with form. 

a8. μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος. By these two terms Aristotle indicated his formal 
cause, which is always correlative to matter, determining and actualising 
matter which would othc.wise, or in itself, be indefinite and potential. pop@y, 
““shape,” it <uuwparatively seldom used alone (καὶ is of course explanatory, 
“nat is to say”), but it is less ambiguous than εἶδος, which serves for “species ” 
as opposed to “genus,” to say nothing of its perpetual use to denote the Platonic 
idea. More frequent is the combination here used. Cf. Metaph. 1033 b 5 
φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος, } 6riSymore χρὴ καλεῖν τὴν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ μορφήν, od 
γίγνεται. The two terms are combined, μορφὴ as here coming first, in P&ys. 11. 
I, 193 a 308q., De Gen. et Corr. 11. 9, 335 Ὁ 6, Metaph. 1017 Ὁ 25 sq., 1052 a 22 sq. ; 
quite as often εἶδος precedes μορφή, and that the order is indifferent appears 
from De Cael. 1. 9, 278 a 14 544. καὶ τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος καὶ μορφὴ τὸ δ᾽ ὡς τῇ ὕλῃ 
μεμιγμένον. ὧν δ᾽ ἐστὶ μορφή τις καὶ εἶδος, xré. 

a 8. καθ᾽ ἣν, ie. κατὰ τὴν μορφήν. The sense of the preposition is “in 
virtue of,” as in 406a 4. Without form there can be no determination, no 
definite thing. λέγεται τόδε Tr, “a particular existence is so called.” From 
the preceding line we expect τόδε 7 to be predicate: if so, it 1s also subject. 
Particularity belongs to nothing except the form (which is excluded by καθ᾽ ἣν) 
and the concrete particular thing in which the form resides. Some would say 
that τὸ μέν, οὐσία ὡς ὕλη, is subject: but matter is not “this something” by 
itself, and its union with form constitutes just the very οὐσία under analysis, τὸ 
ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. However, λέγειν can be used without asserting a predicate of a 
subject, both in the active, 417 a 1o,and more often in the passive with a causal 
dative, Metaph. 1018 a 31 sq. (cf. 10174 19 Sq.), or an adverbial phrase. Thus 
ταῦτα λέγεται Means simply “These things are spoken of,” “these terms are 
used,” in this or that way: κατὰ μεταφορὰν 420a 20, kar ἀριθμόν, κατὰ τὸ ἕν 
Metaph. 1021 a 8 Sq., 10, πολλαχῶς 415b ὃ 54., 426a 26, 4128 22, 4148. 14. 
This is confirmed by a modal or conditional clause following 412 a 22, 422 8. 26 5α., 
Metaph. 1022 b 4,22. In 424a 23, 429b 6 λέγεται should be similarly taken. 

ag. τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων. Matter and form are correlative. The substances 
with which we are concerned are concrete things and their analysis into matter 
and form is logical only. As Grote says (Ὁ. 454, 2nd ed., vol. 11..) p. 182, rst ed.), 
“There can be no real separation between the two: no shape without some 
solid material; no solid material without some shape. The two are correlates ; 
each of them implying the other, and neither of them admitting of being 
realised or actualised without the other.” And again (p. 454, 2nd ed., vol. I1., 
Ῥ. 181 sq., 1st ed.), ‘“‘ This distinction is borrowed from the most familiar facts 
of the sensible world—the shape of solid objects. When we see or feel a cube 
of wax, we distinguish the cubic shape from the waxen material; we may find 
the like shape in many other materials—wood, stone, etc.; we may find the like 
Material in many different shapes—sphere, pyramid, etc.; but the matter has 
always some shape, and the shape has always some matter. We can name and 
reason about the matter, without attending to the shape, or distinguishing 
whether it be cube or sphere; we can name and reason about the shape, with- 
out attending to the material shaped, or to any of its various peculiarities.” 
And Them. (39, 13 H., 72, 7 Sp.) concisely presents the concrete thing (σύνολον) 
aS ἀπολαῦον τοῦ μὲν γίνεσθαι παρὰ τῆς ὕλης, τοῦ δὲ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ εἴδους. ἡ μὲν 
ὕλη. ΟΙΟ ἐντελέχεια. The antithesis of form and matter is presented in another 


II. J 412 a 7—a τὸ 307 


way as corresponding to that between potentiality and actualisation (realisation). 
The latter pair of terms may be no clearer than the former, but they are capable 
of a far wider application. 

8 10. καὶ τοῦτο διχώς That is, there are two senses of actuality; a remark 
which in a modern book would be relegated to a footnote. Cf. 412 b1sqq., 415 Ὁ 2. 
Take the case of knowledge. The student who has a capacity for learning, has 
only potential knowledge when compared with one who has gone through a 
course of study. Here ἐπιστήμη is related to ἄγνοια as actual to potential. But 
the student who has learned is not always exercising his knowledge, and his 
possession of latent knowledge without the application stands to his actual 
exercise of knowledge in contemplation (θεωρεῖν) as potential to actual. 
Obviously the latter knowledge is more perfectly realised. The former, the 
possession of knowledge real but latent, is an inchoate, provisional actualisation. 
Cf. 417 a 2I—29. 

412a11—b6. Bodies have the best claim to rank as substances, 
especially such as are the work of nature, other bodies being derivative from 
these. A body that grows and decays of itself, and is self-nourished, is a 
substance compounded of form and matter [§ 3]. A body thus qualified by 
the possession of life cannot be identical with soul, as body is not an attribute, 
but a subject or substratum of attributes. That is, in the living organism, the 
body is οὐσία ὡς ὕλη. It follows then that soul must be οὐσία ὡς εἶδος. We 
define it as the form of a natural body potentially possessed of life. But such 
a substance is actual, not potential [§ 4]; and of the two senses of actuality 
it is analogous rather to knowledge than to the exercise of knowledge in con- 
templation of the thing known. For in sleep there is no exercise of faculties, 
whereas both sleep and waking are compatible with the presence of soul. 
Knowledge, again, in order of development, is acquired before it can be 
exercised. Accordingly our definition may now be modified as follows: soul 
is the primary actuality of a natural body potentially possessed of life [ὃ 5], i.e. 
of a natural body furnished with organs [ὃ 6]. 

The cogency of this reasoning depends upon two assumptions: (1) that οὐσία 
ἡ μάλιστα-- σῶμα φυσικὸν, (2) that σῶμα φυσικὸν ζωὴν ἔχον τε ζῷον ἔμψυχον. The 
body, of which it is said that it cannot be soul, is the animate body, which is the 
subject (ὑποκείμενον) of the attribute “life,” which it is further assumed implies 
“soul.” It could be wished that the last assumption had been definitely stated 
by Aristotle. There is yet one further assumption, viz. that soul is a substance 
(οὐσία). Some ancient commentators, recognising this, affirm that this has been 
proved in Book I. (the probable reference being to 408 Ὁ 18 ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν 
ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὖσα). Here again the absence of a distinct statement is to 
be regretted. Fortunately the rather arid discussion of 11., c. 1 receives much 
needed elucidation when Aristotle goes over the whole question again in c. 2, 
414 ἃ 4.S8qq., and some at least of the omissions just noticed are made good. 
Thus the connexion between life and soul is made clearer. ‘The soul is that 
whereby in a primary sense we live and perceive and think, and again (cf. 413 a 
21 sq.) that which has soul (τὸ ἔμψυχον) differs from the manimate (τὸ ἄψυχον) 
by the presence of life (ro ζῆν). Later on (414 a 14—19) we have the most 
distinct recognition that the living organism is the composite substance of 
which life and soul are attributes. The argument there runs parallel to that 
in 412 a 16—22, but the necessary link in the chain is inserted 414 a 14 τριχῶς 
yap λεγομένης τῆς οὐσίας.. ὧν τὸ μὲν εἶδος, τὸ δὲ ὕλη, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τούτων δ᾽ 7 μὲν 
ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἔμψυχον, ov τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν 
ἐντελέχεια ψυχῆς, ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη σώματός τινος. 


308 NOTES Il. I 


ΔΙΖ 5. ΤΙ. οὐσίαι Natural bodies are the commonest case of substances ; 
artificial objects are made out of them, and mathematical objects are obtained 
by abstraction from them. The sequel shows that it is οὐσία φθαρτὴ which is 
here subjected to division (cf. Mefaph. 1069 a 30 sqq.), οὐσία ἄφθαρτος or ἀίδιος 
being left out of account. μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώματα. So Alefaph. 
1028 Ὁ 8, where, however, the phrase is δοκεῖ ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα 
μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν, a phrase which elucidates the meaning of οὐσίαι δοκοῦσιν 
εἶναι Ta σώματα here: also 1042 a 6 sqq., where ai φυσικαὶ οὐσίαι are said to be 
ὁμολογούμεναι ὑπὸ πάντων. The whole chapter (efapis. H., c. 1, especially 1042 a 
3—31, should be carefully compared with the present passage. 

8. 12. ἔχει ζωήν: Note that this means capacity for life, the division being 
not into living and dead, but into animate and inanimate. In fact by σῶμα 
ζωὴν ἔχον or μετέχον ζωῆς A. means ἔμψυχον σῶμα. He has not explicitly stated 
this, but it is required by the argument. 

4. 15. ὥστε. This restates what was said above. Living bodies have as 
much claim to be considered substance as inorganic bodies. 

aI6. ὡς συνθέτη, 1.6. compounded of matter and form. See zoze on τρίτον 
τὸ ἐκ τούτων 412 a 09. 

a τό. ἐπεὶ 8’. What is the subject? Probably τὸ φυσικὸν σῶμα μετέχον 
ζωῆς, 1.6. what is afterwards called the body fitted with instruments for living. 
There is no doubt that it was the want of a definitely expressed subject which 
led to the insertion of τοῦτο in some inferior MSS. The predicate is kat σῶμα 
“τοιόνδε, which some interpret “not only a body, but also a body of a given kind, 
namely, capable of life.’ Cf ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη σώματός τινος 414 ἃ 18. More probably 
καὶ emphasises, meaning “in fact.” Life is the ποιότης and virtually the form of 
such a body. From these premisses, the inference which we expect is that the 
body itself cannot be the quality (i.e. practically the form) of this concrete 
organism. Cf. Mr Innes, CZ. &. vol. XVI. p. 462, who would boldly substitute 
εἶδος for a 17 ἢ Wyn. 

a 17. οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα ἡ Ψυχή. In this passage A. passes from identi- 
fying every natural body possessed of life with his composite substance 
to the definition of soul as the form of such a body. I understand the steps 
to be these. As we have seen, a composite substance has two factors or com- 
ponents. In the case of the animal, or natural body possessed of life, we are 
in no doubt as to what A. regarded as these two factors. His expressions 
vary: sometimes soul and body make up the whole animal, sometimes it is soul 
in body, here it is animate body or rather living body; but all these mean the 
same. What A. has to do then is simply to separate the two and determine 
which is form, which matter. If we know that we have the two factors or 
components, if there is good reason to identify thé. one with matter, the other 
must be form, provided the analysis into two components was correct. Here 
it is into logical subject and essential predicate, together making “living body.” 
To avoid mistakes we must enquire if living is wholly distinct from body. For if 
body implies life, we are not analysing properly, some part of the subject being 
itself a predicate in that case. But this, we are assured, is precluded: the body, 
the one component, is always subject and never predicate. This being so, the 
correctness of the analysis being guaranteed, the following inferences can be 
made: (1) the composite substance or anima] has body for one factor and the 
cause of its life, which we call soul, for the other, (2) these two are not identical 
but distinct, (3) the body is substance as matter, and hence (4) the other factor, 
soul, is substance as form. 

On this explanation the soul means ᾧ ζῶμεν (cf. 414 ἃ 12), the origin, ἀρχή, 


Ν 


II. 412 8 II—aI7z 309 


of life in the living animal. Up to this point A. has denoted the composite 
substance or σύνολον by σῶμα. He can hardly be said to desert this meaning 
even here, for the body, which 15 matter (or rather substance as matter) of the 
compound, is the living body. But when he comes to apply the powerful 
solvent of analysis, and to investigate λογικῶς, he regards this living body, 
gud body, as not the entire compound, but only as that part of it which is 
matter. The inference from “logical subject, never predicate” to “matter of a 
σύνολον,7 is a hazardous step. Cf., however, Wefaph. 1028 Ὁ 36—-1029 a 9, where 
οὐσίατετὸ μὴ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ οὗ τὰ ἄλλας, But matter, form, and the 
compound of the two all claim to be οὐσία as τὸ ὑποκείμενον πιρῶτον : 1029 a 20, 
ὕλη καθ᾽ αὑτὴν is none of the categories, 1038 Ὁ 4—6, in different senses both 
τόδε re and its factor, ὕλη, can be called ὑποκείμενον, 1029 a 21 ἔστι γάρ τι καθ᾽ 
οὗ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ExaoTov, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἔτερον καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστῃ" τὰ 
μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορεῖται, αὕτη δὲ τῆς ὕλης. ὥστε τὸ ἔσχατον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ 
οὔτε τὶ οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν ἐστιν. The body of τὸ ζωὴν ἔχον is com- 
pounded of the elements blended in ὁμοιομερῇ : the parts, into which it is divisible 
and into which at the dissolution of the compound it is disintegrated, are material, 
e.g. such parts as bones, flesh, sinew or the like, which when the compound has 
ceased to exist as a compound are mere dead matter. Cf. J/efeor. 1V., c. 12, 
Metaph. 1035 a 17—21, 31 sqq., 1035 Ὁ 19—22, 30. Form and matter being 
relative conceptions, that which is form In one aspect or in one compound may 
itself be the matter of another compound. That Alex. Aphr. considered the 
analysis of composite substance into its two factors to be a step in the argument 
seems clear from his summary statement, De An. Mantissa 102, 13, in which 
he follows the progress of this chapter, while incorporating some things from 
elsewhere: εἰ δὲ κατὰ μηδέτερον τῶνδε τῶν τρόπων [i.e. as a whole is made up of 
parts or a mixture of its ingredients, cf. Alex. De Am. 11,15, Them. 40, 14sqq. H., 
73, 29 sqq. Sp.] τὸ ζῷον οὐσία σύνθετος, κατὰ τὸν τρίτον λείπεται ἄρα. ἦν & οὗτος, 
καθ᾽ ὃν ἦν τοῦ συγκειμένου τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενόν τε καὶ ὕλη, τὸ δὲ εἶδος...τὸ ἄρα ζῷον, 
συγκείμενον ἐκ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος, τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον τούτων εἶναι, τὸ δὲ 
εἶδος, ἐκ τούτων ἔχει τὴν σύνθεσιν. λείπεται δὴ ἢ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος εἶναι, 
ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος λέγειν ἀδύνατον " 
ὑποκείμενον γὰρ τὸ σῶμα. 

The insertion of 7 before ψυχὴ has some MS. authority, and, according to 
Philop., whose testimony to the article both with σῶμα and with ψυχὴ in his 
own text is explicit (215, 11, 18, 22, 32), Alex. Aphr. made ἡ ψυχὴ the subject 
of this sentence and σῶμα the predicate (Philop. 215, 23 sqq.). Cf. Philop. 
215, 25 διὰ γὰρ τοῦ δεῖξαι, φησίν [6 ᾿Αλέξανδρος, ὅτι od σῶμα, συναποδείκνυσιν ὅτι 
οὐδὲ ὑποκείμενον. This statement respecting Alex. Aphr. seems to me to be 
strongly confirmed by Alex. Aphr. himself, De An. Mantissa, p. 121, 2—I15. 
The comment of Simpl. affords little evidence, for it would be unsafe to build 
too much upon the words (86, 8) ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν καὶ ov κατὰ τὸ σῶμα: 
while Them., as is shown by the citation in the critical notes, varies the wording 
of his paraphrase. Sophonias here, as often, agrees closely with cod. E. The 
belief that somehow A. is here proving that the soul is not body, σῶμα being taken 
to stand for ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη, is shared by Alex., Them. (40, 4.564. H., 73, 14 sqq.- 
Sp.) and Philop., and I do not see how this belief can be accounted for unless the 
text which they had read ἡ ψυχή. That with the reading of cod. E before them 
they should have deliberately ignored the article before σῶμα and made ψυχὴ 
the subject, τὸ σῶμα the predicate, seems well-nigh incredible. If ἡ Ψυχὴ is 
genuine, the article might be omitted by carelessness or by deliberate intention, 
to make clear that τὸ σῶμα was the subject. The presence of the article with 


310 NOTES Il. 1 


both σῶμα and ψυχὴ would explain why some took the one, some the other, for 
subject. The parallel passage, 414 a 17 Sq. οὗ τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ψυχῆς, 
favours the view that τὸ σῶμα in our present passage is the subject, as it has 
been in the immediate context. Many translate the text of cod. E “soul will 
not be body,” i.e. “will be incorporeal, ? which on grammatical grounds is hardly 
justifiable, unless we are prepared with Zeller, Archiv /. G. d. Ph. UX. p. 538, 
to omit the article before σῶμα and understand, if not supply, it with Ψυχή. 
The order of the words is no impediment to taking ἡ ψυχὴ as the subject, as is 
shown by 408 a 20 πότερον ὁ λόγος (predicate) ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή (subject), ἢ μᾶλλον 
ἕτερόν τι οὖσα κτέ. Zabarella, however, well remarks that body may be taken in 
three senses, viz., as (1) the animate body, the compound (Alex. Simpl.), (2) that 
which in the animate compound corresponds to matter (τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἣ 
ὕλη Philop. 215, 34), and (3) a corporeal entity distinct from (2), such as the 
early philosophers intended when they described the soul as the thinnest and 
rarest of substances. In senses (1) and (2), he says, no one ever maintained 
that the soul was corporeal, but only in sense (3). If A. really intends to show 
that soul is not corporeal, he must show that it is not so in any one of these 
three ways. The proof, as presented by Simpl., is inconclusive. And similarly 
the ancients might easily refute the proof as given by Philop., “You prove that 
the soul is not the body, say, of a man, that this body is matter, and that there- 
fore the soulis form. But I say that, although the soul is not the body, which 
is matter, yet it is matter of another, rarer kind. Why should it be form?” 
It is only from the universal negative, “No A is &,” that you can infer “No B 
is 4.” Body being sensible and therefore more evident than soul, it is easier 
to prove the universal negative of body than of soul. Thus, according to 
Zabarella, A.’s argument requires him to prove that :the soul is not body, and 
this he does by proving that body in all three senses of the term is not soul. 
This view is ingenious, but the more natural inference from Zabarella’s argu- 
ments would be that A. is not here endeavouring to prove soul to be incorporeal 
at all: if, as I have argued, A. is analysing the composite whole into its two 
factors, and asserting them to be quite distinct, there is no need to assume that 
soul must be the subject, nor to excogitate a meaning for body which will fit the 
assumption. 

218. τῶν καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου, int. λεγομένων. Attributes and qualities, genus 
and differentia, are predicated of actually existing things, and the latter are 
bodies: cf. 432 a 3 sqq., Metaph. 1028 a τὸ sqq., 1029 ἃ 10—27, 1001 Ὁ 29 τὰ μὲν 
γὰρ πάθη καὶ ai κινήσεις καὶ τὰ πρός τι καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις Kal of λόγοι οὐδενὸς δοκοῦσιν 
εἶναι οὐσίαν σημαίνειν - λέγονται γὰρ πάντα καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινός, καὶ οὐδὲν 
τόδε tt. The context extends the same argument to the so-called elements 
or ἅπλᾶ σώματα (1001 Ὁ 32—I002 a 4), which are affirmed to be body with 
various attributes, such as heat and cold. Since καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου, not ἐν 
ὑποκειμένῳ, is employed, life in the living body is treated as an essential 
predicate and not as an accident. See Cazeg.,c.2. The relation of form to matter 
and of accident to subject is in some points similar, in some dissimilar. Both 
form and accident need something in which to inhere if they are actually to 
exist, if the form is to be realised (403 Ὁ 3), both being incorporeal fer se. 
But matter equally needs form if it is to exist, the interdependence is mutual, 
and whereas the subject of an accident can exist independently of it, the accident 
cannot exist independently of a subject. Again, the subject in which an 
accident inheres is actually existent, while the matter of a composite substance 
is only potentially existent (413 a 2 τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸ δυνάμει Gv) unless or until form 
supervenes and actualises it. If A.’s object were, as some suppose, to prove 


II. I 412 a 17—a 20 311 


that soul is form as distinct from accident, nothing could legitimately be inferred 
from a middle term εἶναι ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, which is all we know of soul so far, 
ai3—17. The unguarded point in the argument gives occasion for Alex. Aphr. 
to write his two essays, ὅτι οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἡ Ψυχή, De An. Mantissa, 119, 21 
Sqq-, πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἀπ. καὶ Avo. I. 8, p. 17. 
Cf. also his De Az. 13, 9 sqq. 

a 1:8. μᾶλλον δ᾽. It is rather, so to say, a substratum in which attributes 
inhere, 1.6. matter. The specific attribute of living body is capacity for vital 
functions. Cf. 412b25sq. As explained in Afefaph. 1038 Ὁ 5, τὸ ὑποκείμενον 
may mean either the composite whole as the subject of attributes, or matter as 
the substratum of actuality: διχῶς ὑπόκειται, ἢ τόδε τι ὄν, ὥσπερ τὸ ξῷον τοῖς 
πάθεσιν, ἢ ὡς ἡ ὕλη τῇ ἐντελεχείᾳ. Cf. also Afedaph. τοββ αὶ 17—21, πάθη et 
συμβεβηκότα dist. ὑποκείμενον. 

arg. ἄρα. If the living body, gud body, is the substratum or matter, soul 
is the form. The inference depends on the implications of composite substance 
above explained, a6 sqq. The composite substance before us is thought of and 
spoken of as σῶμα τοιόνδε, not as ψυχὴ τοιάδε, as σῶμα ἔμψυχον, never as ψυχὴ 
ἐνσώματος. If, then, we are justified in identifying οὐσία ὡς ὕλη with the body, 
οὐσία ὡς εἶδος must be soul, the ἀρχὴ which causes such οὐσία ὡς ὕλη to have life 
predicated of it, and by thus determining indeterminate matter converts it into 
τόδετι. Or we may express the same inference more shortly thus: the animal 
consists of body and soul (413 a 3, Metaph. saepe) or soul in body (1043 a 34 sq.-), 
and as soon as we know that an animal is composite substance and body is 
matter, it follows that soul 15 the other factor, form. Cf. Alex. Aphr. De 4nziiia 
11, 14-—I2, 7 and 13, 9—I15, 29, am. xatAvo. I. ὃ, p. 17, 11. 24, Ὁ. 74. I cite from the 
latter (76, 7) δείξας ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ οὔτε σῶμα οὔθ᾽ ὑποκείμενον ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ, ἔδειξεν ὅτι 
ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐσία ἐστὶ ψυχή" δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἢ ὡς εἶδος ἢ ὡς ὕλην εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ. 

3.20. δυνάμει. Cf. 412 Ὁ 25---27 and motes. Why this word is added may be 
seen by considering the distinction between the living body, which is ἔμψυχον" 
“has soul in it,” and the ἄψυχον. Growth and self-nurture are functions which the 
one can and does, and the other cannot, exercise. Cf. 415 b8. On δυνάμει Zabarella 
remarks that it must not be understood as opposed to actus or ἐντελέχεια and 
clistinct from it, as a man is capable of walking if he is not actually walking : 
sumitur in communi, ut amplectatur etiam illam potentiam, quae est simul 
cum actu. So Them. 42, 27 H., 78, 7 Sp. εἰ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀργανικοῦ τὸ δυνάμει 
ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἐθέλοις λαμβάνειν, ληπτέον ἐνταῦθά σοι δυνάμει τῇ παρούσῃ, ἧ δὴ 
ὑποβέβληταε ἐνέργεια, as λέγεται δυνατὸν εἶναι βαδίζειν, ὅ τι βαδίζει, καὶ ὅλως 
δυνατὸν εἶναι, ὅ τε ἤδη ἐστὶ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἦν γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος τοῦ δυνατοῦ, 
ὥσπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ προτάσεων. Heinze gives Amal. Pr. 1. 3, 25 ἃ 38 as 
the reference. But a more satisfactory voucher 15 De Juterpr. 13, 23 ἃ 3 5qq-, 
especially a 7 τὸ γὰρ δυνατὸν οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἀληθὲς ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ 
ἄν, οἷον δυνατὸν βαδίζειν ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ὅλως δυνατὸν εἶναι ὅτι ἤδη ἔστι κατ᾽ 
ἐνέργειαν ὃ λέγεται εἶναι δυνατόν, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἐνεργήσειεν ἄν, οἷον δυνατὸν εἶναι 
βαδίξειν ὅτι βαδίσειεν dv. Here Zabarella follows Alex. Aphr.: De Au. Mantissa 
104, 11 ὅταν δὲ λέγωμεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναε σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος, οὐχ 
οὕτως τὸ δυνάμει κατηγοροῦμεν τοῦ σώματος τότε, ὡς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν ἐπὶ τῶν μηδέπω 
μὲν ἐχάντων τι, ἐπιτηδείων δὲ πρὸς τὸ δέξασθαι. οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο χωρὶς 
ψυχῆς πρότερον, εἶτα δέχεται τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν τὸ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον τὸ 
δυνάμενον ζῆν, τουτέστιν τὸ ἔχον ὄργανα πρὸς τὰς κατὰ τὸ ζῆν ἐνεργείας καὶ ἔστιν 
ἔσον τὸ " δυνάμει ξωὴν ἔχον᾽ τῷ ‘dpyavixdy, De An. 16, 12—18 διὸ τὸ ὀργανικὸν 
σῶμα καὶ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχειν λέγει, τῷ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον ἀντὶ τοῦ δυναμένου κατ᾽ 
ἐνέργειαν ζῆν χρώμενος. τὸ γὰρ ἤδη τὴν τέλειον ψυχὴν ἔχον πολλὰ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν 


212 NOTES II. I 


δύναται ποιεῖν τε καὶ πάσχειν...ἔστι τὸ δυνάμει, TO προσκείμενον, τῆς πρώτης 
ἐντελεχείας δηλωτικόν. Cf. ἀπ. καὶ Avo. Il. 8, p. 54, where Alex. remarks that 
ζωὴν ἔχειν and ψυχὴν ἔχειν are not the same (54, 15), τὸ μὲν evepyes ἡ Can, ὅτι 
(ἡ δι’ αὑτοῦ τροφή τε καὶ αὔξησις, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ ὀργανικὸν 
ἔχον δι᾽ αὑτοῦ [πρὸς] τὸ δύνασθαι τρέφεσθαΐ τε καὶ αὔξεσθαι. If ὀργανικόν, which 
later replaces δυνάμει (ony ἔχον, is an exact equivalent, it is hard to see how 
σῶμα φυσικὸν ὀργανικὸν ceases to be dpyavexdy when it is actively operant. 
Zabarella claims for this interpretation that it clears up the difficulties of the 
vegetative soul, which is never zz potentia ad operandum, but always actively 
-operant. Cf. eg. 413 a 30, De Gen. et Corr. 1. 5, 322 a 24 Sq. 

δι 21. ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία, 1.6. ἡ ὡς εἶδος οὐσία just mentioned. Form, as we were told 
above (412 89 54.), is ἐντελέχεια, aS matter is δύναμις. τοιούτου, such as we 
described, i.e. φυσικοῦ Sivape: ζωὴν ἔχοντος. The subject of the sentence is, of 
course, the soul. The soul is that which makes the corporeal part of the animal 
actual and differentiates the animate from the inanimate body. The utility of 
this remark turns on the contrast with the views of preceding philosophers. 
Some regarded soul solely as the cause of motion in the body, some as percipient 
only. It may be with reason objected that this is an identical proposition and 
no more than a restatement of the problem to be solved. No definition is valid 
if it virtually repeats the term to be defined. τοιούτου here implies ἐμψύχου. 
See 2ofe on 414 a 28. 

8.22. αὕτη δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, as Stated 412 aIOSq. See on 4128 8. 

a23. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ds ἐπιστήμη, int. ἡ ψυχὴ σώματος ἐντελέχειά ἐστι, The 
point reached in the argument was: τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια (ἡ ψυχή 
ἐστ and now we add ὡς ἐπιστήμη (ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν). The difference 
between the two 15 much the same as that between a permanent state or formed 
habit (@s) and the activities (ἐνέργειαι, ἔργα) in which it manifests itself. 
Cf. again 417 a 22—29, and P#ys. VII. 4, 255 8 33 ἔστι δὲ δυνάμει ἄλλως ὃ 
μανθάνων ἐπιστήμων καὶ 6 ἔχων ἤδη καὶ μὴ θεωρῶν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν, 
“included in the presence, or possession of soul.” This means that organisms 
possessed of soul may be either asleep or awake. In waking hours many 
psychical activities will be manifested, of which in sleep there 15 only’ the latent 
capacity. Soul is, by the definition, ‘“‘ the activity which, whether displayed or 
not, 15 implicit in the living body.” 

8. 26. καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. The objection has been raised that the lowest stage 
of soul,’the nutritive (ro θρεπτικόν), is as active in sleep as in waking hours. 
Cf. Atk. Nic. 1102 b2sqq. Further, A.’s “comprehensive definition” takes 
account of plants which, as he informs us (De Sowimo τ, 4548 15—19), do not 
share in sleeping and waking, these functions being restricted to those creatures 
which have the power of sensation. A.’s remark, then, in the text must be 
taken as referring only to the soul in animals, where τὸ αἰσθητικὸν is superadded 
to τὸ θρεπτικόν. Zabarella observes that it is not knowledge ἁπλῶς which is 
comparable to sleep, but scteztva tom extens im actum, knowledge possessed but 
not applied. προτέρα δὲ τῇ yevéou. There are several senses of πρότερον καὶ 
ὕστερον enumerated, among other passages, in Me/faph. A., c. 11, cf. Z., C. 13, 1038 Ὁ 
27sq. This sense “prior by birth” or “by becoming” is sometimes expressed 
as earlier in time (πρότερον τῷ χρόνῳ). Conversely, that which is later in birth 
is said to be “ prior in the order of nature” in Wefafh. 989 al5 εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ τῇ 
γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ φύσει πρότερον, and in Metaph. 1050 a 4 τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα 
are said to be τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότεραι Here ἐπιστήμη, the ἕξις, is said to 
be produced earlier than τὸ θεωρεῖν, the active exercise. Knowledge cannot 
be exercised until it has been first acquired. 


II. I 412 a 20—b 2 313 


4.26. ἐπὶ rod αὐτοῦ, “in the same person.” I take the pronoun as masculine 
with Themistius and Philoponus. It is explained by ἐν τῷ évi, 430a21: ἡ δὲ 
κατὰ δύναμεν (int. ἐπιστήμη) χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί (int. τῆς Kar’ ἐνέργειαν), ὅλως 
δὲ οὐ χρόνῳ. Philop. 216, 28 sqq. observes that the activity of knowledge in the 
master precedes the formation of the state of knowledge in the pupil, and that 
this is why the limitation ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ is introduced. But there seems no ground 
for thinking that such a consideration was present to the mind of A., who 
obviously is throughout dealing with the individual soul. 

8.27. ἡ πρώτη, “the earliest in development.” Not only does this meaning 
directly follow from the words προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει just before, but it agrees 
with A.’s intention to discover the most comprehensive definition (κοινότατος 
Adyos), that is, one applicable to soul even in its simplest, least advanced stage. 
As a matter of fact we see that it is intended to include the “soul” of a plant 
(see 411 b 19—30, 414.4 33, 415 a 23—25, 424 a 32424 Ὁ 3) as wellas of a sponge 
or jelly fish (see 410 Ὁ 19, 432 Ὁ 20, 434 Ὁ 2). In De An. Mantissa 103, L1—20 
Alex. Aphr. makes the difference between 7 πρώτη ἐντελέχεια and ἡ δευτέρα 
analogous to the difference between éfers and ai κατ᾽ αὐτὰς καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν 
ἐνέργειαι. 

Zabarella also discusses the question : what is the difference between aciis 
primus and actus secundus? We condemns the view of Averroes that the first 
is forma non operans, the other forma oferans. He himself decides that the 
second 15 oferafio, rather than forma oferans simply. Both primus and 
secunaus May, according to him, be forma operans, the first giving esse shecificunz, 
the second secundam perfectionem quatenus operatur. "This being so, the first 
entelechy, whether it is or is not operant, equally gives form to matter, and is 
soul in both cases alike. Hence it does not mean the absence of operating, 
but merely that soul is considered abstractly, apart from its operation. This 
same conclusion follows, he urges, from the proper interpretation of δυνάμει 
ζωὴν ἔχοντος. What is inseparable from the animate body, and therefore to be 
included in the definition, is merely the capacity or aptitude to operate, as 
distinct from actual operation or its absence. At the same time δύναμις does 
not mean capacity separated from act, but capacity joined with act. In his own 
words, “forma operans est actus primus cum secundo, cum operatio sola sit 
secundus actus.” In Metaph. 1050a 21—23 A. himself identifies ἐνέργεια with 
ἔργον, from which it gets its name, adding that it tends to perfection, συντείνει 
πρὸς THY ἐντελέχειαν. 

ει 28. ὄὀργανικόν, provided with organs, whereby are meant instruments 
subserving the several faculties (cf. the argument in 429 a 26 sq. that νοῦς unlike 
the sensitive faculty has no such ὄργανον) and adapted to the performance of 
function (τοῦ ἔργον ἕνεκα). Cf. Alex., da. καὶ λύσ-. 54, 9 τὸ δ᾽ dpyavindy ἔστιν ὃ ἔχει 
μόρια διαφερούσαις ἐνεργείαις ὑπηρετεῖσθαι δυνάμενα, and Alex. De An. 16, 11 sq. 
Not only are what we call “organs of sense” ὄργανα to A., but also any parts of 
the living body which promote vital functions (as mouth, heart, foot) and, as 
A. goes on to show, the parts of plants, especially the roots. See mofe on 
407 Ὁ 25 (δεῖ γάρ xré.). This conception is stereotyped in the term “sense- 
organs.” 

412 ὍΣ ὄργανα δὲ...4 τὴν τροφήν. This is a parenthetical remark showing 
that the parts of plants serve the same purpose as the recognised “organs ” of 
animals. It is almost as much a footnote incorporated in the text as 412 a 1o— 
11. The simplicity of the structure of plants is accounted for De Part. An. 
11. το, 655 b 37 5646. 

b2. περικαρπίου The pericarp in most edible fruits (e.g. apples, plums, 


214 NOTES II. I 


grapes) is what we call the fruit; in nuts it is the shell, in peas and beans the 
pod. With more precision from the botanical standpoint, A. reserves the term 
καρπὸς for that which, when sown, will produce the plant after its kind, as the 
apple pip or the grape stone. The leaf, as a protection of the “ pericarp,” is 
well exemplified in the hazel-nut. 

b3. αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον. Cf. De Part. An. τν. το, 686 ἢ 28 
sqq., especially 686 b 32 καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόριον τέλος ἀκίνητόν ἐστι καὶ 
ἀναίσθητον, καὶ γίνεται φυτόν, ἔχον τὰ μὲν ἄνω κάτω, τὰ δὲ κάτω ἄνω- αἱ yap pica 
τοῖς φυτοῖς στόματος καὶ κεφαλῆς ἔχουσι δύναμιν κτέ. 

_--b4. κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης Ψυχῆς. Cf. szgra 412 a5 κοινότατος λόγος. Again it 
becomes clear that we are not so much laying down the nature of soul as indi- 
cating the scope of the enquiry. 

412 b 6-9. There is no need to question the unity of soul and body, 
the one being form, and the other the matter corresponding to it; for that 
which is in the fullest sense actual possesses being and unity [§ 7]. 

b6. διὸ καὶ οὐἠἡ With the foregoing view of the relation of soul to body and 
that of form to its appropriate matter, it becomes idle to enquire whether soul 
and body form a unity or are absolutely distinct. The analysis began with 
concrete things (ovciat), which A. calls individuals (ἄτομα), implying that they 
cannot be further divided except in thought. We cannot be too often reminded 
that matter and form are not things, but “causes” or “principles” of things, 
distinguishable in thought or reasoning and in rational description (λόγῳ), but 
not by sense. 

b7. τὸν κηρὸν καὶ ro σχῆμα. The waxen impression may be regarded either 
as so much wax (οὐσία ὡς ὕλη) or as a form (σχῆμα) impressed by the seal. 
But, howsoever viewed, the thing is numerically one and the same. οὐδ᾽ ὅλως. 
And, as with the wax and the impress, so universally with every concrete 
existence, whether sensible (αἰσθητὸν) or cogitable (νοητόν). In Metaph. 1075 Ὁ 34 
A. complains that no preceding philosopher had explained what it is that makes 
soul and body, or, generally, the thing and its form one: ἔτι τίνι of ἀριθμοὲ ἕν ἡ 
ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲν λέγει οὐδείς. He justifies 
his contention at greater length Jefaph. 1045 a 7---Ὁ 23. 

b8. τὸ οὗ ἡ ὕλη. Cf. b20 infra ὕλη ὄψεως, “the form of which it is the 
matter,” i.e. the form correlative to the matter. Special care is needed or else 
this expression may be misleading. Properly both the form and the matter are 
form and matter of the concrete thing, and even where A., as here, incautiously 
expresses himself, this and nothing else can be his meaning. 

b8. τὸ γὰρ ἕν. The terms “one” and “unity” are susceptible of vanous 
meanings, which are discriminated in Mefaph. A., c. 6 and 1. cc. I—3, 1052 a 15 
sqq. A.holds that unity is a universal (καθόλου). There is no such separate real 
thing as unity, but there is no real thing of which unity cannot be predicated 
in some degree, for things possess this attribute in varying degrees. But 
that which is most properly said to be one and self-identical is ἐντελέχεια, 
that is, the complete actualisation or perfected reality. Contrasted with this, 
every previous stage of development presents something less perfect, something 
potential, but half realised and therefore possessing less unity. καὶ τὸ εἶναι. 
Being, like unity, is a term of various meanings. <A.’s enumeration is (1) Being 
in the sense of the categories, substance and its appendages (quality, quantity, 
relation), (2) Being in the sense of truth, to which “ Not-being” in the sense 
of falsehood is opposed, (3) Being in the sense of accident (συμβεβὴκὸς) or 
incidental fact, (4) Being in the contrasted senses of “actual” and “ potential ” 
(cf. Metaph. A., c. 7, E., c. 2, ©., c. 1, 1045 Ὁ 27 sqq.). In the present passage 


Ir. 1 412 Ὁ 2---Ὁ 13 215 


A. tells us that the proper sense of the term is to denote actuality, as dis- 
tinguished, under the last head, from potential Being. 

412 b 10—25. This then is the account of soul in general terms. 
Now to explain it. Soul is substance, regarded as form, that is, the quiddity or 
the “ what-made-it-so” of an animate body. This A. illustrates by taking two 
things which his definition of natural body excludes, the eye and the axe; the 
one a mere part of a natural body as whole, the other a lifeless instrument. 
As vision makes the former what it is, a seeing eye, and its mere cutting makes 
the latter what it is, these may be regarded as, so to say, the “soul” of eye and 
axe respectively. Similarly it is in activity or active operation that the soul of 
the natural body provided with organs, the animal or plant, consists [§§ 8, 9]. 

BIO. οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον =ovcia ὡς εἶδος, substance expressed in the 
sense of form or notion. Conversely such definition is called ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας. 
A true logical definition aims at expressing the form of the thing. It is the 
form which makes a thing what it is. But as this form, in order to exist, must 
be realised in matter (403 Ὁ 3) οὐσία κατὰ τὸν λόγον is only a factor of concrete 
existing things, 424 a 24 # τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Cf. 414 ἃ 9, where μορφή, 
εἶδός τι, λόγος and οἷον ἐνέργεια are equivalent expressions. The determining 
use Of κατὰ has been noted ad 404 Ὁ ς. Cf. Metaph. 1089 a 31 sq. τὸ ὃν τὸ Kara 
τὰς οὐσίας λεγόμενον, Being predicated of substances. 

biz. τὸ τί qv εἶναι. This is merely an elaborate technical designation of 
the specific form or formal cause. The origin of the phrase is plain. A. used 
(1) the phrase τὸ ri ἐστι, “the what is it?”, for any generic or specific form, any 
rational description which will answer the question ri ἐστε; Also, as we saw 
408 a 25, he used (2) the phrase τὸ τινὲ εἶναι for the abstract notion, the concept 
not embodied in matter, the immaterial form of a concrete thing. Again (3) the 
use Of ἦν dpa=“‘it is, aS we saw,” in recognition of a fact that has existed all 
along, is well known. The technical phrase before us combines in a manner 
all the modes of expression ; τὸ εἶναι τοιῳδὲ σώματι, like (2), will be the abstract 
being of a given body; ro τί ἐστιν εἶναι, if found, would mean the fact of its 
being what it is. When for ἐστε, ἦν is substituted, we get (3) “its being what it 
was all along,” ie. what the thing is in its true essence. Thus τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ 
τοιῳδὲ σώματι is merely an equivalent of τὸ εἶδος τοῦ τοιουδὲ σώματος. See Zeller’s 
elaborate disquisitions Aristotle, Eng. Tr. vol. 1. p. 217, % 1, p. 219, #.1. The 
student should note that the predicate of εἶναι both in (2) and (3) is invariably 
in the dative and that in (2) the article is never found with this dative (τὸ 
αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι, but not τὸ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι. As τόδε τι generalises “this 
man,” “this horse” etc., so τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι simply generalises τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι, τὸ 
ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι κτέ., ti ἦν being predicate, like σαρκὶ and ἀνθρώπῳ. 

biz. τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι. When the logical essence is expounded, the relation 
of soul to the animate body furnishes a typical illustration : cf. Wetaph. 1035 Ὁ 
I4—-16, 1041 Ὁ 4—9, 1043.a 35—b 4. 

biz. φυσικὸν. Instead of being, as it is, artificial {(τεχνητόν). 

b1I3. τὸ πελέκει εἶναι, axeity or axehood, if we might coin the words; axe 
in the abstract or the notion or concept of axe; that is, what essentially belongs 
to an axe as such (and this may serve to explain the dative). τοῦτο, int. τὸ 
“πελέκει εἶναι : the position of the word is due to chiasmus. The οὐσία of the 
inanimate axe would be called ψυχὴ in the case supposed. Zabarella, however, 
takes ἡ ψυχὴ to be subject and τοῦτο to be predicate: the sentence is then 
parenthetical, “and the soul of the animal is this,” viz. its quiddity. This agrees 
with Ὁ 16, where ἡ ψυχὴ is the soul of the animal, but in the parallel illustration, 
b 19g, it is said that eyesight would be the soul of the eye, and 413 a1 the 


316 NOTES Il. I 


capacity of the tool is put on a level with eyesight. χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης, int. 
τῆς οὐσίας. Take this away, 1.6. deprive the axe of its capacity for cutting, and it 
would be a sham axe. This is just as true of the lifeless instrument as it is of 
the supposed animate instrument, as will be shown later (see zofe on Ὁ 15, 
νῦν δ᾽ ἐστὶ πέλεκυς) : only in the instrument spoiled for use, e.g. the blunted axe 
or ruined house, there is not that immediate disintegration which attends the 
animal body when life has left it: cf. 411 b9. Since this passes unnoticed in 
the text, it would seem that the whole clause, Ὁ 13 xwpioGeions...14 ὁμωνύμως, 15 
8. mere accessory to the mention of the quiddity (cf. Ὁ 20 ἧς ἀπολειπούση»). 
It is on the quiddity alone that the comparison really hinges. 

b14. ὁμωνύμως, “in an equivocal, 1.6. ambiguous, sense.” By homonyms 
A. denotes things of different nature which have the same name (as bank, form, 
λόφος, κόρη), whereas synonyms are identical both in name and nature. 

bI5. νῦν δ᾽ ἐστὶ πέλεκυς. But in reality the axe is an axe, a lifeless instrument 
(Philop. 221, 4 ἄψυχος ὧν) and not a living body: Them. 42, 25 H., 78, 4 54. Sp. 
νῦν δὲ κἂν σώζηται ἡ μορφή, πέλεκυς μέν ἐστι, ζῶον δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν. Cf. Alex. De 
An. Mantissa 102, 23sqq. Them. does not stop to enquire what such a 
lifeless instrument is when it has lost its shape, edge and power of cutting ; but 
if all things are defined by their function, it would under those circumstances be 
spoilt for use. If so, J cannot really see that it 1s more truly an axe than the 
wooden saw is a saw: /We/eor. IV. 12,390 a 10 ἅπαντα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ" 
τὰ μὲν yap δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀληθῶς ἐστὶν ἕκαστα, οἷον ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς εἰ 
ὁρᾷ, τὸ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον ὁμωνύμως, οἷον 6 τεθνεὼς ἢ ὁ λίθινος - οὐδὲ γὰρ πρίων 6 
ξύλινος, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὡς εἰκών. From this we may infer that the point of νῦν δὲ is not 
to contrast what would happen (1) to a lifeless instrument, (2) to an animate 
instrument, under the circumstances implied by χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης, a view to 
which some colour is lent by the remarks of Simpl. 93, 16sqq. The question at 
issue is whether (a) viv δ᾽ refers back to the initial supposition, b 11 καθάπερ εἴ 
τι xré.. and so corrects the hypothesis by showing that the comparison does 
not hold and why; or whether it refers to the clause immediately preceding, 
b 13 χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης κτέ. In the latter case νῦν δ᾽ might be taken as equiva- 
lent either (8) to χωρισθείσης τῆς τμητικῆς δυνάμεως, “although its cutting power 
was gone,” or (y) to μὴ χωρισθείσης τῆς τμητικῆς δυνάμεως = ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐχωρίσθη κτέ, 
Torstrik, who allows that the first of the three alternatives gives some sense, 
was deterred from adopting it because (1) the reader could hardly avoid 
associating πέλεκύς ἐστιν with Ὁ 14 οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς Hv, which would lead him 
astray as to the sense, and (2) because the clause with γάρ, instead of proving 
that the axe 15 not a natural body, proves that its form isnot asoul. Accordingly 
he proposed to read νῦν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν (int. ψυχὴ τοῦτο), which he would join closely 
with Ὁ 13 καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο, so that the next clause, Ὁ 15 οὐ γὰρ xré., would follow 
more directly. This seems hypercritical. Another attempt to make νῦν δ᾽ 
antithetical to Ὁ 14 οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς ἦν is that of M. Rodier, who translates : 
** Mais, en fait, la hache existe (quoique séparée, en un sens, de sa quiddité et 
de sa fonction, parce que l’essence de la hache, qui n’est pas un corps naturel, 
ne contient pas la faculté de frapper ou de couper de soi-méme).” This render- 
ing seems to me misleading, for πέλεκυς must be predicate, not subject; and, 
even if it were subject, we should require ἔστιν, not ἐστίν, as the verb. The 
difference between the lifeless axe and the supposed animate axe is that the 
former does not, but the latter does, possess the power to strike and cut of 
itself or on its own initiative. Hence, as M. Rodier says, when it has lost its 
power of cutting of itself “la hache existe sans cette faculté, précisément parce 
qu’elle n’est pas un animal, et que son essence ne contient pas la faculté de se 


II. I 412 b 13—b 24 317 


mettre en mouvement d’elle-méme.” In other words, the axe still exists as an 
axe : 1s, in fact, an axe and nothing more, the interpretation of Them., which 
M. Rodier professes to reject. 

b15. τοιούτου, like the axe just mentioned, i.e. an artificial body {τεχνητοῦ). 
But soul, the definition carefully states, belongs to a natural body, σώματος 
φυσικοῦ 412 a 27. 

b 16. τοιουδί, of a given kind, namely, that designated ὀργανικὸν in b 6 supra. 

b τό ἔχοντος...17 ἐν ἑαυτῷ. This addition renders more explicit the definition 
of animate body as φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος given above a 20, showing that 
it includes the possession of τὴν 80 αὐτοῦ τροφὴν re καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν a 14. 
A. uses automata by way of illustration, Po/, 1253 b 33 566. 

Ὁ 18. ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν, “in the case of the parts (of the body)” above spoken 
of as ὄργανα and defined by their functions, 416a 5. Each of these parts is 
animate; since the whole animal possesses soul, so must every part, if it is to 
perform its function: 27εζαζᾷ. 1036 Ὁ 28 αἰσθητὸν γάρ re τὸ ζῷον, καὶ ἄνευ 
κινήσεως OUK ἔστιν δρίσασθαι, δεὸ οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ τῶν μερῶν ἐχόντων πῶς. οὐ γὰρ πάντως 
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος ἡ χείρ, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ δυναμένη τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖν, ὥστε ἔμψυχος οὖσα" 
μὴ ἔμψυχος δὲ οὐ μέρος, 1035 b 16—18, 23---25, De Part. Ax. 1. 1,640 Ὁ 35 ἔτι δ᾽ 
ἀδύνατον εἶναι χεῖρα ὁπωσοῦν διακειμένην, οἷον χαλκῆν ἡ ξυλίνην, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, 
ὥσπερ τὸν γεγραμμένον ἰατρόν. εἰ γὰρ ἦν.. ΤῊ αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις. That is, sight is to 
the eye what soul is to the body, i.e. its form. 

b 20. 6 δ᾽ ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη ὄψεως, ἧς ἀπολειπούσης οὐκέτ᾽ ὀφθαλμός. The word 
ὀφθαλμὸς is used first for the pupil, called κόρη below 4138 3, the material 
condition of sight, and then for ‘the seeing eye,’ the concrete thing. This 
sudden change in meaning has puzzled readers, and Torst. proposes to insert 
after ὁ δ᾽ ὀφθαλμὸς the words τὸ σύνολον, ἡ δὲ κόρη (see critical zozes). This 
gives exactly the sense required “while an eye is [a combination of the two and 
the eyeball is] the matter of vision.” Torst. was no doubt influenced by Them., 
“qui totum locum laudat,” as he thinks. Themistius’ words are (42, 38 H., 
78, 23 Sp.) εἰ yap ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῶον, [ἡ] ψυχὴ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις ἦν" αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία 
ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ εἶδος καὶ μορφή, ὃ δὲ ὀφθαλμὸς τὸ σύνολον, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ 
ὕλη τῆς ὄψεως. I see no reason for thinking that Them. had a different text 
from ours: as usual, he is amplifying and explaining. Even with some such 
supplement, there is an informality of language (as discussed before, 412 b 8, 
mote). It is as if he said 44+ (τὸ σύνολον) is A, ὕλη, of B, εἶδος, the ὕλη and 
εἶδος together making up the σύνολον. See 413a25q. With ἧς ἀπολειπούσης 
compare what was said of the axe 412 Ὁ 13 χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης (int. τῆς οὐσίας 
τοῦ medéxews), With the usual punctuation ἧς is naturally referred to ὄψεως: 
with that of Bywater (/. of PA. XVII. 54) ἧς would refer back to Ὁ το οὐσία 
ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον, but, as these words are there introduced to define 
ὄψις, the result is the same, whichever punctuation be adopted. Very similar is 
the language of De Part. An. τ. 1, 641a 18 ἀπελθούσης γοῦν [int. τῆς ψυχῆς] 
οὐκέτι ζῷόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τῶν μορίων οὐδὲν τὸ αὐτὸ λείπεται, πλὴν τῷ σχήματι μόνον, 
καθάπερ τὰ μυθευόμενα λιθοῦσθαι. 

Ὁ 22. δεῖ δὴ. “Now what holds good of the part must be applied to the 
living body taken as a whole” (Wallace, p. 63). 

Ὁ 23. ὡς τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ μέρος, i-e. as the particular mode of perception, 
sight, stands to the ‘particular organ, the eye. The proportion is, roughly 
stated: as part of soul is to part of body, so the whole of soul is to the whole of 
body. See zofes on 408a 11, 411 Ὁ 15. 

Ὁ 24. ἡ ὅλη αἴσθησις, sensation as a whole, of which the particular sensory 
functions are the parts. Each special sense is a faculty residing in some part 


318 NOTES If. I 


of the living body, which serves it as an instrument or organ. So sensation in 
general, the sum-total of the faculties which constitute an animal sentient, 
employs the whole body, guvd@ sensitive, as its organ and instrument. Cf. De 
Part. An. 1. 5, 645 Ὁ 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ὄργανον wav ἕνεκά του, τῶν δὲ τοῦ σώματος 
μορίων ἕκαστον ἕνεκά του, τὸ δ᾽ οὗ ἕνεκα πρᾶξίς τις, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ σύνολον 
σῶμα συνέστηκε πράξεώς τινος ἕνεκα πλήρους. 

Ὁ 25. ἢ τοιοῦτον, i.e. 7 αἰσθητικόν, ‘ gud sensitive.’ 

412b 25-27. What bodies, we may ask, have souls? Living bodies 
only, for dead bodies as dead are excluded by the terms of the definition. Nor 
does it apply to the seed or germ of animals or plants which is not as yet 
possessed of life, although it has the capacity or promise of becoming so 
hereafter [§ ro]. 

Ὁ 26. τὸ δυνάμει [int. τοιοῦτον ὃν ὥστε ζῆν, a variant on τὸ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον, 
*“‘that which has the capacity for life,” as required by the definition. 

b 26. τὸ δὲ σπέρμα καὶ 6 καρπὸς. At first sight it would seem as if these, too, 
were potentially “‘ possessed of life.” But in fact they are not as yet bodies (in 
the sense of the definition) at all; their potentiality is a potentiality of becoming 
bodies which (when developed) will be “potentially” possessed of life. Them. 
(43, 10—I4 H., 79, 8—14 Sp.) compares the germ to the steel which is not yet a 
saw, although out of it a saw may hereafter be shaped. A. discusses the 
question whether the seed has life in De Gen. An. 11. τ. 735 a 4 sqq. and 
decides, as here, that it has life potentially. Again, in AMefaph. Θ., c. 7 he 
asks πότε δὲ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἕκαστον καὶ πότε ov, and the first instance cited shows 
that he is thinking of the problem to which we have now come in De Α.: 
1048 Ὁ 37 οἷον ἡ γῆ dp ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος δυνάμει; ἣ οὔ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν ἤδη 
γένηται σπέρμα, καὶ οὐδὲ τότε ἴσως. This brief answer is further elucidated 
1049 a 12 καὶ ὅσων δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι, ὅσα μηδενὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμποδίζοντος ἔσται 
δι αὑτοῦ. οἷον τὸ σπέρμα οὔπω" δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ μεταβάλλειν. ὅταν δ᾽ ἤδη διὰ 
τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀρχῆς 7} τοιοῦτον, ἤδη τοῦτο δυνάμει- ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς δεῖται. 

b 27. δυνάμει τοιονδὶ. Two stages of potentiality are implied: the seed is 
δυνάμει the body of the animal or plant, and again this body, so long as it has 
soul in it, is potentially possessed of life, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον. As already pointed 
out in note on 412 a 20, the present passage supports the interpretation given 
there, for otherwise the two grades of potentiality could not be kept distinct, 
there would be no difference between the seed and the plant. But the dead body 
has neither the first nor the second grade of potentiality. In what sense ζῶν is 
δυνάμει νεκρὸν and a corpse δυνάμει ζῶν, the necessary condition being φθορὰ 
and reversion to the matter out of which the body was constituted, is explained 
Metaph. 1044 Ὁ 34—1045 a 6. 

412b 27-413 a10. Recapitulation of the mutual relations of 
(1) waking activity, (2) soul, (3) body [§ 11]. The soul and the parts of the 
soul, which are related to the body and the parts of the body in this way as 
specific form to specific matter, are incapable of existing separately. If, 
however, any part of the soul is not so related to the body, it may have a 
separate existence [ἢ 12]. There is the further question whether the soul as the 
specific form of the body stands to it as the sailor to the vessel [§ 13]. 

412 Ὁ 28. ἡ ἐγρήγορσις. As we were told before (412 a 25), this is a fuller 
actuality than the passive possession of the soul in sleep. 

41384.1. ἡ ὄψις, the faculty of sight, as distinguished from ὅρασις, the act 
of seeing. ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὀργάνου. The reference is to the cutting power of 
the axe (even if not being used), as distinguished from τμῆσις, the operation of 
cutting. Cf. Mefaph. 1019b 13 καὶ yap ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἔνεστιν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, 


Il. I 412 Ὁ 24—413 a 8 319 


οἷον ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις- τὴν μὲν yap δύνασθαί hace φθέγγεσθαι λύραν, where the 
mention of the lyre shows that the reference is to instruments made by art, and 
not, as in De A. 424 a 25, 28, De Resp. 12, 476 8 25, to parts or organs of a 
living body. 

a2. τὸ δὲ σῶμα. The body corresponds neither to the actual operation of 
cutting, seeing, etc., nor to the capacity of cutting, seeing, etc. The existence 
is merely potential. We may note the change in the meaning of σῶμα. In 
412 a II—I5 it included animate and inanimate bodies; then it is narrowed to 
meaning what is now called (gov, body possessed of soul; here it means body 
to the exclusion of soul. Cf. the irregular use of ὀφθαλμὸς for ὕλη ὄψεως, 412 Ὁ 20. 
See 415 Ὁ 18, ove. 

a4. χωριστὴ rot σώματος. This agrees with De Ger. Az U. 3, 736b 21—27 
and the exception following 413 a6 sq. finds its counterpart in 736 Ὁ 27—209. 

a5. ἐνίων yap, int. τῶν ζῴων. 

a6. τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν, “belongs to the parts themselves ” as opposed 
to the whole body. If these words are nghtly placed, we suddenly talk of 
“parts (μέρη) of the body,” while just before, a4 ἢ μέρη τινὰ αὐτῆς, we were 
talking of parts of soul; an anticipation of b 16, where A. speaks of plants and 
animals having a certain power of living and functioning after division, such 
organisms being, as it were, built in compartments. The above interpretation 
is due to Professor H. Jackson and seems to me unquestionably superior to 
those of the Greek commentators, most of whom apparently make ἐνίων agree 
with μερῶν. Thus Them. 43, 23 H., 79, 27 Sp. ἐνέων yap μερῶν τοῦ σώματος 
évia μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς προφανῶς ἐντελέχεια καὶ τελειότης, ὥσπερ ἢ ὄψις τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ : 
cf. Philop. 223, 29 sq. Simplicius, however, though his explanation is sub- 
stantially the same, seems to admit the possibility of taking ἐνέων apart from τῶν 
μερῶν: (95, 15) ἐνέων yap λέγων ψυχῶν οὕτως ἔχειν τὴν ἐντελέχειαν, as αὐτῶν τῶν 
σωματικῶν οὖσαν μερῶν. The words of Soph. (44, 29) ἔνια γὰρ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων 
ἐντελέχειαι αὐτῶν τῶν μερῶν ἐστι τοῦ σώματος possibly point to a reading ἔνια γὰρ 
ἐντελέχειαι τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν, but I see no reason to suspect that Them., 
Simpl., Philop. had a text different from our own. What these authorities 
make A. say is no doubt true of the nutritive and sensitive faculties (cf. 4o3a 
10 sqq.), but I fail to see (1) how such a meaning can be got from our text, 
(2) why, if this were the meaning, A. should use yap. A. would be merely 
repeating his statement and not assigning a cause. Whereas the fact that, if 
the bodily parts are divided, there is, in certain cases, a corresponding division 
of the ἐντελέχεια or soul, does go to strengthen the conclusion 4138. 3 ὅτε μὲν 
οὖν κτέ. 

a6. ἔνιά ye. By &ita=“some” A. in reality means one only, the thinking 
part, the highest form of intellectual activity, vows, which is declared to be 
χωριστὸς 429 Ὁ 5, 430217; cf. 408 b 29. 

a8. ἔτι δὲ ἄδηλον. Is this a new question? In other words, does ἔτι δὲ 
mean “and again” or should ér be taken closely with @dyAoy in the sense of ἔτε 
καὶ νῦν, ἔτι καὶ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἢ Cf. 413b 25 οὐδέν πω φανερόν. On the first 
view, a new question would be propounded, viz. whether the soul, as we have 
defined it, is related to the body as a sailor toa ship. At first sight this seems 
inconsistent with 413a 3—7. What A. has just declared to be quite certain is 
that some parts of the soul cannot be separated from the body, but others may, 
if they satisfy certain conditions. Anyone who had carefully followed the course 
of the previous argument would expect to hear that the soul is not related to 
the body as a sailor to a ship. On the other hand, if there is nothing to hinder 
certain parts of the soul from being separable from the body, it would be 


320 NOTES It. I 


natural to go further and ask if this possibility extends to the whole soul. In 
the absence of any qualification ἡ ψυχὴ must be understood of the soul as 
defined in this chapter. But we shall find that there are other vital functions 
besides those of self-nourishment and independent growth and decay by which 
life was defined, 4128 14sq. Perhaps ἄδηλον has reference to these. A similar 
question is seriously handled in AZetapAé. Z., c. 11, the question there proposed 
being zrota τοῦ εἴδους μέρη καὶ ποῖα οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ συνειλημμένου; A. remarks 
(1036a 31 5664.) that, when the form of a circle is realised in heterogeneous 
material, as brass, wood and stone, it is clear that none of these materials can 
be parts of the οὐσία of circle, because it is found separated from them. Even 
where this is not so, that is, where the form is not presented in different 
materials, the case may still be the same as it would be if all the circles ever 
seen were of brass, though under those conditions the act of mental abstraction 
would be rendered difficult. Hus illustration has a direct bearing on the passage 
before us : (1036 b 3) οἷον τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος αἰεὶ ἐν σαρξὶ φαίνεται καὶ ὀστοῖς καὶ 
τοῖς τοιούτοις μέρεσιν " ap οὖν καὶ ἐστὶ ταῦτα μέρη τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ λόγου; ἢἣ οὔ, 
ἀλλ᾽ ὕλη. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων ἐπιγίγνεσθαι ἀδυνατοῦμεν χωρίσαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ 
τοῦτο δοκεῖ μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι, ἄδηλον δὲ πότε, ἀποροῦσί τινες ἤδη κτέ. The doubt 
how much is form and how much is matter may be extended to circle and 
triangle ; hence some, i.e. Platonists, would reduce all sensible existence to 
numbers, an hypothesis which A. explains at some length, criticises and finally 
rejects 1036 Ὁ 8—23. He emphatically reiterates his doctrine of material forms: 
ἔνια γὰρ ἴσως τόδ᾽ ἐν τῷδ᾽ ἐστίν, ἢ ὡδὶ radi ἔχοντα. Then, evidently reverting to 
the illustration with which he started, he rejects unequivocally the supposition 
that man or animal is analogous to the circle and separable from the material, 
i.e. corporeal, parts which we know. The cases are not parallel: αἰσθητὸν γάρ τι 
τὸ ζῷον καὶ ἄνεν κινήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι, διὸ οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ τῶν μερῶν ἐχόντων πως 
κτέ. Ifthe conclusion of ἤζεζαζά. Z., c. 11 represents A.’s mature judgment, it may 
be plausibly argued that in our present passage é7z δὲ ἄδηλον is a mere phrase of 
the Iecture-room, like σκεπτέον ὕστερον, an affectation of uncertainty because 
the writer is stimulating, without satisfying, curiosity. Cf Metaph. 1026a 8 
ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἀκινήτων καὶ χωριστῶν ἐστί ΠὨϊ. θεωρητικὴ ἡ μαθηματική], νῦν ἄδηλον : A.’s own 
opinion on the point is abundantly clear from other parts of the Metaphysics, as 
well as from the partial pronouncement 6 lines lower down (1026 a 14.sq.), where 
the text is not above suspicion. Alex. Aphr. De 47. 15, 9 sqq. refuses to allow 
the analogy between the soul and the pilot, unless we substitute ἡ τέχνη ἡ 
κυβερνητικὴ for the pilot himself. In that case alone (15, 11) εἴη ἂν ὡς ἕξις τις 
καὶ εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι (οὕτως yap ai ἕξεις εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς ὧν εἰσὶν ἕξεις - 
ἀσώματοΐ τε γάρ εἶσι καὶ ἀχώριστοι τῶν ἐν οἷς εἰσίν) On the other hand, if we 
take it of the pilot himself, he says, the soul will be made corporeal (σῶμα) and 
will be located in a distinct part of the body, so that the whole body will not 
possess soul or consciousness: and generally he urges the objections which A. 
himself brings against his predecessors in De 4.1, c. 3. Thus Alex. preserves 
consistency and even interprets ἄδηλον εἰ by οὐχ οἷόν τε: but some considera- 
tions may be admitted on the other side. The language of 1036b 7 is cautious: 
A. does not there commit himself either way on the general question. Remnants 
of Platonism turn up oddly elsewhere in A. and, when Alex. substitutes ἡ κυβερ- 
νητικὴ for 6 κυβερνήτης, we are forcibly reminded of Jfefaph. 1075 a 11—1 55 
where A. gives the preference to the arranger and not to the arrangement. In 
this treatise the problem of the origin of life does not concern us and after 
408 b 18, 413 Ὁ 25—27 A. makes no dogmatic statement as to whether soul or any 
part of it is an immaterial entity. See 431b17—20. As to the illustration, it 


11. 2 4138 8—a 12 321 


is quite idle to minimise its meaning. If, as some think, comparing PAys. VII. 4, 
254b 30, it only means that, as the sailor steers the ship, so the soul rules, controls 
and moves the body, A. would not have said ἄδηλον, see 407b 18. The per- 
plexity of the Greek commentators may be inferred from the divergence of their 
views. Them. (43, 28 sqq. H., 80, 5 sqq. Sp.) refers the whole question to νοῦς 
χωριστός; as if ἡ ψυχὴ stood for ἡ νοητική, and as if this could be σώματός τινος 
ἐντελέχεια, but ywpiorn. Simpl. (96, 8 sqq.) gives an explanation which would 
have better suited the ἔνιά ye of a6. He of course has no patience with ἄδηλον, 
but for the opposite reason to Alex. Aphr.; (96, 10) διὰ ri οὖν ἄδηλον ἔτι εἶπεν, εἴ 
καὶ πλάσαι χαλεπόν; καὶ yap ἐναργῶς ἡ θεωρητικὴ οὐδὲ ὡς ὀργάνῳ χρῆται. Philop. 
(224. 12 sqq.) proposes various explanations mutually inconsistent and does not 
omit to criticise Alex. 


CHAPTER IT. 


This chapter is mainly devoted to a fresh discussion, elucidation and 
justification of the definition of soul contained inc. 1. By way of introduction, 
a few logical remarks are prefixed on the value of definitions in general. 

4138 Il. ἀσαφών piv φανερωτέρων Bt. Concrete objects, which are here 
meant, are less distinct to thought than universals, but are more obvious, 
being earlier observed and more familiar to us. The former are αἰσθητά, 
while general notions or concepts (which according to A. are formed by the 
mind from them) are νοητά. The former are particulars, or individual things 
(καθ᾽ ἕκαστα), while the latter are universals (καθόλου). Not only are concrete 
objects ‘indistinct’ (ἀσαφῆ), but also ‘confused’? (συγκεχυμένα) : a fact which all 
subsequent psychologists have emphasised following Plato, Aes. 523 E sqq. 
The meaning would have been clearer if φύσει or κατὰ τὸν λόγον had been 
added to ἀσαφῶν and ἡμῖν to φανερωτέρων. 

δι 12. τὸ σαφὲς. The superior clearness (σαφήνεια) of mental concepts is 
emphasised in Plato, Aes. 523 Β sqq. κατὰ τὸν λόγον, What is better known 
by reason or reasoning is frequently opposed to what is known by sense (κατὰ 
τὴν αἴσθησιν), as theory is to facts. Cf. Pel 1328a 20 διὰ τῶν λόγων \ διὰ τῆς 
αἰσθήσεως: dé Part. An. 11. 8, 653b 22, 30. γνωριμώτερον, int. ἁπλῶς or τῇ 
φύσει. In Lth. Nic. 1095b 2, the distinction is very clearly marked between 
what is better known to us (ἡμῖν), and what is better known absolutely (drh@s) ; 
ἀρκτέον μὲν yap ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ᾽ ἁπλῶς. 
Both there and here A. is discussing method: where are we to start in beginning 
the study of ethics, psychology or any similar subject? Universals are com- 
bined and confused together in the complex object of sense. 4.5 theory of 
learning amounts to this, that we start with the ‘data’ of sense, indistinct and 
confused, when tested by the standard of thought (τῷ λόγῳ) and disentangle 
from their complexity what is more knowable in the order of nature. By 
induction and abstraction we thus arrive at concepts, principles and causes 
which are more truly objects of knowledge. Cf. Zeller, Az¢stotle, τ. 204—-209 
Eng. Tr.; Grote, pp. 196, 239, 332, 2nd edition (vol. 1. 282, 344, II., 5 1st edition). 
The process is described by A. in many passages: Anal. Post. 1.2, 71b 33 sqq., 
Top. Vi. 4, 141 b 3 sqq., Mefaph. 1029b 4 ἢ yap μάθησις οὕτω γίγνεται πᾶσι διὰ 
τῶν ἧττον γνωρίμων φύσει eis τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον, and b7 (where αὐτῷ γνωριμω- 
τέρων stands opposed to τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα). A. continues (1029b 8) τὰ δ᾽ 
ἑκάστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἡρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει 


ἘΠ. 21 


322 NOTES Il. 2 


τοῦ ὄντος. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐκ τῶν φαύλως μὲν γνωστῶν, αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν, τὰ ὅλως 
γνωστὰ γνῶναι πειρατέον, μεταβαίνοντας διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν. Inadequate as are the 
data of experience, we start with them and use them as stepping-stones to 
higher knowledge. 

a 13. πάλιν. The characteristic of the reasoning which follows is, as 
Simplicius points out, that it argues from effects to causes, and revises the 
definition by investigating the different types of soul with which experience has 
made us familiar. Of these there was no mention in II.,c.1,412a6—b9. τὸ ὅτι, 
The fact that 2 is C as opposed to τὸ δεότι, the reason why it 15 so, the cause 

-or condition upon which the fact depends. These convenient abbreviations A. 
explains by πρᾶγμα in the one case and aria in the other. 

8 14. τὸν dptorixov λόγον, “the statement in which a definition is set 
forth,” not materially different from ὅρος or ὁρισμός : cf. Anal. Post. 1. 10, 93 Ὁ 
29 sqq. Besides verbal definitions, which serve merely to explain the meaning 
of a name, A. recognises two classes of real definitions, clearing up the nature 
or what (ri ἐστι) of the thing defined. In the first the object is to set forth 
(δηλοῦν, δεικνύναι) what the thing really is, its essence, not its accidental 
qualities; such are Euclid’s definitions, each of them is ἀναπόδεικτος, σημαίνει 
μέν, δείκνυσι δ᾽ of. The second class, besides such a statement, also con- 
tains a reference to the cause or essential condition. Cf. Amal. Post. 11. το, 
93b 38—94a 13, where the example chosen is thunder (βροντή), of which 
the definition ψόφος ἐν νέφεσιν belongs to the first class, and the definition 
ψόφος ἀποσβεννυμένου πυρὸς ἐν νέφεσιν to the second class. Similarly 
στέρησις φωτὸς defines an eclipse, but the complete definition would add the 
cause, viz. the interposition, ὑπὸ γῆς ἐν μέσῳ γιγνομένης, Metaph. το44 Ὁ 14 sq. 
Thus, according to A., τε κατά τινος σημαίνει 6 λόγος ὁ ὁριστικός, Kat Set τὸ μὲν 
ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφήν, Metaph. 1043 Ὁ 30—32. 

8. Τό. συμπεράσμαθ᾽, “conclusions of syllogisms,” συμπεραίνειν, like “ra- 
tionem concludere,” meaning to draw an inference from premisses and so round 
off or finish the argumentation: cf. 407 a 27. Each fresh physical discovery is 
ultimately embodied in a definition, e.g. gravitation. 

al7. ὁ τετραγωνισμός. See Wallace, p.230. To understand the illustration 
we must refer to Euclid 11.14 and vi. 13. Euclid in 11. 14 proposes to describe a 
square that shall be equal to a given rectilinear figure (4), and after constructing 
the rectangle BCDE which is equal to A, finds that if we produce BE to F'and 
make EF=ED, bisect BF at Gand produce DE to a point Aon the circum- 
ference of a circle drawn from G with radius GB, the square of £7 is equal 
to BCDE, and so to 4. 














H 
Β G lEF 
ς D 


The problem in vi. 13 is to find a mean proportional between two straight 
lines; and we find that by placing the two lines in one straight line AC, de- 
scribing a semicircle on the whole line as diameter, and from the point 4 where 
the two lines meet drawing a line at right angles to Da point on the circum- 


11. 2 413 a I2—a23 323 


ference, a mean proportional, i.e. a line which stands to the one line in the 
same ratio as it itself stands to the other, is obtained; sothat 4B: BD:: BD: BC. 


D 


x 
γ---- 








Α Β Ὁ 


It will be observed that 3.229, which is the mean proportional between 42 
and 50, is also the side of the square equal to the rectangle 4B. BC. Cf. 
Metaph. 996b 18 ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ εἰδέναι ἕκαστον, καὶ ὧν ἀποδείξεις εἰσί, 
τότ᾽ οἰόμεθα ὑπάρχειν, ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν, οἷον τί ἐστε τὸ τετραγωνίζειν, ὅτε μέσης 
εὕρεσις. 

413a 20—b13. Life, in some one of its manifestations, distinguishes 
that which has soul from that which is inanimate [§ 2]. The lowest form of life 
is best seen in plants, which have no other form. It implies nutrition and 
growth, and may be termed the nutritive principle [§ 3]. It is found by itself in 
plants, but is implied wherever, in mortal things, there are higher forms of life. 
Next comes sensation, the distinguishing characteristic of all animals, some of 
which are as stationary as plants [§ 4]. Of the various senses, touch alone is 
common to all animals, and, though found separate in some animals, is implied 
whenever other senses are present, just as the nutritive principle, which exists 
separately in plants, is conjoined with all higher forms of life [§ 5]. To these 
two functions, nutrition and sensation, may be added motion and understanding 
(dedvoia) [8 6]. 

a2l. τῷ tyv. Cf. 4128 13 τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν eyes ζωήν, ra δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει" 
ζωὴν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι’ αὐτοῦ τροφὴν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν. 

8. 22. πλεοναχώς δὲ We notice that the various meanings which the term 
‘life’ bears have reference to the common characteristic by which that term 
was defined in II., c. 1 (see preceding zoe), and this is admitted here in the words 
κἂν ἕν τι τούτων évurrdpxn μόνον, aS soon as the relation between the terms of 
this series of functions is properly understood. At the same time, it is A.’s 
great merit as a psychologist to have enlarged the conception of vitality and 
vital principle and to have brought these different functions into connexion 
for comparative study. Cf. χά. Nic. 1170 a 16—20 τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς 
ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως" ἡ δὲ δύναμις eis τὴν 
ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἔν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ" ἔοικε δὴ τὸ Gv εἶναι κυρίως τὸ 
αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ Gav τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων, and 1149a 9 
καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, 
ὥσπερ ἔνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων. ἕν τι That is, life in a single one of 
these significations, namely the principle of nutrition and growth; not one or 
other, which would be ἕν γέ τ When A. says ἕν τι, he is anticipating, 
6.5.» 413 Ὁ 33. 

a 23 οἷον νοῦς, atc Onots...24 ἔτι...25 αὔξησις. It is confusing to have ἔν τι 
τούτων replaced by a list of four or five powers, when ζῆν is employed in but 
one particular sense, viz. the last. It is best, then, to take the words, though 
grammatically nominatives to ἐνυπάρχῃ; as simply an interpretation of πλεοναχῶς 
δὲ τοῦ ζὴν λεγομένου, for the ἔν τὸ represents nothing but nutrition and growth, 
since (a 3I Sq.) nutrition goes with all the other vital functions and none of them 
can be singly present without it. Later on (414 a 4, 12) A. is more careful to 
distinguish life in this restricted sense from sensation and thought. 


21-2Σ 


324. NOTES Il. 2 


8 25. διὸ καὶ rd φυόμενα. That a plant lives and “has a soul” is consistently 
maintained by A.; cf. De Gen. An. Ul. 3, 736 Ὁ 13 and especially De Part. An. 
IV. 5, 681 ἃ 12 ἡ yap φύσις μεταβαίνει συνεχῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀψύχων eis τὰ ζῷα διὰ τῶν 
ζώντων μὲν οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ζῴων (1.6. plants). 

8. 26. δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν. Cf 4128 14. What is there called τὴν δι᾽ αὐτοῦ 
τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, A. here calls a capacity or origin of growth and 
decay. With ἀρχὴ in the sense of originating cause cf. 402 a 6, 412b 17, 415 Ὁ 8 
Sqq., αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή. 

. 8.28. κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους, “in opposite directions,” 222 contrarias 
.--....-. partes. This incidental addition serves to introduce the parenthetical note of 
the following sentence. 

a 20 πάντῃ, ὅσα...30 τέλους. The text is uncertain. πάντοσε, ut Bekkerus 
restituit, nec vero πάντῃ ὅσα: neque enim scriptor plantis relictis ad cetera 
animantia vagatur (Trend.). But πάντοσε is found in only one inferior manu- 
script and Jzd. Ar. cites no other instance of the word in A. But, if we waive 
the objection to πάντοσε, Bekker should at least have placed a stop after the 
word; his text as it stands requires us to take καὶ τρέφεται καὶ ζῇ with ἐπ᾽ ἄμφω 
καὶ πάντοσε, which strains the meaning of τρέφεται and makes it very little 
different from αὔξεται. Torst., who saw this and placed a colon after πάντοσε, 
insisted on the retention of re: non potest omitti. A. hoc dicit: nutritur et 
propterea quod nutritur vivit. Biehl, however, who restores ὅσα from E, places 
the stop after τρέφεται and is thus compelled to omit re. As none of these 
proposals is very convincing, 1 am content to reproduce the text of Εἰ, placing a 
comma after πάντῃ. It gives a clear sense, ὅσα being of course restricted to 
plants, pace Trendelenburgii, and the tautology of ἀεὶ.. «διὰ τέλους, τρέφεται... ἕως 
ἂν δύνηται λαμβάνειν τροφὴν cannot be altogether removed by any change. I 
cannot see that Biehl’s text is any improvement upon the reading of cod. W, which 
also omits re, provided we punctuate after τρέφεται thus: ὅσα dei τρέφεται, καὶ 
ζῇ «xré. The cardinal point to bear in mind ts that, according to A., growth 
depends upon nutrition, and nutrition implies life (415 Ὁ 26-28, 416b9). So, with 
his habitual caution, after telling us plants grow in all directions, he adds the 
necessary qualification “ provided they are constantly nourished and therefore 
kept alive.” It would be possible to take the last clause ἕως ἂν xré. with ἐπ᾽ 
ἄμφω καὶ πάντῃ [int. αὔξεται instead of with ¢7, but that would not mend 
matters much. Cf. 404 ἃ 15 ζῆν δὲ ἕως ἂν δύνωνται τοῦτο ποιεῖν, 416b 14, 4348 
23 sqq., De Part. An. 11. 10, 655b 31 οὔτε γὰρ εἶναι οὔτε αὐξάνεσθαι ἐνδέχεται 
ἄνευ τροφῆς. 

8 31. τοῦτο μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δυνατόν, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα τούτον ἀδύνατον. Here the δὲ 
is concessive, clearly so because φανερὸν is related only to the clause with μὲν, 
the possibility of separation. Ordinarily it is the μὲν clause which is con- 
cessive. 

a 32. ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς, “in living things which are perishable, as being subject 
to death, and so to generation and destruction.” This is the proper sphere of 
physics and therefore of this treatise. Outside this sphere A. recognised (1) 
οὐσίαι αἰσθηταὶ ἀΐδιοι, τὰ ἀΐδια τῶν αἰσθητῶν and (2) οὐσία ἀκίνητος. The former 
include the heavenly bodies, sun and stars, the latter is the deity. See for 
the divisions Metaph. 1069 a 30—33, 1071 Ὁ 3—5; for a possible reference to 
the eternal things of sense, De A. 434b 4 sq. They are undoubtedly referred 
to Metaph. 991 a 10, 1050b 16-29, 1069 Ὁ 25. 

413bI. τοῖς ζῶσι, 1.6. in plants which live no less than animals. For τοῖς 
ζῶσι, not τοῖς (poss, cf. 413 Ὁ 4 ζῷα λέγομεν καὶ ov ζῆν μόνον and De Part. An. 
IV. 5, 681a 13 τῶν ζώντων μὲν οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ζῴων. 


II. 2 413 a 25---Ὁ 12 325 


b2. S&a τὴν αἴσθησιν: cf. De Gen. An. τι. 2, 736a 29 περὶ ψυχῆς καθ᾽ ἣν 
λέγεται ζῷον (ζῷον δ᾽ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικόν). πρώτως, 
“primarily,” or “fundamentally”; the adverb used in the same sense as the 
adjective in the definition of soul as ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος (412 a 27). 
τὰ μὴ κινούμενα. See 2026 on 410 Ὁ I9 μόνιμα. 

Ῥ4. αἰσθήσεως is the whole, of which ἁφὴ is a part. 

b5. ἁφή. This 15 repeated below, 414 Ὁ 3. Cf. 434 Ὁ 9—II, 13, 23 56. 
435 a 12 sq., 435 Ὁ 5—7, 168q., De Sensu 1, 436 Ὁ 13, Aist. Ax. I. 3, 489 a 17 
πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς ζῴοις αἴσθησις pia ὑπάρχει κοινὴ μόνη ἡ ἁφή. 

b6. οὕτως. Another fact which confirms the ascending scale of psychical 
functions. Plants grow and live without sensation. The lowest animals, or 
zoophytes, have one sense only, namely touch. 

b 7. μόριον. This word is used prematurely and carelessly, for below 
(Ὁ 13—16) the question whether there be parts of the soul is expressly re- 
served: cf. 4138 5 ef μεριστὴ πέφυκεν. In fact the whole sentence is of the 
nature of a footnote explaining the technical term τὸ θρεπτικόν as the nutritive 
*‘ part” or principle of soul, elsewhere often called τὸ φυτικὸν καὶ αὐξητικόν. 

Ὁ 1το. ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. The reason, which is teleological, will be found in 
IIf., c. 12, especially 434 b 1osqq. The sense of touch is necessary if the animal 
is to maintain itself, for body is in every case tangible, and the animal, as σῶμα 
ἔμψυχον, comes in contact with other bodies, and if it had not the sense of 
touch, it would not be able to avoid some of these corporeal things and take 
others. See also the comparison between the means of defence possessed by 
man and the brutes and the superior utility of the human hand, De Part. An. 
iV. το, 687 a 5 sqq. 

bir. ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω, “let this much suffice.” We here repeat the 
substance of 413 a 20—b Io. τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων, “the functions here 
mentioned.” 

biz. τούτοις ὥρισται κτὲ Note the omission of “appetency,” ὀρεκτικόν, 
and the vagueness of “understanding,” dcavonrixdy. A. speaks in detail of all 
the functions which discriminate the animate from the inanimate. He will take 
the several senses, give some speculation as to the way in which each operates 
and some remarks on the central sense in which all converge. Note how 
completely this accords with the scheme outlined in Book 1., c. 1, especially 
402 a 7 sqq., Ὁ 1 sqq., b 9 sqq., and b 21 sqq. 

Ὁ 12. θρεπτικῴ, αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσε. Two of these four, motion 
and sensation, were recognised by all A.’s predecessors ; see 403 b 24—31. He 
adds two others, nutrition and understanding. His first business in this treatise 
is to enlarge the limited view of psychology taken by his predecessors. 

413 b 13—414a 9. It may be asked whether each of these four 
faculties is a soul or a part of soul, and whether, if a part, it can exist separately, 
or is only separable in thought. With respect to some of these faculties the 
question is easy to settle [§ 7]. Not only can plants live when divided, but 
certain worms continue to feel after being cut in pieces. Sensation in the 
severed parts implies pleasure or pain. These in turn imply appetite and so 
desire of a sort. Whence it is easy to infer the union of these several faculties 
in the soul of each segment [ὃ 8]. If any part or faculty of soul is separable, 
it can only be the intellect: the question will come up again hereafter [§ 9]. 
While we deny that the other faculties can have separate existence, we at the 
same time fully maintain that each of them is logically distinct and separable 
in thought, the power of opining being as distinct from sensitivity as opinion is 
from sensation [ὃ 10]. Some animals possess but one of such faculties, some 


226 NOTES Il. 2 


more, and others all of them, just as within the sphere of sense-perception 
some animals have but one sense, others more than one, others all the senses 
[8 xr]. " 

b 13 πότερον...15 τόπῳ. This resumes the old problem of 402 Ὁ 1 σκεπτέον 
δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, cf. 411a 26—b3. It should be observed that only 
material things can be spatially separate, except of course κατὰ συμβεβηκός: cf. 
406 a 4—16, 4078 2, 7—9. What is here expressed by τόπῳ might be ex- 
pressed by κατὰ μέγεθος, cf. 429 a II εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ 
λόγον : also 433 25 μεγέθει δ᾽ ἀχώριστα, 432 a 20 χωριστὸν ἢ μεγέθει ἢ λόγῳ. 

b τό ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν... 19 πλειόνων, “in the case of plants, some,” i.e. such as 
are propagated by cutting. After the division the parent plant and cutting 
continue to live separated from one another. We should expect ἔνια to mean 
“some plants,” but ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων shows that it means “some parts of plants.” 
The judicious Themistius omits ἔνια from his paraphrase. The use of διαιρούμενα 
shows that, when the sentence began, A. was thinking of the undivided plants, 
but from χωριζόμενα ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων it is equally clear that the subject of the 
sentence has changed and has become “the slips” or parts of the now 
divided plants. See zofes on 411 b 19, 25—27. 

bIg. ἑτέρας διαφορὰς, ‘other characteristics,” viz. the differences which 
determine the varieties of soul, the sensitive, locomotive, nutritive. As these 
are not strictly species of a genus, the word must not be taken in the strict 
technical sense of differentiae. 

Ῥ 20. ἐν τοῦς Starepvopévors, in the resulting segments: that is, divide these 
“insects” (see mofe on 411b 20 ἔνια τῶν ἐντόμων) and the portions are able 
to go on performing certain vital functions. Such creatures as earthworms 
have vitality in compartments, as well as in the whole. 

b22. εἰ 8 αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ ὄρεξιν. If we leave the comma after 
αἴσθησιν, imagination in the technical sense (see on 403 a 8) would be attributed 
to all animals which possess sensation. It appears, however, from 415 a Io sq. 
τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία that not all animals have φαντασία. Freudenthal would 
therefore bracket καὶ φαντασίαν. Professor H. Jackson proposes to secure the 
same end by a change of punctuation, removing the comma after αἴσθησιν and 
placing it after φαντασίαν. This gets rid of inconsistency for the present, but, as 
we shall see, A. is not at all clear whether all the lower animals have something 
analogous to imagination in man, or what such a faculty is like in the lowest 
forms of life. See on 428 a Io Sq., 429 a 4—8, 433 b 31--434 8 5, 433a 9—I2. 

Ὁ 25. οὐδέν πω. We are in fact no nearer a decision of the problem raised 
in 403a 3—16. In 408b 18—29 A. gave unmistakable hints that νοῦς is to be 
regarded as a separate entity, which is the view actually expounded of the one 
part of νοῦς in IIL, cc. 4—8 (q.v.). Inthe present passage we have again a mere 
saving clause or guarded statement which does not commit us. Cf. 413a 8 ἔτι 
δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ xré. and moze. 

Ὁ 25. ἀλλ᾽ ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι. Most editors take ψυχῆς as partitive 
genitive, e.g. Wallace translates: “ Reason however would seem to constitute a 
different phase of soul from those we have already noticed.” It would be gram- 
matically possible to join Ψυχῆς with ἕτερον, “it would seem, however, that 
intellect is something different from soul.” If νοῦς and ψυχὴ were ἕτερα τῷ 
γένει, the former might be described as ἕτερον γένος. We should thus avoid 
making νοῦς a kind of ψυχή. But, considering the numerous passages in which 
νοῦς and νοεῖν are treated as functions of soul and the use of ἡ νοητεκή Lint. ψυχή 
429a 28, I shrink from this expedient, even though it might remove some 
superficial difficulties. The fact is that, as pointed out by Zeller and others, the 


II. 2 413 Ὁ 13—414a 3 327 


position of νοῦς in the system is anomalous. What is here said of νοῦς agrees 
exactly with the substance of 408 Ὁ 18—29, of which passage it is a neat 
summary. 

Ὁ 28. καθάπερ τινές φασιν. The Platonic view is intended. Cf. wofes on 
411b5. Inthe 7zmaeus 69 Ὁ sqq. not only does Plato divide the soul, but he 
actually assigns the different parts to different parts of the body. 

b29. τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ὅτι ἕτερα, φανερόν. This was the alternative to spatial or 
local distinctness set forth in 413 Ὁ 14 ὥστ᾽ etvac χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ 
τόπῳ, where see zofe. For the local distinctness which A. ascribes to Plato’s 
three souls he substitutes a logical distinction between the several faculties. 
αἰσθητικῷ yap εἶναι, “sensitivity in the abstract.” Cf. supra 412 Ὁ 13 τὸ πελέκει 
εἶναι. The absence of the article is rare. Cf. 416 b 12 τροφῇ καὶ αὐξητικῷ εἶναι. 
In 429b 11 ὕδατε εἶναι and .Wetaph. tool a 12 τοῦ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ ὄντε the article can 
easily be supplied from what precedes. 

b 30. Soefacrixe, int. εἶναι. This seems to be a subdivision of the thinking 
faculty (δεανοητικόν), δοξάζειν being enumerated among psychical functions in 
411a 26 sq. 

b 32. τῶν ζῴων. If we compare the parallel passage 4148. 29-- 1 we 
notice that these words are absent. To omit them here would remove an 
obvious inconsistency. For, if they are to be taken, not only with Ὁ 32 ἐνίοις, 
but also with Ὁ 33 τισὶ and ἑτέροις, A. is committed to the statement that there 
are animals with only one power or faculty of soul, which cannot be true in 
view of 4148 32--Ὁ 1. Essen, accordingly, would read ζώντων for (dav. 
But it is quite possible that A. did use this incorrect expression, and Them. 
seems tacitly to correct the blunder: 46, 5 H., 84, 19 Sp. τῇ μὲν οὖν πρώτῃ 
διαφορᾷ τὰ ζῶα ταύτῃ διήνεγκεν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἅπασαι τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπάρχουσιν ai 
εἰρημέναι δυνάμεις, τοῖς δὲ πλείους, τοῖς δὲ ἐλάττους, τοῖς δὲ καὶ μία μόνη; ἅπερ οὐ 
ζῶά φαμεν, ἀλλὰ ζῶντα. 

b 33. ποιήσε. Μ. Rodier reads ποιεῖ, a fact which ought to have been 
recorded in the critical zoZes. 

4144 1. διαφορὰν τών ζῴων. The gradations of soul will serve as a basis for 
a classification of animals. The inferior manuscript P reads τῶν ζώντων here. 
M. Rodier, who meets the difficulty mentioned in wove on Ὁ 32 supra by 
restricting Ὁ 32 ταῦτα, b33 τούτων, quite arbitrarily, to the faculties of soul 
which animals possess other than the nutritive, understands Ὁ 33 ἐν μόνον, τοῦτο 
to be τὸ αἰσθητικὸν and so gives a different interpretation of the clause, viz. that 
sensation differentiates the animal from the plant: “qui différencie animal, 
Cest-a-dire qui constitue la différence spécifique de Panimal par rapport au 
vivant.” ὕστερον, VIZ. III., cc. 12 and 13. The teleological explanation there 
sketched in outline is given with greater fulness of detail in the treatise De 
Part. An., cf. IV. 10, 687 a 2 δι ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τὰ μὲν δίποδα τὰ δὲ πολύποδα 
τὰ δ᾽ ἄποδα τῶν ζῴων ἐστί, καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν τὰ μὲν φυτὰ τὰ δὲ ζῷα γέγονεν. 
εἴρηται. 

a3. τὰ δὲ τινάς, e.g. bees, which, according to A., have no sense of hearing 
cf. Metaph. 980 Ὁ 22 φρόνιμα μὲν ἄνευ τοῦ μανθάνειν, ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν ψόφων 
ἀκούειν, οἷον μέλιττα. 

414a4—19. The starting point of the present enquiry, 413 8 20 sqq., 
is that the animate is differentiated from the inanimate by living. Hence 
soul stands for that by which we live and perform the various vital func- 
tions, e.g. have sensation. But A. proceeds: such a phrase as “that by 
which we live and have sensation” bears two meanings, as we see from the 
similar phrases, “that by which we know” and “that by which we are healthy,” 


328 NOTES II, 2 


which may denote either (1) the form, knowledge or health, or (2) that which is 
receptive of form, in the one case “the soul” regarded as capable of knowledge, 
in the other, viz. the case of health, some part of the body or even the whole by 
which we are healthy. Now it is as form and not as recipient or substratum that 
soul is said to be “that whereby we live, perceive and think” [ὃ 12]. Hence soul 
is the form and therefore the entelechy of a species of body [viz. a natural 
body provided with organs], not body the entelechy of soul [§ 13]. 

a4 ἐπεὶ δὲ...14 ὑποκείμενον. The best view as to the construction of this 
sentence is that of Bonitz, Avist. Stud, 11. 1z0sqq. According to him, ἐπεὶ intro- 
duces the first of three premisses, constituting the protasis; the apodosis begins 
at a 13 ὥστε λόγος. Some have made the apodosis begin at a 12 ἡ ψυχὴ δέ, but the 
clause beginning with these words is wanted as one of the premisses of the argu- 
ment. ‘The first premiss gives expression to a fact of linguistic usage, the fact, 
viz. that under ᾧ ἐπιστάμεθα we can understand at once ἐπιστήμη and ψυχή, just 
as under 6 ὑγιαίνομεν we can understand ὑγίεια or σῶμα. The second brings out 
the import of this use of language by showing that the first of the two meanings 
denotes the form and notion, the second the receptive subject or substratum. 
The third premiss finally maintains that the soul is that through which we live 
and think πρώτως, in the truest and most proper sense of the terms, and the con- 
clusion therefore follows that soul is the λόγος and εἶδος, rather than the ὕλη or 
ὑποκείμενον ” (Bonitz, 4r¢sz¢. Stud. 11. 121), Other and less satisfactory modes 
of dealing with the sentence may briefly be noticed: (1) Trend. would alter ἐπεὶ 
δὲ into ἔτι δὲ quite unnecessarily, as Bonitz shows; (2) Torstrik would make the 
apodosis begin with a 12 ἡ Ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦτο ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ διανοούμεθα 
πρώτως; (3) Pacius finds the apodosis in a 8 τούτων δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη κτέ. 

a5 καθάπερ ᾧ ἐπιστάμεθα (λέγομεν δὲ τὸ pev...6 ψυχήν). If we omit the δὲ with 
Bonitz and Biehl, there will be no comma before λέγομεν, which will then be 


constructed with καθάπερ, “just as by the phrase ᾧ ἐπιστάμεθα we mean” etc 


If we retain δὲ the καθάπερ will be retrospective, the comma after ἐπιστάμεθα will 
be required, and λέγομεν δὲ will introduce an explanatory sentence “now we 
mean by it” etc. 

8. 7. ᾧ ὑγιαίνομεν. Prof. Bywater remarks in Journ. of Phil., vol. XVII. p. 55, 
“1 think we might with advantage bracket the ᾧ before ὑγιαίνομεν ; with the ᾧ 
the clause as a whole ought surely to have run thus: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ᾧ ὑγιαίνομεν 
τὸ μὲν ὑγίεια [or ὑγίειαν] τὸ δὲ μόριόν τι τοῦ σώματος ἢ καὶ ὅλον." This is undoubt- 
edly the case, but I take the ungrammatical datives ὑγιείᾳ... μορίῳ... «ὅλῳ to be 
genuine, assimilated by inadvertence to the preceding ᾧ and ἑκατέρῳ : this opinion 
is strengthened rather than weakened by the fact that in some inferior MSS. 
(X and pr. 5) the alteration to ὑγίειαν is found, doubtless on the scribe’s con- 
jecture. τὸ μὲν ὑγιείᾳ, int. λέγεται or φαμὲν ὑγιαίνειν, if it is worth while to 
preserve grammatical accuracy where the writer is notoriously careless. 

a8. τούτων δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη. Here begins the second premiss of the three 
marked by Bonitz. Τούτων, i.e. of these meanings or implications of the phrases 
ᾧ ἐπιστάμεθα and ᾧ ὑγιαίνομεν. 

ag. μορφὴ καὶ εἶδός τι. Cf. 4128 8, ποΐξε. καὶ Adyos. Cf. 412} 16 (also 
403 Ὁ 2). οἷον ἐνέργεια, “active operation.” This, properly speaking, differs 
somewhat from actuality (ἐντελέχεια). When opposed to ἐνέργεια, δύναμις denotes 
capacity of-action, ἐνέργεια being actual operation. Opposed to ἐντελέχεια, 
δύναμις denotes a capacity of existence or development, the power of becoming 
something, ἐντελέχεια being actual existence or realisation. To return to the 
instance given in 412a 22—28, τὸ θεωρεῖν is, more properly, active operation, 
the exercise of knowledge, while ἐπιστήμη is knowledge which may be in abey- 


II. 2 4148 4-ἃ 17 320 


ance, implicit actuality. But the proof of this actuality of existence is to be 
found in active operation. The proof that a fleet is in being is that it is doing its 
work. Hence ἐνέργεια will often do as well as ἐντελέχεια and is constantly so used 
in the Mefaphysics. One reason why ἐντελέχεια is preferred in De A. probably 
is, that soul is made analogous to the first or implicit stage of actuality, to 
ἐπιστήμη and not to θεωρεῖν, comatose body being itself alive and therefore 
endowed with soul, even though not actively operant. At this point (11., cc. I, 2) 
A. is not concerned whether soul is a distinct entity or a mere operation of the 
living body. He has framed a definition wide enough to include all operations 
of the animate being, whichever of these two alternatives he ultimately adopts. 
For this purpose as a rule he prefers the term ἐντελέχεια: thus in 412 a 22—24, 
where sleep is contrasted with waking, and knowledge in abeyance with the 
application of knowledge, soul is put on a level with sleep and knowledge in 
abeyance, because life begins with its implicit presence: it need not at once be 
explicit. Sleep is analogous to ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν, that is ψυχὴ exists before 
ἐνέργεια comes in. Here however, in opposition to the mere δύναμις of ὕλη, soul 
in sleep may be regarded as a sort of energy or activity. 

a I0. τοῦ δεκτικοῦ, the recipient, the subject of which attributes are 
predicated=76 ὑποκείμενον. ὑγιαστικοῦ. There seems no reason to change 
this to ὑγιαστοῦ : see critical zofes. From P&ys. VIU. 5, 2578. I4—Ig it is clear 
that ὑγιαστικὸν stands to ὑγιαστὸν as κινητικὸν to κενητόν, and it might be thought 
that, though the recipient is regarded as active in respect of knowledge, yet in 
respect of health he is regarded as passive. But just as ὑγιεινὸν is explained to 
be not merely that which produces or preserves or marks health, but also that 
which is the recipient of health (Metaph. 1003 a 34 ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν 
ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς 
ὑγιείας, τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς), so also with τὸ ὑγιαστικόν. That Philop. and 
Simpl. should vary the term in paraphrasing is what we might expect. 

a Il Soxet...12 ἐνέργεια. A general principle fully endorsed by A. See 
426 a 2---τὶ with zofes. The word διατιθεμένῳ implies a temporary condition 
or disposition, as does διάθεσις generally. As πάσχοντι and διατιθεμένῳ are 
joined here, so πάθος is joined with διάθεσις in PAys. 11. 1, 1938 25 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα 
πάντα πάθη τούτων καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις. 

8ι.Ὄ 12. ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ. This is the third premiss noted by Bonitz. 

a13. πρώτως. As Bonitz points out, this means “in the primary and 
principal sense”; the adverb is often joined with κυρίως, and ἁπλῶς and καθ᾽ 
αὑτὸ are equivalent expressions. Each thing is said to be what it really is (ὅπερ 
ἕκαστόν τι) in virtue primarily of its form, and only secondarily in virtue of its 
matter. The force of πρώτως is to bring out the fundamental position of the 
soul in life. We live and perceive by the body, but we cannot be said to do so 
πρώτως. Cf. Metaph. 10224 31 καὶ (7 ὁ ἄνθρωπος καθ᾽ αὗτόν- ἡ yap Ψψυχὴ μέρος 
τι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ἧἦ πρώτῃ τὸ ζῆν. See also mole on 403 Ὁ 29. ὥστε λόγος 
introduces the apodosis. Disengaging the argument from its complications, we 
may briefly state it thus: It is primarily in virtue of its form that a given thing 
is said to have such and such a property. Now it is primarily in virtue of soul 
that a thing is said to have life. Therefore soul is the form of the living being, 
the ἔμψιηιιχόν τι. 

a 15. καθάπερ εἴπομεν, VIZ. 4128 6---ἰ 1. 

4 17. ἔπεὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. This is a most important link in the argument, and 
its insertion here tends to clear up the obscurities of the parallel passage in 
4128. 16—22, where see zofes. The reasoning here is as follows: Composite 
substance consists invariably of form and matter. The animate being (τὸ 


330 NOTES II. 2 


ἔμψυχον) is such a composite substance consisting of form and matter. Since 
therefore in this case the composite substance is animate or endowed with soul 
[and it has been proved that soul is form, 414.4 13 ὥστε λόγος xré.], it follows that 
soul is the form of body, not body the form of soul, and, we may add, the form 
or entelechy of a certain sort of body (σώματός τινος), namely (as we learnt in 
IIl., c. 1) a natural body provided with organs. 

414{ 19—28. This definition agrees with the views of those who, 
while distinguishing soul from what is corporeal, make it to depend on body. 
Not only so, but it is dependent on a body of a definite kind, and our predecessors 
were wrong in supposing that any and every sort of body could be tenanted by 
any and every soul [8 14]. This result is just what we should expect: as every 
entelechy has its appropriate matter, so, too, has soul, being as it is the entelechy 
of a body so constituted as to be capable of being tenanted by soul [§ 15]. 

As here soul is not a body, though at the same time it is something belonging 
to and dependent upon a body, so in De Semsu 6, 446 Ὁ 25 sq. the objects of the 
telepathic senses, colours, odours and sounds, are declared to be not bodies, 
though at the same time not independent of bodies. The special sensibles are 
qualities; and in some cases they are κινήσεις, varieties of motion: ἔστι δ᾽ οὔτε 
σώματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ πάθος καὶ κίνησίς τις (οὐ yap ἂν τοῦτο συνέβαινεν), οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ 
σώματος. 

alIg. οἷς Soxet. The reference is not clear. Bonitz suggests that, whoever 
else are intended, the words exactly suit the view of soul as a harmony main- 
tained by Simmias in Plato, Phaedo, 85 ἘΞ sqq.; the harmony 15 not the lyre, but is 
something invisible and incorporeal dependent upon it, and ceases to exist when 
the strings are broken. 

a2I. σώματος 5€ 7. The genitive expresses relation in the most general way. 
Compare its use in Plato, Rep. 438 A ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅσα γ᾽ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα 
εἶναί του, τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα ποιοῦ τινός ἔστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰ δ᾽ αὐτὰ ἕκαστα αὐτοῦ 
ἑκάστου μόνον. [ἴ{15 not easy to find an English equivalent which will express 
this suitably. ‘‘ Function” in the mathematical sense might serve, but from its 
biological associations has become unsuitable. To A. the relation is not one of 
subordination, but of coordinate reciprocity. 

8. 22. τοιούτῳ. This adjective=“of a suitable kind,” and anticipates the 
more explicit description at the close of the chapter (τοῦ δύναμιν ἔχοντος εἶναι 


τοιούτου; 4148. 28). καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ. The literal rendering “contrary to the 
view of our predecessors” etc. is so clumsy that it is convenient to substitute 
“whereas” or the like, οὗ πρότερον, the Pythagoreans more especially. See 
407 Ὁ 13—-26. 


a 23. τίνι καὶ ποίῳ. See 407 b 13—19, where the same objection is urged. 

a24. τοῦ τυχόντος. See 026 on 407 b 19. 

8. 25. οὕτω δὲ γίνεται, I take γίνεται as almost equivalent ἰο συμβαίνει. “The 
thing happens in this way,” i.e. the soul is found in a body of a definite kind, 
ὑπάρχει ἐν σώματι τοιούτῳ Them. replaces οὕτω by νῦν dé, “in point of fact.” 
καὶ “in fact,” emphasising the following words, as in 412a 16 καὶ σῶμα τοιόνδε. 
κατὰ λόγον; “as we might expect.” In this sense contrasted with παρὰ λόγον or, 
as in Thue. 111. 39. § 4, παρὰ défavy,—contrary to expectation. So Bonitz ad 
Metaph. 989 a 30: Ubi κατὰ λόγον usurpatur, nomine λόγος nec per adiectivum 
nec per pronomen definito, perinde atque εὐλόγως id significat, quod rationibus 
ad rem pertinentibus accommodatum est et consentaneum. Here “as we might 
expect from analogy,” and this gives a good meaning to γάρ, for soul in body of 
a certain kind 15 only a particular application of the general law or tendency 
(πέφυκεν) that the entelechy of each thing is manifested in an appropriate 


II. 3 414 a 17—a 31 331 


matter, in that which has the potentiality of becoming such a thing. Bonitz 
cites for κατὰ λόγον in the sense of εὐλόγως Metaph. 1088 a 4 (cf. a6), Phys. τι. 7, 
207 a 33, De esp. 12, 476 Ὁ 14, whilein De Part. An. U1. 4, 666a 18 sq. he notes 
that it is opposed to κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν. See also Pol. 1257 a 31. Some, e.g. Philop., 
suppose that here there is that antithesis between τὰ γιγνόμενα, facts, and oi 
λόγοι, theories, which is frequently found in A. Accordingly, taking xai= “and,” 
Philop. (248, 1) paraphrases ὡς δὲ ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν... καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα οὕτως ἔχοντα 
μαρτυρεῖ καὶ ὁ λόγος. But this strains the words unnaturally, and no such anti- 
thesis seems to be intended. We are concerned with 4 rod λόγου ἐνάργεια 
(413 Ὁ 24), not directly with τὰ φαινόμενα. Yiverat does not, any more than 
8. 23 ἐνήρμοζον, express a fact of experience, but a conclusion reached by 
the whole train of reasoning from 414a 4. The question is, not whether facts 
support the theory or the theory the facts, but whether one theory is in accord- 
ance with another. 

a25. ἑκάστου. Them. interprets as follows (46, 37 H., 86, 5 Sp.) νῦν δὲ 
γίνεται κατὰ λόγον: ov yap πᾶσα ψυχὴ παντὸς σώματος εἶδός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πρὸς 
αὐτὴν ὀργανικῶς κατεσκευασμένου καὶ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὰς ὑπαρχούσας τῇ ψυχῇ δυνάμεις 
ἐπιτηδείως. He must have restricted ἑκάστου to animate bodies. But unquestion- 
ably the reference is wider: cf. 417 Ὁ 3 τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος 
καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως as δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν. So Philop. (248, 3) ἡ γάρ 
Twos, φησίν, ἐντελέχεια ἐν ἐκείνῳ γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν, ὃ φύσει ἔχει δύναμιν τοιοῦτον 
εἶναι" τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἑκάστου προσεχὴς ὕλη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ τυχοῦσα ὕλη τὸ τυχὸν 
εἶδος δέξασθαι δύναται. So also Simpl. (105,13) τὸ δυνάμει ἑκασταχοῦ τοιοῦτον 
ὁποία ἡ ἐντελέχεια. 

a 28. τοιούτου, ig. ἐμψύχου. For this logical flaw in the definition see 
noté On 4128. 21. Body and soul being correlative as matter and form, neither 
can exist and neither can be known apart from the other. Philop. 248, 3 ἀνάγκη 
ἄρα τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγῳ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοῦ δεκτικοῦ σώματος συνεισάγεσθαι, ἐπεὶ καὶ 
τῶν πρός τι ταῦτα, ἦ ὕλη φημὶ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, τὰ δὲ πρός τι χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἢ εἶναι ἢ 
γνωσθῆναι ἀδύνατον, 7 τοιαῦτά ἐστι. 


CHAPTER [{Π|. 


414a 329-- 19. The powers of the soul are variously distributed 
[§ 1], nutrition occurring singly in plants or together with other powers in 
animals. With the sentient faculty in animals goes appetency or desire. 
This follows from two considerations: (1) that all animals have at least the 
sense of touch; and (2) that sense-perception is invariably accompanied by 
feelings of pleasure and pain and these latter by appetite, a form of appetency 
or desire [8 2] Touch is employed upon food and implies the appetites of 
hunger and thirst. To these three faculties, the nutritive, the sensitive, the 
appetitive [§ 3], reserving imagination for a later enquiry, may be added the 
faculties of locomotion and understanding, found in some animals only. Under- 
standing is confined to man and any beings superior to man, if any such exist 
[ὃ 4]. 

4148 30. καθάπερ εἴπομεν. Cf. supra 413 a 31 sqq., Ὁ 32—4I 4a I. 

a 31. δυνάμεις δ᾽ εἴπομεν, viz. 413 a 23—25, Ὁ 11-13, and it also appeared 
413 Ὁ 21—24 that sensation implied appetency. On the other hand there is no 
separate mention of τὸ φανταστικόν. A.’s indifference to a complete enumeration 
and the provisional or tentative character of those which he gives are further 
illustrated 432 a 22—b 8, 433 b I—5. 


232 NOTES II. 3 


a 33. τὸ θρεπτικὸν. Cf. 413a 31—D4. ἑτέροις δὲ, 1.6. all animals: cf. 
413 a 31—b9. 

4I4b 1. εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. The proof which follows Ὁ 1—15 
holds for ἐπιθυμία or appetite only, the lowest form of ὄρεξις. Them. 47, 13 H., 
86, 26 Sp. καὶ οὐ τοῦτο λέγω, ὅτι rots αἰσθανομένοις ἅπασιν ἡ ὀρεκτικὴ πᾶσα ὑπάρχει" 
πολλοῖς γὰρ οὔτε θυμὸς οὔτε βούλησις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιθυμία μόνον. It is tempting to 
equate τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν with the φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῇ λόγου of 
Eth. Nic. 1102b 13. Cf. 2. Ὁ 30 τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει 
πως int. λόγου] κτέ. There is no mention of φαντασία until we come to 414 Ὁ 16. 
In 432 a 31 sqq. τὸ φανταστικὸν appears between τὸ αἰσθητικὸν and τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. 

Ὁ 2. ὄρεξις. Though not always consistent, A. in the main adheres to the 
nomenclature here adopted, according to which ὄρεξις is a generic term for that 
which appears in the rational soul as βούλησις (wish or conation) and in the 
irrational soul as θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία; cf. especially z#/ra 432b 5 sq. and see nore 
on 411 a 28. 

b3. μίαν γε. Cf. 413b 4 sq. 

b4. @8 αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, v. supra 413 Ὁ 16—24. ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη Kal τὸ 
ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν. Ἐν ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη [int. ὑπάρχει] is meant that the 
creature can feel pleasure and pain (ὑπάρχει τινὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡδονὴ τε αἰσθάνεταί 
τις καὶ ἥδεται), but this is not the sense of τούτῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν. 
These words must mean that the creature has for objects what is pleasant and 
what is painful. The pleasure and pain reside in the percipient, the pleasur- 
ableness and painfulness in the object perceived. The mode of statement is 
careless, ‘‘ Pleasure and pain” are feelings in the animals of whom they are 
predicated (ὑπάρχει). Sense is a discriminative faculty and accordingly the 
sentient animal learns to discriminate not only its own feelings (πάθη), but also 
the causes of those feelings. Simpl. 105, 19 sq. ra δὲ ὡς ποιητικὰ τῶν παθῶν, 
viz. the pleasurable, or pleasure-giving object, and the painful. But pleasurable 
and painful objects cannot strictly be attributed to the sentient animal. 

Ὁ 5. τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη: airy means ἐπιθυμία, the gender of the 
pronoun τοῦτο is assimilated to that of ὄρεξις. If what is pleasant is the object 
desired when we are under the influence of ἐπιθυμία, its force is greatest while 
the pleasure is felt. Thus ὄρεξις would follow upon αἴσθησις automatically. 
There would be little need to interpose the link of φαντασία. the after result of 
sensation. 

b6. ἔτι 8. A new step in the argument. The nutriment which animals 
require 1s apprehended by touch. 

b 8. τούτων δ᾽, int. καθ᾽ atvrd, as the necessary antithesis to κατὰ συμβεβηκός. 
Hot, cold, moist, dry, the qualities of body as such, are tangibles fer se, are 
perceived directly by touch. Cf. 423} 27—-29. For the different meanings of 
sensibles Jer se and sensibles fer accidens, see 11.,) c. 6. 

bg. τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, Int. αἴσθησις addy. So Alex. 
Aphr. ap. Philop. 253, 13 τῶν δὲ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν, φησὶν 6 ᾿Αλέξανδρος, κατὰ 
συμβεβηκὸς τὴν ἁφὴν εἶπεν ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι (cf. 252, 17 sqq.), Simpl. 105, 34. 
The objects of the other senses are indirectly perceived by touch. By this 
construction τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν is made parallel to τούτων in the preceding 
line. Ali nutriment is tangible, but all tangibles are not nutriment. Colours, 
sounds and smells, though tangibles Jer acctdexs, contribute nothing to nutri- 
ment. A. himself lays down in so many words that one of the special senses 
may perceive er accidens the direct objects of the other senses. Cf. 425 a 30 56. 
And, as he affirms that in this way we perceive what is sweet by sight (425 a 22, 
cf. 425 Ὁ 1—4), so no doubt he would admit that we, or other animals, fer 


Il. 3 4148 33—b 13 333 


accidens, perceive colour (e.g. honey), smell (sweet-scented thyme), or even 
sound (as of water) by touch. 

The alternatives proposed are (1) that of Philop. 253, 21 sqq. who connects 
the genitive with Ὁ 5 sq. ἐπιθυμία or ὄρεξις, understanding it of the colours and 
odours of viands and beverages, which are objects of desire by association. 
This view, though quite unnecessary, is ingenious and at least reasonable. 
(2) To supply the ellipse from Ὁ ὃ τρέφεται τὰ ζῶντα πάντα and either alter the 
genitive to the dative, as is done by Torstrik and by Belger and Wallace after 
him, or treat the sentence as anacoluthic (the dative could hardly be replaced 
by partitive genitive after τρέφεται). The latter view (2) has found most favour. 
Thus Simpl., who fully recognises the grammatical sense of the words, con- 
tinues (105, 35) οὐ μὴν τοῦτο λέγειν οἶμαι βούλεται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τροφίμων 
τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων αἰσθητῶν ἡ αἴσθησις ἀντιλαμβάνεται. Soph. 53, 7 ἀλλὰ τρεφόμεθα 
μέν, ὡς εἴρηται, τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν αἰσθητοῖς, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν... οὔ. 
Soph., then, interprets “nutriment ger accédens” by “no nutriment at all.” 
Professor Beare (p. 178) likewise adopts (2) “The objects of other senses 
nourish only incidentally; just as sound, colour, smell may put an animal on 
the track of food, but they cannot in themselves feed it.” It comes to this: if 
it had not been for the colour, sound and scent of the quarry, the captor would 
not have pursued it; if he had not pursued and caught it, he would not have 
eaten it; ergo, the colour, sound and scent of the quarry are constructively 
the nutriment of the captor. This is rather a lawyer-like way of stating the 
case. The plain facts are given Z£¢k. Nic. 1118 a 16—23, a 9—13. 

b IO οὐθὲν γὰρ...1 ὀσμή. As I have tried to indicate by the brackets, this 
clause gives the reason, not for the immediately preceding statement that touch 
is only incidentally concerned with the other sensibles, but for that made b 7 
“ΤΟΥ touch is the sense concerned with nutriment,” or rather for the first proof 
of this adduced b 7 ξηροῖς yap...8 πάντα, viz. that the tangibles ger se form 
animal nutriment. The first yap clause gives a proof on the positive side that 
touch is concerned with food: this is now supplemented by showing that no 
other sense is; colours, sounds and smells being not nutriment at all, neither 
per se nor per accidens. Cf. 434 Ὁ 19 5ᾳ. In De Sensu 445 a 16 A. mentions 
the opinion of some Pythagoreans that certain animals feed upon odours only to 
reject it as irrational. The force of γὰρ is really obscured by those who, like 
SimpL, make A. first say “animals are nourished incidentally by the other 
sensibles” and explain this by the addition “for they are not nourished by 
colours, sounds and smells at all.” 

bri. ὁ δὲ χυμὸς, flavour, the proper object of taste. A. here, by anticipation, 
assimilates the object of taste to the object of touch; cf. 11.. cc. Io, 11 generally, 
especially 422 a 8 and 423 a 17—20. 

Ὁ 12. ξηροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ. These are the two qualities of earth, according to 
the scheme which A. formulates for deriving the “natural bodies” (the so-called 
four elements) from ultimate matter (pure potentiality) by the superposition of 
the primary contraries, hot, cold, dry, moist. Similarly water is determined by 
the conjunction of moist and cold as qualification of ultimate matter (πρώτη ὕλη). 
Cf. Zeller, Eng. Trans. vol. 1. p. 479 564. 

b13. ἥδυσμά τι, a relish to the food, and not in itself food; so Them. 
(47, 35 H., 87, 29 Sp.). Cf De Semsu 1, 435b 22—24, 436 Ὁ 15 τὸ yap ἡδὺ 
διακρίνει [int. τὸ ζῷον] καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν αὐτῇ (int. τῇ γεύσει) περὶ τὴν τροφήν, Sore 
τὸ μὲν φεύγειν τὸ δὲ διώκειν, and 4, 442 ἃ ὃ συμμίγνυνται δ᾽ οἱ ἄλλοι χυμοὶ εἰς τὴν 
τροφὴν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ ἁλμυρῷ καὶ ὀξεῖ, ἀντὶ ἡδύσματοςς. Probably this is 
what is meant by the strange phrase Ζ2. 1, 436b 17 καὶ ὅλως ὁ χυμός ἐστι τοῦ 


334 NOTES Il. 3 


θρεπτικοῦ πάθος (so Biehl), flavour is a quality of that which is nutritive. τούτων, 
i.e. of things dry, hot, moist and cold, i.e. of food solid or liquid. 

Ὁ 14. αὐτῶν, i.e. foods and flavours. The promised discussion comes when 
(in cc. 10, 11) the whole subject of τὰ yevora and τὰ ἁπτὰ is treated. 

Ῥ 16. φαντασίας. Cf. 403a 8 and zotes: see more particularly 413 Ὁ 22. 
The uncertainty is not whether sense-perception implies imagination (φαντασία) 
of some sort, but whether, in all animals, this indistinct persistence of sense 
images really amounts to that which is defined as φαντασία in Book 111.) c. 3; at 
least this is what appears from 433b 31—4344a δ. ὕστερον. From IIL, c. 3 
no definite result on this point is obtained. But in 111..0 c. 11, 433b 31—434a 7 
A’s remarks furnish us with an explicit statement of the problem with an 
indication of the lines on which he would solve it: “ But we must consider the 
case of animals imperfectly developed, which have only the sense of touch. Is 
it possible that they should have imagination (φαντασία) or not? Or, again, 
appetite? For it is plain that they feel pleasure and pain. If these, then 
necessarily also appetite. But how can they have imagination? Or shall we 
say, that as such creatures move in a vague and undefined manner, so all these 
powers are present, but present In a vague and undefined manner? Perceptive 
imagination (7 αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία) is found in the other animals also, but 
deliberative (βουλευτικὴ) in those only which have reason.” 

Ὁ 18. τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς. A.’s usage of the two verbs δεανοεῖσθαι, 
νοεῖν as practically equivalent in meaning 1s abundantly illustrated throughout 
the treatise. When he does distinguish between them, he prefers διανοεῖσθαι to 
express the process of judging that 4 is 5 and νοεῖν the process of grasping a 
single object of thought, a notion or the content of a definition. In conformity 
with this distinction διανοητικὸν is the reasoning faculty which is discursive, 
which judges truth and falsehood and draws inferences, while νοῦς is intuitive 
and apprehends. 

big. εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν κτέ. Cf. Ath. Nic. 1141 a 20 ἄτοπον yap εἴ τις τὴν 
πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ 
κόσμῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. Also 1141 a 34 καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν 
φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν 6 κόσμος συνέστηκεν. 

414b 19-- 415. 19. A. now takes up a question which had been 
raised in 402 Ὁ 5 sq., the question, namely, in what sense the definition of soul 
has unity, or in what sense there is a single definition of soul. Does it corre- 
spond to the definition of animal, or is there a separate definition for each 
particular soul, as there is a separate definition of horse, dog, man, god, the 
universal animal being either non-existent or anyhow a posterior and artificial 
conception, like any other common term? Here he proceeds as follows: soul 
will have a common definition in the same way as figure. Just as there is no 
figure other than triangle, quadrilateral, pentagon and the rest, to which the 
generic definition of figure applies, so there is nothing to which the definition 
of soul applies, apart from the several varieties of soul. The only definition 
applicable to soul in general or figure in general is one which will not fit any 
particular soul or any particular figure, and it is absurd to look for a general 
notion, in these as in other cases, without investigating the infimae species [§ 5]. 
But just as each plane rectilinear figure is potentially contained in the next, as 
triangle in quadrilateral, quadrilateral in pentagon, so with the varieties of soul, 
the nutritive being potentially in the sensitive, the sensitive in the intellective. 
The right method of enquiry, then, is to ask what constitutes the soul of a 
plant, of a beast, of a man [§ 6]. Why such a scale exists is a further question, 
but its existence Is a fact, as is also the gradation of the senses, touch alone 


II. 3 414 b 13—b 23 335 


being universal and presupposed wherever the other senses are found. Higher 
still among vital functions comes locomotion, and last of all reasoning and 
thought. In every case the lower faculty can exist apart from the higher, but 
the higher presupposes those below it. The position of speculative intellect will 
be discussed separately [§ 7]. 

The answer here given amounts to this, that soul is a logical entity only, a 
mere καθόλου. We must study the different sorts of soul in the different animals 
and after that we may, if we please, frame a definition of soul in the abstract. 
But we must always remember that soul does not exist first as soul in the abstract 
and afterwards as nutritive soul, sensitive soul, etc. I have translated rerpd- 
yevov (Ὁ 31) by “quadrilateral.” It should be four-angled figure, but no English 
word in common use expresses this exactly, for “quadrangle” has other associa- 
tions, and “‘tetragon” would be pedantic. Heiberg, Mathematisches zu Aristoteles 
(in Abhandlungen zur Gesch. der math. Wtssenschaften XVUl. Heft, 1904), Ρ. 15, 
has the following remarks: “τετράγωνον as used by the Pythagoreans meant 
‘square’ (986 a 26) and this is its usual meaning in A. (e.g. Σ1 8 10, 15 a 30, 306 Ὁ 6), 
its meaning is doubtful in 272b 19, but 414b 31 it appears to mean quadri- 
lateral (Viereck) and in 1054b 2 τὰ ἴσα καὶ ἰσογώνια τετράγωνα this must be its 
meaning if ἰσογώνια is to have any sense: in 1054b 5 either meaning is possible. 
Probably it was Euclid who finally got nd of the ambiguity by introducing the 
term τετράπλευρον. Neither Plato nor A. was acquainted with τετράπλευρον, 
though it occurs in the spurious writings, JZechanica 848 Ὁ 20, Probl. g11b 3.” 

Ὁ 20. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, “in exactly the same way,” neither more nor less. 
There is no real object denoted by figure, the genus or universal, except and 
apart from the various particular figures. And similarly to soul, the genus or 
universal, there corresponds nothing except and apart from the several varieties 
of soul. A purely generic definition of figure, as of soul, can indeed be framed 
in words, but there is nothing in rerum natura, apart from the particular 
varieties of figure, that it defines. εἷς ἂν εἴη λόγος. An echo of 4o2b 5 
εὐλαβητέον δ᾽ ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστί, καθάπερ ζῴου. The 
precise analogue of soul, it now appears, is not so much “animal” as “figure,” 
i.e. plane rectilinear figure, σχῆμα ἐπίπεδον εὐθύγραμμον. 

Ὁ 21. ἐκεῖ, “in the latter case,” in the instance adduced for purposes of 
illustration, i.e. figure, a subject properly foreign to the discussion and so 
further off. παρὰ, “ beside,” “other than.” Cf. 408 a 23, 424 Ὁ 22. τρίγωνόν 
ἔστι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς. By beginning with triangle and going on to αυδαγ!δίοσαι, 
pentagon etc., A. shows that he is thinking exclusively of rectilinear figures. 
Otherwise circle, which is bounded by one line, or segment of circle, bounded 
by two lines, would come before triangle, which is the first only if the series be 
of rectilinear figures. Cf. Wefaph. 1054 ἃ 3: if the universe consisted of nothing 
but rectilinear figures, σχήματα εὐθύγραμμα, the triangle would be the unit of its 
plurality. 

Ὁ 22. ἐνταῦθα, “in the case in hand,” the subject under discussion, soul. 
τὰς εἰρημένας, the grades of soul enumerated at the beginning of this chapter 
(414a 29—32), as also in 413 Ὁ 1oO—13. γίνοιτο δ᾽ dy. Probably concessive : 
“it is possible to frame a generic definition, which shall be one and the same 
(eis λόγος). 

Ὁ 23. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων. The genitive here and the dative Ὁ 24 after ἐπὶ 
give much the same sense. As with figures, so, too, with the different varieties of 
soul. In fact we have already framed such a general definition of soul, 412 Ὁ 4—6. 
The corresponding definition would be for figure generally, “that which is 
enclosed by one or more lines,” and for rectilmear figure (which A. has in mind: 


336 NOTES Il. 3 


cf. Simpl. 106, 36 sq.) “that which 15 enclosed by three or more straight lines.” 
Such definitions convey no information about any of the particular figures. Nor 
does the general definition of II., c. I give any information about any particular 
kind of soul. The only vital functions which it recognised were those common 
to all animals and all plants (412 ἃ 14). ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν. Cf. z0¢/e on 
4o8 a 5. 

Ὁ 25. 86, “Sand hence,” i.e. because the genus figure or the genus soul 
denotes nothing apart from particular figures or particular souls. γελοῖον. 
The proceeding declared to be absurd is not the search for generic definitions 
in itself, but the neglect while seeking them to define also the particular variation 
of the subject under investigation. So Simpl. 107, 39 οὐχ ἁπλῶς βούλεται γελοῖον 
εἶναι τὸ ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζητεῖν τὸ κοινὸν ἀφέντα τὸ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον 
καὶ ἄτομον εἶδος. Cf. Philop. 257, 7—14. In other words, we must not be 
satisfied with the generic definition of soul obtained in II., c. 1, but must go on to 
a detailed investigation of the different forms of soul. It is in fact this investiga- 
tion which is the main subject of the rest of the treatise. 

Ὁ 26. ἐπὶ τούτων, 1.6. in the case of figure or of soul. ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρων. This may 
refer to or include the real genera of zoology and botany. As Philop. (257, 17 sq.) 
puts it, even if we were studying the genus animal, it would not be enough, 
unless we proceed to study the different species of animals: ὦ jforfiord is this 
true in the case of “soul,” which is a genus ger analogiam. οὐδενὸς ἔσται TOV 
ὄντων. What the merely generic definition defines is, in their cases, something 
non-existent. The κοινὸν (to use the language of 402 b 7 sq.) 15 not merely 
ὕστερον, it 18 οὐθέν. 

Ὁ 27. οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἄτομον εἶδος. Believing that these words 
form part of the relative clause, 1 am unable to retain the comma after λόγος, 
much less a colon. The phrase εἶναι κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἄτομον εἶδος bears 
much the same meaning aS τῷ οἰκείῳ καὶ τῷ ἀτόμῳ εἴδει ἐφαρμόζειν (cf. Ὁ 23 
ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν) or εἶναι ἴδιος λόγος τοῦ εἴδους. The article τὸ has virtually a 
distributive force. "Whatever species we are studying is the appropriate one for 
the definition to fit. By ἄτομον εἶδος is meant the infima species which cannot 
be further subdivided by differences. Cf. ὧν μηκέτι ἐστὶ διαφορά Anal. Post. 11. 13, 
97 a 19, or, as Alex. describes them, τὰ ἔσχατα εἴδη, ἃ οὐκέτι διαφοραῖς διαιρεῖται. 
The adjective ἄτομος is also used by A. in his logical -writings to denote indi- 
viduals or particular things, τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα or τινά. In order to guard against 
mistake, when infimae species are intended some word is added, e.g. ἄτομα εἴδη, 
ἄτομα εἴδει or ἄτομα τῷ γένει, when the context itself does not determine the 
meaning intended (see Zeller, Eng. Tyrams. vol. 1.. p. 222 2. 2, p. 216 22. 1). 

b27. ἀφέντας τὸν τοιοῦτον. These words, which are specially important for 
the interpretation of the sentence, are best referred to the ofkeiov καὶ ἄτομον εἶδος 
just mentioned. If so, τὸν τοιοῦτον Ξκετὸν κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἄτομον εἶδος (int. 
λόγον). The participle ἀφέντας is harsh. It of course agrees with the subject of 
ζητεῖν, and has a conditional force ‘‘if (by so doing) we neglect the definition of 
the particular species.” 

Wallace rightly paraphrases the whole sentence: “And hence it is absurd both 
in this case and in others to seek for a universal definition which shall be peculiar 
to no one form of existence nor framed with reference to the particular and indi- 
vidual species, if such common definition makes us neglect particular analysis.” 
Pacius (as did Them. before him) refers τὸν τοιοῦτον to A.’s own definition as given 
in II.,c.1. Zabarella and M. Rodier in his translation make it refer to τὸν κοινὸν 
λόγον. Trend. suggested that it might be taken as=ad certam qualitatem 
redacta (int. notio), which is almost equivalent to “a specific definition.” Of 


11. 3 414 Ὁ 23—415a 5 337 


these the first is the most unreasonable. Again, it has been proposed to regard 
A. as mediating between an excessive attachment either to the generic or to the 
particular definition, and some, who adopt this view, seem to understand ξητεῖν 
with οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἄτομον εἶδος. But this would require μηδέ, and 
not οὐδέ. Others in place of οὐδὲ would read οὐδὲ <Sei>. The sense would 
then be, “but again we ought not to confine ourselves to the appropriate 
individual species,” to the neglect of the generic definition. This interpretation, 
though professedly making A. hold the balance impartially between the generic 
and specific definition, is diametrically opposed to the one I prefer, so far as 
regards the words τὸν τοιοῦτον, but no result in the treatise is, as a matter of fact, 
deduced from the generic definition except that soul is moving and final cause, as 
well as form, of living body, 415 Ὁ 8sqq. The study of soul in the abstract leads 
to no discoveries and would therefore be exposed to the censure which A. has 
unsparingly bestowed upon definitions, such as harmony, 408 a 3—~5, or self- 
moving number, 409b 13—18. 

b 28. τῷ περὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ τὰ κατὰ ψυχήν. There does not seem to be 
much difference between these prepositions as here used, nor between either 
and ἐπὶ c. gen. or (less commonly, as sufra b24) c. dat. Cf. also τὰ περὶ τὸν 
νοῦν) 429b 22. 

b29. ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον. Here, as wherever ἐν ois ἐστὶ 
τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον denotes a class of concepts, the priority intended is 
not priority in time. Its nature could not be better illustrated than by this 
example of figures. A. holds the triangle to be the simplest rectilinear figure 
(seeing that two straight lines cannot enclose a space). Given the triangle, the 
quadrilateral, pentagon etc. can be derived from it by combining two, three or 
more triangles; while, if there were no such thing as a triangle, the other recti- 
linear figures, thus dependent upon it, could not exist. The triangle has thus a 
logical priority among rectilinear figures: it is presupposed by them. Other 
examples are arithmetical numbers (ἡ Ζεζαρά. 999 a 6 sqq., lo80b 1ἰ sqq.), polities 
and forms of constitution (Pol. 1275 a 35sqq.). In all these the relation between 
the varieties (of figure, number, polity, and so likewise of soul) is not a relation 
between species of a genus proper, the latter being mutually exclusive. If eg. 
we divide ζῷον into ἔναιμον and ἄναιμον, nothing ἔναιμον can be ἄναιμον, the 
divisions are mutually exclusive. Whereas αἰσθητικὸν is at the same time, 
potentially, θρεπτικόν. δυνάμει. If we draw the diagonal of our quadrilateral 
what was potentially triangle becomes actually so. 

b 32. ὥστε. This is the conclusion which follows so soon as we learn the 
true nature of the varieties of soul. To have found a generic definition does 
not free us from the obligation to investigate each form separately. Those, 
however, can only be studied in the concrete, in plant, in beast, in man. 

Ὁ 33. ϑιὰ τίνα δ᾽ αἰτῶν. The reason is that nature does nothing in vain. 
All other animals are subservient to man: De Part. Au. Iv. 10, Pol. 1256 b 15—26, 
Metaph. 1075 a 16 sqq. 

4154 1. σκεπτέον. The sequence is accounted for on teleological grounds 
in III. cc. 12, 13, the assumption given in the last note being the starting 
point. ἄνευ μὲν yap. The γὰρ certainly does not introduce the reason of 
the fact asserted, but merely justifies the assertion, expanding τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως 
ἔχουσι. 

a2. χωρίζεται. Cf. supra 4138 31 and 410 Ὁ 19---24. 

a4. apy. Cf. supra 4148 3. 

a5. πολλὰ. Of these lower forms of life, sponges, zoophytes, and some 
crustacea were known to the ancients and are mentioned by A., who also asserts 


H. 22 


338 NOTES II. 3 


(Metaph. 980 b 23) that bees have no sense of hearing. Whether ants can hear 
has not yet been finally determined. 

a7. τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει. Cf. qiob 19, 413 Ὁ 2 sq. 

aro. τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία. That some inferior animals have not φαντασία 
is implied in 428 a 8 εἶτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πτάρεστι, φαντασία δ᾽ οὔ. εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ 
τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν : cf. 4288. 21 τῶν δὲ 
θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δ᾽ ἐν πολλοῖς, and 7. 23 τῶν δὲ θηρίων 
ἐνίοις φαντασία.μὲν -ὃπάρχει, where ἐνίοις and πολλοῖς imply that φαντασία is not 
univérsally found. This is true, in so far as the term φαντασία is limited (as 
sometimes it is in A.) to percepts retained. But it is not in this sense of φαντασία 
that (in 433 a τι sq. and 4344 4) it is said to be implied in all αἴσθησις. 

all. τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ, i.e. animals in general: cf. JZetaph. 980b 26. By 
μόνῃ 15 implied that they do not rise to the possession of λογισμός, not, of course, 
that they are without éri@upia. Cf. 429a 6 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία. 
τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ vod. The subject is finally taken up in III., cc. 4—-8. 

a 173. οὗτος, i.e. the account of the several faculties which it has now been 
decided to give. οἰκειότατος. Probably an absolute superlative “as relevant 
as anything can be.” We must not begin by asking what is soul apart from the 
nutritive, sensitive, intellective faculties, etc. καὶ, “also,” emphasises the περὶ 
ψυχῆς which follows, “is at the same time the most appropriate description.” 


CHAPTER IV. 


415 a 14-22. Since the study of the several faculties is an integral 
part of psychology, the student must begin his investigations by ascertaining 
what each of them is before proceeding further. But if the faculties are to be 
defined, we must first enquire about the corresponding processes or operations, 
and this again requires a preliminary investigation of the correlative objects, 
e.g. the objects of sense and of thought [ὃ 1]. 

The order of investigation here prescribed settles the question raised in 
402 Ὁ 1I—I5. 

4158 14. μέλλοντα. Cf. for the turn of phrase Pol. 1288 Ὁ 5. 

Δ 15. περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. The task proposed in 402 a 7 sq. 
was twofold, to investigate (1) the essence (οὐσία) of soul, and (2) its properties 
(ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν) which must be taken to mean “essential properties,” 
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα, and are explained (ρος. czz.) to include properties shared 
by the body as well as those, if any, peculiar to the soul itself. We should have 
expected the same twofold division here, but in place of τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα, 
Ta ἐχόμενα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα are apparently substituted. These are general ex- 
pressions, “what comes next, and the rest,” and Them. passes over ra ἄλλα 
altogether. He says (49, 15 H., 90, 17 Sp.) ἐχόμενα δέ ἐστι τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρ- 
xovra ἑκάστῃ δυνάμει. Philop. (263, 13 sqq.) agrees as to ra ἐχόμενα, while 
offering a number of suggestions as to τὰ ἄλλα (263, 18—24). Simpl. (109, 16 sq. 
σημαίνει δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶδος τῷ τί ἐστε, rots ἐχομένοις δὲ τὰ δριζόμενα, ὡς τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ 
ὑπάρχοντα) is clearly astray. After the essence must come the essential 
properties. It can hardly be maintained that in the present treatise these 
properties are exhaustively discussed, and this is A.’s own admission at the 
opening of the De Sensu, where, in a passage (4368 1--- 1) too long to quote in 
full, he sketches the programme of the Parva Naturaiia (ἐχόμενόν ἐστι ποιή- 
σασθαι τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν περὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ζωὴν ἐχόντων ἁπάντων, τίνες εἰσὶν 


ΤΠ. 4 415 a 5—a 26 339 


ἔδιαι καὶ τίνες κοιναὶ πράξεις αὐτῶν. τὰ μὲν οὖν εἰρημένα περὶ ψυχῆς ὑποκείσθω, 
στερὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν xré.). If we are to distinguish between τὰ ἐχόμενα 
and τὰ ἄλλα, which is at least doubtful, it may be conjectured that the last 
items on this programme, De Sezsu 436a 12—19, Health and Sickness, Youth 
and Old Age, constitute τὰ ἄλλα, “other matters,” while τὰ ἐχόμενα are the 
essential properties of the several faculties. 

a 18. πρότερον ἔτι λεκτέον. Cf. 402 Ὁ 9—16. The questions as to priority 
there raised are here decided. What are there called τὰ ἔργα are here called αἱ 
ἐνέργειαι καὶ ai τεράξεις. 

aig. κατὰ τὸν λόγον. These words go closely with πρότεραι. The priority 
is a logical priority. Two views of this phrase have been taken, according as it 
does or does not mean the same as οὐσίᾳ πρότερον. In the former case it is 
“in the order of thought”=in the order of real existence, in nature’s order; in 
the latter case we should render “in the order of our thought” or of knowledge. 
ind. Ar. 435 a 6 λόγῳ πρότερον vel ita usurpatur ut distinguatur ab eo quod 
est οὐσίᾳ mpérepov...vel ut idem sit ac πρότερον οὐσίᾳ. Bonitz inclines to the 
view of the Greek commentators, for Alex. Aphr. (ap. Philop. 264, 15—24); 
Philop. (264, 11—15), and Simpl. (109, 24—30) fairly agree with Them., 
according to whom (49, 18 sqq. H., 90, 21 sqq. Sp.) it is relatively to us that 
activities are prior and better known. What takes place, the operation oF 
function, is relatively clear: the faculty or part of the soul is relatively obscure 
to us. We observe operations and from them infer the presence of the faculty 
which exists to realise them. But in the order of nature it is the reverse; the 
faculties must exist before they can operate. It should be remembered that the 
enquiry before us is methodological. Them. explains wpérepac by σαφέστεραι 
πρὸς ἡμᾶς, more evident from our point of view. Thus we select for earlier 
treatment what is easier for us to understand and after studying this we shall 
be in a better position to explain what remains. This priority of the operation 
to the faculty in the order of knowledge would alone be ample justification for 
A.’s procedure. The priority of ἐνέργεια to divapis is established in Mefaph. ©., Ὁ. 8, 
1049 Ὁ Io—12 566.; viz. its priority λόγῳ 1049 b 12—17, χρόνῳ, 1049 Ὁ 17---ἸΟ50 ἃ 3; 
οὐσίᾳ τοτοῖ 4 sqq. Cf. 1071 b 12—1072a 18. It is doubtful, however, whether 
this doctrine is explicitly present to A.’s mind in our present passage, though he 
refers to it below 431 a I sqq. 

a 22. οἷον, “namely”: Jud. Ar. p. 502 a 7 inde eo deflectit usus ut οἷον 
omnino explicandi vim habeat, iq nempe, nimirum, scilicet. Cf. Waitz ad Categ- 
3, 1b 18, Bz. ad Metaph. 985 Ὁ 6. So 421b9, 424b 30, 426b 27, 429 8 4, ὃ, 
434 15. τροφῆς. Nutriment in the concrete is co-ordinate, as an object, 
with sensibles and cogitables. We must study all three objects in order to 
know about the operations of nutrition, perception and thought respectively. 

415a 22-—b 7. We begin, then, with the nutritive faculty, the lowest 
and the most widely distributed. It has two functions, the propagation of the 
species and assimilation of nutriment. The former is a means to the only 
immortality which perishable creatures can secure [§ 2]. 

a 23. τροφῆς. As this word can mean nutrition as well as nutriment, it 15 
fitly co-ordinated with γέννησις. 

a 26. γεννῆσαι. Cf De Gen. An. I. 4, 740b 34 4 γὰρ αὐτή ἐστιν ὕλη ἣ 
αὐξάνεται καὶ ἐξ ἧς συνίσταται τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε καὶ 7 ποιοῦσα δύναμις ταὐτὸ τῷ ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς. μείζων δὲ αὕτη ἐστίν. ef οὖν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχή, αὕτη ἐστὶ καὶ 7 
γεννῶσα" καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις ἡ ἑκάστου, ἐνυπάρχουσα καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν ζῴοις 
πᾶσιν. This explains the point of view from which the two functions are 
regarded as of identical origin, both being moments in that instinct of self- 


22——2 


340 NOTES II. 4 


preservation, which aims at the continued existence of the individual and 
through him of the race. φυσικώτατον γὰρ. Cf. Pol. 1252.a 26 ἀνάγκη δὴ 
πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ 
ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον): 
also De Gen. An. 11. 1, 735 a 17—19, I. 23, 731 b 24 sqq., 111. 10, 760a 35 566. 

a 27 ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα...28 ἔχει. Presumably for ὅσα τέλεια καὶ 
<dca> μὴ πηρώματά ἐστιν ἢ <py> κτέ. The negative μὴ is to be understood 
again in the clause ἢ... ἔχε. 1 have therefore omitted the comma after πηρώ- 
para. Bonitz rightly observes, 7ηα. Ar. 533b 6, membra a pron ὅσα exorsa 
interdum liberius cum unjversa enunciatione coniuncta sunt. The notion of 
ἀτελὲς is distinct from that of πήρωμα, with which it is often conjoined: cf. 
425a 10, 432 Ὁ 22—-24. The former is undeveloped, not yet come to maturity, 
e.g. a boy, the latter is maimed and will never mature. He or it has become 
an abnormal member of his class by loss of some part or function. In the 
organic world there are many irregular natural phenomena where nature’s 
design seems thwarted and stops short of perfect realisation. Extreme cases 
are called monstrosities (τέρατα) and these are παρὰ φύσιν, De Gen. An, IV. 4, 
770b 9 sq. But that πηροῦν and πήρωμα are used in a wider signification 
may be seen from the fact that according to A. the female sex is a stunted or 
undeveloped male: τὸ yap θῆλυ ὥσπερ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ πτεπηρωμένον, De Gen. An. 11. 
3, 7378. 2727. The effect of arrested, unequal development is sometimes expressed 
by νανώδης, which is applied to birds, fishes and even to all bloodless animals 
when contrasted with higher types and with man. 

a 28. αὐτομάτην. A. firmly believed in spontaneous generation, knowing 
nothing of the germs or bacilli which in certain processes of decomposition, as 
in fermentation, invisibly generate new organisms and thus account for the 
apparent spontaneity. ἕτερον [int. τοιοῦτον οἷον αὐτό. Cf. 415 Ὁ 7, 416 Ὁ 24, 26, 
Pol. 1252 ἃ 30 cited above in more on ἃ 26. 

8ι 29. τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ Gelov. Cf. Plato Symp. 206 E ὅτι devyevés ἐστι καὶ ἀθάνατον 
ὡς θνητῷ 4 γέννησις, and 207 A, 207 Ὁ ζητεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀεί τε εἶναι καὶ 
ἀθάνατος. δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον, τῇ γενέσει κτξ, Cf. also Laws IV. 721 Β, C and 
the spurious treatise Oecon. 1. 3, 1343 Ὁ 23 56. See Teichmiiller, Studien zur 
Geschichte der Begriffe, p- 351. 

415 Ὁ 2. τὸ δ᾽ οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν. This is of the nature of a footnote. It is 
repeated below 415 b 20. Probably either here or there it is out of place. We 
find it again, unnecessarily interrupting the argument, in AZeZaph. 1072b 2 ἔστι 
yap τινὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τινός, De Gen. An. 11. 6, 742 a 22 sqq., Phys. Il. 2, 
1094 8. 35 sq.. Aud. Ath. VI. τῷ, 1249 Ὁ 15. The end or final cause may be 
understood as (4) the result for the sake of which, or (4) the person or thing 
for the sake of whom or which, something is done whether in nature or in 
art. Medicine (ἰατρικὴ) has in view both τὸ οὗ, health, ὑγίεια, and τὸ ᾧ the 
patient, 6 ὑγεαίνων. The former is that to secure which such and such things 
are done, that at which the art and the practitioner, or in another sphere 
nature, aims; the latter is the person or thing in whom or in which and for 
whose advantage such and such results are attained, the recipient of the benefit, 
the cuz of Cuz om0? In the domain of ethics “happiness” is the end in chief 
(od) which each man strives to secure for “himself” (ᾧ). Cf. Them. 50, 11—19 H., 
92, 4—15 Sp., Simpl. 110, 32—38, Simpl. 27% Phys. 303, 29—304, 6. 

b 3. τῇ συνεχείᾳ. The dative marks the mode of participation. The word 
must here denote continuity or perpetuity of individual existence. That is 
συνεχὴς which coheres and extends without a break; not only extended magni- 


II. 4 415 a 26—b ὁ 241 


tude (cf. 409 ἃ 14), but also time, PAys. IV. 11, 219 ἃ 12, 1 3. The paraphrase of 
Them. (50, 18 H., 92, 13 Sp.) has suggested a doubt whether he understood τῇ 
συνεχείᾳ of the continuance of the race, not of the individual, and, if so, whether 
he had a different text, e.g. δύναται for ἀδυνατεῖ. His words are: τούτῳ [int. τῷ 
ἐν γενέσει] yap περιποιῆσαι βούλεται εἰκόνα θειότητος καὶ ἀϊδιότητος ἡ φύσις, καθόσον 
δύναται- δύναται δὲ τῇ συνεχείᾳ μόνῃ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταὐτὸ 
καὶ ἕν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν. It would seem, however, that he is paraphrasing freely 
and in δύναται δὲ τῇ συνεχείᾳ μόνῃ he may be thinking of δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον 
τῇ γενέσει cited above (zoze on ἃ. 29) from Plato. 

b6. ταύτῃ: The not very usual addition of the antecedent ταύτῃ after the 
relative, and in this position after the verb, lends emphasis to the manner of 
participation. Thus, then, “must this mortal put on immortality.” With ἢ 
δύναται μετέχειν ἕκαστον, κοινωνεῖ ταύτῃ cf. De Gen. An. I. 1, 731b 21 ἐπεὶ yap 
ἀδύνατος ἡ φύσις τοῦ τοιούτου γένους ἀΐδιος εἶναι, καθ᾽ ὃν ἐνδέχεται τρόπον, κατὰ 
τοῦτόν ἐστιν ἀΐδιον τὸ γινόμενον. ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον (ἡ γὰρ οὐσία τῶν ὄντων 
ἐν τῷ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον" τοιοῦτον δ᾽ εἴπερ ἦν, ἀΐδιον ἂν ἢν), εἴδει δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται. διὸ γένος 
ἀεὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ζῴων ἐστὶ καὶ φυτῶν. Unity of the species is maintained, but 
not the personal identity of its members. The race persists, the individual 
perishes: which exactly accords with the account given 408 Ὁ 18—29. 

Ὁ 7. ἀλλ᾽ οἷον αὐτό, int. τοιοῦτον as above a 28. ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἕν, εἴδει δ᾽ 
ἕν. For the antithesis cf. Wetaph. 1016 Ὁ 31 ἔτι δὲ τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν ἐστιν ἕν, 
τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ εἶδος, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν" ἀριθμῷ μὲν ὧν ἡ ὕλη μία, 
εἴδει δ᾽ ὧν ὁ λόγος εἷς. Cf. also supra 411 Ὁ 20 ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα ψυχὴν τῷ εἴδει; 
εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀριθμῷ. 

415 b 8-- 4168 18. Soul is the principle and cause of a living body 
in each of three senses [§ 3]. It is formal cause [8 4]; it is final cause [δ 5]. 
That it is also moving cause is evident when we consider that motion includes 
qualitative change and quantitative change or growth, as well as spatial motion, 
which is not an attribute of all living things ; and further that sensation is a 
qualitative change, while growth is implied in nutrition, and nutrition is confined 
to living things [ἢ 6]. We may remark in passing that Empedocles was mis- 
taken in attributing downward growth to earth and upward growth to fire, 
the fact being that the roots of plants find their analogues in the heads of 
animals, not to mention the objection that, if parts of an organism tend in 
opposite directions, a central principle is needed to keep them together [§ 7]. 
Another erroneous view makes fire the sole cause of nutrition and growth, 
whereas it is only a contributory cause, soul itself being the true cause [8 8]. 

This remarkable passage is at any rate a digression, as 4168 18 might 
follow 415 b 7 without detriment to the argument. It is also strange that the 
term τροφὴ occurs only once, towards the end of the passage, 416 a Io, as the 
proof that growth accompanies life makes no direct mention of the very faculty, 
the nutritive, which we are ostensibly investigating in this chapter. It is 
strange too, that, while discussing this faculty, we should come across a quite 
general proof that soul is the cause of the living body in three senses, a proof 
equally applicable to all the faculties. One would have thought that such a 
proof would have been more in place at some point nearer the definition of soul 
as entelechy, the definition which is assumed in the argument of the passage. 

b 8. αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή. For ἀρχὴ cf. 402 a 6 οἷον ἀρχή, moze. 

bg. πολλαχῶς. For the three meanings of cause here given see 7Ζεζαῤά. 
983 a 26 τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια λέγεται τετραχῶς, ὧν μίαν μὲν αἰτίαν φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ 
τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (ἀνάγεται γὰρ τὸ διὰ τί εἰς τὸν λόγον ἔσχατον, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸ διὰ 
τί πρῶτον), ἑτέραν δὲ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τρέτην δὲ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, 


342 NOTES Il. 4 


τετάρτην δὲ τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν ταύτῃ, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τἀγαθόν (τέλος γὰρ 
γενέσεως καὶ κινήσεως πάσης τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν). Cf. Metaph. τοῖ3 ἃ 34 sqq., Phys. 
Il. 3, especially 194 Ὁ 23 564. and zd. 7, τοῦ ἃ 14. [ἢ all these passages material 
cause or substratum ranks as a fourth cause distinct from, and contrasted 
with, the other three. διωρισμένους. The reference is perhaps to Mezaph. 
1013 a 24 sqq. cited above. 

bio. τρεῖς. The position of τρεῖς is no argument against its genuineness, 
the rule being that, when there are two epithets, it is sufficient that one should 
go with the article, the other may be placed where you please, as here after the 
_-neun. The paraphrase of Them. (50, 26 H., 92, 25 Sp.) is πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγο- 
μένης τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς αἰτίας ὁμοίως ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τοὺς διωρισμένους ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν 
ἀρχῶν τρόπους τριχῶς ἐστὶν αἰτία, which has suggested to Professor H. Jackson 
the conjecture τρεχῶς for τρεῖς. Them. is however quite within his rights as a 
judicious interpreter. ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις αὐτή. “The soul is in itself the origin of 
motion ” as opposed to something which derives from another the motion which 
it transmits. The accentuation of codd. ES αὐτῇ seems indefensible, for it 
would be intolerably harsh to supply καὶ yap ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῇ, καὶ οὗ evexa= 
for soul has the moving cause and the final cause, and then go on in a new 
sentence with καὶ ὡς 7 οὐσία τῶν ἐμψύχων σωμάτων ἡ ψυχὴ airia=and the soul is 
the cause of living things in the sense of substance. 

biI2 τὸ ydp...14 τούτου ἡ ψυχή. In Ὁ 14 τούτου, though it has poor authority 
(see critical zozes), decidedly improves the cogency of the argument. By 
τούτων, which has supplanted τούτου in the vulgate, must be meant τῶν 
ζώντων, cf. 402a 6 sq. Here we have a new setting of the proof that 
soul is the formal cause of the living organism. In logical form the proof 
runs as follows: the essence, or substance, of everything is the cause of its 
being; the being of living organisms is life; it follows that the essence, or 
substance, of living organisms is the cause of their life. But the cause of the 
life (rotrov=rov ζῆν) of living things is soul (cf. 414 a 12 “the soul is that 
whereby primarily we live”). ‘Therefore soul is the essence, or substance, of 
the living organism. This statement of the case has decided advantages, when 
compared with that of 4128 11—b 5, or 414 ἃ 4—1I4. 

b 13. τὸ δὲ ζῆν rots ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν. Waitz, commenting on Anal. Prior. 
ll. 21, 67 Ὁ 12 τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, has an interesting note on the light thrown by 
such a sentence as this and by 431 a 19 τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ev, καὶ pia μεσότης" τὸ & 
εἶναι αὐτῇ πλείω upon the origin of the construction by which τὸ εἶναι with 
the dative of the predicate does duty for the notion of a thing in the abstract, 
“substantialis notio.” Waitz says: Brevitas scilicet in dicendo et mutatus 
verborum ordo obscuritatem fecerunt. The dative is originally a dative of the 
possessor, like τοῖς ζῶσι here and αὐτῇ (431 a 19), but in the stereotyped phrase 
it 1s as a rule prefixed to the infinitive, and then it is predicative and seldom 
recurs as subject. Cf. ΖοΖ. ν. 4, 133 Ὁ 33 ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο λέγεται τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι αὐτοῖς 
[these are τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε and τὸ συμβεβηκὸς μετὰ τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκε λαμβανόμενον 
τὸ εἶναι- οὐ ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ τε τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ 
τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ λευκῷ. 

Ὁ 14. ἔτι τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος λόγος ἡ ἐντελέχεια. Itis to be noted that λόγος is 
one of the terms used for “formal cause” (v. sufra 403 Ὁ 2, 4148 9, 13 Sq.) 
This elliptical argument fully stated would run thus. Of whatever exists po- 
tentially the entelechy is the notion, essence or formal cause. But from its 
definition in 412 a 27 sq. we have as minor premiss, “ But soul is the entelechy 
of a potential animal or plant”; whence the conclusion, “soul is the formal 
cause.” 


II. 4 415 Ὁ 9---4ιδξ 3 343 


bI5. οὗ ἕνεκεν. We might have expected an article before οὗ ἕνεκεν, but 
the prepositional phrase is virtually a noun and may be construed even without 
the article as a quasi-genitive with airia; cf. supra Ὁ 10 ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις αὐτή, Kat 
ot ἕνεκα: cf. also Pol. 1253 Ὁ 3 οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν πάλιν οἰκία συνέστηκεν 
where the relative phrase ἐξ ὦν... συνέστηκεν is treated as a noun in the genitive 
case. See Newman’s note ad loc.; cf. also Pol. 1258 Ὁ 27 sqq. 

Ὁ 17. τοῦτ᾽, int. τὸ οὗ evexa, τοιοῦτον, int, τέλος OF τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. 

Ὁ 18. καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. Not only is soul the end, body and bodily parts the 
mere instruments for the realisation of the end, but nature intended this, it is 
part of her plan. Caution, however, is needed in the language we use, for 
φύσις is to A., not an external directing intelligence, but an indwelling principle. 
Cf. De Gen. Am. Il. 4,741 a1 cited in mole on 415 a 26 supra; also see 7926 on 
406a 14. Cf. Simpl. 111, 25 sqq. τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα. By this we must (as 
Philop. reminds us) understand all natural Zwizg bodies. Cf. 412 a II—I5, 
where natural bodies are classified as animate and inanimate. In fact σῶμα is 
slipping into this narrower meaning in 412 Ὁ 26—413a 4, see zoze on 4138 2. 
τῆς Ψυχῆς ὄργανα. Cf. 407b 25, with wofe on δεῖ yap, Pol. 1254a 34 ψυχῆς καὶ 
σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ᾽ ἀρχύμενον. This conception of body as 
soul’s instrument is at once the complement and the antithesis of Plato’s view 
in the Phaedo 80 A that, when soul and body are united, nature orders the soul 
to rule and govern and the body to obey and serve. 

Ὁ 22. ov πᾶσι δ΄. Cf ΔΙΟΡ 18 sqq., 413b 1 sqq. All plants and some 
animals are without locomotion. 

Ὁ 23. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ αὔξησις κατὰ ψυχήν. Qualitative change and 
growth are due to soul, though they take place in body. They are processes in 
which both share. Cf. De Semsu 1, 4368. 6—8 and 436b6—8. We note that 
A. is using the categories (place, quality, quantity) to determine the various 
kinds of motion (κίνησις) exactly as in 406 a 12 566. 

b 24. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ἀλλοίωσίς τις. We shall hear more of this in II., c. 5, 
where the discussion is introduced (416 Ὁ 34) by the similar words δοκεῖ yap 
ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι (int. ἡ αἴσθησις). 

b 28. οὐ καλῶς εἴρηκε τοῦτο. We may, with Them., understand the error 
attributed to Empedocles to be the explanation of growth as due to the natural 
tendencies of the elements assimilated. Plants contain earth and fire, earth 
makes the roots grow down, because it has a downward tendency, fire has an 
upward tendency and therefore the branches, which contain fire, grow upwards. 
The pronoun τοῦτο marks the subject treated. So Wallace “ This is a subject 
in which Empedocles has not expressed himself correctly.” Karsten’s con- 
jecture προσθέσει for προστιθείς, for which he cites De Gen. ef Corr. 11. 6, 3338 35 
οὐδ᾽ αὔξησις ἂν εἴη κατ᾽ ἘὨμπεδοκλέα, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, Seems unnecessary, 
even if we grant his premiss “talem αὔξησιν Aristoteles πρόσθεσιν vocat.” 
προστιθεὶς, “when he adds.” Presumably A. would accept part of the account 
given by Empedocles. 

416a2. λαμβάνει approximates here, as often, e.g. 424 a 17, to ὑπολαμβάνει. 
Compare what is said Jud. Ar. s.vv. 422 Ὁ 33 sqq., 799b 33-—45. 

8. 3. ov yap τὸ αὐτὸ... καὶ τῷ παντί, “not the same...as for the whole 
universe”: this καὶ should be taken closely with τὸ αὐτός. A. believed the 
whole physical universe to be spherical in shape, having a centre and circum- 
ference ; rectilinear motion from the centre towards the circumference is upward 
movement and that from the circumference towards .the centre 1s downward. 
Cf. 406 a 27—30, De Caelo IV. 1, 308a 13—31, where A. defines his own view in 
opposition to that of Plato, who in the Ziszaeus (63 B sqq.) denied that there was 


344 NOTES IT. 4 


up or down in the universe: also PAys. IV. 1, 208b 8—s4. As applied to an 
animal or a plant, however, the words “‘up” and ‘‘down” are used in a purely 
conventional sense: zd. 208b 14 ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ μόνον πρὸς ἡμᾶς, TO ἄνω καὶ 
κάτω καὶ δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερόν - ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θέσιν, 
ὅπως ἂν στραφώμεν, yiverat...b 18 ἐν δὲ τῇ φύσει διώρισται χωρὶς ἕκαστον. ov γὰρ 
ὅ τι ἔτυχέν ἐστι τὸ ἄνω, GAN ὅπου φέρεται τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ κοῦφον - ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ 
κάτω οὐχ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπου τὰ ἔχοντα βάρος καὶ τὰ γεηρά. The part where the 
mouth, or whatever organ receives food, is found is regarded as the upper part 
and the rest, in contradistinction, as the lower part. Cf. De /ucessu An. 4, 
705-a 32—b1, De Jaw. et Sen. 1, 468a 1 καθ᾽ ὃ μὲν γὰρ εἰσέρχεται μόριον ἡ τροφή, 
ἄνω καλοῦμεν, πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποντες ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρὸς τὸ περιέχον ὅλον, κάτω δὲ καθ᾽ ὃ 
τὸ περίττωμα ἀφίησι τὸ πρῶτον. ἔχει δ᾽ ἐναντίως τοῖς φυτοῖς τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις, 
Hist. An. τι. 1, 500 Ὁ 28 λέγομεν δὲ ἄνω τὸ ἀπὸ κεφαλῆς μέχρι τοῦ μορίου ἧ ἡ τοῦ 
περιττώματός ἐστιν ἔξοδος, κάτω δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου λοιπόν. The similarity of func- 
tion between the roots of plants and the mouths of animals led to the remark 
frequently made (see next 2926) that plants are placed in the earth upside down ; 
see De Juv. loc. cit. and De Part. An. IV. 7, 683 Ὁ 18. 

a4. ὡς ἡ κεφαλὴ. See De Part. An. iv. το, 686 Ὁ 31 μικρὸν δ᾽ οὕτω mpoBai- 
vovra καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσε κάτω, καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόριον τέλος ἀκίνητόν 
ἐστι καὶ ἀναίσθητον, καὶ γίνεται φυτόν, ἔχον τὰ μὲν ἄνω κάτω, τὰ δὲ κάτω ἄνω; also 
De incessu. An. 4,705a29. The degradation of animal to plant, or rather the 
position of the plant in the scale of organic being, is thus described, “it 15 
rooted to the ground, and the upper part of it, which corresponds to the head 
of animals, is turned downwards.” A.’s criticism assumes that the head con- 
tains fire, if anything does, for it grows upwards, and therefore the roots of 
plants ought to grow upwards upon the theory of Empedocles. 

a5. τοῖς ἔργοις. The functions are the standard by which the identity or 
difference of the instruments is determined. See wzoze on 412b 18, ἐπὶ τῶν 
μερῶν. This principle is enforced and expounded throughout the De Part. Az., 
a treatise by which A. founded the science of comparative morphology. 

a6. τί τὸ συνέχον. Cf. 411 b 5—14 and notes. 

a8. τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ. Cf. supra 415 b 23 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ αὔξησις 
κατὰ ψυχήν. Whether Empedocles really thus ignored this unifying function of 
soul is extremely doubtful. Theophrastus follows A. in emphasising the unity 
of the vegetative principle in plants: Theoph. De Caus. Plant. 1. 12, § 5 ἐν γάρ 
TL TO γεννῶν, οὐχ ὥσπερ "EumedoxaAns διαιρεῖ καὶ μερίζει, τὴν μὲν γῆν eis ras ῥίζας, 
τὸν δ᾽ αἰθέρα εἰς τοὺς βλαστοὺς ὡς ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου χωριζόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ μιᾶς ὕλης 
καὶ up ἑνὸς αἰτίου γεννῶντος. αἴτιον...9 τρέφεσθαι. And so αἴτεον τοῦ ζῆν : cf. 
415b12—14. For the plant to live is simply to grow and to be nourished. 

ag. δοκεῖ δέ mow: Heraclitus and (according to Simpl.) Hippasus. The 
doctrine of vital heat passed from Heraclitus to the Stoics: cf. Cic. De Nat. 
Deor. τι. §§ 23—30, 57, 58, especially ὃ 27; Iam vero reliqua quarta pars 
mundi, ea et ipsa tota natura fervida est et ceteris naturis omnibus salutarem 
impertit et vitalem calorem. 

AIX povov...12 καὶ αὐξόμενον, 1.6. the only one which in its elemental state 
and before it is compounded in ra μεικτὰ admits of nutrition and growth. ἢ is 
corrective, “I mean.” 

a 13. τὸ δὲ συναίτιον μέν πώς ἐστιν, ov μὴν ἁπλῶς ye αἴτιον. Cf. for τὸ 408 Ὁ 5. 
This is one of many instances in A. where μὲν is answered by οὐ μὴν or οὐ μὴν... 
ye, these latter particles replacing the more common οὐδέ, either because οὐδὲ in 
the second clause would be ambiguous or for some other reason of convenience ; 
cf. 424 8 26 μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον - οὐ μὴν τό γε αἰσθητικ ᾧ εἶναι 


Il. 4 416a 3—a 23 345 


οὐδ᾽ ἡ αἴσθησις μέγεθός ἐστιν, and 429b 8 ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν 
ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν. Cf. also Eth. Nic. 1173 Ὁ 26 αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταί 
εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπό γε τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, πτροδόντι δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, 
οὐ μὴν ὁτιοῦν φαγόντιι The antithesis between συναίτιον and αἴτιον ἁπλῶς comes 
to A. from Plato; cf. PAhaedo 99 ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ᾽ 
ἐκεῖνο, ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν mor εἴη αἴτιον : see also 77m. 46 Ὁ. By a “joint 
cause” or concurrent cause (causa adiuvans) is meant a necessary condition, 
hence in .etapdh. A. c. 5,a chapter which deals with various meanings of the 
term ‘“‘necessary,” we find συναίτιον used to explain the necessary condition 
or ov ἄνευ οὐκ as it 15 often termed: 1015 a 20 ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται, οὗ ἄνευ οὐκ 
ἐνδέχεται ζὴν ὡς συναιτίου; οἷον τὸ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ 7 τροφὴ τῷ ζῴῳ ἀναγκαῖον - ἀδύνατον 
γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων εἶναι. So, too, τροφὴ is explained as a necessary condition of 
life or subsistence in De Part. An. τ. 1. 642 ἃ 7 λέγομεν yap τὴν τροφὴν ἀναγκαῖόν 
τι κατ᾽ οὐδέτερον τούτων τῶν τρόπων, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ody οἷόν τ᾽ ἄνευ ταύτης εἶναι. τοῦτο 
δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπεὶ δεῖ σχίζειν τῷ πελέκει, ἀνάγκη 
σκληρὸν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ σκληρόν, χαλκοῦν ἢ σιδηροῦν, οὕτω καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον... 
ἀνάγκη ἄρα τοιονδὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τοιωνδί, κτξέ, The necessary condition is thus 
subsumed under the material cause. 

416a 19—b 11. In attempting to determine the nature of nutriment 
we are met by adifficulty. Some maintain that a thing is fed by its opposite, 
with the qualification that this holds not of all contraries but only of those which 
being quantities admit of increase, as do the elements [ 9]. Others maintain 
that feeding, like growth, is a matter of addition and therefore that like is fed 
by like. The advocates of the former view object that like is impassive to like, 
for change will be to an intermediate state, when it is not to a contrary, and 
food in digestion undergoes a change. Further they urge that that which 1s 
nourished is not affected by the nutriment as the nutriment is affected and 
changed in the process of nutrition, appealing to the example of the craftsman 
and his material: if he is said to be affected by his material, what is meant is 
only that he changes from inactivity to activity [ὃ 10]. The truth is that all 
depends on what precisely is meant by “nutriment.” Is it the food in its 
original state, bread, meat, etc.? Or is it that food after digestion? If the 
former, then it is true that “contrary is nourished by contrary”; if the latter, 
then “like is nourished by like.” Thus, as the terms may reasonably be used in 
either way, both views of nutrition are, in a sense, correct [§ 11]. However, it 
must be remembered that nutriment, as such, of the living organism, is relative 
to the animate being [§ 12]. 

The main positions are admirably summarised in PAys. VIII. 7, 260a 29 
ἀδύνατον γὰρ αὔξησιν εἶναι ἀλλοιώσεως μὴ προῦὐπαρχούσης" τὸ yap αὐξανόμενον ἔστι 
μὲν ὡς ὁμοίῳ αὐξάνεται, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς ἀνομοίῳ- τροφὴ γὰρ λέγεται τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ 
ἐναντίον. προσγίνεται δὲ πᾶν γινόμενον ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ. ἀνάγκη οὖν ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναι 
τὴν εἰς τἀναντία μεταβολήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ἀλλοιοῦται, δεῖ τι εἶναι τὸ ἀλλοιοῦν καὶ 
ποιοῦν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει θερμοῦ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ θερμόν. 

8. 20. περὶ τροφῆς. Here we resume the main subject interrupted by the 
digression of §§ 3—8. Generation (γέννησις) having been dismissed at the 
end of § 2, 415 Ὁ 7, nutrition remains to be discussed. 

8. 21. τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ, the function of nutrition. δοκε. This was a 
current opinion, but, as we see below, the opposite view also found support. 

a 22. οὐ πᾶν δὲ παντί, int. τροφή ἐστι: white and black, for example, as well 
as health and sickness, would be exceptions. 

a23. γένεσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἔχουσιν, i. 4. a 24 γίνεται ἐξ ἀλλήλων. So ἔχειν 
διαφορὰν = δεαφέρειν 416b 4. 


346 NOTES ΤΙ. 4 


8. 24. οὐ πάντα ποσά, int. ἐστι. Not all contraries are “quanta,” and unless 
they are, they are incapable of increase. 

a25. οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνα. By ἐκεῖνα are meant, not health and sickness, but the 
contraries which are supposed to derive growth from each other: a24 γίνεται 
yap...25 κάμνοντος are parenthetical. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. The relation is not 
reciprocal. 4 may be τροφὴ to & (as oil to fire) without A being similarly (τὸν 
αὐτὸν τρόπον) τροφὴ to A. 

4 26. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ τῷ πυρὶ τροφή. Cf. AZelaph. 983 Ὁ 22 λαβὼν ἴσως τὴν 
ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ὁρᾶν τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ 
τούτου γιγνόμενον καὶ Τούτῳ ζῶν. Here τὸ θερμὸν is nurtured by the water, but in 

-—othér passages there is the same reference to water as nourishing, not animal 
heat as one is inclined to interpret it, but fire. Mag. Mor. ΤΙ. 1210a 16 καὶ γὰρ 
εἰ θέλεις τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ποιῆσαι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις χρήσιμά εἶσιν. τὸ 
γὰρ πῦρ φασίν, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ ὑγρόν, φθείρεσθαι, ὡς τοῦτ᾽ αὐτῷ παρασκευάζον ὥσπερ 
τροφήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ τοσαύτην, ὅσης κρατήσειεν «ἄν >: ἂν μὲν γὰρ πλεῖον ποιήσῃς 
τὸ ὑγρόν, ἐπικρατῆσαν «“ποιήσει;» φθείρεσθαι τὸ πῦρ, ἐὰν δὲ σύμμετρον, συνοίσει. 
Them. (51, 35 H., 95, 1 Sp.) refers to oil as a compound of water and air, both 
liquids. But Professor H. Jackson suggests that A. is thinking of how to keep 
a wood fire alight; you need some olive wood, not altogether dry. Philoponus 
(282, 9—11) says thoroughly dry wood will not keep a fire burning, any more 
than ashes. 

a27. ἐν μὲν οὖν tots ἁπλοῖς. The particles μὲν οὖν are resumptive. The 
simple bodies are the four elements.’ It is implied that they are called 
“quanta” {ποσά), and the view that contrary is nutriment to contrary is more 
obviously true of them than of compounds. It may well be that A. is thinking 
primarily of the growth of tissues, which, relatively to the organs which they go 
to form, are simple. See 2026 on 408a 11. As the growth of organs is due 
to the growth of tissue, so the growth of tissue is due to the increase of the 
elements. 

a 28. ταῦτ', i.e. the pair of correlative opposites. This is expanded into τὸ 
μὲν..«τὸ δέ, one of the opposites being nourishment, the other that which is 
nourished. 

a 30. τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ. Empedocles attributed nourishment to the attrac- 
tion of like for like. Sweet, bitter, acid and hot unite with what is kindred to 
them in animal or plant: /vag. 62,6; 90, 1 sq. Ὁ (253, 268 sq. K), Aet. Plac. V. 27 
(Doxogr. Gr. p. 440, 4) Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τρέφεσθαι μὲν τὰ ζῷα διὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ 
oixetov. This was also the view of Democritus, if he included nutrition in his 
general view of action and passivity (cf. De Gen. e¢ Corr. 1. 7, 323 Ὁ 3 sqq.). 
While the majority agree in thinking that like is wholly unaffected by like, 
Democritus, A. there says, stood alone (mapa rots ἄλλους ἰδίως ἔλεξε μόνος) in 
holding that what acts and what is acted upon are like and the same, for if two 
things are different and distinct, it is impossible that one should be acted upon 
by the other. καθάπερ καὶ αὐξάνεσθαι. No other argument is cited in support 
of the “like by like” view of nutrition. Its supporters would dwell upon the 
fact of increase in bulk, the presumption being that the added tissue is of 
similar nature. 

8.31. ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, supra 4168 21. 

a 32. ὡς ἀπαθοῦς ὄντος. The view of Empedocles 410 8 23 (see mote) and of 
Anaxagoras, who consistently extended it to knowledge and perception, as one 
particular case of action and being acted upon. See zofZes on 405 Ὁ 14, 15. 

a 33. μεταβάλλειν. The verb is intransitive, as often. ἡ St μεταβολὴ. Cf. 
Metaph. 1069b 3 ἡ δ᾽ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή. εἰ δ᾽ ἡ μεταβολὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀντικει- 


II. 4 416 a 24—b 12 347 


μένων ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, ἀντικειμένων δὲ μὴ πάντων (od λευκὸν yap καὶ ἡ φωνή) ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ 
τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀνάγκη ὑπεῖναί τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν: οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία 
μεταβάλλει, where the clause introduced by εἰ expresses A.’s own view. By 
change A. means motion in the widest sense, affecting the category of sub- 
stance as well as those of quality, quantity and place. See zofes on 405 Ὁ 31 
and 406a 12. τεσσάρων. 

416 Ὁ 3. τὸ τελευταῖον προσγινόμενον, “the final thing added,” that is, the 
thing added in its final state; cf. the use of τελευταία and προσεχὴς as epithets 
of ὕλη, when applied to the proximate matter as contrasted with matter in its 
primary state of pure potentiality (πρώτη ὕλη): .Wetaph. 1070a 20 ἅπαντα yap 
ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ τῆς μάλιστ᾽ οὐσίας ἡ τελευταία [int. ὕλῃ]. 

Ὁ 4. εἰ δ᾽ ἄμφω, Le. εἰ ἄμφω ἐστὶν ἢ τροφή. ἡ μὲν ἄπεπτος ἡ δὲ πεπεμμένη. 
The former is πρώτη τροφή. the latter τελευταία. 

Ὁ 8. ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. So 4178 18 sq., De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 5, 322a 3 ἔστι 
μὲν yap ὡς τὸ ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ αὐξάνεται, ἔστι δ᾽ ὧς ἀνομοίῳ. The formula recurs in 
a different connexion, 426 ἃ 22 sq. 

bg. οὐθὲν τρέφεται μὴ μετέχον ζωῆς. Cf. wove on 413a 29. It follows from 
this that it is only in a figurative sense that fire can be said to be fed with 
fuel. 

bit. kal οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. An animal is nourished gzé living, not gud 
white or black, nor in virtue of any other non-essential qualities that it may 
possess, just as a servant is properly and essentially the servant of a master 
and not, except incidentally, the servant of a white man, an old man, a gram- 
marian, or indeed a man at all. Cf. Them. 52, 31 sqq. H., 96, 19 sqq. Sp., 
Simpl. 114, 36 sqq., Philop. 285, 6—r8. 

416 b L1i--Sl. The two notions of nutrition and growth can be thus 
distinguished. Growth is a quantitative conception. Nutrition is of the animal 
or plant regarded as a concrete individual thing; for it is nourishment which 
preserves it in being [§ 13]. And thus we have determined the function and the 
correlative object of the nutritive faculty [§ 14]. The end which this nutritive 
or rudimentary soul subserves is the propagation of the species and it may 
therefore be called the generative soul [§ 15]. In the nourishment of the 
animal or plant the soul makes use of (@) internal heat, (6) food, just as in 
steering a boat the steersman uses (@) his hand and (4) the rudder. The 
internal heat is necessary for the digestion and assimilation of food [§ 16]. 

Ὁ 12. τροφῇ, int. εἶναι, which is expressed with the second dative (αὐξητικῷ) 
only, as in Afetaph. 1043b2sq. In 408a 25 sq. and 413b 29 it is expressed 
with the first dative and not with the second. 

Ὁ 12. αὐξητικῷ evar. Ch supra 412 Ὁ 13. For the relation of these two 
notions compared see De Gen. et Corr. 1. 5, 322a25 καὶ ἡ τροφὴ τῇ αὐξήσει τὸ 
αὐτὸ μέν, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἄλλο. ἣ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ προσιὸν δυνάμει ποσὴ σάρξ, ταύτῃ μὲν 
αὐξητικὸν σαρκός, 7 δὲ μόνον δυνάμει σάρξ, τροφή. For the omission of the 
article τὸ with the infinitive see zoZe on 413 Ὁ 29. ἡ μὲν yap.-.13 αὐξητικόν. The 
subject of 13 αὐξητικόν (as of τροφὴ) is left unexpressed, the construction being 
emphatically ad sensum: it must be the food assimilated. In so far as this 
maintains the bodily structure by repairing waste and conducing to vital 
functions, it is said merely to nourish it, and this it will do in old age, when 
the bulk of the body is shrinking instead of increasing ; in so far as it increases 
the bulk and volume of the body, as happens in the years of growth, it is not 
only τροφὴ but αὐξητικόν. Not only is the animal economy maintained, but 
there is a surplus which, as we say, builds it up and adds to its bulk. Cf. the 
similar passage De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 5, 322 a 16—33. 


348 NOTES II. 4 


bix3. τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία, For οὐσία in the sense of τόδε τι (καὶ being explica- 
tive) see 4128 7 and “οΐε. 

biI5. Kal γενέσεως ποιητικόν. Cf. Them. (53, 4 H., 97, 3 Sp.) ὅταν δὲ ἤδη εἰς 
ἀκμὴν ἔλθῃ τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα, τοῦ μὲν αὔξειν παύεται ἢ τροφή, τοῦ τρέφειν δὲ 
οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη ποιεῖ καὶ γεννητικόν [τοῦ ὁμοίου ydp|* τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα περίττωμα 
ἦν τῆς ἐσχάτης τροφῆς [1.6. the blood or its analogue. Cf. De Gen. An. 1.. 
cc. 17—20, especially 726 Ὁ 1—11] γίνεται οὖν τηνικαῦτα καὶ γενέσεως αἰτία 
τροφή. The intimate relation between nutrition and reproduction and the 
diversion of superfluous nourishment to the development of new individuals is 
most _cledrly seen in the lowest forms of life. Barco, p. 20, zoZe, cites Dante 
(Purg. XXV. 37) and supposes the poet indebted to the commentary of Thomas 
Aquinas on this passage. ἀλλ᾽ οἷον τὸ τρεφόμενον, int. ἀλλὰ τοιούτου οἷόν ἐστι 
τὸ τρεφόμενον. Cf. 4158 28, Ὁ 7 and 416b 25 znx/fra, 

bI7., ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ, 1.6. the nutritive principle or faculty as 
above defined: the possessive genitive (as with δύναμις or μόριον). 

Ὁ 18. τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν, 1.6. τὸ ἔχον τὴν τοιαύτην... «ἀρχήν. By τὸ ἔχον is meant 
Ὁ 9 τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα 7 ἔμψυχον (cf. Ὁ 11—13), or τὸ ἔμψυχον ζῷον. See note on 
4038 4. By ἣ τοιοῦτον I understand 7 τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία (b 13). The θρεστικὴ 
δύναμις maintains its possessor-in existence as τόδε re καὶ οὐσία all through life, 
whether its growth is increased as in youth, or diminished as in age, as a 
numerical unity through all the changes of material assimilated. Trend.?: 
Nutriendo id subest, ut corporis particulae et pereant et nascantur novae. 
Non igitur corpus servatur unum et idem numero, sed genere et natura. It 
seems to me that, if 7 τοιοῦτον meant simply 7 ἔχον αὐτήν, the functions of 
nutrition and growth would be confused. 

big. ἐνεργεῖν, 1.6. to be an active and operative organism, as contrasted 
with one which is dormant. 

b 21. ἡ πρώτη ψυχή. Not the first soul as of several, but the rudimentary 
soul, soul at its lowest stage, that is to say, the nutritive principle. 

b 22. τὸ ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα. Cf. sudra Ὁ 18. 

b 23. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους. Torstrik advocated the transposition of the 
sentence ἐπεὶ d€...25 οἷον αὐτὸ to follow δύναται εἶναι of Ὁ 20. By so doing he 
makes the reference of ἔστε δὲ ᾧ τρέφεται διττὸν to Ὁ 22 ᾧ δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ τροφὴ 
more direct and perspicuous. See, however, zoze on 414b 10. As there, so 
here, the sequence of thought is momentarily interrupted. 

Ὁ 24. τέλος δὲ, int. τῆς πρώτης ψυχῆς. 

b 25. γεννητικὴ οἷον, int. γεννητικὴ τοιούτου οἷον. 

b 26. διττόν. This statement is apparently intended as an amendment of 
the previous account. Not only nutriment, but vital heat, has a title to be ᾿" 
called the means or instrument of nutrition (6 τρέφεται. ὥσπερ καὶ ᾧ κυβερνᾷ. 
The illustration is perfectly clear. The steersman guides the ship with the 
rudder, but he sets the rudder in motion with his hand. The rudder is a part 
of the ship and is merely set in motion (for no account is or need be taken of 
the displacement of the water or of the motion of the ship, which would be due 
to wind). The hand which moves the rudder is itself moved by the steersman. 
Thus the steersman is himself the source of motion, the prime movent of the 
system, and as such relatively, though not absolutely, unmoved. This is quite 
in accordance with A.’s theory of motion, in order to account for which he 
postulates, as we shall be told in 433b 13—15, (1) a prime movent, itself 
unmoved, (2) an agent for the transmission of motion, moved by the prime 
movent and in turn setting in motion (3) the instrument proper, which is 
merely moved and is not a cause of motion. 


11. 5 416 Ὁ 13—b 31 349 


Ὁ 27. τὸ μὲν κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον «“μόνον;». Thanks to the 
commentary of Philop., the application of the example is also clear. Like the 
hand of the pilot, the vital heat (τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμὸν Them., Philop.) is the inter- 
mediary in nutrition, itself set in motion by the nutritive soul and in turn acting 
upon the food (τροφή): while the latter, like the rudder in the illustration, is 
merely passive, undergoing transmutation in the process of digestion. The 
ancient commentators from Alex. Aphr. downwards, with the single exception 
of Philop., were misled by the erroneous reading κινοῦν, presented by all our 
MSS. except E. With misplaced ingenuity Alexander endeavoured to get a 
good sense out of his text by making the nutritive faculty itself answer to the 
pilot’s hand and the vital heat to the rudder, both being instruments. The 
nutritive faculty, though movent, is itself unmoved, the vital heat has the inter- 
mediary position, moving and moved, which is correct enough, but food is 
ousted from being an instrument of nutrition at all, which flatly contradicts A.’s 
explicit statement in 416 Ὁ 22sq. Alex. Aphr., foreseeing this, sets out by boldly 
denying that either of the two meanings of ᾧ τρέφεται in 416 Ὁ 25 applies to 
food. The words of Philop. (288, 5) are λέγει δὲ ὁ ᾿Αλέξανδρος καὶ ἄλλην ἐξήγησιν" 
τὸ yap ᾧ τρέφει τὸ διττὸν οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς τροφῆς ληπτέον, φησί, viv, ἀλλὰ διττὸν λέγει 
τὴν θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμόν, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἀκίνητον 7 θρεπτικὴ 
δύναμις (αὕτη γὰρ οὐ κινουμένη κινεῖ), τὸ δὲ ἔμφυτον θερμὸν κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον" 
κινεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τροφήν, κινεῖται δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως. ἡ δὲ ἐξήγησις αὕτη ἅρμόζοι 
ἂν πρὸς γραφὴν τὴν φερομένην οὕτως τὸ μὲν κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν 
μόνον, δηλονότι αὐτὸ μὴ κινούμενον. Them. (53, 26 sqq. H., οὗ, 5 sqq. Sp.) in the 
main agrees with Alexander. Simpl. (115, 30 sqq.) scruples to regard the 
nutritive soul as one of the instruments of nutrition (6 τρέφεται) and rightly 
makes food and vital heat the two things signified (διττόν. But, with the false 
reading κινοῦν before him, he is driven to reverse the rightful relation of these 
instruments as media, making vital heat τὸ κενοῦν and food τὸ κινοῦν καὶ κινού- 
pevov. Vital heat acts upon food, but food does not react upon vital heat, 
which is therefore in this sense only, but not absolutely, κινοῦν μόνον. In the 
process of digestion vital heat takes an active part, food a passive part; yet, in 
so far as it acts upon the body by increasing its bulk, even food is movent as 
well as moved. Cf. Zeller in Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Ph. UX., Pp. 537 Sq- 

Ὁ 28. ἐργάζεται δὲ τὴν πέψιν τὸ θερμόν. Ch De Gen. An. τι. 4, 740 Ὁ 26 sq., 
De Part. An. 11. 7, 652b9 τούτον δ᾽ αἴτιον ὅτι τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργοις ὑπηρετικώ- 
τατον τῶν σωμάτων τὸ θερμόν ἐστιν : cf. also De Resp. 21, 480a 16; 18, 4798 29. 

b 31. ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις. A. would seem to have written a separate treatise 
περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ τροφῆς (or simply περὶ τροφῆς), to judge by the citation in De 
Somno 3, 456 Ὁ 2 τῆς μὲν οὖν θύραθεν τροφῆς εἰσιούσης eis τοὺς Sexrixods τόπους 
γίνεται 4 ἀναθυμίασις εἰς τὰς φλέβας, ἐκεῖ δὲ μεταβάλλουσα ἐξαιματοῦται καὶ 
πορεύεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τροφῆς. But all 
trace of this treatise is lost. See Trend., Ὁ. 131, 7πά, Ar. 1o4b 16—28. 


CHAPTER V. 


With c. 4 we take leave of nutritive soul. The next higher stage is the 
faculty of sense, which is the main subject from this point nght on to Book IIL, 
c. 2, the discussion of φαντασία in III., c. 3 being a sort of appendix to it. 

At first sight we seem to make little progress in this chapter by the barren 
discussion of the terms “potential” and “actual,” applied in turn to αἰσθητικόν, 
αἰσθάνεσθαι and αἴσθησις. In reality the questions are of far-reaching import 


350 NOTES Il. 5 


and materially affect our conception of sense, and consequently of thought. 
When we call sensation an affection, πάθος. or a movement, κίνησις, we must 
always remember that the affection and the movement belong to the composite 
substance of the individual percipient and are shared in by body and soul. 
Affections and movements of the body present no difficulty, but what do these 
terms mean when applied to the soul? Consider the analogous case of ac- 
quiring knowledge. There we find one transition from sheer ignorance by 
learning, and another from the possession to the exercise of knowledge already 
acquired, and these are mental changes. Sensation implies similar transitions, 
and, when these are regarded abstractly, apart from the bodily processes 
-~--accompanying them, the real nature of such changes or transitions becomes 
clear. They are no alterations for the worse, impairing and destroying; they 
tend to preserve, develop and perfect the sentient being, which is thus enabled 
to realise itself in act. In short, sensation is alteratio non corruptiva, sed 
perfecttva, an ἐνέργεια, and not properly speaking an ἀλλοίωσις or κίνησις, 
though the use of these terms in reference to it can hardly be avoided. What 
this means for sensation will not be fully realised until we reach 11.) c. 12 and 
II, c. 2, more especially 426b 8—427b 16. The present chapter forms the 
subject of a valuable essay by Alex. Aphr. in ἀπ. καὶ Avo. 111. 3, pp. 82-—86. 

416 b 32—417 a 14. To come to sense-perception in general. It 
consists in being acted upon or moved. For, as already remarked, a sensation 
is a certain change of quality or alteration [§ 1]. It may be asked why external 
objects are indispensable to sense-perception and why there is no sensation of 
the senses, i.e. the sense-organs, themselves, if earth, water and the other 
elements of external things are actually present in our sense-organs. We reply 
that the perceptive faculty exists potentially and not actually. Take as an 
example fuel, which will not burn of itself, but needs something to make it burn. 
Similarly the faculty of sense needs external objects to stimulate it into activity. 
We must distinguish two meanings of (@) perceiving and therefore of (4) per- 
ception, according as they are potentially so or actually so [§ 2]. 

416 Ὁ 32. κοινῇ. A general survey of sense introductory to the separate 
treatment of the several senses in cc. 7—II. 

Ὁ 33. ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαΐ τε καὶ πάσχειν. Cf. 434 b 28 sq. 

b 34. καθάπερ εἴρηται, i.e. supra 415b 24 ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι 
δοκεῖ; cf. 410 a 25. 

Ὁ 35. φασὶ δέ tives. Democritus and Empedocles, although the latter is 
inconsistent ; see zofes on 405 b 15, 4108 23 Sqq., 416a 30. 

4174. τ. ἐν rots καθόλου λόγοις, that is, De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 7, 323 Ὁ 18 sqq.: 
see the citation in zoze on 407 Ὁ 19, also zofes on 405 Ὁ 14, 410223. A reference 
in the same form occurs in De Gen. An. IV. 3, 768 Ὁ 23 ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν 
καὶ πάσχειν διωρισμένοις. 

ἃ 2. ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν. Our problem is this. If sense is a faculty of appre- 
hending sensibles, and the sense-organs themselves are sensibles, how is it that 
sense does not have perception of its own organs quite apart from the presence 
of any external objects, especially as these sense-organs consist of the elements, 
which are objects of sense? The solution (which we will here anticipate) is to 
the effect that the sense-faculty has only a potential existence, and, like every- 
thing which exists potentially, is called into actuality by something else which 
already has actual existence; in this case, the external object. , This problem is 
not, as at first sight might appear, altogether without a bearing upon the theory 
of sense-perception as modification or qualitative change (ἀλλοίωσις). For, if 
the faculty of sense is potentially what the sensible object is actually, and if the 


11. 5 ΔΙΘΌ 52--4217 8 9 351 


presence of the sensible calls the faculty into proper actual existence, this 
change may fitly be described as an action of the object upon a passive faculty, 
and so justifies the remark that sense-perception consists in being moved, that 
is, in being acted upon. But we shall see that the action of the external on the 
passive faculty is not the last word or the final account of the matter. 

a3. τῶν αἰσθήσεων, 1.6. the sense-organs, usually called αἰσθητήρια. A. is 
generally careful to distinguish the two, but sometimes, especially in the plural, 
the one word (αΐσθησες) is used in place of the other, as with the English 
“sense,” “senses.” Cf. De Purt. An. Iv. το, 686a 8 ἐξέθετο δ᾽ ἡ φύσις ἐν αὐτῇ 
καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐνίας, De Sensu 3, 440a 19, Prob. XXXI. 12, 958b 16. 
Similarly ὄψις, ἀκοή, ὄσφρησις are used for eye, ear and nostril respectively, 
€.g. 423b 18, and probably γεῦσις for the tongue 4228 31, 33. Cf. 435 2, zote 
On τοῦτο τὸ αἰσθητήριον. καὶ διὰ τί: καὶ explicative, “or, in other words, 
why.” 

a4. ov ποιοῦσιν. The subject to the verb is ai αἰσθήσεις, the “sense-organs.” 
The sense-organs, e.g. the eyes, are compounded of the elements, and these 
elements and their properties are perceived by sense. The qualification “or 
their properties” is introduced because sometimes the element itself (e.g. air) 
cannot be directly perceived, but only its qualities (e.g. temperature and perhaps 
transparency, τὸ διαφανές). ποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, produce actual sensation as 
objects perceived. Jud. Ar. 20b 55 ποιεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν et τὰ αἰσθητήρια et τὰ 
αἰσθητὰ dicuntur. But, apart from the present instance where the sense-organs 
are ex hypothesi αἰσθητά, 1 do not remember any passage in 2926 A. in which 
ποιεῖν αἴσθησιν is used of a sense-organ. Bonitz himself cites De Part. An. 
IV. 11, 690 b 30 ἡ μὲν yap γλῶττα τῶν χυμῶν ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν. See moze on 
410 ἃ 26. 

a5. καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἢ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτοις. We must understand κατὰ to 
govern τὰ συμβεβηκότα. As explained in the zofes on 406 ἃ 4, 5. the element in 
itself is opposed to its accidents. As from 11., c. 6 it appears that qualities or 
attributes are αἰσθητὰ proper, we must interpret perception of the elements in 
themselves to mean perception of their essential qualities and refer τὰ συμβεβη- 
κότα τούτοις to the non-essential or properly accidental qualities. The former, 
hot, cold, dry, moist, are perceived by touch (cf. 414b 8sq., 423 b 27 sq.), the 
latter, colour, sound, odour, by the other senses: Philop. 295, 3—8, Simpl. 
118, 23 τῶν γὰρ στοιχείων ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ κατὰ τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχοντα 
ἢ κατὰ τὰ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκότα. καὶ γὰρ τῆς ἀντιτυπίας αἰσθανόμεθα τῆς γῆς 
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ αὐτῇ συμβεβηκυίας, καὶ τοῦ ὁποιουοῦν αὐτῆς χρώματός τε καὶ μεγέθους, 
Soph. 63, 33—35. The grammatical note of Philop. (295, 8—12) makes no 
sense as it stands, but if by a slight emendation we read (1. 9) τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ for 
καθ᾽ αὑτῶν, his view of the construction will agree with that of Soph. (63, 33) 
ὧν... καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ προσόντων...καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, according to which 
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ stands for τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ and τὰ συμβεβηκότα for τῶν συμβεβηκότων. 
In neither of these two ways do the sense-organs perceive the substances of 
which they are themselves severally composed, always provided that flesh is 
regarded not as an organ, but as an intra-organic medium. 

a 6. δῆλον οὖν. These words introduce the obvious, because the only 
possible, explanation. If the faculty existed actually, like the sense-organs, the 
one would act upon the other even in the absence of external objects. 

a7 &6. To complete the sense we must before καθάπερ supply τὸ aio On- 
τικόν ἐστι or at least otras ἔχει. See note on 403a 12 καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ. 

8. 9. ἐντελεχείᾳ: to be taken closely with ὄντος, “fire actually existent,” 
that is, “fire operant.” Cf. 403 b 25, first moze. 


352 NOTES IL. 5 


alo. λέγομεν διχῶς We say of a man who 15 not blind and not deaf, that 
he sees and hears, even though at the moment he is asleep. Hence the two 
meanings of ‘‘ perceive” (αἰσθάνεσθαι) to be distinguished are (1) “to perceive 
potentially,” i.e. to have the capacity of perception, (2) “‘to perceive actually,” 
i.e. to be engaged in perception at the moment. This tedious discussion could 
have been shortened, if A. had two simple technical terms, one for the implicit 
and another for the explicit stage of actuality; cf. 412a Io sq., 22—26. That 
he has no such pair of terms either for actuality or for the corresponding 
potentiality is plain from the first sentence of § 7 of this chapter (417 b 29 sqq.), 
where the two stages of potentiality are cumbrously expressed by “‘the sense in 

-_-which a boy, and the sense in which a grown man, may be said to be potentially 
or in potency a general.” 

δι 12. ἡ αἴσθησις. Etymologically the noun in -ovs should denote an act, 
“perceiving” (cf. βάδεσις, walking) fully as much as the infinitive. Butcf.417a 3 
and see zole on εἴδησις, 402 a I. 

a 13 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι...14 ἐνεργείᾳ. This is a strange piece of 
carelessness. The double meaning of αἴσθησις has just been inferred from the 
double meaning of αἰσθάνεσθαι (ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγομεν διχῶς,...διχῶς ἂν 
λέγοιτο καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις). Now apparently the double meaning of αἰσθάνεσθαι is 
adduced as similar to that of αἴσθησις. Cf. 423b17—20. Torstrik proposed 
to replace τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι by τὸ αἰσθητὸν, which gives unexceptionable sense and 
may be thought to be confirmed by Alex. ἀπ. καὶ Ato. II. 3, 83, 4 λαβὼν δὲ τὸ 
διχῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι... ἔλαβεν τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως THY μὲν εἶναι δυνάμει τὴν δὲ 
ἐνεργείᾳ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν. However, the mention of the double meaning 
of αἰσθητὸν here would anticipate the distinction drawn in c. 6, where there is 
no cross reference, and M. Rodier while adopting αἰσθητὸν encloses the whole 
sentence in square brackets as a marginal note which has crept into the text. 
I prefer to retain the MS. reading, but I cannot help suspecting that, if A. had 
revised the treatise for publication, he would have made some alteration here, as 
well as in numerous other passages: cf. 415 2 and noZe. 

417a 14-20. A preliminary note on action and passivity. Let us 
proceed on the assumption that to be acted upon and to be moved are identical 
with being actively operant, motion having been defined in the P&Ayszcs as 
an active operation of a kind and yet incomplete. Hence wherever there is 
passivity or motion there must be some agent which is actively operant, and 
agent and patient are dissimilar before, but assimilated after, the one has acted 
upon the other [§ 3]. 

ΘΔ 15. τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν : we shall assume pro- 
visionally that, when the faculty actively operates, it is acted upon and set in 
motion (κινεῖται), that is, we return to the position of 416b 33 ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ἐν 
τῷ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν συμβαίνει, with the qualification that by αἴσθησις is 
now meant ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις. That the assumption aforesaid is not 
without justification when we examine the general conceptions of motion, being 
acted upon, and active operation, without any restriction to the particular case 
of sensation, is clear from the following clause. 

a6 ἐνέργειά ris...17 εἴρηται. The same view of motion is presented 431 a 6 sq. 
and in a well-known passage of 47k. Nic. 1174 a 19 “every motion requires 
time and implies an end,” ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός [int. ἐστίν]: 
this end it seeks to attain and is incomplete until it has attained it, “e.g. the 
motion or process of building is complete when the required structure is made— 
either in the whole time therefore, or in this final moment of it. But in the 
several portions of this time all the motions are incomplete, and specifically 


II. 5 417 a 1το---ἃ 20 353 


different from the whole motion and from each other; the fitting together of the 
stones is different from the fluting of the pillar, and both from the building of 
the temple. The building of the temple is complete; nothing more is required 
for the execution of the plan. But the building of the foundation and of the 
triglyph are incomplete; for each is the building of a part only. These motions, 
then, are specifically different from one another, and it is impossible to find a 
motion whose nature is complete at any moment—it is complete, if at all, 
only in the whole time” (Peters’ Trans.). If instead of a popular treatise like 
Leth. Nic., we turn to the more exact treatment of the subject in the P&Aysics, 
the definition of motion there given is (PAys. 111. 1, 201 a 10) ἡ τοῦ δύναμει ὄντος 
ἐντελέχεια ἧ τοιοῦτον (int. κινητόν), but that motion is incomplete is recognised 
201 Ὁ 31 ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργεια μέν Tis εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἀτελὴς δέ, the reason being ὅτε ἀτελὲς 
τὸ δυνατόν, οὗ ἐστὶν ἡ évépyea. In Mefapk. 1048 Ὁ 28 A. says: All motion is 
incomplete (ἀτελής) as growing, learning, walking, building. These, being 
motions, are incomplete (αὗται δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς ye). To take a walk and to 
have finished walking at the same moment are incompatible, as are to be 
building and to have built, to become and to have become, to be moving and to 
have moved at the same moment: whereas with energies it 15 different; the act 
of sight as of thought is indivisible and independent of time: Ὁ 33 ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ 
ὁρᾷ Gua τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενηκεν. 

3.17. πάσχει. See mote on 407 Ὁ 19. καὶ κινεῖται When the result 
produced by τὸ ποιοῦν is ἀλλοίωσις, this is one of the species of κίνησις, viz. 
κίνησις κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, κατὰ πάθος. See 405 Ὁ 31, 406a 12 sq. and zozes: also 
cf. 434.b 29—435 a 5. 

86. 186. ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ. Cf. De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 7, 324 Ὁ 13 ἔστι δὲ τὸ 
“τοιητικὸν αἴτιον ὃς ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. ἐνεργείᾳ Gyros. The fire which 
kindles the fuel is actually hot; the fuel can be made hot, and so is potentially 
hot, even if it has in it cold, the privation of heat; but it will never kindle itself, 
a7—9Q supra. Thus τὸ πάσχον is δυνάμει ποιόν τι, but τὸ ποιοῦν must be ἐνεργείᾳ 
ποιόν τι, Θιλᾶ the ποιότης in question constitutes the point of similarity, being 
present actually in the agent and potentially in the patient. We may remark 
éx Passant that for motion in the widest sense, and primarily of spatial motion, 
the conclusion also holds that the ultimate cause of motion must be actual, 
never potential, Mezaph. A., c. 6, especially 1071 Ὁ 12—32 and 1072a 2—7. 

a8. ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίουι. The conclusion is perfectly general, with the qualifi- 
cation mentioned below 417 Ὁ 4 5α.; cf. De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 7, 323 Ὁ 31 ἀνάγκη 
καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν Kal τὸ πάσχον τῷ γένει μὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ταὐτό. It holds in 
sensation because, as we shall see, the sensible object is in actuality what the 
faculty of sense is only potentially: this constitutes the similarity. Cf 429b 
20----31. 

aig. ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου The sensible object, as it actually is, and the faculty 
of sense before perception, are dissimilar. This constitutes the dissimilarity. 
It is in perception that they are assimilated and the faculty becomes what the 
object already is; cf. De Gen. ef Corr. τ. 7, 323 Ὁ 24 τότε παντελῶς ἕτερον καὶ τὸ 
μηθαμῇ ταὐτὸν ὡσαύτως [int. εὔλογον μὴ πάσχειν)" οὐδὲν γὰρ dv πάθοι λευκότης ὑπὸ 
γραμμῆς ἢ γραμμὴ ὑπὸ λευκότητος. καθάπερ εἴπομεν. Apparently in the dis- 
cussion of nutrition, the first case of being acted upon to arise, 416a 29—b9. 
Or A. may mean no more than to reiterate the reference to De Gen. et Corr. 
I. 7, given above 417a 1. This is somewhat less probable. 

a20. πάσχει... «ὅμοιόν ἐστιν. Compare the parallel version in 418 a καὶ sq. 
Some such formula is repeated mutatis muzandis in the chapters on the several 
senses, e.g. 4228 7, b1I5 sq., 423 Ὁ 31. 

H. 23 


354 NOTES 11. 5 


417a 21-418 a 6. The meaning of the term potential is extended 
to include racial capacity as well as the capacity which comes when a habit is 
acquired. Thus in the possession of knowledge we distinguish (1) the stage 
when the individual has the capacity implied in his belonging to a given species, 
(2) the stage when the individual has acquired the knowledge, say, of the rules 
of grammar. At both these stages he is potentially possessed of knowledge. 
Again, (3) there is the further stage when he puts his knowledge into application 
[8 4]. By asimilar extension of meaning passivity or to be acted upon comes 
to include the transition from potentiality to actuality, whereby a thing realises 
its true nature, and this change is preservation, not destructive alteration ; or if 

“τ΄ δῇ alteration at all, is an alteration in a new sense of the term [8 5]. When, 
therefore, the faculty of sense is declared to be potential, this term must be 
understood to include both the stage reached at birth and the subsequent 
growth of the faculty by the presentment of external objects; and here lies the 
difference between sense-perception and knowledge. The objects of knowledge, 
being universals, are in a manner in the soul itself, while to sense the stimulus 
of an external object is indispensable [ὃ 6]. Allowance being made for these 
distinctions which pass unrecognised in language, the general rule holds that 
the faculty of sense-perception is potentially what the object of sense is actually. 
In perception the faculty becomes assimilated to and one in quality with its 
object [§ 7]. 

The distinction between two stages of potentiality 1s laid down P&ys. VIII. 4, 
2558 30—b5. If we compare 412 ἃ 10 8q., 22 sqq., where knowledge as potence 
is opposed to its exercise in act, we see that here A. introduces an intermediate 
step, knowledge as habit, ἕξις, which is act if contrasted with potence, but 
potence if contrasted with act. Thus it does double duty, the three stages 
being really four. Cf. what is said of νοῦς ἐν ἔξει 429 Ὁ 5—9. 

417 4 21. διαιρετέον. The word is frequently used in the sense of drawing 
distinctions or analysing a thing. See 2026 on 402a 23 διελεῖν and cf. 420 Ὁ 30. 
Cf. also Metaph. 1048 a 27. 

a 21. ‘viv γὰρ ἁπλῶς. By νῦν is meant “‘in the present discussion regarded 
as incomplete.” “Am Aés with λέγεσθαι or σημαίνειν properly means “in a single 
sense” as opposed to two (διχῶς) or more or several senses (πλεοναχῶς) in which 
a term is used. But when opposed to ὡρισμένως it means, like ἀδιορίστως, 
“vaguely, without distinction”: e.g. Zog. VIIL. 5, 159. a 38 ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν ἀποκριν ό- 
μενον ὑπέχειν λόγον θέμενον ἤτοι ἔνδοξον ἢ ἄδοξον θέσιν ἢ μηδέτερον, καὶ ἤτοι ἀτελῶς 
ἔνδοξον ἢ ἄδοξον ἢ ὡρισμένως and Metaph. 1020b 32 λέγεται δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα κατ᾽ 
ἀριθμὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ὡρισμένως πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἢ πρὸς ἕν, οἷον τὸ μὲν διπλάσιον πρὸς ἕν 
ἀριθμὸς ὡρισμένος. In these passages, as here, it means “ without qualification, 
vaguely, indefinitely.” 

a22. περὶ αὐτῶν, int. περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελέχειας. In 417a 7 we declared 
τὸ αἰσθητικὸν to be δυνάμει μόνον and 417a 14---2᾽ὶ general statements were 
made about ἐνεργεῖν and ἐνέργεια, in both cases without qualification. In what 
follows two senses of δύναμις are distinguished. In 417 Ὁ 2 sqq. the meaning of 
πάσχειν which also appeared in 417 a 15 is further enlarged. 

8. 24. τῶν ἐπιστημόνων, int. ἐστί. This means that without the capacity to 
learn and so become ἐπιστήμων man would not be man. 

a25. ἤδη. We at once pronounce him possessed of knowledge without 
requiring that any further condition should be fulfilled; cf. Pol. 1275 b 18 & yap 
ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἣ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἤδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς 
πόλεως. Cf. 4128 8. 

8. 27. τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ ὕλη. Cf. 4178 23 sq. and Metaph. ἸΟΖ2 9 25 
ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ τὸ γένος, whence we infer that τὸ yévos=the race or species to which 


11. 5 417 a 2I—a 32 355 


the individual belongs by birth. With τοιοῦτον supply οἷον ἐπίστασθαι or οἷον 
δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι. Thus τοιοῦτον Ξεδεκτικὸν τῆς ἐπιστήμης: cf. Alex. Aphr. 
ἀπ. καὶ duc. 83, 20 τὸ φύσιν ἔχον δέξασθαι ἐπιστήμην, 83, 28 ὁ κατὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι 
[int. λεγόμενος δυνάμει ἐπίστασθαι), Them. 55, 21 H., τοῖ, 14 Sp. The next 
words present difficulty, for καὶ may be merely explanatory or may introduce a 
further reason. In the latter case ἡ ὕλη cannot mean, as St Hilaire seemed to 
think, the material substratum in the composition of the individual; moreover, 
there seems hardly any reason why difference of matter as giving rise to 
different capacities should be mentioned in this context. Probably therefore 
we should take ἡ ὕλῃ as summing up the latent capacities of the species and 
not therefore really very different from τὸ γένος, because the capabilities of the 
race, that is, the latent capabilities of the individual, are such as to render him 
capable of knowledge. Them. (doc. ciz.) paraphrases dre τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ 
φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὡς εἶναι δεκτικὴ ἐπιστήμης : cf. Philop. 299, 27 ὁ yap ἄνθρωπος 
κοινῶς ἐπιστήμων λέγεται, ὅτε ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὴ ἐστι" τοῦτο 
γὰρ αὐτῷ σημαίνει τὸ γένος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ αὐτὸ 
τὸ ὑποκείμενον γένος γὰρ λέγει καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ σημαινόμενον 
καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἔφαμεν δυνάμει [412a 9, where Philop. reads δυνάμει" πᾶσα γὰρ ὕλῃ 
δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἔστιν ὕλη, τῷ δύνασθαι δέξασθαι αὐτό. Simpl. 121, 17, 
after explaining δυνάμει ἐπιστήμων by ὡς πεφυκὼς γίνεσθαι διὰ μαθήσεως, con- 
tinues καὶ τῷ γένει τοῦτο [1.6. this capacity] τουτέστιν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ὑπάρχει φύσει 
(he therefore interpreted γένος as “the nature of man”), καὶ ὑλικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον 
δυνάμεε ὡς τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἑτέρωθεν δέχεσθαι τελειούμενον- διὸ πρόσκειται τὸ καὶ 
ὕλη. Such a capacity, needing development and instruction to perfect it, has 
kinship with matter. Probably it was from following a Latin translation and 
not from any deference to this remark of Simpl. that Zabarella treated ὕλη as 
predicate with τοιοῦτον : haec est potentia ad actum primum, quae est potentia 
subiectae materiae, quia homo est subiectum, capax ac veluti materia scientiae. 
The natural endowment implied in being a member of a species is the starting- 
point of all further acquisition, but A. could hardly use δύναμες here to explain 
δυνατός. Cf. Metaph. 1032 a 20 ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἔχει ὕλην - 
δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ εἶναε καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ἑκάστῳ ὕλη. 
1039 Ὁ 29 sq., 1071 a 8—1I1, 1069b 14 sq. 

8. 20. τόδε ro A. The same illustration recurs iWetaph. 1087 a 20 καὶ ὃ 
θεωρεῖ 6 γραμματικός, τόδε τὸ ἄλφα ἄλφα [int. ἐστίν]. 

8. 31. ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν. There is no verb in this sentence. We cannot supply 
κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶ from the last sentence because of the participles 
ἀλλοιωθεὶς and μεταβαλών. The effect of these participles is best shown if we 
supply γίγνεται ἐπιστήμων, “but the one [becomes possessed of knowledge] after 
modification...the other....” ὀἄλλοιωθεὶς, “qualitatively changed.” The process 
of conversion from ignorance is, as Philop. remarks, a change from privation to 
form, and is therefore, strictly speaking, a case of γένεσις rather than of ἀλλοΐωσις.. 
In the latter process the substratum remains the same, while the form or quality 
undergoes change, as exemplified in the change from false opinion to true. 
Cf. Melaph. 1069b 10 sq. 

a 32. ὁ δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ This sentence also must be completed by understanding 
ἐπιστήμων γίγνεται, and with ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν...μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δ᾽ εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, the 
participle μεταβαλὼν must be supplied from the preceding clause. τὴν 
αἴσθησιν. The introduction of sense-perception, side by side with a branch 
of science like grammar, as an instance of the intermediate state, is certainly 
illogical: ὁ ἔχων τὴν αἴσθησιν instead of being κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστήμων iS κατὰ 
δύναμιν αἰσθανόμενος. Cf., however, 417 Ὁ 18. 


23-—2 


356 NOTES Il. 5 


ἅτ7 Ὁ 1. ἄλλον τρόπον. Take these words with μεταβαλὼν understood, “by 
another sort of change,” and not with ἐνεργεῖν. 

b2. οὐκ ἔστι 8 ἁπλοῦν, “15 not used in a single sense,” i.e. has not invari- 
ably the same meaning, is an ambiguous term: cf. 426a 26 ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἁπλῶς 
ἔλεγον περὶ τῶν λεγομένων οὐχ ἁπλῶς. τὸ πάσχειν. This word is rendered by 
“ suffer” or “be acted upon.” It is cognate with πάθος, the passive state or 
quality. Buta thing may (@) be acted upon destructively by something of an 
opposite nature or (4) be acted on by something similar in such a way as to be 
preserved and perfected. The importance of this distinction lies in the applica- 
tion to sensation. A. accepts provisionally the common belief that sensation is 
πάσχειν τι, ἀλλοίωσις (416 Ὁ 33 sq., 415 b 24), and therefore κίνησις, but he aims 
at correcting this view by substituting ἐνέργεια for κίνησις. See 431 a 4—7. 
Similarly νόησις is often described as πάσχειν τι, but this also requires cor- 
rection: 429b 22—430a 2. Again, for ὄρεξις see 433 Ὁ 18. 

b3. σωτηρία, ie. not a deterioration or reversal, but an enhancing of the 
present condition, which is raised from potentiality to actuality. 

Ὁ 4. καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ds. The agent is generically the same as that which 
it acts upon, but ἐναντίον or at least ἕτερον : and τὰ ἐναντία belong to the same 
genus. Hence its similarity is limited by the clause οὕτως ὡς δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς 
ἐντελέχειαν. 

b 5. θεωροῦν γὰρ γίγνεται, I understand ἐπιστῆμον with γίγνεται, the parti- 
ciple θεωροῦν denoting the manner (not, as some hold, completing the predica- 
tion of γίγνεται, which is an odd verb so to use, if we bear in mind ἅμα νοεῖ καὶ 
vevonxev). In technical language, the possessor of the ἕξις, by exercising his 
wisdom, becomes in actuality wise. His ἕξις is still a potentiality, though of a 
higher grade: in the schoolmen’s phrase fotentia ad secundum actum, ad solam 
operationei. 

b6. οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. If the term is interpreted strictly, ἀλλοίωσις is 7 
κατὰ τὸ πάθος μεταβολή (Metaph. 1069 b 12), but this is inconsistent with the 
enhanced existence and self-development which he goes on to describe. Alex. 
Aphr. suggests γένεσις as a better term to describe not only the second transition 
from ἕξις to ἐνέργεια, but also the first transition by which a habit is acquired, 
though he admits that the term Becoming cannot be applied without qualifica- 
tion to the activity of thinking: dz. καὶ Avo. 84, 23 56.) 28; 81, 27—82, 20. But 
no physical analogy is adequate to describe an ἐνέργεια: cf. 407 a 32 sq., 
431 a3 sqq., Atk. Nic. 1174 ἃ 13—17, Ὁ 13 οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις. 
εἰς αὐτὸ. The meaning is exactly the same as for ἑαυτὸ (cod. X, Soph.) and the 
balance of authority is against the change. Uncial MSS., presumably the arche- 
types of all our authorities, would omit the breathing altogether. ἡ ἐπίδοσις, 
“progress” or “growth.” The actualisation of a thing enables it to realise itself. 

Ὁ 8. ὅταν dpovy. Cf. 429b 3 sq. Φρόνησις is an ἐνέργεια strictly so called, 
while οἰκοδόμησις is an example of physical motion as distinct from ἐνέργεια : see 
Metaph. 1048 Ὁ 23 sq., 30 56. 

b9. ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ. He then passes from inaction to activity. Cf. 416 Ὁ 2. 
If the transition from potence into act is not ἀλλοίωσις for physical motion, of 
which building, οἰκοδόμησις, is an example, @ fortiord it is not so for ἐνέργειαι 
strictly so called, like φρόνησις. 

bg τὸ μὲν οὖν... τὸ ἄγον. The clause which begins with these words refers 
to the second transition, viz. that from the ἕξις to the ἐνέργεια, or from knowledge 
implicit to the exercise of knowledge, and asserts that the agent in this change 
should not be called instruction. The rest of the sentence b 12—16 deals with 
the first transition which results in the acquiring of the habit. The patient in 


II. 5 417 Ὁ 1—b 16 357 


both stages I take to be the same, who, when he has been instructed or has 
learned for himself, is able to think and exercise his knowledge at will. Cf. 
429 Ὁ 5—9. 

bio, κατὰ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ φρονοῦν: in relation to that which cogitates and 
thinks. Here κατὰ does not much differ from περὶ c. δος. Ξε “concerning.” The 
whole phrase indicates the subject of this development from potential to actual, 
1.6. τὸ ἀγόμενον understood as correlative to τὸ ἄγον. Alex. Aphr. appears to 
have read κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν, unless his citation, ἀπ. καὶ λύσ., 81, 15 $q., 15 
inexact. 

bil. ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν. No special term is suggested for this application or use 
of knowledge already acquired. 

b13. οὐδὲ πάσχειν φατέον: because of the implication of suffering and 
deterioration, φθορά, which this term and ἀλλοίωσις contain. From the stage of 
pure potentiality advance is possible either to the acquirement of a habit or in 
the opposite direction towards privation and deterioration. 

b 14. δύο τρόπους. There is the change from ignorance to knowledge and 
the change (by forgetting) from knowledge to ignorance. 

bI5. tds στερητικὰς διαθέσεις, “privative conditions.” 3répyow and ἕξις 
are usually opposed, the term στέρησις being employed to denote the 
privation or absence of a particular form, ἕξις its presence. They are chiefly 
used in connexion with the transition from or to contraries, as from health to 
sickness: cf. Wetaph. 1022 Ὁ 22, 1070b 12. In the latter passage form, 
privation and matter are called the three principles of things. Since ἕξις and 
στέρησις are relative terms (Cafeg. 38, 11a 22 τῶν πρός τι, 26. 10, 12a 26 περὶ 
ταῦτόν τι), the negative quality may even be said to be in some sense a positive 
quality: Mefaph. τοῖο Ὁ 6 εἰ δ᾽ ἡ στέρησίς ἐστιν ἔξις mas...(b 9) εἰ ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν 
στέρησιν: e.g. cold, the privation of heat, may be regarded equally with heat as 
a degree of temperature. For the distinction between matter and privation see 
Metaph. 1033 a 5—26. 

Ὁ 16. τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν. The subject is capable of taking on qualities 
or positive states (ἕξεις) and so becoming what nature designed it to be ζ(φύσιν. 
τουτέστιν ἐφ᾽ ὃ πέφυκε, as Philoponus puts it, 304, 24 sq.: cf. 418 8 25): nature 
of course always aiming at the good and tending to perfection. In Mefaph. 
ΙΟ44 Ὁ 30 A. asks: Since the body is potentially healthy, and disease is the 
opposite of health, is the body potentially diseased as well as potentially 
healthy? His answer is 1044b 32 ἢ τοῦ μὲν καθ᾽ ἕξιν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὕλη, τοῦ 
δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ φθορὰν τὴν παρὰ φύσιν; In so far as it 15 related to positive 
state and to form, the body is the matter of health; in relation to privation 
and unnatural deterioration, it is the matter of disease. Cf. Bonitz ad loc. 

Ὁ 16. τοῦ δ᾽ αἰσθητικοῦ. The distinctions just drawn between the two stages 
of potentiality and the stage of actuality, and the transitions from the one to the 
other, apply to sensation as well as to knowledge. The first step which trans- 
forms pure potentiality into a sensitive thing or potential sensibility is taken at 
birth. The animal after birth has an aptitude (és) for sensation, which is 
similar to the possession of knowledge without the application of it. Later 
on, upon contact with external objects, the animal will exercise its powers of 
sensation, just as the one possessed of knowledge passes to the application and 
active exercise of his knowledge. Thus sense is a δύναμις συγγενής, Metaph. 
1047 Ὁ 31 sqq., it comes neither by habit nor by instruction; whereas artistic 
skill and moral virtue are only acquired by practice. ἡ μὲν πρώτη μεταβολὴ. 
The first change implies a second change. The commentators take the first to 
be the passage from pure indeterminate potentiality to the ἕξις of sensitivity in 


358 NOTES Il. 5 


the one case and of knowledge in the other. The second change is the passage 
from this ἕξις unused to its actual exercise, cf. Alex. Aphr. ἀπ. καὶ Ado. 111. 3, 
84, 33 εἰπὼν δὲ ταῦτα..-μετῆλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ ἔδειξεν, τίς μὲν ἡ πρώτη 
δύναμίς ἐστι, καὶ πτῶς καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος εἰς τὴν ἕξιν μεταβάλλει ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, πῶς δὲ 
καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος ἡ δευτέρα εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν; καὶ λέγει τὴν μὲν ἐκ τῆς ὑλικῆς δυνάμεως 
μεταβολὴν eis τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γενέσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννῶντος δηλονότι τὸ ζῷον. 

Ὁ 17. ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, int. τὸ ζῷον. Them. however might be thought to 
imply that the subject is τὸ αἰσθητικόν: κό, 15 H., 103, 1 Sp. ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως 
τὸ μὲν σπέρμα τοῦ ζώου Kal τὸ dv THY πρώτην μεταβάλλει μεταβολήν, καθ᾽ ἣν γίνεται 
αἰσθητικόν. ᾿ 
“- Ὁ 18, ἔχει ἤδη...καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. This does not imply a new transition, 
but describes the consequence of the first, the possession of a power of sensation 
even before it is exercised. ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμην, in the same way as (in the 
example) 6 δυνάμει ἐπιστήμων possesses knowledge, that is, he has the 
capacity to know even when he is not exercising it. So after birth, the child 
has the capacity of sense-perception, whether he exercises it or not; cf. 
Alex. Aphr. ἀπ. καὶ Avo. III. 3, 85, I γεννηθὲν δὲ ἔχει τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ἕξιν εὐθύς, 
ὥσπερ τὸ ἀναλαβὸν τὴν ἐπιστήμην. To ὥσπερ answers καὶ by a well-known 
idiom which the phrase of Thucydides ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐποίουν ταῦτα 
sufficiently illustrates. καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν δὲ, int. αἰσθάνεσθαι. Καὶ. ..δέ, “yes, 
and.” The parallel between sense-perception and knowledge is still maintained. 

Ὁ 19. ὁμοίως λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν, we speak of the actual exercise of sensation 
in the same way as we speak of the application or actual exercise of knowledge. 
Cf. De Sensu 4, 441 Ὁ 22 od yap κατὰ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἐστὶ 
τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. As θεωρεῖν, at all events, is explicit actuality and the transition 
from the ἕξις of ἐπιστήμη to θεωρεῖν, or from (2) to (3) of the stages distinguished 
in 417 a 22 sqq., constitutes the second μεταβολή, in the case of αἰσθάνεσθαι this 
second transition must be that from the sensitivity or power of sensation, with 
which the creature is endowed at birth, to the active exercise of this power in 
actual sensation. 

b 20. τοῦ μὲν, int. αἰσθάνεσθαι. By τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας are to be 
understood the agents which educe and transform potential sense, the faculty, 
into actual sensation, Ὁ 22. For, on the assumption that to perceive 15 to be 
passively affected and acted upon, there must be such an agent. Cf 417 8 17 56. 
supra, 426a 4 5..; 431a48q., De Sensu 6, 445 Ὁ 7 ποιητικὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἕκαστον 
αὐτῶν [int. τῶν παθημάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν] τῆς αἰσθήσεως: τῷ δύνασθαι γὰρ κινεῖν 
αὐτὴν λέγεται πάντα, Metaph. 1010 Ὁ 31--ἼΊΟΙΙ a 2. ἕξωθεν. The affection of 
the percipient is αἴσθημα, Mefaph. 1010b 32. Its cause is something distinct 
from sense, ἕτερον mapa τὴν αἴσθησιν, and prior to it, 20. b 36.sq.: cf. De Jnsommt. 
2, 460 b 2 ἀπελθόντος τοῦ θύραθεν αἰσθητοῦ ἐμμένει τὰ αἰσθήματα αἰσθητὰ ὄντα. 
Properly speaking, external objects do not affect the αἰσθητικόν, but only the 
αἰσθητήριον or organ of sense. Cf. Them. 56, 39 H., 104, 9 Sp. ὅτε γὰρ ov 
πάσχουσα κυρίως ἡ αἴσθησις ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἀλλοιουμένη δέχεται αὐτῶν 
τὰ εἴδη, δῆλον ἐκεῖθεν - οὐ γὰρ λευκὴ γινομένη τῶν λευκῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται, οὐδὲ 
θερμὴ τῶν θερμῶν, Simpl. 124, 3 τουτέστιν ὅτι δεῖ τι παθεῖν τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὑπὸ 
τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔξω καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ ὄντων ἅπερ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας 
λέγεται, οὐχ ὡς ἐμποιοῦντα τὴν κρίσιν, GAN ὡς πάθος τι ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ 7 
κριτικὴ ἐγείρεται ἐνέργειαι. But it will be presently explained (4248 24---28) how 
‘ the two, organ and faculty, are inseparably connected. 

b 22. τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, int. ἐστί. The actual exercise of sensation is con- 
cerned with particulars: cf. dval. Post. 1. 18, 81b 6 τῶν yap καθ᾽ ἕκαστον 7 
αἴσθησις and 1. 31, 87 Ὁ 28 εἰ yap καὶ ἔστιν ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ τοιοῦδε καὶ μὴ τοῦδέ 


Il. 5 417 Ὁ 16—418 a 4 359 


τινος, ἀλλ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαί ye ἀναγκαῖον τόδε τε καὶ ποῦ καὶ νῦν. Thus it is restricted 
to a particular place and a particular time. 

Ὁ 23. τῶν καθόλουι᾽͵ The objects of knowledge are universals; cf. again 
Anal. Post. τ. 31, 87 Ὁ 37 αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν yap ἀνάγκη καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιστήμη 
τῷ τὸ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστίν : also 87 Ὁ 39—88 a 7. ἐν αὐτῇ πώς ἐστι τῇ Ψυχῇ. 
Cf. infra 4298 22—31, 431 b 26—432a 3. By πώς, as we shall see hereafter, he 
means δυνάμει. Cf. 431 Ὁ 20, 22. 

Ὁ 24. ἐπὶ αὐτῷ, int. ἐστίν, “is in a man’s power.” Of Simplicius’ alternative 
explanations of αὐτῷ (124, 28—30), the last τῷ ἐπιστήμονι ἀνθρώπῳ is preferable 
to τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νῷ and to τῇ els νοῦν ἀνεγειρομένῃ ψυχῇ. 

b 25. ὑπάρχειν. The presence of the sensible object here and now is a 
necessary condition. See Axel. Post. 87 Ὁ 29, cited above, 2926 on 417 Ὁ 22. 

b 26. ὁμοίως δὲ What has been said about sense-perception applies equally 
to the arts and sciences based upon sense-perception. The practical and pro- 
ductive arts and sciences, commonly so called, require the use of external 
materials: architecture, navigation and (to a less degree) painting. But the 
reference need not be restricted to such sciences: cf. Them. 56, 25 H., 
103, 17 Sp. ὅσαι τῶν τεχνῶν ποιητικώτεραι. All detailed observation which 
depends on external objects is intended. 

Ὁ 29. εἰσαῦθις. The subject of νοῦς is resumed in III., c. 4. 

Ὁ 31. τὸν παῖδα. The potentiality in this case is quite indeterminate. The 
child is capable of becoming a general or anything else, as he is capable of 
knowing and perceiving. 

Ὁ 32. οὕτως ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητικόν. This has been taken to mean that it is with 
sensibility as with knowledge, viz. that sensibility, like knowledge, has two 
grades of potentiality. But the Greek commentators must surely be right in 
restricting οὕτως to the second grade, οὕτως ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκείνως : “it 15 in this latter 
sense that we must understand the term potential of the sensitive subject.” Cf. 
Alex. Aphr., ἀπ. καὶ Avo. 85, 25 κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον τοῦ δυνάμει τὸ 
δυνάμει αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὴν δυνάμει αἴσθησιν λέγεσθαι. The corresponding use 
of otros=the latter of two, the last of three, is not uncommon, e.g. γε. VIII. 7, 
260 a 28, where ταύτην must replace φοράν. 

4184 3. ὡς κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν, as proper and adequate terms for whichever 
of the two processes we are talking about. When we talk of sensation, they will 
denote the latter process, viz. the transition from ἕξις to ἐνέργεια, if 1 am right in 
following the commentators in the preceding note, though these terms are not 
strictly appropriate to the transition from ἕξις to ἐνέργεια (called above σωτηρία 
τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος). Obviously when a term has two or more meanings, it cannot 
be strictly appropriate to more than one. Readers of the Peezzc are familiar 
with κύριον ὄνομα as opposed to μεταφορά, γλῶττα or ξενικὸν for the legitimate, 
ordinary, current application of a term in contradistinction to its figurative or 
archaic use (cf. 1457 Ὁ 3, 1458 a 19, 8. 22 54.) : κύριον ὄνομα, as Cope says, is “the 
proper word by which any object is designated and the word correctly employed 
to express it.” Trend. thinks the metaphor is from the law courts, “as far as 
their authority goes.” I prefer to explain, “not as technicalities but as ordinary 
words with ordinary liabilities,” and therefore taking on the necessary qualifica- 
tions in particular cases. 

a4. οἷον. It is to be noted that it is in respect of quality that faculty is 
assimilated to the sensible object, cf. 2z/ra 424 a 22 ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν 
ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ 7 ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἧ τοιονδί. καθάπερ 
εἴρηται. This has been virtually anticipated if we piece together 417 Ὁ 18 5ᾳ., 
417 Ὁ 3—7, 417a 12—20. In other words, the faculty of sense must be capable 


360 NOTES IL 5 


of assuming the peculiar quality of the object of sense, and in the act of sensa- 
tion the faculty adapts itself to the object. To begin with they are dissimilar, 
but in the act of sensation they become similar. In sensation the faculty takes 
in the object wezzes its matter. 

ad. πάσχει μὲν οὖν. Cf. sufra 417 a 19, 20, nofes. 


CHAPTER VI. 


418 a 7—25. Objects of sense may be classified according as they are 
perceived (a) der se, in themselves or (6) fer acctdens, incidentally. Objects 
directly perceived may be either (1) objects of the special senses or (2) objects 
common to several, or all, of the senses [8 1]. An object of a special sense is 
that which one sense only can perceive, about which that one sense cannot be 
mistaken, as colour, sound and the various qualities corresponding to the 
varieties of the sense of touch [§ 2]. Objects of the senses in common are such 
qualities as motion, rest, number, shape and magnitude [§ 3]. Besides these, 
there are (4) objects indirectly or accidentally perceived. In such cases what is 
perceived is an accident or concomitant of the object perceived directly or ‘der 
sé. This latter is the sensible object in the proper sense of the term [§ 4]. 

In order to understand the full import of A.’s distinction we must enlarge 
our notion of συμβεβηκός. Usually a quality or attribute is said to be an 
accident of, or to belong to, a thing or substance. But, as συμβαίνειν means 
simply “to go with” or “accompany” something, it may be, and is, used to 
denote the thing or substance which goes with or accompanies its attribute or 
quality: e.g. we perceive white colour directly, but the son of Diares, the 
substance to which the colour belongs, we perceive indirectly, the man being 
regarded as a concomitant of the colour. 

418 a8. πρῶτον. In accordance with the rules of procedure laid down in 
11.. c. 4, we must study not only the ἔργα καὶ πράξεις, but also the ἀντικείμενα. 
Cf. 415 a 16—22.> καθ᾽ aird...9 κατὰ συμβεβηκός. It has been shown in the 
notes on 406 a 4, 5 that κατὰ τε “ἴῃ virtue of ” and why two phrases the precise 
meaning of which is ger se and per accidens should, like καθ᾽ atréand καθ᾽ ἕτερον, 
become practically equivalent to “directly” and “indirectly.” We perceive the 
qualities of things, τὰ ἴδια αἰσθητά, and the attributes of things, τὰ κοινὰ αἰσθητά, 
directly; the things themselves, to which these qualities and attributes belong, 
we perceive indirectly. This account, transparently simple as it seems, raises 
some further questions. The common belief is that we directly perceive the 
things, and the analysis of sensation points the same way. InII., c. 5 we learned 
that the process of actual sensation, the transition of the faculty from potentiality 
to active operation, has an external cause, τὸ αἰσθητόν, τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, which we 
are bound to regard as a substance or thing. What then, exactly, is perceived, 
the qualities and attributes, or the things to which they belong? For example, 
is it χρῶμα or τὸ ἔχον τὸ χρῶμαξ A.’s answer would seem to be (cf. 418 a 24 sq.) 
that, properly speaking, the quality or attribute, not the thing or subject of 
attributes, is perceived directly. Investigations of the special senses tend to 
confirm this. But the implications of ordinary language and the thought which 
it expresses, as well as his own doctrine that qualities, attributes and properties 
do not exist independently of the things or substances in which they inhere, 
compel him to find some means by which things or substances, e.g. τὸ ἔχον τὸ 


II. 6 418 a 4—a 16 361 


χρῶμα, may also be entitled to rank as perceived objects or sensibles. Accord- 
ingly, he says we perceive the thing fer accidens. If he occasionally employs 
ordinary language and speaks of the thing, not its quality, as perceived by the 
special senses (e.g. 422 a Io), this must be taken with the qualification “so far 
as it possesses the quality in question,” e.g. the thing gzé coloured, sonorous or 
odorous. It is the constant tendency of language and thought to neglect this 
qualification and to treat the part as if it were the whole. We really perceive 
whiteness, we think and say we perceive Cleon. The phrase κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 
first occurred in this connexion 414 b 9 (on 417 a 5 sq. see zofe): we shall meet 
with it again in III., c. I and 11I., c.3. Cf. 425a 15, a 20—-b 4, 428 Ὁ 18—30. 

alI0. κοινὸν πασών. This statement requires qualification. See xzoze on 
alg 2u/ra. 

air ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται...12 ἀπατηθῆναι. Probably the two characteristics should 
be taken together. Cf. the important qualification of 428b 18 ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν 
ἰδίων ἀληθής ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι. ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος : also 428 a 11 sq., 430 Ὁ 29 566. 
(of sight), De Sensu 4, 442 Ὁ 8 διὸ καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων [int. τῶν κοινῶν] ἀπατῶν- 
ται; περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οὐκ ἀπατῶνται, οἷον ἡ ὄψις περὶ χρώματος καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ περὶ 
ψόφων, Metlaph. lolob 2 sq., with which must be taken the qualifications 
ΙΟΙΟΡ 14—26. 

aI2. οἷον ὄψις χρώματος. We might have expected χρῶμα ὄψεως [ἴδιον xré.] 
to conform with ἴδιον ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως above. But a fresh construction seems 
to begin with οἷον, “sight is of colour,” a genitive of relation, as in 418a 26, 
422 a 20 Sqq., 422 b 24, 424 b 34; or we might supply αἰσθάνεται ws ἰδίου from 
δι 12 αἰσθάνεσθαι; or, less plausibly, κριτική ἐστε from a 14 κρίνει below; or again 
χρώματος, ψόφου, χυμοῦ might conceivably, though not very probably, be 
objective genitives closely attached to the governing nouns, in which case 
there would be no need to supply ἐστί. Cf. 430b 29 τὸ ὁρᾶν rod ἰδίου ἀληθές: 
where, however, see critical ozes. - 

8. 14. πλείους μὲν ἔχει διαφοράς. I consider μὲν solzfarium, as in 412 ἃ 7. 
Whatever the punctuation, the sentence ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστη γε xré. does not in meaning 
answer the present clause. For μὲν solztarium cf. De Interpr. 14, 23 Ὁ 30, 
Pol. 1257a 15, 1262a 7, 1270 ἃ 34, 1271 a 19, 1284b 13. See also Wyse, 
Speeches of Isaeus, p. 181. What A. means is explained 422b 17 sqq., where 
the question is raised whether touch be not one single sense, but a variety of 
senses with a corresponding variety of objects. It is quite another matter 
that the single senses of sight and hearing are sometimes said to reveal 
many qualities in objects. Thus we have the varieties of colour recog- 
nised 421 a 14 sq., varieties both of colour and of sonorous objects in 
420 a 26—29 and similar varieties of flavours and odours, there called εἴδη 
(=species), 421 a 16—18, 422 Ὁ το: cf. Mefaph. 980 a 26 μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν 
ἡμᾶς αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς [int. ἡ ὄψις], De A. 422 Ὁ 28 
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεών εἶσιν ἐναντιώσεις πλείους, οἷον ἐν φωνῇ οὐ μόνον 
ὀξύτης καὶ βαρύτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότης καὶ λειότης καὶ τραχύτης φωνῆς 
καὶ τοιαῦθ᾽ ἕτερα. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ χρῶμα διαφοραὶ τοιαῦται ἕτεραι. All these are 
varieties of colour in the one case and sound in the other, whereas A. is careful 
to point out that it is not possible to reduce all tangibles to any one such 
common quality: 422 Ὁ 32 ἀλλὰ τί τὸ ἐν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ ἀκοῇ ψόφος, 
οὕτω τῇ ἀφῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἔνδηλον. They form at least two groups, temperature 
and resistance. 

8 15. περὶ τούτων, int. τῶν ἰδίων. 

a6. ἀλλὰ τί. This is a judgment respecting the direct object, whether 
that object be construed strictly as the quality, colour, or as the thing or 


362 NOTES 11. 6 


substance, τόδε ri, in which the colour inheres. Thus, as a judgment, it falls 
outside the province of the special sense. Note that the neuter adjective is 
ambiguous. As τὸ καλὸν = beauty, so τὸ λευκὸν = whiteness. Even in English 
the white, the beautiful may mean either thing or quality, but the dark need not, 
and usually does not, mean a thing or substance, τόδε rz. Sensation pure and 
simple, without the reference to a thing, would be expressed in a judgment of a 
different form: “It is white,” or at the utmost ‘* This sensation is the sensation 
of white.” 

8. 17. ἑκάστου. There is no need to alter this, with the scribe of W, into 
ἑκάστης, if we follow the lax ruling of Bonitz, Jzd. Ar. 484a 59: pronomina 
demonstrativa interdum non sequuntur genus eius nominis, ad quod referuntur, 
sed neutro genere ponuntur. Cf. 418 Ὁ 18 ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος στέρησις THs τοιαύτης 
ἔξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἢ τούτου παρουσία τὸ φῶς ἐστίν. In any 
case the meaning is clear: “are special to each sense,” as ἴδεον.. ἑκάστης αἰσθή- 
gews above. κοινὰ On these see 425 a 14 566. and De Sensu 1, 437 a ὃ sq., 
where their perception is attributed chiefly (μάλεστα) to sight. Also cf. Plato, 
Theaet. 185 C, Το, where the conception of ‘common objects of apprehension” is 
the same, though number is the only example common to the two lists, and 
Plato refuses in the sequel to attribute their apprehension to sense at all, but 
makes them directly apprehended by the soul itself. Cf. De Jmsomzn. 1, 458b 4 
κοινὰ & ἐστὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οἷον σχῆμα καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κίνησις καὶ τἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, 
ἴδια δ᾽ οἷον χρῶμα ψόφος χυμός, De Mem. 1, 450 ἃ 9 μέγεθος δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν 
καὶ κίνησιν ᾧ καὶ χρόνον: καὶ τὸ φάντασμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν - 
ὥστε τοῦτο φανερὸν ὅτι τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητικῷ τούτων [int. χρόνου, μεγέθους, κινήσεως 
ἢ γνῶσίς ἐστιν, 26. 4518 16sq. The omission of time, in view of 433 Ὁ 7 χρόνου 
αἴσθησιν, is remarkable, but, since it is defined as ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ 
πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, Phys. IV. 11, 219b 2, its claim to a place on the list 
must be regarded as deducible either from number or from motion or both. 
The reference in Ἔχ. Nic. 1142 a 27 οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων [int. αἴσθησις, ἀλλ᾽ 
ota αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον must be to σχῆμα 
as one of the κοινά. Bywater brackets ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς. 

4 10. πάσαις. Cf. the important passage 425 a 14-—-30, which introduces us 
to sensus communis in relation to these common sensibles. The statement 
Kowa maoas 1s quite true of number and unity (see 4258 19 sq.): each sense 
perceives one object, and number is made up of units. The statement is also 
true of motion, but magnitude and figure can hardly be said to be directly 
perceived except by sight and touch. Cf. De Sensu 4, 442 Ὁ 5 μέγεθος γὰρ καὶ 
σχῆμα καὶ TO τραχὺ Kal τὸ λεῖον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ Kal τὸ ἀμβλὺ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὄγκοις κοινὰ 
τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν, εἶ δὲ μὴ πασῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὄψεώς γε καὶ ἁφῆς, where it will be seen 
that A. adds τραχὺ and λεῖον, ὀξὺ and ἀμβλὺ to the list of common sensibles, or 
rather to those common to sight and touch. The fact is that no one of these 
common sensibles is perceived by one sense only ; and all the senses, in various 
combinations, at one time or another contribute to make them known. This 
leads to new and important developments, 425 a 27. 

8. 22. τούτου, “him,” i.e. Diares’ son. Strictly speaking, it is the whiteness 
of the object that you perceive by the sense of sight. This is plainly stated in 
425 a 24 οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἠἡσθανόμεθα, οἷον τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν οὐχ 
ὅτε Κλέωνος υἱός, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι λευκός" τούτῳ δὲ συμβέβηκεν υἱῷ Κλέωνος εἶναι. Cf. 
Simpl. 2722 Phys. 1062, 2 6 γὰρ Ξωκράτης κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 6pards, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ 
χρῶμα. αἰσθάνεται, int. ὁ αἰσθανόμενος. Cf. 4038 22, 2072. ὅτι, “ because.” 
The clause explains why Diares’ son is said to be perceived κατὰ συμβεβηκός, 
“‘as a concomitant”: that is what he is. 


11. 6 418 a 16—a 25 363 


a 23. τοῦτο οὗ αἰσθάνεται, “that which in this manner (i.e. indirectly) you 
perceive,” viz. Diares’ son, the substance to which the quality white belongs. 
Thus rovro and rovrov refer to the same thing. As above remarked, though it 
is more usual to call the quality whiteness a συμβεβηκὸς of the substance, we 
have a perfect right to call the thing or substance a συμβεβηκὸς of the quality, 
and this A. occasionally does: e.g. 425 a 25 sq., Avail. Prior. 1. 27, 438 33 τῶν 
yap αἰσθητῶν σχεδὸν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι κατὰ μηδενός, 
πλὴν ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκός" φαμὲν γάρ ποτε τὸ λευκὸν ἐκεῖνο Σωκράτην εἶναι καὶ τὸ 
προσιὸν Καλλίαν, Anad. Posi. 1. 22, 83 ἃ I—I14, a passage in which both uses of 
the term κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς occur. See Torst. pp. 175 sq. (zoze on 428 Ὁ 18) and 
the remarks of Professor Bywater on the same passage, Journal of Phil. XVIL., 
p- 57. The order of the words makes it more natural to regard τοῦτο as the 
antecedent of οὗ, though it is just conceivable that τῷ λευκῷ, far removed as it 
is from the relative, is the antecedent. We should then translate “because 
this fact is incidental to the white thing which the subject perceives directly.” 
Still, the perception of a white object, being a case of direct perception, is not 
what at this point we should expect to be marked by οὗ αἰσθάνεται, but rather the 
perception of something der accidens. Such a view might, it is true, be thought 
to derive support from the paraphrase of Them. 58, 8 H., 106, 16 Sp., which in 
Spengel’s text appears as follows: ᾿Αριστοτέλης δὲ τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητὰ 
οὕτως épunvever> κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τούτου αἰσθάνεται, διότι τῷ λευκῷ οὗ 
αἰσθάνεται, τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ λέγοι ὅτε κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦ Διάρους 
αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε Διάρει εἶναι. Heinze, however, following 
4183 22 ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε τοῦτο οὗ αἰσθάνεται, in spite of all the MSS. of 
Them., has altered the relative order of the words in thick type. He gives 
τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν οὗ αἰσθάνεται, and this does better accord with the subsequent 
words of Them. ὅτε τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε Διάρει εἶναι. ἢ τοιοῦτον. To be taken 
with τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. The percipient subject, τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, is not acted upon 
by the concomitant thus indirectly perceived, τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, as such, i.e. as xara 
συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητόν (in the illustration the eye is not affected by the white 
object, gzé son of Diares), but by the sensible object as coloured, sonant, 
flavoured or tangible. Cf. 4248 23 ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ F ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, GAN 7 
τοιονδί. However, A. permits himself to substitute the universal, e.g. colour, for 
the specific shade of colour as τὸ αἔσθητόν, of course κατὰ συμβεβηκός. See 
Metaph. 1087 a 19 ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ ὄψις τὸ καθόλου χρῶμα ὁρᾷ, ὅτι 
τόδε τὸ χρῶμα ὃ ὁρᾷ χρῶμά ἐστιν" καὶ ὃ θεωρεῖ ὁ γραμματικός, τόδε τὸ ἄλφα ἄλφα. 

a24. τὰ ἴδια, the specific objects of the particular senses and not τὰ κοινά, 
although both alike are καθ᾽ αὑτὰ αἰσθητά. The view that the quality of the 
thing, and not the thing itself, is properly perceptible by sense is confirmed by 
De Sensu 6, 445b 11—13, where a body without colour, weight, or any other 
such attribute, viz. sound, smell, flavour or tactile properties, is declared to be 
not perceptible by sense at all, οὐδ᾽ αἰσθητὸν ὅλως. A. continues Ὁ 13 ταῦτα γὰρ 
fint. ra πάθη] τὰ αἰσθητά. 

a25. πρὸς & The relative sentence is part of the predicate, joined to 
κυρίως aicOnrd. The teleological view again emerges. Each sense is by 
nature so constituted as to be affected by, and to perceive, its special objects. 
Thus, while concomitant or accidental objects of sense, as such, exert no 
influence on the sense, direct objects of sense, whether κοινὰ or ἴδια, do; with 
the difference that the κοινὰ are always associated in perception with the 
specific objects of particular senses. While the eye is always affected by and 
perceives colour, it makes all the difference whether the coloured object be 
perceived as of a given shape or size, in rest or in motion. This chapter must 


264 NOTES 11. 6 


be carefully compared with Book 111.. cc. 1,2. Whatever conclusion be adopted 
on the controverted points, it is obvious that perception per acctdens receives an 
extension of meaning in Ill.,c. 1. Cf. also Mefafh. 1087 a 19 sq. cited in second 
note on 418 a 23 supra. If, then, A. has not given complete information on one 
important point raised in IL, c. 6, it may be plausibly argued that the account 
here given of τὰ κοινὰ 15 also imperfect. 


CHAPTER VII. 


In placing sight at the head of the special senses A. departs from the rule 
he has hitherto observed of starting with the lowest and most widely diffused 
manifestation of life. If he had conformed to this rule, he would have begun 
with touch. Cf. £¢z#. Mic. 1118 b 1—3. In 111., c. 12 A. does begin with touch 
434b 10 sqq. and proceeds to taste b 18 sqq. and the other senses b 24 sqq. 
Why, then, is the ordo docitrixae not the ordo naturae here also? Various 
reasons have been assigned for the procedure: almost every commentator has 
his own. It may have been the difficulty of establishing the presence of a 
medium in taste and touch which determined A. to reserve these senses until he 
had firmly established the necessity of a medium for seeing, hearing, smelling. 
Sight, he tells us (429 a 3), is the sense Jar excellence, and writers of all ages 
have been tempted to regard it as the typical sense and to make general 
statements about sensation, which are only partially, if at all true, of the other 
senses; just as A.’s predecessors concentrated their attention upon the soul of 
man, while at the same time making statements about the soul in general. In 
the application of his doctrine of sensation to memory and imagination A. 
appears to err in this direction. Zabarella maintains that sight was taken first 
for purely practical reasons, because it had been most studied: more information 
had been accumulated about it, and it was therefore the easiest of the senses to 
explain. 

In the explanation of sight A. proceeds from the cardinal facts that by this 
sense we distinguish objects (1) at a distance, (2) as coloured. Hence he 
assumes a medium upon which colour can act. The medium, in itself neutral, 
has two determinations, a positive state when it is illuminated and we say there 
is light, a negative state when we say there is darkness. The motion or 
activity set up by colour is of the type ἀλλοίωσις and not of the type φορά, for 
it takes place instantaneously, however great the distance between the coloured 
object and the eye. If the medium is there and not actualised, we have dark- 
ness, which is not the contrary of light but its mere absence; the normal 
activity of the medium gives light but not colour, special states of the medium 
when it is stimulated in special ways in consequence of special agents give 
colouring, and it is the presence of colours which makes things visible. This 
medium he calls “the transparent,” τὸ διαφανές. Light itself, or this medium in 
normal operation, is not visible Jer se, but it is the necessary condition of the 
visibility of colour. The necessity of the medium and the prominent part it 
plays are more obvious in the case of seeing: and this is why, of the three topics 
discussed in the case of each special sense, viz. (1) the object, (2) the medium 
and (3) the sense-organ, in the words of Zabarella: Hic Aristoteles de obiecto 
pauca, de organo nihil, de medio permulta dicturus est. Here we have a 
valuable supplement in the De Semsu: in c. 2 of that tract the organ of vision 
receives considerable attention, c. 3 is wholly devoted to colours as the object of 


Il, 7 418 a 25—a 27 36ς 


vision, while the problems of cc. 6 and 7 have especial reference to that which 
A. regards as the principal and typical sense. 

These facts premised, we give a short abstract of §§ 1, 2. 

418a 26—b17. The object of sight is colour and phosphorescence, 
colour being crudely defined as that with which an object visible in itself is 
overlaid. It is the nature of colour to set the medium, which we may call “the 
transparent,” in motion [ἢ 1]. Such a transparent medium is found in air and 
water, not as being air and water, but because of the presence in them of this 
something, the medium, which is also present in the eternal body above us 
[aether], and the medium is set in activity by fire or by aether, which has the 
same illuminative property as fire. From this it follows that light is not fire 
{as had been maintained by previous thinkers] nor anything corporeal at all, 
nor any emanation from body (which would be equally corporeal). Light is 
solely the presence of fire or of a similar agency in the medium [§ 2]. 

418 a 26. οὗ μὲν οὖν.. «ὁρατόν. It is implied that ὅρασις is the process or 
operation (ἔργον or πρᾶξις) of vision. Here again (cf. 418 a 7) A. is careful to 
follow the method proposed 415 a 16—22. He passes directly from the faculty 
(ὄψις) to the process (ὅρασις), and from the process to the correlated object 
{éparév). We shall find that he adheres to this procedure when dealing with 
each of the other senses. ὁρατὸν δ᾽. The special object of the sense of 
sight, 1.6. the visible, is (1) colour, (2) phosphorescence. The best clue to the 
meaning of this discussion is to bear in mind that colour was regarded by the 
Pythagoreans as the surface of bodies, De Semsu 3, 439a 30 τὸ γὰρ χρῶμα ἢ ἐν τῷ 
πέρατί ἐστιν ἢ πέρας: διὸ καὶ of ἸΤυθαγόρειοι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν χροιὰν ἐκάλουν. A. 
corrects this view by making colour a property in the extremity, but not itself 
the extremity of bodies: 4398 31 ἔστι μὲν yap ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος πέρατι, ἀλλ᾽ οὔ 
τι τὸ τοῦ σώματος πέρας, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν δεῖ νομίζειν, ἥπερ καὶ ἔξω χρω- 
ματίζεται, ταύτην καὶ ἐντός. He still speaks of it here (418 8 29) as τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ 
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ: cf. Top. 107b 28 and Mefaph. Ἰο228 16 ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ πέφυκε 
γίγνεσθαι, οἷον τὸ χρῶμα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ. It is more exactly described in De 
Sens 3, 430 Ὁ 11 sq. ὥστε χρῶμα ἂν εἴη τὸ τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἐν σώματε ὡρισμένῳ 
πέρας. Colour makes and defines the surface of the body gwd transparent, as 
figure defines it gwd extended. Colour makes the transparent medium itself 
visible and its own varieties visible through the medium. White and black 
as colours in solid bodies correspond to the condition of light or darkness in 
air. A coloured object, then, is one which has the cause of its visibility within 
itself (ἐν ἑαυτῷ), as distinguished from transparent substances, air and water, 
through which we can see the colour of other bodies. As with these trans- 
parent substances, so with light and its correlative darkness, for light is the 
medium in active operation, while if the medium is in a state of potentiality, 
i.e. present but not working or actualised, there is darkness. If we see colour 
in the water, we suspect colouring matter or some other foreign cause. If we 
see the transparent medium, it is because there is something analogous to 
colour actually present in it (οἷον χρῶμα Ὁ 11, δι’ ἀλλότριον χρῶμα Ὁ 5); not, 
however, as a coating on the surface, but as intrinsic and constitutive of the 
medium in activity. 

a27. χρῶμα μέν, καὶ 8. For μὲν followed by καὶ Bonitz s.v. cites Lez. Il. 19, 
1392b 15 sqq., Poet. 3, 1448 a 31. Cf. Vahlen, Beztrage iv., Ὁ. 427. λόγῳ μὲν 
ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, “can be stated in words”; that is, a rational account can be given 
of it. It can be described, though it has as yet no name. The phrase shows 
how Adyos acquires a meaning which is frequent in A., that of rational descrip- 
tion, something wider and vaguer than definition proper, cf. dual. Pos?. 11, Lo, 


366 NOTES Il. 7 


94a 11, Melaph. 1043 Ὁ 23—26, where definition is decried by the Cynics as 
μακρὸς λόγος (cf. ΙΟΟῚ a 7—9). ἀνώνυμον δὲ We call such objects phos- 
phorescent. They are not seen in the light as coloured objects are, but in the 
dark; cf. 4198 3. 

a 28. προελθοῦσι, “if we proceed.” There is no reference to a definite 
passage. The sense is that the progress of our enquiry will of itself clear up 
the point. For προελθοῦσι cf. 403 b 21. 

a29. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα. This is a hard saying. We have just been 
told that the nameless quality now known as phosphorescence is also visible, 
and this is fully borne out by a careful consideration of 418b 2 sq., 419 a I—6, 
22 sq., where we are told that all colour is seen in the light and cannot be seen 
without light, but that not all that is visible is visible in the light, that certain 
things (1.6. phosphorescent objects) are visible only in the dark and then 
without their natural colour, while fire again is visible both in the light and in 
the dark. Moreover, A. himself admits elsewhere that colour and visibility are 
not convertible terms, PAys. 111. 1, 201 Ὁ 3 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐ ταὐτόν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ χρῶμα 
ταὐτὸν καὶ ὄρατόν (cf. Metaph. 1065 Ὁ 32), but there the context shows that this is 
a case of logical distinction and material identity. Colour is τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ one 
and the same with the visible, but differently conceived, λόγῳ érepov. There is 
no trace of a different reading. Them., indeed, paraphrases (58, 23 H., 107, 
8 Sp.) ὁρατὸν δὲ λέγω πρώτως τὸ χρῶμα, but afterwards (58, 26 H., 107, 14 Sp.) 
νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον κείσθω τὴν πρώτην, ὅτε τὸ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα. Simplicius seems 
to have expected τὶ γὰρ ὁρατόν, for (130, 6) he says ἀντὶ τοῦ τὶ ὁρατὸν εἴρηται νῦν 
τὸ ὁρατόν. If we wanted to emend the text, we should welcome Essen’s happy 
inspiration, which is very unlike the great majority of his unconvincing and 
somewhat arbitrary alterations. He puts a full stop after προελθοῦσι and 
continues μάλιστα yap ὁρατὸν xré. Thus A. is made consistent, and the proposal 
might seem to derive some slight support from Them.’s πρώτως and from the 
fact that Philop. (320, 4), in his abbreviated citation δῆλον ἡμῖν ἔσται προελθοῦσι. 
stops short of μάλισται But the passage from the Physics should make us 
chary of alteration. Them. by his πρώτως showed that he was conscious of the 
same difficulty in the text which Simpl. has noted: cf. Soph. 72, 26 δῆλον δὲ 
ἔσται ὃ λέγομεν προελθοῦσι μάλιστα. viv δὲ τὸ ὁρατὸν κυρίως ἐστὶ χρῶμα. The 
fact is, A. has descended to popular modes of speech (cf. 425 Ὁ 18 sq.) and 
committed the fault which he censures 426 a 26. In the light of 421 Ὁ 5, 
422 a 20 54.) 4244 10, 425 Ὁ 21 sq. we may opine that he was just as inexact in 
the opening statement of this chapter. But he is bound by his method to put 
down half truths provisionally and correct or qualify them as he goes along. 
ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ: that is, on the surface of the coloured body, rod 
κεχρωσμένου. Simpl. 130, 8 τὸ κεχρωσμένον κατὰ τὸ χρῶμα καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν κατὰ 
τὴν λαμπρότητα ὁρᾶται. The comment of Simpl. would be more to the point if 
he had read κατ᾽ αὐτὸ (Ξετὸ χρῶμα) instead of καθ᾽ αὗτό. See nore on a 26 
ὁρατὸν δ᾽. I understand ὄν, rather than κατηγορούμενον, with τὸ ἐπὶ rov...dparov. 
In any case the surface of the coloured body is meant by τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατόν. 
There is this difference between body and the surface of body that, while 
κεχρῶσθαι may be truly predicated of both, it is only of the surface that it is 
predicable καθ᾽ αὑτὸ and πρώτως. See Top. V. 5, 134a 18—25 and Waitz ad loc. 
“sic corpus dicitur album ὡς κατ᾽ ἄλλο τι πρῶτον, κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν - ταύτῃ yap 
πρώτως ὑπάρχει τὸ κεχρῶσθαι- ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιφάνεια λέγεται κεχρῶσθαι ὡς πρῶτον αὐτό." 
The term coloured is applied to the body or coloured thing in virtue of its 
surface and so κατ᾽ dAdo: Phys. IV. 3, 210b 4 τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ὅτι ἐν 
σώματι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ: ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐκέτι κατ᾽ ἄλλο. At the same 


Il. 7 418 a 27--- 5 367 


time to be a surface and to be coloured are logically quite distinct: zd. 210b 6 
ἕτερά γε τῷ εἴδει ταῦτα, καὶ ἄλλην φύσιν tye ἑκάτερον καὶ δύναμιν, Fr’ ἐπιφάνεια 
καὶ τὸ λευκόν. Cf. Jfefaph. 1029b 13, where A. gives the first rough approxi- 
mation to the ri ἦν εἶναι as ὃ λέγεται καθ᾽ αὑτὸ and then corrects it thus: (Ὁ 16) οὐδὲ 
δὴ τοῦτο πᾶν- οὐ γὰρ τὸ οὕτως καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὡς ἐπιφάνεια λευκόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι TO ἐπιφανείᾳ 
εἶναι τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι. In the next sentence of our present passage A. enforces a 
similar distinction between 76 ἐπεῴαν εἰᾳ εἶναι and τὸ ὁρατῷ εἶναι : to be a surface 
and to be visible are logically distinct. 

a 30. καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ [int. ὁρατοῦ] οὐ τῷ λόγῳ. What is here meant by καθ᾽ αὑτὸ 
is afterwards expressed by τὸ οἰκεῖον, as opposed to τὸ ἀλλότριον, χρῶμα 419 a2, 6. 
The meanings excluded are those exemplified in Mefafh. 1022a 25 ἕν μὲν yap 
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, οἷον ὁ Καλλίας καθ᾽ αὑτὸν Καλλίας καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι 
Καλλέᾳ- ἐν δὲ ὅσα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχει (i.e. the essential marks), οἷον ζῷον 6 
Καλλέας καθ᾽ αὑτόν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχει τὸ ζῷον- ζῷον γάρ τι 6 Καλλίας. 
ἔτι δὲ εἰ ἐν αὑτῷ δέδεκται πρώτῳ ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινί, οἷον ἡ ἐπιφάνεια λευκὴ καθ᾽ αὑτήν, 
καὶ ζῇ ὃ ἄνθρωπος καθ᾽ αὑτόν" ἡ γὰρ Ψυχὴ μέρος τι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ἣ πρώτῃ 
τὸ ζῆν. Thus ὁρατὸν is not (1) the τί ἦν εἶναι of the surface or coloured thing 
nor (2) one of its essential marks nor (3) the logical subject necessarily implied 
in its definition, as number is implied in any definition of odd or even, or surface 
in any definition of white colour. The relation of visibility to the surface of a 
body or other κεχρωσμένον re here denoted by τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατὸν might be 
compared to that between unity and being, of which A. says Mezaph. 1003 Ὁ 22 
εἰ On τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ἕν ταὐτὸ καὶ pla φύσις τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ καὶ 
αἴτιον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ δηλούμενα κτὲ. 

8. 31. κινητικόν, “capable of exciting motion,” not, however, local movement, 
φορά, but qualitative change, ἀλλοίωσις. In this respect vision differs from the 
other senses, De Sensu 6, 4468 20—~447a 10. This limitation of “motion” or 
“ἐ perturbation” must be remembered when Grote says, pp. 465 sq., 2nd edition 
(11., pp. 198 sq., Ist edition): “colour operates upon the eye...by causing move- 
ments or perturbations in the external intervening medium, air or water, which 
affect the sense through an appropriate agency of their own. The eye is of 
watery structure, apt for receiving the impressions.” Cf. De Sensu 2, 438 Ὁ 3 
ἀλλ᾽ εἴτε φῶς cir ἀήρ ἐστι τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ὁρωμένου καὶ τοῦ ὄμματος, ἡ διὰ τούτου 
κίνησίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιοῦσα τὸ ὁρᾶν. 

4ISbI. τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς: that is, “the medium in a state of 
activity.” This, as we shall see below, is light. 

b2. οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός. This comes in somewhat prematurely, as it is 
only in the next section that A. tells us that light is τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν διαφαν ἔς. 
Cf. 419 a 7—9 and oZes. 

b3. ἐν φωτὶ. The preposition is primarily significant of the environment, 
but as this is a sime gud non (οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ), it comes to be at the same time 
instrumental. 

b 5. ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, “to speak without qualification,” 1.6. in the unrestricted 
sense of the term καθ᾽ αὑτό. See second moze on 417 a 21. δι᾽ ἀλλότριον 
χρῶμα. According to Philop. 322, 31 sq., the cause intended is light, which 
below is said to be οἷον χρῶμα τοῦ διαφανοῦς : to be quite accurate, we need 
to insert some qualifying word like οἷον here. The fact which A. has before 
him is that air or water, in order to be seen, must be illuminated. In them- 
selves colourless, their transparent bodies take on the colour of the light in 
which they are seen. For the extension of this theory cf. De Sensu 2, 3, 
439 a 18—439 b 16 and Alexander's Commentary on the De Seusu (45, 17 W., 
95, 8 Th.) δέχεται δὲ τὸ φῶς τὰ ἀόριστα διαφανῆ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν οἰκεῖον χρῶμα" τὰ 


268 NOTES Il. 7 


yap ἀόριστα, ὥσπερ τὸ πέρας ἴσχει παρ᾽ ἄλλον οὐκ ἔχοντα οἰκεῖόν τε Kal ὡρισμένον, 
οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ χρώματα. δι᾽ οὗ δὴ ταῦτα φαίνεται, τοῦτο δὲ ἰδίως καλοῦμεν διαφανές, 
cf. (45, 13 W., 95, 3 Th.) ὧν δὴ τοῦτο [1.6. φῶς] χρῶμα, ταῦτα ἰδίως διαφανῆ. 

b6. ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν στερεῶν. Instances of solid bodies which 
are (more or less) transparent are glass, certain crystals, and other translucent 
stones, horn, tortoise-shell. According to De Sensuz 3, 439 b 8, all bodies have 
some measure of transparency on their surface as a necessary condition of 
colour: τὸ ἄρα διαφανὲς καθ᾽ ὅσον ὑπάρχει ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν (ὑπάρχει δὲ μᾶλλον Kat 
ἧττον ἐν πᾶσι) χρώματος ποιεῖ μετέχειν. But air, water and the other bodies 
properly and commonly called transparent (ra ἰδίως δεαφανῇ) are distinguished 
as transparent through and through (δι ὅλου) and are called by Alexander 
διοπτά (45, 12 W.). 

b8. ἐστὶ φύσις. In De Sensu 3, 439 a 23 κοινὴ φύσις καὶ δύναμις, ἣ χωριστὴ 
μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐν τούτοις δ᾽ ἔστι: that is, an inseparable attribute, like number. Alex. 
calls it διαφάνεια (44, 1 W.). As often, φύσις implies objectivity. It is a property 
in the bodies in question, and not something subjective such as the theory of the 
Atomists made colour to be. ἐν τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις, 1.6. air and water. Both 
these bodies (and the other bodies mentioned in De Sensu 3, 439 a 2I—25) 
have in them the transparent, the medium which with its normal activity gives 
us light, and with its special states colours. 

b9. ἐν τῷ didie τῷ ἄνω σώματι. Elsewhere called aiéyp (the word, according 
to A., being derived from ἀεὶ θεῖν). It is a form of matter peculiar to the celestial 
region and distinct from all the elements known in this sublunary region on 
and immediately around (cf. dZezeor. 1. 3, 340 Ὁ 6) the earth, one of its 
distinctive qualities being circular motion, De Caelo 11. 3, 286a 10~—12: cf. 
Zh. τ. 3, 270 Ὁ II Sqq., where it is called ἡ πρώτη οὐσία τῶν σωμάτων and τὸ 
πρῶτον σῶμα, ἕτερόν τι ὃν παρὰ γῆν καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ. The stars them- 
selves, as Philop. remarks (324, 18), are not transparent, for one star can occult 
another, but the various spheres in which A. supposed the heavenly bodies to be 
fixed are transparent. Yet at the same time A. thought it reasonable to believe 
that the stars were composed of the aether in which they moved (De Caelo 11. 7, 
289 a 13), and, as he admits many varieties of the aether, probably some were 
less transparent than others. 

bio. ἧ διαφανές, int. ἐστι, “in so far as it is transparent,” “gud transparent” ; 
that is, light is the active operation of the transparent as such, ie. not as air, 
nor as water, nor as aether, but as transparent. δυνάμει. Placed thus before 
the relative for emphasis but going with ἐστὶ to complete the predication, an 
instance of true hyperbaton used, as Newman holds (see p. 211 sq. sufra), 
for emphasis. τοῦτ΄, int. τὸ διαφανές. καὶ τὸ σκότος: more fully thus, ἐν 
ἐκείνῳ καὶ τὸ σκότος ἐστί. Cf. izfra 4τ8 Ὁ 18—20, b29—419a 1. If instead of 
σκότος we had had the adjective σκοτεινόν, 1 should have been tempted to under- 
stand ἐν ᾧ as ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ like ὅταν in Ὁ 11, b30. Wherever light is potentially, 
darkness is actually; hence, too, where light is actually, darkness is potentially. 
The medium must have one or the other, the ἕξεις, light, or the στέρησις, dark- 
ness: ἔστε μὲν οὖν ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ποιεῖ φῶς, ἔστι 
δὲ μή, ἀλλ᾽ ἐστερῆσθαι, De Sensu, 3,)439 Ὁ 14—16. Cf. Philop. 341, ro—18, Simpl. 
133, 2—21 and Them. 59, 26—33 H., 109, 7—17 Sp., from which last passage 
we may cite ἐν οἷς οὖν δυνάμει τὸ φῶς, ἔν τούτοις ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ σκότος" οὐδὲν γὰρ 
ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ σκότος 7 τὸ δυνάμει διαφανές, τὸ δὲ φῶς ἐντελέχειά τις καὶ τελειότης 
τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἧ διαφανές. All three are careful to tell us that this holds of our 
sublunary region only, the celestial region is always light: τὸ μὲν οὖν θεῖον σῶμα 
ἀεὶ διαφανὲς ἐνεργείᾳ" ἀεὶ yap αὐτῷ πάρεστι καὶ τὸ φῶς. 


II. 7 418 Ὁ 5—b τό 269 


bIL. τὸ δὲ φώς οἷον χρῶμα, In De Seusu, α. 3, recapitulating and referring 
to this passage, A. says (439 a 18) ἐστὶ γρῶμα τοῖ διαφανοῖς κατὰ σιμιϑεβηκύς- ὅταν 
yap ἐνῇ τι πυρῶδες ἐν διαφανεῖ, ἦ μὲν παρουσία Pas, ἡ ὃὲ στέρησίς ἐστε σκύτος 
(cf. 418 Ὁ 18—20), and 430 Ὁ τ φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ χρωματιζόμενα" καὶ 
γὰρ 7 αὐγὴ τοιοῦτον ἐστιν. By αὐγὴ is meant the sheen or brightness of air and 
sea, which present a series of shifting hues rather than a constant colour. The 
De Sensu makes the difference between colour and light to depend ultimately 
upon this, that the extremity of bodies, which have a limit of their own to 
bound them, is receptive of, and necessary to, colour, while bodies which have 
no such limit of their own have light. The one class have colour of their own 
and have it in their bounding surface. The others, in particular air and water, 
have no colour and, properly speaking, no bounding surface of their own; 
cf. also Alex. Aphr. on De Sevsu (44, 18 W., 93, 7 Th.) ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ πέρας αἰτοῦ 
ἐπιφάνεια τοιαύτη κεχρωσμένη, ὡς εἶναι, καθὸ μὲν σῶμα, τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν αἰτοῦ πέρας, 
καθὸ δὲ τοιόνδε καὶ διαφανές, τὸ χρῶμα. In short, light is in the transparent 
medium what colour is in body. 

b13. ἕν καὶ ravrov. The sentence is incomplete. καὶ rotr@=xKal τῷ ἄνω 
σώματι: and with ἕν καὶ ταὐτὸν must be understood καὶ τῷ mvpi: that is, “for 
aether also has some quality identical with that in fire,” more literally, “for to 
this also as well as to fire belongs (ὑπάρχει) one and the same attribute.” Per- 
haps this common attribute may be described as illuminative, τὸ φωτίζον, for 
aether does not, like terrestrial fire, consume and destroy. Trend. is inexact in 
explaining ἕν καὶ ταὐτὸν as igni simile or “fiery,” for fire is one of the things 
with which aether is itself co-ordinated, and .Wefearv. 1. 3, 339 b 22, to which 
he appeals, merely states that Anaxagoras held aether to have received its 
name from a belief in its identity with fire: ἣν ᾿Αναξαγόρας μὲν τῷ πυρὶ ταὐτὸν 
ἡγήσασθαί μοι δοκεῖ σημαίνειν. τί μὲν ovv...I4 εἴρηται. Having given his own 
view, A. casts a glance upon current views which are excluded by it, especially 
(1) that light is fire or akin to fire (as was held by Empedocles and Plato), 
(2) that light is something corporeal emitted from the surface of bodies 
(Democritus). 

Ῥ 14. οὔτε wip. Cf. Plato, 77. 45 B—46B. Plato does not say in so many 
words that light is fire, but he explains vision as due to a stream of clear and 
subtle fire issuing from the eyes, of the same substance as the sunlight in the 
air, with which it mingles, the two combined then meeting the fire proceeding 
from the object seen. This at any rate suggests that fire and light are identical. 
οὔθ᾽ ὅλως σῶμα, “nor a body at all,” as it would be if it were fire (which the 
ancients regarded as an element or uncompounded body), and as in any case it 
must have been in the view of Democnitus. 

Ὁ 15. οὐδ᾽ ἀπορροὴ. This view, that light is an emanation, is attributed 
to Empedocles in De Sensu 2, 437 Ὁ 23 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δ᾽ ἔοικε νομίζοντι ὅτὲ μὲν 
ἐξιόντος τοῦ φωτὸς... βλέπειν. Then, after citing the famous lines in which the 
structure of the eye is compared by Empedocles to a lantern, A. continues 
(438 a 4) ὁτὲ δὲ ταῖς ἀπορροίαις ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρωμένων [int. ὁρᾶν φησίν}: cf. 
Theophr. De Sensibus § 7 (Diels, Dox. Gr. 500, 28) φέρεσθαι δὲ (Ἐμπεδοκλῆς 
λέγει) τὰ χρώματα πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν διὰ τὴν aroppony. The supposition of emana- 
tions is in full accord with Empedocles’ distinctive doctrine of perception 
through pores or channels. Cf. Plato, Meno 76C, Ὁ, De Gen. e¢ Corr. 1. 8, 
324 Ὁ 26—35, cited in zoZe on 418 b 20 below. 

Ὁ 16. πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία. This cannot mean the local presence 
of fire as of something material. For A. has just denied that light is a body at 
all. Nor has the light exactly the relation of form to the transparent regarded 


H. 24 


370 NOTES Il. 7 


as matter or substratum. The fire, which is the source of light, is not immanent 
in the transparent. It is not the illumining fire but the transmitted influence of 
the fire which actualises the medium and converts it from darkness into light. 
See 418} 11—13 and 0765. Them. explains “presence” as a mere relation: 
60, 22 H., 110, 25 Sp. σχέσις τοῦ παρόντος πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, 6 πάρεστι. Plato uses 
παρουσία of colour, Lysis 217 C—E, in a very similar manner, and this may have 
suggested the term to A. for light. Cf. De Sezsu 3, 439 a 20, the presence 
of something fiery constitutes light and its absence darkness. 

418b 18—419 b S. Darkness is commonly thought to be the con- 
trary of light; the fact is that light is the presence of a positive quality in the 
medium, darkness its mere absence or privation. Empedocles assumed motion 
of light, motion so rapid as to escape observation, an assumption legitimate 
perhaps if the distance were short, but not justified if light travels the whole 
distance from East to West [ὃ 3]. The medium that is to receive colour must 
itself be colourless, and the potentially transparent satisfies this condition, as 
also does that which is invisible or scarcely visible, like dusk. Some objects, 
namely those which are phosphorescent, are seen, not in the light, but in the 
dark, but in this case it is not the colours which are seen [§ 4]. That which is 
seen in daylight is colour, and this can stimulate motion in the transparent 
medium, viz. air, which extends continuously between the visible object and the 
eye. An object in contact with the eye is not visible. A medium of some sort 
reaching to the eye is essential to account for vision [§ 5]. If there were a void 
between eye and object, vision, and @ fortéord accurate vision, of a minute and 
distant object would (Jace Democriti) be impossible [ὃ 6]. Fire is seen both 
in the light and in the dark, naturally, as being the necessary condition of the 
actualisation of the transparent medium [§ 7]. A medium intervening between 
the object and the organ is, as will hereafter appear, indispensable in the case 
of all senses [§§ 8, 9]. 

418 Ὁ 18. δοκεῖ τε... ἐναντίον. “ This [viz. A.’s] explanation of light is confirmed 
by the ordinary view which regards light as the opposite of darkness” (Wallace). 
And so Philoponus (344, 13) εἰ yap τὸ σκότος ἀντίκειται τῷ Hari, τὸ δὲ σκότος οὐδὲν 
ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ στέρησις φωτός (οὐ γὰρ γινομένου τινὸς ἐν τῷ ἀέρι γίνεται τὸ σκότος, 
ἀλλὰ μόνον τῇ τοῦ φωτὸς ἀπουσίᾳ), τὸ δὲ ἀντικείμενον τῇ στερήσει ἕξις ἐστί, τὸ φῶς 
ἄρα ἕξις ἐστὶ τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ, καὶ ov σῶμα. Darkness is the 
privation of the ἕξις described, which explains why the presence of this ἕξις in 
the diaphanous medium is light. From 417 a 22—b 16 we learn that ἕξις stands 
to στέρησις, e.g. knowledge to ignorance, as actual operation to mere potence. 
The medium, when illumined, is raised from its dormant state. 

big. στέρησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς. By τοιαύτης 15 meant the 
condition of active operation as such (ἐνέργεια, cf. 418 Ὁ 9): ἐκ διαφανοῦς is 
attached to στέρησις to denote the absence of this condition from the trans- 
parent. The exact force of the preposition is seen from 417 a 31 ἐξ ἐναντίας 
μεταβαλὼν ἕξεως, 20. a 32 ὃ δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν γραμματικήν; μὴ 
ἐνεργεῖν δέ, ἐδ. bg τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐντελέχειαν ἄγον ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος, and Ὁ 12 
τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος μανθάνον, where a change from a former state 15 meant. 
Here, too (418 b 19), the construction is the same, στέρησις being regarded as 
(417 Ὁ 15) ἡ ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις μεταβολή. 

b 20. ἡ τούτου παρουσία: obviously for ἡ τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως παρουσίας. See 
woteé on 4τ8ὃ ἃ 17 ἑκάστου. ᾿Ἐίμπεδοκλῆς, οὐδ᾽ εἴ τις Gros. More fully De Gen. 
et Corr. 1. 8, 324 b 26 rots μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ πάσχειν ἕκαστον διά τινων πόρων εἰσιόντος 
τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐσχάτου καὶ κυριωτάτου, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν 
ἡμᾶς φασὶ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσας, ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶσθαι διά τε ἀέρος 


Il. 7 418 Ὁ 16—b 22 3271 


καὶ ὕδατος καὶ τῶν διαφανῶν, διὰ τὸ πόρους ἔχειν dopdrous μὲν διὰ μικρύτητα, πυκνοὺς 
δὲ καὶ κατὰ στοῖχον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔχειν τὰ διαφανῆ μᾶλλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπί τινων 
οὕτω διώρισαν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῶν ποιούντων καὶ πασχόντων 
ἀλλὰ καὶ μίγνυσθαί φησιν ὅσων οἱ πόροι σύμμετροι πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰσίν. Visible 
bodies, according to Empedocles ‘cf. Plato, Jfene 76>, give off emanations 
which enter the pores of the eye. Light, if visible, must be such an emanation 
from the sun and stars. In vision the visual ray was supposed to issue forth 
from the eye in order to come in contact with the emanations of the object. 
Empedocles thus compared the eye to a lantern ‘see fray. 84D, De Sensu 2, 
437 b 26 sqq.). The fire in the centre of the eye. the pupil, or lens, is sur- 
rounded by membranes or coatings, and darts out through these membranes 
and the watery part of the eye, presumably to meet the emanations of luminous 
bodies. See Theophr. De Sensibus $$ 7, ὃ (Doxoyr. Gr. 500, 19--501, 11). 
Empedocles, then, held light to be a corpuscular emanation from luminous 
bodies, which had to travel over the intervening space before it reached the 
eye. Thus sunlight traversed the space between the sun and the earth before 
it could reach the earth: De Sensu 6, 4468 26 sqq. cited zzfra in note on Ὁ 22, 
γιγνομένου ; also 72. 3, 440a 15 sqq. To the same effect Philop. (344, 34) 
᾿μπεδοκλῆς, ὃς ἔλεγεν ἀπορρέον τὸ φῶς σῶμα ὃν ἐκ τοῦ φωτίζοντος σώματος. 
In εἴ τις ἄλλος Philop. (345, 11) sees a reference to Plato 7771. 58c. The 
view of the Atomisits, which postulates motion of the corpuscular emanation, 
if not of light, will occupy us below, 419 a 15. 

Ὁ 2ΖῚ. εἴρηκεν, ὡς φερομένου τοῦ φωτὸς, “has said that light travels”; the 
construction of ὡς with the genitive absolute after a verb of saying is very 
common. More is told us of this view in De Sezsu 6, 446a 26 sqq., which I 
translate. A. asks if the perception of the visible and of light agrees with the 
perception of other sensibles, viz. in being gradually transmitted from one point 
of space to another, and then continues: “ Empedocles, for instance, says that 
the light from the sun reaches the intervening space before it reaches the eye 
or the earth. And this might well seem to be the fact. For, when a thing is 
moved, it is moved from one place to another, and hence a certain time must 
élapse during which it is being moved from the one place to the other. But 
every period of time is divisible. Hence there was a time when the ray was 
not yet seen, but was being transmitted through the medium.” A. of course 
rejects this theory: see De Semsz 6,446b 27. Light is to him not a κίνησις κατὰ 
τόπον Or φορά, but an ἀλλοίωσις, a qualitative change, of the transparent 
medium. 

Ὁ 22. yryvopévov. With Torstrik and Diels (Vors. fy. 170, 38) I adhere to 
the vulgate, although τεινομένου, the reading of E, is supported by V and vet. 
transl. Cf. Them. 60, 28 H., 111, 6 Sp. ὡς κινουμένου τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ γινομένου 
πρῶτον μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς, εἶθ᾽ οὕτω πρὸς τὴν γῆν, which is very similar to the 
citation from De Sensz below, Philop. 344, 34 ὃς [Empedocles] ἔλεγεν ἀπορρέον 
τὸ φῶς σῶμα ὃν ἐκ τοῦ φωτίζοντος σώματος γίνεσθαι πρῶτον ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τόπῳ τῆς 
τε γῆς καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. The confusion οὗ T and I in uncial MSS. is notorious. 
The difficulty of understanding revouévov is increased by the juxtaposition of 
ποτέ. This appears from the parallel passage De Semsu 6, 446a 25—b 2 which 
serves as a commentary on the present passage: ἄρ᾽ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον 
καὶ τὸ φῶς; καθάπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρότερον τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίον 
φῶς εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ πρὶν πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν εὐλόγως τοῦτο 
συμβαίνειν" τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον κινεῖταί ποθέν ποι, ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη εἶναί τινα καὶ χρόνον 
ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται ἐκ θατέρου πρὸς θάτερον. ὁ δὲ χρόνος πᾶς διαιρετός, ὥστε ἦν ὅτε οὕπω 
ξωρᾶτο ἀλλ᾽ br” ἐφέρετο ἡ ἀκτὶς ἐν τῷ μεταξύ. Cf. A.’s reply 446 Ὁ 27 τῷ εἶναι γάρ 

24—2 


372 NOTES Il. 7 


τι φῶς ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ov κίνησις. ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ ὁμοίως ἐπί τε ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει Kal 
φορᾶς' αἱ μὲν γὰρ φοραὶ εὐλόγως εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ πρῶτον ἀφικνοῦνται (δοκεῖ δ᾽ ὁ 
ψόφος εἶναι φερομένου τινὸς κίνησις), ὅσα δ᾽ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκέτι ὁμοίως - ἐνδέχεται 
γὰρ ἀθρόον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ ἥμισυ πρότερον, οἷον τὸ ὕδωρ ἅμα πᾶν πήγνυσθαι. 
These extracts lead us to expect that the word before ποτὲ should bear the 
meaning of ἀφικνουμένου or ἀφιγμένου : γίγνεσθαι certainly bears this meaning: 
possibly τείνεσθαι could also. Torstrik raised the interesting question whether 
τεινομένου Was an Empedoclean word, “ut sit lux quasi σειρὴ χρυσείη." On the 
affirmative side M. Rodier cites Alex. Aphr., who, commenting upon Emped. 
jrag. 84, 5 D, in De Sensu 2, 437 Ὁ 30 ταναώτερον [int. πῦρ], “finest or most 
subtle fire,” remarks (23, 21 W) ταναὸν δὲ τὸ πῦρ [φησί τὸ διὰ λεπτότητα 
τεινόμενόν τε καὶ διεκπίπτειν διὰ τῶν πυκνῶν δυνάμενον, Aet., Plac. VI. 14 (Diels, 
Doxogr. Gr. 405, τ6) φέρεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τὴν ὄψιν τεταμένην ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν χαλκόν, 
ἐντυχοῦσαν δὲ πυκνῷ καὶ λείῳ πληχθεῖσαν ὑποστρέφειν αὐτὴν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὴν κτὲέ. 
For τείνεσθαι of light see Jebb’s σοζε on Azz. 600 and P27, 831; and of sound 
Ant. 124. When we consider the use of τείνειν and ἐκτείνειν with μακρὰν in 
tragedy (6.5. μὴ τεῖνε μακράν, μακρὰν ἔτεινας, μακρὰν ἂν ἐξέτεινα sim.) where it is 
practically a verb of motion, it would not be surprising if Empedocles used 
τείνεσθαι-- φέρεσθαι. A. himself so uses ἀποτείνεσθαι, e.g. De Senst 2, 438 a 25 
ἄλογον δὲ ὅλως τὸ ἐξιόντι τινὶ τὴν ὄψιν ὁρᾶν, καὶ ἀποτείνεσθαι μέχρι τῶν ἄστρων 
(v. fd. Ar. 86 Ὁ 60 5.ν.) : “and, speaking generally, that the eye should see by 
something issuing from it and that the visual ray should reach as far as the 
stars, is unreasonable.” 

b22. ποτὲ. In De Sensit 6, 446 Ὁ 1 sqq. (cited in last vore) A. says “there was 
a time when the ray was not yet seen, but was still on its way in the intervening 
space.” Here he says that the sunlight travels and arrives at some time or 
other in the space between earth and heaven. μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς Kal τοῦ περιέ- 
Xovros. The meaning of the word μεταξὺ must not be pressed. The light 
reaches the eye from the sun, moves from East to West, and this motion takes 
place ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι, “in that which surrounds or encircles.” Meptéyov 
denotes here not, as in 404a 10, 411 a 19, the circumambient air, but the sky, 
ind. Ax. 581 a 22 de extremis mundi finibus, e.g. De Caelo 111. 5, 303 b 12. 
According to Empedocles the world was surrounded by a hollow sphere or 
rather two hemispheres, the one bright, the other dark, see Plut., Péac. ΤΙ. 11 
(Diels, Doxogr. Gr. 339, 16). 

Ὁ 23 παρὰ τὴν...24 τὰ φαινόμενα. Theory, λόγος, and facts, φαινόμενα, as in 
4148. 24: also De Luvent. 4, 469 a 23 κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὰ φαινόμενα, ...:ὖ. a 28 κατὰ δὲ 
τὸν λόγον, De Sensi 1, 436 Ὁ 7 δῆλον καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ λόγου χωρίς. A. of 
course rejects the spatial motion of light (see De Sezsu 6, 446 Ὁ 27 cited 
above), because to him light is not a φορὰ but an ἀλλοίωσις of the transparent 
medium. 

Ὁ 26. μέγα λίαν τὸ αἴτημα. A quasi-proverbial expression. Cf. the oracle in 
Herodotus 1. 66 ᾿Αρκαδίην μ᾽ aireis; μέγα μ᾽ αἰτεῖς- οὔ τοι δώσω. Apparently τὸ 
αἴτημα is in apposition to τὸ λανθάνειν. 

Ὁ 26 ἔστι δὲ...27 τὸ ἄψοφον. Philop. says (345, 17 sqq.: cf Simpl. 134, 31— 
34) that this is because the admixture of any colour in the medium would 
prevent it from receiving colours in their purity. This principle, that the 
recipient must be neutral to the qualities it receives, is applied to all the senses 
in succession and to the mind (429a 15—26). 

b 28. τὸ ἀόρατον ἢ τὸ μόλις ὁρώμενον. There are many degrees of obscurity 
from twilight to total darkness. Cf. 425 b 20 sqq., 426b 1 sq. 

b 29. τοιοῦτον δὲ, int. σκοτεινόν, “dusky,” “ obscure.” 


Il. 7 418 Ὁ 22—419 a 15 373 


Ὁ 30. ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν δυνάμει, int. διαφανές, 1.6. the medium is potentially trans- 
parent when there is not present the necessary condition of its conversion from 
dark to hght. 

419 a 1. ov πάντα δὲ. It must not be supposed however that light is 
in all cases the necessary condition that objects may be visible. It is only the 
condition in order that they may show their colour. Cf. Them. .61, 9 H., 
112, 3 Sp.) οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ ὁρατὰ ἐν φωτὶ ὁρατά, ἀλλὰ TO μὲν οἰκεῖον ἑκάστου χρῶμα 
ἐν φωτὶ μόνον. Some things, 6.5. the phosphorescent objects about to be 
described, carry their own medium with them, enough to show brightness and 
be visible, but not enough to show colour. See also second zoze on a 7 zafra. 

a3. τὰ πυρώδη φαινόμενα kal λάμποντα. <A. here defines the class of visibles 
besides colours for which he has no name (418 a 273, namely things which 
present a fiery and luminous appearance. 

asd. κέρας. Δ similar account of such objects is given in De Scusiz 2, 437 ἃ 
31 sqq.: (437 Ὁ 5) “for smooth objects glow normally in the dark,...the heads 
uf certain fish, for instance, and the ink of the cuttle-fish.” 

a7. ἄλλος Adyos. Philop. (348, 11) refers to the De Semsu for a statement 
to the effect that πέφυκεν ὁ ἀὴρ ὑπὸ τοῦ λαμπροῦ φωτίζεσθαι, oid ἔστι τὰ οὐράνια. 
But no such words occur in the De Sexsu, and Bonitz, who (εἶ, Ar. 99a 13) 
refers to De Sensu 2, 437 Ὁ 5, has taken care to mark the reference as dubious. 

a 7 νῦν 8’...9 ἄνευ φωτός. If, then, we exclude phosphorescent objects, which 
do not show colour in the dark, the relation between light and colour is this, 
that light is the indispensable condition in order that a colour or a coloured 
object may be seen. In this sense A. can say De Sensu 6, 447a 11 τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ 
τὸ ὁρᾶν. Our next sentence explains how this is. 

aQ τοῦτο yap ἦν...11 φῶς ἐστίν. It is the nature of colour to excite or 
stimulate the transparent medium, provided it is transparent in actuality, 
1.6. has been illuminated: for light is the actuality or positive determination of 
the transparent medium. When the transparent is not actualised, we have 
darkness, when it is actualised, we have light, and when the latter is the case 
colour can act upon the eye. ἦν, “is, as we Saw,” viz. 418 a 3I—b 2. 

8 ΤΙ. τούτου, viz. of the whole theory that that which is seen in light is 
colour, and light is the active operation of a medium called the transparent. 
That such a medium is indispensable to account for light and vision is 
evidenced by the experiment now to be mentioned. 

8 12. ἐπί αὐτὴν τὴν ony, “on the organ of sight.” Cf. 423 Ὁ 22 ἐπὶ τοῦ 
ὄμματος...τὸ ἔσχατον. The ambiguity noticed above (417 a 3) in the use of 
αἴσθησις for sense-organ as well as for faculty thus recurs in the case of ὄψις: 
cf. Ind. Ar. ττ3 Ὁ 51. 

84 13. οὐκ ὄψεται. The subject, 6 ὁρῶν, is not expressed. Cf. zoZfe on 
403 a 22. ἀλλὰ, “in fact,” used simply because of the negative οὐκ ὄψεται 
preceding. 

8 14. συνεχοῦς, “continuous.” This excludes not only the hypothesis of 
Democritus, next criticised, but also that of Empedocles, who held that light 
or, as he called it, “fire” made its way through the intervening air and entered 
the organism by the pores. Cf. Plato, 4ezo 76c, D. This condition of con- 
tinuity justifies us in calling the transparent a medium. Ὁ 

a 15. Δημόκριτος, Democritus explained the perceptions of sight, as 
Empedocles did, by the hypothesis that emanations or films (δείκελα) fly off 
from visible things, which emanations retain the form of the things; these 
Images are reflected in the eye and are thence diffused throughout the whole 
body; thus arises vision. But as the space between the objects and our eyes is 


374 NOTES IL. 7 


filled with air, the images that fly off from things cannot themselves reach our 
eyes; what does so is the air which is moved by the images as they stream 
forth and receives an impression of them. Therefore it is that the clearness of 
the perception decreases with distance, the image is blurred, and, as at the 
Same time emanations are going out from our eyes, the image of the object is 
also modified by these. Cf. De Sevtsu 2, 438 a5 546... Theophr. De Senszbus 50 
(Diels, Doxogr. Gr. 513, 17) ὁρᾶν μὲν οὖν ποιεῖ τῇ ἐμφάσει: ταύτην δ᾽ ἰδίως λέγει- 
τὴν γὰρ ἔμφασιν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐν τῇ κόρῃ γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀέρα τὸν μεταξὺ τῆς ὄψεως 
καὶ τοῦ ὁρωμένου τυποῦσθαι συστελλόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁρωμένου καὶ τοῦ ὁρῶντος" 
ἅπαντος γὰρ ἀεὶ γίνεσθαί τινα ἀποῤῥοὴν" ἔπειτα τοῦτον στερεὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀλλόχρων 
ἐμφαίνεσθαι τοῖς ὄμμασιν ὑγροῖς" καὶ τὸ μὲν πυκνὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι τὸ δ᾽ ὑγρὸν διιέναι 
and Alex. De Sezsz 124, 6 W τῆς δ᾽ αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ Δημόκριτός ἐστι καὶ πάντες 
καθ᾽ ots ἀπὸ τῶν δρατῶν ἀπορρέον τι φέρεται πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν. 

ἃ 16. εἰ γένοιτο κενὸν, i.e. if the air, which in fact fills the space intervening 
between the eye and a visible object, were removed. Greater clearness of 
perception would then be attainable, because the emanations from objects 
(δείκελα) would not be obstructed in their course, but would reach the eye 
directly. As it is, according to Democritus (see last zo¢e), they are liable to 
disintegration or distortion after they fly off from the surface of the visible 
object, and besides do not themselves reach the eye at all. 

a 17 πάσχοντος yap τι.. 18 τὸ ὁρᾶν. An instructive remark, affording a sum- 
mary explanation of the Aristotelian theory of sense-perception. For πάσχοντός 
τι compare 416 b 33, where it is stated of perception generally that it occurs ἐν 
τῷ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν. In the case of vision the action of the visible object 
upon the faculty is not direct and immediate, hence we are bound to assume a 
medium. 

a 21. οὐχ ὅτι. A well-known idiom, best explained as οὐ (λέγω) ὅτι ἀκριβῶς 
(ὀφθήσεται). Here οὐχ ὅτι puts the case aside: we shall not see the object at 
all, a fortiori we shall not see it exactly. 

a 22 δι᾽ ἣν μὲν odv...23 εἴρηται, viz. because action upon the sensitive organ is 
a necessary condition of sensation; visible colour cannot directly act upon the 
organ, but only through a medium, and this medium actively operant is light; 
cf. 419 a 17 sqq. 

a 23. πῦρ. This constitutes a third class of visible objects. Philop. (348, 
10 sqq.) points out that the sun, as the source of daylight, constitutes a fourth 
class. Like colours, the sun cannot be seen in the dark, but for a different 
reason. Colours cannot be seen without daylight; the sun cannot be seen in 
the dark because where he is, it is not dark, and where it is dark, there he is 
not! Cf. Simpl. 129, 3 sqq. who first enumerates visible objects and then 
rearranges thus, (1) light, (2) coloured objects, (3) phosphorescent objects, 
(4) fire and sunlight. 

a 25. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος, “of sound and of smell the same may be said as of 
sight.” There is no direct contact of the object perceived with the sense-organ. 
The object sets in motion an appropriate medium, which in turn acts upon 
the sense-organ. 

a 26. ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν. Cf. 417 a 4, 4198 3, 30,422a 17. Unless it does 
this, the sensible object is only δυνάμει αἰσθητόν, as indeed αἰσθητὰ always are, 
except in actual sensation. A. has clearly laid this down, 431 Ὁ 24—26, and 
we are reminded of the statements in JVe¢af/. that most so-called substances 
are potentialities (1040 b 5 sq.), that particular sensible substances cannot be 
defined or brought under demonstration owing to the contingent element of 
matter in them (1039 b 27 sqq.), and that their very existence becomes problem- 


11. ὃ 419 a 15—b 3 375 


atic so soon as they pass out of sensation (1040a 2 Ssqq., 1036a 5—9;. Thus as 
αἰσθητικὸν to αἴσθησις, so the potential αἰσθητὸν to the actual προώγσις τῆς 
αἰσθήσεως. Cf. Beare, Greek Theories, Ὁ. 63. 

a 30. περὶ δὲ ἁφῆς Kai γεύσεως. In the case of touch and of taste it might 
appear as if there were immediate contact. But, as we shall see ‘in cc. τὸ and 
II), this is not so; there is a medium in the case of these senses also, namely 
flesh. 

8.31. οὐ φαίνεται δέ is concessive, “although it does not appear so.” ὕστερον 
ἔσται δῆλον, see 422 b 34 5366. 

a 32. κοινὸν yap δή τι πάθος, “a common property.” Above (418 Ὁ 8) he had 
called the transparent φύσις : cf. De Semsu 3, 439a 21 οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδιον ἀέρος ἢ 
ὕδατος οὐδ᾽ ἄλλου τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων σωμάτων, ἀλλά τις ἔστε κοινὴ φύσις καὶ 
δύναμις, ἣ χωριστὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐν τούτοις δ᾽ ἔστι, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν 
ἐνυπάρχει. 

ΔΙΟΌ 3. ὕστερον, 421 b 13---423 ἃ 6. The commentators call this medium 
of smell τὸ δίοσμον. As Them. (62, 31 sq. H., 115, 2. sq. Sp.) informs us, A. 
himself does not use this term any more than τὸ dinyés for the medium of 
hearing. They are said to have been first applied by Theophrastus. 


CHAPTER VIII. 


A. gives the second place to the sense of hearing. His treatment, though 
by no means exhaustive, is far more complete than in the preceding chapter; 
consequently in De Sevwsu c. 4, 440 Ὁ 27 sq. he virtually admits that he has 
nothing to add with regard to sound, the object of hearing, and so passes at 
once from the consideration of colours to that of odours and flavours, although 
the sense of hearing receives some attention in De Sevsu,cc. 6 and 7. Our 
present chapter defines the sensible object, deals with the medium and inci- 
dentally with the organ, so far as this can be done without detailed physiological 
examination. After a short notice of the fundamental qualities of sound, the 
high or shrill, ὀξύ, and the low or deep, βαρύ, A. proceeds to discuss vocal 
sound and the mode of its production in living beings. Throughout, the dis- 
cussion implies what is more distinctly stated, De Semsu 6, 446 Ὁ 30, that sound 
is φερομένου τινὸς kivnois: but A. does not here explain how the conceptions of 
φορὰ and ἀλλοίωσις should be combined. 

419 b 4. 420 4a &. Sound, that is, actual sound, is due to the con- 
cussion of two or more solid bodies and the communication of the shock to the 
air. Not all bodies, however, produce sound, but only such as are hard and 
smooth, or hollow bodies which reverberate when struck. The medium of 
sound is air or water, but the medium is not the determining cause of sound 
[88 1, 2]: there must be a concussion of hard bodies with each other and with 
the air, the blows following one another so rapidly and violently that the air 
shall not have time to disperse gradually [ὃ 3]. If the air be bounded and 
enclosed, being unable to find an escape, it reverberates and produces an echo. 
As a fact, in every case of sound there is some echo, but often this is indistinct ; 
just as light is everywhere reflected or refracted, though as a rule not enough 
to throw a shadow [§ 4]. If by a vacuum we mean the air, it is correct to 
say that a vacuum is a determining condition of hearing. Air must, in order 
to communicate sound, be in one continuous mass. Soft bodies, like sponges, 
wool, etc., emit no sound, nor do hard bodies if they come in contact gradually 


376 NOTES Ir. 8 


(for then the air succeeds in getting away). Hence the conditions required: 
sonant bodies must be hard, not soft, with interspaces through which the air 
may escape, and smooth, not rough, with hollows that may serve as retreats 
for the air [§ 5]. 

419 DS. Ψψόφος. Cf. De Caelo 11. 9, 291 a 9 ὅσα μὲν yap αὐτὰ φέρεται, ποιεῖ 
ψόφον καὶ zAnynv- ὅσα δ᾽ ἐν φερομένῳ ἐνδέδεται ἢ ἐνυπάρχει, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ 
τὰ μόρια, οὐχ οἷόν τε ψοφεῖν, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τὸ πλοῖον, εἰ φέροιτο ἐν ποταμῷ. καίτοι τοὺς 
αὐτοὺς λόγους ἂν ἐξείη λέγειν, ὡς ἄτοπον εἰ μὴ φερόμενος 6 ἱστὸς καὶ ἢ πρύμνα ποιεῖ 
ψόφον πολὺν τηλικαύτης νεώς, ἢ πάλιν αὐτὸ τὸ πλοῖον κινούμενον. τὸ δ᾽ ἐν μὴ 
φερομένῳ φερόμενον ποιεῖ ψόφον- ἐν φερομένῳ δὲ συνεχὲς καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντι πληγὴν 
ἀδύνατον ψοφεῖν. ὥστ᾽ ἐνταῦθα λεκτέον ὡς εἴπερ ἐφέρετο τὰ σώματα τούτων εἴτ᾽ ἐν 
ἀέρος πλήθει κεχυμένῳ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν εἴτε πυρός, ὥσπερ πάντες φασίν, ἀναγκαῖον 
ποιεῖν ὑπερφυᾶ τῷ μεγέθει ψόφον, τούτου δὲ γινομένου καὶ δεῦρ᾽ ἀφικνεῖσθαι καὶ 
διακναίειν. ὥστ᾽ ἐπείπερ οὐ φαίνεται τοῦτο συμβαῖνον, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἔμψυχον οὔτε βίαιον 
φέροιτο φορὰν οὐθὲν αὐτῶν, where A. is discussing the Pythagorean theory of the 
harmony (συμφωνία) of the spheres. ὁ μὲν yap ἐνεργείᾳ ris, ὁ δὲ δυνάμει. To 
transform this into a grammatical sentence, we must supply ὧν ψόφος ἐστὶ after 
τις and δυνάμει, but the fact is that the two datives ἐνεργείᾳ and δυνάμει after 
being used repeatedly as adverbs with the participle ὦν, have come to be 
virtually indeclinable adjectives. 

b6. ἔχειν ψόφον, a frequent variation of παρέχειν ψόφον, which is itself 
equivalent to ψοφεῖν or Ψοφητικὰ εἶναι. Cf. Ὁ 7 znzfra ὅτι δύναται ψοφῆσαι and 
425 Ὁ 29 τὸ ἔχον ψόφον οὐκ ἀεὶ ψοφεῖ. So ἔχειν ὀσμὴν 421b 7 56. χυμὸν 422 a 30, 
434 8 223 ϑῳ:-:- The sound or odour or flavour, if regarded simply as the power to 
stimulate sense, resides in the external thing. 

b7. δύναται. Beyond this remark there is no further allusion to sound 
potential. We confine ourselves to sound actual. The distinction is brought 
up again 425 Ὁ 26—4426a ὃ. 

b 8. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν, “that is to say”; the words αὐτοῦ peragv...9 ἐνεργείᾳ being 
substituted for ψοφῆσαι. Cf. Them. 63 3: 7 #H. IT 5, 21 Sp. ψοφεῖ δέ, ὅταν δύνηται 
ξαυτοῦ μεταξὺ καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἐμποιῆσαι τὸν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ψόφον. αὐτοῦ, the 
sonorous object itself. Them. paraphrases it by ἑαυτοῦ. Cf. zofe on 417 Ὁ 6, 
εἰς αὐτό. τῆς ἀκοῆς, “the organ of hearing”; just as ὄψις was used for the 
eye, 419a 13. So far A. appears to deal with sound and hearing from the side 
of the object, i.e. of sound. 

bo. γίνεται δ᾽. The object of hearing, sound, as compared with the object 
of sight, colour, is complex. It involves three material conditions: a thing 
that strikes, a thing that is struck, and a medium. What is heard is the sound 
of something (reds) striking against something else {πρός τῷ in a certain 
medium (ἔν τινι). 

bio. ἡ ποιοῦσα: by attraction for τὸ ποιοῦν, Cf. 404 ἃ 25 sq. 

13. ὥσπερ δ᾽ εἴπομεν, supra 410 Ὁ 6. 

Ὁ 14. τῶν τυχόντων. Cf. 407 Ὁ 19, “026. 

Ὁ τό. τὰ δὲ κοῖλα. The construction is so far broken that instead of a 
subordinate causal clause, τὰ δὲ κοῖλα «ὅτι» cxré., we have a fresh main 
sentence (τῇ ἀνακλάσει πολλὰς ποιεῖ πληγάς), which really contains the reason 
why hollow bodies give sound, namely that there is a reverberation and multi- 
plication of blows. Cf. 428 a 26 sq. 

Ὁ 18. τοῦ κινηθέντος, int. ἀέρος. ἔτι. A. here passes on to consider the 
medium of sound. ἀλλ᾽ ἧττον, These words, if retained, are parenthetical: 
int. ἐν ὕδατι ἢ [than] ἐν ἀέρι. 

9. κύριος, “the determining condition.” As three have been named, 


Ir. 8 410 Ὁ 4---Ὁ 25 377 


that which strikes, that which is struck and the air ‘or water, in which it 15 
struck, it is natural to ask which is the main condition, as daylight is for the 
visibility of coloured objects. The determining condition is pulsation of air 
intercepted in a confined space. 

b 20. πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα. Is this a second condition? When we come to read 
διὸ ἐὰν ταχέως κτέ, (Ὁ 22), it is plain that A. is thinking of an exceptional case 
where air itself is one of the bodies struck, as e.g. in the cracking of a whip. 
That the air in such cases is both the medium and the body struck 1s clearly 
recognised by Alex. Aphr. De Ax. 47, 18 ἤδη δὲ καὶ μόνος ὁ ἀὴρ πληγείς mos 
ψύῴφον mote, Them. 63, 30 H., 116, 25 Sp. τηνικαῦτα δὲ τοὺς δύο avadéyerac 
λόγους ὁ ἀὴρ τόν Te TOU TUTTOMEVOU σώματος καὶ TOV τοῦ ἐν @ τύπτεταιι Not much 
would be yained by the proposal to insert ἢ or to put a full stop after ἄλληλα 
and beyin the next sentence with καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται. 

Ὁ 21. μὴ διαχυθῇ. The blows need to be smart and quick, or the air will 
disperse, and the sound in that case will be slight, or even too slight to be 
appreciable. 

Ὁ 23. φθάσαι, “get a start of,” “ anticipate,” “head off.” 

Ὁ 24 ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σωρὸν...25 ταχύ. The rapidity and vigour of the stroke 
required if the dispersion of the air is to be effectually anticipated must be the 
point of the comparison. Philop. supposed the sand to be shot out of a funnel. 
The sand of itself would fall noiselessly upon the heap below, although it has a 
certain amount of solidity; and it is only by striking rapidly that any sound 
can be produced. (Air is thought to be κενόν, yet it has solidity in it. You 
take the exceptional case when you appear to have one body only: the second 
1s air struck so rapidly that it has no time to escape.) But if this were the 
sense, it would surely be better to take ταχὺ with τύπτοε and not, as the order 
of the words would suggest, with φερύμενον. As Professor Beare points out 
(Hermathena 111., Ὁ. 73 sq.) this explanation, like all hitherto offered, is quite 
inadequate. He himself gives the following most satisfactory explanation : 
“The dppadds φερόμενος is a ‘revolving ring,’ a sand-whirl, such as often 
appears in warm, sandy countries when a wind plays upon the sand in a certain 
way. A vortical motion occurs in the mass of sand, which arranges itself in a 
revolving ring, and, besides revolving on its centre, also moves onwards with a 
certain speed” (φερόμενον ray). ‘These rings, which are of all sizes, are 
frequent in South Africa, and are vulgarly known as ‘devils,’ owing to their 
unwelcome effects when they happen to collide with and break over a traveller. 
The word ὁρμαθὸς is very well suited to designate a revolving ring of this kind. 
Hesychius gives χορὸς as the first meaning of édppadds; and indeed the revolving 
movement of a circle of dancers linked hand-in-hand well illustrates the rapid 
whirling of the eddy of sand or dust. Thus A. improves upon his first example 
σωρόν, Which might or might not be in motion and which therefore here may or 
may not agree with φερόμενον, by adding ἢ ὁρμαθόν, which must of course move 
in order to exist. The object of the whole illustration is to enable one to 
‘envisage’ more clearly what the writer supposes to take place in the sound- 
medium, the air, when the πληγὴ which causes sound is inflicted upon it....The 
rapid vortical motion constitutes the raison @étre, or rather the physical cause, 
of the ὁρμαθός, and 15 not an effect of the πληγή." 

b 25. ἑνὸς γενομένου: The same idea as that suggested by συνεχής. The 
air is one continuum and not composed of adjacent particles with interspaces. 
The enclosed cavity is not empty: it has air already init. For this reason that 
part of the air which has been pushed against the solid walls of the cavity must 
on finding no escape in that direction resist the impact of that part of the air 


378 NOTES Il. ὃ 


which has been set in motion from without. This latter part is not that which 
in the first instance received the concussion, but that to which the impact has 
been transmitted as it travelled along the continuum of air to the entrance of 
the cavity and even inside it. 

Ὁ 27. πάλιν... ἀπωσθῇ. The idea of air being repelled and driven back from 
air, which has caused difficulty, is made intelligible if we adopt the explanation 
offered by Alex. Aphr., De Az. 47,25 ὅταν yap ὁ πληγεὶς ἀὴρ εἷς μείνας ἐνεχθεὶς ἐπί 
τι στερεὸν ἔχον τινὰ κοιλότητα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ ὄντος ἐν τῷ κοίλῳ τούτῳ ἡνωμένου 
διὰ τὸ περιέχεσθαι καὶ μὴ θρυπτομένον ἀλλ᾽ ἑνὸς μένοντος ἀπωσθῇ, διὰ τὴν βίαν ἐπὶ 
ταὐτὸν φέρεται ὅθεν ἠνέχθη. οὐ γὰρ κενῷ τῷ ἀγγείῳ προσπίπτει, ἀλλὰ ἀέρος πλήρει, 
up οὗ διὰ τὸ συνέχεσθαι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγγείου κωλυθεὶς εἰς τὸ πρόσω ἐνεχθῆναι Fj 
θρυβῆναι, ἀπωσθεὶς εἰς τοὐπίσω πάλιν φέρεται ταχέως ἅτε εὐκίνητος ὧν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔτι 
φυλάσσων Ψόφον. 

Ὁ 27. ὥσπερ σφαῖρα, i.e. like a ball rebounding from a wall. So the air can 
find no exit because the other air already massed in the closed cavity acts hike a 
wall. Cf. Alex. Aphr., De Az. 48, 7 δύναται δὲ λέγεσθαι καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ὃ πρῶτος ἀὴρ 
πληγεὶς φέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ κοῖλον σῶμα καὶ τὸν ἐν τούτῳ ἀπειλημμένον ἀέρα καὶ πάλιν 
ἀπὸ τούτων εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀνακάμπτει (οὕτως γὰρ ἀντιπερίστασις ἂν γίνοιτο διπλῆ τοῦ 
μετὰ τὸν πεπληγότα ἀέρα καὶ φερόμενον αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸν κοῖλον τόπον ὑποχωροῦντος 
καὶ πάλιν ἀναστρέφοντος), ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἀὴρ πληγεὶς διὰ τὸ τάχος τῆς πληγῆς 
συνεχὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος μείνας τὸν μετ᾽ αὐτὸν σχηματίζοι ἂν τῇ ὁμοίᾳ πληγῇ: καὶ οὗτος 
τὸν μετ᾽ αὐτόν, καὶ οὕτως κατὰ συνέχειαν μέχρι τοῦ ἀγγείου 7 πρόοδος τοῦ ψόφου κατὰ 
διάδοσιν γίνοιτ᾽ ἄν, 6 δὲ τελευταῖος 6 πρὸς τῷ ἀγγείῳ πληγείς τε καὶ σχηματισθεὶς 
κωλυθεὶς εἰς τὸ πρόσω διαδοῦναι τὴν πληγὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγγείου, ἀνάπαλιν ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ 
στερεοῦ ἀντιτυπίας ἀπωσθείς, ὡς σφαῖρα ἀπὸ στερεοῦ τινος, τὸν ἐπὶ τάδε αὐτοῦ 
πλήσσοι τε ἂν καὶ σχηματίζοι πάλιν. 

b 29. ἀνακλᾶται, is “refracted” or “reflected” (to use modern scientific 
terminology), according as the ray of light passes through, or is unable to 
penetrate, the obstacle. 

b 33. 7...6pflopev. The expression is inexact, as pointed out by Torstrik, 
who gives us the choice between 7 τὸ φῶς ὁρίζεται, “by which light is bounded,” 
if A. is speaking of the fact, and @ τὸ φῶς ὁρίζομεν, “by which” [viz. τῷ σκιὰν 
ποιεῖν} “we commonly define light.” Them. (64, 4 H., 117, 13 Sp.), more exact 
than his author, writes: ἡ ἀνάκλασις ἐκδηλοτέρα διὰ τὸ καὶ σκιὰν δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ 
ἀποπαλλόμενον φῶς. If ὁρίζομεν means “we define,” cf. 405 Ὁ 11, 413 b 12, 
427 a 17, 432 a 15, 435 Ὁ 16. 

419 Ὁ 33420 a 2. Does this section, we ask, refer distinctly to echo? 
Probably not, though Them. (64, 6 sqq. H., 117, 16 sqq. Sp.) tries to make the 
most of the connexion between smoothness and hollowness as the two con- 
ditions necessary for an audible echo. 

Ὁ 33. τὸ δὲ κενὸν ὀρθῶς, The view that vacuum is a determining cause of 
hearing is, A. pronounces, correct, if correctly interpreted: that is, in so far as 
we accept the popular description of air as vacuum. Cf. De Part. Ax. 11. 10, 
656b 14 ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν εὐλόγως ἕνια τῶν ζῴων ἐν τῷ τόπῳ περὶ THY κεφαλὴν" 
τὸ γὰρ κενὸν καλούμενον ἀέρος πλῆρές ἐστι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀκοῆς αἰσθητήριον ἀέρος εἶναί 
φαμεν. Air, aS we saw, is the cause of hearing, provided it be made to pulsate 
in one continuous mass. κύριον τοῦ ἀκούειν. Here air is the determining cause 
in hearing, rod ἀκούειν. Above, 419b 19, the question is whether it is ψόφου 
κύριος. A. recognises the fact that ψόφος and ἀκοὴ are the same in actual 
operation, but he distinguishes the one from the other. He insists on the 
importance of impact on the objective side and the presence of air in the ear on 
the subjective side. 


11. 8 419 Ὁ 25—420 a 2 379 


b 34. δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν. The word κενὸν in A., as in the ordinary usage 
of Greek literature, denotes that which is empty of solid bodies, unoccupied 
by anything excepting air, and not, as with Democritus, absolute void or 
“vacuum.” Cf. the Vergilian phrase ‘“auras...inanes” (= auras...tenuis of 
G. IV. 499 sq.). 

b 35. wWabvpos. This word, which properly means “ friable,” “easily crumb- 
ling,” of solids, is used in De Sevsw 4, 4118 25 of water as contrasted with the 
more viscid oil. 

420a 1. yeyovel. A mainly poetic word, used however by Xenophon and in 
the Socratic dialogue A7Apias \ajor 292 Ὁ. 

al. λεῖον. The similarity of the language in 435 a 5—8 and the final 
limiting clause there “‘ provided the air be one, as it is in the case of a smooth 
body” render it probable that there A. has echoes as well as reflection of light 
in his mind. The use of λεῖον in this passage proves, if any proof were needed, 
that A. does not limit ἐπίπεδον to a flat surface or plane. The word used by 
the Pythagoreans to denote surface was ypocd (cf. zofe on 418 a 26, ὁρατόν δ᾽). in 
Plato it is ἐπίπεδον only and in A. ἐπίπεδον is still in use, although he also 
employs the new word ἐπιφάνεια, which is never found in Plato in this sense. 
After Euclid’s time ἐπίπεδον was limited to plane which in Archimedes is also 
expressed by ἡ ἐπίπεδος (int. ἐπιφάνεια). Heiberg, .Warthenuttisches su Aristotetes, 
p. 8, remarks: “Proclus zz Z£uc/idem, pp. 116, 17, observes that Plato and A. 
do not distinguish ἐπίπεδον and ἐπιφάνεια. Plato has only ἐπίπεδον, some- 
times for surface (Law's 817 E, -Vexo 76 4, Philebus 51 C), sometimes for plane 
(Theaefet. 173 E, Rep. 528 A—D). A. is already acquainted with ἐπεῴφάνεια in 
the mathematical sense (PAys. IV. 1, 209 a 8, .Wetaph. 1020a 14, 1060b 15), but 
still uses ἐπίπεδον also for surface (Zog. VI. 4, 141 Ὁ 7, 22, De Caelol. 1, 268 a 8, 
Metaph. 1016 b 27) and both interchangeably, e.g. Cafeg. 6,5a2sqq. Once in 
Euclid ἐπίπεδον survives as surface, in a definition presumably derived from an 
earlier text book, though elsewhere Euclid sharply distinguishes the two terms, 
eg. Def. 5 ἐπιφάνεια δέ ἐστιν, ὃ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος μόνον ἔχει, Def. 7 ἐπίπεδος ἐπι- 
φάνειά ἐστιν, ἥτις ἐξ ἴσου ταῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς εὐθείαις κεῖται. The latter definition, 
there is reason to think, originated with Euclid himself. These facts make 
against an assertion in Diog. Laert. 111. 24 [Πλάτων πρῶτος ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ... 
ὠνόμασε...τῶν περάτων τὴν ἐπίπεδον ἐπιφάνειαν." 1 am indebted to Dr T. L. 
Heath for my acquaintance with Heiberg’s article. 

a2. ἅμα. The air is simultaneously unified at the very moment of impact, 
and this because of the nature of the surface, διὰ τὸ ἐπέπεδον. 

420 a 3—b 4. That may be defined as sonorous which is capable of 
setting in motion air which reaches continuously to the organ of hearing. The 
movement in the external air is communicated to the air within the ear. The 
organ of hearing must be in that part of the body where air is confined; this 
air being motionless, the ear perceives accurately all the varieties of sound. 
We can hear in water, but if water reaches the inner ear hearing ts hindered, as 
also when the membrane is injured. The air, i.e. the air in the ear, has, it is 
true, a motion of its own, indicated by the ringing in the ears. It 1s not by that, 
however, that we hear, but by the extraneous motion transmitted from the 
object [8 6]. Both that which strikes and that which is struck contribute, 
though in different ways, to sound. But to ensure repercussion, the thing 
struck must be smooth and even [ὃ 7]. Sounds differ in pitch, and this 
difference is expressed by the terms acute and grave borrowed from tangible 
objects. The acute, whether to touch or to the ear, is not the same as the fast, 
nor the blunt or grave the same as the slow, but the acute, because of the fast 


280 NOTES Il. 8 


motion which it sets up, is itself incidentally fast, and similarly the blunt or 
grave is incidentally slow [§ 8]. 

420a 3. συνεχείᾳ qualifies ἑνός. Cf. Phys. 1. 3, 186a 28, MefapA. 1015 Ὁ 36 sq., 
1016b 7 sqq., and especially 1016 a 4 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων μᾶλλον ἕν τὰ φύσει συνεχῆ 
4 τέχνῃ. συνεχὲς δὲ λέγεται, οὗ κίνησις pia καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ οἷόν Te ἄλλως, where 
unity of motion is made the test of continuity. Cf. zofe on 411 Ὁ 6. 

a4. συμφυὴς, “naturally continuous with.” The contrast is between parts 
which are one because they have grown together, and parts connected simply by 
contact. A natural limb is συμφυὴς with the rest of the body, an artificial limb, 
though συνεχής, is not oupmuns. Cf. Wefaph. 1014 b 22 διαφέρει δὲ σύμφυσις 
ἁφῆς" ἔνθα μὲν yap οὐδὲν παρὰ τὴν ἁφὴν ἕτερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς cvpredv- 
κόσιν ἐστί τι ἕν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὃ ποιεῖ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι συμπεφυκέναι καὶ εἶναι 
ἐν κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, and De Sensu 2, 438 ἃ 29 τό 
τε γὰρ συμφύεσθαι τί ἐστι φωτὶ πρὸς φῶς; ἢ πῶς οἷόν θ᾽ ὑπάρχειν ; ov γὰρ τῷ 
τυχόντι συμφύεται τὸ τυχόν. 

a4. ἀήρ. I prefer this reading, which is more consistent with the language 
of A. elsewhere. Though it has slight support from the manuscripts, hardly 
any indeed, it is attested by the commentators. A. is speaking of the air 
enclosed (a 9 ἐγκατῳκοδόμηται) in the ear under the membrane of the tympanum. 
This air has grown together with, and become one with, the organ of hearing: 
as Torst. observes, “concrevit cum auditu.” On the other hand, if we take the 
alternative reading ἀέρι, “the ear is συμφυὴς with the air,” which air is meant, the 
air within the ear or the air outside? If the former, there is force in Torst.’s 
remark “‘ridiculum est dicere auditum concrevisse cum aere.” If the latter (and 
Professor Beare, who adopts this reading, translates: “the organ of hearing 
proper is physically homogeneous with the air,” Lc., p. 114), there seems no 
appropriateness in συμφυής, for the inner air and the outer air, though “ physi- 
cally homogeneous,” have certainly not become so by natural growth; for 
συμφυὴς only applies in its proper sense to things which are qualitatively 
distinct and unlike, though they form a natural whole. Besides Philop. (364, 11, 
365, 20), Simpl. (143, 22), Soph. (86, 25), we have the more valuable authority of 
Theophrastus as reported by Prisc. Lyd. (τό, 22 ἀλλ᾽ εἰ 6 ἀὴρ συμφυής, τὸ δὲ 
ἀκούειν «ré.), whose evidence is accepted by Professor Bywater ad /oc. <As to 
Them., it is true that he first paraphrases (64, τό H., 117, 29 Sp.) ἀκοὴ δὲ συμφυὴς 
ἀέρι, but that this is the licence of paraphrase in wilful alteration is rendered 
exceedingly probable by the words immediately following: éyxar@Kodopnra.... 
ἀὴρ...τῇ μήνιγγε συμφυὴς and (64, 28 H., 118, 17 Sp.) γίνεται yap ὥσπερ μεθόριον 
ὁ τῇ μήνιγγε συμφυὴς ἀὴρ τοῦ τε εἴσω πνεύματος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἔξωθεν 
ἀέρος. Cf. 65, τό 5ᾳ H., 119, 26Sp. See also Bon. Jud. Ar. 720 ἃ. τι. 

a4. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀέρι εἶναι. The commentators supply τὴν ἀκοήν, and so I 
have translated. But it would seem more natural to regard τὸ κινητικὸν... «ἀκοῆς 
as the subject, the sonorous body as such. <A. in various passages expressly 
declares the organ of hearing to consist of air (425a 4, De Sensu 2, 438 Ὁ 20, 
De Part. An. τι. 10, 656b 16sq., De Gen. An. ν. 2, 781 a 23 sq.) and such a view 
is in full accord with the whole tenor of the present discussion, 419 b 8, 419b 
33—420 a 19. But it seems to me impossible that, if the organ proper is of air 
(ἀέρος εἶναί φαμεν, 656b 17), it should also be said to be in air. The external 
ear, Empedocles’ σάρκινος dos, is in air no doubt, but so is the eye and the 
whole body, and it is not with the external ear that we hear. Them. must have 
felt this difficulty, for, as cited in the last note, he sometimes substitutes ἡ μῆνιγξ. 
But is the membrane of the tympanum really the organ? If, however, my 
suggestion be taken, all that needs to be assumed is that A. confines his 


II. ὃ 4208 3—a 18 381 


attention, as usual, to the normal case of sonorous bodies in the air, and regards 
hearing in the water as an exception. The conjecture of Steinhart, διὰ ro ἕνα 
ἀέρα εἶναι, has the great merit of avoiding the difficulty of the traditional inter- 
pretation, and it ts adopted by Professor Beare, who translates thus ‘Lc., p. 114}: 
‘Since then the air is one, it follows that, when the outer air is moved, the inner 
air is moved also.” 

a6. τὸ κινησόμενον μέρος καὶ ἔμψυχον, 1.6. the part that is to be affected (by 
sound). Since perception implies movement, κινησόμενον here is equivalent to 
αἰσθησόμενον We might have expected τὸ ἔμψυχον ζῷον as subject. But the 
animal does not hear in all parts of the body (a 6) and, if hearing were possible 
at any other part of the body than the ear, that part would be an dpyavav. The 
text substitutes a description of ὄργανον for the word ὄργανον itself. 

a8. ἡ τούτου, Le. ἡ τοῦ θρύπτεσθαι κωλυθέντος ἀέρος. 

ag. ἐγκατῳκοδόμηται, “is lodged deep down,” “immured.” 

aio. ἀκίνητος. This word does not mean that the air within the ear is 
absolutely motionless; for not only is the communication of motion to it from 
without the cause of hearing, but Aristotle expressly says below (a 16, that tt 
has an intrinsic motion of its own. It is necessary to his theory that the air in 
the ear should not be dislodged and that it should be relatively at rest, in the 
same sense as a lake when compared with the running water of a river. It will 
then be better able to receive the motions which it is its function to receive. 
Cf. Them. 65, 13 sqq. H., 119, 22 sqq. Sp. Similarly mind is ἀπαθής (429a 15) 
in order that it may more perfectly “suffer,” πάσχειν, 1.8. receive πάθη from 
without. 

all. τῆς κινήσεως, “of the movement,” int. τῆς ψοφητικῆς, “‘the movement 
which conditions sound.” διὰ ταῦτα, 1.6. the position of this internal air well 
covered up and protected. 

8. 12. πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν συμφυῆ ἀέρα, “right up to the air which is in and part 
of” the ear. Note that Aristotle looks upon the ear as consisting of bone, 
membrane, convolutions and the air contained, exactly as he recognises water 
as a constituent part of the eye-ball, and as anyone would count the air in a 
drum as an essential part of the drum. 

84. 13. ἕλικας, the spiral convolutions of the inner ear, often called the 
labyrinth. The word is applied to mathematical spirals, e.g. to those described 
by the heavenly bodies Mezaph. 998 a 5. 

Δ 14. τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κόρῃ δέρμα, the comea, which Simpl. describes (144, 29) as 
ὁ κερατοειδὴς λεγόμενος χιτῶν. 

α 16. ὥσπερ τὸ κέρας: the musical instrument. A more familiar instance 
is that of spiral shells, which, like the horn, ring when held to the ear. The ear 
is active, the organ is in its healthy, normal condition when, if the hand be put 
over it, a murmur is heard like that proceeding from a shell. del, “ perpetu- 
ally”. Such inner movement is always going on. As Them. says (65, 18 H., 
119, 28 Sp.) διὸ καὶ ἠχεῖ τὸ οὖς ἀεὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης [int. τῆς οἰκείας] κινήσεως. We 
are only aware of it when we apply the test. 

4 17. GAN ὁ ψόφος ἀλλότριος. Sound which we hear comes in from without 
and does not belong to the ear itself, and is not, like the ringing just mentioned, 
due exclusively to the ear. 

4 18. τῷ κενῷ καὶ ἠχοῦντι. A popular description of the ear: presumably 
one and the same organ is intended, which is (@) empty, (4) resonant. A. goes 
on to show that his theory satisfies these conditions if by “resonant” we 
understand the air enclosed (ὡρισμένον) within the ear, and by “empty” an 
organ which contains within it nothing but air. It should be remembered, as 


382 NOTES 11. 8 


mentioned above (zo/e on 4204 12). that the organ of hearing is to him the ear 
with the interior air in it, ὁ συμφυὴς ἀήρ. Here ἠχοῦντι better suits the enclosed 
air, κενῷ the cavity of bone, membrane, and convolutions. 

alI9Q. ὡρισμένον. Probably “delimited” or “circumscribed.” Against this 
interpretation Simpl. (145, 29) raises the objection that the same thing will 
apply to the external air, and prefers to explain “air of a definite character” 
τῷ ζωτικῷ ἤχῳ χαρακτηριζόμενος. This seems over subtle, though it is no doubt 
true that the air confined within the ear will remain ὡρισμένος καὶ 6 αὐτὸς when 
it ceases by its peculiar motion to produce the murmur which is the evidence 
of its vital activity. But this point A. could afford to neglect when adjusting 
the popular saying to his theory. 

a 20. ἢ καὶ ἄμφω. This is Aristotle’s own solution. 

a 23. ὅταν tis κρούσῃ. With κρούσῃ should probably be understood τὰ 
ἀφαλλόμενα, the objects which rebound (such as tennis balls and the like). It is 
just possible to understand ra λεῖα τῇ σφαίρᾳ, on the analogy of τοῖς ποσὶ τὴν γῆν 
κρούειν. Them. (65, 31 H., 120, 17 Sp.) calls attention to the inadequacy of the 
illustration because the ball is not continuous with the surface against which it 
strikes and from which it rebounds: οὐδὲ τὸ παράδειγμα ᾧ κέχρηται ᾿Αριστοτέλης 
πάντη ἔοικε" φησὶ yap τὸν ψόφον εἶναι κίνησιν τοῦ δυναμένου κινεῖσθαι τὸν τρόπον 
τοῦτον, ὃν τὰ ἀφαλλόμενα ἀπὸ τῶν λείων, ὅταν τις κρούσῃ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀφαλλόμενα 
χωρίζεται ὧν ἀφάλλεται, δὲ πρώτως ψοφήσας ἀὴρ οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀφάλλεται ἐπὶ τὴν 
ἀκοήν. I append ἃ supplementary note by my friend Miss Alford: “I think the 
object is ra λεῖα. The noise is the movement of a portion of air which being 
συνεχὴς καὶ εἷς has the power to leap back from the surface as a ball (or a tea- 
cup) leaps off from a tea-tray when the fist 15 brought down on the tray. That 
which leaps off is, like the air in most cases of hearing, neither τὸ τύπτον nor 
τὸ τυπτόμενον but a third thing. Themistius objects that the air which pro- 
duces the sound does not as one whole leap off from the surface struck and pass 
across and strike on the air in the ear. That portion of air which begins the 
production of the sound 6 πρώτως ψοφήσας (being that which rested on the 
surface struck and leaps off from it like the ball) sets in motion successive 
portions of air comparable to waves, of which the last strikes on the air in the 
ear and directly produces the sound heard.” ὥσπερ εἴρηται, cf. sudra 419 Ὁ 13 
and 419 b 6 there referred to. 

a 25. ἀθροῦν. In this term are summed up the conditions denoted above 
by συνεχὴς καὶ eis (419b 35) or εἷς συνεχείᾳ (420a 3) and ὡρισμένος (4204 19), 
in the absence of which the air, when struck, disperses, so that no sound 
results. 

a 26. af δὲ διαφοραὶ τῶν ψοφούντων. Cf. διαφοραὶ τῆς κινήσεως 420a IO 56. 
Other qualities of vocal sound are, e.g., loudness, harshness and their opposites, 
422 Ὁ 29 sqq. The quality of pitch is here attributed to the object which emits 
the sound. 

a 29. ταῦτα, 1.6. τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ. κατὰ μεταφορὰν. I have found it 
impossible to preserve this metaphor in the translation. We do indeed talk of 
acute sounds and of sharp and flat notes; but the proper way of indicating in 
modern English the musical quality called pitch is by a different metaphor. 

The analogy is so far faulty that, whereas here the opposite of ὀξὺ is given as 
βαρύ, below where A. is speaking of touch, it is ἀμβλύ (cf. Prod. XIX. 8, 918 a 19), 
and, while βαρὺ was obviously the proper and usual term for a low or deep voice 
in Greek, ἀμβλὺ alone really suits the metaphor from touch. The truth would 
seem to be that it is only ὀξὺ which can be said to have been applied to sounds 
by analogy from touch, meaning “shrill” or “piercing” or “acute.” 


II. 8 420 a 18—a 30 383 


a 30 τὸ μὲν yap ὀξὺ...420 Ὁ 4 εἶναι. In this obscure passage there is reason to 
believe that A. is thinking of a Pythagorean definition and tacitly correcting the 
words of Plato in 77. 67 Ὁ ὅλως μὲν οὖν φωνὴν θῶμεν τὴν Ov ὥτων ὑπ᾽ ἀέρος 
ἐγκεφάλον τε καὶ αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδομένην, τὴν δὲ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς 
κίνησιν. ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς μὲν ἀρχομένην, τελευτῶσαν δὲ περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἥπατος ἕδραν, 
ἀκοήν" ὅση δ᾽ αὐτῆς ταχεῖα, ὀξεῖαν, oon δὲ βραδυτέρα, βαρντέραν- τὴν δὲ ὁμοίαν 
ὁμαλὴν τε καὶ λείαν, τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν τραχεῖαν" μεγάλην δὲ τὴν πολλήν, ὅση δὲ 
ἐναντία, σμικράν. Cf. 804, Β ὅσοι φθύγγοι ταχεῖς τε καὶ βραδεῖς ὀξεῖς τε καὶ βαρεῖς 
φαίνονται κτές, According to Plato, voice, the object of hearing, is a shock 
transmitted to brain and blood by the air through the ears, and reaching the 
soul (cf. zofe on 4o8b 15). The “motion” which this shock or blow sets up is 
hearing. Obviously, then, Plato’s κίνησις is A.’s αἴσθησις of 420 a 30, since both 
terms refer to actual hearing. <A. appears from his criticism to have understood 
the next sentence to mean “‘so much of sound as is rapid, let us call shrill, so 
much as is slower, deeper or of lower pitch.” And in 804 Plato certainly says 
that swift and slow sounds appear shrill and deep. In the Zofrcs (1. 15, 
107a 15) A. quotes a Pythagorean definition of shrill or high-pitched sound: 
φωνὴ μὲν yap ὀξεῖα ἡ ταχεῖα, καθάπερ φασὶν οἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς dppovexoi. 

A.’s own view appears to be that of Theophrastus, De ilfusica, frag. 80, 
viz. that there is a natural difference between one vocal sound and another, 
quite irrespective of the mode of production and of any mathematical relations 
which this mode of production involves. The characteristic of the shrill or 
high note, as compared with the deep or low one, A. explains by the analogy of 
the tangible quality of sharpness. What is sharp, as it were, stabs; the 
sensible impression is rapid and deep, if these metaphorical terms may be 
allowed; and the same thing is true of the shrill sound or high note, it also 
makes a deep impression on the ear in a very little time, whereas the impression 
of the deep voice as heard is assimilated to that of the slower thrust of a blunt 
instrument. The description may not be very accurate, but at all events it aims 
at establishing simple, ultimate, unanalysable differences between sounds as 
heard. The high note, says Theophr., can be heard at a greater distance than 
the low note. The ear apprehends it because of its distinctive quality, διὰ τὴν 
ἰδιότητα, οὐ διὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ πλῆθος. Nor does the high note surpass the low note 
in speed of transmission: if that were the case, a chord would be impossible, 
for the ear would catch the higher of the two components sooner than the lower: 
ἄλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τάχει ἂν διαφέροι ὁ ὀξύς- προκατελαμβάνετο γὰρ ἂν τὴν ἀκοὴν ὥστε μὴ 
γίγνεσθαι σύμφωνον. This difficulty (see Zz. 8ο a, Β and Theophr., De Sen- 
stbus, § 85, Doxogr. Gr. 525, 17), had already occurred to Plato, who met it by 
supposing that one vocal sound is in accord with another when the beginning of 
the slower is similar to the ending of the more rapid: συμφωνεῖν δ᾽ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ 
τῆς βραδείας ὁμοία ἢ τῇ τελευτῇ τῆς ταχείας. Cf. Simpl. 147, 9—14, whose account 
is most explicit. It seems quite clear from De δόμοι 7, 448 ἃ τὸ sqq., that, hke 
Theophr., A. believed that two notes, one high, one low, which in a chord coalesce 
into an unity, are heard at one and the same moment: at any rate, he rejects the 
hypothesis of certain musical theorists, that the two sounds which compose the 
chord, though not arriving simultaneously, appear to do so, their lack of simul- 
taneity being undetected, when the time between them is so short as to be 
imperceptible. This is impossible, according to A., because there is no such 
thing as imperceptible time. The argument of Theophr. is apparently fatal to 
the Pythagorean theory which A. here disclaims, 420 a 31 οὐ δὴ ταχὺ τὸ ὀξὺ κτέ. 
But at the same time it is not easy to see how the whole passage is to be 
interpreted, if A. as well as Theophr. had really emancipated himself from the 


384 NOTES Ir. 8 


view that a shrill or high note travels and is transmitted more rapidly than a 
deep or low one. The words διὰ τὸ τάχος and διὰ βραδυτῆτα seem against this. 
We may say with Zeller (Avdsfotle U1. Ὁ. 379, τι. 3, E.T.) that Theophr. is op- 
posing both A. and Plato: but the context of /vag. 89 does not favour this 
supposition. We cannot credit Theophr. with the crucial experiment of the 
chord, for he found it in De Sewsz. If, however, A. by his metaphors of stab 
and thrust, 1s describing the character of the contrasted sensations as facts of 
experience, and not as physiological processes, a different view may be taken of 
διὰ τὸ τάχος, διὰ βραδυτῆτα and of ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἐπὶ πολύ. The “time” would 
be that during which the sensation lasts, not that which has elapsed between 
the shock to the sonorous body and our apprehension of the sound, an interval 
of which we are seldom conscious ; while the relative speed would be an attribute 
of the sensation, wholly independent of the physical conditions necessary for the 
production of the sound and the rate at which the shock has travelled through 
the air. On this view the passage would furnish no evidence of A.’s opinion on 
the question whether the shrill sound does or does not travel faster than the 
deep or grave sound. 4 fortiori, there would be no need to suppose, with 
Simpl. (147, 7 sqq.), that the sentence a 30 τὸ μὲν γὰρ o€v...a 31 ἐν πολλῷ ἐπ᾽ 
ὀλίγον, so far from expressing A.’s own opinion, is actually the same view as the 
one which he emphatically condemns in the next sentence a 31 οὐ δὴ ταχὺ κτέ. 
To turn now to the ancient commentators. Philop. (373, 14 566.) gives the 
fullest explanation. He distinguishes between sound, the incorporeal ἐνέργεια, 
which does not move in space, and the air, which does so travel and of which 
sound is the energy. Thus ψόφος ὀξύς τε ψόφος ταχέως παραγινόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν 
αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐπιμένων, while Ψ. Bapus=W. βραδέως παραγινόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν 
καὶ ταχέως ἀποπαυόμενος. He illustrates from the bow-string and the strings of 
the lyre. The bow-string takes a short time to discharge the arrow and for the 
same reason sends it a long way, the rapidity of discharge showing greater 
force: and so generally with strings at greater tension. The ὑπάτη of the lyre 
which gives the note of lowest pitch, like the G string of a violin, takes a long 
time to move the medium and keeps up the movement only a short time, ἐπ᾽ 
ὀλίγον ἐφύλαξεν. Thin strings, like the high-pitched νήτη, having: a thinner 
column of air to resist, move the air more quickly and each single vibration 
ceases sooner, but the series of vibrations lasts longer. Being tense, the string 
gives the air a smart blow, the air then retaliates with a sharp blow on the 
string and so on: the sound lasts as long as the series of vibrations. The 
reverse is the case with the thicker strings which sound the lower notes. They 
are slower to move the air and each single vibration lasts longer, but the series 
of vibrations ceases sooner, because they give the air a gentler blow and receive 
a gentler one from it. When he comes to a 32 ἀλλὰ γίνεται Philop. gives two 
alternative explanations: (@) “owing to the speed of the body which is moved 
and in which the sound is [the air], the stimulation of the sense by the sound 
becomes like it,” i.e. speedy; (δ) rapid or slow effect upon the sense happens 
to accompany shrillness or depth in sound exactly as in touch it accompanies 
rapidity or slowness of cleaving or dividing. What is sharp‘cleaves quickly: 
therefore rapidity of cleavage is a concomitant of sharpness to the touch. So 
in sound acuteness of pitch is one thing, rapid movement of sense is another, 
which attends upon the former. Philop. is evidently influenced by De Gen. 
An. V. 7, 786b 25 sqq. and perhaps by certain of the musical Problems, e.g. 
Prob. XIX. 8, 21, 37, 49, 50. By κινεῖ, κίνησις he clearly understood spatial 
motion: cf. 374, 17 Sq., 373, 21, 23. He took ἐπὶ πολὺ as well as ἐν ὀλέγῳ χρόνῳ 
of time. Simpl. (147, 3 544.) takes ἐπὶ πολὺ to combine distance and duration, 


Il. ὃ 4208 30—b3 385 


καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ διάστημα καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ» ἐπιμένον χρόνον ἐξάκουστον. The low note 
is more slowly heard and for a less distance and lasts a shorter time. On the 
analogy of acute and blunt to touch, the acute of sound penetrates and strikes 
deep down, διεισδύνει καὶ οἷον κατὰ βάθος πλήττει, the deep note makes a more 
superficial impression οἷον ἐπιπολαιότερον καὶ κατὰ θλῖψιν. He understands 
τοιαύτη, NOt as ταχεῖα, βραδεῖα, but as ὀξεῖα, βαρεῖα. For to stimulate sense in 2 
short time deeply implies rayurns but not ὀξύτης : therefore we shall be speaking 
of the motions, not as shrill or deep, but as quick or slow, even when we do call 
them shrill or deep. 

a 30. κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν: indirectly, for the necessity of a medium was 
insisted upon 419 a 27—29. The phrase recurs 426b 31. See 417 Ὁ 2, wo/e on 
τὸ πάσχειν, and 431 a48sq. Cf. also De Sensu 6, 445 Ὁ 8. 

δι. 31. ἐπὶ πολύ. As we have seen, this has been variously interpreted of 
(1) distance traversed by vocal sound before it is heard or of (2) the duration, or 
(3) the extent, of the effect produced upon the ear when it is heard. In any 
case ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἐπὶ wodkv=raxyéws. The objection to (1) 15 that it seems 
Inconsistent with the next sentence, a 31, ov δὴ xré. What one would expect 
from the passage in De Gen. An. Vv. 7, 786b 25 sqq. is some recognition of the 
mass of air to be moved, so that “in a short time” should be qualified by some 
such words as “considering the relatively large mass to be moved.” But I 
cannot find this in the text and it is quite inconsistent with Philop., who says 
expressly that the swiftness of the shrill note is partly due to the relatively 
small mass of air set in motion. 

8.31. οὐ Sy. This is not saying that what is high-pitched is (identically) 
quick, or what is low-pitched (identically) slow, but that when we hear a shrill 
or high note the movement in us or sensation is what it is (i.e. high-pitched or 
shrill) owing to speed, and when we hear a deep or low note the movement in 
us is what it is G.e. deep or low) owing to slowness (characterising it). With 
this explanation, the apparently opposite statement in De Gen. Ax. (lc. 787a 30 
sqq.) to the effect that τὸ ταχὺ is ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῇ and that τὸ βραδέως φερόμενον is 
βαρύ, does not conflict. Simpl. says δεὰ τὸ τάχος means κατὰ τὸ τάχος, “in virtue 
of speed,” and not κατὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, “in virtue of high pitch.” He thinks (147, 
36—148, 1) that οὕτω δὴ in place of the od δὴ of our text would better express 
the reductto ad absurdum to which the preceding sentence a 30 τὸ μὲν yap ὀξὺ 
xré., in his opinion the view of others and not of A. himself, would be exposed. 

a 33. τοιαύτη, “such as described”: in other words, ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἐπὶ πολὺ 
τὴν αἴσθησιν κινεῖ, its description on the analogy of touch being that it rapidly 
produces a considerable impression (or with the other meaning of ἐπὶ πολύ, 
a lasting impression). I am not sure that Philop. (374, 21—23, 28 sq.) means 
anything different from this, though he does seem to imply that he took τοιαύτη 
for ταχεῖα and βραδεῖα. 

a 33. τοῦ δὲ διὰ βραδυτῆτα. We complete this elliptical sentence rod δὲ 
βαρέος γίνεται ἡ κίνησις τοιαύτη : in other words, ἐν πολλῷ ἐπ᾽ ὀλέγον τὴν αἴσθησιν 
κινεῖ. . 

420 Ὁ 2 τὸ μὲν γὰρ...4 βραδὺ εἶναι. This remark concerns the illustration from 
touch, and not the quality of pitch. 

b 3. ὥστε συμβαίνε. And so the one is fer accidens quick, the other fer 
accidens slow. We say that a clock is fast or slow when its works go too fast 
or too slow. Here συμβαίνει εἶναιτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι: cf. Simpl. 147, 34-36, 
148, 6—8, Philop. 374, 20---31. 

420>b 5—421 a G. Voice, as distinct from mere sound, is peculiar 
to living things. Not all animals, however, have vocal sound. Bloodless 


H. 25 


386 NOTES 11. 8 


animals and fishes have none [$9]. For the production of voice, there must 
be breath, or air inhaled. To render it articulate speech (διάλεκτος) there is 
need also of the tongue (which, thus, has a second function besides its own 
necessary function in taste) [§ 10]. Physiologically, voice is produced in the 
φάρυγξ, now known as the larynx, by the action of the soul-moved breath 
against the wind-pipe or trachea. It is for lack of such a larynx that fishes are 
voiceless. Not every sound made by an animal is voice. Voice presupposes a 
mental image present to the animal, and is thus “significant” (onpavrixés) 
[8 11]. Voice is impossible if we hold our breath [8 12]. 

420 Ὁ 5. ἡ δὲ φωνὴ. The object of hearing is sound in general, but more 
particularly the species, vocal sound, or voice. See /7zst. Az. IV. 9, 535 a 27 
περὶ φωνῆς τῶν ζῴων ὧδ᾽ ἔχει. φωνὴ καὶ ψόφος ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρίτον τούτων 
διάλεκτος. φωνεῖ μὲν οὖν οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων οὐδὲν πλὴν τῷ φάρυγγι" διὸ ὅσα 
μὴ ἔχει πνεύμονα, οὐδὲ φθέγγεται: διάλεκτος δὲ ἡ τῆς φωνῆς ἐστὶ τῇ γλώττῃ διάρ- 
θρωσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν φωνήεντα ἡ φωνὴ καὶ ὁ λάρυγξ ἀφίησιν, τὰ δὲ ἄφωνα ἡ γλῶττα 
καὶ τὰ χείλη" ἐξ ὧν ἡ διάλεκτός ἐστιν. When attention was concentrated upon 
the human soul (cf. 402 b 4), it was natural that vocal sound should be regarded 
as the exclusive object of hearing. Cf. Plato, Charm. 168D οἷον ἡ ἀκοή, φαμέν, 
οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἣν ἀκοὴ ἢ hovias...paviy ἐχούσης ἑαυτῆς ἀκούσεται" ov yap ἂν ἄλλως 
ἀκούσειε. Hence the teleological conclusion (435 b 24 sq.) that speech subserves 
the end of communicating, and not as in Talleyrand’s improved version, of 
concealing, our thoughts. On the difference between “voice” and “speech” 
cf. Pol. 1253a9-—18. According to De Gen. An. V. 7, 786b 21 sq., φωνὴ is ὕλη 
τοῦ λόγου: cf. Afetaph. 1038a6 ἣ μὲν γὰρ φωνὴ γένος καὶ ὕλη, ai δὲ διαφοραὶ τὰ 
εἴδη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐκ ταύτης ποιοῦσιν. 

6. τῶν.. ἀψύχων. Ch Metadbh. 1019b 13 καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἔνεστιν ἡ 
τοιαύτη δύναμις, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις" τὴν μὲν γὰρ δύνασθαί φασι φθέγγεσθαι λύραν, 
τὴν δ᾽ οὐδέν, ἐὰν ἦ μὴ εὔφωνος. Also St Paul, ad Corinth. 1. 14. 7 ὅμως τὰ ἄψυχα 
φωνὴν διδόντα, εἴτε αὐλὸς εἴτε κιθάρα, ἐὰν διαστολὴν τοῖς φθόγγοις μὴ δῷ, πῶς 
γνωσθήσεται τὸ αὐλούμενον ἢ τὸ κιθαριζόμενον; 

Ὁ 8. ἀπότασιν, the “register,” 1.6. range of notes of which a voice is capable, 
the generic term of which ἐπίτασις and ἄνεσις are the correlative species, 
marking the ascending and descending scales. Cf. for ἀπότασις Hist. An. 
v.14, 545a 17 [ζῴων], ὅσων ἐστὶν ἀπότασις τῆς φωνῆς and for ἐπίτασις Aristox., 
Harm. Elem. i. 10 (Meib.) ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπίτασίς ἐστι κίνησις τῆς φωνῆς συνεχὴς ἐκ 
βαρυτέρου τόπου εἰς ὀξύτερον. μέλος, “tune,” implying a succession of musical 
notes. This is an advance from ἐπίτασις, for the shriek of a railway whistle or 
the boom of a bittern exemplify high and low pitch, but are not properly 
musical sounds. As far as I am aware, Greek musical writers have left no 
definition of μέλος. It is one of those simple, unanalysable notions which, in 
A.’s words, pera τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἢ τῆς νοήσεως γνωρίζονται. Cf. Bacchius, /sagoge 
(ed. Jan, p. 297, 22) μέλος δὲ τί ἐστιν; ἄνεσις καὶ ἐπίτασις δι’ ἐμμελῶν φθόγγων 
γινομένη. This is a definition in a circle of tune or melody in general, since 
ἐμμελῶν implies μέλος. A particular tune or melody is defined 24. 309, 13 as τὸ 
ἐκ φθόγγων καὶ διαστημάτων καὶ χρόνων συγκείμενον, “that which is made up of 
notes and intervals and times,” but this again is circular, for his account of 
φθόγγος (292, 15), Viz. φωνῆς ἐμμελοῦς πτῶσις ἐπὶ μίαν τάσιν pia yap τάσις ev φωνῇ 
ληφθεῖσα ἐμμελῆ φθόγγον ἀποτελεῖ, though a very good description, does not 
satisfy the requirements of a logical definition. In several passages of the 
Politics A. implies that μέλη, melodies or tunes, and ῥυθμοί, rhythms, are the 
essential factors in music: 1340a 13, 19, 1341a 1,14. The essential difference 
between μέλος and φθόγγος, song and speech, is well brought out Ae/aph. 


II. ὃ 420 Ὁ 5---Ὁ 14 387 


1Ο53 Ὁ 34—1054a 2. If the universe consisted entirely of μέλη, it would be a 
number or assemblage of quarter tones, a quarter tone being the least musical 
interval, and so the unit of the scale. But if the universe consisted solely of 
φθόγγοι, it would be a number or assemblage of elementary sounds (στοιχεῖα, 
vowels and consonants: not, as Bonitz translates, Buchstaben) and a vowel 
sound would be the unit. 

Ὁ 8. διάλεκτον, “articulate utterance,” “language,” “speech,” ἡ τῆς φωνῆς... 
τῇ γλώττῃ διάρθρωσις, as in 535 a 30, cited in moze on 420b 5 supra: cf. 420b 18. 
That discourse of sweet sound should be attributed to instruments may be best 
understood if we take the case when the instruments accompany the chorus or 
when without the voices they play the same melody which the voices afterwards 
sing unaccompanied. The first case is noticed in Prod. XIX. 9, 918 a 22 διὰ τί 
ἥδιον τῆς μονῳδίας ἀκούομεν, ἐάν τις πρὸς αὐλὸν ἢ λύραν ἄδῃ : καίτοι πρόσχορδα [sic 
Jan] καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μέλος ᾷδουσιν ἀμφοτέρως]. Cf. 26. XIX. 27, 919 b 26 δεὰ τί τὸ ἀκουστὸν 
μόνον ἦθος ἔχει τῶν αἰσθητῶν; καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ἦ ἄνευ λόγου μέλος, ὅμως ἔχει ἦθος, 
z6. XIX. 15. When an instrumental melody is said to have character, ἦθος, it 
may well be supposed to “speak.” The same mode of thought recurs in the 
musical criticism of the present day, in fact, it is implied by the very common 
direction “cantabile” and by our expression “phrasing,” as applied to a single 
instrument. Professor Beare, Greek Theories, p. 118, thinks διάλεκτος is “distinct 
from μέλος and used to designate the effect of a number of instruments played 
in harmony or in unison....Articulation and harmony are terms as suitable for 
the interplay of ideas in conversation as for that of tones in concert.” I see no 
reason for assuming that several instruments are necessary to διάλεκτος : surely 
one can speak, as one person can carry on a monologue. As I understand it, 
the difference between μέλος and διάλεκτος is that in the one the instrument 
mimics the emotions, in the other the intellectual functions, of human speech. 
As with the voice words may be either said or sung, so it is claimed for the 
instrument without the voice that it can express or suggest ideas in songs 
without words. Cf. Proél. XIX. 15,918 Ὁ 17 μᾶλλον γὰρ τῷ μέλει ἀνάγκη μιμεῖσθαι 
ἢ τοῖς ῥήμασιν : in the expression of the idea the music, as we should say, is 
more important than the libretto. A. is approximating the instrument to the 
human voice by gradual stages. The lyre has its high and low notes, it can 
play a melody, it can, in fact, talk. ἔοικε γὰρ. This may be taken im- 
personally, =eixds ἐστιν. Or, if ra ἄψυχα be the subject, we may supply either 
φων εῖν or τοῖς φωνοῦσι. 

Ῥ9. ταῦτ᾽, i.e. pitch, melody, articulation (ἀπότασις, μέλος, διάλεκτος). 

bio. ἄναιμα, ie. insecta, crustacea, mollusca (cephalopoda), testacea. See 
Ogle on Parts of Animals, pp. xxvil.—xxx. There follows in our text a paren- 
thetical remark on fishes. 

Ὅ τι. τοῦτ᾽, 1.6. that they are voiceless. εὐλόγως, int. ἔχει. 

Ῥ 12. of λεγόμενοι φωνεῖν. Cf. Ast. An. τν. 9, 535 Ὁ 14 5644. οἱ δ᾽ ixdues 
ἄφωνοι μέν εἶσιν,.-«ψόφους δέ τινας ἀφιᾶσι καὶ τριγμοὺς obs λέγουσι φωνεῖν, οἷον 
λύρα καὶ χρομίς..«.καὶ ὃ κάπρος ὁ ἐν τῷ ᾿Αχελῴῳ, ἔτι δὲ χαλκὶς καὶ κόκκυξ. πάντα δὲ 
ταῦτα τὴν δοκοῦσαν φωνὴν ἀφιᾶσι τὰ μὲν τῇ τρίψει τῶν βραγχίων, ...τὰ δὲ τοῖς ἐντὸς 
τοῖς περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν - πνεῦμα γὰρ ἔχει τούτων ἕκαστον, ὃ προστρίβοντα καὶ κινοῦντα 
ποιεῖ τοὺς ψόφους. 

13. ζῴου ψόφος. This does not rule out fish. Torstrik supposes οὗ πᾶς δὲ 
to have fallen out after ψόφος. If we are not satisfied with A.’s expression, 
the addition is a perfectly good correction. 

Ῥ 14. οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ, int. γινόμενος, that is, produced by a particular 
or appropriate, and not by any and every, organ. πᾶν Ψψοφεῖ.. τ ty τινι 

25—2 


388 NOTES 11. ὃ 


“ everything [i.e. everything that is sonorous, πᾶν τὸ ψοφητικόν] emits sound” 
by reason of there being something that strikes, something that is struck, and 
a medium: cf. 419 Ὁ 9 γίνεται δ᾽ 6 κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ψόφος ἀεί τινος πρὸς τι Kat 
ἔν τίνι. 

bI5. τοῦτο 8’, i.e. the medium. 

b 16. ἤδη. The word seems to emphasise ἀναπνεομένῳ: “uses the air 
which is in any case breathed.” No translator whom I have consulted has 
succeeded in expressing its force. 

bry. ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα. You want breath (1) to keep life going, the necessary 
function, (2) for the nobler function, the luxury, of speech. To qualify the 
internal heat is the explanation of the use of the lungs in De Paré. Ax. 111. 6, 
668 Ὁ 33 sqq., De Resp. το, 4768 7—15. Cf. De Sensu 5, 4448. 25. Respiration 
subserves two ends: its ἔργον is to reinforce the action of the chest, its πάρεργον 
is to facilitate smell. Arteries were taken for air vessels because they were 
without blood after death. Therefore their use was supposed to be to cool the 
blood. 

Ὁ 18. τῇ γλώττῃ. Cf. De Resp. 11, 476a 18 καθάπερ ἐνίοις τῇ γλώττῃ πρός TE 
τοὺς χυμοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἑρμηνείαν. 

Ὁ 19 ἀναγκαῖον...20 ἕνεκα τοῦ ev. This contrast of what is “necessary” to” 
existence and what is conducive to its perfection or full development, i.e. the 
distinction between necessary and nobler functions, 1s characteristic of Aristotle. 
Cf. 434} 21 sqq., 435 Ὁ 20 sq., Pod. 1252 Ὁ 28 κοινωνία... γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν 
ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν, 1280a 31 εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ξῆν μόνον ἕνεκεν [int. ἐκοιν ὦ- 
νησαν καὶ συνῆλθον] ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εὖ ζῆν, 1280b 29—35, 25. 1338 84 13 sqq., 
De Part. An. Ul. 7, 670 Ὁ 23 of δὲ νεφροὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀλλὰ τοῦ 
εὖ καὶ καλῶς ἕνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, 20. III. 10, 672 Ὁ 23. 

big. ἡ δ᾽ ἑρμηνεία. To express and interpret thought is the special function 
of language (διάλεκτος). Cf. Pol. 1253a 14 6 δὲ λόγος [rational speech, as dis- 
tinguished from φωνή, which irrational animals share] ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ 
συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερὸν xré. Cf. again 435 Ὁ 24 sq. γλῶτταν δὲ ὅπως σημαίνῃ τι 
ἑτέρῳ. Cf. also De Resp. 11, 4768 18 sq. as cited in 220 75 on 420b 18. 

Ὁ 20. ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ. Jd. Ar. 291 Ὁ 25 frequentissime legitur τὸ εὖ, vel ita, ut 
e contextu orationis infinitivus verbi alicuius cogitatione addatur, veluti κιθαρισ- 
τοῦ τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ [sc. κιθαρίξειν], Eth. Nic. 1098 a 12, ...vel 
ita, ut τὸ εὖ ἴῃ substantivi naturam abire videatur, syn τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ καλόν (neque 
utriusque usus fines ubique accurate circumscribi possint). Here, as in 420 Ὁ 22 
znfra and probably 435 Ὁ 21, τὸ εὖ is a substantive. 

Ὁ 21. ἐν ἑτέροις, 1.6. in De ResZ., c. 8, especially 474 Ὁ 10 sqq. 

b23. ὁ φάρυγξ. The cavity at the back of the mouth opens both into the 
oesophagus or gullet and into the windpipe. A. uses the term φάρυγξ (= throat) 
chiefly for the upper part of the windpipe itself, what we call the “larynx”: cf. 
fiist. An. IV. 9, 535 ἃ 28 sq. In zd. Σ. 5, 637 a 29 he mentions a passage from 
the nostrils to the φάρυγξ. In De Part. An, 111. 3, 664 ἃ 16, the φάρυγξ is 
distinguished from the οἰσοφάγος. See also Ill. 3, 665a το: but in Erk. Nic. 
r118 a 32 sq. they are confused, φάρυγξ there being clearly the oesophagus. A. 
also occasionally uses the word λάρυγξ. By Galen’s time the terms φάρυγξ and 
λάρυγξ had come to be discriminated (cf. “παῖ, Ar. s.v. φάρυγξ, where Galen’s 
definitions, XIX. 359, XVIII. B 264, 961, XIV. 715, are quoted). On the supposed 
difference between ἡ φάρυγξ and ὁ φάρυγξ see Lobeck, Phrynichus, p- 65. 

Ὁ 25. Setra...26 πρῶτος, “is the first to need.” Simplicius paraphrases by 
πρώτως, “primarily needs breath to cool it.” Them. 66, 36 sqq. H., 122, 
17 544. Sp., Simpl. 149, 17—20 and Philop. 382, 24—28 say more precisely that 


ΤΠ. 8 420 Ὁ 14—421a 3 380 


it is the heart which most needs to be cooled, and the lung because it is near 
the heart and shares in its warmth. 

Ὁ 26. dvarveopévov, int. τοῦ ἀέρος, although τὸν ἀέρα is the subject of εἰσιέναι. 
This use of the genitive absolute, found in other writers, is more frequent in 
Aristotle (cf. nd. Ar. 149 Ὁ 26 sqq., also Waitz, Organon ad 57 a 33, Bonitz, 
Metabh. 990b 14). 

b 28. τῆς ἐν τούτοις rots μορίοις Ψυχῆς. We require breath where the vital 
force is greatest, and the heart is the seat of life. But economical nature makes 
a further use of the breath. It is thrown by the ψυχὴ in the organs of respira- 
tion (τὰ ἀναπνευστικὰ ὄργανα, Them. 67, 4 56. H., 122, 25 sqq. Sp.) against the 
windpipe, or, strictly, against the air in the windpipe. These “organs of 
respiration,” according to Them., are the tongue, the palate and the windpipe or 
φάρυγξ. This ψυχὴ strikes the air in the windpipe against the windpipe. A. 
thus gets a parallel to his account of hearing: air in the windpipe answers to 
air in the internal ear. Cf. Philop. 384, 4 544., who carefully points out the 
distinction: πλὴν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτό, TO δὲ ἐν TH 
ἀρτηρίᾳ ἄλλοτε ἄλλο. Cf. Them. 67, 16 sq. H., 123, 13 sqq. Sp. Cf. the account 
of echo 419 a 25—27 supra. 

Ὁ 29. ἀρτηρίαν. Here ἡ dprnpia=7n τραχεῖα ἀρτηρία (not, as L. and S. say, 7 
ἀρτηρία τραχεῖα), 1.6. ἡ τραχεῖα, the trachea or windpipe. τὴν καλουμένην ἀρτη- 
ρίαν, “‘the windpipe, as it is called,” because ἀρτηρία in general denotes any 
tube in the body, especially the arteries. 

Ὁ 30. καθάπερ εἴπομεν. In 420b 14 οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ (cf. 420b 12 τοῖς 
βραγχίοις): but the condition there stated, viz. the appropriate organ for the 
production of voice, is not enough. 

b 31. τὸ τῦπτον. That which strikes, as distinct from that upon which it 
strikes (re) and the air which serves as medium (ἔν riz), 420 Ὁ 14—16. 

Ὁ 32. μετὰ φαντασίας τινός, int. δεῖ εἶναι. There must be simultaneously a 
mental picture, φάντασμα: Them. 67, 25 H., 123, 26 Sp. μετὰ φαντασίας onpav- 
τικῆς. In the singular, as more often in the plural (425 Ὁ 25), φαντασία can mean 
the mental picture and not the faculty or operation of imagining. Jud. Ar. 
812 a 19 etiam numerus singularis interdum ita est accipiendus [1.6. non 
facultatem vel actionem imaginand: significat, sed imaginem animo obver- 
santem]. Cf. Phys. Iv. 4, 210b 34 ὁ τόπος διὰ τοιαύτης τινὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ φαντασίας, 
Magna Mor. i. 6, 1203 Ὁ 4 ὁ ἐκ τῆς προσφάτου φαντασίας ἀκρατής. σημαντικὸς. 
All voice, according to A., is indicative of something, whether feeling, desire or 
(in the case of men) thought. Thus it is by the presence of the image that 
vocal sound is mainly differentiated from mere noise. 

42lal. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, int. τῷ ἀναπνεομένῳ πνεύματι. The subject to τύπτει 
must be τὸ ἔμψυχον, the animate being, τὸ rimrov οὗ 420 Ὁ 31. By means of the 
air breathed the animal causes the impact of the air in the windpipe (τὸν ev τῇ 
aprnpia, int. ἀέρα) against the windpipe. 

a2. ἀναπνέοντα: cf. Probl. ΧΙ. 14,900a 39 ἐκπνέοντες, οὐκ εἰσπνέοντες φωνοῦ- 
μεν. The generic term here, as frequently, is used for the specific eiamvéovra 
or inhaling. Cf zuz/fra 421 b 14 μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ GAN ἐκπνέων ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα 
οὐκ dopara. In both passages dva-rveiy=in-spire, ἐκ-τπνεῖν =re-spire, κατέχειν 
[int. τὸ avetpa]=hold the breath. 

a3. τούτῳ. By a1, 2 supra this should mean the air that is breathed, with 
which the air in the windpipe about to be exhaled is struck. In fact, the 
windpipe is the meeting place of two currents (1) the air which is being inhaled 
and (2) the breath from the chest, the passage of which outward is checked 
by ὁ κατέχων. The collision between these two currents of air sends one of 


200 NOTES Ir. ὃ 


them against the edges of the windpipe and, according to 420b 27 and 4214 1, 
what is so sent is not the air in process of inhalation, as this is the instrument. 
So Simpl. κινεῖ μὲν ὁ ἀναπνέων, ἔμψυχος δηλαδὴ ὧν καὶ κινούμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, 
χρώμενος δὲ τῷ ἀναπνεομένῳ οὐ πρὸς τὸ εἰσπνεῖν ἢ ἐκπνεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατέχων, ἵνα 
τούτῳ ἀθρόως τύψη τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ καὶ προσκρούσῃ αὐτὸν τῇ aptnpig. This 
interpretation is fully borne out by Them. 67, 12 H., 123, 8 Sp. τοῦ γὰρ ἀναπνεο- 
μένου ἀέρος ἐστὶ πληγὴ [int. ἡ βῆξις, sic Them.], ἡ φωνὴ δὲ οὐχὶ τούτον πληγή; 
ἀλλὰ τούτῳ’ τούτῳ γὰρ τύπτει τὸν ἀπειλημμένον TH ἁρτηρίᾳ...δ μὲν ἀναπνεόμενος 
ἀὴρ τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πλήττει, οὗτος δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρτηρίαν... δεῖ γὰρ κατασχεῖν τὸν 
εἰσπνεύσαντα ἀέρα καὶ οὕτω πλῆξαι τὸν εἴσω. Philop. 384, 2 sqq. also supports 
τούτῳ, though, according to him, it is with the air which he is restraining from 
exit that 6 κατέχων sets in motion the air which is being inhaled. 

a6. ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος. See De Part. An. 111. 6, 669 ἃ 2 ἀνάγκη δὲ καταψύχειν 
ἔξωθεν [int. τὸ θερμόν] ἢ ὕδατι ἢ ἀέρι. διόπερ τῶν μὲν ἰχθύων οὐδεὶς ἔχει πλεύμονα, 
ἄλλ᾽ ἀντὶ τούτου βράγχια, καθάπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀναπνοῆς" ὕδατι γὰρ ποιεῖται 
τὴν κατάψυξιν, De Resp. 9, 474 Ὁ 25 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν ἔνυδρα, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ 
γῇ ποιεῖται τὴν διατριβήν, τούτων τοῖς μὲν μικροῖς πάμπαν καὶ τοῖς ἀναίμοις ἡ 
γινομένη ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἣ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος ψύξις ἱκανὴ πρὸς τὴν βοήθειαν τῆς 
φθορᾶς ταύτης- μικρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντα τὸ θερμὸν μικρᾶς δέονται τῆς βοηθείας. ..(47: a 9) 
κινοῦσι γὰρ [int. τὰ ἔντομα, e.g. bees, wasps, cockchafers and other insects which 
hum] τὸν τόπον τοῦτον, ὥσπερ ra ἀναπνέοντα ἔξωθεν τῷ πλεύμονι καὶ οἱ ἰχθύες 
τοῖς βραγχίοις. See also De Resp. το, 4768 1 ὅσα δὲ βράγχια κτέ. 


CHAPTER IX. 


421 α 7—422 a 7. The nature of smell and its object are less easy 
to determine than that of sight or hearing, this sense not being developed in us 
to the same degree of delicacy as in the other animals [8 1]. Our position in 
regard to smell is comparable to that of the hard-eyed animals in respect of 
sight. The superiority of man on the other hand is shown especially in touch 
[8 2]. Varieties of odour correspond to and are named from varieties of flavour, 
the latter being the more clearly distinguishable [§ 3]. Smell conforms to the 
analogy of the other senses and has as its object the inodorous (i.e. that 
which has a faint smell or none at all) as well as the odorous [§ 4]. The 
medium of smell is air or water, as is clear from the fact that animals, whether 
living in the water, in the air, or on land, all scent their food [§ 5]. It is only 
while inhaling breath that man can smell: a trait peculiar to man [§ 6]. The 
organ of smell, in man and other animals that inhale breath, has a protection, 
not possessed by other species, namely the nostril, just as the eyes of all but 
hard-eyed animals have lids [8 7]. The object of smell is dry, while the object 
of taste is moist [§ 8]. 

With this chapter should be compared De Semsu c. 5, 442 Ὁ 27—445b 1 
which serves partly to illustrate, partly to supplement the present discussion, 
the most important addition there made being the distinction between two 
kinds of ὀσῴφραντόν. The first is that discussed in this chapter, the second 
causes a purely aesthetic pleasure, which only man feels; the scent of flowers is 
the best example of this second kind (443b 17 sqq.). The ὀσφραντὸν treated in 
our present chapter is classified by A. on the analogy of flavours, 421 a 26 sqq. 


II. 9 421 a 3—a 20 3901 


4218. 7. τῶν εἰρημένων, int. αἰσθήσεών τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν, viz. sight and hearing 
and their respective objects. 

a8. ἡ ὀσμή here means “odour,” i.e. τὸ αἰσθητόν, as is shown by its 
co-ordination with sound and colour. The word is in itself ambiguous (like 
ὄψις, ἀκοή, αἴσθησις) and is used sometimes (subjectively) like ὄσφρησις of the 
faculty or act of perception, sometimes of the object perceived, odour, ὀσφραντόν, 
and sometimes to cover both (like our words “smell” and “ scent”). 

8.0 οὐκ ἔχομεν dxpiBy...10 ζῴων. The remark is repeated in De Sensu 4, 
440 Ὁ 31—441 a 3 as follows: “of all animals we have the poorest sense of 
smell; it 15 the poorest, too, of all our own senses, whereas of all animals we 
have the most delicate sense of touch, and taste is a sort of touch.” Accordingly 
in De Sensu A. first discusses flavours and uses the results thus obtained for 
the explanation of odours. ἀκριβῆ, “precise” and so “delicately discrimi- 
nating,” like the Latin sudfilzs. 

8. 12. ἄνευ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος. That is, unless the odour is sufficiently 
marked or powerful to produce positive pain or pleasure. We are conscious 
only of the intense forms. In other senses (e.g. taste) you can have intellectual 
discrimination of flavour etc. apart from the gratification of appetite. 

8. 13. οὕτω, φαύλως, μὴ ἀκριβῶς, 1.6. ἀμβλύτερον ; see next “2025. τὰ σκληρόφ- 
θαλμα. Cf. De Sensu 5, 444 Ὁ 25, “some animals have eye-lids which they must 
open in order to see, while hard-eyed creatures have none, and so have no need 
of anything with which to uncover them, but see directly.” Cf. also De Part. 
An. τι. 13, 657 Ὁ 29 sqq.: “fishes, insecta and hard-skinned animals [e.g. beetles] 
have eyes of various types, but are all without eyelids. The hard-skinned 
animals are absolutely devoid of such protection for their eyes, and instead 
have hard eyes; the eyelid, so to speak, has adhered to the eye and they see 
through it (οἷον βλέποντα διὰ τοῦ βλεφάρου προσπεφυκότος) : hence their sight is 
comparatively dim (ἀμβλύτερον βλέπειν). Fishes are not hard-eyed, but have 
soft or watery eyes (ὑγρόφθαλμοι, De Part. An. 658 a 3, 9).” It would seem 
that insects and beetles are the chief instances of hard-eyed animals. 

ΘΔ 15. πλὴν τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ apdBo. So long as a telepathic sense like sight 
gives its possessor a danger-signal and warns him of the approach of something 
pernicious or destructive, it fulfils one of its main ends: 434b 24 sqq., De Sensu 
1, 436 Ὁ 20 σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως...τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ φεύγωσι. 
οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς, int. μὴ διαδήλους ἔχειν or the like. As the verb (αἰσθάνεσθαι) 
in the positive half of the preceding sentence takes a genitive, we have to think 
of some transitive equivalent, such as ἔχειν or κρίνειν, to govern τὰς ὀσμάς. 

8 17. ἀνάλογον ἔχειν, int. τὴν ὄσφρησιν, which is the subject of ἔχειν : with 
ἀνάλογον we find πρὸς ς. acc., as here and Po/. 1271 Ὁ 40, or the dative as in the 
next line 421 a 18, and 1272 b 37 sq. ὁμοίως, int. ἀνάλογον ἔχειν, the subject 
being ra εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν. Previously we have had διαφοραὶ for the distinctive 
species of the sensible object (e.g. 4208 26): cf. 423b27. This analogy between 
flavours and smells is further developed zxz/ra a 26 sqq. and is repeated in De 
Sensi 5, 442 Ὁ 27, 443 b 12—15, 443 b 19, 445 a 29—b 1, and it is upon this 
analogy that A.’s explanation of the process of smell is based. 

4.18. τοῖς τῆς ὀσμῆς, int. εἴδεσιν. ἀκριβεστέραν, l.e.as compared with smelling. 
See again De Sensu 4, 440 Ὁ 30 ἐναργέστερον δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τὸ τῶν χυμῶν γένος Fj 
τὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς. Thus smell is inferior not only to sight and hearing (421 a 7 sq.), 
but also to taste. 

alg. ταύτην δ᾽ ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν, i.e. touch. 

84. 2ο. ἀκριβεστάτην, i.e. “because touch is the most exact of man’s senses,” 
not “is more exact in man than in any other animal.” The latter fact is 


392 NOTES II. 9 


adduced in the next clause to prove the former. If man falls short of the 
brutes in the other senses and rises above them in touch, touch must be his 
most exact sense. Cf. De Part. Az. 11. τό, 660a 12 sq. 

A2I. πολλῶν τῶν ζῴων.. πολλῷ τῶν ἄλλων. The critical zofes amply justify 
this reading. Bekker made an unlucky choice when, finding πολλῶ..«πολλῷ in 
ἘΣ and other MSS., he changed the second zroAA@ instead of the first into πολλῶν. 

a2z. dkp Bot. For this intransitive use of ἀκριβοῦν cf. Poet. 1450 a 36 
πρότερον δύνανται τῇ λέξει.. ἀκριβοῦν ἢ τὰ πράγματα συνίστασθαι [ συνιστάναι, 
Thurot], De Gex. An. IV. 7, 778 8 4 βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῖς τούτων ἀριθμοῖς 
ἀριθμεῖν τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς τελευτάς, οὐκ ἀκρεβοῖ δὲ and V. I, 780 Ὁ 25 τοῦτο (int. 
τὸ ζῷον) περὶ μὲν τὰς διαφορὰς οὐκ ἀκριβώσει τῶν χρωμάτων. 

a23. παρὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο, i.e. Owing to the tactile organ, which A. 
identifies with cdpé in the next sentence, though in c. 11 we learn that the true 
organ of touch is internal, fesh and skin being merely a medium. 

a25. τὴν διάνοιαν, to be taken closely with ἀφνεῖς, “poorly endowed in 
intellect”: κατὰ might have been used to define this accusative, as we see from 
Pol. 1283 a 26 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὔτε πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν δεῖ τοὺς ἴσους ἕν τι μόνον ὄντας οὔτε 
ἄνισον τοὺς ἀνίσους καθ᾽ ἕν, Plato Rep. 409 E αἱ τῶν πολιτῶν σοι τοὺς μὲν εὐφυεῖς 
τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς θεραπεύσουσι, τοὺς δὲ μή, ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιοῦτοι, 
ἀποθνήσκειν ἐάσουσι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους αὐτοὶ dmokre- 
νοῦσιν. 

a 26 ἔστι δ᾽, ὥσπερ χυμὸς...27 καὶ ὀσμαί, “just as flavour is sometimes bitter, 
sometimes sweet, so with odours.” Plato had denied (777. 66 Ὁ) that odours 
could be classified: περὶ δὲ δὴ τὴν τῶν μυκτήρων δύναμιν, εἴδη μὲν οὐκ ἔνι, his 
reason being that all odours are subtler than water and coarser than air, while 
our veins in the nostrils are formed too narrow for earth and water and too 
wide for fire and air. A. must be controverting this statement in De Semsu 5, 
443 Ὁ 17 sq. As Professor Beare points out (p. 143), modern psychologists 
incline to Plato’s view, though not of course on the same grounds. Having 
begun the sentence with ἔστι δέ, A. might have been expected to end it with 
οὕτω καὶ ἡ ὀσμή. But the distribution of χυμὸς into 6 μὲν and ὁ δὲ so forcibly 
suggests plurality that, in spite of the initial singular, we have ὀσμαί, int. εἰσίν. 

8. 27. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν, Int. τῶν dodpavrav or τῶν σωμάτων. The plural verb 
ἔχουσι more Aristoteleo after τὰ μέν. This sentence ἀλλὰ...29 τοὐναντίον is 
virtually a parenthesis, as Miss Alford suggests. 

ἃ 31 μὴ σφόϑδρα...32 χυμούς, “because odours are not, like flavours, very 
clearly distinguished.” The accusative by assimilation, τοὺς χυμούς, is perfectly 
regular. Cf. Thuc. VI. 68, 2 ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸς avdpas...otx ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ 
καὶ ἡμᾶς. 

ει. 32. ἀπὸ τούτων, int. τῶν χυμῶν. The singular εἴληφε shows that the 
subject is 7 ὀσμή, collective. 

42IbiI. καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν πραγμάτων. “The things” which are “similar” 
are odours and flavours, e.g. the sweet flavour and sweet odour of honey or the 
bitter flavour and bitter odour of thyme. We recognise the resemblance in the 
act of perceiving them. Such sensible qualities are πράγματα in contradis- 
tinction to the terms used to describe them. The degree of community 
indicated by a common name may be relatively slight, as A. often reminds us: 
see the cautious remarks 414 Ὁ 20—33, Pol. 1275 a 33—b 5 in reference to such 
terms as “soul” and “citizen.” Simpl. 153, 27—154, I goes too far afield when 
he enquires into the physical grounds of the relation between flavour and odour, 
with which we are not here concerned. What he says, κατὰ τὰ πράγματά ἐστι 
συγγένεια τοῖς ὀσφραντοῖς πρὸς τὰ γευστὰ διὰ THY τοῦ ἐγχύμου ἀπόπλυσιν ἐν τῷ 


II. 9 421 a 20—b Io 393 


κοινῷ ἀέρος τε καὶ ὕδατος ὑγρῷ, is taken from De Semsu 5, 443b 3—16: cf. 
4458 13 5ᾳ. We have καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα λέγεται φωνεῖν 420 Ὁ 6 sq. 

b I ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλυκεῖα...2 τοιούτων. It is conceivable that “the sweet odour,” 
ἡ γλυκεῖα (int. ὀσμή), is the subject, the predicate being “comes from saffron and 
honey.” But it is more probable that A. is here only adducing examples. In 
that case 7 μὲν is the subject, “the one odour,” and γλυκεῖα the predicate, ‘‘is 
sweet,” saffron and honey being adduced without any comparative οἷον and 
without the article, so that οἷον ἡ [ἀπὸ τοῦ] κρόκου καὶ μ. would have been the 
fuller version. This is the way in which Argyropylus appears to have inter- 
preted the words: “alius enim est dulcis, ut croci mellisque, alius acer, ut 
thymi ac huiusmodi rerum.” Or we might say that οὖσα must be understood 
with the words in apposition, κρύκου καὶ μέλιτος. But why, we ask, ἀπὸ τοῦ 
κρόκου parallel to the simple genitive 6vpou? Such deliberate variation is more 
in the manner of Tacitus than of A., and accordingly I follow Torstrik in 
bracketing ἀπὸ τοῦ. Torstrik’s note is as follows: Legebatur ἡ μὲν yap γλυκεῖα 
ἀπὸ τοῦ κρόκου καὶ τοῦ μέλιτος, intell. εἴληφε τὸ ὄνομα. Sed verum non est 
odorem dulcem a croco esse appellatum: nam dulcem dicimus, non croceum 
odorem. Qui ἀπὸ τοῦ addidit, debebat certe eadem addere ante θύμου, Ὁ 2: id 
quod in iis libris factum videmus e quibus Basileensis et Aldina derivatae sunt 
editiones. Verba quae huic interpolationi ansam dederunt, leguntur Ὁ 1 καθ᾽ 
ὁμοιότητα τῶν πραγμάτων, quae πράγματα bonus vir putavit esse τὸν κρόκον et τὸ 
μέλε et τὸν θύμον. Imo quas res A. dicit esse similes, sunt ἡ ὀσμὴ ἡ γλυκεῖα et 
ὃ χυμὸς ὁ γλυκύς, item ἡ ὀσμὴ ἡ δριμεῖα et 6 χυμὸς ὁ Spits. Inter haec sapores 
praediti sunt nominibus, odores per se carent: sed quum odor quisque Saporis 
cuiusque similis sit, etiam nomen traxit ab eo. Cf. De Sensu et Sens. 4, 440 Ὁ 30 


(Ρ- 157). 
Ὁ 3. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον, int. ἔχει. 
b5. ἡ δὲ, 1.6. ὄψις. καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις, “so smell,” τοῦ ὀσφαντοῦ καὶ ἀνοσφράν- 


του, int.goret. Here καὶ, “so,” answers to ὥσπερ 421 Ὁ 4. See 417b 18, ποΐξε. 

Ὁ 6. ἀνόσφραντον δὲ, int. ἐστί: cf. 418 b 28 ἄχρουν δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τὸ 
ἀόρατον ἢ τὸ μόλις ὁρώμενον, οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ σκοτεινόν. 

Ὁ 7. παρά, “on account of,” dropter; cf. 4218. 23. 

Ὁ 8. καὶ τὸ φαύλην, int. ἔχον. Cf. 4218 10 φαύλως ὀσμᾶται, 422 8. 28 ἐὰν μὴ 
ἔχῃ ἢ φαύλως, which point to the meaning “ defective,” “inadequate,” both here 
of feeble scent and 422 a 30 of insipid flavour, and therefore almost certainly 
also 422 a 32 yevous...davrAn καὶ φθαρτικὴ τῆς γεύσεως. If so, there can be little 
difference here between μικρὰν and φαύλην. 

Ὅ 9. διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, οἷον ἀέρος. Cf. 419 a 25—b 3, especially the words (a 32) 
κοινὸν yap δῇ τι πάθος ἐπ᾽ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατός ἔστιν. In the case of smell this 
medium is termed δίοσμον ; see mote on 4198. 32. οἷον here means “namely,” 
or “that is,” as in 415 a 22 (see zoze). A good instance of this meaning is 
De Sensu 5, 445a 7,8: cf. Ath. Nic. l102a 27, 1144 ἃ 19, 11544 9. 

bio. καὶ yap τὰ ἔνυδρα. The mention of water as the medium leads up 
to the enquiry: how can aquatic and bloodless animals smell, if they do not 
breathe the air? τὰ ἔνυδρα...καὶ ἔναιμα καὶ ἄναιμα. Exactly parallel to 
421 Ὁ 22 τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ καὶ δυσώδους καὶ εὐώδους and 426b 2 ἡ ἰσχυρὰ ὀσμὴ καὶ 
γλυκεῖα καὶ πικρά, which Torstrik cites. The supenority of cod. E here is 
evident. In the absence of punctuation a pause after αἰσθάνεσθαι would be 
likely to introduce δὲ after ὁμοίως, and this had been done by the time of 
Philop., who comments quite in the style of a modern editor: “ ὁμοίως δὲ.. «ἄναιμα 
is parenthetical; if δὲ be omitted the syntax becomes clear”: (392, 35) τοῦτσ 
μεταξυλογία ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῆς συντάξεως τοῦ ῥητοῦ οὕτως. Kal γὰρ 


304 NOTES Il. 9 


ra ἕνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι. εἶτα τὸ ἕξῆς 
κατασκευαστικὸν τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι τὰ ἔνυδρα, <Kal> γὰρ τούτων ἔνια πόρρωθεν 
ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφήν- τούτων δηλονότι τῶν ἐνύδρων. τὸ δὲ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ 
ἔναιμα καὶ τὰ ἄναιμα ἐπί τε τῶν ἐνύδρων καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι: ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γάρ ἐστιν 
αὕτη ἡ διαφορά: ὀσφραίνονται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄναιμα, οἷον τὰ ἔντομα. ἐὰν δὲ περιττεύῃ ὁ δέ 
τοῦ ὁμοίως δέ, καθαρὰ γίνεται ἡ σύνταξις. On the sense of smell in non-breathing 
animals, cf. De Sensi 5, 4438. 2 sqq., 444 Ὁ 7 sqq. Indeed, the sequence of 
topics in the latter passage as far as 445 a1 very closely resembles that in the 
present chapter 421 Ὁ 9—422a 3. See moze on 421 Ὁ 13 zzfra., 

bI2. τούτων. Doubtless water-animals, as understood by Philop. (see last 
note) and Simpl. 154, 9 πρὸς ro δέλεαρ σπεύδοντες. There is no point in saying 
here that animals which live in the air follow their prey by scent: the new idea 
is that this is done by aquatic, 1.6. non-breathing animals. Cf. De Sensu 5, 
444 Ὁ 8 καὶ yap ἰχθύες καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐντόμων γένος πᾶν ἀκριβῶς καὶ πόρρωθεν 
αἰσθάνεται, διὰ τὸ θρεπτικὸν εἶδος τῆς ὀσμῆς, ἀπέχοντα πολὺ τῆς οἰκείας τροφῆς... 


(Ὁ 13) καὶ τῶν θαλαττίων ai πορφύραι. ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς. Cf. Pol. 1258 ἃ 13 πρὸς 
τὸ τέλος ἅπαντα δέον ἀπαντᾶν. ὕποσμα. This word, used here only, is framed 


on the analogy of ὑπήκοος (cf. also ὑπαίθριος, ὕπομβρος, ὑπόσκιος) and means 
“guided by scent,” “odori quasi obnoxia,” as Trendelenburg has it. 

Ὁ 13. ἄπορον φαίνεται, εἰ. The εἰ clause is used as after θαυμαστόν: and the 
ὥστε clause (Ὁ το sqq.) gives the inference suggested as following from the 
discrepancy, καὶ τὸ μὲν... πειρωμένοις (Ὁ 17—19) being a parenthesis. ‘It is felt 
as inexplicable (or ‘ puzzling’) that while all animals alike have perception by 
smell, man perceives smell (only) when inhaling breath, and when not inhaling 
but breathing out or holding the breath has no perception of a smell either 
far or near, not even if the thing with odour is placed at the nostril or within 
it,...so that bloodless animals, since they do not inhale breath, would seem to 
have some different sense not included in the regular list of five.” We shall 
be driven to assume that they have a sixth sense. 

If this is right, the force of ὁμοίως may be no stronger than in Ὁ Io, 
emphasising rather the fact that all have smell, than that all smell in the 
same manner. The true solution, according to A., is that, though all alike 
smell, all do not smell in the same way (b 25 sqq.), but the possibility of 
different processes is here for the moment ignored, the inference being sug- 
gested (in order to be rejected) that the ἄναιμα do not smell at all. 

The same point is raised in De Sensz 5, 444b 15 ὅτῳ δὲ αἰσθάνεται (int. τὰ μὴ 
ἀναπνέοντα τῶν ζῴων) οὐχ ὁμοίως φανερόν...445 τ 4. This passage 15 almost a 
duplicate of 421 Ὁ 13---422 8 3 of this chapter and forms such an excellent com- 
mentary that I append a translation of part of it. It will be noticed that, as to 
the precise process by which non-breathing animals smell, A. is not more 
explicit in the one passage than in the other. “By what means they thus 
perceive is not so clear. The point therefore might here be raised, with what 
organ they perceive odour, if we assume that smelling takes place in the act of 
inhaling breath, and in this way only (μοναχῶς) ; for it is a fact that all breathing 
animals do thus smell, whereas no one of the animals we are now considering 
breathes, and nevertheless they perceive odours. With what organ, then, can 
they perceive, if there is not some other sixth sense? But this is impossible, for 
smell is the sense for odours, and these they perceive, but not perhaps in the 
same way as breathing animals. The explanation is rather this, that in 
breathing animals the breath lifts up what covers over the sense-organ, as a 
sort of lid (and hence if they do not breathe, they do not smell), whereas in 
non-breathing animals there is no such lid to be lifted. It is the same here as 


1.0 421 Ὁ 1ο--- 19 205 


with the eyes; some animals have lids which they must open in order to see, 
while hard-eyed creatures have none, and so have no need to open them, but 
see, with what ability they have of seeing, directly. Likewise also none of the 
other animals is in the least disturbed by the smell of things essentially bad- 
smelling unless it happens to be something noxious. But they are killed by the 
odours which are noxious, just as men are stupefied and often killed by the 
fumes of charcoal,” 

Ὁ 14. 68 ἄνθρωπος ἀναπνέων, int. doparat. 

Ὁ 16. οὐδ᾽ ἂν...τεθῇ, int. τὸ ὀσῴραντόν. The parallel experiment establishing 
the existence of a medium for sight is mentioned 419 a 12: cf. for hearing and 
smell 419 a 28 sq. and for the contrast presented by touch and taste 423 Ὁ 17—26. 

Ὁ 18. κοινὸν πάντων. Whether we understand by πάντων all animals or all 
sensible objects depends upon whether we adhere to ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων in a 19 
or change to ἐπὶ τῶν ἀὀσῴφραντῶν. 1 think the alteration, though plausible, 
unnecessary and am content to understand here κοινὸν πάντων τῶν ζῴων. 
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν. On this question, in what sense animals can be 
understood to smell without inhaling, we have, as mentioned above, a parallel 
and fuller disquisition in De Sevsz 5, 444 Ὁ 15 566. 

big. ἴδιον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Taken literally, this is not true. Other air- 
breathing animals also smell while inhaling breath. To meet this difficulty 
Hayduck proposes to substitute ἐπὶ τῶν ὀσφραντῶν for ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. The 
meaning would then be: “It is indeed universally true of all objects of sense 
that the object is not perceived when it is put directly on the organ, but the fact 
that we do not perceive without inhaling breath is a peculiarity of objects of 
smell.” Another way is to water ἴδιον down to μέλιστα ἴδιον. Philop. (393, 9), 
always honest, says “man is adduced as a specimen of air-breathing animals,” 
οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντα τὰ ἔχοντα πνεύμονα (τὸν yap ἄνθρωπον ἔλαβε παράδειγμα 
ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἀναπνεόντων). If this were the only place in the chapter where 
A., meaning “animals which breathe the air,” says “‘men,” it would be worth 
while to emend. But we have already had such a case, b 14, and we have only 
to read as far as b 24 ὑφ᾽ ὦνπερ ἄνθρωπος and Ὁ 26 ἔοικε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κτέ. 
to find man again adduced as a type: although in 422 a1 sq. by mentioning 
respiration of “animals which receive the air” A. certainly corrects the 
impression which Ὁ 26 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις suggests, if literally interpreted, viz. that 
the olfactory organ in man is different from that of all other animals. Alex. 
Aphr. in his commentary on De Sensu (99, 16 sqq. W) supposed that in 
5, 4448 3, 8 A. had shown a similar carelessness because, while there de- 
scribing the aesthetic sensation of fragrance as peculiar to man, he goes on 
to speak, a 19—21, of some sense of smell conditioned by respiration as being 
shared by man with other sanguineous air-breathing animals. It is possible 
to interpret 4448 19---2ὶ as applying to the sensation of odour in general and 
not of the aesthetic fragrance last mentioned. (See Mr G. R. T. Ross ad loc.) 
But the context favours Alexander’s interpretation, and in any case A. cannot 
be acquitted of negligence in not indicating the transition to odour in general. 

big. ὥστε ta ἄναιμα. Bloodless animals do not inhale breath. If, there- 
fore, such inhalation is necessary to smelling (as it certainly is in the case of 
man and air-breathing animals generally), bloodless animals cannot smell. But 
such a sweeping conclusion is contrary to the facts, as above stated (Ὁ τὸ sqq.). 
What alternatives are possible? We may say they perceive odour, not by the 
sense of smell, but by a sixth sense. This hypothesis, introduced by ὥστε; 
proves to be untenable. To perceive odour zs to smell: cf. 424 Ὁ 5 sq. If this 
way of escape be cut off, the only explanation consonant with the facts is that 


396 NOTES Il. 9 


given Ὁ 25 sq. zzfra (cf. De Sensu 5, 444 Ὁ 20 sq.): bloodless animals smell, but 
without inhaling breath. 

Ὁ 20 av...21 ἔχοι. The potential optative states the inference: “would 
have”=“must have on that supposition.” Cf. 4128 17, 424a 26 and xoze on 
403a9. The implied condition is best seen from Plato Afo/. 28 B, C φαῦλοι yap 
dy τῷ ye σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν. 

Ὁ 21. ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον. More clearly in 424 Ὁ 5 referred to above: εἰ δὲ τὸ 
ὀσφραντὸν ὀσμή, εἴ τι ποιεῖ, τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ moet: ὥστε τῶν ἀδυνάτων 
ὀσφρανθῆναι οὐθὲν οἷόν τε πάσχειν ὑπ᾽ ὀδμῆς, and 424b16. Cf. also 425 Ὁ 17 εἰ 
γὰρ τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν ὁρᾶν. 

b 23. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται, int. τὰ ἄναιμα. A second argument to 
prove that bloodless animals do smell without inhaling breath. A. seems to 
have hesitated as to whether it is the smell that destroys in such cases. The 
argument here implies that it is; in 435 Ὁ 9 sqq. it is the organ of smell, and 
not the animal itself that is destroyed. Cf. 424 a 29, Ὁ Io 5q., where see zzo0/Zes, 
and De Sensu 5, 444 Ὁ 28 sqq. (see wore on 421 Ὁ 13) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ζῴων ὁτιοῦν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνει τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δυσωδῶν τὴν ὀσμήν, ἂν μή τι τύχῃ 
φθαρτικὸν ὄν. ὑπὸ τούτων δ᾽ ὁμοίως φθείρεται καθάπερ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν 
ἀνθράκων ἀτμίδος καρηβαροῦσι καὶ φθείρονται πολλάκις - οὕτως ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ θείου 
δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν ἀσφαλτωδῶν φθείρεται τἄλλα ζῷα, καὶ φεύγει διὰ τὸ πάθος. 

Ὁ 25. ὀσφραίνεσθαι μὲν οὖν, int. τὰ ἄναιμα. 

Ὁ 27. τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο, “the olfactory organ.” A. goes on to show that 
the part played by the nostril is analogous to that of the eyelid. Hard-eyed 
animals are destitute of eyelids and perceive, however imperfectly, without the 
previous action of removing an obstruction, εὐθέως δρᾷ (421 Ὁ 31). Similarly 
the animals with which man is contrasted have no nostril to dilate and do not 
inhale air in order to smell. τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων. This is not true of all other 
animals. Them. (69, 29 H., 127, 23 Sp.) vaguely gives τὰ ἔντομα (insecta), for 
“the other animals” as opposed to τὰ ἔναιμα, sanguineous animals: ἔοικεν οὖν 
τοῖς ἐναίμοις διαφέρειν τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο τῶν ἐντόμων. Thus it seems that he 
found it necessary to render more precise the antithesis between “man” and 
“the other animals,” which I prefer to treat as one more instance of A.’s 
carelessness in matters of detail. Philop., when he comes to explain 421 b 26, 
Opposes τὰ ἀναπνέοντα to τὰ μὴ ἀναπνέοντα (395, 8, 10). 

Ὁ 28. τὰ μὲν γὰρ, int. ὄμματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων. With the neuter article ra it 
would be equally easy to understand τῶν ζῴων, the group of animals, including 
man, which is contrasted with τὰ σκληρόφθαλμα. But, on the whole, the former 
view seems the more natural, and, if this is chosen, no change of gender is 
involved in κινήσας or ἀνασπάσας, but only the quite usual change of number. 

Ὁ 29. φράγμα, “a fence or protection.” In De Part. An. τι. 13, 657 a 25 it 
is called φυλακή : καὶ of μὲν ἄνθρωποι καὶ οἱ ὄρνιθες καὶ τὰ ζῳοτόκα καὶ τὰ φοτόκα 
τῶν τετραπόδων φυλακὴν ἔχουσι τῆς ὄψεως. ἔλυτρον. The phrase in the 
De Sensu 5, 444 Ὁ 22 is ὥσπερ πῶμά tt, “lid” or “cover.” ἃ. The relative 
is the object of the two participles κενήσας and ἀνασπάσας, the verb ὁρᾷ being 
used absolutely. 

Ὁ 30. ἀνασπάσας οὐχ ὁρᾷ, int. ὁ ἄνθρωπος or ὁ ὁρῶν or simply res. See nore 
on 403 a 22. 

Ὁ 31. GAN εὐθέως ὁρᾷ τὰ γινόμενα, see without any such delay: they have not 
to wait to lift the eyelid before seeing. Cf. De Sensu 5, 444 Ὁ 27 ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾷ ἐκ τοῦ 
δυνατοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ [leg. αὐτοῖς] εὐθύς. ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ, in air or water, animals 
being supposed to live in the one element or in the other: cf. 435 Ὁ 21 ἐπεὶ ἐν 
ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, ὅπως ὁρᾷ, ὅλως δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἐν διαφαν εἴ, 423 ἃ 29—b I, 4228 11. 


1.0 421 Ὁ 19---4228 7 397 


4223 I ἀκάλυφες εἶναι...2 ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα. These infinitives depend on ἔοικε 
continued or understood from above (b 26). 

a2. ὃ ἀναπνεόντων ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι. The same uncertainty arises in regard 
to rots pev...rois δὲ here as was noticed above in mofe on 421 Ὁ 28. Them. 
completes τοῖς μὲν ἐντόμοις... τοῖς δὲ ἀναπνέουσιν. Philop. understands as τὰ μὴ 
ἀναπνέοντα ζῷα opposed to τὰ ἀναπνέοντα, which, as before, he supposes man to 
represent: (395, 8) οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως τὰ μὲν ἀναπνέοντα τῶν (dav 
ἐοίκασι προκάλυμμά τι καὶ ἔλυτρον τοῦ ὀσφραντικοῦ μορίου ἔχειν ἀσθενεστέρου κατὰ 
τὸ εἰκὸς τυγχάνοντος, τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἀναπνέουσιν ἀκάλυφές τε εἶναι τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο. 

8.4. ἐν τῷ typo. Here and in the next line these words must mean “in the 
water,” ot “in what is liquid” in general, which would include air. Man and 
air-breathing animals can smell in the air, but not in the water. 

αὖ. ἔστι δ᾽... τοῦ ὑγροῦ. The partitive genitives ξηροῦ and ὑγροῦ are used 
predicatively. See “ϑέθ ΟἹ 402 4 1. Odour ranks with, belongs to, or consists 
of the solid and dry, flavour of the liquid and moist. The quality denoted 
by ξηρὸν requires some limitation: elsewhere it is called specifically τὸ ἔγχυμον 
ξηρόν. Simpl. (154, 30) ἐν yap τῷ διόσμῳ ἐναποπλυνόμενον τὸ ἔγχυμον ξηρὸν τὸ 
ὀσφραντὸν ἐργάζεται, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἹΤερὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν ἐρεῖ: τὸ δὲ γευστὸν 
κἂν ξηρὸν ἧ, οὐ γίνεται αἰσθητὸν τῇ γεύσει κατὰ τὸν χυμὸν μὴ ὕγρανθέν. Cf. 
Soph. 93, 11—3I, who remarks that τὸ ξηρὸν is not to be understood as wholly 
destitute of moisture nor τὸ ὑγρὸν as wholly destitute of dryness: odour is 
preponderantly solid and dry, flavour preponderantly the reverse. It must be 
remembered that air as well as water is ὑγρόν. The summary statement in the 
text receives much-needed elucidation from the explanation afforded by De 
Sensu,c.5. A. there says that odours correspond to flavours and their operation 
on sense must be similarly explained: (442 Ὁ 27) τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον Set νοῆσαι 
καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀσμάς - ὅπερ yap ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ ξηρόν, τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει 
τὸ ἔγχυμον ὑγρόν, ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι ὁμοίως, (443 ἃ 6) εἰ οὖν τις θείη καὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ 
τὸ ὕδωρ ἄμφω ὑγρά, εἴη ἂν ἡ ἐν ὑγρῷ τοῦ ἐγχύμου ξηροῦ φύσις ὀσμή, καὶ ὀσφραντὸν 
τὸ τοιοῦτον, (443 Ὁ 3) ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται ἀπολαύειν τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ 
πνεύματι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ πάσχειν τι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐγχύμου ξηρότητος, οὐκ ἄδηλον - 
καὶ γὰρ 6 ἀὴρ ὑγρὸν τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν. ἔτι δ᾽ εἴπερ ὁμοίως ἐν τοῖς ὑγροῖς «πτοιεῖ καὶ ἐν 
τῷ ἀέρι οἷον ἀποπλυνόμενον τὸ ξηρόν, φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ ἀνάλογον εἶναι τὰς ὀσμὰς τοῖς 
χυμοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων συμβέβηκεν" καὶ yap δριμεῖαι καὶ γλυκεῖαί 
εἶσιν ὀσμαὶ καὶ αὐστηραὶ καὶ στρυφναὶ καὶ λιπαραΐ, καὶ τοῖς πικροῖς τὰς σαπρὰς ἄν 
τις ἀνάλογον εἴποι. διὸ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα δυσκατάποτα, τὰ σαπρὰ δυσανάπνευστά ἐστιν. 
δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ὁ χυμός, τοῦτ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι ἡ ὀσμή. The 
medium or vehicle, whether air or water, is ὑγρόν, liquid, not solid. Flavour, or 
the dry substance possessing flavour, τὸ ἔγχυμον ξηρόν, when further subjected 
to the influence of moisture in air or water by the process of ἀπόπλυσις, yields 
odour. For it is clear, says A., that air and water can derive something from, 
and be affected by, the dry substance possessed of flavour, which has been 
washed and, as it were, dissolved in them. Odour is perceived when the dry 
thing possessed of flavour affects the animal by the medium of air or water 
(both conceived as “moist or liquid”) without itself being moist. Flavour is 
perceived when the thing possessed of flavour, being itself moist or moistened, 
is touched by the tongue. 

a7. δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, i.e. ξηρόν, in accordance with the principle that the 
sense is potentially what the sensible object is actually: cf. 418 a 3 sqq. 


398 NOTES 11. 10 


CHAPTER X. 


422.a 8. 39. The object of taste is a species of tangible, taste being 
a variety of touch. Hence the object of taste, as of touch, is not perceived 
through any foreign medium. Flavour, the object of taste, is conveyed in the 
liquid as its vehicle, and liquid is something tangible [§ 1]. If we lived in 
water, the water which is the vehicle of flavour would still not be a medium to 
tell us of sweetness in it: herein lies a marked contrast to our perception of 
colour. In taste there is nothing corresponding to the medium of sight. But 
the substance in which it resides must be dissolved before flavour can act upon 
the sense [8 2]. On the analogy of the other senses, objects of taste must be 
understood to include that which can hardly be tasted at all and that which has 
a bad, 1.6. pernicious or destructive flavour [§ 3]. 

42249. διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματος, that is, a medium consisting 
of a body foreign to the percipient. The common characteristic of touch and 
taste is that they have no extrinsic medium. But from c. 11 we learn that 
“flesh” is the medium, though not an external medium, of touch and taste. 
For the relation of taste to touch and of flavour to tangible cf. 421 a 18 sq., 
414 Ὁ II. 

a IO. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἁφή, int. διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματός ἐστιν or 
γίνεται. 

a Io. καὶ τὸ σῶμα δὲ ἐν ᾧ ὁ χυμός, τὸ γευστόν, ἐν ὑγρῷ ds tAy. A. here 
enunciates his own view of τὸ γευστόν (somewhat inaccurately, as we shall 
presently see). From De Sevsu, c. 4 we learn that this is one of three alterna- 
tive views there under examination. The other two are (1) that of Empedocles 
that water contains in itself the various flavours, imperceptible by reason of 
their minuteness, and (2) that there is in water a matter which is a sort of 
universal reservoir of flavour germs. These two theories, there refuted (441 a 3— 
a 20), are here left unnoticed. 

The inaccuracy above mentioned lies in ἐν ὑγρῷ ds ὕλῃ. It is quite clear 
both from the rest of this chapter and from the parallel discussion in De 
Sensz, c. 4 that it is flavour, the proper object of taste, which is 222 liquid, as 
matter, i.e. which has liquid for its matter. In the De Sensu 441b 19 flavour 
(χυμὸς) is defined as τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰρημένου ξηροῦ πάθος ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τῆς 
γεύσεως τῆς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀλλοιωτικὸν εἰς ἐνέργειαν, “the quality arising in that 
which is moist through the action of the aforesaid dry, such quality having the 
capacity of converting potential taste into actual.” Flavour is thus clearly a 
quality or property in the liquid (ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ), constituting it “of a certain 
quality” (ποιόν ri), namely “flavoured.” So Them. says ποιότης yap ὑγροῦ ὁ 
χυμὸς (70, 33 H., 129, 21 Sp.) and Alex. Aphr. De An. 54, 5 ὑγρὸν δὲ ὁ χυμός, ὅτε 
ὕλη τῇ ποιότητι ταύτῃ τὸ ὑγρὸν ὕδωρ γίνεται. οὐδὲν yap γευστὸν ἄνευ ὑγρότητος. τὸ 
γὰρ ὕδωρ ἄχυμον ὃν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ κτέ. In the text of our present passage, however, 
it is not as it should be, the flavour, but the body possessing the flavour which 
is said to be “in liquid” as its matter (i.e. to have liquid for its matter). This is 
an inaccuracy of phrase. Philop. in his interpretation has given what A. ought 
to have said and probably meant to say: (398, 33) τὸ yap σῶμα ἐν ᾧ ὧς ἐν ὕλῃ τὸ 
εἶναι ἔχει 6 χυμός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶ γευστόν, ὑγρόν ἐστιν : “for the body in which, as in 
its matter, favour, which is the proper object of taste, has its being, is moist.” 
No doubt solid bodies have flavour, but they are not gustable without a liquid 


If, 10 4228. Q-—a 13 399 


vehicle, in the last resort, the saliva. If the gustable is a liquid, then its 
particles mix with and flavour water, which, in itself, is flavourless. Flavoured 
bodies, if solid, are dissolved in, if liquid, are mixed in, the flavourless liquid, 
water. Sometimes colour, sound etc. are said to be αἰσθητά, sometimes the 
bodies possessing these qualities. Our text presents the case for taste in 
analogy with the latter mode of statement. Cf. 424 a 22 ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου ὑπὸ 
τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει: cf. zofe on 419b6. This would 
suggest that with the words τὸ σῶμα τὸ γευστὸν in our present text should be 
understood the qualification 7 γευστόν. In Metaph. 1016 a 22 after of χυμοὶ 
πάντες λέγονται ἕν, A. proceeds οἷον ἔλαιον οἶνος καὶ τὰ τηκτά, thus giving the 
bodies as instances of the flavours. This is a complete departure from the 
position taken up in 11., c. 6. 

azo. xai...88=“and again.” The medium through which our perception 
takes place is a part of our body: and again, the moisture, which is the vehicle 
and, in a sense, the medium of flavour, is not such in the sense in which water 
or air is the medium of odour. The difference is plain if we imagine how 
things would be were water the element in which we lived. Then we should 
perceive both odour and flavour by means of water, but not in the same way: 
the latter would be perceived by the mixing of the body which has flavour with 
the water. Water would then be a true medium for odour, but only a vehicle 
for flavour. Cf. De Sensu 6, 447 ἃ. 6 ἦν δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τὸ γεύεσθαι ὥσπερ ἡ ὀσμή, εἰ ἐν 
ὑγρῷ ἦμεν καὶ πορρωτέρω πρὶν θιγεῖν αὐτοῦ ἡσθανόμεθα. ἐν ᾧ,...ττ ἐν ὑγρῷ: The 
preposition is differently used in these two cases. Flavour is an attribute of the 
thing tasted and, as such, resides in, or is predicable of, its subject. This might 
have been expressed thus: κατὰ τοῦ γευστοῦ σώματος ὁ χυμὸς κατηγορεῖται. But 
(according to A.) what is tasted is always something liquid or liquefied. Thus 
flavour is the form, liquid the matter, the two being inseparably united. Cf. 
414 a 25—27. 

all. ὡς ὕλῃ. Before a word in apposition and governed by a preposition 
Greek writers usually omit both the preposition (as here) and the article where 
there is one. Cf. PAys. IV. 12, 2218 17 τὰ δὲ πράγματα ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ τῷ χρόνῳ 
ἐστίν, 1.6. ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ, Metaph. 986 Ὁ 15 γεννῶσιν ὡς ἐξ ὕλης τοῦ ἕνός, 
1037 b 3 τῷ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς ὕλῃ. A. does not invariably 
observe the rule. See MeZaph. 1035 Ὁ 21 διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ὡς εἰς ὕλην, com- 
pared with 1035 Ὁ 12 εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὡς ὕλην : also Metaph. 1073 ἃ 19 Sq. περὶ τῶν 
ἀριθμῶν...ὡς περὶ ἀπείρων. Somewhat similar is the suppression of os before 
τέτταρσιν in Metaph. 985 a 33 οὐ μὴν χρῆταί ye τέτταρσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς δυσὶν οὖσι 
μόνοις. τοῦτο §’, int. τὸ ὑγρόν. It is true that τὸ σῶμα ἐν ᾧ ὁ χυμὸς is also 
ἅπτόν, but it may be dissolved in the liquid. Cf. 4238 24 τὸ δ᾽ ὑγρὸν οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἄνευ σώματος. 

ΔΊΙΣ διὸ κἂν εἰ...12 τοῦ γλυκέος. The original reading of E is open to some 
doubt. It now presents eipev...aicGavoiped’, but εἶμεν is over an erasure, so that 
probably ἦμεν was first written. Of the combination, an unreal condition in 
the indicative (εἰ... ἦμεν) followed by a potential optative (aic@avoiped’), Goodwin 
(ΖΩ͂. and T., p. 190, ὃ 504b) says that it seldom occurs and is not a strictly 
logical combination: cf. Dem. De Cor. XVII. ὃ 206 εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπεχείρουν λέγειν, οὐκ 
ἔσθ᾽ ὅστις οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἐπιτιμήσειξ με. The ἂν contained in κἂν anticipates 
the ἂν of the apodosis, but κἂν εἰ often go together in A. (possibly to avoid 
hiatus) when no apodosis follows with which ἂν can be construed, e.g. 432 a 21: 
see Eucken, De Particularum uss, Ὁ. ΟἹ. 

8 13. τῷ payOrva. Cf. De Sensu 4, 441a35qq. Water in itself is flavour- 
less (ἡ rod ὕδατος φύσις βούλεται ἄχυμος εἶναι). What flavours it acquires are 


400 NOTES II. 10 


therefore due to admixture with it of flavoured particles and the influence 
of heat. 

4. 14. καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποτοῦ, “as in the case of what we drink,” without the 
aid of an external medium. We have direct and immediate perception of the 
flavour of a beverage. 

4. 14. τὸ δὲ xpopa. A note is here added to contrast with this direct 
perception of flavour the case of sight, where the object, colour, is farthest 
removed from the percipient and the necessity of a medium is most undeniable. 
Cf. 418 b 15, where it is denied that light is an emanation, dzoppon. Them., in 
his paraphrase, remarks that, though we taste the beverages in a liquid vehicle, 
the liquid is not the medium, and though it has received the flavour of the 
beverage, it has not received it in the same way as the transparent medium 
receives colours: (70, 29 H., 129, 15 Sp.) αὐτοῦ (int. rod ὑγροῦ) δεξαμένου τὸν 
xupov, δεξαμένου δὲ οὐχ ὡς τὸ διαφανὲς τὰ χρώματα. He then proceeds: the 
colours are not seen because they are mixed with the air or because there is any 
emanation from them which is mingled with the transparent medium (70, 30 H., 
129, 17 Sp.) οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὄρᾶται τὰ χρώματα τῷ ἀναμίγνυσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα ἢ 
ἀπορρεῖν τὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀνακίρνασθαι πρὸς τὸ διαφανές, flavour being in fact a 
determining quality of liquid, ποιότης γὰρ ὑγροῦ ὁ χυμός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡ typdv. Το. 
the same effect Philop. 400, 12 οὐχ οὕτως δὲ τὰ χρώματα ὁρῶμεν δι’ ἀέρος ἣ Ov 
ὕδατος - οὐ γὰρ ἐμμίγνυνται τὰ χρώματα τῷ διαφανεῖ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὕλη αὐτῶν γίνεται τὸ; 
διαφανές, ὡς τῶν χυμῶν τὸ ὑγρόν, οὐδὲ κεχρωσμένον τὸ διαφανὲς τῇ ὄψει ὑποπίπτει, 
ἄλλὰ δι᾿ αὐτοῦ τὰ χρώματα ὁρᾶται. 

8. 15. τῷ μείγνυσθαι. That is to say by being mixed with the air (Them.). 
ὡς μὲν οὖν, 1.6. ὥς τὸ μεταξὺ ἐπὶ τῆς ὄψεως, οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῆς γεύσεως. The 
parallel with sight (says A.) must be left incomplete: in the case of taste 
there is no medium, i.e. no external medium, as there was in the case of 
sight. 

8. 17. ov0ty...dvev ὑγρότητος. No gustable object produces an actual sensa- 
tion without moisture. As to ποιεῖ αἴσθησιν see note on 419 a 26. It is in 
virtue of moisture, ὑγρότης, that A. can say Metaph. 1016a 22 of χυμοὶ πάντες 
λέγονται ἕν, οἷον ἔλαιον οἶνος καὶ τὰ τηκτά, ὅτι πάντων τὸ ἔσχατον ὑποκείμενον τὸ 
αὐτό- ὕδωρ γὰρ ἢ ἀὴρ πάντα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν. 

aig. εὔτηκτόν τε yap...yAérrys. Cf Them. 70, 37 H., 129, 27, Sp. of yap 
ἅλες δυνάμει typoi- dua yap τῷ πελάσαι τῇ γλώττῃ συντήκονται Kai ἐξυγραίνουσι. 
τὴν γλῶτταν. See ποζέ on 422 8. 6. 

a20. τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ dopdrov. Cf. 418b 28 sqq., 4210 3 sqq. The 
treatment of this topic here is much fuller than elsewhere. 

a 22. λίαν λαμπροῦ. This recalls Milton’s phrases “dark with excessive 
bright” and “brightness had made invisible” and Gray’s imitation “blasted 
with excess of light.” It is anticipated by Plato, Red. 516 A, where those who 
have escaped from the cave are dazzled by too much light as well as blinded by 
the darkness of the cave when they return to it. τοῦ σκότους, genitive of 
comparison =7 τὸ σκότος [ἀόρατόν éorw]. Cf. th. Nec. 1131 Ὁ 27. 

a25. ὥσπερ yap. Either there is too little which is characteristic of the 
object, or too much. If there is too much, the organ is incapable of acting ; 
see 424 a 29 αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια : excellens sensibile corrumpit 
sensum. Both the defect and the excess in the object produce insensibility in 
the sense. 

a 26 déparov...28 ἔχῃ Here λέγεται seems misplaced. The more natural 
order, to judge from the many parallels in Metaph. A, is ἀόρατον λέγεται τὸ μὲν 
ὅλως, ...τὸ δ᾽ ἐὰν κτέ. See last zoze on 4128 8. 


II. 10 422 a 13—a 33 401 


8 27. τὸ ἀδύνατον. If to any verbal in -ros the negative a- be prefixed the 
result will be an adjective implying impossibility. Here τὸ ἀδύνατον is a general 
term for ἀόρατον, ἀνήκουστον, ἄγευστον, ἄπρακτον xré., what cannot be seen, 
heard, tasted, done etc., as the case may be: in short, with reference to sensibles, 
ἀδύνατον ποιεῖν αἴσθησιν. 

δι 28. ἐὰν πεφυκὸς μὴ ἔχῃ, Le. ἐὰν πεφυκὸς ἔχειν (ὁτιδήποτε οἷον πόδας ἢ 
πυρῆνα...) μὴ ἔχῃ. The subject is quite general and therefore the participle is 
neuter singular. Thus τὸ drovy=rotro ὃ πόδας ἔχειν πεφυκὸς μὴ ἔχῃ πόδας, and 
τὸ τυφλόν Ξετοῦτο ὃ ὁρᾶν πεφυκὸς ὄψιν μὴ ἔχη. Compare the account of στέρησις 
in Metaph. 1022 Ὁ 22 στέρησις λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἐὰν μὴ ἔχη τι τῶν πεφυκότων 
ἔχεσθαι, κἂν μὴ αὐτὸ ἢ πεφυκὸς ἔχειν, οἷον φυτὸν ὀμμάτων ἐστερῆσθαι λέγεται (one 
meaning of στέρησις is when a thing is without something naturally possessed, 
though it is not its own nature to possess it; e.g. a plant is said to be without 
eyes). ἕνα δ᾽ ἐὰν πεφυκὸς ἔχειν, ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ τὸ γένος, μὴ ἔχῃ; οἷον ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος 6 
τυφλὸς ὄψεως ἐστέρηται καὶ ἀσπάλαξ. Thus in the present case sound and smell 
are dépara. But we are concerned with such objects as might be the objects 
of sense and are not, owing either to excess or defect. Cf. Simpl. 156, 
13 —24. 

a 30. τοῦτο δὲ, int. τὸ dyevoror. 

a3lI. φθαρτικὸν τῆς γεύσεως, as we should say, ‘injurious to the palate.” 
The organ may not be actually destroyed, but, gvé@ organ of taste, it is crippled 
and rendered useless. When it can no longer subserve its function, it is no 
longer a sense-organ (except equivocally: a tongue which cannot taste, an eye 
which cannot see, a withered hand). Cf. 416a 5, 412 b 20 sq. ἀρχὴ, int. 
τῶν χυμῶν Or τῶν γευστῶν. In enumerating flavours or gustables we begin 
with the pair “drinkable and undrinkable.” With this primary sense of ἀρχή. 
starting-point, beginning, cf. e.g. 403 Ὁ 24, 413 a 20 and the use of πρῶτος 
Metaph. 1046a 10 πρὸς wparny μίαν [int. δύναμιν] λέγονται [int. δυνάμεις]. 

a 32. γεῦσις γάρ τις ἀμφότερα, “for both are a sort of taste.” This must mean 
flavour, xupds, rather than τὸ ἔχον χυμόν. A. uses the abstract term (in the 
singular) for the concrete plural yevora, as ὄψις for spectacle, thing seen: so 
also ἁφὴ for its object, tangible De Sexsu 3, 439 a 8, 11 (see Alex. Aphr. ad loc. 
41,21 W). Compare our own double use of the words taste and smell. τὸ 
μὲν, Int. τὸ ἄποτον. 

a 33. φθαρτικὴ τῆς γεύσεως, Considering that the feminine adjective forcibly 
suggests γεῦσις, it is strange to find τῆς γεύσεως as a genitive dependent on it. 
The γεῦσις which is φαύλη is the object of taste, in other words, χυμός, while 
τῆς γεύσεως which is governed by φθαρτικὴ is the organ of taste as such, in 
other words, the tongue. Injury to the organ implies .that the faculty is 
impaired, so that it makes very little difference whether γεῦσις here be rendered 
“tongue” or “faculty of tasting,” and the same uncertainty attaches to γεῦσις, 
ὄψις, ὄσφρησις in 426b I sq. τὸ δὲ, int. τὸ ποτόν. κατὰ φύσιν, int. ἐστίν, 
“Is natural.” κοινὸν ays Kal γεύσεως. Oud ὑγρόν, it is tangible, an object 
of touch; gud ἔγχυμον, it is gustable, an object of taste. 

422 a 33—b 16. The organ of taste needs to be, not actually liquid, 
for that is what its object is, but capable of liquefaction. Thus the tongue, if 
too moist or too dry, cannot taste [§ 4]. The species of flavour are various, 
like those of colour. The primary contrast is between sweet and _ bitter, 
answering to white and black in colour. Next come unctuous (succulent) 
and brackish. Intermediate (between the last pair) come the pungent, the 
harsh, the astringent and the acid. Potentially the faculty of taste is each 
of these in turn: it is the object of taste which makes them so actually [§ 5]. 


H. . 26 


402 NOTES II. 10 


422Ὁ 1. ἀνάγκη. On the principle that the sense-organ must be δυνάμει 
what the sense-object is ἐνεργείᾳ. Cf. 418a 3 sq., 4228 7. 

Ὁ 4. τὸ Svvdpevov piv ὑγραίνεσθαι σωϊζόμενον, μὴ ὑγρὸν δέ, “that which is 
capable of becoming moist without losing its nature [1.6. its distinctive character 
as organ of taste], but is not really moist.” That the organ of sense must be 
moistened we have already heard. What is new is that it must be capable 
while moistened of retaining its own character. The article covers the whole 
group of words in the lemma. One might be tempted to suggest ri for τό, but 
the fact is that the article can be used in this odd fashion, which it is difficult to 
formulate precisely. The participle σωζόμενον has the qualifying effect of an 
adverb with ὑγραίνεσθαι. Miss Alford has favoured me with the following 
suggestion: “May this be a development from the use of the article with the 
future participle, e.g. in Plato, Red. 342 A δεῖ τενὸς τέχνης τῆς τὸ ξυμφέρον eis ταῦτα 
σκεψομένης᾽ Compare the change of tense, without obvious change of meaning, 
in Pol. 1272a41 πόρρω γ᾽ ἀποικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθερούντων and 1308 a 24 sq. 
σώξονται δ᾽ ai πολιτεῖαι ob μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω εἶναι τῶν διαφθειρόντων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε 
καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγύς." 

b6. αὕτη. This represents τοῦτο attracted to the gender of the complement 
égyn, and the “this” stands for the attempted contact of the unduly moist 
tongue with the object. 

b7. τοῦ πρώτου ὑγροῦ, “the original moisture,” 1.6. the tongue retains the 
taste of the first fluid with which it has come in contact, namely the saliva. 
The tongue in this case tastes its own moisture, and thus is prevented from 
tasting anything afterwards brought in contact with it. 

b9. τοιαύτης, int. πικρᾶς. 

bir. dwkd Ch De Sensu 4, 4428 12: “again, just as the colours result 
from the mixture of white and black, so the flavours result from the mixture 
of sweet and bitter. And these flavours depend on the quantitative relation 
between the components mixed.” 

Ὁ 12. τοῦ μέν, int. rod γλυκέος. τοῦ δέ, int. τοῦ πικροῦ. 

13. μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων. Evidently the four flavours next mentioned are 
meant to be intermediate between the single pair which may be designated 
either “unctious” and “saline,” or, if we like, “succulent” and “briny”: and 
these four are not arranged in pairs. 

14. σχεδὸν, “approximately,” Latin /erve. Cf. 403 b 28 σχεδὸν δύο ταῦτα. 

bI5. ὥστε τὸ yevorixdy xré. Cf. 418 a 3 56. 


CHAPTER ΧΙ. 


422 b 17—423 a 21. With regard to touch, two questions arise. 
(1) Is touch a single sense, or does it include several senses? In the latter 
case, the objects of touch will be various. (2) Is the sense-organ the flesh, or 
something internal? [§ 1]. A single sense, it might be thought, relates to a 
single pair of opposite qualities. Touch, however, relates to several such pairs, 
hot and cold, dry and moist, hard and soft, etc. Now it might be urged that 
this is also the case with other senses, e.g. with hearing, which distinguishes 
Joudness and timbre as well as pitch. This is true; but then the audible 
qualities have a common substratum, sound. What common substratum is 
there for tangible qualities? [§ 2]. Next, as regards the sense-organ, the fact 


11. 11 422 Ὁ 1—b 22 403 


that the sensation occurs simultaneously with contact is not convincing evi- 
dence. For suppose the flesh encased in a thin membrane, objects of touch 
would be, as before, directly felt [§ 3]; still more if this membrane became a 
part of the body [in fact, its flesh]. Such a medium of touch may be compared 
to an envelope of air surrounding the body on all sides and enabling us to have 
direct perception of colours, sounds, and odours: whereby seeing, hearing and 
smelling would apparently be reduced to a single sense. An animate body 
could not be constructed merely of air or water: it needs earth as well, as it 
must be solid; and such a compound is just what flesh is. Hence the body 
must be a medium [and not an organ] of touch, a medium which is part of us, 
and which serves more than one sense [§ 4]: as is shown by the case of the 
tongue. For the tongue has touch as well as taste: now if the rest of our flesh 
had been able to taste as well as to touch, we should have thought that the two 
senses, taste and touch, were one and the same [§ 5]. 

422 Ὁ 17. ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, “the same account is to be given.” On coming to 
touch, the last of the five senses, Aristotle remarks that the relation between 
this sense and the sensible object is the same as in the case of the former four. 
In Professor Beare’s words (p. 189), “‘the sense of touching, like the other senses, 
is best explained if its object be first analysed and examined.” Cf. 415 a 16—22. 
Philop., however, has a different explanation, to the effect that the same account 
must be given of touch as of tangible objects, namely that if touch is a single 
sense, then there is only one sort of tangible, while if touch includes several 
senses, there will be several sorts of tangible (Philop. 422, 11-21). 

br7. εἰ yap ἡ doy. Two questions are propounded. (1) Is touch a single 
sense or a coalition of separate senses? (2) Is flesh an organ or a medium 
through which an internal sense works? A. considers (1) as far as 422 Ὁ 33 
ἔνδηλον. Each sense appears to have a pair of contraries with which it deals. 
Touch, however, deals with a number of contraries. Yet closer examination 
shows that it is only a superficial view which makes each of the other senses 
concermed with a single pair of contraries. Still, A. notes that there is no 
single correlative object of touch corresponding to sound, which is correlative 
of hearing. Here the first question is allowed to drop. 

b 20. τὸ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ, “the organ of the faculty of touch.” There seems no 
ground for departing from this well-attested reading, although Bekker’s con- 
jecture τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ ἁπτικὸν has been followed by Trendelenburg, Torstrik and 
Wallace. 

b2I. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἀνάλογον. Cf. Ast. An. 111. 16, 519 b 26 σὰρξ δὲ 
καὶ τὸ παραπλησίαν ἔχον τὴν φύσιν τῇ σαρκὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐναίμοις πᾶσίν ἐστι μεταξὺ τοῦ 
δέρματος καὶ τοῦ ὀστοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀνάλογον τοῖς ὀστοῖς, De Part. Ax. 1. 5, 645b 8 
καὶ τοῖς μὲν αἷμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν ἥνπερ τοῖς ἐναίμοις τὸ 
aia. Cf. 4218. 17, 28. Dr Ogle, Parts of Animals (pp. 196, 203), takes red 
muscular tissue to be what A. understood by σάρξ. Flesh is discussed De Part. 
An. 11.. c. 8, where it is described 653 b 21 as ἀρχὴ καὶ σῶμα καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τῶν (dor. 
After showing on teleological grounds the necessity for this b 22—30 he shows 
in detail b 30 sqq. from the facts of experience (κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησεν) that all other 
parts of the structure of all animals are subservient to the protection or main- 
tenance of flesh or its analogue. 

Ὁ 22. τὸ δὲ πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον, “the primary sense-organ,” that is as con- 
trasted with flesh, regarded on this hypothesis as a medium, although as part of 
the body it has apparently a superficial claim to be called a sense-organ. In 
the Jzd. Ar. (653 Ὁ 25) Bonitz distinguishes this use of the word from the more 
common absolute use in which it is almest equivalent to καθ᾽ αὑτό (“ πρρῶτος ubi 


26—2 


404 NOTES II. Il 


absolute usurpatur conferri potest cum notione et vario usu nominis ἀρχή" 652 Ὁ 
35) and thus defines it: “ πρῶτον relatum ad aliud id dicitur, quod alteri ita est 
proximum, ut nihil intercedat medium. potest haec relatio significan, πρῶτον 
πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, πρὸς τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον Anal. Post. 11. 18, 99b 9, plerumque non 
significatur sed ex contextu sententiarum intellegitur.” According to Bonitz, when 
A. calls the internal organ of touch “ primary” he means that it is in direct and 
immediate communication with the tangible object, in spite of the interposition 
of flesh. The phrase or an equivalent recurs 423 Ὁ 30 sq., 424a 24, 425 Ὁ 19, 
and the internal organ is called ἔσχατον 426b 16. 

Ὁ 23. ἐντός. The position of the sense-organs is discussed De Part. Ax. 
II. 10, their position in man more particularly 656a 13—657a11. The following 
are the most important positive statements: 656a 27 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τῶν 
αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν 6 περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος, διώρισται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ aic- 
θήσεως" καὶ διότι αἱ μὲν δύο φανερῶς ἠρτημέναι πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν εἰσίν, ἥ τε τῶν 
ἁπτῶν καὶ ἣ τῶν χυμῶν, Ὁ 24 τὴν δ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἀπὸ τῆς καρδίας fint. ἔχει τὰ ἔχοντα 
τὸν ἐγκέφαλον], Ὁ 34 ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἁφῆς...οὐκ ἔστι τὸ πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον ἡ σάρξ 
καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο μόριον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐντός. Equally emphatic is the statement of positive 
doctrine in De Juv. 3, 469a 4—27. πᾶσά τε yap αἴσθησις. This re is taken 
up by δὲ Ὁ 25, ἐν δὲ τῷ dara: cf. Ind. Ar. 749 Ὁ 40 56. 

Ὁ 23. μιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως, a single contrariety, 1.6. a single pair of contraries or 
opposite qualities. We have already seen that sight is related to light and 
dark, sound to loud and faint, smell to odorous and inodorous, taste to γευστὸν 
and dyevorov. But A. expands his doctrine (see 426 Ὁ 8—12), which is most 
clearly set forth De Sensu 6, 445 Ὁ 24 πᾶν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν 
χρώματι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ἐν χυμῷ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρόν" καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ 
πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἔσχατα τὰ ἐναντία. τὸ μὲν οὖν συνεχὲς εἰς ἄπειρα τέμνεται ἄνισα, εἰς δ᾽ 
ἴσα πεπερασμένα- τὸ δὲ μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ συνεχὲς εἰς πεπερασμένα εἴδη. The last 
sentence is introduced to show why the different species or kinds of quality 
which form the proper object of each special sense are finite in number, 
(445 Ὁ 21) διὰ τί πεπέρανται ra εἴδη καὶ χρώματος καὶ χυμοῦ Kal φθόγγων καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν. The province of each sense is continuous, 24. Ὁ 29 sq. ὑπάρχει 
δὲ συνέχεια ἀεὶ ἐν τούτοις, and the opposite qualities form the extremities, ἔσχατα, 
of this continuum. Hence A. applies his general proposition, 24. Ὁ 23, ὧν μὲν 
yap ἐστιν ἔσχατα, ἀναγκαῖον πεπεράνθαι τὰ ἐντός. Each special sense has its own 
province (colour, sound, smell, flavour); in this τὸ pronounces judgment on 
sensible qualities which run from one to the other extreme by imperceptible 
gradations. Thus sight discerns the positive quality white at one end of the 
scale, the negative quality black at the other, and the various shades of colour 
intermediate. Hearing discerns the shrillest of high notes at one end of the 
scale, the deepest of low notes at the other and all the varying degrees of pitch 
intermediate. All the qualities cognised by a single special sense, even the 
contrary extremes (white, black, sweet, bitter etc.), are species (τὰ μὲν πάθη ads 
εἴδη λεκτέον De Sensu 6, 445 Ὁ 29) homogeneous with each other, ὁμογενῆ, and 
heterogeneous with those cognised by any other sense: 431a 24, De Sensu 7, 
447 b 24—448a 18. Cf. also xove on 418 a 14 supra. 

b24. λευκοῦ kal péAavos. This may be inferred from 418b 18 φῶς ἐναντίον 
σκότει, 418 Ὁ 28, 29, but it is singular that it has not been explicitly stated 
hitherto in this treatise, as it is in De Sensu 3, 439b 16 ὥσπερ οὖν ἐκεῖ τὸ μὲν 
φῶς τὸ δὲ σκότος, οὕτως ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἐγγίγνεται τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, where 
A. attempts to show that the seven species of colour can all be derived from 
white and black blended in different proportions or one seen through another. 
Cf. 22. 4, 4428 12, 20. ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος. Cf. 420 ἃ 29. 


II. 11 422 Ὁ 22—-423 a 2 405 


b 25. πικροῦ καὶ γλυκέος, Cf. 422 Ὁ 11, 421 a 27. ἐν δὲ τῷ ἁπτῷ πολλαὶ. 
Cf. De Part. An. τι. τ, 647 a 16 μάλιστα γὰρ αὕτη [int. ἡ ἁφὴ] δοκεῖ πλειόνων εἶναι 
γενῶν, καὶ πολλὰς ἔχειν ἐναντιώσεις τὸ ὑπὸ ταύτην αἰσθητόν [i.e. τὸ ἁπτόν], θερμὸν 
ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρὸν καὶ εἴ re ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. The variety may be reduced to two 
main heads (1) resistance, (2) temperature. 

Ὁ 26. θερμὸν uxpov. Compare the list in De Gen. et Corr. 11. 2, 320 Ὁ 18, 
where are added βαρὺ κοῦφον, γλίσχρον κραῦρον, τραχὺ λεῖον, παχὺ λεπτόν. 

Ὁ 27. ἔχει δέ τινα λύσιν. With λύσιν as with b 19 ἀπορίαν the verb ἔχει is 
impersonal: the German idiom “es giebt Etwas” is a parallel. The clause 
with ὅτε contains the partial solution of the difficulty. A. means that a sort of 
answer may be given by saying that each of the other special senses has 
likewise to deal with more than one pair of opposites. Not a satisfactory 
answer: cf. Ὁ 32, ἀλλά. Them. remarks (72, 21 H., 132, 20 Sp.) τοῦτο μὲν οὖν 
ἴσως ἄν τις οὐκ ἀποχρώντως μὲν ἀλλὰ πιθανῶς διαλύσει, ὅτι... ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἱκανὴ... ἡ 
παραμυθία- μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ καὶ σμικρότης κοινὰ πασῶν ἐστὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τοῦ 
καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἑκάστη μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ αἰσθάνεται, λειότης δὲ καὶ τραχύτης ἤτοι 
λέγονται ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν ἁπτῶν, ἣ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ αὗται ἂν εἶεν, εἴπερ καὶ φωνῆς 
σχῆμα θετέον διὰ τὸν πληττόμενον ὕπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἀέρα" τὸ δὲ σχῆμα κοινὸν ἦν καὶ αὐτὸ 
αἰσθητόν. Thus Them. regards the varieties perceived by sight and hearing as 
κοινά, not té:a. For the expression cf. Po/. 1281 a 41 δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι καί τιν᾽ 
ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀλήθειαν, Meftaph. 995 a 28 ἡ yap ὕστερον εὐπορία 
λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, De Caelo Il. 12, 201 Ὁ 26 εἴ τις διὰ τὸ 
φιλοσοφίας διψῆν καὶ μικρὰς εὐπορίας ἀγαπᾷ περὶ ὧν τὰς μεγίστας ἔχομεν ἀπορίας. 

Ὁ 29. οὐ μόνον dfirns...3I τραχύτης. The same three pairs of opposite 
qualities are recognised by Plato, Zim. 67 B, C. 

Ὁ 32. τὸ ἕν τὸ ὑποκείμενον. In each of the other senses, the various qualities 
perceived can be reduced to a single genus. There seems however to be no 
one common genus to which the tangible qualities just enumerated can be sub- 
ordinated. Philop. (423, 30—32) raises a doubt even as regards sight, whether 
phosphorescence can be brought under the same genus as colour. There is no 
great difference between ὑποκείμενον τῇ ἀφῇ and τὰ ἀντικείμενα in 402b 15 and 
415a 20. Cf. 426b 10 ras rot ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφορὰς and nore. 

b 34. πότερον...ἢ οὔ. This is the second main question; but its discussion 
serves also to elucidate the first. We shall here anticipate A.’s decision, which 
is that flesh is for touch the medium and not the organ of sense. Cf. De Pari. 
An. 11. το, 656b 34 as cited in moze on 422 Ὁ 23, ἔντός. In subsequent passages 
of De A. Aristotle continues to speak of flesh as the organ of touch and, 
though this may be sometimes an accommodation to popular language and 
ideas, yet on the whole the conclusion of this chapter that flesh is an intra- 
organic medium is not incompatible with the view that flesh is in some sense 
also the organ of touch. The internal organ here postulated, τὸ ἐντός (cf. 
423 Ὁ 23), in contradistinction to the surface of the body, may itself be com- 
posed of flesh. Furthermore, the hypothesis of organ and medium combined 
in one is distinctly formulated De Part. An. 11. 8, 653b 24 ταύτης δ᾽ [int. τῆς 
ἁφῆς] αἰσθητήριον τὸ τοιοῦτο μόριόν ἐστιν, Fro. τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ ἡ κόρη τῆς ὄψεως, 
ἢ τὸ δὲ οὗ συνειλημμένον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις προσλάβοι τῇ κόρῃ τὸ διαφανὲς πᾶν [all 
the external diaphanous medium]. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἀδύνατόν 
τε καὶ οὐδὲν προὔργου τοῦτ᾽ ἦν ποιῆσαι τῇ φύσει, τὸ δ᾽ ἁπτικὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης" μόνον 
γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ σωματῶδες τῶν αἰσθητηρίων. εὐθέως, directly, without 
any intermediary. Cf. 421 b 31. 

4238. 2. ἅμα θιγγανομένων, int. τῶν αἰσθητῶν : genitive absolute, “simul- 
taneously with the things being touched.” καὶ yap viv. In order to establish 


406 NOTES Il. If 


his point that the instantaneousness of the sensation of touch by no means 
proves the absence of a medium, Aristotle introduces two ingenious sup- 
positions. The first is: suppose we were to make and stretch over our flesh 
an artificial skin or tissue. Such a glove on the hand (Them. calls it a gauze- 
like web λεπτὴν ὀθόνην) does not impair the instantaneousness of touch, as may 
be verified by experiment (xat...viv). Now imagine (a 5 εἰ δὲ καὶ xré.) such a 
glove, or web, to grow on to, and become part of, the body. Perceptions would 
pass, if possible, still more rapidly. Cf. De Part. An. 11. 8, 653b 25 τὸ δι᾽ οὗ 
συνειλημμένον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις προσλάβοι τῇ κόρῃ τὸ διαφανὲς πᾶν, cited in last 
mote but one. 

a4. ἁψάμενος, “the moment it (i.e. the membrane) touches.” The meaning 
may be a little clearer in the paraphrase of Themistius (73, τ H., 133, 18 Sp.) 
καὶ yap νῦν εἴ τις περὶ τὴν σάρκα περιτείνειεν οἷον ὑμένα ποιήσας ἢ λεπτὴν ὀθόνην, 
ὅμως εὐθὺς ἁψαμένοις (the moment we touch) γίνεται ἔνδηλος ἡ θερμότης ἢ 7 
ψυχρότης κτὲ., and ἁψαμένοις would be preferable in our text to the proposals 
ἁψαμένου (Torst.) and ἁψαμένῳ (Trend.). But no change is needed. évon- 
patver, int. ὁ ὑμήν, “intimates,” “gives a sign,” “communicates.” Observe the 
indicative after the previous optative mepureivecey. Cf. Thuc. 11. 39, 4 καίτοι 
εἰ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτῃ...ἐθέλοιμεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν Kré., 
which Dionysius of Halicarnassus criticises περὶ Θουκ. ἰδέωμ. 12,1. Doubtless 
he would have repeated his criticism in the present passage thus: ἐνταῦθα yap 
τὸ μὲν περιτείνειε ῥῆμα τοῦ μέλλοντός ἐστι χρόνου SyrAwriKdy, τὸ δὲ ἐνσημαίνει τοῦ 
παρόντος" ἀκόλουθον δ᾽ ἂν ἣν εἰ συνέζευξε τῷ περιτείνειε τὸ ἐνσημανεῖ. 

a4. ἐν τούτῳ, int. ἐν τῷ ὑμένι. The suggestion is that so also flesh, though 
apparently the sense-organ, may not really be so. 

a5. συμφυὲς, “naturally adhering.” The two grow together and coalesce 
throughout, as the tongue with the lower jaw or base of the mouth in the crocodile 
(τῇ κάτω σιαγόνι συμφνής, De Part. An. τι. 17,660b 28). Cf infraa 7 περιεπεφύκει. 
This is the primary meaning of συμφνής. For a more extended application in 
which the idea of growth is lost and that of direct contact or close connexion 
is retained see 4208 4, 12. Thus ol. 1286 a 18 συμφυὴς is used to express 
the connexion between τὸ παθητικὸν and reason in the human soul. 

a 6. τὸ τοιοῦτο μόριον τοῦ σώματος. The part of the body which 
answers to the inseparable membrane of the illustration: of course the flesh 
15 meant. 

a7. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ. From the last supposition, Aristotle now passes on to yet 
another, which concerns not only the question in hand respecting the sense- 
organ, but also the previous question whether touch is one sense or more than 
one. For the web fitted to the skin he substitutes in imagination an envelope 
of air. If this were attached to us, we should think that we perceived colours, 
sounds and odours by one and the same organ, namely this enveloping air, and 
that the three senses, which as a fact we know to be distinct, sight, hearing and 
smell, were one. The effect of this illustration is to suggest that similarly 
touch, which appears to be a single sense, may be a plurality of senses. Flesh 
for touch will be like air for those three senses in the case supposed, an intra- 
organic medium (δι᾽ οὗ) attached to the percipient, περιεπεφύκει. 

a8. ἑνί τινι, “by means of a single thing,” the envelope of air in question. 
This would be assumed to be the single organ of the three senses then con- 
sidered as merged in one. 

8 10. διὰ τὸ διωρίσθαιτι The subject to διωρέσθαι is the antecedent to διε οὗ, 
namely that which is in each case the medium, as τὸ διηχὲς for sound, τὸ διαφανὲς 
for sight, τὸ διοσμὸν for smell. With διωρίσθαι understand rot σώματος (in 


11. 11 423 8. 2—a 14 407 


contrast to προσπεφυκέναι or περιπεφυκέν αὐ). αἱ κινήσεις. A Comparison 
with a 16 αἰσθήσεις shows that the two terms are here identical in meaning. 
Cf. 417 a 14—18, 420 a 33, 4268 2 sqq., 426 Ὁ 29—427 a I, 425 Ὁ 25 in the light 
of 428 Ὁ 10—429 a 2. 

alr. davepa...érepa ὄντα, “it is evident that the organs of the three senses 
mentioned are distinct,” i.e. are distinct from each other: quum vero aér a 
corpore animantis separatus sit, non latet nos sensus illos esse tres (Torstrik, 
p- 159) We are able to distinguish between the organs of sight, hearing and 
smell. This remark carries several consequences. What does A. intend? 
That flesh, like the supposed envelope of air, is not an organ but a medium, and 
that an internal organ may work through this medium. Air congenitally united 
to our bodies, as in the case supposed, would still be a medium and we should 
not then be able to discriminate between the organs of the three senses. The 
implication is that it is for a similar reason, because it is united with us, that the 
flesh is popularly regarded as an organ. How can we be sure it is anything 
more than an inseparable medium? There is, however, another possible infer- 
ence, which must not be overlooked. The distinctness of the three sense-organs, 
as things are, might suggest a totally different conclusion, viz. the unity of 
sense. What seem to us three distinct senses, seeing, hearing and smelling, 
may have to be referred hereafter to one internal sense, with its organ in the 
region of the heart. This is possible, even if less likely at this point in the 
treatise. But in this chapter A. doubtless has in his mind the conception of 
SENSUS Communtzs, to be developed in 111.) cc. I, 2. 

ἃ 12. τοῦτο viv ἄδηλον, i.e. whether it is a fact that several distinct senses 
are confused in an apparently single sense. Cf. Them. (73, 19 H., 134, 14 Sp.) 
ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ πλείω ἢ ἕν. He proceeds to make A.’s meaning a little 
more explicit thus: τί γὰρ κωλύει πλείω μὲν εἶναι, τὴν σάρκα δὲ ἅπασιν ἔξωθεν 
ὁμοίαν οὖσαν ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον περιπεπλάσθαι; “Are we any nearer the solution,” 
A. may be supposed to ask, “of our question (Ὁ 19, 20) as to whether touch 
embraces more senses than one?” We might have a number of different 
organs working through the flesh as medium: but if so, we are unable to 
distinguish them. From this it follows that we cannot hope to assign the 
different sorts of touch to different parts of the body. 

δ 13 λείπεται δὲ μεικτὸν...14 τούτων εἶναι. It follows that of the composite 
animal body (1) earth, the solid element, (2) air and water (τούτων), the media 
of the telepathic senses, must be constituents. The same conclusion is more 
clearly expressed in 435 a 11 sqq. and the argument by which it 1s reached 
more fully stated. The body of the animate creature cannot be ἁπλοῦν, 
i.e. consisting of one element only. For example, it cannot be of fire (πύρινον), 
for fire is destructive; it cannot be of air or water, for these are media of the 
telepathic senses and not suitable for touch; it cannot be of earth only, for by 
touch we perceive hot and cold, whereas earth would only account for hard and 
soft. Thus it cannot be ἁπλοῦν, but must be μεικτόν. 

8 14. βούλεται. See Jud. Ar. 140b 41 saepe per βουλεται εἶναι significatur 
quo quid per naturam suam tendit, sive id assequitur quo tendit, sive non plene 
et perfecte assequitur. Cf. Pol. 1261 b 12, 1295 Ὁ 25, 1289 a 32 βούλεται γὰρ ἑκατέρα 
Kar ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην, 1254 Ὁ 27, 1255b3. Until an example 
of βούλεσθαι in this sense without an infinitive following has been adduced, 
I am content to follow Torstrik and Biehl in inserting εἶναε in the text. The 
question at issue is not whether A. frequently omitted the copula, εἶναι. as 
readily as ἐστίν and εἰσί. No one who has read Vahlen’s note on Poet. 1459b7 
will have any doubt that A. dispensed as easily with the copula as any of the 
Latin writers, and would have been content to take such a sentence as “fusi 


408 NOTES 11. 11 


hostes” for normal (Roby, Latin Grammar U., xxii.) The brevity of his 
shorthand style leads him nearly as often to omit the subject, if this can be 
understood. But the question here is whether οἷον βούλεται ἡ σὰρξ Or τοῦτο 
βούλεται ἡ φύσις would not naturally suggest ποιεῖν or συμβαίνειν as the verb to 
‘be understood, so that the insertion of εἶναι is needed to prevent misappre- 
hension. Cf. De Sensu 4, 441 a 3 ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὕδατος φύσις βούλεται Gyupos 
εἶναι, 26. 7, 447 Ὁ το sq. 

615. ὥστε. It has just been stated that μεικτόν τι, such as flesh, is necessary 
to the animal body, and from this it is inferred that it is the medium of touch, 
the organ of touch being the central organ in the region of the heart. It is 
obvious that the argument requires that by τὸ σῶμα should be understood not 
the whole body, but a part of it: in man, the flesh. Yet it is easy to see why 
σῶμα and not σὰρξ was written, for A. has been speaking of the composition 
of the animal body in general, and not all animal bodies have flesh; some have 
a substitute (τὸ ἀνάλογον). The medium δι᾽ οὗ is in this case the animal body 
itself or such part of it as intervenes without break of continuity between the 
sense (or organ) of touch (μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ) and the tangible object, καὶ τοῦ 
ἅπτοῦ being of course understood. See Jud. Ar. 460b 53 τὸ μεταξύ, vel τὸ 
μεταξὺ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, vel τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ aia O@nrnpiov, id quod interpositum inter τὸ 
αἰσθητήριον et τὸ αἰσθητόν utrumque coniungit. Bz. cites not only our present 
passage 423 a I—b 26 and 424 Ὁ 29, but also De Sensu 3, 4408 18 κρεῖττον 
φάναι τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν, 
26. 6, 4474 ἃ ὧν ἐστὶ μεταξὺ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου, where there is a medium between 
the organ and the object. When μεταξὺ is used as a preposition, one of the 
termini is often suppressed. Whether τὸ be inserted before μεταξὺ or not, the 
words μεταξὺ rod ἁπτικοῦ προσπεφυκὸς form an attributive clause which qualifies 
σῶμα. See critical sozes. 

a16. προσπεφυκός. This participle, like the adjective συμφυές, denotes an 
integral or inseparable part of the organism, something which may be regarded 
as distinct, but is by natural growth of one piece with the rest. The word could 
appropriately be used of the supposed membrane, or of the “flesh” as attached 
to the rest of the body. It is so used in reference to the visual organ of hard- 
eyed animals De Part. Ax. ll. 13, 657 Ὁ 34, which see οἷον διὰ τοῦ βλεφάρου 
προσπεφυκότος: 2. 11. 17, 661a τι the word προσπεφυκὸς is used of the tongue 
and opposed to ἀπολελυμένον, meaning a tongue which is fixed in its position in 
the mouth, as opposed to one free from attachments, which can be protruded 
and retracted. Cf. Them. 73, 27 H., 134, 26 Sp. εἰ yap πᾶσα αἴσθησις διὰ τοῦ 
μεταξύ, καὶ dan: τοῦ δὲ ἁπτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἕτερον μεταξὺ ἢ τὸ 
σῶμα, τὸ σῶμα ἄρα τὸ μεταξύ. δι’ οὗ γίνεται ἡ ἀντίληψις. διοίσει δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος τε 
καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος...ὅτι μὴ κεχώρισται ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα, GAN ἔστι συμφυὲς τῷ Cd. But 
συμφυὲς τῷ ζῴῳ is not more correct than A.’s own expression. The fact is 
that one part of the animal body is attached to the rest to serve as a medium 
to the sense of touch. 

a8. αἰσθάνεται. I suppose the subject to be the tongue, which will then 
be said to perceive all tangible qualities at the same part, e.g. the tip, as that at 
which it perceives flavours. Thus καὶ is correlative to τὸ αὐτό. This gives a better 
antithesis to a 19 ef...4 ἄλλη σάρξ ἠσθάνετο. So clearly Simpl. 162, 33 sqq. and 
apparently Philop. 427, 29 ἡ δὲ γλῶττα καὶ πάντων τῶν ἁπτῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ 
πρὸς τούτοις χυμῶν. Others make κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον mean “ with one and the 
same organ, viz. the tongue” and suppose αἰσθάνεται to have as its subject 
§ αἰσθανόμενος aS In 423 Ὁ 25 (d¢s). Professor Beare, p. 192, translates: “for in 
virtue of the tongue, which is one and the same organ, one has the sensation of 
all the other objects of touching and also that of taste.” To A. it makes no 


II. I1 423 a I4—a 22 409 


difference whether (1) the percipient subject or (2) the special sense as part of 
the sensitive soul or (3) the organ of sense be said αἰσθάνεσθαι. For the tip of 
the tongue as preeminently sensitive to flavour cf. Azs¢. Az. 11. 9, 492 Ὁ 27 ἐν 
τῷ ἄκρῳ [int. τῆς γλώττης], De Part. An. τι. 17, 661 ἃ 5 τῷ ἄκρῳ μάλιστα. 

εἰ 20. νῦν δὲ δύο, int. δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. 

δι 21. ἀντιστρέφειν. Cf. Trend.?: ἀντιστρέφειν notiones dicuntur, quae inter 
se converti possunt, quae adeo inter se respondent, ut, quod una habeat proprium, 
etiam alteri adsit, ideoque altera in alterius locum substitui possit...dvriorpodos 
significat ex altera parte respondere et quasi ex adverso oppositum esse.” See 
also Cope, ad Rhe?t.1.1, §1,p.1. The word denotes an exact correspondence in 
detail as a facsimile or counterpart: in logic it is used of propositions “con- 
vertible.” Hence whatever part of the flesh perceives flavours also perceives 
tangibles, but we cannot convert the proposition and affirm that whatever part 
perceives tangibles also perceives flavours. Cf. 406a 32, De Interpr. 13, 
22a 14-16, .Wetaph. 1016b 28, Them. (74, 2 H., 135, 12—15 Sp.) viv δὲ δύο 
φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν τὰ ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ δι’ οὗ μὲν μορίου τῶν χυμῶν 
αἰσθανόμεθα, διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν- δι᾽ οὗ δὲ τῶν ἁπτῶν, ov διὰ παντὸς καὶ 
τῶν χυμῶν. Philop. remarks (422, 6) οὐχ ὡς γλῶττα ἁπτικὴ ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ 7 πᾶν τὸ 
σῶμα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. 

423 a 22—b 27. Even liquids and fluids have body: which implies _ 
three dimensions. Therefore two solid bodies immersed in water (or, for the 
matter of that, in air) cannot, strictly speaking, ever touch one another: there 
must always be, although we do not perceive it, a film or layer of fluid or of air 
interposed [§ 6]. Returning, then, to the question whether touch and taste 
operate, like the other three senses, through a medium, or not, we decide that 
hard and soft are perceived through a medium, just as much as the resonant 
and the odorous; but in the case of the latter, owing to the distance of the 
object, we are aware of the medium, while the former are close at hand and so 
we fail to notice the medium. In fact the thin film of air or water which, 
unperceived, separates bodies apparently in contact, is like the membrane 
imagined in the illustration given above [§ 7]. The real difference between 
touch and taste on the one hand, and the three remaining senses on the other, 
is that in the case of the latter, the medium is acted upon by the object and in 
turn acts upon the sense-organ, while in touch and taste the medium plays no 
such part: organ and medium are acted upon together [§ 8]. That the flesh 
plays the part of medium in touch and the tongue in taste is also made clear by 
the crucial experiment that an object placed in close contact with the flesh or 
the tongue is perceived if tangible or gustable. But when the objects of the 
other three senses are so placed in close contact with the respective sense- 
organs there is no perception [§ 9]. 

423 αι 22. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις. Here A. takes up a new question. Apart from 
the correspondence between flesh and air, we must acknowledge that in touch 
there is never actual contact between sense-organ and object; for we must take 
account of a film of the medium (air or water) interposed, ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις 1S 
taken up at 423b1 by πότερον οὖν πάντων ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ ἄλλων ἄλλως. 
εἰ, “if, as is a fact” (stguidem). βάθος...23 τὸ τρίτον μέγεθος. Cf. De Caelol. 1, 
268 a7 μεγέθους δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἕν [int. διαιρετὸν] γραμμή, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ δύο ἐπίπεδον, 
τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τρία σῶμα, Metaph. to20a 11 μεγέθους δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἕν συνεχὲς μῆκος, 
τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ δύο πλάτος, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τρία βάθος, Top. VII. 5, 142 Ὁ 24 ὁ τοῦ σώματος 
ὁρισμός, τὸ ἔχον τρεῖς διαστάσεις, De Caelo i. 2, 284b 21 λέγω δὲ τὰ rpia τὸ 
ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ τὸ πρόσθιον καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν - 
ταύτας γὰρ τὰς διαστάσεις εὔλογον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς σώμασι τοῖς τελείοις πάσας. ἔστι 


410 NOTES 11. 11 


δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄνω τοῦ μήκους ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν τοῦ πλάτους, τὸ δὲ πρόσθεν τοῦ 
βάθους. Cf. also De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 2, 315 b 28 sqq., where the atomistic 
analysis of solids is contrasted with that of Plato in the 7zmaeus. 

a 23. dv...860 σωμάτων. The construction is: τὰ δύο σώματα ὧν μεταξύ ἐστι 
σῶμά τι, ταῦτα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀλλήλων ἅπτεσθαι. The antecedent σώματα is 
attracted into the case of the relative ὧν and taken up again by ταῦτα. 

a24. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ σώματος, “cannot exist apart from body,” in which as a 
quality it inheres. A. constantly reiterates that qualities and attributes are not 
independent entities: πάθη and συμβεβηκότα cannot be separated from οὐσία or 
τόδετι. Liquid implies liquid body, which must have three dimensions. 

5.25. τὸ διερόν. The word is defined in De Gen. e¢ Corr. 11. 2, 330a τό sq. 
as τὸ ἔχον ἀλλοτρίαν ὑγρότητα ἐπιπολῆς, βεβρεγμένον δὲ τὸ εἰς βάθος.. τὸ μὲν διερὸν 
ἔσται τοῦ ὑγροῦ. It seems, in the context, peculiarly applicable to a solid body 
like fish immersed in water; so that εἰ διερὸν διεροῦ ἅπτεται (énfra 423 Ὁ 1) 
practically means “whether fish touches fish,” or any two things immersed in 
water which are in apparent contact. 

a 26. μὴ ξηρῶν τῶν ἄκρων ὄντων. This condition limits the reference to 
things actually exposed to the water, and excludes the case of things in contact 
with one another inside a waterproof chest, bottle or sack. The ἄκρα are the 
* outermost parts,” that is the “ outside,” in contrast with the “interior.” While 
a thing thus wet on the outside is dcepdv, a thing wetted through and through 
(BeBpeypévov) is defined as τὸ εἰς βάθος (ἀλλοτρίαν ὑγρότητα ἔχον) De Gen. ef 
Corr., loc. cit. 

a 27. μεταξύ, “between them,” 1.6. in between their apparently contiguous 
surfaces. τὰ ἔσχατα means the same as τὰ ἄκρα above, “ outside surfaces,” 
not “extremities.” Cf, zzfra 423 Ὁ 22 τοῦ ὄμματος... τὸ ἔσχατον. 

a 28. εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽΄.. ὕδατι, τὸν αὐτὸν κτ, A comma seems quite sufficient 
here. Bekker puts a period and Biehl a colon. 

a 29. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον, int. ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἅψασθαι ἄλλο ἄλλου. 

8ἃ 30. λανθάνει δὲ μᾶλλον, we fail to notice, we are less ready to discern it. 
What we are more apt to overlook is that there is no actual contact even of 
things in air. 

a3I. ὥσπερ καὶ κτὲ,, 1.6. ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ζῷα λανθάνει εἰ. 

423b1. εἰ. For ei =“ the fact that,” cf. 42: Ὁ 13. 

bi. πότερον οὖν. Though the question is really dependent on ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ 
ἄν τις 4238. 22, the οὖν (resumptive after a digression) shows that the writer is 
unconscious of this dependence, and the whole paragraph becomes slightly 
anacoluthic. A. is of opinion that the dissimilarity in the manner of perception 
is only apparent. Flesh, he thinks, is the medium of touch and taste, and the 
objects of these two senses are really at a distance from the seat of perception. 
A. leads up to and brings out the view that there is never actual contact. The 
membrane of the illustration has a counterpart in the film of air or water which 
separates two things supposed to be in contact. 

b4 τὸ δ᾽, “but this.” Although no τὸ μὲν has preceded, the article, as in 
πρὸ τοῦ, τὸ Kal τὸ, is really a demonstrative pronoun. Cf. 408 Ὁ 5. 

Ὁ 6. τὰ μὲν, 1.6. τὸ ψοφητικὸν καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν Kai τὸ ὀσφραντόν., while τὰ δ᾽ = τὸ 
σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακόν. διὸ, 1.6. because they are so near. 

b7. αἰσθανόμεθά ye. The fact is so at any rate, whether we notice it or not. 

Ὁ 8. ἐπὶ τούτων, 1.6. in the case of “hard” and “soft.” This is the imme- 
diate reference of the pronoun, though ‘‘hard” and “soft” merely stand as 
representative of all objects of touch and taste. καὶ πρότερον, supra 
423 ἃ 2 566. 


II. 11 423 a 22---Ὁ 23 41} 


b9. λανθάνοντοςς The participle agrees with ὑμένος. This seems a simpler 
view than to make it a genitive absolute, though in translation we may con- 
veniently treat it as if it were such: “the fact of its being interposed escaping 
us,” “of whose intervention we are not conscious.” 

bir. δοκοῦμεν, “we fancy,” this is the ordinary opinion (καθάπερ viv δοκεῖ 
423b 2). Though incorrect in not taking account of the film, the ordinary view 
is nevertheless substantially correct, because there is a distinction between the 
three senses of sight, hearing and smell, which operate at a distance, and the 
two senses of touch and taste, which operate near at hand. A. himself so far 
sympathises with and shares the popular belief that, in spite of all his efforts in 
this chapter to demonstrate a medium for touch, we find him talking like other 
people of immediate contact with the tangible 424 Ὁ 27 καὶ ὅσων μὲν αὐτῶν 
ἁπτόμενοι αἰσθανόμεθα. ..(Ὁ 29) ὅσα δὲ διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι (by 
the latter he intends objects of sight, smell and hearing), 4358 17 ἡ δ᾽ ἁφὴ τῷ 
αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαί ἐστιν. 

b 16. οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀσπὶς. Somewhat similar is the case of motion produced 
per acctdens in Phys. Vil. 4, 255 Ὁ 27 ὥσπερ καὶ ἢ ἀνακλασθεῖσα σφαῖρα οὐχ ὑπὸ 
τοῦ τοίχου ἐκινήθη ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ βάλλοντος. ἅμ᾽ ἄμφω. The illustration chosen 
by A. is not particularly good; because even if, with Philop. (432, 7 sq.), we 
suppose the shield to be struck by a stone and not transfixed with a spear, 
the striking of the man’s body can hardly be simultaneous with the striking of 
the shield. It will be seen that A. makes no attempt to show that there are 
any vibrations in flesh analogous to the disturbances of the medium of which 
we heard when discussing the three senses sight, hearing, smell. 

biI7. ἡ γλῶττα. The tongue is clearly regarded as a special case of “the 
flesh.” 

Ὁ 18 ὄψιν.. ἀκοὴν... το ὄσφρησιν, here the organs of sight, hearing and smell 
respectively. See zofe on 417 4 3. 

big. ὥσπερ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. This redundant ὥσπερ clause reiterates, and so 
emphasises, the analogy already expressed by the clause beginning with as 6 
ἀήρ. Something similar occurs 417 a 9—13 where a 13 ὁμοίως introduces a 
restatement of the clause a 9 ἐπειδὴ xré.: cf. 431 b 12 τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα 
νοεῖ Gowep...15 οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικά, Metaph. 1002 Ὁ 5 παραπλησίως δ᾽ ἔχει... 
(Ὁ 8) ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι ἔχει. Cf. also Plato, Pkaedo 109 E, Crifo 54D, Crat. 433 A, 
cited by Riddell, Digest of Platonic Idioms, §209. The sequence ὡς.. οὕτως... 
ὡς 15 more Common in poetry. 

Ὁ 21. οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖ οὔτ᾽ ἐνταῦθα, “neither in the case of sight, hearing and smell 
(ἐκεῖ), nor in the case of taste and touch (é€vravéa).” 

Ὁ 22. ἧ καὶ δῆλον: so 426b 15. The dative is causal, rather than modal, 
like our “whereby it is also clear,” or 7 καὶ μᾶλλον in Thucydides, e.g. IV. 1, 3. 
Cf. Pol. 1272 ἃ 3, De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 1, 314 Ὁ 26. 

b 23. ὅτι ἐντὸς, int. ἐστί, is inside the body. “The region of the heart is 
nowhere precisely indicated in De A. or De Sensu or De Mem.: it is sometimes 
mentioned, more often alluded to, in the physiological or biological treatises. 
See De Juv. 3, 4692 4 ἡ δὲ καρδία κυριωτάτη... 10 ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε κύριον τῶν 
αἰσθήσεων ἐν ταύτῃ [int. τῇ καρδίᾳ] τοῖς ἐναίμοις πᾶσιν - ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον 
εἶναι τὸ πάντων τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον. δύο δὲ φανερῶς ἐνταῦθα 
συντεινούσας δρῶμεν, τήν τε γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν ἀφῆν, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀναγκαῖον. 
From this passage it would appear that the same is true for the other senses, 
viz. that the true seat of sensation is internal, and not, as some passages imply, 
in the external sense-organ. Cf. De Juv. 3, 469 ἃ 20 διὰ τί δ᾽ ai μὲν τῶν αἰσθήσεων 
φανερῶς συντείνουσι πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν, ai δ᾽ εἰσὶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ... «τὸ αἴτιον τούτων 


412 NOTES II. 11 


ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται χωρίς. The transmission of corporeal κινήσεις A. supposed to 
take place along the blood-vessels, all of which terminate in the heart. οὕτω 
yap, 1.6. on this view and on this view only, namely that the seat of touch is 
within, do we get a consistent account, applicable to the action of all the senses. 
It will then be true of all that what is placed upon the organ is not perceived, 
even if what is placed upon the flesh is perceived by touch. Cf. 419 a 12, 
421b 16. 

Ὁ 25. αἰσθάνεται, int. 6 αἰσθανόμενος, the percipient subject. 

4293 b 27—424a 16. Objects of touch are the different qualities 
of body as such, hot and cold, dry and moist, the fundamental qualities which 
differentiate the four elements [ἢ 10]. And the sense-organ of touch, that is, 
the primary sense-organ, is potentially possessed of these qualities. Hence we 
do not perceive a quality (e.g. temperature) when it is uniform in degree with 
our own, but only when it is in excess or defect as compared with ourselves. 
The sense being a mean between extremes can judge sensible objects, which 
are extremes [8 11]. The range of touch, as of the other senses, includes the 
special sensible itself and its opposite, in this case the tangible and intangible, 
the latter term including what is barely perceptible by touch, as air, and what 
is so violent as to destroy the sense [§ 12]. 

423 Ὁ 27. ἣ σῶμα, int. dori. The same thing is said from the opposite side, 
De Gen. eé Corr. 11., c. 2 adintt, We set out in search of αἰσθητοῦ σώματος ἀρχάς, 
Le. ἁπτοῦ σώματος or οὗ 7 αἴσθησις ἁφή, whence the conclusion (329 Ὁ 8) φανερὸν 
ὅτε ov πᾶσαι ai ἐναντιώσεις σώματος εἴδη καὶ ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον al κατὰ τὴν 
ἁφὴν. There A. asks what are the qualities of body as such and replies the 
opposites which fall under touch. Here in Ye A. he has to enumerate the 
different qualities that fall under touch and says they are the properties of body 
as such. 

Ὁ 28. διορίζουσι. For the manner in which the different combinations of 
these primary contraries, two and two, determine the four “simple bodies” 
(ἅπλα σώματα), the so-called “elements” (στοιχεῖα), see De Ges. et Corr. 11..) cc. 2 
and 3. In building up things, A. starts from matter regarded as pure potenti- 
ality. He then takes four primary qualities and puts them together in pairs: 
the hot with the dry constitutes Fire, the hot with the moist Air, the cold with 
the moist Water, the cold with the dry Earth. 

b 30. αὐτῶν, 1. 6. τῶν ἁπτῶν, viz. θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν. τὸ ἀἁπτικόν, 
in agreement with τὸ αἰσθητήριον. kal, explicative. 

b 30 ἡ καλουμένη ἁφὴ...31 αἴσθησιΞ. I accept the word αἔσθησις inserted by 
ET Wy and Simpl. ἡ καλουμένη ἁφὴ αἴσθησις =“ the sense which is called touch,” 
asin Pol. 1262 a 247 ἐν Φαρσάλῳ κληθεῖσα Δικαία ἵππος =“ the mare called Dicaea.” 
All four words are to be taken together, the construction being interrupted by 
hyperbaton of ὑπάρχει. It may be that A. speaks thus because he does not 
regard contact of the object with the flesh (which he is here considering) as 
truly touch. True touch is the action of the object (through the flesh) upon the 
internal organ. Cf., however, 420 b 28, 407 a 4, 429 a 22. 

b 31. πρώτῳ. See note on 422 Ὁ 22. It is expressly said in 426b15 that 
flesh is not the real organ of sense as such, there called ἔσχατον. τοιοῦτον, 
Le. “hot, cold, dry and moist,” in fact possessing, but only potentially, the 
qualities actually possessed by tangible things. 

424 τ. πάσχειν ti. Cf. 416b 33, 417a 15. The word τι might be taken 
as In agreement with πάσχειν (see move on 4104 25), but to make it the accusa- 
tive governed by πάσχειν gives an equally satisfactory sense and is supported 
by the parallel account of ὀσμᾶσθαι 424b 17. Cf. 419 a 18, 4248 34, Ὁ 16, in 


11. 11 423 Ὁ 23—424a 2 413 


all of which τι 1s governed by πάσχειν. ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν. «ἐνεργείᾳ. This is very 
concise. The full construction would be τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ ἁπτικὸν τοιοῦτον ἐνεργείᾳ 
οἷον αὐτό [i. q- τὸ ἁπτόν, which is τὸ ποιοῦν] ἤδη ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν, where the predica- 
tion of ποιεῖν is incomplete without ἐνεργείᾳ. The tangible object makes the 
organ in actuality such as the object itself is already in actuality. 

a2. τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ δυνάμει ὄν. As I understand this, rozodrov goes with 
δυνάμει ὃν and not with the preceding οἷον αὐτό. In the formula we generally 
have δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, though nowhere else at such length. In either case 
τοιοῦτον is strangely misplaced. ποιεῖ is used as a verb of complete predication 
= “acts upon,” correlative to πάσχειν, “to be acted upon”: cf. 407} 18 τὸ μὲν 
ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχει, 423 Ὁ 14, 424 Ὁ 10 οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα, 429 Ὁ 26, 4304 το. 
This use of ποιεῖ is very common in other treatises, e.g. Wefreor. Iv. 8, 3ὃς ἃ 5,4 
ποιεῖν τι δύνασθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν (the subject of the verb there including θερμόν, 
ψυχρόν), IV. 12, 390a 18 πάντα yap δυνάμει τινί ἐστιν ἢ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ τοῦ πάσχειν. 
ἐκεῖνο is of course the sense-organ. Others prefer to make τὸ ποιοῦν the agent, 
taking it in the same manner as I take ποιεῖ and joining τοιοῦτον with the pre- 
ceding οἷον αὐτός In that case it would be better to remove the comma after 
ἐνεργείᾳ. So Trend.: iungas hoc modo: ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ ἐκεῖνο δυνάμει ὃν 
τοιοῦτον οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ. Relativa effecerunt, ut quae verba effectum indicant, 
non, qui quidem iustus est sententiarum ordo, sequantur sed praeposita sint. 
If Trend. were right, we might compare 418 a 23 οὐδὲν πάσχει F τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τοῦ 
αἰσθητοῦ. How cumbrous this is may be seen from Professor Beare’s version 
(p. 195) “the (agent or) object so acts upon the organ (the patient) as to impart to 
the latter actually the quality which the object itself actually has, but which the 
organ before had only potentially”: whereas, if we conceive τὸ ποιοῦν [τοιοῦτον] 
οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ to be merely a periphrasis for the agent, describing it from 
the final result of its agency, and so get rid of that part of the formula, room is 
left for special insistence on the potential likeness between agent and patient. 
The agent which assimilates the patient to itself finds the way prepared, for it 
acts upon something potentially like itself. Hammond neatly renders “ what- 
ever makes another thing to be in reality like itself does so by virtue of that 
thing’s having this nature in potentiality”: but he does not appear to take 
ἐνεργείᾳ with αὐτό (ἐστι). 

az. διὸ The change from δυνάμει τοιοῦτον to ἐνεργείᾳ τοιοῦτον, which takes 
place in the act of sensation, explains why, when the object which we touch is 
as hot or cold, as hard or soft, as the organ of touch, we have no perception of 
hot or cold, hard or soft, from it. If the temperature or resistance of ἁπτικὸν 
and ἁπτὸν were equal, no change would take place. It will be observed that 
the organ, whether it be internal or the flesh, has its own temperature and its 
own degree of hardness or softness when it is not functioning as an organ of 
touch. Qué organ, it may be δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, but it is also in actuality of this 
or that temperature, this or that hardness or softness. If we touch something 
and pronounce it hard, the hand itself must be soft as compared with what it 
touches: and similarly if with the same hand we touch something else and 
pronounce it soft, the hand must be hard compared with what it now touches. 
The same hand, then, must be soft to the one thing, hard to the other, and we 
perceive in the first case the excess and in the second case the defect of 
hardness in the object as compared with the hand: the hand itself, then, in 
point of resistance, lies between the two. Cf. Meteor. Iv. 4 3828 17 ἐπεὶ δὲ 
πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν πάντα κρίνομεν τὰ αἰσθητά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ 
μαλακὸν ἁπλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἁφὴν ὡρίκαμεν, ὡς μεσότητι χρώμενοι τῇ ἄφῃ διὸ τὸ μὲν 
ὑπερβάλλον αὐτῆς σκληρόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐλλεῖπον μαλακὸν εἶναί φαμεν. 


414 NOTES IL 11 


a4. ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως. On ὡς with an absolute case, “8 fact which implies,” 
see nofe on 411 Ὁ 26. Cf. 426b 3. Whether the inference is confined to 
touch or includes sense in general was not clear to Philop. (435, 25) αἴσθησιν νῦν 
τὸ αἰσθητήριον λέγει, μεσότητα δ᾽ εἶπε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἤτοι τὴν ἁφήν (περὶ ταύτης yap 
νῦν 6 λόγος) ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν. It is unimportant, for the general conclusion must be 
reached by induction from the particular senses and, as we see 4248 7—9, A. 
regards the induction as complete for the other senses. 

a4 μεσότητος...5 ἐναντιώσεως. Here we must anticipate the general conclusion 
to which the examination of each special sense has brought us nearer. A. says, 
426 b 8—12, that each special sense has its own province or γένος, bounded by 
a pair of opposites. All the sensible objects which come under its ken exhibit 
some quality (colour, odour, temperature, humidity, resistance), but in infinitely 
varying degrees. To perceive colour is to perceive white or black, or any of the 
various shades lying between the two. To perceive temperature is to be made 
sensible of what is extremely hot or extremely cold or is at any degree of heat 
or cold intermediate. Thus to the single province of each special sense corre- 
sponds a single contrariety, a sort of scale ranging from opposite to opposite 
and including every possible difference. See zofe on 422 Ὁ 23 μιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως. 
The sense, we know, is potentially any of its special sensibles and is assigned 
an intermediate position in the scale from opposite to opposite formed by them. 
This is obvious in regard to temperature. Our normal temperature is a mean 
between the opposite extremes, that is, the highest and lowest degrees of 
temperature perceived by us. The sense-organ has an intermediate place in 
the scale. It is constituted by different elements and hence is itself called their 
combining proportion, or the ratio of their admixture: cf. 426b 3, 7 λόγος [int. 
τῆς μείξεωςῆ. The term μεσότης recurs 431 a ΤΙ, 19, 435 a 21. It is implied 
that the organ, being neutral or indifferent, is capable of receiving the opposite 
determinations. 

a5. ϑιὰ τοῦτος Because it is a mean and a mean is the best empirical 
standard. κρίνει. See 4l1a 4 and zote. The discrimination, which is 
implied in all perception, has not been hitherto specially emphasised in the 
treatment of the several senses, but from 426b Io it is clear that it belongs to 
every act of sensation. To perceive an object by sense, to pronounce a judg- 
ment upon it, to receive its form without the matter, are various modes of de- 
scribing what is substantially one and the same act. Cf κρίνει 418 a 14, 4228 21. 

a6. πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν, relatively to each of the extremes in turn. The 
subject to γίνεται is τὸ μέσον. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1108b 15 ὥσπερ yap τὸ ἴσον πρὸς 
μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως ai μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν Tas 
ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ 
ταῖς πράξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν 
θρασὺν δειλός. Cf. Phys. VIII. 8, 2628 19 (where A. is speaking of points on a 
line) τρεῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀρχῆς μέσου τελευτῆς, τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἄμφω ἐστί: cf. 
262 ἃ 21---26. 

a7. ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον. Cf. supra 4178 6 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἐνεργείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον κτὲ. 

aI0. καὶ ἀοράτον. Cf. 418b 26—29, 422 a 20 566. 

ail. ἦν, “is, as we saw.” Cf. 41949, 4248 31. 

aii. wos. Cf. 422 a 22 ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ σκότους. ἀντικειμένων, int. 
ἦσαν. This was shown for smelling 421 Ὁ 5 sq., for tasting 422 a 20. 

αι 12. ἄναπτον. The intangible may be that which has too small a differ- 
ential quality to be perceived by touch, or it may have the quality in large 
excess, 50 that it is more than the organ can take in without suffering. 


ΤΠ. 12 4248 4—a 17 415 


8. 13. διαφορὰν, “qualitative difference,” almost the same as quality. Air 
resembles ourselves, being not very hot or very cold, and the small difference 
of temperature causes it to have a very small differential quality. Cf. Them. 
77, 24 H., 141, 28 Sp. ἄναπτον δὲ τό τε μικρὰν παντάπασιν ἔχον Kat ἀμυδρὰν τῶν 
ἁπτῶν διαφοράν, Philop. 436, 24 τὰ ἠρέμα ἅπτά- τοιαῦτα δ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὰ μὴ πολὺ 
ἀφεστηκότα τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατὰ τὰς ἁπτὰς ποιότητας. So taken, διαφορὰν τῶν 
ἁπτῶν practically=d:aphopay ἁπτήν. It is possible, however, to take τῶν ἁπτῶν 
as a partitive genitive depending upon τὸ ἔχον, “that of tangibles which has an 
extremely slight difference.” Or, if dsadopa=“ distinctive character,” ‘that of 
tangibles which has the [tangible] quality in an extremely slight degree.” So 
Professor Beare, p. 196, with zo¢e 2. The parallel passages 421 b 7 sq., 422a 30 
lead us to expect the accusative after ¢yov to be that which in touch corresponds 
to ὀσμὴ and χυμός: and, as this has no name (cf. 422 b 32 sq.), it may very well 
be replaced by διαφορὰν τῶν ἁπτῶν. 

Madvig, 4 dversaria 1. 472, proposed τῶν ἁπτόντων for τῶν darév and would 
then translate διαφορὰν “difference,” not “quality.” The clause would then 
run “ ἄναπτον includes tangibles very slightly different (In temperature etc.) from 
those touching,” i.e. from the subject. Thus Madvig makes A. insert a clause 
explaining why things with small differential qualities are termed intangible. 

al4. πέπονθεν. Cf. 4308 13. τῶν array ai ὑπερβολαί. Here τῶν ἁπτῶν 
should naturally bear the same sense as in the preceding line, which makes 
against Madvig’s proposed change. In 4248 4 τῶν ὑπερβολῶν Means no more 
than the excess of the quality over that of the sense-organ which is necessary to 
sense-perception at all, if it consists in the transition from δύναμις to ἐνέργεια. 
Here it means extravagant excess of quality, deranging the organ as such. Cf. 
424 a 29, 4268. 30, Ὁ 7, 435 Ὁ 8, 15, 18. 

Αἰ 15. φθαρτικά. Violent excesses of the quality in the object derange and 
destroy the sense-organ in its attempt to apprehend them. Cf. 422a 31, 33, 
421 Ὁ 23—25. 


CHAPTER XII. 


424a 17—28. Sense in general must be understood to be the re- 
cipient of various sensible forms apart from the matter. As wax receives the 
impression of the signet-ring without the material, iron, gold, or bronze, that is, 
takes the imprint of the material, but not gzd@ material, so sense is affected by 
objects possessing colour, flavour, or sound, not as so many concrete objects, 
but as coloured, flavoured, or sonorous, that is, in respect of their notion or 
character [§ 1]. As soon as any part of the organism exhibits this sort of 
capacity, we have a sense-organ. Thus the organ and the faculty are identical, 
though in aspect different: the organ which perceives being something ex- 
tended, while sensitivity, or sense in the abstract, instead of being something 
extended, is, so to say, a Character or capacity of the organ [§ 2]. 

4244 17. καθόλου. The five senses have been severally treated in chapters 
7 ἴο 11. It remains to consider what statements we can make concerning all 
the senses collectively, that is concerning sense as a whole (412 Ὁ 24). See 
note on 410 Ὁ 26. ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις. What precisely is “sense,” which we here 
proceed to define? Is it the organ or the faculty? The answer, given in 
424 a 24 sq., is that it is both: or rather organ and faculty are one and the same 
under different aspects. And so we must interpret the useful, if somewhat less 


416 NOTES Il. 12 


exact, summary 426 b 8 ἑκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, 
ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἣ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ 
διαφοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις. ὁμοίως δ᾽ 
ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 

4 18. δεκτικὸν. Cf 418 Ὁ 26 ἔστι δὲ χρώματος μὲν δεκτικὸν τὸ ἄχρουν, ψόφον 
δὲ τὸ ἄψοφον. Sense is “receptive” as being “passive” or “acted upon” and 
also as being potentially what the object is actually. The same statement is 
made of τὸ αἰσθητήριον 425 Ὁ 23, 435 a 22. Cf also 414 ἃ 8—I0, 429 a 15. 
τῶν αἰσθητών εἰδών. Sensible objects have form as well as matter. Sense, as 
we shall see, is form, and, as such, it apprehends form. The “sensible forms” 
of the text are therefore the forms of sensible things, the qualities in them 
which constitute them what they are, the red of the red thing, the sound of the 
resonant thing, the flavour of the flavoured thing. Each of these qualities, 
taken in itself, is a universal, or καθόλου, in A.’s language τοιόνδε, not τόδε τι, 
Anal. Post. τ. 31, 87 Ὁ 28 sq. 

alg. τοῦ δακτυλίου depends grammatically upon a 20 τὸ σημεῖον. It is 
placed thus early and close to ὁ κηρὸς in order to correspond to τῶν αἰσθητῶν 
εἰδῶν in relation to τὸ δεκτικόν. 

a2I. οὐχ ἢ χρυσὸς, int. 6 daxrvAcds ἐστι, “not in so far as the ring is gold....” 
Note that this phrase replaces the ἄνευ... τοῦ χρυσοῦ of the previous clause. 
With this use of the simile compare De Mem. 1, 450a 30—b 3 ἢ γὰρ γιγνομένῃ 
κίνησις évonpaiverat οἷον τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ of σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς 
δακτυλίοις xré., where it is applied not to the original “motion” of sensation 
but to the subsequent retention or survival of that motion in φαντασία. Cf. 
De A. 428 Ὁ το sqq. 

a 22. ἑκάστου. The genitive must express the special sensible in each case: 
426 b 8 rot ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ, 428 Ὁ 18 ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων. Thus ἑκάστου 
= whatever it be that sense perceives, whether colour or sound or flavour. Cf. 
425 Ὁ 24, 430b 6, also 426b 16 αὐτοῦ -- τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. Similarly 418a 17 “such 
and such objects are called special sensibles of the sense, whatever it be, which 
perceives them.” 

a 23. ἢ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται. This means that the object acts upon sense 
not in so far as it is a concrete object, but in so far as it is coloured or flavoured, 
or sonorous: e.g. when we perceive the white rose by sight, it is not the rose 
gué rose, but the rose gud white, which acts upon the sight. The ring im- 
presses the wax, not gwd metal, but in so far as it has a particular shape. τὰ 
ἔχον χρῶμα is some particular object, τόδε rs, yet it is not as τόδε τι Or τοῦτο that 
it acts upon sense, but solely as τοιονδί, coloured. Hence ἐκείνων refers to 
424 8. 22 τοῦ ἔχοντος...23 ψόφον, ἐκείνων being rightly used for “the other 
things” or the substances possessed of sensible qualities as distinguished from 
the sensible qualities themselves to which sense is related: cf. a 22 ἡ αἴσθησις 
ἑκάστου. We may ask, is ἕκαστον subject or predicate? If it is subject, as. 
seems probable, it must be understood again as predicate, for τοιονδὶ is 
predicate (a 24) and ἕκαστον ἐκείνων must correspond to τοιονδί; or, which 
comes to the same thing, λέγεται must be taken=‘“‘is so called,” is called what 
it 15, Viz. some individual concrete thing. Cf. 412 a 8, 429b 6, Metaph. 1018b 3 
καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει ἀλλήλων ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ λεγόμενα (int. ἐναντία] πρώτως, 
called contraries in the primary sense of the term. 

a24. towvil. This serves as a general term for “coloured, flavoured, 
sonorous,” or for epithets denoting particular colours, flavours or sounds, 
“white etc., sweet etc., shrill etc.” A. commonly uses τοιονδὲ as opposed to 
τόδε re for the category of quality as opposed to the category of substance- 


II. 12 424 a I7—a 26 417 


καὶ, explanatory. κατὰ τὸν λόγον, “in virtue of its form,” ‘‘on the formal 
side.” With this adverbial use of the phrase cf. 412 b 10 sq., where it is an 
attribute of οὐσίας. The terms λόγος and εἶδος are equivalent (see first zofe on 
403 b 2), but the former gives prominence to the notion or character, that 
which the definition seeks to express in words. The whole sentence merely 
expands a 18 sq. “receptive of the form without the matter.” As the soul 
itself is the formal essence of the animal (οὐσέα ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον), i.e. the form 
without the matter, so the sensible acts on sense in virtue of its form alone to 
the exclusion of its matter. πρῶτον. For this expression cf. 422 b 22, moze. 
Here, however, it is decidedly preferable to understand πρῶτον in the same 
way, €-g-, aS 412a 27, Ὁ 5 ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη. We have gone through the 
several senses and found various parts of the body employed as sense-organs. 
The common characteristic of them all is that in them the sensory faculty 
resides. Thus seeing resides in the pupil of the eye 412 b 20 sq., and so on. 
This is a provisional view, which will require to be modified when we consider 
sensus communis. There seems no ground for introducing at this stage τὸ 
κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον, “the organ of this sexzsus communis,” that which is at the 
back of the several senses (for which see 426 b 12—427 a 16), as is done by some 
commentators, e.g. M. Rodier: “Le sensorium premier est celui dans lequel 
réside cette faculté (la sensibilité en général).” 

a25. ἢ τοιαύτη δύναμις. The power, or capacity, to apprehend the form 
without the matter, as above explained. ἔστι μὲν οὖν, int. τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ 7 
δύναμις. Thus Them. 78, 14 H., 143, ὃ sqq. Sp. καὶ τῷ μὲν ὑποκειμένῳ ταὐτὸν F 
re αἴσθησις καὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον...τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἕτερον τοῦ τε ὀργάνου καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. 
τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἕτερον. A. wants to say that the sense-faculty and the sense-organ 
are inseparable: you cannot have one without the other. Without the faculty 
the dead organ is a mere ὁμώνυμον or ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενον, so called by courtesy 
(cf. 412b 14, 21, Metaph. 1035 Ὁ 14—18, 22—25, 1036b 28—32, Pol. 1253a 21). 
But they are essentially different; the one is an organ, the other a faculty, the 
one has magnitude, the other is unextended; the sense is a δύναμις connected 
with the organ, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἡ αἰσθητήριον. 426b9. The organ 
and its faculty are one and the same, but we can separate the two in thought. 
If we look at the organ (τὸ aio@avdpevoy) as a concrete thing and take account 
of its matter, it is an extended magnitude: if we abstract from the matter and 
attend only to the form, it is a power or faculty residing in this extended 
. magnitude, but itself unextended and immaterial. That which each of these 
two aspects zs can be expressed by τὸ εἶναι: the aspects are different; the 
act of thinking is different for each of them; as the notion whereby we think 
each aspect is different, so the definition which expresses this notion in words 
is different. Sometimes A. will prefer to say that two things are ἕτερα 
(or οὐ ταὐτὸν) τῷ εἶναι, τῇ νοήσει, τῷ λόγῳ: Sometimes, as here, he says that in 
the two cases τὸ εἶναι ἔτερόν ἐστιν. The aspect or εἶναι of the one is not the 
aspect or the εἶναι of the other. Organ and faculty, like uphill and downhill, 
are logically distinct. Their mutual implication appears in such phrases as 
“poor sight,” “a good ear,” “a delicate touch.” 

a26. ἄν τι εἴη. The mode of expression with ἄν and the optative implies 
no sort of doubt in this conclusion, the suppressed protasis being ‘“‘if the 
foregoing is true.” In fact the potential optative here approximates in meaning 
to the indicative (Goodwin, JZ. amd 7. § 238; cf. Gildersleeve 442) and the 
ancient commentators paraphrase by ἐστί: Them. (78, 17 H., 143, 12 Sp.) τὸ 
μὲν yap ὄργανον μέγεθός τι καὶ σῶμά ἐστιν : Simpl. (167, 31) τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀμέριστον, 
ἡ δὲ ἀνειλιγμένη ἐστὶν οὐσία. Cf. Philop. 438, 30 sqq. See zofes on 403 4 9, 


H. 27 


418 NOTES II. 12 


421 Ὁ 20. τὸ αἰσθανόμενον. What is said is equally true of the whole per- 
cipient organism and of the particular organ. τό ye αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι. Cf. 
408 a 25, γοΐσ, 413 Ὦ 29 54.. 429 Ὁ Io 566. 

8 28. ἐκείνου, int. τοῦ aicGavopévov. Receptivity in the abstract is an im- 
material form. Such a form is properly called a Adyos because it alone can be 
rationally defined or (in other words) is the content of the definition, cf. 424 a 24 
κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Again, it is a δύναμες because it represents what a thing is good 
for, or is able to effect or be. Thus musical or medical skill “determines” the 
musician or physician, making him what he is: Pol. 1253 a 23 πάντα δὲ τῷ 
ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει. For the combination of λόγος and δύναμις, the 
character and capacity, cf. De Gen. Am. 11. 1, 731 Ὁ 19 τίς ἡ δύναμις καὶ ὁ λόγος 
τῆς οὐσίας [int. τοῦ θήλεος καὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος}, and for δύναμις as equivalent to form 
cf. Pol. 1323 Ὁ 33 ἀνδρία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ᾧρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει 
δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, and De Ges. e¢ Corr. 1. 5, 322a 28 τοῦτο δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄνευ 
ὕλης, οἷον ἄῦλος δύναμίς τις ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστίν. 

424a 28-—b18. If the sense-organ is too violently affected from 
without, its constituent form, that is to say, its capacity to perceive, is destroyed. 
The reason for this will be evident from the foregoing [§ 3]. Again, the absence 
of sensibility in plants, in spite of their having a vital principle and being acted 
upon by tangible objects, is due to the fact that they have not in them any 
capacity of receiving the forms only, apart from the matter, of sensibles [§ 4]. 
Further, a question arises: In the absence of perceptive faculty, can the 
sensible quality, e.g. odour, produce any effect short of perception? Apparently 
not: the effect, e.g., of odour is either smelling or nothing at all. Besides, it 
is the medium or vehicle of the sensible quality, and not the sensible quality 
itself, which directly affects bodies [8 5]. But the objects of touch and taste do 
produce effects apart from perception. Why not, then, it may be urged, the 
ebjects of the other senses? What, e.g., is smelling except being acted upon by 
odour? To this we reply: Smelling involves sentience; the air, acted upon by 
odour, becomes not sentient, but sensible [§ 6]. 

424 α 28 φανερὸν 8’...29 τὰ αἰσθητήρια. This well-known maxim became 
stereotyped amongst the scholastics as excellenms senstétle corrumptt sensum, or 
senstbilium excellentia corrumptt sensum, Cf 422 a 21 ἔτι τοῦ λίαν λαμπροῦ (καὶ 
yap τοῦτο ἀόρατον). Dante is fond of bringing in this fact, Purgatorio 8, 36 Ma 
nelle facce I’ occhio si smarria, | Come virtt, ch’ a troppo si confonda, where 
νἰτι Ξε ἀρετὴ of the faculty: A. says the λόγος or δύναμις is spoiled, and the organ 
when it can no longer function has to all intents and purposes ceased to be an 
organ. See wofe on 422 ἃ 31, and cf. supra 421 Ὁ 23, 422 a 29-—33, 424 a 14, 15, 
also 4268 30—b7, 429 a 29—b 3. 

a 30. ἡ κίνησις. Clearly the corporeal change in the corporeal organ. It 
is attended either by no perception at all, or by a painful effort and failure to 
perceive accurately. Cf. 426b 7 λυπεῖ ἢ φθείρει, 429 8 31—b 3. λύεται ὁ Adyos. 
We are tempted to understand by λόγος the quantitative proportion in which 
materials are compounded in the sense-organ, the κρᾶσις or ἁρμονία τῶν μειχθέν-- 
τῶν of 407 Ὁ 328q., see mole on 4248 4, μεσότητος. But it seems probable that 
even here the word bears the same meaning as in the previous section, namely 
“character” or “form,” which the quantitative proportion may, however, be 
regarded as conditioning. 

8.31. τοῦτο 8’, int. ὁ λόγος, τὸ αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι, a 27, 28 supra. ἦν. Cf. 
424 ἃ 11. ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συμφωνία καὶ ὁ τόνος, int. λύονται: συμφωνία is the 
blending of two or more sounds or notes, which may form either a chord or 
an unison in octaves. Cf. AMefaph. 1043 a 10 συμφωνία δὲ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος μῖξις 


11. 12 424 ἃ 26---Ὁ 3 419 


τοιαδί, But the notes which are capable of being so blended into one are 
determined by numerical proportion, λόγος ἀριθμῶν, and ultimately by number 
itself: Anal. Post. 11. 2, 90a 18 sqq., PAys. τι. 3, τοῦ ἃ 29 sqq., De Sensu 3 
439b 31 sq. (ἐν ἀριθμοῖς εὐλογίστοις). Thus the ratio of the double, 2: 1, de- 
termines the octave, that of the ἡμιόλιον, 3 : 2, determines the fifth and that of 
ἐπίτριτον, 4 : 3, determines the fourth. Jan has collected the relevant passages 
of Aristotle in Musicz Scripiores, De Consonantia, pp. 18—22; cf. 74. pp. 84——111 
from Problems XIX. 

a 32. 6 τόνος, “the tension” (of the string) and so the pitch of the note 
produced by it. Cf. Physiogn. 2, 807 a 16 τόν τε τόνον ἀνίησε καὶ βαρὺ φθέγγεται. 
The effect of striking the lyre too violently is that the strings get out of tune 
and what should be a harmonious chord becomes a discord. The two strings, 
e.g., that should emit a perfect fifth produce notes which refuse to blend in 
concord. καὶ διὰ τί ποτε...33 οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, Cf. 411 b 28, 415 a 1 566. 

a 33. μόριον Ψυχικὸν, namely the vegetative or nutritive principle, soul or 
faculty. Cf. 414a 32 ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον. Cf. also 
411 b 27 sqq., 4348 22---26. 

α 34. πάσχοντά τι; ψιλὰ τὰ εἴδη δέχεσθαι, Them. 78, 32 H., 144,4 Sp. We 
have the clearest evidence that tangibles, if not other sensible objects, act upon 
plants. The question whether the plant can see or hear is not so likely to 
arise. Plants are acted upon, or affected, but not (like animals) in such a 
manner as to take the form of objects without the matter. 

424b1. τὸ pr ἔχειν μεσότητα. Heat is in no part of the plant so tempered as 
to be in respect of temperature and humidity, like the flesh in animals, inter- 
mediate between any two degrees of these qualities presented by tangible 
objects. The simple organs of plants are incapable of discriminating the 
differences of the sensible qualities in objects. See 412b1sq.,411b23. This 
illustrates the importance of μέσον or μεσότης to A. Plato’s term μέτριον in 
Philebus and Polzticus is more appropriate. See Prof. J. A. Stewart on £74. 
Vic. 1106 Ὁ 8—16, Notes ov Nic. Ethics τ. p. τοῦ sq. 

b3. πάσχειν pera τῆς ὕλης, Le. “at the same time as they receive the form 
of anything, they receive the matter likewise” (Wallace). As Them. says 
(78, 36 H., 144, το Sp.) πάσχει οὖν συνεισιούσης τῆς ὕλης τῆς τοῦ ποιοῦντος. They 
are affected by tangibles in the same way as they absorb nutriment. The plants 
cannot be warmed or cooled unless material vapour or moisture enters them, let 
us say, by the pores, in the very way in which Empedocles and Democritus 
supposed sensation to take place in animals. But such an explanation of 
sentience or sensation A. has left far behind, as modern botany has superseded 
his own crude view of the physiology of plants. Philop., while mentioning the 
view taken above, inclines to a different view which interprets pera τῆς ὕλης by 
κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ὕλην πάσχειν τρεπομένην καὶ μεταβάλλουσαν, in the plant’s own 
matter, ὑλικῶς καὶ σωματικῶς. The plant’s own matter then is modified by 
contact with heat and cold, the sensible qualities get so far and penetrate no 
further: (440, 23) ἢ γὰρ ὑποκειμένη αὐτοῖς ὕλη ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πάσχουσα ἐν 
ἑαυτῇ δέχεται τὰ πάθη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὕλη αὐτῶν γινομένη καὶ ὡς ὕλη αὐτὰ δεχομένη 
εἰς ἑαυτήν, ὡσεὶ καὶ ἄψυχος ἦν. But we cannot overlook the marked contrast to 
424 a 18, ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, nor does anything A. says justify us in assimilating what 
takes place in plants to the case where τὸ πάσχον, as well as τὸ ποιοῦν, 15 
lifeless. 

b 3. drop ‘cae δ᾽ ἄν. The gist of the following discussion comes out more 
clearly in the paraphrase of Them. (79, 13 sqq. H., 145, 1 sqq. Sp.) than in the 
text of A. itself. The question seems to be suggested by the case of plants. 


27 ---- 2 


420 NOTES II. 12 


Granted that plants do not smell and do not see, are they, then, wholly un- 
influenced by odour or by colour? The influence of light on the growth of 
plants is notorious. Does a noxious smell really do you any harm? A.’s 
contention is that the smell does you no harm. There may be something else 
noxious. The smell is a sort of danger signal. This corrects the too brief and 
summary statement of 421 b 23, which, however, applied to animals only (cf. 
4124 Ὁ 8 τῶν δυνατῶν). 

86. εἴ τι ποιεῖ. Whatever effect odour produces consists in smelling and 
in nothing else. In the εἰ clause, the verb ποιεῖ has its general signification 
(st guid agit), in the apodosis its special signification (efctz). See xoze on 
4248 2 τοιοῦτον. One of the conditions for the mutual interaction of bodies, 
ποιεῖν τι aNd πάσχειν τῷ is that they should be in contact, either directly or 


through a medium. Cf. 424b 12. τὴν ὄσφρησιν ὑἡ ὀσμὴ ποιεῖ, The same 
argument is used 421 Ὁ 21--23. 
Ὁ 8. 6 8 αὐτὸς... τῶν ἄλλων. This sentence is parenthetic. οὐδὲ τῶν 


δυνατών, int. αἰσθάνεσθαι. From the particular sense of smell A. has passed to 
the case of sensation generally. Anything capable of sensation cannot be acted 
upon by a sensible object unless it possesses the particular sense which that 
object can stimulate. An animal with no other sense than that of touch cannot 
see, hear or smell: colours, sounds and odours fail to act upon it. 

Ὁ 9. καὶ οὕτως, i.e. by the following argument. 

br. ἐν ots ἐστίν. The relative clause is used as in 408a 32, Ὁ 23 and 
implies ἐκεῖνα ἐν ols τὸ φῶς καὶ σκότος καὶ ὁ ψόφος καὶ ἡ ὀσμή εἰσιν, “the things 
which contain light, dark, sound or smell.” Cf. ἔχει ψόφον, 419 Ὁ 6 5α.: sound 
and smell are attributes of bodies, and so is τὸ διαφανές (418 b 6 Sq.), which is 
actually light, when it is not actually darkness. Cf. Philop. 442, 20 οὐχ ὑπὸ τῆς 
βροντῆς, ἢ ἀκουστόν, πάσχει τὰ ῥηγνύμενα ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς σώματα, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ 
ψοφοῦντος κινουμένου βιαίως πλησσόμενα διίσταται..«οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ ψόφου, 7 ψόφος 
ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκουστός. The difficulty arises from a failure to distinguish between 
the object of the sense and the thing in which it resides, between the thing 
itself and its visible (or audible or odorous) quality. Simpl. would seem to 
have taken φῶς as equivalent to colour: (170, 16) ὡς εἰ τὸ Keypoopévor...eis τὸ 
κάτω cuveboin, ot κατὰ τὸ χρῶμα δηλαδή. ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν βαρύτητα. Cf. 435 b 7—I12. 

biz. ἀλλὰ. A. foresees an objection to this effect: “If tangibles admittedly 
act upon bodies, how about the objects of the other senses?” He answers: 
““ If we take the same view of these other sensibles, we shall confuse ‘having a 
smell’ with ‘having a sense of smell”” The passage is not very clear, but A. 
insists upon making the theory apply uniformly to all the special sensibles alike. 
I conceive the objection introduced at Ὁ 12 ἀλλὰ to be developed as far as Ὁ 14 
κἀκεῖνα ἐμπτοιεῖ and A.’s first answer to extend from Ὁ 14 ἢ od πᾶν σῶμα to b 16 
παθῶν mr. He has then admitted πάσχειν τὶ and asks whether this does not 
carry with it αἰσθάνεσθαι, while the concluding sentence Ὁ 17 ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι 
cre. finally disposes of the objection. 

Ὁ 12. of χυμοὶ. The effects of brine (salt water) or of acid upon vegetables 
and many minerals are instances. But, as Them. points out, the effect in these 
cases is due not to the “taste” of these juices (yupot)—acids, alkalis or salts— 
but to their intrinsic qualities (79, 19 sq. H., 145, 11 sq. Sp.). εἰ yap μή. How 
can the palpable facts of change and modification in inanimate things be 
explained except by assuming that these inanimate objects are acted upon 
by other tangible things? 

bi4. dp’ οὖν. “Shall we then say that the objects of the other senses 
produce modification in things?” It seems at first sight doubtful whether this 


11. 12 424 Ὁ 3—b 18 421 


expresses A.’s own view. κἀκεῖνα, 1.6. the objects of the other three senses 
also, things visible, things resonant and things odorous. ἢ οὐ xré. We 
should naturally expect a clause commencing with 4 to introduce the solution 
provided by the author. A. may be supposed to put his reply in the form of a 
question: “Will odour and sound, therefore, also produce modification in in- 
animate things? or is it the fact that only some things can be acted upon by 
odour and sound, while others cannot?” 

bi5. καὶ τὰ πάσχοντα ἀόριστα, καὶ ov μένει. “And the bodies which are 
susceptible are indeterminate and shifting and do not permanently remain what 
in quality they are made by the odour, sound etc.” Cf. the Heraclitean dictum 
πάντα ῥεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μέν ει. οἷον ἀήρ- ὄζει yap. The γὰρ explains why air is an 
instance. It “has scent ”—is perfumed—from having been (just) acted upon. 

Ὁ τό. τί οὖν. What, then, it may be said, is “smelling” beyond just this 
being acted upon? How, that is, does smelling differ from being affected, or 
acted upon, by odours? 

bi7. πάσχειν τι. Here τὶ must be accusative, following so closely upon 
παθών τι, Ὁ 16. Cf. moles on 410a 25, 4244 I. 

Ὁ 17. ἤ introduces A.’s final solution. The difference is that smelling 
involves perception (literally “is also perception”), whereas air, after being 
acted upon, does not perceive, but on the contrary is itself actually perceived. 
Cf. 421 b 21 εἴπερ τῆς ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεται. 

b18. ταχέως. The suggestion seems to be that, if odour or sound, acting 
on the air, quickly makes it odorous or sonorous, it will as rapidly lose these 
acquired properties. They “quickly come and quickly go”: cf. sufrvabi5 οὐ 
μένει. | In De Sensu, c. 6, odour and sound, the objects of smell and hearing, are 
said to be propagated gradually and to travel through the medium, reaching 
one percipient who is nearer sooner than one who is distant. αἰσθητὸς γίνεται. 
The net result, then, of the discussion, 424 Ὁ 3 sqq., is to make it very clear that, 
while we may say αἰσθάνεσθαι is πάσχειν τι; it is not invariably true that πάσχειν 
τι is αἰσθάνεσθαι. Air and water are the two great instances of wdoyxovra which 
are not αἰσθαν μενα. 


BOOK III. CHAPTER I. 


This chapter is closely connected with the preceding. In fact, it would 
have been better to begin Book 111. at c. 3, or even, as Zabarella appears to 
have done, at c. 4. 

4294 b 22--425a 13. The five senses discussed in the previous 
book are all that there are. This may be proved as follows: [premising that 
sensation is either direct, like touch, or indirect through a medium, like sight or 
hearing, we go on to state that] (1) All the tangible properties of objects are 
apprehended by touch, a sense which we possess. (2) As regards sight, hearing 
and smell, in which perception is through a medium, if the sense is wanting, it 
is because the sense-organ is wanting [this is so because animals, as such, 
possess the sensitive faculty which, given the appropriate organ, ensures every 
form of actual perception] [§ 1]. (3) Sense-organs are composed of the same 
elements as the corresponding media. (4) One and the same element may be 
the condition of our perceiving more than one kind of sensible: thus air is the 
medium of both colour and sound. And, if the same sensible can be perceived 
through the medium of more than one of the elements, as colour either through 
transparent air or through transparent water, either one of these two elements 
will serve to constitute the sense-organ [§ 2]. (5) Among the elements, how- 
ever, two only, viz. air and water, are fitted to form sense-organs [§ 3]. (6) Now 
sense-organs thus constituted, i.e. of air, water or both, are actually possessed 
by animals. [The sense-organ need not be wholly composed of the element 
essential to perception.] The inference from all this is that all possible means 
of sense-perception are possessed by animals, unless they be mutilated or not 
fully developed [8 4]. 

It has been doubted whether the foregoing argument is an induction or a 
demonstration. In the Aistory of Animals (Iv. 8, 532b 29), where the same 
question is treated, A. appeals to experience: περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων viv λεκτέον" 
ov yap ὁμοίως πᾶσιν ὑπάρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν πᾶσαι τοῖς δ᾽ ἐλάττους. εἰσὶ δ᾽ ai 
πλεῖσται, καὶ παρ᾽ ἃς οὐδεμία φαίνεται ἴδιος ἑτέρα, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν κτέ. Cf. 
De 4751 5, 444 Ὁ 19. But we hold with Alexander and Simplicius that the 
reasoning here is deductive. Cf. Alex. Aphr., ἀπ. καὶ Avo. 111. 6, p. 90, 3 566." 
De An. 66, 3 sqq., Simpl. 173, 32 sq-, 175, 34 8qq-, 178, 36sqq. Hegel is credited 
with having demonstrated, the very year in which the first asteroid was dis- 
covered, that seven must be the number of the planets. Aristotle, too, may well 
have thought that the plain fact of experience, “there are five senses and no 
more,” would be none the worse for being strongly fortified by argument. It 
goes without saying that the premisses of his hypothetical syllogisms are neither 
logically prior to nor better known than the fact they are supposed to establish. 
However, a different complexion will be put upon this dialectical feat if we 
accept the suggestion that it is directed against a supposed fanciful tenet of 
Democritus who, according to late authorities, maintained that some animals 
have senses which are lacking to man and that the number of αἰσθήσεις is 


111. I 424 Ὁ 24---Ὁ 30 423 


greater than the number of αἰσθητά, so great indeed that they escape observa- 
tion. The point is obscure, but, if any preceding philosopher indulged in such 
speculations as Stobaeus fathers upon Democritus, it would be not unnatural 
for A. to oppose them, not merely by the common-sense statement that things 
are what they are, but by an attempt to prove that they must be so and cannot 
be otherwise. See Aet., Plac. Iv. 10, 4, 5 (Doxogr. Gr. p. 399, 15) πλείους εἶναε 
αἰσθήσεις, περὶ τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα καὶ περὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς καὶ περὶ τοὺς θεούς, and again 
20. 399. 19 Δ. πλείους μὲν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τῷ δὲ μὴ Ἰἀναλογίζειν τὰ 
αἰσθητὰ τῷ πλήθει λανθάνειν, Lucret. IV. 794---803, Krische, Forschungen 154, 
Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. τ. 912, um. 1, 2, Natorp, Porschungen 177, 2. (ck. Archiv /. 
Gesch. @. Phil. τ. 350 sqq.), Siebeck, Gesch. der Psych. 1. 114, 22. 2, Diels, Vorsokr. 
p. 388, Beare 206 sq. It is assumed throughout that fire, air, earth and water 
are the only “elements” in our region of the physical universe: hence the 
qualification in 425 a ΤΙ “provided there exist no unknown body with unknown 
properties.” This caution would safeguard the argument in the event, however 
improbable A. may have considered it, of the discovery of new forces in nature 
and new senses in living things correlative to them. 

424 Ὁ 24. εἰ γὰρ. Here begins the first of six clauses of a complex protasis, 
followed at length in 425a9 by an apodosis πᾶσαι dpa xré. Bonitz, to whom 
the elucidation of the construction is due, paraphrases the first clause as follows: 
εἰ yap καὶ viv αἴσθησιν τούτων πάντων ἔχομεν ὧν ἡ αἴσθησις ἁφῇ γίγνεται. Madvig 
questioned this punctuation, proposing in its place εἰ γὰρ παντός, οὗ ἐστὶν αἴσ- 
θησις, ἁφή, καὶ νῦν αἴσθησιν ἔχομεν κτέ. in order to make out that ἁφὴ is involved 
in all the senses. But touch is here discriminated from the senses which have 
separable media, the flesh—as explained in II., c. 11—being an inseparable 


medium of touch. καὶ νῦν, “as it is,” “constituted as we are.” In these 
words there is a suggestion of a difference between the natural and the possible. 
See 425 a 9. 


b 25. πάντα γὰρ. This is the first of many parentheses which complicate 
and retard the course of the argument. The statement seems to differ from the 
premiss, which it purports to prove, by the careful qualification of ra row ἁπτοῦ 
οὐ πάθη by 7 ἅπτόν (int. τὸ ἁπτόν ἐστιν). 

Ὁ 26. ἀνάγκη τ΄. This is the second premiss. ἐκλείπει. For this use of 
the word cf. Amal. Post. 1. 18, 81a 38 φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἴ τις αἴσθησις ἐκλέ- 
λοιπτεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐκλελοιπέναι. 

Ὁ 27 ὅσων μὲν...29 ὅσα 8 The stress is on the second of the antithetical 
clauses, which introduces objects of “mediate” perception and so constitutes 
the third premiss, the μὲν clause merely rehearsing the contents of the first 
premiss. 

Ὁ 28. αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι. Here and in Ὁ 29 μὴ αὐτῶν ἅπτ. we must understand 
τῶν αἰσθητῶν. In this passage A. even goes so far as to speak of the two 
senses which work through an inseparable medium as working by immediate 
contact. This is inexactly stated, but there is no uncertainty as to A.’s real 
position. We perceive tangibles “by direct contact” only in the sense that we 
are proprietors of the medium, while of air and water we are not proprietors. 
The inexact statement of the text, in fact, returns to the popular view which had 
been corrected in Il.,c. 11. See 426b 16, 4358 17 and mode on 423 11. The 
phrase also recurs De Sensu 7, 449 a 24 καὶ ὅσων μὴ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι αἰσθάνονται. 

Ὁ 29. διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ, “through media,” i.e. through separable media, for A. 
adds his own explanation in the words λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι in 424 Ὁ 30. 

b 30. τοῖς ἁπλοῖς, int. αἰσθανόμεθα. The words practically repeat διὰ τῶν 
μεταξύ, defining it a little more closely. 


424 NOTES IITl. I 

b3r. ἔχει δ᾽ οὕτως, ὥστε. The clause with ὥστε, a clause of actual result, 
expresses how the case stands: “if on the one hand...then it is necessary 
(b 32 ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ) that...; ifon the other...then the possessor of either of these will 
perceive (425 a2 καὶ ὃ τὸ ἕτερον... «αἰσθήσεται xré.).” It will be seen that ἔχει δ᾽ οὕτως 
Sore is merely a variant on the more common συμβαίνει ὥστε and might be 
translated “this being so, it follows that.” érepa...32 τῷ γένει, “ generically 
different,” as colours, odours and sounds, μὴ ὁμογενῆ (431 ἃ 24). The test of 
identity or difference of sensibles as given in De Sensu 7, 447 Ὁ 21—26 is that 
the object is numerically one, provided it be perceived in the same instantaneous 
act: it is specifically one and the same, if perceived by the same sense and in 
the same manner. 

b 32. τὸ τοιοῦτον, i.e. corresponding to the medium. 

b 34. ἔστιν 6 ἀὴρ καὶ ψόφου καὶ χρόας, “the air is related to, stands in 
relation with, both sound and colour.” Cf. 418 a 12, zoze. As being dia- 
phanous, air is the medium of colour, while, as διηχής. it is the medium for 
sound. εἰ δὲ πλείω, 1.6. if there be more media than one. 

425al. τοῦ αὐτοῦ, int. αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν. οἷον χρόας καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ, “for 
example, both air and water are media of colour.” 

a2. καὶ 6 τὸ ἕτερον, even the percipient who has but one of the two. Of 
the two media only one 15 available for him. τοῦ Sv ἀμφοῖν, int. αἰσθητοῦ, the 
object that is capable of being perceived through both media, air and water. 

a3. τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν. Partitive genitive depending on δύο τούτων, with which 
μόνον goes closely: “it is from these two alone of the simple bodies that etc.” 
αἰσθητήρια. From this point onward it must be noted that A. uses the word in 
a narrower sense for the organs of the telepathic senses, sight, hearing and 
smell, as distinguished from touch, which, in conformity with the popular 
opinion, he considers to be effected by direct contact. See Beare, p. 245, also 
mote on 424 Ὁ 28 sufra. For another instance of αἰσθητήριον in this narrower 
sense see 435 a 15 and zoze. 

a4 ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόρη. Cf. De Semsu 2, 438 Ὁ 16 dor εἴπερ τούτων τι συμβαίνει, 
καθάπερ λέγομεν, φανερὸν ὡς εἰ δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀποδιδόναι καὶ προσάπτειν 
ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑνὶ τῶν στοιχείων, τοῦ μὲν ὄμματος τὸ ὁρατικὸν ὕδατος 
ὑποληπτέον, ἀέρος δὲ τὸ τῶν ψόφων αἰσθητικόν, πυρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν. This 
passage agrees with De A.as to the eye andthe ear. It differs as to the organ 
of smelling, because the object of smell, which the organ is potentially, is differ- 
ently conceived, viz. as καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις, whereas it was ξηρὸν 422 a 6, as it 
is ἔγχυμον ξηρὸν in De Sensu,c.5. This discrepancy in respect of the organ of 
smeli has led some to think that it is not his own view which A. is there 
expounding. See Baeumker, Arist. Lehre v. d. dussern und tnnern Sinnesver- 
mitogen, Pp. 30 54.. 47, 7 4, Zeller, Aristotle, τι. p. 62, 2. 3, E.T.: cf. Alex. Aphr., 
ad De Sensu 37, 7 564.» 38, 12 sqq. W. But A. may have subsequently modified 
an earlier view as to the composition of the organ of smell. See Prof. Beare, 
p. 148, 2. 5, p. 155 and Mr Ὁ. R. T. Ross ad loc. The former suggests (p. 155) 
that cc. 2 and 5 of De Sensw may have been written at a considerable interval 
of time from each other and (p. 282) that c. 7 of the same work was “perhaps 
chronologically Aristotle’s first essay on the subject of simultaneous perception 
of different sensibles,” i.e. earlier than De «4. Il.,c.2. “The de Semsu seems 
to contain,” he says, p. 244, zoze, “preliminary essays on certain subjects of the 
larger work de Anima, which may therefore (notwithstanding many references, 
e.g. 436 a 1 544.) be regarded as possibly later.” In plan and intention De 4. 
certainly came before the Parva Naturalia, as is fully borne out by the 
anticipations and cross-references. But doubtless these courses of lectures 


III. I 424 Ὁ 31—425 a 13 425 


were several times repeated with additions and modifications,*so that some 
things in the subsidiary lectures may be chronologically earlier than some 
things in the principal course, the De A. as we now have it. 

a4 ἡ 8 ἀκοὴ...5 ὄσφρησις. Here, as above 419 a 13, 423 Ὁ 19, the term properly 
denoting the operation of a sense is used to denote the corresponding organ. 
For ὄσφρησις used of the organ cf. De Sensu 2, 438b 20 πυρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν, 
cited in the last mote. Cf. also De Gen. An. τι. 6, 744a 2 ἡ δ᾽ ὄσφρησις 
καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ πόροι συνάπτοντες πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα τὸν θύραθεν, πληρεῖς συμφύτου 
πνεύματος, 425a 7 ἐν τῇ ἀφῇ. 

8. 5. θατέρου, “ of one or other” of these, viz. of water in the case of water- 
animals, of air in the case of land-animals. στὸ δὲ πῦρ ἢ οὐθενὸς, int. αἰσθητικοῦ. 
Fire is related to, is the medium of, no sense-faculty. As the medium is 
between the percipient faculty and the perceived object, it may be described as 
related to either; and the context, οὐθὲν γὰρ ἄνευ θερμότητος αἰσθητικόν, shows 
that here the reference is to the percipient. The same remark applies to a 6 γῆ. 
Cf. 435 a 11---24. 

az. ἐν τῇ ddpy. Cf. De Sensu 2, 438 Ὁ 30 ro δ᾽ ἁπτικὸν γῆς [int. ἐστίν. 
μάλιστα, more than in any other perceptive organ or part. ἰδίως qualifies 
μέμεικται. The presence of earth in the organ is essential to its performance of 
its function. It has to perceive all tangible qualities, of which the properties 
belonging to earth are some of the most important. Cf. 435 a 22 sq. The 
presence of fire ensures that the remaining tangibles are perceptible. διὸ 
λείποιτ᾽ dv. This means that, if we take away air and water, there is nothing 
left of which to make a sense-organ. Fire will not do, earth will not do, and 
we have already organs into whose composition air and water enter. 

a8. ταῦτα δὲ, 1.6. the sense-organs, αἰσθητήρια, constituted of air and water. 

ag. καὶ viv, “as it is,” “even within our experience.” Cf. 424 Ὁ 24, 
425 ἃ 22, Ὁ 9. ἔνια. From ist. Am. iv. 8, 532b 33 we know that this 
includes all viviparous animals: ἄνθρωπος μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἔῳφοτόκα καὶ πεζά, πρὸς 
δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὅσα ἔναιμα καὶ ζῳοτόκα, πάντα φαίνεται ἔχοντα ταῦτας πάσας. πᾶσαι 
ἄρα- Here at last is the conclusion drawn from the unwieldy series of premisses 
which began with εἰ yap παντός (424 Ὁ 24). 

alo. ὑπὸ τῶν...πεπηρωμένων, 1.6. by the aforesaid animals, viz. as we know, 
the vivipara, if fully developed and unmutilated. Cf. 415 a 27 o/e. φαίνεται 
γὰρ... ὀφθαλμούς. Another parenthesis. The mole is regarded by Aristotle as 
belonging to the πεπηρωμένα. In the Ast. Ax. loc. cit., Aristotle excepts the 
mole as “an entire class” which is “maimed” (533a 2 πλὴν εἴ τε πεπήρωται 
γένος ἕν, οἷον τὸ τῶν ἀσπαλάκων). 

ἃ 12. ἕτερον, other than those known to us in experience. This is shown 
to be the meaning of ἕτερον by the words which qualify πάθος. καὶ πάθος. If 
there were an unknown “elemental” body distinct from the four, it would 
presumably have distinct and unknown properties. τῶν ἐνταῦθα, the bodies 
found in our world, the world of actual experience. So τὰ ἐνταῦθα is contrasted 
with τὰ ἐκεῖ in Metabh. 990b 34 ταὐτὰ δ᾽ ἐνταῦθα οὐσίαν onpaive: κἀκεῖ (in the 
world of ideas). 

4 13. οὐδεμία ἂν ἐκλεύποι. This sentence corresponds to and is equivalent to 
the sentence οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἑτέρα παρὰ ras πέντε, with which we started 
424 Ὁ 22. 

Having proved that there are five senses and no more, A. proceeds to make 
the first use of his conclusion by demonstrating that the κοινὰ are really what he 
called them, “common sensibles.” He does this by proving that they are not 
the province of any special sense. There could be no sense and no sense-organ 


426 NOTES Itl. 1 


outside the five which he has described, and no one of these five apprehends 
the κοινὰ as ἴδια or κυρίως αἰσθητὰ to it in particular. This is the first step 
towards developing his doctrine of sezszs communis or 6An αἴσθησις in which 
the five special senses are merged and coalesce, for the κοινὰ are perceived καθ᾽ 
αὑτὰ and, since it is none of the special senses that so perceives them, it must 
be this sessus communts. 

425a 14—b 4. Can there be a special sense which apprehends as its 
province the “‘common sensibles,” all of which we perceive by movement? 
The common sensibles are motion, rest; size (extended magnitude), figure; 
number, unity. Of these number and unity are also apprehended by means of 
the objects of the special senses. [Aristotle decides in the negative.] There 
can be no special organ for the apprehension of these common sensibles, and 
therefore no separate special sense. If there were, our perception of the 
common sensibles by any of the five senses would be either (a) on a par with 
that indirect apprehension which in fact we have of one quality, e.g. sweetness, 
by the special sense, e.g. sight, which perceives another [§ 5]. This, viz. our 
apprehension of sweetness by sight, is due to the circumstance that we have a 
sense [sensus communis] which has both sensibles for its object, and whereby 
we take cognizance of their simultaneous presentment. Or (4), if not like the 
perception of sweetness by sight, our perception of the common sensibles 
would be purely incidental, as is our recognition of Cleon’s son in the 
white object which we see [§ 6]. But of the common sensibles we have a 
perception to which all the senses contribute, direct not incidental, and there- 
fore not confined to a special sense; not, that is, like our apprehension that it is 
Cleon’s son that we see [which is confined to sight]. In our apprehension, 
above explained, of the objects of one special sense by another perception is in 
a manner incidental; when the special senses operate not as separate, but in so 
far as they meet in one. To recognise the co-existence of different qualities in 
the same object requires a common, and not a separate or special, sense [§ 7]. 

4258. 14. οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν. Having rejected the hypothesis of a sixth sense 
dealing with special sensibles, ἴδια αἰσθητά, of its own, A. has now to consider 
the question whether we should assume a separate organ, and therefore a 
separate sense, for the apprehension of τὰ κοινά. These κοινὰ have been already 
introduced in II., c.6. Them. puts the case ingeniously: 81, 18 H., 149, 28 Sp. 
“it may be said that there ought to be a special organ for the common sensibles, 
but that this is lacking to man.” αἰσθητήριον. If there is no separate sense- 
organ, it will follow (cf. the statement above 424 Ὁ 26sq.) that there is no separate 
sense, and this is the conclusion drawn below: ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι 425 a 20. 

8 15. ὧν ἑκάστῃ..-κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Torstrik followed the old Latin version 
in inserting the negative ot before κατὰ συμβεβηκός: then, he thought, the 
relative sentence would consistently express A.’s own view as laid down in 
Il., c. 6, where τὰ κοινὰ are said to be perceived καθ᾽ aid, i.e. ov κατὰ συμβεβηκός. 
Cf. 425 a 28. Others suppose that A. is not stating his own view but what 
would be the effect of the hypothesis of a sixth sense for the κοινά, which he is 
refuting (cf. Simpl. 182, 38—183, 4). In that case, besides perceiving the κοινὰ 
directly by this sixth sense, we should indirectly perceive them by every special 
sense. I am dissatisfied with both these explanations and believe (1) that the 
words express A.’s own belief about τὰ κοινά, not the consequences which would 
follow if there were a special sense-organ for them, and (2) that there is no need 
to insert the negative before κατὰ συμβεβηκός. In ordinary language we are 
said to perceive ¢hzugs, but the simplest psychological analysis shows that the 
proper objects of the special senses are qualities. A. adopts the convenient 


111. 1 425 a 13—al5 427 


assumption that the sensible thing may be regarded as a substratum, ὑποκεί- 
μενον or logical subject, with qualities, πάθη, which cannot exist apart from it, 
ov χωριστά. In IL, c. 6 the special sensibles are qualities, colour, sound, odour 
etc., perceived directly by the special senses. The things or substances, 
ὑποκείμενα, in which the special sensibles inhere, are perceived fer accidens and 
by the special senses. Thus Diares’ son is seen fer accidens. Of the κοινὰ we 
are told (@) that they are perceived directly, καθ᾽ αὗτά; (δὴ) that they are per- 
ceived by all the special senses, κοενὰ πασῶν, κοινὰ πάσαις ; (c) that a certain 
movement is perceived both by touch and by sight. But it will be observed 
that A. does not say in 11., c. 6 under (4) or (c) that the κοινὰ are derectly 
perceived by the special senses. The brevity of his exposition might suggest 
this, but it would create a false impression: for in our present chapter 
(425 a 27 sq.) he states that we have a non-incidental, i.e. direct, perception 
of the κοινὰ and therefore, he argues, this common perception is not a special 
sense (οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἐστὶν ἰδία, int. αἴσθησις). Cf De Wem. 1, 450a 9—14, which 
implies that magnitude, motion and time are καθ᾽ αὑτὰ αἰσθητὰ of the πρῶτον 
αἰσθητικόν. The same view is implied in the expressions κοινὰ πασῶν and κοινὰ 
πάσαις Of 11.. c. 6, as will be evident on reflection. The proper object of sight 
(neglecting for the moment light, darkness, fire and phosphorescence) is colour. 
But none of the κοινὰ is colour: therefore none of the κοινὰ is directly perceived 
by sight, none of them is κυρίως αἰσθητόν, πρὸς ὃ ἡ οὐσία πέφυκε τῆς ὄψεως, περὶ ὃ 
μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι: and, we may add, though this has been disputed, 
(418 a 23) οὐδὲν πάσχει ἣ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν τινὸς ἡ ὄψις, sight is not 
affected by any of the κοινὰ as such. Sight is not affected by magnitude as 
magnitude, by motion as motion, and so on, as it is affected by its κυρίως 
αἰσθητόν, or ἴδιον, colour. But (418a 19 sq.) sight zs affected by motion; we are 
led to the irresistible conclusion that a special sense 15 affected by a κοινὸν Der 
accidens. Again, the argument by which A. concludes that Diares’ son is 
per accidens an object seen will also apply to the κοινά, What the eye sees 
directly is colour, but the πάθος, colour, has for its logical subject the thing or 
substance, Diares’ son. Directly the eye perceives the quality, mdirectly it 
takes in the thing or substance to which the quality belongs. Now the case of 
the κοινά, though not quite on a par, is similar. If we take in the thing or 
substance per accidens by a special sense, we take in with the thing or substance 
its various attributes, even though these are not directly cognizable by that 
special sense. When we are aware of Diares’ son, we are aware of motion, 
magnitude, number, shape, all of which are his attributes: they “go with” him 
or “accompany” him (425 Ὁ 5) ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ κοινά, (Ὁ 8) ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις 
ἅμα χρῶμα καὶ μέγεθος, (428 Ὁ 22) τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἑπομένων τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν 
[=the logical subjects], (Ὁ 23) κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος, ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. 
In perceiving the things or substances, as we do, indirectly and incidentally by 
the special sense, we also perceive the attributes of these things or substances ; 
and, so far as the perception is by the special sense, again indirectly and 
incidentally. Or rather, the content of sensation by any special sense 15 a 
confused whole, out of which that special sense itself cannot separate and 
abstract τὰ κοινά. To do so is the task of sevsuws communis, which in A.’s 
theory has usurped some of the purely intellectual functions assigned by Plato, 
Theaet. 185, 186, to the soul or mind. 

a I5 οἷον kuvijoews...16 évds. For the list of κοινὰ see supra 418 a 17 and 
motes. In the present passage ἕν is added. The reason doubiless is that in 
the common view of Greek mathematicians ἀριθμὸς implies plurality  εζαΖά. 
1088 a 6 οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕν ἀριθμός), and “one” or “unity” is not a number, but 


428 NOTES ᾿ III. I 


rather a principle of number, Ζζεξαζᾷ. 1021 a 12 τὸ δ᾽ ἕν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀρχὴ καὶ 
μέτρον. Cf. the phrase τὸ ἕν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, Metaph. 987 Ὁ 29. 

δι 17. κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα. The Greek commentators understand this to 
mean “by the movement which the sensible sets up” in us or, more explicitly, 
in one or other of the sense-organs. Them. is rather vague, but (81, 30 H., 
150, 17 Sp.) wet τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ καὶ ἐνδίδωσι τὴν ἰδίαν μορφήν, though 
not expressly commenting on the words, points in this direction. Simpl. com- 
ments directly on the words thus: 183, 4 τῷ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητήριον ἢ πάσχειν τι ὑπὸ 
τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ...ἢ καὶ ἄνευ πάθους.. τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ δεχόμενον...(1ο) ὑπὸ 
μὲν οὖν τῶν κοινῶν κινεῖται καὶ πάσχει ἑκάστη αἴσθησις. More explicitly Philop. 
457, 29 κίνησιν δὲ λέγει τὸ πάθος, τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν: τὰ οὖν κοινὰ αἰσθητά, φησί, 
πάθος ποιεῖ. Cf. Prisc. Lyd. (ed. Bywater) 21, 20 δεῖ οὖν οὐχ οὕτω τῇ κινήσει 
λέγεσθαι γνωριστικοὺς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τῶν κοινῶν, as προηγουμένως μὲν τῆς κινήσεως, 
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ἢ δευτέρως τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως μὲν πάντων τῶν κοινῶν, 
πάντως δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων τῇ κινήσει, τουτέστι τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, συναισθάνεσθαι. If the 
words are so taken, our knowledge of the common sensibles is not said (by A.) 
to be due to motion in the sense that motion is primarily perceived and the 
other κοινὰ only in a secondary or indirect fashion through it; but they are all 
alike and in all objects perceived through modification in the percipient. But 
how then are the κοινὰ in any way different from the ἴδια Ρ The explanation 
tendered to us applies equally to colour, sound, odour, flavour. In fact, our 
investigation of sense began with the common opinion that sensation is an 
ἀλλοίωσις and πάθος, wherever found; so that the addition of κινήσει adds 
nothing to αἰσθανόμεθα, It appears to me, then, that this interpretation cannot 
be accepted. But the alternative course is not without difficulty. If we retain 
κινήσει, We may understand by it the perception of external movement. Siebeck 
has argued that this brings a wrong conception into the whole passage. It is 
startling to find our perception of the other κοινὰ made to depend upon our 
perception of one of them, κίνησις: and no use is made of the deduction. 
There is no attempt elsewhere to deduce these conceptions from motion, and 
number is expressly said to be logically prior to motion. Still, the perception 
of motion might help us to perceive what is prior to motion; and time, a 
common sensible, which is altogether omitted in II., c. 6 and the present 
chapter, might truly be said to be perceived by the perception of motion. But 
in Phys. 1V. 11, 219a 12 sqq. magnitude, motion and time are all instances of 
τὸ συνεχές, and the continuity of motion and of time are deduced from the con- 
tinuity of magnitude: διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι συνεχὲς καὶ ἡ κίνησίς ἐστι 
συνεχής; διὰ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν 6 χρόνος: ὅση γὰρ ἡ κίνησις, τοσοῦτος καὶ 6 χρόνος ἀεὶ 
δοκεῖ γεγονέναι. The motion is continuous because the magnitude is continuous, 
but we should not know that the magnitude was continuous, unless the motion 
were so: and in that sense we may say μέγεθος κινήσε. Cf. De Mem. 1, 
450a 9—I4. On the whole it is not unlike A. to start a cognate investigation 
upon a very slight occasion. It would be reading the ideas of modern 
psychology into A. to interpret κινήσει, not of external movement as perceived, 
but of local movement of the percipient, especially movement of the eye and 
hand. Torstrik, in making his fine emendation κοινῇ for κινήσει, was misled as 
to Simpl. by the Aldine edition (see 184, 7 Hayduck). There can be no doubt that 
the text of Simpl. was κινήσει: cf. 183, 4, 30. If we accepted the emendation, 
the meaning of the passage would be rendered much simpler and more coherent 
and a good antithesis given to the ἰδίαν of a 21: “because we always perceive 
the common sensibles together, therefore there cannot be a special sense for 
any one of them, e.g. for motion.” This is not in conflict with the following 


111. 1 425 a 15—a 20 429 


statement, a 27, for sensus communis is not a special sense. The same end 
might be secured by inserting κοινῇ before κενήσει. 

a 17. μέγεθος κινήσει. Simpl. understands μέγεθος to be apprehended by the 
amount or intensity of the impression produced on sense: (183, 17) ὅτε yap Kai 
ὡς μέγεθος εἰς τὸ αἰσθητήριον δρᾷ τὸ αἰσθητόν, δηλοῖ ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς χιόνος ὡς λευκῆς τῇ 
ὄψεε ἐγγινομένη βλάβη τῆς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐκτεταμένης πεδίον, ἀλλὰ καὶ 6 ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλον 
πεσόντος λίθου μᾶλλον πλήττων ἦχος. Cf. Categ. 6, 5b6—8. Philop. mentions 
the same explanation (458, 19) εἰ μὴ ἄρα εἴποις dre μέγεθος λέγει τὸ ἐν ἑκάστη 
αἰσθήσει καὶ οὐκ ἐν ποσῷ, οἷον μέγαν ψόφον ἢ μέγα λευκόν. Cf. Plato, 77. 67 Β of 
sound μεγάλην δὲ τὴν πολλήν [int. κίνησιν], “if the movement is large, the sound 
is loud” (Archer-Hind). The connexion between spatial magnitude and motion 
as Dercepia gives a far more satisfactory interpretation. 

aI8. μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα. Philop. informs us (458, 23 sqq.) that an 
objection was raised (φασί τινες) on the ground that in Cafeg. 8, loa 11 σχῆμα 
is a ποιόν, while Melaph. 1020a 9 μέγεθος is a ποσόν. Cf. Simpl. 183, 22 sq. 
κατὰ yap τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὕλῃ τῷ μεγέθει χρώμενον, ὡς καὶ τὸ βάθρον ξύλον 
λέγομεν, ἐπεὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ποιὸν πᾶν σχῆμα. In the words of Philop. (458, 30), μέγεθος 
here means τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον, not τὸ σχῆμα. τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαι. Rest is the 
cessation of motion, and the knowledge of contraries is one, 4118 3 54ᾳ. Cf τῇ 
ἀποφάσει 4258 19; also 7 στέρησις 430 Ὁ 20—23: also 4228 23 ἀκοὴ καὶ σιγῆς, 
which must be the cessation of movement, if sound is movement. The Greek 
commentators, if consistent, must explain the perception of rest by the absence 
of an impression upon the sense. But Philop. (458, 31—36) 1s obliged to admit 
that it is the cessation of the motion in the external object which brings our 
internal πάθος to a halt. We do not cease to have a πάθος, but it does not 
change: τὰ ἱστάμενα δρῶμεν μήτε μειουμένου μήτε αὐξανομένου τοῦ πάθους, διότε 
ἵσταντα. He adds the shrewd observation τὰ δὲ κινούμενα ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως 
ὁρῶμεν ἣ μειουμένου ἣ αὐξανομένου τοῦ πάθους πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν αὐτῶν. Simpl. scouts 
the notion that it is by στέρησις of motion that rest is perceived : (183, 25) τὸ δὲ 
ἠρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαί φησιν, wa σαφηνίσῃ, ὅπως εἴρηται τῇ κινήσει, ri οὐχὶ τῷ 
αὐτὰ κινεῖσθαι. τὸ γοῦν ἠρεμοῦν οὐ κινούμενον ὅμως γνωρίζεται, ὡς αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ 
κινούμενον, κινοῦν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν... προείρηται γὰρ ὧς πάντα κινήσει 
αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν στάσιν. 

alg. τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς. The perception of unity and number ds 
analogous to that of motion and rest, the latter berng m each case the contrary 
of the former. The ἕν of 4258 τό is here represented by τὸ συνεχές. It is a 
concrete unit and the numbers which it would generate would also be concrete. 
A quantum, ποσόν, is said to be either continuous, like magnitude, or discrete, 
like number. Kal rots ἰδίοις, int. αἰσθητοῖς γνωρίζεται. The verb to be supplied 
must, owing to the construction having been changed, be passive. Simpl. 
(184, 5—9) would not confine καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις to the case of number, but would 
make it apply to all the κοινά: at least, so I understand his suggestion that the 
words ought to be joined with a 17 πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα. Such a huge 
parenthesis seems too much even for A. 

a20. ἑκάστη γὰρ ἕν. This shows how number can be said to be appre- 
hended τοῖς ἰδίοις, i.e. by or in the special sense-objects. Every one of the five 
senses apprehends unity, because each sensation is one: one colour, one sound 
etc., and number is a plurality of units, πλῆθος μονάδων. Thus unity is appre- 
hended apart from extension. Cf De Sensu 7, 447b 21 sqq. After arguing 
that it is impossible to have two sensations simultaneously when they fall under 
the same sense, and still more impossible when they belong to two separate 
senses, A. then continues (Ὁ 24) φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἀριθμῷ & ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδενὶ 


430 NOTES III. I 


ἑτέρῳ λέγειν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τῷ ἅμα [int. αἰσθάνεσθαι], τὸ δὲ τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῇ κρινούσῃ αἰσθήσει 
καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ κτέ. The instantaneous single act implies the single object. 
Again, since there are a plurality of senses, the plurality of their objects 
similarly furnishes plurality apart from extension. The ἕν here (425 a 20) 
recalls, and has the same meaning as, the ἑνὸς of a 16. But, unless we 
postulate memory, the “hoarding sense,” or a sezses Communes capable of 
apprehending simultaneously more than a single object, it is difficult to see how 
successive single acts of sensation, however numerous, can be apprehended by 
mere sense as number. Cf. zofe on 424b 31 érépa. ὥστε δῆλον. A., having 
shown how in his view the κοινὰ are perceived by means of each of the five 
senses κατὰ συμβεβηκός, now draws the conclusion that the common sensibles 
cannot be the proper province of any one of these senses; and he has already 
proved thai there are only these five senses; therefore the common sensibles 
are not the exclusive province of any single special sense. 

a 2I. ὁτουοῦν... «τούτων, “any one whatever of these common sensibles.” 
The inference would be clearer if put the other way: no single one of the five 
or six κοινὰ belongs especially and exclusively to any special sense. οὕτω γὰρ 
ἔσται. Cf. 4326 Ὁ 19 οὕτω μὲν γὰρ..«δῆλον ἂν εἴη. In both passages we have ex- 
pressed what would be the result of an inadmissible supposition: here “‘if there 
were a special sense,” as there cannot be. For, if there were, then (οὕτω) the 
perception of motion or magnitude or number, which is conjoined with a given 
special sensible, would be related to it as sweetness 1s now to white colour when 
these qualities are united in the same object and we are said to perceive them 
both by sight. Cf. Neuhaeuser, 47zst. Lehre, p. 32 sq. 

a22. αἰσθανόμεθα. This statement of A. clearly stands in need of correction. 
From the sight of a white object we may infer its sweetness, or from the previous 
experience of the conjunction of whiteness and sweetness in the same object we 
may anticipate a similar conjunction now; but in neither case can we be 
properly said to perceive sweetness. Below, a 30, a similar statement is 
qualified by κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Philop. substitutes the sewsws communzs for 
sight: at least, so I understand 460, I ἀμῴοῖν δὲ λέγει τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν. 
ἐπειδὴ yap ἔχομεν, φησίν, αἴσθησιν καὶ γλυκέος καὶ ξανθοῦ, ὄψιν καὶ γεῦσιν, ταύτῃ 
ὅταν ἐμπέσῃ χρῶμα ξανθόν, κινουμένου τοῦ τύπου τοῦ γλυκέος γινώσκομεν ὅτι μέλι 
ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ τύπου οὗ ἔλαβεν, ὅτε ἅμα ὄψις καὶ γεῦσις ἐνήργησαν. A similar case is 


Lith, Nic. 1113a 13 we can see the loaf is properly baked. τοῦτο δ᾽ Gru=ToUTa 
δὲ ὧδε συμβαίνει ὅτι, “and this comes about because.” 
a 23. ἀμφοῖν, of sweet and white. ἔχοντες τυγχάνομεν. Cf. 424 Ὁ 29. 


συμπέσωσιν. The word συμπίπτειν in A. as jn Plato, is used to denote 
concurrence of sensations, qualities and the like. Cf 27k. Nic. 1171 a 7, Plato, 
Rep. 402 D, L772. 75 B, Phil. 394 ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ξυμπίπτονσα eis ταὐτόν. 
a 24. ἅμα γνωρίζομεν, “we cognise both simultaneously,” or co-instant- 
aneously. This throws some light on the αἴσθησις just mentioned. The 
characteristic of all the special senses is that they cannot perceive more than 
one object in one single act of sensation (see the discussion of the question, 
De Sensu, c. 7): nor can two special senses produce sensations simultaneously. 
When two or more objects are judged co-instantaneously the sense at work is 
what is technically known as κοινὴ αἴσθησις, sensus communis. Simpl. (184, 
22 sqq.), ignoring ἅμα, prefers to explain ἀμφοῖν... αἴσθησιν by [αἰσθήσεις] διαφόρους 
δηλαδή, χρώματος μὲν τὴν ὄψιν οὖσαν, τοῦ δὲ γλυκέος THY γεῦσιν and to take #, not as 
the relative, but as equivalent to καθ᾽ 6, as in 423 Ὁ 22, 426 15. Philop., on the 
other hand, gratuitously introduces πρότερον (with a present tense), following 
Plutarch: (459, 32) λείπει yap ἐν τῷ ῥητῷ τὸ πρότερον, ὥς φησι Wrovrapyxos. His 


III. I 425 a 20—a 27 431 


explanation comes to this: yesterday (455, 24) we both saw and tasted sugar, 
to-day we see it but do not taste it: the sight of white to-day acts upon the 
impression (τύπος) of yesterday’s white stored up in the sensus communis and 
through it on the impression of sweet, also stored up there. But even so the 
αἰσθανόμεθα Of a 22 is inaccurate. In place of two objects simultaneously 
present we have a present object and a memory or image of a past object. 
εἰ St μή, Neuhaeuser supplies ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντες ἐτυγχάνομεν αἴσθησιν. It would 
come to the same thing if we supplied οὕτως ἔσται fromaz2i. Grammatically one 
might go back to a 20 ἀδύνατον, and so Philop. may have understood it (460, 
6—9). The hypothesis of a single special sense for ra κοινὰ still holds the field. 
What will follow? One of two consequences. The first has been considered: 
τὰ κοινὰ and τὰ ἴδια would be perceived by the special sense as it now perceives 
the ἴδιον of some other special sense along with its own ἴδεον, experience having 
generated an inseparable association: whereby, however, it is sometimes de- 
ceived (425 Ὁ 3). This is the most favourable case. But the link between 
κοινὰ and ἴδια as perceived by the same special sense might be weaker: there 
might be no inseparable association. If there were not {εἰ δὲ μή), we should say 
that we perceived motion and magnitude by sight or any other special sense on 
no better grounds than we now say that we perceive Cleon’s son by sight. Cf. 
418 a 21—23. As appears from 425 a 30, even the inseparable association of 
sweetness and colour is only perceived xara συμβεβηκός, and Them. and Philop. 
both point out that the phrase is used in two different senses in the two cases. 

a24. οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἀλλ ἢ Kara συμβεβηκὸς. Strictly speaking, in the case 
supposed “sweetness” is a κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητόν. This follows from the 
test proposed in 418 a 23. Sight is not acted upon by the sweet thing as such 
(οὐδὲν πάσχει ἧ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, int. τὸ αἰσθητήριον). But the fact is 
that there are degrees of “indirectness”; the phrase “per accidens,” that is, or 
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, admits of different applications according to the degree of 
remoteness. Cf. Phys. Ul. 3, τοῦ Ὁ τ ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἄλλα ἄλλων 
πορρώτερον καὶ ἐγγύτερον. The difference here seems to be between the recog- 
nition of a quality formerly perceived on the occurrence of one with which it 
was then conjoined, and the recognition of an attribute that may never have 
been so conjoined and has in fact no permanent connexion with the quality which 
we do perceive. So Them. (81, 35 H., 150, 23 Sp.) διττὸς yap ὁ τρόπος τῶν κατὰ 
συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητῶν" ἢ yap ὅταν τῇ ὄψει κρίνωμεν τὸ γλυκύ, (82, 7 H., 151, 10 
Sp.) ἕτερος δὲ ὅταν προσιόντα τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν θεασάμενοι μὴ τοῦτο ἀποφαινώμεθα 
μόνον ὅτι λευκός, GAN ὅτι καὶ Κλέωνος vids. So Philop. 454, 15 566. 

8. 25. οἷον τὸν Ἐ λέωνος υἱὸν, int. αἰσθανόμεθα. οὐχ ὅτι  λέωνος vids, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι 
λευκός. I have translated this as if ὅτι meant “ that,” which apparently is the 
view of Them. as just cited ; but it is more probable, when we compare 418 a 22, 
that here, as there, ὅτι means “because.” We perceive Cleon’s son not because 
he is Cleon’s son, but because he is white. 

a 26. τούτῳ, int. τῷ λευκῷ, “the white colour that we see.” Of this white 
colour it is (in Aristotelian phrase) “an accident” that it is Cleon’s son. 
Substance is conjoined with accident. See mofes on 4188 22 sq. The υἱῷ is 
dative by attraction to τούτῳ. 

a 27. αἴσθησιν κοινήν, “a common sensibility,” namely that which serves as 
a common. basis to all the special modes of sense-perception (αἰσθήσεις), 1.6. the 
five senses. The modern associations of the term “common sense” preclude 
its use as an equivalent of Aristotle’s κοινὴ αἴσθησις or as an exact philosophical 
term at all. Both Simpl. and Philop. deny that the term is used here in the 
technical sense, but I am not satisfied that they are right. 


432 NOTES Ill. I 


a 28. οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Compared with perception of sweetness on sight 
of a white object which is sweet, or, still more, compared with perception of 
Cleon’s son on sight of a white object which happens to be that person, 
perception of “common sensibles” by the κοινὴ αἴσθησις is direct and oz 
ancidentad. The ordinary interpretation of the chapter makes this statement 
contradict the traditional text of a 15. But see ove. 

a 28. οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἐστὶν ἰδία, int. αἴσθησις τῶν κοινῶν αἰσθητῶν. If they are 
directly perceived by a “common sensibility,” it follows that there is no one 
of the five nor any special sixth sense to which they are related as special 
objects. 

a 29. οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴρηται. It has been remarked that, in order to complete- 
ness, A. should have added here the other case of indirect “ perception” (so- 
called), to which in fact he recurs in the next sentence. 

a30. τὰ 8’ ἀλλήλων ἴδια, “one another’s proper objects.” A., having claimed 
the κοινὰ for sensus Communts, goes on to show how it sometimes judges ἴδια, as 
he had already hinted a 22—24. 

8. 31. οὐχ ἡ αὐταί, “not in their own right as so many separate senses.” 
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μία, “ but as forming (for the time being) one sense.” Philop. (461, 5) 
οὐχ <> avrai (int. ai πέντε αἰσθήσεις), ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἔχειν μίαν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν. 
From dua he argues μία αἴσθησις. 

425 Ὁ 1. ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, int. αἰσθητοῦ: “in the case of the same thing.” Cf. 
Phys. Vil. 3, 254a 6 δρῶμεν γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνομένας τὰς εἰρημένας 
μεταβολάς. χολὴν, int. αἰσθάνεται, the singular being borne out by Ὁ 3 ἀπατᾶται 
and ἐὰν ἢ ξανθόν [int. τὸ αἰσθητόν], χολὴν οἴεται εἶναι. The anticipatory accusative 
seems more in conformity with Attic usage than the nominative preceding ὅτι 
as read by Biehl in his second impression. The genitive χολῆς (Simpl. in 
interpr. 186, 12, but apparently citing the text) is probably assimilated to τοῦ 
αὑτοῦ ; it might also be joined with γένηται ἡ αἴσθησις. 

Ὁ 2. érépas ye. It belongs to no other sense, distinct from the κοινή, to 
affirm the co-existence in one object of two or more qualities. We should have 
expected ovderépas, neither sight nor taste. Judgments of identity and differ- 
ence are claimed for the senmsus communis in the next chapter, 426b 14 sqq. 
ἄμφω, τὸ ξανθόν re καὶ πικρόν (Simpl. 186, 18). 

b3. διὸ καὶ ἀπατάται, int. ἡ αἴσθησις. Sense is liable to be deceived in this 
reference of qualities to objects, whereas, as was emphasised in 4188 12, no 
single sense is ever deceived about the qualities which it directly perceives (καὶ 
οὐκ ἀπατᾶται ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ᾽ ὅτι ψόφος, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρωσμένον ἢ ποῦ, ἣ τί τὸ 
ψοφοῦν ἢ ποῦ, 418 ἃ 17). The inference is that it is not the special sense 
functioning with its proper objects which is at work when we are said to see 
sweetness by sight. 

425 b 4—Il11. The final cause of a plurality of special senses is to 
ensure the recognition of the common sensibles. If sight were our only sense 
in a world of colours, certain attributes of things would elude us altogether. 
It would not be easy to detect magnitude and the other common sensibles, for 
they would never be found apart from colour [§ 8]. 

425b 4. τίνος ἕνεκα. Why, if the several senses combine, as we have seen, for 
certain purposes, there should be a plurality of senses at all. I see no reason 
to restrict the question with Simpl., who would understand τῶν κοινῶν after 
αἰσθήσεις (186, 26), on the ground that there are other reasons for a plurality of 
senses, which A. does not mention here. 

b5- ἢ ὅπως. Aristotle’s answer. It is that a plurality of senses better 
secures the recognition of the common sensibles. A., always teleological in his 


III. 2 425 a 28—bio 433 


enquiries, urges the necessity that such qualities as magnitude and number 
should be made familiar, and that their importance should be forced upon us by 
their being presented in a variety of ways. 

b5. τὰ ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ κοινά, “the accompaniments of the objects of the 
special senses which are common to all the senses.” The “common sensibles” 
are fitly called ἀκολουθοῦντα because the “special sensibles” (colour, sounds, 
tangible qualities) are always accompanied by one or more of them. Thus 
everything perceptible has mzw#zber, is either at 7652 or in wofion, and things in 
space have magnitude (μέγεθος) and shape. 

b6. εἶ yap ἦν ἡ ὄψις μόνη. We may compare the imaginary case put for the 
sake of argument Mefapfh. 1053 Ὁ 32 if all things were colours, and again 
(26. Ὁ 35) if all were melodies or (1054 a 1) sounds or (a 3) rectilinear figures. 

b7. αὕτη λευκοῦ. Here I have adopted Professor H. Jackson’s conjecture, 
αὕτη for αὐτή. More than once in the treatise αὐτὴ is suspicious, but in 415 b Io, 
427 Ὁ 15 it has an appropriateness which I fail to discover here. ἐλάνθανεν ἄν, 
int. τὰ κοινά. We might have failed to discern the common sensibles as distinct 
from τὰ téta. Sight would in relation to rd κοινὰ be in the same position as that 
in which all special sensibles would be in the case supposed above 425 a 21I—27, 
viz. of the existence of a special sense for the cxarvd. Cf. again the consequences 
which would follow in the imaginary case put 423 a 6—1r. 

Ὁ 8. πάντα, “all sensibles,” that 1s κοινὰ and ἴδια alike. There would in fact 
in the supposed case be no distinction : all sensibles would be ὁρατὰ and, in fact, 
colour, Just as now various species of quality are merged in the object of touch. 
διὰ τὸ...9 μέγεθος. The only μέγεθος which he would perceive would always be 
coloured. 

boQ. ἐν ἑτέρῳ αἰσθητῷ, “in a second object,” 1.6. one which is the object 
proper to a sense other than the sense which perceives this common sensible at 
first: e.g. magnitude may be first perceived by sight and then perceived by 
touch in a tangible object (ἐν ἑτέρῳ). 

bio. ἄλλο τι, “something distinct,” 1.6. from the two or more ἔδια with 
which it 15 conjoined and from other κοινά. 


CHAPTER IT. 


425 b 12—25. The consciousness which accompanies sensation must 
be referred to sense itself. For example, we perceive that we see. Is this by 
sight or by some other sense? On the latter assumption, the subsidiary sense 
will have a double object, not only sight which it 15 introduced to perceive, but 
also colour, the object of sight. Hence, unless we are driven back upon the 
other alternative that sight sees itself, there will be two senses dealing with the 
same object, colour, viz. sight and the subsidiary sense. Again, there is another 
objection to assuming a subsidiary sense. One subsidiary sense necessitates 
another to perceive it, and so on. Thus either the series of such subsidiary 
senses will be infinite, or there will be a halt when we come to a sense which 
has no other beyond it to perceive it in action, and, if so, we had better stop at 
sight itself [§ 1]. But here there is a difficulty. From the proposition “it is by 
sight that we perceive that we see” in its equivalent form “by sight we shall 
perceive that which sees,” does it not follow that that which sees, as being the 
object of sight, must have colour? This difficulty may be met by the consider- 
ation that “to perceive by sight” has more than one meaning [§ 2], as when we 


H. . 28 


434 NOTES 111. 2 


discriminate darkness and light, and by the further consideration that in 
perception the form is received without the matter, so that in a qualified sense 
that which sees may be said to have colour when it receives the form of colour; 
and for the same reason sensations and memory impressions remain in the 
organs of sense after the object of sense has been removed [§ 3]. 

With this passage should be compared De Somuo 2, 455 a 12 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ trdpxe 
καθ᾽ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν τὸ μέν τι ἴδιον τὸ δέ τι κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν οἷον τῇ ὄψει τὸ ὁρᾶν, 
τῇ δ᾽ ἀκοῇ τὸ ἀκούειν, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἑκάστῃ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἔστι δέ τις καὶ 
κοινὴ δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, ἧ καὶ ὅτε ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀκούει αἰσθάνεται, “in each 
particular sense, besides something special to it, there is a common element as 
well. The special element is, in sight, seeing, in hearing, the act of hearing, 
and so with the other senses severally. But there is also a common faculty 
accompanying them all, whereby we perceive that we see and hear.” Here we 
have an explicit positive answer to the question raised but not properly 
answered in the present chapter, namely how we perceive that we see and 
hear. It isin virtue of a common faculty accompanying all the special senses, 
just as 425b 5 sq., 8 sq, the common sensibles were described as accompanying 
the objects of the special senses. It cannot then be doubted that this κοινὴ δύναμις 
ἀκολουθοῦσα ττάσαις (cf. De Somno) is precisely the common sensibility, αἴσθησις 
κοινή, Of 425a 27. The entire passage reminds us of the discussion in Plato, 
Charmtides 167 sqq. There the conception of a science of science is examined, a 
conception which in the course of the argument is shown to be impossible, and 
useless, if possible. Among the examples adduced to prove the impossibility 
we find the senses of sight and hearing. A sight which sees itself or a hearing 
which hears itself will be regarded as incredible by some, though not, Plato is 
careful to add, by others. Sight, if it sees itself, must be coloured, for sight 
cannot see that which has no colour, which is precisely the difficulty of 425 b 17 
sqq., and similarly for hearing: if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice, for 
there is no other way of hearing, which reminds us of 4268 15 sqq., a 27 sqq. 

Ὁ 12. αἰσθανόμεθα. The fact which this word expresses is that we are con- 
scious that we see and hear. Such consciousness is regarded ,by A. as in itself 
a sense-perception attendant on the original perception of the colour seen or 
the sound heard. To denote this Alex. Aphr. regularly employs the compound 
συν-αισθάνεσθαι, which in Aristotle and Eudemus is rarely found and never in 
precisely this sense, unless it be Φ Ζα. zc. 1170b 4 (see Stewart δα loc.). Butthe 
simple verb αἰσθάνεσθαι is used to mean the consciousness which attends on all 
activities in £74. Λα 1170 ἃ 25 εἰ δ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ 7v,...(a 29) ὁ δ᾽ ὁρῶν ὅτι 
ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ 6 ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτε βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε ἂν αἰσθαν μεθ᾽ [int. αἰσθανόμεθα] 
ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, κἂν νοῶμεν, ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν 
(τὸ γὰρ εἶναε ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν), τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ᾽ 
αὗτό (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ). Cf. 
De .5471514 7, 4408 8 ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕν τι εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ ἅπαντα alc Odverac. 

b 13. αἰσθάνεσθαι. The subject to be supplied is τὸ (or τὸν) αἰσθανόμενον : 
see “2026 ON 4038 22, ὀργίζηται, and cf. Ath. Nic. 1170 ἃ 31 τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι 
ἐνεργοῦμεν cited in last zoze. ἢ ἑτέρᾳ, int. αἰσθήσει, a sense distinct from sight. 
Obviously, if sight does not fulfil the required conditions, still less can hearing 
or any other special sense perceive sight. Thus the old hypothesis of a sixth 
sense, rejected in the last chapter, reappears in a new form to be again refuted: 
and this view of the passage is confirmed by the more explicit problem in 
De Somno. <A. leaves out of account the alternative that it is not by sense at 
all that we are conscious of seeing, hearing etc. Cf. De Sommo 2, 4558 15 ἔστι 


ΠῚ. 2 425 Ὁ 12—b 16 435 


δέ τις καὶ κοινὴ δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις [int. ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν] F καὶ ὅτι ὁρᾷ καὶ 
ἀκούει αἰσθάνεται. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ, καὶ κρίνει δὴ καὶ δύναται 
κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερα τὰ γλυκέα τῶν λευκῶν, οὔτε γεύσει οὔτε ὄψει οὔτ᾽ ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλά τινι 
κοινῷ μορίῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων πάντων. Here there is not the least suggestion 
that sense is inadequate (cf. 426b 14 sq.): ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ, not indeed by sight, but 
by the κοινὴ δύναμις, employing κοινόν ti τῶν αἰσθητηρίων πάντων. 

Ὁ 13. GAN ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται. But sight and its object colour must be objects of 
the same sense and therefore, if we adopt the alternative ἢ ἑτέρᾳ, we shall have 
two senses perceiving colour, (1) sight perceiving it directly and (2) érépa, ἡ 
αἰσθανομένη ὅτι ὄρᾷ, the hypothetical sense which, while perceiving sight directly, 
indirectly perceives colour; while if with A. we reject this conclusion as absurd, 
we are driven to the other alternative (τῇ ὄψει), and thus we have a sense 
perceiving itself; cf. 425 b 19 ὄψεταί τις τὸ ὁρῶν. A. assumes that the sense 
which perceives sensation must perceive the object of sensation, τὸ αἰσθητόν : 
cf. Them. 83, 15 H., 153, 17 Sp. od γὰρ οἷόν τε ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς ὄψεως ὅτι 
ὁρᾷ μὴ γινώσκουσαν τὸ ὁρώμενον. But is this assumption self-evident? Itis so 
only within the narrow limits laid down 418 a 14—16, according to which colour 
alone is the object, ἴδιον αἰσθητόν, of seeing. 

Ὁ 14. τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χρώματος, the colour which is the subject or subject- 
matter of vision. The same mode of speech occurs below 426} 8 ἑκάστη μὲν 
οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν. This is one way of expressing the 
relation between psychical processes or operations (épya καὶ πράξεις) and what 
are called 402 b 15) ἀντικείμενα, corresponding or correlative objects. The 
application of the terms “subject” and “object” to denote the antithesis 
between “that which perceives” and “that which is perceived,” between 
“that which knows” and “that which is known,” is, of course, un-Aristotelian 
and in fact quite modern. The antithesis itself is familiar enough to A. and is 
expressed in various ways, e.g. by τὸ αἰσθητικὸν and τὸ αἰσθητόν, τὸ νοητικὸν and 
τὸ νοητόν. Here τὸ αἰσθητὸν is described, relatively to the sense-faculty which 
apprehends it, as τὸ ὑποκείμενον, that which falls under its ken, that which is its 
province, “its subject” (swbzectum). The same αἰσθητόν, regarded as “set over 
against,” logically contrasted with, the percipient faculty or operation, is called 
ἀντικείμενον (obtectum). 

Ὁ 14. ἢ δύο, int. αἰσθήσεις. τοῦ αὐτοῦ, int. αἰσθητοῦ, e.g. in the case of 
sight τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χρώματος. 

bI5. ἢ αὐτὴ αὑτῆς, int. αἴσθησις ἔσται. This is a generalisation of the first 
of the two alternative hypotheses, viz. that it is by sight (τῇ ὄψει) that we 
perceive that we see. As against the second alternative, érépa, it commends 
itself to A.: but, as he points out, it is not free from difficulties; and, if stated 
in the crude form τῇ ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ, is untenable, as he says in De Somunea l.c., 
4558 17 Sq. ov yap δὴ τῇ γε ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅτι Spa. It 15 accordingly there superseded 
by the more explicit solution cited above. I may remark parenthetically that it 
is of course not in the same way that we should interpret such passages as 
417 a 2—4, Metaph. 1010 Ὁ 35—-37, where A. denies that αἴσθησις can be of 
itself or have no external thing, but simply itself, for its object. Cf. dleéaph. 
1074 Ὁ 35 sq. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ kal. A further argument against the hypothesis that 
consciousness of sight, hearing etc. is by a separate special sense (érépq). 

Ὁ τό. ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον dow. To explain the consciousness of the second, we 
shall require a third sense, and similarly a fourth to explain the consciousness 
of the third, and so on ad infinitum. Such infinite regress is always assumed by 
A. to be in actuality impossible; cf zofe on 411b 13. Mr Shorey (4. /. P&Z. 
XXII. 154 sq.) adduces a similar case in Plato, Zheaefet. 200 C, where also the 


28—z2! 


436 NOTES III. 2 


inference is drawn that it is better to accept the paradox at the beginning of the 
series than later, if an infinite regress is our only way of escape from it. ἢ 
αὐτή τις ἔσται αὑτῆς. Some one or other of the series of subsidiary faculties will 
have to be self-perceiving. Sooner or later we shall have to do what might 
just as well, therefore, be done at first, viz. admit a self-perceiving faculty. 
M. Rodiers rendering “ce second sens devra se sentir lui-méme” apparently 
overlooks ris. Cf. Innes, CZ. Rev. XVI. 462: “the necessary alternative to the 
continuation of the series is not that the second of the series but that some one 
of the series should be its own object.” 

Ὁ 17. ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης, int. αἰσθήσεως. τοῦτο ποιητέον, 1.6. λεκτέον ὅτι αὐτὴ 
ἑαυτῆς αἴσθησις ἔσται. 

Ὁ 17 εἰ γὰρ τὸ τῇ ὄψει...18 τὸ ἔχον, Le. granting, as has been assumed through- 
out the treatise, (z) that perceiving by sight is seeing, and (4) that what is seen 
is always “colour” or “the coloured” (the coloured thing, of course, gud 
coloured: cf. 4248 21—24 and contrast 418 a 23 sq.). 

big. εἰ ὄψεταί τις τὸ ὁρῶν. The stress is on the accusative τὸ ὁρῶν: “if 
that which you are to see is something which itself sees.” This hypothesis 
merely draws out what is implicit in the alternative αὐτὴ αὑτῆς (αἴσθησις ἔσται). 
It is quite possible that with τὰς should be supplied αἴσθησις, and this would 
agree with b 16 above; but even then, in view of the general principle 
enunciated 408 b 13 sqq., we cannot be far wrong in translating as if ris were 
the indefinite pronoun. τὸ ὁρῶν πρῶτον, “that which primarily or directly sees.” 
By πρῶτον it is implied (see 2926 on 422 Ὁ 22) that organ and object have been 
brought at once into communication. The primary organ of any sense is that 
in which primarily resides the faculty (424 a 24 sq.) of receiving sensible forms 
without their matter. The difficulty is that, according to 418 b 26 sq., “it is 
that which is colourless which is receptive of colour.” Which view are we to 
take: is it colourless or coloured? And is it the eye or a central sense-organ 
which is τὸ ὁρῶν πρῶτον and is in direct communication with the object? 

Ὁ 20. φανερὸν τοίνυν. The difficulty can be met partly by enlarging the 
meaning of τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι, to perceive by sight, partly by explaining that 
in a certain qualified way the seeing faculty may be said to have colour inas- 
much as it receives the form, though not the matter, of colour. 

b20. ὅτι οὐχ ἕν. We might have expected ὅτι πολλαχῶς λέγεται, 1.6. per- 
ceiving by sight has more senses than one and therefore is an ambiguous 
phrase: οὐχ ἕν (ἐστι) stands to the more usual οὐχ ἁπλῶς (or πλεοναχῶς) λέγεται 
(cf. 426a 26 ἁπλῶς ἔλεγον) as διττόν ἐστι stands to διττῶς λέγεται (cf. διττὸν yap ἡ 
ἀκοή, καὶ διττὸν ὁ ψόφος 426a 7 54. Metaph. 1069 b 15 διττὸν τὸ ὄν, Pol. 
1342a 18 6 θεατὴς διττός, 20. 1261 Ὁ 28 τὸ γὰρ πάντες καὶ ἀμφότερα καὶ περιττὰ καὶ 
ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διττὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικοὺς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς). 

b22. οὐχ ὡσαύτως. If seemg were always the apprehension of colours or 
coloured objects (τὸ ὁρᾶν χρωμάτων ἐστὶν ἀντίληψις, Philop. 463, 38 sq.), it might 
include perception of light, which is in a manner the colour of the transparent 
medium (418b 11). To discern light would be to see the illuminated air. But 
to discern darkness is to try to see either colour or light and to be conscious of 
failure: darkness, at any rate, has no colour, 418 Ὁ 28 sq., and we do not discern 
it in the same way as we discern light. <A. is probably thinking, not so much of 
absolute darkness, as of perception of light or darkness in twilight, when colours 
cannot be seen. Cf. 4228 20 (τὸ γὰρ σκότος ἀόρατον, κρίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ὄψις), 
ἔτι τοῦ λίαν λαμπροῦ (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀόρατον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ σκότους), where 
ἄλλον τρόπον suggests that ὡσαύτως in our passage discriminates the perception of 
darkness from the perception of light, rather than from the perception of colours. 


ΤΙ. 2 425 Ὁ 16—b 26 437 


b 23. δεκτικὸν. What is here said of the sense-organ is said 4348 18 of 
sense, the λόγος or δύναμες of the organ. 

Ὁ 24. ἕκαστον, “every sense-organ” and therefore the eye. See zofe on 
ἑκάστου, 424 a 22. διὸ, because we receive the form without the matter. To 
receive this immaterial form in actual sensation is to undergo some change, 
ἀλλοιοῦσθαί πως, and, when ἀλλοίωσις has once taken place, the organ does not 
at once lose the modification which the sensation produced in it. ἀπελθόντων, 
when the external object has ceased to stimulate the sense. Cf. De /nsowz7i. 
2,459a 24 τὰ yap αἰσθητὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον ἡμῖν ἐμποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, καὶ 
τὸ γινόμενον ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν πάθος ov μόνον ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐνεργουσῶν 
τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπελθουσῶν, De Alem. τ. 450a 26 τοῦ πράγματος ἀπόντος, 
Metaph. 1036a 6 ἀπελθόντες ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας, also 408b 18, De Wem. 1, 
450a 30—32. 

Ὁ 24. ἔνεισιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι: cf. De Lnsomn. 2, 459b 5 διὸ τὸ 
πάθος ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ἐν αἰσθανομένοις τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πεπαυμένοις, 
καὶ ἐν βάθει καὶ ἐπιπολῆς, not only in the peripheral organs “δὲ the surface,” but 
deep down in the central organ. Cf. also De Jusomn. 2, 460b 2 ἀπελθόντος τοῦ 
θύραθεν αἰσθητοῦ ἐμμένει τὰ αἰσθήματα αἰσθητὰ ὄντα. Since sensations are move- 
ments (not φοραί, but ἀλλοιώσεις, 408 b το 56.), it is not inconceivable that they 
should in turm set up other movements, cf. 428b το sqq. Such are imaginings 
and memories: cf. De Mem. 1, 450a 25—32. See mole on 408b 18, μόνας. On 
the plural davraciarc= φαντάσματα see ad 420b 32. 

425 b 26—426 b 7. In actual sensation the sense and its object, 
e.g. hearing and sound heard, are identical, though logically we can distinguish 
the one from the other in thought and give them different names, e.g. audition 
and resonance [§ 4]. The action of the agent, as well as the passivity of the 
patient, resides in the patient. Sound being such an agent and hearing such a 
patient, it will be in the sense of hearing, or in that which has the power to hear, 
that not only audition but also actual sound or resonance is realised [§ 5]. But 
the actualities as distinct from the potentialities are often without a name: 
e.g. there are no terms to distinguish colour and flavour actually seen and 
tasted from the corresponding potentialities [§ 6]. Actual sensation and the 
sensible object in actuality (e.g. actual hearing and actual sound) are main- 
tained and destroyed simultaneously, but such simultaneous co-existence is not 
necessary for potential sensation and the potential sensible [8 7]. This qualifi- 
cation was overlooked by the earlier physicists when they committed themselves 
to the assertion that colour does not exist apart from seeing nor flavour apart 
from tasting: I mean, they failed to distinguish between actual and potential 
sensation and sensible [§ 8]. The sense must be a proportion when its object 
is so. This explains the fact that excess in the sensible object destroys the 
sense. Objects pure and unmixed do indeed give pleasure, but the pleasure is 
heightened when the object is not simple, but a mixture in which opposite 
ingredients are blended. The sense being the due proportion, excess in the 
sensible causes pain, when it does not destroy [8 9]. 

425 Ὁ 26 ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ...27 αὐταῖς. See wofes on 4248 24 κατὰ τὸν λόγον, 
on 4248 25 τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἕτερον, and for τὸ εἶναι with dative 408 a 25, end of ποζε. The 
actively operant sensible is identical with the actively operant sense at the 
moment of perception. Later in this book we hear that actual knowledge is 
identical with the thing actually known at the moment of cognition; cf. 
4308 19 56., 431 a 1. This identity of subject and object in the act of cog- 
nition, whether perception or knowledge, is stated with qualifications which 
deserve careful attention. Sense-perception may be actual or potential, 4178 10: 


438 NOTES III. 2 


cf. 431 b 24—-26. It is only actual or actively operant sense which is identical 
with its object. The sensible, again, may be either an actual or only a potential 
sensible; we are dealing with the former only. The question what is sense 
when not percipient and what is the sensible when not perceived does not 
concern us. Lastly, though τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἕν, one and the same in material 
substratum, materialiter, percipient sense and perceived sensible are in essence 
or notion distinct. We can analyse this one thing and distinguish in thought 
its two characters or aspects. They differ as the ratio 2:1 differs from the 
ratio 1:2 or as up hill differs from down hill, PAys. 111. 3, 202a 18 sqq. For 
this qualified identity of subject and object in actual perception, the way has 
been prepared by the assimilation which was so marked a feature of the account 
of the separate senses, e.g. 418 ἃ 3 τὸ δ᾽ αἱσ θητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν 
ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, καθάπερ εἴρηται. πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ᾽ 
ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο: Cf 422b 15 ὥστε τὸ γευστικόν ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει 
τοιοῦτον, γευστὸν δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐντελεχείᾳ αὐτοῦ: further, by the account of 
perception given in 4248 17 sqq. Objects of sense, colours, sounds and smells, 
there are no doubt in abundance, but unless actually perceived they are only 
potential objects of sense, whatever else they may be actually. 

b 27. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον, “I mean, for example.” It might have been expected 
that λέγω would influence the construction, but οἷον is followed by the nomina- 
tive, just as if Aéyw had not preceded. 

Ὁ 28. ἔστι, “it is possible” = ἐνδέχεται. 

Ὁ 29. τὸ ἔχον Ψψόφον, 1.6. τὸ δυνάμενον ψοφεῖν of the next line. See moze on 
ἔχειν ψόφον. 419 b 6. οὐκ ἀεὶ ψοφεῖ, int. κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν. Cf. 419b 4 sq., and 
4268 8 infra. 

b29. ὅταν 8 ἐνεργῇῆς. The transition from dormant power to its actual 
exercise must be treated as equivalent to πάσχειν or κινεῖσθαι; 417 a 14sqq. The 
sense is stimulated and acted upon by the object, but, as there explained, this 
does not mean destruction by the opposite, but rather preservation of the 
potentially existent and its normal development: eis αὐτὸ yap ἡ ἐπίδοσις καὶ eis 
ἐντελέχειαν, 417b 6. The external stimulus is the occasion of a development 
from dormant potentiality to active exercise, 431 a 4 566. 

b 30. τότε, at the moment of actual operation, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ. There is an 
error in the critical- zofes upon this line. According to Stapfer, Studza, p. 7, 
Krit. Studien, Ὁ. 19, #., the lacuna in cod. E is longer by the two words καὶ ὁ 
than Bekker has reported. The note should have run: “rére...31. καὶ 6 om, E.” 
Stapfer adds: “‘ partim insert., partim in marg. posit. ab E?.” 

31. ἅμα γίνεται. Here only the simultaneity of the two processes is 
mentioned ; their identity, subject to the proper qualifications, follows from the 
fact that, as explained below, 426a 4 sq., they both take effect ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι. 

426a 2. εἰ δή...ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ, “assuming, therefore, that moving, or rather 
acting and being acted upon, go on in that which is undergoing the action.” 
From PAys. 111., c. 3, we learn that κίνησις takes effect ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ. As he is 
dealing with sense-perception, which he sometimes calls a κίνησις but regularly a 
πάθος, A. not only adds (426 a 2) καὶ ἡ ποίησις to κίνησις, but even takes the unusual 
step of substituting ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ for ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ when we should have 
expected ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι, cf. 4268 5, loand 4148 11 ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ διατιθε- 
μένῳ. The passage in the Physics is Ill. 3, 202 a 13 καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον δὲ 
φανερόν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις ἔν τῷ κινητῷ- ἐντελέχεια γάρ ἐστι τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ 
κινητικοῦ. καὶ ἡ τοῦ κινητικοῦ δὲ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἄλλη ἐστίν: δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι 
ἐντελέχειαν ἀμφοῖν. κινητικὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῷ δύνασθαι, κινοῦν δὲ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν - 
ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἐνεργητικὸν τοῦ κινητοῦ, ὥστε ὁμοίως μία ἡ ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια ὥσπερ τὸ 


111. 2 425 Ὁ 26---426 8 20 430 


αὐτὸ διάστημα ἕν πρὸς δύο καὶ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ τὸ ἄναντες καὶ τὸ κάταντες. ταῦτα γὰρ 
ἕν μέν ἐστιν, ὁ μέντοι λόγος οὐχ εἷς. Cf. also Phys. V. 1, 224 Ὁ 4 546., Ὁ 25 ἡ 
κίνησις οὐκ ἐν τῷ εἴδει ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ καὶ κινητῷ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν. Also 
De Gen. et Corr. 1. 7, 324 Ὁ 5 sqq-; cf. PAys. vil. 3. In our passage A., having 
joined ποίησις with κίνησις, goes on to add ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ for all three, whereas 
strictly ἡ ποίησις is ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ, just as ἡ κίνησις is ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ and as τὸ 
πάθος is ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι. That the present passive participle ποιούμενον was 
not displaced by πάσχον is attested by Aledaph. 1050a 31 τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια 
ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν, Phys. 11. 1, 192b 27 ἕκαστον τῶν ποιουμένων, 76. 11. 3, 
194 Ὁ 31 καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου 
Lint. αἴτιον], De Gen. An. Il. 6, 742 ἃ 30 τὸ γὰρ ποιητικὸν καὶ γεννητικόν, ἦ τοιαῦτα, 
πρὸς τὸ ποιούμενόν ἐστι καὶ γεννώμενον. 

a4. ἐν τῇ κατὰ δύναμιν, int. ἀκοῇ which corresponds in this instance to 
τὸ πάσχον. Potential hearing must have that hearing actualised and the sound 
must take effect in it. TOU ποιητικοῦ Kal κινητικοῦ. It would not be safe to 
infer that the terms ποιητικὸν and κινητικὸν are identical: sometimes κίνησις is 
regarded as more extensive than ποίησις, e.g. De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 6, 323.4 20 τὸ 
κινεῖν ἐπὶ πλέον TOU ποιεῖν ἐστίν. 

a5. διὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι. Hence there may be a cause of 
motion which is itself unmoved, and such a cause for the motion of the whole 
universe we accordingly find described in Mefafh. A., cc. 6,7. There are other 
applications, e.g. the good as the end of action, De A. 433 Ὁ 15 sq.: ch 
434 a τό sqq. 

a6. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ψοφητικοῦ ἐνέργειά ἐστι ψόφος. This sentence applies to 
the special case of sound and hearing, the principle enunciated 4268 4 of action 
taking effect in that which is being acted upon: ποιητικὸν becomes ψοφητικόν, 
τὸ πάσχον becomes τὸ ἀκουστικόν. It has been proposed to separate the sentence 
from διὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι by transposing a 9 ὥσπερ yap ἡ ποίησις... 
a Il ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ to precede it. The objection to this is that the subject of 
a 12 ὠνόμασται is left obscure, for the verb is separated from its natural subject 
ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ by the interposition of three sen- 
tences, which, if the transposition be adopted, must be regarded as a sort of 
parenthesis. 

a7. ϑιττὸν, namely, potential and actual: see 419b 4 sq. cited above, xoze 
on 425 Ὁ 29, οὖκ ἀεὶ ψοφεῖ. 

all. ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ. This is a more general expression for ἐν τῷ πάσχοντε 
than ἐν τῇ κατὰ δύναμιν, which is used of ἀκοὴ 426 ἃ 4. 

a 13. ὅρασις γὰρ λέγεται. See the last zoze on 4128 8. 

ἃ 14. καὶ γεῦσις, int. ἐνέργεια λέγεται. 

ἃ 15. ἡ δὲ τοῦ χυμοῦ, int. ἐνέργειά ἐστιν. 

ἃ 17. ἅμα φθείρεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι, ““must be simultaneously destroyed or 
simultaneously maintained.” They exist and cease to exist as actuality together. 
τὴν οὕτω λεγομένην, 1.6. THY κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν λεγομένην, in contrast to τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν 
λεγόμενα 4268. το. 

α 19. οὐκ ἀνάγκη, int. ἅμα φθείρεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι. 

a 20. ot πρότερον φυσιολόγοιι The assertion of the relativity of sensation, or 
at any rate the denial of its objective validity, was a consequence of more than 
one Pre-Socratic system, but it is uncertain how far the constructors of such 
systems recognised this. Cf. MWefapk. T, c. 5, where A. has before him not only 
the views of Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus, but also the maxim of 
Protagoras, which may be regarded as the outcome or result of previous 
physical speculation. See Plato, Zheaet, 156 A—C, 159 C, Ὁ, Aristotle, De Sevszu 


440 NOTES Ill. 2 


4, 442a 29 sqq., Mefaph.T,c. 5, especially 1009 Ὁ II—IoI1 a2; cf. also De A. 
404 a 28, Theophrastus, De Senstbus § 63. By the term φυσιολόγοι the earlier 
Ionian philosophers are often intended, e.g. M/ezaph. 986b 14, but Empedocles 
is so designated Poetic 1447 Ὁ 19. As to Protagoras, though he was a professed 
humanist and not a natural philosopher, it seems reasonable to accept Trend.’s 
explanation: Quoniam autem in hac quidem re Heracliti placita in suum usum 
convertit, haud inepte cum aliis physiologus dici potest (ed. 2, p. 358). 

ἃ 21. οὔτε λευκὸν.. ὄψεως. Cf. De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 2, 315 Ὁ 33 ὅμως δὲ τούτοις 
ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ γένεσιν ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τροπτῇ καὶ διαθιγῇ μετα- 
κινοῦντα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ταῖς τῶν σχημάτων διαφοραῖς, ὅπερ ποιεῖ Δημόκριτος " διὸ καὶ 
χροιὰν οὔ φησιν εἶναι- τροπῇ γὰρ χρωματίζεσθαι. οὐδὲ χυμὸν. Cf. Theophr. 
De Sensibus ἃ 69 ἁπλῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν σχῆμα [shape of the atoms] καθ᾽ αὑτό ἐστι, τὸ δὲ 
γλυκὺ καὶ ὅλως τὸ αἰσθητὸν πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις, ὥς φησιν [int. Δημόκριτος]. 
In ὃ 64 Theophr. implies that it was only the atomic shapes which generate 
colour and flavour, which Democritus determined accurately πλὴν οὐχ ἁπάντων 
ἀποδίδωσι τὰς popdds, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῶν χυλῶν Kal τῶν χρωμάτων καὶ τούτων 
ἀκριβέστερον διορίζει τὰ περὶ τοὺς χυλοὺς ἀναφέρων τὴν φαντασίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον 
[making the presentation to sense, viz. as flavour, relative to the individual 
percipient]. See also AMetaph. 1047 a 4 οὔτε yap ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε γλυκὺ 
οὔτε ὅλως αἰσθητὸν οὐδὲν ἔσται μὴ αἰοσθανομένων᾽ Sore τὸν ἸΤρωταγόρου λόγον 
συμβήσεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς, where A. endeavours to fasten upon the Megarians the 
doctrine of Protagoras, just because they held ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι and 
denied the validity of any distinction between the potential and the actual, 
between a power to do and the act of doing. 

84 24. ἐπὶ τούτων, 1.6. ἐπὶ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν 
αἰσθήσεως. 

8. 25. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων, “but it does not hold of potential sensation and 
potential sensible.” 

a 26. περὶ τῶν λεγομένων ovy ἁπλῶς. A. means τὸ αἰσθητικὸν and τὸ αἰσθητόν. 
When we speak of these two things, it is necessary, A. thinks, to indicate in 
each case whether the term we use refers to τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν or to τὸ δυνάμει. 
Cf. Metaph. 988 Ὁ 14 ὥστε λέγειν τε καὶ μὴ λέγειν was συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς τἀγαθὸν 
αἴτιον" οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγουσιν. 


The general drift of the following section (426 ἃ 27—b 7) is clear and may be 
presented in the paraphrase of Them., who characteristically passes over certain 
expressions which occasion great difficulty. “If the actual audible is identical 
with the actual hearing, then the sensations were rightly said to be λόγοι. For 
the mixed among sensibles are always more pleasant to us than the unmixed, 
e.g. in sounds αἱ συμφωνίαι, mixed flavours and blended colours. Now every 
mixture and blending is a λόγος which, when actually perceptible, becomes 
identical with sense-perception. Rightly and naturally (εἰκότως), then, sense- 
perception is λόγος as being identical with a λόγος (λόγῳ γὰρ ἦ αὐτή): un- 
tempered sounds and unmixed flavours, whether in excess or in defect, either 
fail to move sense or else destroy or pain it, for in excess they are no longer 
λόγοι nor blendings (κράσεις) nor cvppovia” (84, 24 sqq. H., 155, 26 sqq. Sp.). 
Thus, as before, A. takes hearing as his typical sense and from the admitted 
proposition λόγος δ᾽ ἡ συμφωνία, he concludes that hearing is ἃ λόγος (4268 29 
ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν λόγον τινὰ εἶναι), and, by ‘induction, that every actual sensation 
is similarly a λόγος (Ὁ 3 ὡς λόγου τινὸς ὄντος τῆς αἰσθησεως) : and thisis seen to bein 
complete agreement with the acknowledged fact that sensibles in excess destroy 
or pain the sense, while when duly tempered they are not only perceived but 


III. 2 426 a 20—a 27 441 


give pleasure. It will be remembered that in £7i. Mic. 1174 Ὁ 14—1175a 3A. 
lays down that pleasure is the inseparable accompaniment of actual sensation 
when the faculty of sense is functioning normally upon its proper object, the 
appropriate sensible. 

a27. εἰ δὴ συμφωνία φωνή ris ἐστιν. The text in this form is as old as the 
fifth century A.D. The evidence of Simpl. is explicit, 193, 32—194, 3; 194, 9. 
He informs us that Plutarch of Athens enquired whether EIAH should be read 
as three words, εἰ δ᾽ 7, or as two, εἰ δή, and decided for the latter division of the 
letters. The same possibility of dividing AH into δ᾽ ἡ is also considered and 
rejected by Philop. 475, 29 sqq., doubtless upon authority, though he does not 
name Plutarch. The objections of Syrianus and Ammonius as cited by Philop. 
473, 2 566.,) Io 546. also imply that they had substantially the same text. Simpl. 
and Philop. agree that συμφωνία is predicate and therefore does not need the 
article and that φωνή ris (or, as they put it, ἡ τὶς φωνή) is the subject and means 
actual voice: Simpl. 194, 8 τὴν συμφωνίαν καλῶς κατηγορεῖ τῆς τινὸς φωνῆς, 
τουτέστι τῆς Kar ἐνέργειαν, Philop. 475, 30 τὶς δέ ἐστιν Fris φωνή, δηλονότι ἡ κατ᾽ 
ἐνέργειαν: αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ συμμέτρως ἔχουσα πρὸς τὴν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἀκοήν. 
Trend., however, conjectured εἰ δ᾽ ἡ φωνὴ συμφωνία τίς ἐστιν and this has been 
thought to derive support from Soph. 112, 32 and Priscianus Lydus 22, 24 cited 
in the critical zozves. But, as Priscianus does not add ris to συμφωνία, his 
evidence is inconclusive. Philop. or Simpl., interpreting our present text as we 
know they did, would have thought themselves equally justified in saying 
ἡ φωνὴ συμφωνία εἴρηται παρὰ τῷ ᾿Δριστοτέλει. 

Now, for the sake of argument, suppose we take the words in this way, 
“actual voice 15 a συμφωνία": our greatest difficulty is then to conceive exactly 
what is meant by συμφωνία. The word (1) may mean literally a concord of two 
or more sounds heard as one sound, or (2) it may have a wider meaning, in 
which it is scarcely to be distinguished from ἁρμονία or ὁμοιότης (cf. Plato, Rep. 
401 Ὁ, Symp. 187 B), as agreement, tempering, harmony, of opposites, or at any 
rate contrasts, in general, and not specifically of sounds. With the first meaning 
it is clear that συμφωνία is φωνή τις and not conversely. To take the specific 
meaning (1) with @wvr7 as subject is absurd: it is not true that all actual voice is 
a concord in which two or more sounds are blended: some actual voice is, some 
is not. The ancient commentators, then, who insist that φωνὴ is the subject, 
give συμφωνία the more general meaning (2). Thus Simpl. 194, 16 τὸ κατ᾽ 
ἐνέργειαν αἰσθητὸν ἐν συμφωνίᾳ τινὶ εἶναε βούλεται τῶν ἄκρων, ὥστε μήτε ἐλλείπειν 
μήτε ὑπερβάλλειν, ἔχειν δὲ μέσως πως" τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ συμφωνία, οἷον κρᾶσίς ris οὖσα 
τῶν ἄκρων, ὀξέος μὲν καὶ βαρέος ἐν ἀκοῇ, λαμπρότητος δὲ καὶ ἀμυδρότητος ἐν ὄψει: 
here συμφωνία seems to be very little different from μεσότης. ῬΈΠΟΡ. again says 
472, 30 συμφωνίαν δὲ τὴν κοινωνίαν λέγει and Soph. 112, 33 συμφωνία τις καὶ 
συμμετρία and Prisc. Lyd. 22, 25 ἡ φωνὴ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ συμφωνήσασαι καὶ συναρμοσ- 
θεῖσαι ἀλλήλαις. Again, if συμφωνία bears the second meaning of agreement in 
general, the question arises ; agreement of what with what? Of the sense with 
the sensible, says Philop. 472, 29 ἡ δὲ φωνὴ συμφωνία ἐστὶν οὐκ αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν 
ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀκοήν. Similarly Prisc. Lyd. in the passage cited above and also 
22, 29 ἣ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ta ἔξω ἀποτάσει καὶ τῇ πρὸς 
τὰ αἰσθητὰ σχέσει, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τὴν ἐνεργητικὴν ἕξει συμμετρίαν καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν. 
Simplicius, on the other hand, as is shown in the passage cited, interpreted the 
agreement as one between the opposite extremes in the sensible, a view which 
is shared by Trend., who rejects the supposition that the word means “con- 
centus inter vocem et auditum” and prefers to understand it as “concentus inter 
ipsa vocis quasi elementa, temperata quaedam acuti et gravis soni ratio, vocis 


442 NOTES Ill. 2 


temperies.” We may recall the treatment of the term ἁρμονία in I., c. 4, where, 
as A. explains it, it implies opposites, σύνθεσις ἐναντίων or λόγος τῶν μειχθέντων, 
1.6. τῶν στοιχείων. If we interpret συμφωνία here in an analogous manner as 
the combining of opposite elements, we avoid the absurdity of supposing that A. 
used the identity of sense and sensible as one of his premisses for establishing 
the conclusion that there is symmetry, agreement or consonance between them. 

However, though συμφωνία might thus be taken as κρᾶσις ἐναντίων in general, 
the connexion with the sense of hearing and the repetition of the word below, 
b 6, incline me to adopt Torstrik’s contention that the word has here its 
restricted meaning as a musical term. Cf. 4248 31 wote. As we there saw, 
συμφωνία is a sound which to the ear is a single object, although we know that 
in its production two or more actual sounds coalesce. It is thus a typical 
example of μεῖξις proper (see zoze on 407 Ὁ 32) and is so treated in De Semsu 7, 
447 a 290—447b 4, 447 Ὁ 11. A. does not believe that this coalescence is 
apparent only and that the two constituents of a chord are separately heard, 
although the interval between them is so short as to be imperceptible, De Sesz 
7,448 a19sqq. This was the theory of certain Pythagoreans, which A. rejects, 
because he regards an imperceptible moment of time as an impossibility. His 
own belief is that what is heard is neither of the constituent sounds, but a new 
single sound formed by their combination. Thus understood, it is quite evident 
that συμφωνία is a species of vocal sound. I take συμφωνία to be the subject, 
even without the article prefixed. Cf. eg. 420b 5 ἡ φωνὴ with 420b 13 φωνὴ 
without the article. Torstrik admits that the conclusion of the syllogism does 
not follow from the premisses: and this cannot be denied. But no universal 
conclusion does follow from particular premisses. 

a 28. καὶ ἔστιν ὡς οὐχ ἕν τὸ αὐτός Torstnk bracketed these words as a 
marginal gloss. They are a needless interruption to the argument and the 
omission of καὶ between ἐν and τὸ αὐτὸ looks suspicious. 

a 28. λόγος δ᾽ ἡ συμφωνία, more precisely a mumerical ratio. Cf. Mefaph. 
991b 13 εἶ δ᾽ ὅτι λόγοι ἀριθμῶν τἀνταῦθα, οἷον 7 συμφωνία, 1092 Ὁ 13 ἢ ὅτι [6] λόγος 
ἢ συμφωνία ἀριθμῶν, also De A. 4248. 30 λύεται ὃ λόγος (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν ἢ αἴσθησις), 
ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συμφωνία καὶ 6 τόνος κρουομένων σφόδρα τῶν χορδῶν, Probl. X1x. 38, 
O21 ἃ 2 συμφωνίᾳ δὲ χαίρομεν ὅτι κρᾶσίς ἐστι λόγον ἐχόντων ἐναντίων πρὸς ἄλληλα. 
6 μὲν οὖν λόγος τάξις, ὃ ἦν φύσει ἡδύ. τὸ δὲ κεκραμένον τοῦ ἀκράτου πᾶν ἥδιον, 
ἄλλως τε κἂν (αἰσθητὸν ὃν) ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἄκροιν ἐξ ἴσου τὴν δύναμιν ἔχῃ (ste Jan) 
ἐν τῇ συμφωνίᾳ ὃ λόγος. 

8. 290. ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν λόγον τινὰ εἶναι. This is A.’s conclusion from the 
threefold protasis (2) actual sound and actual hearing are one and the same, 
(1) συμφωνία is a kind of vocal sound and (3) ἡ συμφωνία is λόγος. This is the 
order of Simplicius. The steps might be arranged as follows: (1) συμφωνία is 2 
kind of vocal sound, (3) ἡ συμφωνία is λόγος, therefore a certain vocal sound is 
Adyos, but (2) actual sound and actual hearing are identical: therefore actual 
hearing, like actual sound, is a sort of Adyos. But the inference is fallacious. 
Obviously the premisses with their qualifications ris and ἔστιν ds do not bear 
out the general conclusion. Nor, if we adopt Trend.’s conjecture, is the case 
much better, for even then ἔστιν ὡς should precede ἀνάγκη in the conclusion. 
When we actually hear a concord, then on A.’s theory of sensation the Adyos or 
ratio of the audible sound is transmitted to the percipient sense-organ, for it is 
only there that it resides in actuality. But this proves nothing for sensations 
other than those of musical chords. I conjecture that it was their recognition 
of the fallacy in A’s reasoning here which led the commentators to such 
arbitrary interpretations of the passage. 


III. 2 426a 27—b6 443 


a 30. διὰ τοῦτος Cf. 4248 28 φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων sqq., where φθείρουσι τὰ 
αἰσθητήρια is parallel to φθείρει τὴν ἀκοὴν here. A lesion of the organ prevents 
it from functioning. 

a 31. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τὴν γεῦσιν: supply φθείρει as predicate and 
τὸ ὑπερβάλλον γευστὸν for subject. 

426 Ὁ 3. διὸ, because the sense is in some sort a ratio or proportion, λόγος 
τις. ἡδέα μέν, int. τὰ αἰσθητά ἐστιν. The clause, which is answered by b κα 
ὅλως δὲ μᾶλλον xré., iS concessive, as pointed out by Mr Shorey, 4._/. Ph. XXII. 
p- 159. To the question what sensibles give pleasure A. answers (1) those 
which are pure and unmixed, under certain conditions ; but (2) in a still higher 
degree those which are composite, when divers elements have been fused into a 
unity. Cf. Probl. XIX. 38, 921 a 2 sqq. cited in second moze on a 28 supra. 

Ὁ 4. ἄγηται εἰς τὸν λόγον, i.e. in actual perception. When unmixed sensibles 
are perceived, they are brought before the bar of sense (cf. eis κρίσιν, eis 
δικαστήριον ἄγειν), which pronounces on their purity. Sense is the λόγος here 
and εἰς τὸν λόγον ἄγεσθαιΞξε αἰσθητὰ γενέσθαι. A. uses ἄγειν of the transition from 
potential to actual (eg. 417b το, Atk. Nic. 1153a 12, De Sensu 4, 441 Ὁ 21, 
Metaph. 1051 a 29 sq-.), which in the moment of perception affects simultaneously 
the αἰσθητικὸν and the αἰσθητόν. The process has been often described from the 
side of the subject as ὁμοίωσις : here it is described from the side of the object. 
τὸ ὀξὺ. I am in doubt whether this word, which in our treatise is variously applied 
to the object of at least four of the five senses, hearing, smelling, taste and touch, 
ought to be taken, as in the rest of this section, to mean “shrill” or as “sharp 
to the taste,” which better suits its association here with salt and sweet. 

b5. ἡδέα γὰρ τότε, i.e. when perceived as pure and unmixed. The com- 
mentators, however, persist in making this mean “when mixed in the proper 
proportion,” which is the meaning they attach to ὅταν ἄγηται eis τὸν λόγον: 
Simpl. 195, 15 sqq., Philop. 477, 5 sqq. This destroys the antithesis to τὸ 
μεικτόν. Surely A. would have granted that it is possible to perceive qualities 
pure and unmixed and to derive pleasure from them. In De Semsu, cc. 3—5 he 
goes to great lengths in the analysis of χρώματα, ὀσμαὶ and χυμοὶ and with 
regard to these claims to have established the result that, as a rule, the greatest 
pleasure is derived from the composite sensibles. 

Ὁ 5. μᾶλλον, int. ἡδύ. The only alternative is to make συμφωνία the predi- 
cate of τὸ μεικτόν, and this I reject, because συμφωνία is the typical example of 
τὸ μεικτόν. The omission of οἷον, καθάπερ or the like is not wholly unexampled ; 
cf.e.g.425b9. But ἀκοῇ μὲν before συμφωνία would correspond exactly to ἀφῇ 
δὲ τὸ θερμαντὸν xré. and must, I think, be mentally supplied. 

b6. ἁφῇ δὲ, int. μᾶλλον ἡδύ ἐστιν. τὸ θερμαντὸν ἢ ψυκτόν, not the merely 
hot or cold, which, like τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ τὸ βαρύ, would be ἀμιγές, but the temperate, 
which is capable of being heated or cooled: cf. Philop. 477, 12 ὅρα πῶς εἶπεν τὸ 
θερμαντόν, τουτέστι τὸ δυνάμενον θερμανθῆναι, καὶ ψυκτὸν τὸ δυνάμενον ψυχθῆναι, 
τότε γάρ ἐστιν ἡδύ, ὅταν δύνηται δέχεσθαι ἐπίτασιν: τὸ γὰρ ἄμετρον ψυχρὸν καὶ 
θερμὸν ἀνιαρόν. With τὸ θερμαντὸν fh ψυκτὸν as an instance of τὸ μεικτὸν the 
other members of the comparison are left unexpressed, “more pleasant than 
unmixed hot or unmixed cold.” Thus understood, the words are in their right 
place and the proposal to transfer them to follow Ὁ 5 ἁλμυρὸν would be mis- 
chievous, for the shrill, the sweet, the salt are instances, not of τὸ pexrdv, but of 
extreme qualities in isolation. ' 

426 b 8--427a 16. What we have said of the special senses and 
their special objects comes to this: each such sense has an organ or sensorlum 
of its own and distinguishes or discerns the different qualities of its own proper 


444 NOTES III. 2 


object. But such discrimination is not confined to the objects of the separate 
senses taken by themselves. When, e.g., we compare sweet and white and 
pronounce them different, this must be an act of sense, for the objects are 
sensible, not intelligible [§ ro]. Here it may be remarked that the flesh is not 
the final sensorium, or else comparison and discrimination would imply contact 
with the objects compared. But if to compare and distinguish is the work of 
sense, what instrument does the faculty therein employ? Can it employ the 
agency of two distinct special senses? No, for discrimination implies that both 
objects are presented to a single arbiter, and two distinct senses no more 
constitute such a single umpire than do two distinct persons [8 11]. The unity 
of judgment presumes the unity of perception and thought. Moreover, not 
only must there be a single arbiter, but both the objects discriminated must be 
presented to it simultaneously. For the judgment “4 is different from B” isa 
pronouncement about B as much as about A. Further, the coincidence in 
time is all-important: we must pronounce now and we must pronounce that 
A and 5 are different now [ἢ 12]. How can we conceive this to be done? 
Not by physical action, for since all change or movement implies two parts or 
factors, one the movent, the other the moved, physical changes opposite and 
simultaneous are impossible when by the use of the term indivisible we exclude 
a division of that which is moved, its division into these two parts or factors. 
Let us, then, start with an hypothesis. Suppose that which judges to be 
numerically indivisible and only logically separable into different parts [§ 13]. 
This is not possible. The same indivisible unity may potentially be a pair of 
opposites, but it cannot be in actuality both opposites at the same time, it 
cannot be simultaneously both white and black, it cannot simultaneously receive 
the forms of both white and black, as is required by our theory of sensation and 
thought [§ 14]. Suppose, then, that we use the analogy of the point, which is 
divisible in the sense that it can be considered as one or as two. That which 
judges, then, gwzé indivisible, is single and judges its two objects simultaneously: 
but it may also be regarded as divisible, and then it is no longer one; the same 
point isused, we may say, twice in an instantaneous act. Treat the point as two: 
then it judges two objects with an instrument in some sort divided into two; 
treat the point as one, and it judges a single object and in an instantaneous 
act [§ 15]. 

The problem is very briefly, how can unity know diversity? It is a fact of 
experience that we pass such judgments of identity and difference: “ Sweet is 
not white” or more generally “4 is identical with, or different from, B.” When 
A and # are sensibles, Aristotle refers the cognition to sense. But which 
sense? Each of the special senses is restricted to its own province or sphere. 
When the objects compared, as sweet and white, belong to different provinces, 
which is the arbiter, with what do we judge that sweet is not white? Sight 
takes no account of sweet, nor taste of white. The first suggestion is that we 
employ the two senses concerned as separate instruments: cf. De Sensu 7, 
448 b 20—449 a 2, where the analogy of the two eyes which serve as the organ 
of vision is employed to render more plausible the supposition of a division of 
the αἰσθητικὸν in an indivisible act of perception. 

Our first suggestion cannot be sustained: the judgment being one, the 
arbiter must be one; two separate senses would pronounce two opinions, not 
one. And if this should be met by modifying the hypothesis, and the two 
instruments of the single arbiter should be supposed to pass judgment on 
different objects at different times, A. points out that if the act of comparison is 
to be instantaneous, the simultaneous presentment of both objects is indis- 


III. 2 426 Ὁ 8—b 13 445 


pensable. In the judgment “4 is zow not B” the “now” is not indifferent. 
The hypothesis of different instruments once excluded, it must be by a single 
indivisible instrument in an indivisible moment of time that we compare and 
distinguish diverse sensibles. Such comparison is part of the work of ἡ κοινὴ 
αἴσθησις, though the phrase is never used in this chapter. This faculty, then, 
τὸ πρῶτον ΟΥ̓ κοινὸν αἰσθητικόν, 1s one and indivisible. But the difficulty remains. 
This faculty undergoes a certain “motion” when sweet is perceived, the opposite 
“motion” when the sensible is bitter and a different “ motion” when it is white. 
But simultaneous opposite motions are impossible in the same thing in the same 
instant of time, unless that thing be capable of division. This apparently 
insurmountable objection stated, A. offers two hypotheses and professes a 
preference for the second of the two (cf. De Seusu 7, 449 a 10—22, where 
apparently the same two hypotheses are presented). In the first the indivisible 
πρῶτον αἰσθητικὸν is numerically and spatially one, but logically diverse, just as 
in the same object, numerically and spatially one, logical analysis discloses 
various qualities. But this fails to explain the simultaneous perception of 
contrary qualities. An object may simultaneously have opposite or diverse 
qualities (1) potentially, when the object is as yet actually neither, (2) actually, 
only if it 15 divisible: e.g. a material thing may be actually black in one part, 
actually white in another at the same moment, whereas the πρῶτον αἰσθητικὸν 15 
assumed to be an individual unity. A. meets this objection by the analogy of 
the point, which, though indivisible and devoid of parts, can be regarded either 
as one or as two. 

This passage is the subject of an essay by Alex. Aphr. ἀπ. καὶ Avo. 111. 9, 
94, Io sqq. We also have his valuable commentary on De Sensu, c. 7, which 
discusses the similar problem, whether simultaneous perception of several 
objects is possible. 

426 Ὁ 8. τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, “is related to, or concerned with, the 
sensible which falls under its ken,” which is ὑποκείμενον in the sense explained 
above in first zoZe on 425 Ὁ 14. 

bg. ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ. Cf. supra 424 8 24-28, where it is 
explained that faculty and organ are to one another as form to matter. 

bio. κρίνει: cf. 418a 14, where the same thought is expressed. See Alex. 
ἄπ. καὶ λύσ. 94, 28 συστήσας, ὅτι ἡ αἰσθανομένη τινῶν καὶ ras διαφορὰς αὐτῶν κρίνει 
(οὐ γὰρ ἄλλης μὲν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινων, ἄλλης δὲ τὸ κρίνειν τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν, 
καθ᾽ ἃς ἐστιν αἰσθητά, ἀλλ᾽ ἣ τε αἰσθανομένη τινῶν καὶ κρίνει αὐτά, καὶ ἢ κρίνουσα 
τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν καὶ αἰσθάνεται αὐτῶν - ταὐτὸν γὰρ κρίνειν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι" διὰ 
τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις κρίσις τις εἶναι δοκεῖ). In Book 11, however, sense was 
more often described as ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, πάσχειν, ἐνεργεῖν. In Book ΠῚ. its dis- 
criminating and intellectual side, already noticed 418 a 14, 4228 21, 4248 5 sq., 
is brought out and its relationship to thought and knowledge is emphasised : 
cf. 4328 16 τῷ τε κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθήσεως. The same process 
may be viewed in one aspect as πάθος, in another as κρίσις. The position for 
which Alex. contends is the key to the whole subsequent discussion. Whatever 
judges two or more sensible objects must zfso facto co-instantaneously perceive 
them. 

bro. τὰς...διαφοράς, “the specific differences of the appropriate sensible,” 
e.g. taste pronounces upon sweet, bitter and the other varieties of flavour, 
which are constituted by these differences: cf. 4188 13 sq., 4208 26, 422} Io, 
Ὁ 31 sq., 423 Ὁ 27 56. 4248 13. 

bi3. ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον κρίνομεν. A special sense dis- 
criminates only specific differences: white and black, though they present 


446 NOTES ΠῚ. 2 


ἐναντίωσις or μεγίστη διαφορά, are still in the same genus, colour, they are 
ὁμογενῆ. But discrimination transcends the limits of a single sense and its 
proper province, for qualities generically distinct are included under the same 
judgment. Cf. Them. 84, 38 H., 156, 16 Sp. αἰσθανόμεθα τοίνυν οὐ μόνον τὸ 
λευκὸν τοῦ μέλανος διαφέρον, ἀλλὰ Kal τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ γλυκέος. White and sweet 
are the objects of two different senses and not, like white and black, objects of 
the same sense. 

Ὁ 14. καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει, int. ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν. The καὶ 
emphasises the verb αἰσθανόμεθα. Cf. Them. 85,1 H., 156,17 Sp. ταύτην οὖν τὴν 
διαφορὰν καθ᾽ ἣν τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ γλυκέος διενήνοχεν τίς ἐστιν ἡ κρίνουσα δύναμις; 
He is undoubtedly right in equating αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι διαφέρει with τὴν διαφορὰν 
κρίνειν. See above on bioxpive. The answer to this question takes up the 
rest of the present chapter. ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰσθήσει, int. αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡμᾶς ὅτι 
διαφέρει. Οἵ, De Sensu 6, 445 Ὁ 15 ἔτε τίνι κρινοῦμεν ταῦτα ἢ γνωσόμεθα; ἣ τῷ νῷ. 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νοητά, οὐδὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς τὰ ἐκτὸς μὴ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως. 

b15. αἰσθητὰ γάρ ἐστιν. The reason given, though it seems decisive for Α., 
would have appeared inconclusive to Plato: cf. Theaef. 185 A sqq. 

Ὁ τό. τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον, the immediate organ of sense in general, of 
the so-called common sense, more usually styled πρῶτον, κοινὸν or κύριον αἰσθη- 
τήριον. The words should not be restricted, as some restrict them, to the 
primary or single organ of touch. What from one point of view is first or 
primary is from another last or ultimate. Cf. 431 a 19 and see mofe on 422 Ὁ 22. 
The use of ἔσχατον to denote a peripheral organ is quite dissimilar: cf. also τοῦ 
ὄμματος τὸ ἔσχατον 423 Ὁ 22. 

b 16. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦν. The natural interpretation of this passage is that 
flesh, the organ of the fundamental sense of touch, cannot be the immediate 
organ of the common sense, for, if 1t were, a judgment could only be passed by 
touching the object itself: nor indeed can a judgment involving qualities 
perceptible by different senses be formed by means of any of the organs of 
sense taken separately. The argument becomes consecutive enough so soon as 
1 is recognised that A. here adopts the common opinion, so severely criticised 
in 11.) c. 11, that flesh 15 the organ of touch and that touch requires no medium: 
in fact, that A. uses precisely the same language as in 424 Ὁ 27—30, 435 a 17, 
De Sensu 7, 440 8 24. See Innes, Class. Rev. XVI. p- 463. Trend., failing to 
find the right clue to the sequence of thought, supposed that A. went out of his 
way to attack once more the views of the earlier physicists, e.g. Empedocles 
and Democritus, who with their theories of pores and emanations could con- 
ceive of sensation as a corporeal process taking effect in all cases through 
contact alone. Cf. De Sensu 4, 442 a 29 sqq. Them. also (85, 5—11 H., 
156, 23—157, 2 Sp.) considered Ὁ 15 7 καὶ δῆλον...Ὁ 17 τὸ κρῖνον as a digression. 
Simpl. 197, 11 sqq. and Philop. 482, 30 sqq., on the contrary, assume that the 
whole reference must be to the flesh as corporeal substance, σῶμα, of the central 
organ and not to flesh as the organ or inter-organic medium of the sense of 
touch. But after gravely informing us that when A. said σὰρξ he meant σῶμα, 
that when he said αἰσθητήριον he meant αἴσθησις, all the meaning they can find 
in the passage is simply that ἡ κοινὴ αἴσθησις, the αἰσθητικὴ ψυχή, is nothing 
corporeal. For the view of Neuhaeuser see next oZe. αὐτοῦ, in spite of the 
preceding αἰσθητήριον, must mean the object itself, rod αἰσθητοῦ. Neuhaeuser, 
however, Ὁ. 81, thinks this would be too careless even for A. Hence he puts 
forward a different interpretation of Ὁ 15 7 καὶ δῆλον...Ὁ 17 τὸ κρῖνον. By the 
word ἔσχατον, he says, A. means the last term of a series, which has no term 
beyond it, and in the question raised 422 Ὁ 34 πότερον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον 


ΤΠ. 2 426 Ὁ 13—b τὸ 447 


ἐντός, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθέως ἡ σάρξ Neuhaeuser considers the second alternative, 
εὐθέως ἡ σάρξ, to be the same view as that here expressed by calling flesh τὸ 
ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον. “Statt der friiher gebrauchten Worte ‘das Fleisch sei 
nicht sogleich (εὐθέως) das Organ des Gefuhlsinnes,’ sagt er hier, und zwar 
durchaus angemessen, ‘das Fleisch sei nicht das letzte Organ des Gefiihlsinnes,’ 
d. ἢ. sei nicht das Organ desselben in der Weise, dass sich hinter ihm in der 
Richtung nach Innen nicht noch ein anderes (das eigentliche Organ) befinde.” 
The organ of the central sense must be in contact with the organs of the special 
senses, if it 15 to discriminate sensations. It follows that it must be in contact 
with every point of the flesh, for tactile sensations may occur at any point on 
the exterior surface of the body. Thus the assumption that flesh is τὸ ἔσχατον 
ἁπτικὸν αἰσθητήριον is reduced to an absurdity. Neuhaeuser remarks that the 
same argument would apply to the ultimate organs of the other senses, the 
central organ being no more to A. than τὸ κοινὸν μόριον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἅπάντων, 
τὸ κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον πάντων τῶν (or τῶν ἰδίων) αἰσθητηρίων, De Somn. 2,455 a 19, 
De Luv. 1, 467 Ὁ 28; 3, 469a 12. Cf. Them. 85, 5 H., 156, 23 Sp. οὐδὲν οὖν 
θαυμαστόν, εἰ ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν ἐδόκει μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἁφὴν ἐν σαρκί, ἀλλὰ THY σάρκα μὲν 
εἶναι μεταξὺ τοῦ τε ἁπτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ, ἢ εἴ τις καὶ βούλοιτο καλεῖν αὐτὴν αἴσθη- 
τήριον, ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε γε πρῶτον οὐδὲ ἐν ᾧ ἡ δύναμις ἐγκαθίδρυται ἡ ἁπτική- προϊὼν γὰρ 
ὁ λόγος εὑρήσει μὴ περὶ τὴν σάρκα τοῦτο μόνον συμβεβηκέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ λοιπὰ 
αἰσθητήρια, οἷον λέγω τὴν κόρην καὶ τοὺς διὰ τῶν ὥτων πόρους. Neuhaeuser 
closely follows Them. in the main outlines of his interpretation, but there is no 
indication how Them. took the words ἁπτόμενον αὐτοῦ. 

17. τὸ κρῖνον. Under this disguise, or as & ri, 6 ἐπικρίνει ἡ ψυχή, A. refers 
to what is called sensus communis, ἢ κοινὴ αἴσθησις ΟΥ τὸ πρῶτον αἰσθητικὸν of the 
Parva Naturalia. οὔτε δὴ. Post οὔτε alterum membrum per anacoluthiam 
quandam omittitur ac post aliquod intervallum mutata constructione per οὐδὲ 
adiicitur (/zd. Ar. 546a 8). We have to wait some time for οὐδέ: Ὁ 22 ὅτι μὲν 
οὖν repeats in substance the clause with οὔτε Ὁ 17 and ὅτι δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ comes at last in 
b 23 56. κεχωρισμένοις. In De Sensu 7, 448b 17 sqq. the problem, is it 
possible to perceive several objects in the same instant of time, is first 
approached as formulated thus: (Ὁ 20) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν dp’ ὧδ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, ἅμα μέν, 
ἑτέρῳ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι; (cf. in the recapitulation 4498 5 εἰ δὲ δὴ ἄλλῳ 
μὲν γλυκέος ἄλλῳ δὲ λευκοῦ αἰσθάνεται ἣ ψυχὴ μέρει). This 15 a close parallel to 
κεχωρισμένοις, but the subsequent words (448 Ὁ 21) καὶ ot τῷ ἀτόμῳ οὕτω δ᾽ [ἢ 
οὕτω Ross] ἀτόμῳ ὡς παντὶ ὄντι συνεχεῖ indicate a somewhat different and 
possibly more developed form of the hypothesis, the separate parts of the 
sensitive soul being supposed continuous throughout. This might be the case 
if the peripheral organs were all connected with the central organ by ducts, 
πόροι, containing some fluid, e.g. breath or blood. The use of the indefinite 
neuter here, as in rive above b 14 and évi τινε below Ὁ 18, is probably intentional : 
if any noun had to be supplied, it would be μορίοις or ὀργάνοις. 

br8. ἀλλὰ Set ἑνί τινι ἄμφω δῆλα εἶναι. It is not by two separate faculties 
that we can compare and discriminate sweet and white, there must be some 
single faculty to do this. Alex. Aphr. 95, 8—10 argues that, judgment and 
perception being inseparable, it 15 not possible for that which judges both 
objects to judge both without perceiving both. Now sight does not perceive 
sweet, nor taste colour. Cf Lucretius Iv. 486 ---406. 

Β 19. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ, “for at that rate,” i.e. if we assume that the difference 
(e.g. between sweet and white) could be discerned by two different instruments 
of sensus communis judging separately. If this were so (says A.), the difference 
between the two could be just as well apprehended by two different percipients : 
which is absurd. 


448 NOTES III. 2 


Ὁ 20. Set δὲ τὸ ἕν λέγειν. The assumption of two principles as instruments 
judging separately being discarded, we reaffirm the necessity of a single judging 
principle (Ὁ 19 οὕτω pev...b 20 det δέ). For the use of λέγειν or φάναι to express 
a verdict or judgment cf. 431a 8, De em. 1, 449b 22 δεῖ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ 
τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ Ψυχῇ λέγειν, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ ἤσθετο ἢ 
ἐνόησεν, De Sensu 7, 447 Ὁ 14 καὶ εἰ μία τοίνυν ἡ αἴσθησις ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, ἕν 
ἐκεῖνα ἐρεῖ, 447 Ὁ 24 sq. 

Ὁ 21. ἕτερον yap, int. λέγει, “for it does pronounce sweet to be different from 
white.” λέγει ἄρα τὸ αὐτός In this sentence τὸ αὐτὸ is the subject and means 
the same as τὸ ἕν, λέγει being used absolutely. In the previous sentence, the 
single deciding faculty is shown to be a necessary consequence of the argument: 
in this clause it is laid down as a fact which we may now accept. 

b 22. νοεῖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται. Cf. 426 Ὁ 31 τὴν αἴσθησιν ἣ τὴν νόησιν, 4274 9, 18 
56.,) 434 Ὁ 3 νοῦν κριτικόν. Discrimination being the characteristic of sensation 
and intellect alike, 4328. 16, it is not always easy to determine to which faculty 
a given judgment should be referred: cf. 429 Ὁ 13, 15, 17) 20 5ᾳ. Good and bad, 
the examples which directly follow, are of course νοητά, not αἰσθητά. 

Ὁ 22 Ort μὲν ovv...23 τὰ κεχωρισμένα. This resumes or re-states what was said 
above 426b 17: see 2916 ad loc. 

Ὁ 24. οὐδ᾽ ἐν κεχωρισμένῳ χρόνῳ. As it is one faculty, and not two, which 
compares and pronounces, so it is In one time and not in two that the com- 
parison and pronouncement are made, 1.6. simultaneously and not successively : 
cf. 426 b 28. If the first condition were not fulfilled, the action of two senses as 
parts or instruments of the judging faculty would be as independent as that or 
different percipients; if the second were not fulfilled, objects could not be 
pronounced to be af one and the same time distinct or identical. ἐντεῦθεν, 
int. δῆλόν ἐστι. 

Ὁ 26. καὶ θάτερον. Fully written out this would be τότε καὶ θάτερον λέγει ὅτι 
ἕτερον. In the same instant, in which the judging faculty pronounces good to 
be different (from bad), it also pronounces bad to be different (from good). 

Ὁ 26 (od κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς...28 καὶ ὅτι viv). The whole of this is a digression 
introduced to explain in what sense ὅτε is and is not used in the foregoing 
sentence (Ὁ 25) οὕτω καὶ ὅτε xré. It is not to be understood (says A.) in the same 
sense as νῦν in the example indicated by the words οἷον viv λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον, οὐ 
μέντοι ὅτι viv ἕτερον, where the note of time is merely incidental (κατὰ ovp- 
BeBnxés); but it is to be understood as signifying that the difference upon which 
we are now pronouncing is perceived now; that is to say, the two qualities 
compared or contrasted (e.g. good and bad) must be simultaneously present to 
the judging faculty. Cf. Professor Bywater in Journ. of Phil. XVII. p. 56. 
“The argument in fact, if we may simplify its form by ignoring the accessories, 
is shortly this: ὅτε θάτερον λέγει ὅτε ἕτερον, καὶ θάτερον [scil. λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον]. ἅμα 
ἄρα [scil. Aéyec]. The parenthetical note is merely thrown in to prevent a 
misconception to which the expression ὅτε λέγει might possibly give rise.” 

Ὁ 27. viv Aéyo...viv ἕτερον. There is a similar precision De Jem. 2, 451 a 30 
μνημονεύει yap νῦν ὃ εἶδεν ἣ ἔπαθε πρότερον, οὔχ ὃ viv ἔπαθε, viv μνημον εύει. 

Ὁ 28. ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω λέγει. The οὕτω is explained by what follows: καὶ νῦν (int. 
λέγει) καὶ ὅτι νῦν (int. ἕτερόν ἐστι, λέγει). ἅμα ἄρα, int. λέγει τὸ κρῖνον ὅτι 
ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. 

Ὁ 28. ὥστε ἀχώριστον, int. τὸ κρῖνόν ἐστι. We here reach the main con- 
clusion of the chapter. The remarks which follow from here to the end are an 
example of what has been called A.’s “subtilitatis luxuria.” 

b 29. ἐν ἀχωρίστῳ χρόνῳ, int. xpiver. These words, as b 30 sq. ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ 
χρόνῳ, replace dua. Cf. De Sensu 7, 448 Ὁ 18, where A. enquires πότερον ἐνδέχεται 


III. 2 426 Ὁ 20—427 a 6 449 


dua πλειόνων αἰσθάνεσθαι and adds (Ὁ 19) τὸ δ᾽ ἅμα λέγω ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτύμῳ χρόνῳ 
πρὸς ἄλληλα. 

b29. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον. One objection is here considered. The two 
qualities compared are simultaneously present to the same perceiving and 
judging faculty. Since κρίνειν Ξε αἰσθάνεσθαι (see zoe on 426 Ὁ το, κρίνει), two 
simultaneous processes go on in that ὑποκείμενον in which the faculty resides 
as λόγος or δύναμις : in short, in the central organ of sense. It would seem, then, 
that τὸ κρῖνον would upon occasion be subject to different and perhaps contrary 
affections (here called motions) at one and the same time: which is impossible, 
unless it is divisible. (A. defines contrary motions as κινήσεις at ἱστᾶσι καὶ 
παύουσιν ἀλλήλας Phys. VIII. 8, 262 a 6—8.) The same impossibility is assumed 
De Sensu 7, 448 a 1 ἔτι εἰ ai τῶν ἐναντίων κινήσεις ἐναντίαι, ἅμα δὲ ra ἐναντία ἐν τῷ 
αὐτῷ καὶ ἀτόμῳ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὴν μίαν ἐναντία ἐστίν, 
οἷον γλυκὺ πικρῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αἰσθάνεσθαι ἅμα. 

b 30. ἡ ἀδιαίρετον, “in so far as it is undivided,” οὐ κατ᾽ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μόριον, 
Simpl. 198, 31, Philop. 484, 5 sq. If it were a body and extended, it could 
simultaneously apprehend black and white, namely, with different parts of itself. 
καὶ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ, int. κινεῖται. Contrary motions in the same indivisible 
subject are not impossible, if they are successive, instead of simultaneous. 

b 31. εἰ γὰρ γλυκύ, int. ἐστι τὸ αἰσθητόν. 

4278 1. ἐναντίως, int. κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν νόησιν, which must also be 
understood with ἑτέρως. There can be no doubt that A. would include under 
νόησις in the wider sense imagination and memory: cf. 425 Ὁ 25 αἰσθήσεις καὶ 
φαντασίαι, 437 Ὁ 17 sqq., 433a 10. But see 4278 8 sq. zxz/fra. 

8. 2 ἄρ᾽ οὖν ἅμα μὲν...3 κεχωρισμένον; A. is endeavouring to make clear how 
the single judging faculty judges its plurality of objects in an indivisible time. 
His speculations here must be carefully compared with the similar speculations 
De Sensu 7, 449 a ὃ ἀνάγκη dpa & τι εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ ἅπαντα αἰσθάνεται... (8 10) 
ἄλλο δὲ γένος 8&0 ἄλλου. ἄρ᾽ οὖν F μὲν ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, ἕν τί ἐστι τὸ 
αἰσθητικὸν γλυκέος καὶ λευκοῦ, ὅταν δὲ διαιρετὸν γένηται κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, ἕτερον; ἢ 
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Ψυχῆς. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ 
καὶ ἕν ἀριθμῷ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ ἐστι, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, εἰ μὴ χωριστὰ τὰ πάθη 
ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἔτερον ἑκάστῳ. ὁμοίως τοίνυν θετέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ 
αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν εἶναι ἀριθμῷ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πάντων, τῷ μέντοι εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον τῶν 
μὲν γένει τῶν δὲ εἴδει. ὥστε καὶ αἰσθάνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ évi, λόγῳ δ᾽ οὐ τῷ 
αὐτῷ. By τὸ διαιρετὸν A. means the central sense regarded as divisible into the 
five special senses, while 7 ἀδιαίρετον signifies the same viewed as αἴσθησις κοινὴ 
or pia αἴσθησις. Qualities opposite or heterogeneous have to be discrimi- 
nated at the same time: how is this to be done? The first suggestion for a 
way out of the difficulty is to apply once more the antithesis of τόπῳ μὲν καὶ 
ἀριθμῷ ἕν (ἀδιαίρετον) καὶ ταὐτό, τῷ δ᾽ εἶναι ἕτερον (διαιρετόν), locally and numeric- 
ally one and indivisible, while in conception or essence different and divisible. 
In other words, is this one more instance of the line at once convex and 
concave? Will the formula help us? The next sentence is a development of 
the suggested way of escape, it shows us what the application of the formula 
will be. 

a5. ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε; By these words A. appears to reject the formula just 
proposed as inapplicable. 

a6 δυνάμει μὲν ydp...7 τῷ ἐνεργεῖσθαι διαιρετόν. Sense is either potential or 
actual 417a 9 sqq., 428a 6. In contrasting δύναμις in general with ἐνέργεια A. 
says Metaph. 1051 a 10 τὸ μὲν οὖν δύνασθαι τἀναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχει, τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία 
ἅμα ἀδύνατον καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας δὲ ἅμα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμ-- 


H. 29 


450 NOTES 111. 2 


vew. Here, as elsewhere, whether we are dealing with the material or the im- 
material, with a sense-organ or a faculty, ἢ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει, Metaph. 1039 a 7. 
Potentially sense is each or both of opposite sensibles. This has been proved 
in detail. See, eg. 418 Ὁ 26 sqq., 423 Ὁ 29 sqq. But in actuality this is no 
longer the case: the only way in which the same thing can simultaneously be, 
or receive the forms of, two opposites such as white and black is by becoming 
divided and so ceasing to be actually indivisible. The organ of a special sense 
is a material thing, extended, divisible, it can undergo the motion caused by 
white in one part of itself and simultaneously the motion caused by black in 
another part of itself. But such explanations are meaningless when applied to 
the immaterial, unextended, indivisible faculty, the form of the said organ. Cf. 
424a 26—28. See Philop. 484, 18—2z. 

a8. ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ, int. οἷόν τε. τὰ εἴδη. Cf. 4244 18, where, however, 
δέχεσθαι and not the somewhat unusual πάσχειν is employed: and for the 
process of thought 429 a 15, Ὁ 25, 431 b 29, 4298 27 sq. Judging belongs to 
thought as much as to sense: cf. 426b 22 οὕτω καὶ νοεῖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται. 

ἃ Ὁ. τοιοῦτον, int. οἷον ra εἴδη πάσχειν or déyerGar. There seems no arriére 
pensée here, though it is quite true that in 424b 14—18 A. distinguishes 
between πάσχειν and αἰσθάνεσθαι. 

40. ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ. This remark is intended to introduce a second, amended 
and more satisfactory solution. See PAyszcs IV. 11, 2204 10 καὶ γὰρ ἡ στιγμὴ 
καὶ συνέχει τὸ μῆκος Kal ὁρίζει" ἔστι yap τοῦ μὲν ἀρχὴ τοῦ δὲ τελευτή. ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν 
μὲν οὕτω λαμβάνῃ τις ὡς δυσὶ χρώμενος τῇ μιᾷ, ἀνάγκη ἵστασθαι, εἰ ἔσται ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ 
ἡ τελευτὴ ἡ αὐτὴ στιγμή; See also zd. IV. 13, 2228. 12 56. From these passages we 
gather that any given point in a line may be regarded as dividing the line into 
two segments. The one point is the extremity of both these segments, at once 
the beginning of one and the end of the other: e.g. if C be any point on the line 
AB, C is at once the end of the line AC and the beginning of the line CB. 
Alex. Aphr. (96, 14 sqq.) understands the illustration to apply to the centre of 
a circle, which, though a single point, is still the extremity of an indefinite 
number of convergent radii. But the case I have given is the simplest and 
best fits the language of the text. In the point we thus find something which, 
while one and indivisible, yet has simultaneously different relations and is in 
a certain aspect divisible. So, too, the judging faculty of sense may be treated 
as at once single (αἴσθησις κοινή, pia αἴσθησις) and divisible. 

al0. ἣν καλοῦσί τινες στιγμήν. I see no ground for interpreting this to mean 
anything else than the geometrical point: the context shows that σημεῖον or 
πέρας might have been used (cf. 431 a 22 ὅρος) : or, if A. had been dealing with 
the point in time, he would have called it the “now,” and it is quite certain that 
he would not have applied to the “now” the unqualified terms σημεῖον, πέρας or 
Spos. Cf. Neuhaeuser, p. 45- 

4 το. ἡ pla ἢ δύο, ταύτῃ Kal διαιρετή. This is Biehl’s conjectural restoration. 
Bekker rightly felt that a relative 7 must precede ravry and therefore rejected 
the reading ἢ pia ἢ δύο, which has the greatest authority, viz. E, vet. trans., Alex. 
Aphr. 94, 20: but he went too far when he replaced it by 7 pia καὶ 7 δύο, for the 
point, 7 μία, “regarded solely as single,” is not divisible. It is divisible because 
it can be regarded at will not as single, but as double. Cf. AWVefafh. 1002 a 32 
τὰς δὲ στιγμὰς καὶ τὰς γραμμὰς καὶ ras ἐπιφανείας οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὔτε 
φθείρεσθαι, ὁτὲ μὲν οὔσας ὁτὲ δὲ οὐκ οὔσας. ὅταν γὰρ ἅπτηται ἢ διαιρῆται τὰ σώματα, 
ἅμα ὁτὲ μὲν μία ἁπτομένων, ὅτὲ δὲ δύο διαιρουμένων γίγνεται" ὥστ᾽ οὔτε συγκειμένων 
ἐστὶν ἀλλ᾽ ἔφθαρται, διῃρημένων τε εἰσὶν ai πρότερον οὐκ οὖσαι. οὗ γὰρ δὴ yy ἀδιαί- 
ρετος στιγμὴ διῃρέθη εἰς δύο. 


III. 2 427 a 6—a 14 451 


aII. ἅμα, int. κρίνει. Or, as A. tends to treat dua sometimes as an ad- 
jective, sometimes as an adverb, we might supply κρῖνόν ἐστι. 

8. 12. ἢ δὲ διαιρετόν, οὐχ ἕν ὑπάρχει. According to Stapfer, Studia, p. 8, 
cod. E has διαιρετὸν ὑπάρχει δὶς τῷ, but a later hand has inserted ody ἔν before 
dis and yap before τῷ. Whether οὐχ ἐν comes before or after ὑπάρχει, the verb 
must be supplied a second time. Cf. mofe on 403b 18. 

a 12 δὶς γὰρ...13 ἅμα. Note the usual confusion between the illustration and 
the fact it 1s intended to illustrate. Cf. e.g., 402 b 6 sqq., 403a 12 sqq. The 
geometer treats the single point C twice over, as the extremity both of the line 
AC, which it ends, and of the line CB, which it begins. The single judging 
faculty similarly treats its single object, e.g. the difference between sweet and 
white, twice over, for it cannot pronounce that sweet is not white without at the 
same time pronouncing that white is not sweet. Cf. 426 b 25 οὕτω καὶ ὅτε 
θάτερον λέγει ὅτε ἕτερον καὶ θάτερον. 

αι 13. δυσὶ χρῆταιι Cf. Phys. IV. 11, 2208 17 τῇ γὰρ μέσῃ στιγμῇ ὡς δυσὶ 
χρήσεται. 

8. 14. ἔστιν ds κεχωρισμένῳ: The dative gives a tolerable sense and has the 
support of Alex. Aphr. 94, 23 ἔστιν ὥς τῷ κεχωρισμένῳ. Of course it is an 
instrumental dative, like tiv: 426 Ὁ 14, as Trend. saw: quodammodo separato 
instrumento. Cf. De Senmsu 7, 449 a 10 ἄλλο δὲ γένος δί ἄλλου. I cannot accept 
M. Rodier’s version “et ces choses sont séparées, comme elles peuvent l’étre 
dans le divisé.” Both ἔστιν ὡς and the singular κεχωρισμένῳ modify and correct 
the apparent inconsistency with 426 b 17 οὔτε δὴ κεχωρισμένοις and b 22 sq. 
Trend. was naturally dissatisfied with the text bequeathed to him by Bekker καὶ 
κεχωρισμένα ἐστὶν ὡς κεχωρισμένων, “et sunt diversa velut diversorum.” He 
saw that ἔστιν ὡς must be taken together and remarked that it would be easier 
to substitute κεχωρισμένον (cf. Soph. 114, 38) for κεχωρισμένων. But, so long as 
A. is concerned to emphasise the unity of the judging faculty, he is more likely 
to say that the instrument it employs is “in some sense separated into two” 
than to concede so much of the faculty itself. Trend., according to Belger, was 
finally of opinion that <r@> κεχωρισμένῳ should be read with Alex. Aphr. 
Wallace, who himself held that the dative should be retained on the authority 
of Alex. Aphr. 94, 23 and Simpl. 201, 19, pointed out the possibility of taking 
κεχωρισμένω as dual. 

al4. ἡ δ᾽ ἑνί, <&y> καὶ ἄμα. The text of the better Mss. E L, with which 
SVX agree, is 7 δ᾽ ἑνὶ καὶ Gua and Biehl accepts this, placing a comma after 
évi. We have to decide whether this abbreviated version is genuine, in which 
case the authorities which prefix ἕν to ἕν beginning with Alex. Aphr., have 
made an arbitrary addition, or whether the abbreviated text is the result of 
accident, ἐν having dropped out either before or after éi. I believe that 
Bekker was guided by a true instinct when he admitted both ἕν and ἐνὶ into the 
text. The case of the inferior MS. U is instructive: whereas ELS VX read ἑνὶ 
and omit ἔν, the first hand of U, according to Bekker, reads ἐν and omits évi. 
But, in spite of Alexander and Simplicius, the probability that ἐν ἑνὲ is the right 
order is but slight. To balance the preceding clause 9 μὲν οὖν δυσὶ we require 
7 δ᾽ ἑνὶ and then ἕν should follow to balance δύο κρίνει, which is exactly what 
Christ’s emendation provides. The single object of the single judging faculty 
is, in short, identity or difference: the difference, e.g., between white and sweet,. 
and this, A. has been insisting all along, 15 instantaneously perceived. 

It is natural to enquire what advantage the second hypothesis, that of the 
point, possesses over the first: does it remove the difficulty of 426 Ὁ 29 sqq., the 
impossibility of contrary “motions” in an indivisible subject at the same instant 


29—2 


452 NOTES ΠΣ. 2 


of time? The suggestion I have made in the second zofe on a 12 supra seems 
at first sight to increase this difficulty, since it implies that simultaneously judg- 
ment is passed on each of the two sensibles: “A is not B,” “Bis not A.” The 
considerations adduced by Alex. Aphr. (97, 25 sqq.) do not help us, to whichever 
hypothesis we apply them. Very briefly, Alex. says that while the motion of 
perceiving white is contrary to the motion of perceiving black, the judgment 
“White is white” is not contrary to the simultaneous judgment “Black is 
black.” Contrariety in the judgment only comes in when we simultaneously 
pronounce that white is both white and black. But the two judgments “ White 
is white” and “Black is black” still imply the presence of two sensibles which 
affect sense, and, if these judgments are simultaneous, the simultaneous affection 
of sense by the two objects. Moreover Alex., who previously declared judgment 
and sensation to be inseparable (94, 32 ταὐτὸν yap κρίνειν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, cf. the 
whole citation in zoze on 426 Ὁ 10 supra), now distinguishes παθεῖν from κρίνειν: 
97, 27 παθεῖν μὲν γάρ τι τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἀδύνατον...28 κρῖναι δὲ dua τὰ 
ἐναντία οὐδὲν ἀδυνατεῖ. ‘The judgment which sense pronounces can be due to 
nothing but that process or affection or movement of sensation, which is a fact 
of experience: cf. 426 Ὁ 22 as λέγει, οὕτω καὶ αἰσθάνεται. We are still as far as 
ever from learning what precisely is the “motion” of which the judgment of 
comparison “‘A is not B” is the result. Aristotle rigidly adheres to the assump- 
tions made tacitly in this chapter, explicitly in De Semsu, c. 7: a single faculty, 
a single act; a single act, a single object: and his only way of escape is to 
convert the two sensibles present to the same judging faculty in the same 
instant of time into some sort of unity (e.g. white-black, sweet-white) compatible 
with the diversity implied in the co-existence of different relations. 


CHAPTER III. 


This chapter might be entitled περὶ φαντασίας, but prior to 427 b 27, where 
something like a plan of procedure is enunciated, we find a series of preliminary 
remarks and criticisms of which the intention is not obvious. A. begins by 
associating sensation and thought by the common link of judgment or dis- 
crimination 427a 18 sq.,a 20. In the absence of any explicit statement until 
427 Ὁ 27—29 the purpose of this association is not clear. Probably A. means 
that the critical or discriminating faculty has not been exhausted: there still 
remain over for discussion whatever mental processes, if any, involve dis- 
crimination and at the same time do not fall under sensation or have not been 
treated already. His own view, which we gather partly from this treatise and 
still more fully from the Parva Naturalia and other works, is that thought in 
the narrower sense, or intellection properly so called, is the chief of these 
processes, but that there are others subsidiary to thought, especially imagination 
and memory. But A.’s procedure is not at first dogmatic and categorical, 
although the much disputed sentence 427 Ὁ 14——-16 may be said to anticipate 
his final result, and presupposes an acquaintance with this result, if it is to be 
thoroughly comprehended. On the contrary, A. proceeds tentatively on a 
somewhat circuitous route. He has to deal, not for the first time in this treatise, 
with the wide-spread opinion, endorsed by Pre-Socratic schools, that there is no 
essential difference between sensation and thought, both being material changes 
in the animal body. On this view was based the Empedoclean theory of per- 
ception by means of channels, πόροι, and the Atomistic hypothesis that all 


II. 3 4278. 14--- 17 453 


perception, knowledge included, takes place by contact with εἴδωλα or material 
emanations from external objects. A. controverts such theories by an appeal to 
the fundamental conceptions of truth and error, which play so large a part in 
his logic. Probably the current views and the older Pre-Socratic philosophical 
theories would put φαντασία or ὃ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται on a level with αἴσθησις and 
νόησις, all alike being regarded as changes in the animal body due to impact of 
something external. It is unlikely that any sharp distinction would be drawn 
between them, so that what A. himself understands by φαντασία, viz. presenta- 
tion, whether to sense or thought, whether in the presence or absence of an 
external object, would be identified, now with αἴσθησις, now with νόησις. In 
this way I am tempted to explain the very vague use of νοεῖν and νόησις, 
especially in the passage 427 Ὁ 16—29, in which a division of νοεῖν into φαντασία 
and ὑπόληψες seems, at any rate provisionally, to be admitted. Further on in 
the treatise A. is very careful to define what he means by νοεῖν 429 a 10 56. 23. 
That he is not using the term so strictly in the present passage is seen at once 
when we find that νοῦς in this narrower sense is by implication only one species 
of the powers or faculties, δυνάμεις ἢ ἕξεις, which are brought into play in the 
process of thinking, νοεῖν, taken in the wider sense: cf. 427 Ὁ 27—29 with 
428a 1—5,16—18. As before, 427 a 29 sqq., he assailed the position that there is 
no difference between sensation and thought by introducing ἀπάτη, so again A. 
seems to me to be tacitly controverting the position that φαντασία Ξε αἴσθησις = 
νόησις (all three processes being, on Pre-Socratic assumptions, on the same 
footing as corporeal changes) by an appeal to ὑπόληψις 427 Ὁ 16, 17, 24 54.» 28, 
a term which, like ἀπάτη, involves the fundamental distinction between true and 
false. For, though on the whole ὑπόληψις, belief, stands nearest to δόξα, the 
weakest form of conviction, it is also predicated of the stronger forms ἐπεστήμη 
and φρόνησις. A. firmly held that not only the maxim of Protagoras, but 
also most of the Pre-Socratic theories of knowledge, were inconsistent with 
the distinction between true and false and led inevitably to the conclusion πᾶν 
τὸ φαινόμενον ἀληθὲς εἶναι. This first part of the chapter down to 427 Ὁ 26 15 a 
desultory criticism of the earlier views, and the obscurity of certain parts of it is 
due to terms like φρόνησις and νόησις, φρονεῖν and νοεῖν being used sometimes 
with the same vagueness as by the older philosophers, sometimes in A.’s own 
technical sense. 

42°7a 17—b 14. The soul is defined by two powers, (1) the power of 
causing spatial motion and (2) the power of discerning or apprehending, which 
is shown both in sense and in thought. Indeed, that sense and thought are even 
identical is a popular opinion which has the support of some philosophers [ἢ 1]. 
This opinion is natural, where thought and sense are regarded as something 
corporeal, and like is held to be apprehended by like. But such a view ought 
properly to include, what is not forthcoming, an explanation of error also [§ 2]. 
Moreover, that sense and thought are not identical seems clear from the fact 
that the former is a property of all animals, the latter of but few. Again, 
thinking may be right or wrong, false or true, which is not the case with 
perception by sense [§ 3]- 

4274 17. ἐπεὶ δὲ As frequently happens when A. is lost in a labyrinth of 
parentheses, it seems doubtful where the apodosis begins or whether there is 
one at all. The obvious difficulties and the expedients available which occurred 
to Bonitz and Torstrik are precisely those which had already occurred to 
Alexander, Plutarch of Athens and the other Greek commentators, while the 
text is above suspicion. We may frankly admit anacoluthon with Alex. Aphr. 
(afud Philop. 489, 9), and it is only a modification of this view to hold, with 


454 NOTES III. 3 


Torstrik, that A. ought to have written (and, Torstrik adds, probably did write) 
after a 19 αἰσθάνεσθαι something like σκεπτέον εἴ re διαφέρει τὸ νοεῖν τοῦ aicGd- 
νεσθαι, just as Argyropylus felt constrained to insert in his version cossiderandum 
est st guid interstt inter intelligere et sentire. Ory, on the other hand, we may 
follow Plutarch (agud Philop. 489, 10) in making the apodosis begin at Ὁ 6 ὅτι 
μὲν οὖν ov ταὐτόν ἐστι. This solution was accepted by Simplicius and Philoponus, 
while Bonitz in Avist. Stud. 11.—III., pp. 131—133 considers this to be the best 
expedient, if the idea of an anacoluthon is to be rejected. By the time A. had 
reached Ὁ 6 ὅτε μὲν οὖν it is very unlikely that he was conscious of any gram- 
matical connexion between the new clause and a 17 ἐπεὶ δέ. 

8 17. Sto διαφοραῖς. Cf 403b 25 τὸ ἔμψυχον δὴ τοῦ ἀψύχου δυοῖν μάλιστα 
διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει Te καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι: cf. also Ζ7γα 4328. 15 sqq. 

8 18. τῷ κρίνειν. Cf. Alex. Aphr., cited in zofe on κρίνει 426 b το. This 
power of judging is obviously the common element in sense and thought: 
cf. infra 427 a 20 ἐν ἀμφοτέροις yap τούτοις κρίνει, Whether we perceive or 
whether we think, we of necessity discriminate: we judge the thing known to 
be different from all other things and to be the same with itself. 

α 19. δοκεῖ δὲ. This ἔνδοξον or prevalent opinion is so far from being A.’s 
own that he proceeds to refute it below. 

a 20. αἰσθάνεσθαί τι, “wihrend manche das Denken fiir eine Art von 
Wahrnehmen halten,” Bz. 47. Stud. 11.-τῖτι. 132. The same uncertainty recurs 
as to the construction of rr, which was pointed out in the zoze on πάσχειν τι 
410a 25. I prefer to regard it as a contained accusative and not as an attribute 
of the infinitive transformed into a noun, and I think there is some support for 
my view in κρίνει τι following. ἐν ἀμφοτέροις yap τούτοις, 1.6. τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαε on 
the one hand and τῷ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν on the other: ἐν may well be instru- 
mental. 

8. 21. τῶν ὄντων Separated from τι, with which it must be taken; see ~o¢e on 
hyperbaton 403b 25. οἵγε ἀρχαῖοι. Cf. 404a 27 Sqq., 405 a 9 sqq., 410 a 23— 
26, Metaph. 1009 Ὁ 12 sqq., where the opinion in question is attributed to 
Empedocies, Democritus, Parmenides, Homer; and to Anaxagoras on the 
dubious authority of an apophthegm. It is interesting to compare this list 
with that given in Plato, 7eaer. 152 E 5646. 

a 23. πρὸς παρεὸν yap. It is probable that Empedocles did not mean by 
this line (/vag. τοῦ D) to assert the identity of thought with sense. The line 
15 again cited Metagh. 1009 b 12—21, a passage which shows more clearly by 
what reasoning A. was led thus to interpret the words of Empedocles. Thought 
is perception, perception is change. Therefore the quality of our thought 
depends upon the change in our bodily state or the condition of the sense- 
organs (lc. Ὁ 17 καὶ yap Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μεταβάλλοντας τὴν ἔξιν μεταβάλλειν φησὶ 
τὴν φρόνησιν). This is not, however, the way in which the Greek commen- 
tators understand the passage. They make παρεὸν refer to the object pre- 
sented (αἰσθητόν): thus Alex. Aphr. 272 Metaph. 306, 19 τουτέστι πρὸς τὸ παρὸν 
yap καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡ φρόνησις γίνεται καὶ 7 τοῦ ἀληθοῦς κατάληψις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 
(μῆτις γὰρ ἡ φρόνησις): τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον αἰσθήσεως, Them. 87, 23 H., 161, 7 Sp. 
τοῦτο γὰρ αἰσθήσεως ἴδιον ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν παρόντων κινεῖσθαι. 

a24. ὅθεν. This word is no part of the citation as given in a fuller and 
slightly different form Mezaph. 1009 Ὁ 20 sq. ὅσσον τ᾽ ἀλλοῖοι μετέφυν, τόσον 
ἄρ σφισιν αἰεὶ | καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίστατο (frag. τοῦ Ὁ). 

a25. ἀλλοῖα. Cf. Homer, as quoted 4048 30: Keir ἀλλοφρονέων, “he lay 
distraught.” On this view of thought, it varies and fluctuates with the bodily 
condition. ‘There are variations between man and man, and in the same man 


111. 3 427 8 17----Ὁ 8 455 


at different times and under different conditions. παρίσταται, “comes to 
them,” ‘‘arises in them.” 

a 26. τοῖος yap νόος ἐστίν. From Od. XVIII. 136 56. 

τοῖος yap νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονέων ἀνθρώπων 
οἷον ἐττ᾽ ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. 

a26. σωματικὸν. Cf. 4108 28 ὡς τοῖς σωματικοῖς στοιχείοις ἕκαστα γνωρίζεται 
οἵ Empedocles: also 404 Ὁ 13—1I5. 

ει 28. ἐν τοῖς kar ἀρχὰς λόγοις. A clear reference to 1.7) c. 2, where both views, 
viz., (I) that thought, as well as perception, is something corporeal, and (2) that 
we think, as well as perceive, like by like, are attributed to Empedocles or others 
404b 7 sqq., 405 b 11 sqq. For the form of the reference, cf. Pol. 1278 Ὁ τ 
εἴρηται δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους. 

427 Ὁ1. οἰκειότερον γὰρ, int. τὸ ἡπατῆσθαι. Error, says A., is more truly 
natural to living things than right thinking. Cf. Theophr. ejud Them. 108, 
27 H., 200, ὃ Sp. διὰ τί λήθη Kai ἀπάτη καὶ ψεῦδος; 

Ὁ 3. ἔνιοι λέγουσι, amongst them Democritus, to whom this opinion is 
attributed 404a 28 τὸ yap ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον : see wole. Cf. also Metaph. 
1009 Ὁ 13 τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί ῴασιν. In 
De Caelo il. 7, 306a τό, A. himself asserts that τὸ φαινόμενον ἀεὶ κυρίως κατὰ 
τὴν αἴσθησιν is the net result or outcome, τέλος, by which, after all, any physical 
theory has to be verified. This, however, is merely an emphatic way of saying 
that theories must agree with facts. 

b 4. τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου θίξιν. Upon the view that thought and perception, 
the means by which we acquire knowledge, are material processes in which like 
acts upon like, the action of unlike upon the bodily organ is the cause of error. 

Ὁ 5. ἡ ἀπάτη καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ The man who has know- 
ledge or right views about one of two contraries has knowledge or right views 
about the other: cf. zofe on 411a 4. So with error: the man who is mistaken 
or has wrong views about one of two contraries is z/so facto mistaken about 
the other. This is because contraries always belong to the same genus, of 
which they are the two most opposed species; e.g. black and white in the genus 
colour. To know white is to distinguish it from all the other colours and 
therefore from black. The point of the present passage is that what A. is fond 
of asserting about knowledge (cf. Amal. Prior. 1. 1, 24a 21, 36, 48b 5, Zod. 1. 
14, 105b 5 sq., 23 sq., PAys. VII. 1, 251 a 30, ALetaph. 996a 20sq., Zth. Nic. 
1129 a 13 $q., 17 sq.) holds good of error also. 

b6. ὅτι μὲν οὖν. Cf. Philop. 490, 15 τὸ δὲ οὖν διὰ τὴν μεταξυλογίαν κεῖται" 
ἔθος γὰρ εἶχον οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐν ταῖς μακραῖς ἀποδόσεσι προστιθέναι τὸ οὖν. See nole 
on 8 17 supra ἐπεὶ δέ. 

Ὁ 7. καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν. Here A. appears to separate φρονεῖν from νοεῖν, the 
latter term being used in a vaguer manner, including φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, 
as species under it, when the thinking is correct, and their opposites when it is 
erroneous. Asa technical term, φρόνησις is restricted to thought which has a 
practical end in view: cf. Atk. Nic. 114Qb 4 (φρόνησιν) εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου 
πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά; cf. 72d. 1143a8 sq. But in De A. 
φρονεῖν hardly seems to be a technical term; cf. 417} 8 and 4208 1τὸ γινώσκει 
τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ (a general description of the functions of νοῦς). The term 
is appropriate in the discourse of those who held one thought to be as right as 
another. 

Ὁ 8. τοῦ δὲ, int. rot φρονεῖν. That φρόνησις of some sort is, in A.’s view, 
attributable to some animals appears from JZe/aph. 980 a 28 sqq. and also from 
Eth. Nic. 1141 a 26 διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν 
αὑτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν. 


456 NOTES III. 3 


b8. οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν. The nominative, after the insertion of a relative clause 
and then a parenthesis, is taken up and repeated in οὐδὲ τοῦτο at 427 Ὁ 11 οὐδὲ 
τοῦτο [δ᾽] ἐστὶ ταὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. 

b9. τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς. Of thinking you can say that it is done 
“rightly” or “ wrongly”: you cannot say this of perceiving in the normal case, 
to which the term sense-perception strictly and properly belongs, τῶν ἰδίων 
αἴσθησις. But see 428 Ὁ 19 ὅτι ὀλίγιστον, 2026. 

bo τὸ μὲν dp0ds...11 τἀναντία τούτων. This is a parenthesis. Within it 
φρόνησις κτέ. are in apposition to τὸ μὲν ὀρθῶς (int. νοεῖν), τἀναντία to τὸ δὲ μὴ 
ὀρθῶς (int. νοεῖν). 

biz. [8᾽. If this quite superfluous δὲ be retained, it is a proof that the 
writer has lost the thread of his argument owing to the preceding parenthesis. 

biz. ἀεὶ ἀληθής. Ch supra 418a 11 λέγω δ᾽ ἴδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ 
αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθήῆναι, where see 2:0Ζ6. 

Ὁ 14. ᾧ μὴ καὶ λόγος, int. ὑπάρχει. That no animal devoid of reason can 
think, in the strict sense of the term, is implied in415a6—11. Cf. £th. Nic. 
1097 Ὁ 33—1098 a 3. 

427 b 14.-. 24. Imagination is something distinct both from sense- 
perception and from thought. It presupposes the former (αἴσθησις) and is 
essential to belief (ὑπόληψις), but clearly thinking is not the same as believing. 
Thinking is under our own control, for we can form mental images at pleasure, 
as the system of mnemonics shows. We cannot, however, form opinions at 
will, for opinion must be either true or false. Again, the opinion that something 
terrible is imminent affects us powerfully, while a mere mental image affects us 
no more than the representation of an event in a painting [§ 4]. 

The subject of this section, the difference between imagination and opinion, 
is treated again below 428 a 18—b 9 and as though there had been no previous 
discussion of it here. Freudenthal called attention to this fact in his classic 
monograph Ueber den Begriff des Wortes φαντασία bet Aristoteles. The 
present passage 427b 14 sqq. opens a distinct paragraph and should not be 
forced into too close a relation with the preceding sentences: hence I have put 
a full stop after λόγος 427 Ὁ 14. 

427 Ὁ 14. φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον. What are we to understand by yap? In 
other words, why is φαντασία introduced for comparison just at this point? 
Freudenthal has suggested (p. 10) that it is to meet a possible objection to the 
last argument, an argument adduced to show that perception is distinct from 
thought. Suppose the objector to urge: “ You say that thought is found in few 
animals, sensation in all; but then there is φαντασία, a species of sensation, 
which also, like thought, is not found in all animals.” This objection is met, 
according to Freudenthal, by distinguishing imagination from both sense and 
belief, which is one species of thought, imagination itself being apparently the 
other, at least in the popular use of the term: cf. 427b 28, where, however, 
δοκεῖ must not be pressed as if it were a strictly scientific view. Such ellipses 
as that assumed by this explanation are not uncommon in Aristotle. But this 
is an extreme case and the explanation is therefore questionable. A simpler 
one is given by Pacius. According to him, A. is still arguing that sense is 
distinct from thought, for imagination is different from both sense and thought; 
and, we may presume, two things which have a third thing intermediate between 
them must be distinct from one another. But the argument would then be 
wholly inconclusive, for we have merely ἕτερον, “distinct,” not “intermediate” 
in the text; and it is not true that two things are proved to be distinct from 
each other because a third thing is distinct from both. If yap must be pressed, 
1 would suggest that the sentence may refer back to the resolution of νοεῖν into 


III. 3 427 Ὁ 8---Ὁ 17 457 


φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη and δόξα 427b9—11. The sense of the sentence introduced 
by yap would then be: “I have omitted φαντασία in this division, for it is 
distinct, not only from αἴσθησις, but also from διάνοια or τὸ νοεῖν." The whole 
context abundantly proves that νοεῖν and διανοεῖσθαι, νόησις and διάνοια are 
used indifferently. Memory is to A. one species of φαντασία, De Mem. 1, 
451a2sqq., 14. 566- and in AZetaph. 980a 27 sqq., Anal. Post. τι. το, οὐ Ὁ 34 sqq. 
A. traces a successive development from sensation, through memory, to experi- 
ence, knowledge and art. In the scale of development sensation necessarily 
precedes imagination, as the latter necessarily precedes opinion and belief. 
Cf. Them. 88, 27 H., 163, 2 Sp. ἥπερ [int. φαντασία] ἀμείνων μὲν δύναμις τῆς 
αἰσθήσεως, πολὺ δὲ ὑποβεβηκυῖα τῆς διανοίας, καὶ ὥσπερ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μεθορίῳ κειμένη 
καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσα μὲν τῇ αἰσθήσει, ττρολαμβάνουσα δὲ τὴν ὑπόληψιν. 

biI5. αὐτή τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως. The subject is φαντασία. Cf. the 
definition given below 428 Ὁ r1—13, 14—16. Here αὐτή, “alone,” fer se, 
strengthens ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως. 

Ὁ 16. ταύτης, 1.6. φαντασίας. 

b16. ὑπόληψις. We should rather have expected διάνοια. What then is 
the relation between the two? It must be close, for in 429a 23 ὑπολαμβάνει is 
obviously added to explain δεανοεῖται. Bonitz (Jud. Ar. 186 a 60) says: 7 
διάνοια, ipsa actio cogitandi, distinguitur quidem ab ea sententia et persuasione, 
ad quam cogitando pervenitur...sed saepe διάνοια cum actione simul effectum 
(τὴν δόξαν, τὴν ὑπόληψιν) comprehendit. Thus δεάνοια is the process of which 
ὑπόληψις is the result. Cf. Afetaph.g81a5 ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων 
pia καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις, where Bonitz notes ὑπολαμβάνειν is 
“to suppose” or assume something as true, whether it be true or not. And so 
ὑπόληψις iS a supposition or assumption or belief, whether true or false. Cf. 
Mhetabh. 1005 Ὁ 25 οὐκ ἔστι yap ἀναγκαῖον, & τις λέγει, ταῦτα Kat ὑπολαμβάνειν. 
The term ὑπόληψις is not a technical term, and is chosen here because it will 
include ἐπιστήμη, δόξα and d@povyois. Of these technical terms, δόξα is the one 
which most nearly approaches it, as “opinion” approaches to “belief.” It is 
substituted for it 434a 20 (cf 4344 17). Cf. Eth. Mic. 1139b 17 ὑπολήψει yap 
καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι, and also Anal. Post. 1. 33, 89 a 2 λείπεται δόξαν 
εἶναι περὶ TO ἀληθὲς μὲν ἢ ψεῦδος, ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν 
ὑπόληψις τῆς ἀμέσον προτάσεως καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαίας, 1b. 89 ἃ 38 sqq- As Bonitz 
notes, ὑπολαμβάνειν is synonymous with τιθέναι Metaph. 998 a 20, 22 and 
ὑπόληψις with δόξα in the phrases MZefaph. 1073a 17 ἢ περὶ ras ἰδέας ὑπόληψις 
and 1078b 12 ἡ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξα. Them. glosses δόξα and ὑπόληψις by the 
Stoic term συγκατάθεσις = assent (89, 1, 6, 21, 23 H., 163, 21, 29; 164, 18, 21 Sp.) 
and paraphrases δοξάσωμεν Ὁ 21 by ὑπολάβωμεν (89, 14 H., 164, 10 Sp.). 

bIz. ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις. The perplexity which this passage has 
occasioned can, I think, be better removed by interpretation than by emenda- 
tion. The words of the text naturally mean “ νόησις is clearly not the same as 
ὑπόληψις." The objections to this are, first, that we have been dealing with 
φαντασία just before and, secondly, that A. goes on to support his assertion by 
adducing instances where φαντασία differs from δόξα. These objections do not 
seem insuperable. How closely ὑπόληψις and δόξα are related has been seen in 
the preceding note: it is as easy to show that there is a close relation between 
νόησις and φαντασία. The free play of the imagination repeatedly occurs as the 
first and most obvious instance of thought, νόησις, in the wider sense: cf. 
432 b 30, De Mem. τ, 450a 1—7. In the stricter sense of the terms, of course, 
φάντασμα is not νόημα itself, but its indispensable condition, 432a13sq. But 
both νοεῖν and διανοεῖσθαι are unquestionably used, as in the passages just cited, 


4:8 NOTES Ill. 3 


for τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων, which we describe as picturing or imagining and the 
Greeks as φαίνεσθαι or φαντάζεσθαι. There is nothing unreasonable, then, in 
the remark of Simpl. 206, 5 sq., Philop. 492, 24 that by νόησις A. means φαντασία 
and by ὑπόληψις either ἡ λογικὴ γνῶσις as a whole or one species of it, δόξα. Cf. 
Prisc. Lyd. 29, 3 ἐοίκασι δὲ of ἄνδρες οὗτοι, καὶ ὁ ᾿Αριστοτέλης καὶ ὁ Θεόφραστος... 
νοῦν ἐνίοτε καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν λογικὴν προσαγορεύειν ζωήν, ὅπου γε καὶ μέχρι φαντασίας 
τὸ τοῦ νοῦ διατείνουσιν ὄνομα. 

However, doubt must have been felt long ago as to the exact interpretation 
of νόησις, for which Themistius in his paraphrase substitutes φαντασία : 88, 33 H., 
163, 11 Sp. od μὴν αἱ αὐταί εἶσι (the subject is the three faculties, δυνάμεις, into 
which Them. has just divided ὑπόληψεο) τῇ φαντασίᾳ. ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ὑπολαβεῖν 
εἴτε δοξαστικῶς, εἴτε ἐπιστημονικῶς, εἴτε δὴ κατὰ φρόνησιν ἑτέρας ἐστὶ δυνάμεως καὶ 
οὗ φαντασίας. The substitution of φαντασία for νόησις, suggested in the margin 
of cod. U, appears in the Aldine edition and that of Sylburg and was finally 
accepted by Biehl in his ova impressio of 1896. The change is unnecessary, 
if νόησις can be taken in the way suggested above, corresponding to the lax use 
of νοεῖν and νόημα, e.g. in De Mem. Freudenthal met the difficulty in another 
way by making ἡ φαντασία the subject understood and ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις the 
predicate, and taking cai=“as” after ἢ αὐτὴ νόησις: “that imagination is a 
different kind of thought from belief is clear.” Below, Ὁ 28, τὸ νοεῖν includes 
both φαντασία and ὑπόληψις. It will be seen that Freudenthal extracts the 
same meaning as Simplicius or Themistius, but his construction of the words, 
though not impossible, is strained and unnatural. 

Madvig proposed to bracket νόησις, and this is perhaps the simplest way to 
ensure that the comparison is between φαντασία and ὑπόληψις. On the other 
hand, Schneider's proposal to bracket 7 is a quite inadequate remedy, for αὐτὴ 
would then mean as in Ὁ 15 “by itself” If Schneider supposed the meaning to 
be “this is not the same as thinking or conceiving,” he should have conjectured, 
as he might perfectly well have done, αὕτη for ἡ αὐτή: cf. mofe on 425 Ὁ 7 αὕτη 
λευκοῦ. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος, int. τὸ νοεῖν, as I understand the passage; τὸ 
φαντάζεσθαι, according to others. 

Ὁ 18, ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστίν. We are free to picture this or that to ourselves in 
thought, whenever we please (whether we can exclude an image or a thought 
from our mind at will is doubtful, nor does A. say that we can). Cf. 417 Ὁ 24 
διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούλητα. πρὸ ὀμμάτων. Cf. τίθεται πρὸ ὀμμάτων 
De Mem. 1, 4504 5, 6, where A. uses the phrase in connexion with the process 
which he there calls νοεῖν : (a 4) καὶ νοῶν ὡσαύτως, κἂν μὴ ποσὸν von, τίθεται 
πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποσόν, νοεῖ δ᾽ οὐχ 7 ποσόν. 

Ὁ 19. ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς. Some system of artificial aids to memory, memoria 
technica, was elaborated at an early date, if we may credit the well-known 
anecdote about Themistocles. Such a mnemonic art is mentioned by Xenophon, 
Syitp. IV. 62 οἶδα δέ σε Ἱππίᾳ τῷ λείῳ, παρ᾽ οὗ οὗτος καὶ τὸ μνημονικὸν ἔμαθεν" 
ἀφ᾽ οὗ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτικώτερος γεγένηται διὰ τὸ ὅ τι ἂν καλὸν ἴδῃ μηδέποτε ἐπιλαν- 
θάνεσθαι, Cic. De Or. 11. c. 86, § 351, 87, esp. §§ 357, 358; Claudius Ptolemaeus, 
περὶ κριτηρίον καὶ ἡγεμονικοῦ, 16; Sext. Emp. P. A. 11. 222. For A. the locus 
classicus is De Jnsomn. 1, 458 Ὁ 17 564. “So, too, in sleep we sometimes think of 
other things besides the objects mentally imaged. And this anyone would see 
who should give careful attention and try to remember after getting up. Indeed, 
cases have occurred in which persons have actually while dreaming seemed to be 
arranging by rules of mnemonic art the objects presented to them in the dream. 
For it frequently happens to them to set before the mind’s eye, along with 
the dream, a new image to remember the dream by”: 458 Ὁ 20 ἤδη δέ τινες καὶ 


III. 3 427 Ὁ 17—b 24 459 


ἑωράκασιν ἐνύπνια τοιαῦτα οἷον of δοκοῦντες κατὰ TO μνημονικὸν παράγγελμα 
τίθεσθαι τὰ προβαλλόμενα- συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς πολλάκις ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον 
τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων εἰς τὸν τόπον φάντασμα. The τόποι μνημονικοὶ are mental 
pigeon-holes in which images (εἴδωλα), associated with the facts to be remem- 
bered, are supposed to be arranged. See, for illustration of this, the passage 
from Cic. De Or. (1.c.), and the anonymous treatise dd Aerenniumi ll., c. 16, 
where there is an especially full and curious account of these Zocz. 

Ὁ 20. δοξάζειν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. Opinion is not in our own power, as is 
imagining or thinking. In forming opinions, in judging, that is to say, that this 
is or Is not so, we are fettered by facts, which we must take into account. Even 
an erroneous opinion takes account of facts, though it distorts or mistakes them 
(cf. Plato, Theaet. 186 54.) There 1s a special reason for distinguishing δοξάζειν 
from φαντάζεσθαι. Δόξα and φαντασία, as being the nouns corresponding to 
δοκεῖ and φαίνεται, which are often synonymous, might themselves be synony- 
mous, and in fact one use of φαντασία does seem to correspond with δόξα: 
cf. Metaph. 1062 Ὁ 33 τό ye μὴν ὁμοίως προσέχειν ταῖς δόξαις καὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις 
τῶν πρὸς αὑτοὺς διαμφισβητούντων εὔηθες, where ταῖς φαντασίαις seems to be added 
as a synonym to bring ταῖς δόξαις into relation with the preceding φαένεσθαι and 
φαινόμενον (Ξετὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ 1062 b 14). For this reference I am indebted to 
Miss Alford. 

b20. ἀνάγκη yap. An opinion, a judgment, a proposition must declare 
either what is true or what is false. The subject is probably τὸν δοξάζοντα. A 
mental picture makes no such declaration. 

b 23. κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν. The noun has here its technical sense, which 
differentiates the meaning of the phrase from that of 402 Ὁ 23: see moze ad loc. 
ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεώμενοι. Cf. Them. (89, 18 H., 164, 15 Sp.) οὐ συμ- 
πάσχομεν οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς wivak τὰ γεγραμμένα θεώμενοι πάσχομεν 
οὐδέν. We are as wholly unaffected by the mental image as if we were gazing 
at a scene depicted in a painting. Cf. 4038 19—-21, also 432b 29—32, where 
b 30 οἷον πολλάκις διανοεῖται φοβερόν τι ἢ ἡδὺ implies imagination (cf. 431 a 16 sq., 
432 a 8). 

427 Ὁ 24. 428 a 5. Again, belief has several varieties, ἐπιστήμη, 
δόξα, φρόνησις and their opposites, which we are not here concerned to dis- 
criminate. But, as thought (τὸ νοεῖν) is distinct from sense-perception, αἰσθά- 
νεσθαι, and is presumed to include imagination (φαντασία) and belief (ὑπόληψις), 
our best plan is first to fix the meaning of φαντασία before we discuss belief 
[8 51 Imagination may be described as a habit or faculty concerned with 
images, by which we judge and pronounce either truly or falsely. Of such 
habits or faculties there are four, αἴσθησις, δόξα, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς [from which 
imagination must accordingly be distinguished] [§ 6]. 

This passage contains the plan of the discussion which follows to the end of 
the chapter. A. intends to fix what is meant by φαντασία before he passes on 
to νοεῖν proper. This was the more difficult because Plato had put on the word 
φαντασία a sense of his own, Soph. 263 E sqq. RE. Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος 
ταὐτόν: πλὴν 6 μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος 
τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια; OEAI. Ιϊάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΞῈ. Td δέ γ᾽ ἀπ᾽ 
ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ. 
BE. Kal μὴν ἐν λόγοις αὐτὸ ἴσμεν ὄν. ΘΕΑῚ. Τὸ ποῖον; RE. Φάσιν τε καὶ 
ἀπόφασιν. OEAI. Ἴσμεν. HE. Ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται 
μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅ τι προσείπῃς αὐτό; ΘΈΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς; FE. Ti δ᾽ 
ὅταν μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἀλλὰ δ αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος, ἄρ᾽ οἷόν τε 
ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν; ΘΕΑῚ. Οὐδέν. ΞῈ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ λόγος 


46ο NOTES Ill. 3 


ἀληδϑὴς ἦν καὶ ψευδής, τούτων δ᾽ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, 
δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, φαίνεται δὲ ὃ λέγομεν [int. φαντασία] σύμμιξις 
αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ ξυγγενῶν ὄντων Ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν 
ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι ΘΈΑΙ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; A. returns to the current usage and 
makes it more precise. We must separate it from sense-perception and yet 
connect it with it. It is to A., in the main, decaying sense (ἀσθενὴς αἴσθησις), 
whether the retention be voluntary or involuntary: for, if we include the “after- 
image” (see zoze on 428 a 16) or the mental image produced during the presence 
of the sensation which produces it (428 Ὁ 1—4), it is not always ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. He 
dismisses the meaning Plato would fix upon the word, viz. a judgment on 
present sensibles. 

427 Ὁ 26. τἀναντία τούτων. The opposite of knowledge is ignorance (ἄγνοια), 
and of wisdom, folly (ἀφροσύνη), while δόξα may be either true or false. érepos 
ἔστω λόγος. Possibly £7th. Nic. 1139 Ὁ 15 566. is intended. 

Ὁ 28, τούτου δὲ, int. τοῦ νοεῖν. 

Ὁ 28. τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις. In every act of thought 
there is presentation on the one hand and assumption of objective reality on the 
other. At 403a 8 sq. two alternatives are presented, τὸ νοεῖν 15 φαντασία τις OF οὐκ 
ἄνευ pavracias: the former would accord with the views attributed to Democritus 
and other physicists who made no distinction between νοῦς and ψυχή. Very 
possibly the latter was a view current at the time, the process of thought being 
analysed into presentation and judgment upon it. Cf 428 a 25 δόξα per 
αἰσθήσεως and wozve. A.’s own doctrine is οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος 
431 a 16 sq., 432 a 8, but at the same time φάντασμα is distinct from νόημα 
4328 13 sq. The student of post-Aristotelian philosophy will remember that 
Zeno analysed αἴσθησις into φαντασία and συγκατάθεσις, as mental presentation 
dius an act of assent. If ὑπόληψις, the common element of knowledge, opinion 
and wisdom (φρόνησις), is the assumption that the presentation is true, it is very 
like the mind’s assent or belief. 

Ὁ 29. περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας ovrw. The emphasis is on the participle, 
“we must first define, i.e. mark the limits of, φαντασία and then pass on to treat 
of ὑπόληψις, or whatever is the rest of νοεῖν. 

428 a1. καθ᾽ ἣν. This is added to distinguish the proper use of the term 
from the applications of it which A. stigmatises as metaphorical, or, it would be 
more correct to say, due to an extension of the term (see moze on 428 a2). Cf. 
Them. 89, 26 H., 164, 27 Sp. ᾿Αποσκεναζόμενοι.. .λέγομεν (πολλάκις μὲν yap καὶ 
τὴν αἴσθησιν φαντασίαν καλοῦμεν, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τὴν νόησιν), περὶ ἐκείνης λέγομεν 
τῆς φαντασίας, καθ᾽ ἥν φαμεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεσθαι, οἷον τύπον τινὰ καὶ 
μορφὴν τοῦ αἰσθήματος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ" αὕτη τοίνυν, ἣν κυρίως φαντασίαν καλοῦμεν, 
pia τις ἂν εἴη τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἔξεων τῶν κριτικῶν αἷς ἀληθεύομεν ἣ Ψψευδό- 
μεθα. The antecedent to ἣν in our lemma is φαντασία itself, or rather τοῦτο, the 
relative ὃ being attracted to the gender of φαντασία. There is no need to supply 
either ἕξις (or δύναμις) or (from 428 Ὁ 11) κίνησε. The sense to which the word 
φαντασία is here restricted is that of the power of calling up mental images, 
wherever this occurs, as in recollection, discursive thought and what is called 
the free play of the constructive imagination. 

az καὶ μὴ εἴ τι. And not whatever we, by an extension of the term, are in 
the habit of calling imagination. In this metaphorical or extended use φαντασία 
replaces in turn ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, αἴσθησις and νόησις. In fact, it may be said to 
mean πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον or πάθος ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῃῆ- The reason is that 
φαντασία Means presentation, appearance, and any of the cognitive faculties, or 
again even sense-perception, may be described as presentative; that is, the 


111. 3 427 Ὁ 24—428 a 8 461 


result they produce is something present to the soul, something that appears 
(ὃ φαίνεται). In fact the wider, or what A. here calls the metaphorical, meaning 
is based on the felt connexion of φαντασία with φαίνεσθαι, while the more 
limited meaning is determined rather by the meaning of φαντάζεσθαι and 
φάντασμα. In English while we use the verb “imagine” in a wide sense and in 
connexion with any of the cognitive faculties indifferently, we never use it, still 
less the noun “imagination,” of direct presentation to sense. In Latin on the 
contrary, “arbitrari” and “ videri” were technical terms in the witness-box. 

a3. τούτων, 1.6. among the various faculties already mentioned in this 
chapter. Four are enumerated in the next sentence. Imagination is then 
shown, 428 a 5—b 9, to be identical with no one of the four, but it takes rank 
with them as a separate faculty (δύναμις). 

428 a 5--16. Imagination is not sensation. (1) Imagination occurs 
when there is neither actual nor potential sensation, e.g. in dreams. (2) Sensation 
(i.e. potential sensation) is always present; imagination is not. (3) Imagination 
is not found in all animals, e.g. not in the grub. It would be if it were the same 
as the actuality of sensation. (4) While sensations are always true, mental 
images are more often false than true. (5) The view that there is a real dis- 
tinction between sensation and imagination is confirmed by linguistic usage [§ 7]. 

In spite of the arguments here adduced as if conclusive, A. sometimes 
speaks as if this were an open question: De /msom. 1, 458 Ὁ 29 εἴτε δὴ ταὐτὸν εἴθ᾽ 
ἕτερον τὸ φανταστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. Again, he speaks of an act of 
memory as an act of perception De Mem. τ. 450 Ὁ 16—18. 

428 a5. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, int. 7 φαντασία. 

a6. οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὅρασις. Here ὄψις is the faculty, δύναμις, of sight, the 
power to see, ὅρασις is actual seeing: cf. 412 Ὁ 27 sqq., 426 ἃ 12 sqq. 

a7. φαίνεται δέ τι, “there is an image” = φάντασμά τι ἐγγίγνεται. μηδετέρον 
ὑπάρχοντος, neither potential nor actual sense-perception. An exaggeration: 
see next zoze. A. might have said that, neither as actual nor as potential, is 
sensation to be identified with the imagination, which is active, not potential, 
in dreams: and this is what we find in Philop. 498, 13 διαιρεῖ δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν eis 
τὸ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ λέγει ὅτι ἡ φαντασία οὔτε τῇ δυνάμει αἰσθήσει ταὐτόν 
ἐστιν οὔτε τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, τῇ μὲν δυνάμει, ἐπειδὴ ἐνεργοῦμεν σαφῶς ἐν τοῖς ὁν είροις, τότε 
δὲ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ: ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐπεὶ οὐδέποτε ἂν 
ἐφανταζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις (νῦν δὲ φανταζόμεθα), ἐπειδὴ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς 
ὕπνοις [int. ἡ αἴσθησις] καὶ οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ" ὦστε οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡ φαντασία τῇ κατ᾽ 
ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσε. Cf. Them. 89, 36 5646. H., 165, 12 566. Sp. 

8 8. τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, int. φαινόμενα. In sleep there is potential sensation, 
the dormant power. There is, however, no actual sensation. In De Sowmno 3, 
458 a 28 sleep is thus described: ὁ ὕπνος. «τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητηρίου κατάληψις 
[arrest] πρὸς τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐνεργεῖν. The sleeper cannot actually see or hear: 
yet in dreams φαντασία is in active operation: cf. 4288 16 φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν 
ὁράματα. Here, as elsewhere in the chapter, A. is thinking of sight as the 
principal sense: cf. De Jnsomn. 1, 458b 31 οὐ γίνεται [int. τὸ φανταστικὸν] ἄνευ 
τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι. 

a8 εἶτα...1ο ὑπάρχειν. Philop. (498, 22, 25) breaks up this passage into two 
distinct arguments, the second beginning at ἃ 9 «εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ: but A.’s own 
indications εἶτα...εἶτα.. ἔπειτα tend to show that he regarded a 8 e¢ira...10 ὑπάρ- 
χειν as a single argument. Imagination is neither (4) potential sensation, nor 
(6) actual sensation: not potential sensation, for that, the mere faculty of sense, 
is always present in the animal, it is a distinctive mark or characteristic of 
animals as contrasted with plants, whereas imagination is not so. The 


462 NOTES III. 3 


question whether all animals, or whether certain animals, have or have not 
imagination is raised several times in the treatise, and even after the provisional 
solution of 4348 1—5 it cannot be said to be an invariable accompaniment of 
animal life. It will be seen that αἴσθησις in 428 a 8 must be understood as 
meaning δυνάμει αἴσθησις. Freudenthal would alter det to πᾶσι, which seems 
unnecessary with the above explanation: if, that is, det=“ universally,” in all 
species. As to the verbal contradiction between a 7 μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος and 
a ὃ ἀεὶ πάρεστι, it is the former words, and not the latter, which stand in need of 
correction. 

ag. εἰ St τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, Int. ἡ φαντασία ἐστίν. Here we pass to (4), the 
proof that imagination is not actual sensation: for by τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ must be un- 
derstood τῇ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐνεργείᾳ, τῇ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἴσθήσειι See note on 
428 Ὁ 13. “And supposing them [i.e. φαντασία and αἴσθησις) to be in their 
activities identical, all animals must have capacity for imagination, whereas this 
does not appear to be so, e.g. the ant, the bee, the grub do not possess it.” 

a Io. οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ ἢ σκώληκι. Thus understood, A. denies to these 
lower forms not any and every kind of imagination, but imagination as the 
developed faculty which he is here seeking to define. See mode on 4158 8 το. If 
A. here denies φαντασία to the ant and the bee as well as to the grub, we must 
bear in mind what he says in 434a 1 “How can undeveloped or imperfect 
animals, which have no sensation except touch, have imagination? May we 
say that as their movements are vague and indeterminate, so, though they 
possess the powers in question (imagination and desire), it is only in a vague 
and indeterminate way?” In the Metaphysics 980 b 22 sqq. and in the De Part. 
An. τι. 2, 648 ἃ 5 sqq., bees are called φρόνιμα, or φρονιμώτερα ἐναίμων πολλῶν, 
and in the former passage memory is expressly attributed to them, while from 
De Mem. 1, 450a 22 sqq. it is clear that the possession of memory implies the 
possession of φαντασία. Cf. 26. 4518 148qq., where memory is described as 
φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα, eis: further in A7zsz. Az. I. 1, 488 ἃ 7 sqq., 
bees and ants are said to be, like man, πολιτικὰ ζῷα. In view of these facts 
Torstrik refuses to accept the MS. text οἷον μύρμηκε ἢ μέλιττῃ ἢ σκώληκι, Where 
the bee and the ant are classed with the grub or larva, the lowest type of 
animal existence (De Gen. An. 11. τ, 732 8 16 544.): at apis certe et formica, 
prudentissima animalia, ex tam ignobili societate removenda sunt. Accord- 
ingly he reads οἷον μύρμηκι μὲν ἢ μελίττῃ, σκώληκι δ᾽ ov, for which he finds 
authority in Them. (ad foc.) and Sophonias. The words of Them. are: 90,6H., 
165, 23 Sp. φαντασία δὲ τοῖς μὲν rots δ᾽ οὔ, μύρμηκι μὲν ἴσως καὶ μελέττῃ καὶ 
πολλῷ μᾶλλον κυνὶ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ ὅσα μετέχει αἰσθήσεως, σκώληκι δὲ οὔ, Soph. 
55, 27 μύρμηξι μὲν γὰρ καὶ μελίτταις καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ ταῦτα, καὶ 
ἁπλῶς οἷς τισιν οὐκ ἀόριστος οὐδ᾽ ἀνεπίστροφος κίνησις, ἀνάγκη παρεῖναι φαντασίαν, 
πρὸς ἣν ποιοῦνται τεταγμένην τὴν κίνησιν - σκώληκες δὲ καὶ μυῖαι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα 
ἀτάκτως καὶ ἀορίστως ὁρῶνται κινούμενα καὶ μάλιστα τὰ ἐκ σήψεως ἐπετείως γινόμενα 
ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὅλως ἔχειν ἢ ἀμυδράν τινα. Unless Them. is correcting A., he can 
hardly have had our present text. Soph., on the other hand, is paraphrasing 
415a Io sq. and drawing upon 434a 4 sqq., and he says no more than Philop. 
in his notes on 413b 22 and 414} 33: 240, 11 μύρμηκες μὲν γὰρ καὶ μυῖαι καὶ 
πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ὅτε φαντασίαν ἔχει, πρόδηλον: ἴσασι yap ἑαυτῶν ras καταδύσεις" 
σκώληκες δέ, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐρεῖ, οὐ φαίνονται φαντασίαν ἔχοντες, 258, 32 
μύρμηκες μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλιτται καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμολογουμένως μετέχει φαντασίας, 
σκώληκες δὲ καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα τὴν κίνησιν ἄτακτον ποιεῖται, φαντασίας οὐ μετέχει. 
Yet that Philoponus had before him in our present passage the text of the 
MSS. 15 plain from his comment: 498, 30 ὁ δὲ σκώληξ καὶ ὁ μύρμηξ εἶ καὶ 


111. 3 428 ἃ 8—a 16 463 


ἔχει φαντασίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμυδρὰν ταύτην ἔχει καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον. Cf. Simpl. 308, 18 οὐκέτε 
μέντοι μύρμηκες καὶ μέλισσαι ἢ τὰ ἑρπετὰ ἢ νηκτά, οὐδ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὰ ἀόριστον 
ἔχοντα τὴν φαντασίαν and 200, 21 μύρμηκι δὲ καὶ μελίσσῃ καὶ ἐναργεστέρως σκώληκι 
οὐχὶ ἑκάστου ὡρισμένους, ἀλλὰ κοινότερον τροφῆς, ἢ εἶ καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἄλσει, ὡς 
ἐπὶ μελισσῶν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀτόμου τουδὲ τοῦ ἄνθους. The denial of 
φαντασία to the bee in particular seems not unnaturally to have puzzled the 
ancient commentators. 

alti. εἶτα αἱ μὲν, int. αἐσθήσεις. ἀληθεῖς αἰεί. Cf. supra 427 Ὁ 12, 418 a 12. 
Later in the chapter, 428 Ὁ 19, A. qualifies this αἰεὶ by the words ἢ ὅτε ὀλίγιστον 
ἔχουσα τὸ Ψεῦδος. 

8 12. Ψευδεῖς. The causes of error will be investigated zz/fr 428 Ὁ 18----30. 
Cf. in general Jefaph. 1024 Ὁ 17—28, also first zofe on 402b 23. As Simpl. 
remarks, 216, 4 sqq., the error is mainly due to the interval of time which has 
elapsed between the first presentation and the re-presentation. When every 
allowance is made, the statement in the text before us is surprising. It has 
been suggested that it is culoured by reminiscences of the discussion in the 
Philebus, where expectation of the future forms a large element in imaginative 
pictures, and Plato further contends (40 B) that the hopes and desires of the 
wicked are false, because they are never destined to be realised. On the 
whole I prefer the explanation of Simplicius and take ai πλείους ψευδεῖς to be a 
dialectical exaggeration for the more cautious, matter-of-fact πολλάκις Ψεύ- 
δονται (cf. supra 7 μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος). The later sceptics challenged the 
truth of all φαντασία, whether presentative or representative. 

8 13. ὅταν ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς, 1.6. ὅταν ἀκριβῶς τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθανώμεθα, when 
in actual sensation we give careful attention to the thing perceived, in other 
words, when we observe accurately. 

ἃ 14. τοῦτο, int. τὸ αἰσθητόν, the sensible object. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον. If, with 
Torstrik, Madvig and Biehl, we reject the words τότε ἢ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς as a 
gloss, the predicate to be supplied here will be λέγομεν ὅτι φαίνεται. 

8 15. [τότε ἢ ἀληθὴς ἢ Wevdys], int. ἐστεν ἡ αἴσθησις presumably. The words 
are confusing, whether we make αἴσθησις or φαντασία the subject. Again, the 
consideration thus introduced is irrelevant where, as here, the question is the 
distinction between αἴσθησις and φαντασία. 1 therefore concur in bracketing 
the words. 

aI6. ὁράματα, “visual sensations.” As αἴσθημα, which is rod αἰσθανομένου 
πάθος Metaph. τοῖο Ὁ 33, is the result of αἴσθησις, perception in general, so 
ὅραμα is the result of ὅρασις, the special activity of seeing (cf. νόημα, νόησις). 
The phenomenon alluded to is probably that of the after-image mentioned 
above 425b24sq. In De Jusomm. 2, 459b 5—20 A. says: “Thus the affection 
is not only in the organs of sense, while they are perceiving, it is in them also 
when they have ceased to perceive, in their deeper parts as well as at the 
surface. This is plainly evident in cases where the perception of an object is 
steadily continued. For when we turn the sense in another direction, the 
impression follows; as e.g. when we look away from the sun into darkness, for 
we are unable to see anything owing to the persistence in the eyes of the 
movement produced by the light. So, too, if we look for a long time at one 
colour, say white or yellow, the same kind of colour appears on whatever object 
the sight may be turned. So also if after gazing at the sun or any brilliant 
object, we close the eyes, we see if we observe closely, straight before us, 
wherever we happen to look, first the colour of the same sort, then it changes to 
dark red, then to purple, until it turns to black and disappears. The sensations 
derived from moving objects also suffer change, e.g. from rivers, especially from 


464. NOTES Ill. 3 


those that have the swiftest current; for objects at rest appear to be moving.” 
It is not necessary, then, to restrict the reference to the phenomena of dreams, 
as is done by Simpl. 210, 3 sq. 

42938 a 16—b 9. Again, imagination is not knowledge or thought, 
faculties which are infallible, for it may equally well be erroneous. It remains 
to see whether imagination is identical with opinion, which, like it, admits of 
error. No: for (1) opinion is attended by conviction, which no animals possess, 
though many of them have imagination. And (2) conviction, which thus 
attends opinion, presupposes persuasion by argument, and therefore reasoning 
(λόγος). But no animals reason [8 8]. Clearly, then, imagination is not opinion 
accompanied by sensation, nor opinion following upon antecedent sensation, 
nor a complex or mixture of opinion and sensation. For, apart from the 
considerations above mentioned, the opinion required for any such combination 
would have to refer to the same object as the sensation. The result of such a 
theory would be that imagination is the direct thinking or conceiving of the 
object perceived [§ 9]. [Such a view, however, is untenable.] Images are often 
false. A man may have at one and the same time a false mental image and a 
quite true opinion or conception of the same object, e.g. of the sun. Thus, then, 
imagination is no one of the four faculties enumerated, nor is it any com- 
bination of them [§ ro]. 

428 a 17. τῶν ἀεὶ ἀληθευόντων. Cf Anal. Post. Il. 19, 100b καὶ ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν 
περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων, ais ἀληθεύομεν, ai μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσίν, ai δὲ ἐπιδέχονται 
τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῆ δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς. 

8ἃ 18. ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα, int. ἐστὶν 7 φαντασία. 

a 22 ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν...24 λόγος δ᾽ οὔ The suspicions which induced Biehl to 
bracket this sentence come from Torstrik, who, always on the look out for 
double recensions, was as ready as Philoponus 501, 5 sq. to consider the two 
arguments separated by ἔτι as substantially identical. There is a similar 
uncertainty as to whether the sentence beginning with ἔτι in Pol. 1262 8. 1, or 
that beginning ἔτε δ᾽ in De Mem. 2, 4518 25, is a repetition of what precedes 
or an independent argument, adding something new. See Freudenthal, Aen. 
Mus. N. F. XXIV. (1869), p. 405. In the present passage something new is 
certainly added, viz. the dependence of πίστις upon λόγος. The first argument 
stated as a fact that animals are destitute of belief, the second shows the reason 
for the fact, viz. that belief, being reasoned conviction, implies reason. This is 
another instance of a sentence in which the pev clause is subordinate to a clause 
with 8. The suspected words were read by all the Greek commentators: 
Them. go, 23—~25 H., 166, 17—21 Sp., Simpl. 211, 19—29, Philop. 501, 5 sq., 
Soph. 118, 37-119, I. 

a 22. ἀκολουθεῖ. This word, like ἕπεται, does not imply sequence in time, 
but logical concomitance, or a psychical relation of dependence. Cf. ἔποιτ᾽ ἄν, 
406 Ὁ 4. 

a 232. πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι. πίστις as defined in Jud. Ar. 595 Ὁ 8 sq. is 
persuasionis firmitas, sive ea ex argumentis et rationibus, sive ex sensu et 
experientia orta est, atque eae res quae ad efficiendam eam persuasionem 
conferunt. Here the word has the former subjective meaning “ persuasionis 
firmitas” and the “‘belief” is “derived from reasonings.” For the belief, based 
on the evidence of sense, cf. Phys. VIII. 8, 262a 18 ἡ πίστις ov μόνον ἐπὶ τῆς 
αἰσθήσεως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Adyov. There cannot be belief without persuasion 
and, apart from the direct evidence of the senses, there cannot be persuasion 
without reasoning. On this passage see Kampe, Lrkenninisstheorie, pp. 271— 
273. 


III. 3 428 εἰ 16—b 2 463 


8. 24. ἐνίοις. Cf. 4288 9—I1I. λόγος δ᾽ ot. Cf. 4138 7 5qq., 4338 II 56.» 
4344 5—7. 

8. 24 φανερὸν τοίνυν...26 φαντασία dv ey. A. has three Platonic formulae 
before him, δόξῃ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως from 7 2». 52 A, the other two from the Sophisé. 
There seems to be a needless precision in the last of the three, συμπλοκὴ δόξης 
καὶ αἰσθήσεως, following upon dvEa μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως. The reason is to be sought 
in the language of Sophist 264 Β (cited above in summary of $8 5, 6, p. 460) 
φαίνεται δὲ ὃ λέγομεν (1.6. what we mean by the term “ φαίνεται," or “gavracia,” is) 
σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης : in other words, φαντασία is with Plato a variety of 
δόξα, judgment. Aristotle however (as W. H. Thompson observes, Journ. of 
Phil. vol. Vill. p. 293) needs the term for another purpose and accordingly 
brushes Plato’s distinction aside. At the same time, quoting from memory, he 
substitutes συμπλοκὴ for σύμμιξις. The second formula δόξα δε αἰσθήσεως is also 
from the Sophist (264.4) ὅταν μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν [1.6. τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῇ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν) ἀλλὰ 80 
αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ wddos, ap οἵόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλὴν 
φαντασίαν; ' 

8. 26ὅ. διά τε ταῦτα, “both for the foregoing reasons,” Le. the reasons urged 
against the identification of φαντασία with δόξα or with αἴσθησις. 

a27. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι, “and also because it is clear that.” Unless we supply 
ὃν with δῆλον, thus forming an accusative absolute (in other words, if we supply 
€ori), the sentence will be slightly anacoluthic: ‘‘and also it 15 clear” for “and 
also because it is clear.” But A. indulges in this as in other irregularities. 
For an exactly similar instance see PAys. 1V. 11, 220a 17 διά τε τὸ εἰρημένον (τῇ 
yap μέσῃ στιγμῇ ὡς δυσὶ χρήσεται, ὥστε ἠρεμεῖν συμβήσεται), καὶ er. φανερὸν 
ὅτι xré. Cf. also zofe on 410 Ὁ 16. οὐκ ἄλλου τινός, “not of anything else, 
but of the thing perceived.” 

a 28. λέγω δ᾽. I mean, if φαντασία is a combination of δόξα and αἴσθησις at 
all, it is a combination of (for instance) the perception of white with a judgment 
or opinion relating to the same thing, white, and not to another thing, e.g. good. 
This is a fuller explanation of the views cited before, 428 a 25, and challenged by 
A. Trendelenburg proposes to read εἰ in place of ἐκ: “I mean whether.” 

428 τ. τὸ οὖν φαίνεσθαι. Such is the consequence on the theory which 
A. is criticising, viz. that φαντασία is some combination of perception and 
opinion. 

b2 μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. These words are added to include the qualifica- 
tion pointed out in a 28—31 sxfra. The account given in the Sofhist comes to 
this: φαντασία is a direct opining of the object given in sensation, direct, not 
incidental, to exclude the case where the sensation refers to one quality of an 
object (white) and the opinion to another (good). In other words, φαίνεταί por 
τοῦτο λευκὸν by --δοξάζω τοῦτο ὅπερ αἰσθάνομαι λευκὸν εἶναι and not ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, 
in which case the opinion would refer zxczdentally to the same object as the 
sensation: cf. Them. 90, 35 H., 167, 5 Sp. οὐδὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν ὑποκειμένου κατ 
ἄλλο δὲ Kat ἄλλο, οἷον εἰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἴη λευκὸν Kai ἀγαθόν, THY μὲν δόξαν εἶναι 
περὶ αὐτοῦ καθὸ ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν καθὸ λευκόν" κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τοῦ 
αὐτοῦ 7 δόξα τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις. 

b2. φαίνεται δὲ, int. τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ. This is clear from the example given. 
Here and in the next line φαίνεται is not equivalent to φάντασμά ἔστι, in the 
sense in which it was used, e.g. 428 a 7, but connotes a presentation, impression 
(or whatever it should be called) which A. regards as a form of αἴσθησις, Cf. 
De Insomn, 1, 458 Ὁ 28 sqq., 2, 460 Ὁ 18 [cited p. 192 in moze on 402 b 23 κατὰ τὴν 
ᾧΦαντασίαν]. So the ancient commentators: Them. 91, 2 H., 167, 13 Sp. ὅταν... 
ἡ μὲν δόξα ἀληθεύῃ, ἡ αἴσθησις δὲ διαψεύδηται, Simpl. 213, 15 ψευδὴς διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν 


H. 30 


466 NOTES ΠῚ. 3 


(τοῦτο yap δηλοῖ τὸ φαίνεται καὶ ψευδῆ), Philop. 505, 18 ἡ αἴσθησις ποδιαῖον τὸν 
ἥλιον ὁρᾷ. 

b3. ὑπόληψιν. The view, assumption or conception which the percipient 
has is correct, but what he opines directly, and not incidentally, does not agree 
with his perception: it cannot be said of him δοξάξει ὅπερ αἰσθάνεται μὴ κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός. ἔχει. The subject, not expressed, is 6 ὑπολαμβάνων : cf. zote on 
403 a 22, ὀργίζηται. 

b4. πεπίστευται. If the reading πεπίστευται δ᾽ εἶναι μείζω were right, the 
verb would be impersonal. It seems, however, more natural for A. to write 
πεπίστευται μείζων (int. ἥλεος) or else πέπεισται (int. res) μείζω. The scribes 
seem to have felt this, as the variants show (see critical zo/es). μείζων τῆς 
οἰκουμένης. Cf. Meteor. 1. 8, 345 Ὁ 1 εἰ καθάπερ δείκνυται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀστρολογίαν 
θεωρήμασιν, οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ τό τε τοῦ ἡλίου μέγεθος μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ τῆς γῆς, and 
De Insomn. 1, 458b 28 καὶ ὑγιαίνουσι δὲ καὶ εἰδόσιν ὅμως 6 ἥλιος ποδιαῖος εἶναι 
δοκεῖ: also 26. 2, 460b 18. 

b4. συμβαίνει οὖν. Here then sensation (Ὁ 2, 3 φαίνεται) and opinion (Ὁ 3 
ὑπόληψιν, Ὁ 4 πεπίστευται) relative to the same object are at variance. Upon 
the theory we are criticising, that of the SofAzs?, how is this to be explained? 
And how can we combine an opinion which is true with a sensation which is 
false into that σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης which the theory asserts φαντασία 
to be? Two explanations suggest themselves. Either the percipient subject 
without forgetting or conversion by argument must relinquish his former correct 
opinion, while the object remains unaltered, and exchange it for the false 
opinion, which conforms to the presentation of sense (this we shall see is im- 
possible); or, if he retains his former opinion at the same time that he δοξάζει 
ὅπερ αἰσθάνεται, the same opinion is both true and false. <A parallel passage is 
Anal. Post. τ. 6,74b 5sqq. The syllogism must start from premisses which 
are not only true, but necessarily true. Unless we can state the reason for the 
conclusion, τὸ διότι, that is, unless the middle term, by reason of which the 
conclusion is necessarily true, be predicated as necessary, we have not demon- 
strated the conclusion. Nor indeed do we know it scientifically. The middle 
term, not being necessary, may vanish, while the conclusion to which it was 
supposed to lead abides: 74 Ὁ 30 οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο [the conclusion] διὰ τὸ μέσον" 
τὸ μὲν yap ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἀναγκαῖον. ἔτι εἴ τις μὴ οἶδε viv 
ἔχων τὸν λόγον καὶ σωζόμενος, σωζομένου τοῦ πράγματος, μὴ ἐπιλελησμένος, οὐδὲ 
πρότερον ἤδει. φθαρείη δ᾽ ἂν τὸ μέσον, εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον. ὥστε ἕξει μὲν τὸν λόγον 
σωζόμενος σωζομένου τοῦ πράγματος, οὐκ οἷδε δέ. οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πρότερον ἥδει. εἶ δὲ μὴ 
ἔφθαρται, ἐνδέχεται δὲ φθαρῆναι, τὸ συμβαῖνον ἂν εἴη δυνατὸν καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον. ἀλλ᾽ 
ἔστιν ἀδύνατον οὕτως ἔχοντα εἰδέναι. A different case is considered Anal. Prior. 
Ir. 21, 66 Ὁ το sqq., viz., a mistaken inference due to a false supposition respect- 
ing the premisses of a syllogism, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀπάτην: 
cf. 66b 29 ἅμα γὰρ εἴσεταί re καὶ οὔχ ὑπολήψεται ὑπάρχειν. 

b7. τὴν αὐτὴν, int. δόξαν. By this δόξα Simpl. understood the resulting 
φαντασία: 213, 6 συμβήσεται τὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν συστᾶσαν φαντασίαν 
τὴν αὐτὴν ἅμα τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα μεταπίπτειν τις καὶ γίνεσθαι 
ψευδῆ θεῖτο καὶ τὴν δόξαν. But, as Simplicius goes on to say, the false presenta- 
tion does not become true, nor again does our former true opinion become false, 
unless by a change either in us who opine or in the object, that is, in the 
example, the sun. The sameness of the opinion consists in its being the 
opinion of the same man at one and the same time; and what A. should have 
said is, ‘‘we shall have the same man holding at one and the same time a true 
and a false opinion regarding the same thing.” 


Ill. 3 428 Ὁ 2—b 12 467 


b8. ψευδὴς ἐγίνετο, ὅτε λάθοι. Opinions (as we saw) become false instead of 
true as often as, unknown to the observer, the object observed undergoes some 
change: as, for instance, when a man who, when last observed, was sitting, has 
risen up and is standing. In this case the opinion that he is still sitting is no 
longer true, but false (cf. Cufeg. 5,4a26sq.). This parenthetical remark rounds 
off the enumeration of possible grounds for a change of opinion; forgetfulness, 
conversion by argument and change in the object perceived. Philop. (505, 26 sq.), 
in deference to Azal. Post. τ. 6, 74 Ὁ 33, 35 σωζόμενος, introduces a fourth ground, 
viz. a change not further specified in the man himself who opines: the observer 
might approach the object or he might change from health to sickness. It is 
important, then, to postulate that he, as well as the object, should remain 
constant. Cf. 422b 8—10 and υχοζαᾷ. τοῖο Ὁ 21 λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς οἶνος 
δόξειεν Gv ἢ μεταβαλὼν ἢ τοῦ σώματος μεταβαλόντος ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι γλυκὺς ὁτὲ δὲ 
οὗ γλυκύς. 

428 b 10—429a 9. Our own explanation of φαντασία assumes (1) 
that one motion may generate another, (2) that imagination, which is commonly 
held to be a motion, is not independent of sensation, occurs only in sentient 
beings and with regard to sensibles and (3) especially that the movement, or 
rather act, of sensation may generate a subsequent, secondary movement, which 
must resemble the original movement of sensation. If this be granted, then the 
subsequent movement postulated satisfies the conditions required. It is de- 
pendent on sensation, the possession of it makes its possessor act and be acted 
upon in varlous ways; it may be true or false [8 11]. The reason why it can 
be true or false is as follows. The subsequent movement, generated by actual 
sensation, will differ in kind, according to the nature of the sensible object 
which has produced the original movement, that is, according as the percept is 
(1) a special sensible quality (ἴδιον); (2) a thing which happens to possess such 
quality (συμβεβηκός, ᾧ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἴδιον) or (3) one of the “‘common sensibles” 
(κοινόν) [ὃ 12]. The movement and consequently the mental image produced 
by (1) is true during the presence of the sensible object which produces it. 
In the images produced by (2) or (3) there may be falsehood or error, especially 
if the object is perceived from a distance. Hence φαντασία may be defined 
as a movement consequent upon and resulting from the movement of actual 
sensation [8 13]. Its name φαντασία connects it with φάος, ight, and therefore 
with sight, the most important of the senses [8 14]. The persistence of mental 
images and their similarity to sense-perception will account for many of the 
actions of animals, which are without reason, and of men in whom reason is 
obscured by emotion, disease or sleep [8 15]. 

428 bi10. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ. This is the first of a series of protases of which the 
apodosis comes at εἴη ἂν αὕτη 428 Ὁ 14. So Simpl. 214, 30—37. 

b1IO. κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου. Cf. Phys. VIM. 5,256a45qq., 
where the theory of the transmission of motion through a series of κινοῦντα 
κινούμενα or intermediaries is exemplified by the stick in a man’s hand which 
moves the stone. The present application supposes sensation, which is one 
motion, to generate a secondary or subsequent motion ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, which 
is the mental image, exactly as the motion of the stone is generated by the 
motion of the stick. The sensible object is the cause of the motion which is 
sensation ; and this latter in turn is the cause of the motion which is φαντασία: 
or, as Them. (92, 11 H., 169, 23 Sp.) puts it, ὅπερ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τῇ αἰσθήσει, τοῦτο ἡ 
κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις τῇ φαντασίᾳ. 

biz. ἀλλ᾽ αἰσθανομένοις. The participle has a limiting effect, “solely in 
sentient beings.” ὧν, int. τούτων ὧν, neuter. The genitive is a genitive of 


30—2 


468 NOTES 111. 3 


relation. Imagination (we are told) is a movement concerned with those 
objects which are objects of sensation (τῶν αἰσθητῶν). 

b13. ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, “caused by the active operation of 
sensation,” or, which is the same thing, “by the sensation in actuality” (ὑπὸ 
τῆς ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήσεως). A. uses both forms of expression, but more often the 
latter, treating ἐνεργείᾳ, and so likewise δυνάμει, as a kind of indeclinable 
adjective. 

Ῥ 14. καὶ ταύτην, int. τὴν κίνησιν, this subsequent movement, ὁμοίαν 
ἀνάγκη. For the expression cf. De sem. 1, 450 Ὁ 15 εἴ τ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅμοιον [int. τὸ 
φάντασμα] ὥσπερ τύπος ἢ γραφὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. It 15 true generally that the motion 
transmitted through intermediaries is specifically one and the same, φορὰ 
through the stick to the stone, ἀλλοίωσις through the intervening medium, air 
or water, in sensation: 419 a 9—3I, 434b 26—435a 5. In the case before us 
the stimulation (1) of sense by the external object, (2) of the imaginative faculty 
by sensation, must be specifically alike, although the former has an external and 
the latter an internal stimulus, viz. the traces of sensory movements left in the 
sense-organs, μοναὶ 408 Ὁ 18: cf. De Zusomn. 2, 460 Ὁ 2, De Mem. 1, 450a 31 τύπος 
ris τοῦ αἰσθήματος. The impression made by a seal serves in De Mem. 1, 
450a 32 sqq. to illustrate μνήμη exactly as in De A. it 1s used to elucidate 
αἴσθησις 4248 19 344. 4358 2 544.: and this illustration in itself implies the 
close resemblance of the copy to the original. εἴη ἂν...15 ἐνδεχομένη : Equiva- 
lent to ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἄν. 

bi6. κατ᾽ αὐτὴν, i.e. κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν, “ἸῺ virtue of possessing imagina- 
tion.” We must understand ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν from the preceding εἴη ἂν ἐνδεχομένη 
as the predicate to which the infinitives ποιεῖν and πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον form the 
subject. 

bi7. τὸ ἔχον. Its possessor. The neuter singular, as often, in a quasi- 
collective sense. There is no necessity to supply τὸ ζῷον : τὸ ἔχον, the possessor, 
is itself τὸ ἔμψυχον ζῷον. See norte on 403 8 4. 

On the following section, 428 b 18—25, Professor Bywater comments as 
follows. “Aristotle is showing that there are degrees of truth in the report 
of sense; and his statement, read in the hght of the parallels elsewhere (in 
De Anima 11. 6 and Ill. 1), leaves no room for doubt as to his general 
meaning. First in order of truth comes our sense of the ἴδια αἰσθητά: next 
after this our sense of the things or substances of which the ἴδια αἰσθητὰ are 
attributes and marks: third, our sense of the κοινὰ αἰσθητὰ in these things or 
substances. As regards the second kind of sense (our consciousness of the 
presence of a thing or substance), Aristotle’s theory is that the objects in this case 
are only indirectly known by sense; we perceive the sensible quality of whiteness 
(an ἴδιον αἰσθητόν) directly, but that the white thing is the son of Cleon—to take 
one of his instances—we perceive only indirectly and κατὰ συμβεβηκός, because 
τούτῳ [1.ε. τῷ λευκῷ) συμβέβηκεν υἱῷ Κλέωνος εἶναι (111. 1, 425 a 26; comp. II. 6, 
418a 21 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τούτου αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε τοῦτο 
οὗ αἰσθάνεται. πὰ the order of being the sensible attribute is conceived as the 
συμβεβηκὸς of the substance, but in the order of knowledge the relative position 
of things is reversed: the sensible attribute is in the latter case the primary 
fact, the substance the secondary or accessory fact, the συμβεβηκός. It will be 
observed that in the above passage, when he comes to his third point, our 
perception of the κοινὰ αἰσθητά, Aristotle still speaks of the things or substances 
as συμβεβηκότα, but with the explanatory addition of οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ ἴδια; he 
seems to be aware that he is using the word in an uncommon sense, and that 
some explanation therefore may be wanted to prevent misconception. Though 


111. 3 428 Ὁ τ2--- 19 469 


the general meaning however is clear enough, the text of the passage as we now 
have it involves difficulties which have puzzled the commentators from the days of 
Themistius downwards, and which, it seems to me, no arts of interpretation will 
enable us to solve” (Journ. of PAil. vol. XVII, p. 57). Prof. Bywater proposes 
to meet these difficulties by the transposition of the words Ὁ 24 ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς 
αἰσθητοῖς to follow big δεύτερον δὲ τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα. This transposition 
would enable us to give to συμβεβηκέναι Ὁ 20 a meaning consistent with that of 
Ὁ 23 συμβεβηκόσιν. The same end is attained by more violent means if we adopt 
Torstrik’s conjecture rod ὃ συμβέβηκε τούτοις, for Torstrik intends ὃ συμβέβηκε 
to refer to the substance or thing regarded as accessory to its attributes. It is 
also possible to interpret Ὁ 20 συμβεβηκέναι and b23 συμβεβηκόσιν consistently 
and yet to give to both words the more usual meaning, viz. that by which a 
quality or attribute is said to be accessory to a substance or thing. But in that 
case we must omit the words Ὁ 23 οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ ἴδια With Maier: see Syllogisizk 
des Aristoteles, 1., Ὁ. ὃ sq., zofe2. If we are not prepared to purchase con- 
sistency by some alteration either in the wording of the received text or the 
order of the clauses, we are bound to admit that A. has used Ὁ 20 συμβεβηκέναι 
of the attributes and b23 συμβεβηκόσιν of the substances themselves, returning 
in Ὁ 24 to the use of συμβέβηκε for the attributes. I have taken this latter course 
myself, though fully aware of the obvious objection urged by Torstrik with his 
usual acumen: utrumque sane recte dici potest, sed non utrumlibet eodem loco. 
A. is just as inconsistent when he tries to force quasi-technical meanings upon 
other words in common use, Adyos being a glaring instance. Cf. also the 
divergent use of ἔχειν in Metadh. 1072 b 23, 24, 26. But what parallel can 
be more apposite than the confusing use of γεῦσις not only for the faculty 
and the organ, but also for the object of taste? Yet this occurs in one and 
the same passage, 422a 29—34. Both there and here, however, the writer 
has made his meaning clear, which 15 his chief concern. 

428 Ὁ 18. τοῦτο δὲ, i.e. its fallibility, τὸ καὶ ἀληθῇ καὶ ψευδῆ εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν. 
τάδε, the considerations he proceeds to enumerate. They should be carefully 
compared with the account of αἰσθητὸν given in De A. ττ., c. 6. The broad 
outlines are the same. The order of 11., c. 6 tScov, κοινόν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς [int. 
αἰσθητὸν is abandoned, κοινὸν now coming last as being most subject to error. 
An instructive commentary is also furnished by Mefaph. 1010 b2—26, where 
sensible qualities as αἰσθητά, whether ἴδια or κοινά, are clearly distinguished from 
things or substances. Cf. Torstrik, pp. 175 56. 

big. ὅτι ὀλίγιστον, “the least possible.” Cf supra 427 b11 sq., De Sensu 
4, 442 Ὁ 8 περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οὐκ ἀπατῶνται, ALefaph. τοῖο b2—-26. A. is there 
criticising the maxim of Protagoras. It is strange, he has remarked, that 
difficulties should be raised over such questions as whether the magnitude 
and colour of objects are what they appear to be at a distance or when near, 
in sickness or in health; whether the weight of an object is what it appears to 
be to a weak or to a strong man; whether reality belongs to our waking hours 
or to our dreams. Our own actions disprove our doubts. Again, with respect 
to sensations in the future, as Plato pointed out (7heaet. 178 C, 171 E), the 
opinion of the expert is decisive and valid. A. then proceeds: “Again, when 
we come to the senses themselves, their verdict on an object is not so authori- 
tative when the object lies outside of their domain as when it is a special 
sensible, nor if pronounced by a neighbouring sense is it so authoritative as 
if it came from the appropriate sense: it is sight, not taste, which pronounces 
upon colour, and taste, not sight, which pronounces upon flavour. But none of 
the senses reports at the same time about the same object that it both has and 


470 NOTES III. 3 


has not a given quality [e.g. that it is at once sweet and not sweet]. Even at 
different times no one ever doubted about the sensations, but solely about the 
object to which they belong. The same wine, if it has undergone a change, or 
if there has been a change in the bodily health of the person who tastes it, may 
at one time appear sweet and at another not; whereas the flavour of sweet as 
sweet, when present, never changes, but the sensation which it stimulates is 
always true and, in order to be sweet and to stimulate this sensation, the object 
must have certain definite qualities”: (101I0b 14) ἔτι δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων 
οὐχ ὁμοίως κυρία ἡ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίον καὶ ἰδίου 7 Tot πλησίον καὶ τοῦ αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ περὶ 
μὲν χρώματος ὄψις οὐ γεῦσις, περὶ δὲ χυμοῦ γεῦσις οὐκ ὄψις" ὧν ἑκάστη ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ 
χρόνῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδέ ποτέ φησιν ἅμα οὕτω καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν 
ἑτέρῳ χρόνῳ περῖ γε τὸ πάθος ἠμφισβήτησεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ πάθος 
[the object, i.e. substance, to which the quality belongs]. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς 
οἶνος δόξειεν ἂν ἢ μεταβαλὼν ἢ τοῦ σώματος μεταβαλόντος ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι γλυκὺς ὁτὲ δὲ 
οὐ γλυκύς: GAN οὐ τό γε γλυκὺ οἷόν ἐστιν ὅταν ἧ, οὐδεπώποτε μετέβαλεν, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ 
ἀληθεύει περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ἐσόμενον γλυκὺ τοιοῦτον. The qualifi- 
cation introduced in our passage, ὅτι ὀλίγιστον. must be understood with the 
more unguarded statements on this point elsewhere, in particular 418 a 12—16. 

b1x9. τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα, int. 7 αἴσθησίς ἐστι. Secondly, perception is of 
the fact that these ἴδια are accidents, τοῦ συμβεβηκότα εἶναι ratta. That is to 
say, we perceive (as A. would say; at any rate, we infer) that there are things of 
which the special qualities (ἴδια) are accidents. 

Thus understood, the text appears to me sound. The proposals for change 
proceed not only from a desire to secure consistency in the meaning of συμ- 
βεβηκέναι, but also from the assumption that A. could not use συμβεβηκέναι 
absolutely in the sense indicated, and that a dative must be supplied or under- 
stood. Prof. Bywater secures this dative by his transposition and would read 
in Ὁ 19 τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα, ἃ συμβέβηκε rots αἰσθητοῖς. Earlier still Torstrik 
condemned the vulgate Ὁ 19 δεύτερον δὲ...20 ταῦτα as absurd. He states his 
grounds as follows (p. 175): Loquitur Ar. de re colori vel alii qualitati sensili 
subiecta: si enim album videmus, dicimus nos nivem videre vel cygnos vel 
tentorium, quamquam in e& re facile erramus: (Ὁ 21) ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, od 
ψεύδεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευκὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι, Ψεύδεται. Haec vero sententia non sic 
potest dici, sensum esse τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα : nam τὸ συμβεβηκέναι non est 
obiectum senstis, sed intellectiis, sicut ceterae notiones abstractae. Here I 
think Torst. is in error. If A. believed that it is by sense that we perceive, not 
only τὰ κοινά, but the difference between two sensibles (426 Ὁ 14 sq.), he would 
have no difficulty in assuming αἴσθησις τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι τὰ ἴδια, for difference 
and magnitude are just as much “notiones abstractae” as the conception of the 
thing or substance to which the ἴδια are referred as attributes and accidents. 
The divergence of view between Plato and A. on this point is notorious: see 
motes on 418 a 17, 426b 15. Torst.’s own conjecture τοῦ ὃ συμβέβηκε τούτοις 
is based upon the variant of cod. X τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, the Aldine edition rot ᾧ 
συμβέβηκε καὶ ταῦτα, Themistius 93, 10 H., 171, 19 sq. Sp. δεύτερον δὲ τῶν 
ὑποκειμένων τοῖς idiow καὶ ois ἐκεῖνα συμβέβηκε and the fact that codd. L and ἘΣ 
have τῷ for τοῦ. Thus he, too, is in search of a dative to go with συμβεβηκέναι. 
But there is no more need of a dative here than in Jferfaph. 1007 a 21 πάντα γὰρ 
ἀνάγκῃ συμβεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτοῖς, “they are bound to call all things accidents,” 
even οὐσία and the τί ἦν εἶναι, as the context shows. It would seem, then, 
that the received text makes A. say exactly what Torstrik wishes him to say rod 
ὃ συμβέβηκε τούτοις, and in a far neater and more idiomatic way: to perceive 
that the ἔδια are attributes implies that there is a substance of which they are 


III. 3 428 Ὁ το---Ὁ 24 471 


attributes or accidents, εἰ μὴ χωριστὰ τὰ πάθη ἀλλήλων. This, the more common 
and natural use of συμβεβηκέναι, is not only in accord with ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς 
αἰσθητοῖς b 24, but also with JJeZaph. τοῖο Ὁ 20 sq. τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ πάθος cited 
in zole on 428 Ὁ 19 ὅτι ὀλίγιστον see Bonitz ad loc., p- 207. 

Ὁ 20. καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη. It is when we come to this second kind of per- 
ception, involving reference of an ἴδιον to something of which it is an accident, 
that serious error becomes possible. 

b2I. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, int. πάρεστι or τὸ αἴσθητόν ἐστι The subject to 
ψεύδεται is, again, indefinite, ὁ αἰσθανόμενος or τες; and I should supply τὸν 
αἰσθανόμενον as subject to the infinitive διαψεύδεσθαι in the preceding line. As 
to the fact that there is something white before him, or that that which he sees 
is white, a man, generally speaking, cannot be mistaken. Error arises on the 
question whether the white object is this or that thing or person, e.g. the son of 
Cleon or someone else. Cf. 41:88 15 sq., 430b 29 sq. 

Ὁ 22. τρίτον δὲ τῶν κοινών, int. ἡ αἴσθησίς ἐστι. 

Ὁ 23. τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν...τὰ ἴδια. This must mean the substances, ὑποκεί- 
μενα, whether things or persons, to which the qualities perceived by the special 
senses belong. They are called συμβεβηκότα either as being κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 
αἰσθητά (cf. 418 a 20 sqq.) or because, in the words of Professor Bywater (loc. cit.), 
“in the order of being the sensible attribute is conceived as the συμβεβηκὸς of the 
substance, but in the order of knowledge...the sensible object is the primary fact, 
the substance the secondary or accessory fact, the συμβεβηκός." If we leave the 
text unaltered, we must assume that A. has changed his point of view from the 
order of being to the order of knowledge. 

b24. ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. “Torstrik and Biehl bracket these words. 
Professor Bywater (/ourn. of Phit., l.c.) prefers to transpose them. If they are 
omitted here, the parenthetical remark introduced by λέγω δ᾽, Ὁ 23, includes no 
more than λέγω δ᾽ οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος. If we retain the words in their 
traditional place, we can account for their presence by the fact that, in de- 
scribing τὰ κοινὰ as ἑπόμενα τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ ἴδια, A. is conscious 
of having employed an unusual phrase, not easily intelligible, and only adopted 
to make clear the double chance of error in such conceptions as magnitude and 
motion: (1) because they are not ἴδια and not directly perceived by any single 
special sense (cf. 425 a 15 with mozes) and (2) because they are attributes of κατὰ 
συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητά, i.e. of things or substances themselves not directly per- 
ceived but, as we should say, only inferred from the direct perception of special 
sensible qualities. But, having so described them, as soon as he comes to the 
examples, A. is glad to revert to the more ordinary expression that these κοινά, 
as well as τὰ ἴδια, συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. are attributes of things or sub- 
stances. By τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς we should naturally understand τοῖς ἰδίοις, which are 
αἰσθητὰ in the strict and proper sense of the term, 418a 24 sq. But, though 
the common sensibles accompany the special sensibles, ἔπεται, ἀκολουθεῖ, 1t 15 
the substances in which the special sensibles inhere that, as explained above, 
are properly said συμβεβηκέναι in this connexion, and not the common sensibles. 
Hence Torst., following Simpl. is driven to understand by τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς the 
things or substances incidentally perceived. Cf. Simpl. 216, 14 ὑπάρχει δὲ τὰ 
κοινὰ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἴδια συμβεβηκότα, ὄντα ἄμφω τοῖς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητοῖς, 
ἅπερ ai ὑποκείμεναι οὐσίαι, Torst. (p. 176): possunt quidem haec aliquo modo 
defendi, si quis dicat τὰ αἰσθητά hoc loco non esse τὰ ἴδια (v. c. colorem) sed 
subiecta ols ὑπάρχει τὰ ἴδια (v. c. hominem colore praeditum). I myself incline 
to the latter view. 

b24. περὶ &. This remark is parallel to that beginning καὶ ἐνταῦθα above. 


472 NOTES Ill. 3 


The reference of the relative is to τῶν κοινῶν, the words λέγω δ᾽ οἷον κίνησις καὶ 
μέγεθος forming a parenthesis. περὶ dis here equivalent to καὶ περὶ ταῦτα, just 
as in 430b 18 I take ὃ -- καὶ τοῦτο. 

Ὁ 25. μάλιστα. The chance of error is greatest in dealing with τὰ κοινά, 
greater than in referring qualities or attributes to a thing or substance: cf. 
425 b6—I11. ἠδὲ κίνησις ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας γινομένη, that is to say, (according 
to 428 b 10 sqq.) the secondary or subsequent movement which constitutes 
φαντασία. It is here described as due to the activity (of sensation). Cf. supra 
428 Ὁ 13 κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως. If τῆς αἰσθήσεως, which is found 
in the Mss. after διοίσει, be retained, it must in any case be constructed with 
ἐνεργείας and would be more 1n place if transposed to follow that word. 

Ὁ 26. διοίσει; “will vary,” that is, will assume different forms, according 
as it proceeds from one or another of the three kinds of percept: Dicit 
igitur διοίσει, h. 6. discrimen habebit: non additur a qua tandem re differat 
ἡ φαντασία, quia non id quaeritur, sed quae sint τῆς φαντασίας ipsius species ac 
differentiae (Torstrik p. 177). Μ. Rodier translates: “Par suite, en ce qui 
concerne le mouvement produit par la sensation en acte, c’est-a-dire en ce qui 
concerne limagination, celui qui résultera de chacune de ces trois sortes de 
sensations, différera de celui qui résultera de chaque autre.” The meaning and 
connexion of the passage are best seen from Alex. De An. 70, 5 ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸ 
ἐγκατάλειμμα TO ἀπὸ τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ αἰσθητοῦ σωζόμενον γινομένη ἐνέργειά τε Kai 
φαντασία ὁμοίως τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἕξει τῇ αἰσθήσει ἐφ᾽ ἡ γίνεται. διὸ ai 
πλεῖσται τῶν τοιούτων καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φαντασιῶν ἀληθεῖς, al δὲ περὶ τὰ ἐγκατα- 
λείμματα ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν τε αἰσθητῶν καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς πολὺ τὸ ψεῦδος ἔχουσιν. 
No genitive need go with the verb of our lemma and, least of all, τῆς αἰσθή- 
σεως. In what the φαντασία will vary A. does not expressly say, but if we 
bear in mind that he has been showing that there are degrees of truth in the 
reports of sense and goes on to show that there are similar degrees of truth and 
falsehood in the φαντασίαι, it seems clear that the difference referred to must be 
difference of truth and falsehood. Various other interpretations have been 
proposed. (1) Philop. understands διοίσει τῶν αἰσθήσεων πασῶν ad ὧν γέγονεν 
(514, 19), imagination will be a movement distinct from sense, but this point has 
been laboured in 428 a 5—16: cf. 428b 10sqq. (2) Much the same sense is 
obtained by Bekker’s purely conjectural reading τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τριῶν 
αἰσθήσεων, “further, the movement which results from the activity due to 
these three sorts of sense will be distinct from the sensation which causes it.” 
(3) Christ proposed 74 ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τριῶν αἰσθήσεων, “in so far as it [the 
movement, i.e. imagination] results from these three sorts of sense.” 

b 27. ἡ ἀπὸ τούτων. From Torstrik’s masterly note, p. 177, it is certain 
that Bekker’s reading τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων was due to inadvertence. It is found 
in none of the MSS. which he was collating, but is the reading, doubtless 
conjectural, of the Basileensis, in a copy of which he recorded the variants 
of those MSS. 

Ὁ 27. τῶν τριῶν αἰσθήσεων, viz. (1) perception of sensible qualities proper to 
the several separate senses (ἴδια); (2) perception of substances (things or 
persons) in which such sensible qualities inhere as accidents or attributes; 
(3) perception of attributes, which, though belonging to such substances, are 
not perceived by one sense only, but are indirectly perceived by several or all of 
the single special senses, directly only by sense as a whole (κοινά). ἡ μὲν 
πρώτη, int. κίνησις, 1.6. φαντασία, of the first sort, that is, derived from perception 
of the first sort. παρούσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως, “‘so long as the original sensation 
lasts.” After it has passed away, the subsequent movement which it set up in 


1Π|. 3 428 Ὁ 24---Ὁ 30 473 


the sense-organs, i.e. the φαντασία corresponding to it, becomes gradually 
weaker and may thus eventually cease to be true. 

b 28. ai δ᾽ ἕτεραι, int. κινήσεις. Kal παρούσης Kal ἀπούσης, int. τῆς 
αἰσθήσεως. 

Ὁ 30 εἰ οὖν...429 a 2 γιγνομένη. The critical notes disclose considerable varia- 
tions in the authorities. We may at once set aside the text of Bekker and 
Trend., in which Torst. has proved that μὴ before Ὁ 30 φαντασίαν has no 
manuscript authority, but 15 merely a printer’s error in Sylburg’s edition, on 
the margin of which, as well as on that of the Basileensis, Bekker and Brandis 
entered the results of their collations. The first point to decide is whether we 
shall follow cod. E in reading μὲν after μηθὲν or the six manuscripts of the other 
family which omit μέν : miror protasin, ad inanem verborum speciem factam 
(Trend.). Then again, E has μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο ἔχοι ἢ τὰ εἰρημένα ἡ φαντασία, 
while most other MSS. transpose this ἢ to follow εἰρημένα and only cod. W Has 
both ἢ and the article ἡ before φαντασίαι The divergence of the two families 
may be explained if the omission of μὲν is an oversight on the one side and if, 
at the same time, as Torst. suggests, the scribe of E, with equal carelessness, 
has anticipated 7. Doubtless the text of E, adopted by Biehl, affords a good 
sense: “if Imagination has no other charactenstic than those already specified”: 
and I have been content to follow it in the translation, though the words ἢ τὰ 
εἰρημένα certainly seem superfluous. But the alternative given by the other 
Mss., “if imagination alone has the given characteristics,” seems on the whole 
better. Moreover, with the reading of E, ἡ φαντασία is indispensable to the 
first clause. Yet this ἡ (or, according to most other MSS., ἢ) φαντασία is not 
above suspicion. Philop. appears not to have read ἢ φαντασία in his text after 
εἰρημένα : (514, 31) εἰ οὖν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἔχει τὰ εἰρημένα, rovréore ττλὴν φαντασίας, 7 
δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ ἔχουσα τὰ λεχθέντα, ἅτινα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς συμπληροῦσι, 
λέγω δὴ τὸν ὁρισμόν, δῆλον ὅτι κτέ. If it were certain that such an omission of 
7 φαντασία rested on good authority, it would be tempting to extrude ἢ φαντασία, 
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθὲν as a marginal gloss. However, if Philop. had not ἢ 
φαντασία in his text, he nevertheless had the following clause τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ 
λεχθέν. Torst. urges that τοῦτο can refer neither to ra εἰρημένα nor to φαντασία. 
But, if ἢ φαντασία were absent from the original text, τοῦτο might very well 
denote ἡ φαντασία, as Philop. understood it, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ ἔχουσα τὰ 
λεχθέντα, where the words emphasised are the natural variations of paraphrase 
and seem hardly to justify Torst.’s τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔχει : in fact, ἔχειν τὰ εἰρημένα and 
εἶναι τὸ λεχθὲν come to about the same. Or again, it is just conceivable that 
τοῦτο may replace τὸ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἔχειν τὰ εἰρημένα (or ἢ τὰ εἰρημένα, if that was 
the genuine reading). It was stated b 11 that imagination δοκεῖ, is held to be, 
κίνησίς τις, intimately conjoined with αἴσθησις etc. and Ὁ τὸ such an hypothetical] 
movement, αὕτη ἢ κίνησις, is further described. All that remains is to identify 
what has been thus described with the faculty of which we are in quest. This 
may well be the sense of the words τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθέν, which would then 
mean “and if this (viz. φαντασία) is what some have described it as being,” 
referring back to Ὁ 11 δοκεῖ. Cf. Them. 93, 21 H., 176, 6 Sp. εἰ τοίνυν ὅτε μὲν 
ἔστιν ἡ φανταστικὴ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἅπασι φανερόν, οὐδεμίαν δὲ ἄλλην τῶν 
διγριθμημένων οὖσαν τοιαύτην 6 Adyos ἐξεῦρεν, λείπεται ταύτην εἶναι ἣν ἡμεῖς φαμὲν 
κίνησιν τῆς Ψυχῆς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν γινομένην. It was 
probably the first clause in this extract from Them. which inspired Biehl to 
change the accent from ἐστι to ἔστι: “and if this which has been descnbed 
really exists.” 

Ὁ 30. τὰ εἰρημένα, the above-mentioned marks or characteristics, viz. de- 
pendence on sensation, presence in living beings and fallibility. 


474 NOTES 111. 3 


429a τ. ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη. Cf De Jnsomm. 1, 4598. 17 ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ φαντασία ἢ 
ὑπὸ τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως γινομένη κίνησις. 

a2. ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι. Cf. De Sensu 1, 4378. 3 sqq., Metapa. 
980 a 21 sqq., Plato, Phaedrus το Ὁ and Tzmiaeus 47 A. 

a4. Std τὸ ἐμμένειν, int. τὰς κινήσεις, 1.6. τὰς φαντασίας. Cf. 425 Ὁ 24 sq. 
ἔνεισιν...ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, 4ο8 Ὁ 18. 

a5. κατ᾽ αὐτὰς, le. κατὰ τὰς φαντασίας. Cf. 415. 84 11, Metaph. 980b 25 τὰ 
μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν. 

a6. οἷον, scilicet: δῃᾶ σὸο 8 8. See 2026 ΟἹ 4158 22. 

a7. πάβει, in the narrower sense (see wofe on 403 ἃ 16), approximating to 
ὀρέξει, or at least ἐπιθυμίᾳ. This would include appetite and pleasure and pain, 
as well as what we call emotions, such as anger and fear. 

ag. διὰ τί Mention has been made both of the efficient cause (that is, the 
previous motion of sensation) and of the final cause, namely, that animals may 
be enabled, reason apart, to act and be acted upon in various ways, The 
definition obtained satisfies the canons laid down 402 Ὁ 21—25, 413a 13—16. 


CHAPTER IV. 


Hitherto the order has been, in general, to proceed from lower faculties to 
higher and from the most widely diffused to the least common. In accordance 
with this principle locomotion, being far more common in the animal world 
than intellect, should have been taken before it. The departure from this order 
is due to A.’s desire to treat the two discriminating faculties, intellect and sense, 
together. A further reason is that intellect, being one of the causes to which 
animal locomotion is ascribed, requires to be treated first. 

For the comments of Theophrastus on III., cc. 4 and 5 see the Appendix. 

429 a 10—b 9. Coming now to intellect, the part of the soul con- 
cerned with knowledge and thought, we must consider how it differs from 
other faculties and how thinking comes about [§ 1]. Thought, assuming that 
it is analogous to perception, implies that mind is acted upon by the object 
of thought, or that something of the sort happens [§ 2]. If so, the mind must 
be impassive, receptive of form and potentially like its object, without actually 
being its object. In order to think all things, it must, in the words of 
Anaxagoras, be unmixed. Allow the mind to have any form of its own, and 
the intrusive presence of this form disqualifies the mind from receiving any 
form from an external object. Mind is thus a mere capacity. Before it 
thinks, it is in actuality nothing [§ 3] and, consistently with this, it must, 
further, be incorporeal. Any admixture with the body would invest it with 
some one or other sensible quality and would necessitate a special bodily organ, 
which, in fact, does not exist. The soul has been described as a place of forms 
or ideas. This is just what the thinking soul is potentially, not actually [§ 4]. 
The impassivity of intellect is different from the impassivity of sense. Sense 
becomes fatigued and the sense-organ fails when the sensible object has been 
too overpowering. But with the mind this is not so. Occupation with the 
highest intellectual objects does not disable or unfit it from subsequently 
contemplating what is less abstract, mind being independent of a bodily organ 
[ὃ 5]. Even after the mind has become all things, it is still in some sense a 
mere capacity; a capacity, however, resembling that which enables the savant 
to exercise his knowledge at will: and at this stage the mind can know itself. 


III. 4 4208 I—a Τά 475 


4298 10. περὶ δὲ τοῦ popfov. From consideration of what in the Afrfzcs is 
called τὸ ἄλογον, we pass now definitely to τὸ λόγον ἔχον. In calling νοῦς a part 
of the soul A. is, as usual, condescending to popular language. AI] mention of 
“ parts” of the soul must be provisional: see 432 a 22 sqq. 

alO ᾧ γινώσκει Te...II καὶ dpovet. The word γινώσκει is not in itself peculiar 
to intellect, but applies to sense as well: cf. 427 8 21 γνωρίζει, De Gen. An. 
I. 23, 731 a 33 αἴσθησιν yap ἔχουσιν, ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις γνῶσίς τις. It is the 
addition of @povet that discriminates intellect from the other cognitive faculty, 
viz. sense; for, as we saw 427 Ὁ 6 54., φρονεῖν is not the same as αἰσθάνεσθαι. 
According to Themistius and Simplicius, however, the words of the lemma 
point to the theoretical and practical activity of soul. For the division cf. zz/ra 
433a 14 νοῦς δὲ 6 ἕνεκά τον λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός" διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ 
τῷ τέλει and £rk. Nic. 1103b 26 sqq., 1139a 26 sqq.- But the terms are ill- 
chosen, if this division is intended by A. Cf. De Sensu 1, 437a1 cited in 20 
on 434 Ὁ 26 and 437 ἃ 2 7 re τῶν νοητῶν ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις καὶ ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν. 

alo. ἡ Ψυχὴ. A strict adherence to the precept of 408 Ὁ 13 sqq. would 
require the substitution of 6 ἄνθρωπος for ἡ ψυχή. So Them. 93, 32 H., 
172, 23 Sp. paraphrases © χρώμεθα eis θεωρίαν καὶ πρᾶξιν. The soul is properly 
the instrument of thought as well as of sensation and vegetative life to the 
animate compound, man: 414a 12 ἡ Ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦτο ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ 
διανοούμεθα πρώτως. Cf. also A.’s use of ψυχὴ in 430a 13, 430 Ὁ 15, 4318 14. 

8. 11. χωριστοῦ. The qualifying clause a 11 εἴτε ywpicrov...a 12 λόγον 15 
elicited by the term μόριον : cf. 413 Ὁ 13 πότερον δὲ τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι ψυχὴ 
ἢ μόριον ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως ὥστ᾽ εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἣ καὶ 
τόπῳ. The case οὗ νοῦς was specially reserved 413 Ὁ 24—27 (cf. 415 a 11). 
Hence χωριστοῦ must mean “separable from the other parts or faculties of soul.” 
Two questions arise: (1) Is νοῦς separable or inseparable? (2) If separable, 
is it separable spatially (cf. τόπῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ 427a 5) or only in thought? 
If νοῦς is χωριστὸς κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν ἄλλων μορίων it follows that it is also y. τοῦ 
σώματος and capable of independent existence. Cf. 403 a 5—16. The inter- 
pretation of χωριστοῦ given above agrees with that of Plutarch of Athens apud 
Philoponum 520, 34 sqq. and accords with the language of Erk. Nic. 1102 a 28 
ταῦτα δὲ (int. τὸ ἄλογον and τὸ λόγον ἔχον) πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ 
σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα. 
Cf. 429b 16 ἤτοι χωριστῷ ἢ κτέ. and 431} 17—19. Some further consideration 
of the question is brought in at 434 b 3 sqq. in connexion with the necessity of 
αἴσθησις in animals. 

8 12. κατὰ μέγεθος expresses the same meaning as κατὰ τόπον, spatially, 
locally, as one physical thing and its accidents are separate from another. 
Either phrase or both can be opposed to λόγῳ or κατὰ λόγον : cf. 403 a 11, 
413 Ὁ 15, 42744 54.. 4328 20, 433 Ὁ 24 56. διαφοράν, characteristic quality, 
distinguishing mark. Cf. 413 Ὁ 19, zote. It may be suggested that in 
429a 10—b9 A. deals mainly with the distinctive attributes of νοῦς and that 
at 429b 10 he passes to the process of thinking; but nature and operation, 
operation and object are so closely blended that no hard and fast line is 
possible. 

ἃ 14. ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. The two processes, which are not identical, 
according to 427b 8 sqq., Ὁ 27, are assumed to be analogous: cf. 4278 ὃ sq., 
431 b 28—432a 3. Whenever αἰσθάνεσθαι can be interpreted by κρίνειν, there 
is some analogy with thought, but this is most clearly seen in the perception of 
difference and identity and the other operations, like self-consciousness, which 
A. has ascribed to sensus communis. In what follows A. begins with points of 


476 NOTES Ill. 4 


community, but also takes notice of differences, e.g. 429 a 29 sqq., which indeed 
have already come up 417 b 16—29, a passage which ends with a reference to 
further discussion, presumably in the present chapter. In one respect there is 
a formal difference in the treatment of νοῦς. In IL, c. 6 various meanings of 
αἰσθητὸν were carefully distinguished. There is no similar preliminary elucida- 
tion of νοητόν, unless it can be indirectly derived from the not very satisfactory 
discussion 427 Ὁ 6—b 29. 

al4. ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη, int. τὸ νοεῖν. See mofes on 4108 25, 4278. 20. Cf, 
however, Simpl. 223, 40 τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὶ πρόσκειται τῷ πάσχειν, ἵνα μὴ φθαρτικὸν τὸ 
πάσχειν ἀκούσωμεν: cf. 417 2 544. For intellect, as well as for sense, the 
modification expressed by πάσχειν 1s not φθορά tis ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, but a 
σωτηρία τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος. It was agreed, however, in default of a better term, 


to use the word πάσχειν to express this, 418 a 2 sq. ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ. Cf. 
De Part. An. τ. 1, 64τ8. 36 ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν νοητῶν...τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς (int. ἐπιστήμης 
περὶ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ θεωρῆσαι. ἢ τι τοιοῦτον Erepov. The analogy between 


sense and intellect must not be pressed too far. The latter has no bodily organ, 
429 a 26 sq., so that the resemblance between them is incomplete. Cf. also 
429 ἃ 29 566. 

αὶ. ἀπαθὲς. See Jd. Ar. 72a 36—40 τὸ μὴ wemovGés...1ta...429a 15 sig- 
nificare videtur μηδέν πῶ πεπονθός. Applied to intellect, the term means (1) not 
having yet suffered, i.e. devoid of the objects of thought which it is to receive and 
(2) incapable of suffering or of being affected by them, i.e. in its own nature, 
when they are received. As to the sense of ἀπαθὴς see moles on 405 Ὁ 19--2ὶ and 
infra 429 Ὁ 23, where the quotation from Anaxagoras is repeated. If the meaning 
were restricted to (1), as a casual reading of Bonitz, /z@. Ar., would lead one 
to suppose, A. must be thinking in the present passage of the mind of the child 
at birth or before it has ever thought at all, and πρὶν νοεῖν 429 a 24, πρὶν ἂν vo7 
429 b 31 would be similarly restricted, which seems inconsistent with 429 Ὁ 3—5, 
which certainly does not refer to the child, and with 429b 5—9. The second 
meaning implies the first, for if mind is incapable in its own nature of ever being 
altered or affected, it must be so incapable to start with. It remains what it 
was at first, a permanent capacity. The analogy of the senses has prepared us 
for this conclusion. See ἄχρουν 418b 26 sq. nore, ἀκίνητος 4208 10 (see 702), 
a 15—18, and generally 4248 7—10. The difference is, as Zabarella explains, 
that sense is impassive only in certain respects, thought in all respects. To 
apply the term πάσχειν to anything ἀπαθὲς is inconsistent, as A. himself fully 
admits when he afterwards discusses the difficulty herein involved, 429 Ὁ 22 sqq. 
There is, however, no real contradiction of the preceding sentence when once 
the meaning is fully understood. Intellect in a still higher degree than sense, 
429 a 29 sqq., remains unaffected, i.e. entirely unaltered in its nature, by the 
object of thought, whatever it be. Intellect is not liable to be altered or destroyed. 
It is a permanent capacity which, as often as it is acted upon by an object, is 
developed into actuality (Them. 94, 9 H., 173, 12 Sp. τελειοῖτο ἂν eis ἐνέργειαν 
ἐκ δυνάμεως), and this it could not be if, when once acted upon, it underwent 
essential modification. Mind cannot at any time receive that which it already 
possesses in actuality. Any form of its own would stand in the way of its 
receiving forms from without and spoil it as a recipient of εἴδη and διαφοραὶ 
τῶν εἰδῶν. The argument is precisely similar to that by which Plato in the 
Timaeus 50 A—51A demonstrates that his ὑποδοχή, if it 15 to receive all forms, 
must itself be destitute of form. Besides the general resemblance of the 
argument, reminiscences of particular phrases, e.g. παρεμφαῖνον ὄψιν, indicate 
that A. has this passage especially in view. See Archer-Hind ad doc. Ὁ. 177 sq. 


. 


111. 4 429 a 14--- 18 477 


The resemblance was first pointed out by Teichmuller, Studzen sur Geschichte 
der Begriffe, Ὁ. 333 sqq- zoze. 

8 15. δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ edous. Cf. 424a 18, 425b 23, of sense, 427 a ὃ sq. of 
sense and thought, with wofes. Further cf. 414a 8—10, .Welaph. 1072b 22 τὸ 
yap δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσέας νοῦς. 

4 16. δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, int. οἷον τὸ νοητὸν ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐστίν. Like the two pre- 
ceding characteristics, ἀπαθὲς and δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἴδους, this has been transferred 
to thought from sense, where it had become the standing formula. Cf. 4178 20 
πάσχει μὲν γὰρ TO ἀνύμοιον, πεπονθὸς δ᾽ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν, 418 a 3 τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθητικὸν 
δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ κτέ,, 432 a 7, 423 Ὁ 15, 424a 33 566. 
ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτος The mind in actual thought is identical] with its object at the 
particular time: previously to actual thinking it is not actually identical, though 
capable of becoming so. Sense is receptive of the sensible form ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, 
424 a 18, and what sense receives then is in this respect (ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης) different 
from the sensible object. This makes clear the meaning of δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ 
μὴ τοῦτο as applied to νοῦς. Intellect before actual thinking is not identical with 
any of the particular forms which in actual thinking it receives. We may call 
it an apparatus for receiving-all and every such form, εἶδος εἰδῶν. But, in order 
to be such an apparatus, it must be capable of the identification with its object 
which, according to A., takes place in every act of thought: 429 Ὁ 5 ὅταν ἕκαστα 
γένηται: cf. 430a 2 sq. Here, as elsewhere, τοῦτο emphasises the particular 
νοούμενον, Τοιοῦτον the universal νοητόν. For δυνάμει cf. Them. 94, 17 H., 173, 
24 Sp. ὥσπερ ἐκείνη (int. ἡ αἴσθησις] κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἦν ὧν ἠσθάνετο. 
οὕτω μηδὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον νοῦν κατ᾽ ἐνέργεεαν εἶναί τι τῶν νοουμένων. In fact, IL, 
c. 12 is the best commentary on the present section. 

aI6. ὁμοίως ἔχειν. The construction with δεῖ, 429a 15, is continued. 

al7. ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν... οὕτω τὸν νοῦν. In 402b 12 οἷον τὸ νοεῖν ἢ τὸν 
νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν we similarly find τὸ αἰσθητικὸν and not 
αἴσθησις answering tO νοῦς. 

4. 18. ἀμιγῆ. This is a further inference from the analogy of sense and 
intellect. With “unmixed” supply “with objects of cognition,” ie. εἴδη νοητά, 
intelligible forms, πάντα τὰ νοούμενα being implied in πάντα νοεῖ. In 429b 23 56. 
ἀμιγὴς is practically replaced by μηθενὶ μηθὲν Eyes κοινόν : cf. 405b 20. So Alex. 
apud Philop. 523, 4 φησὶ yap ὅτι ef πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγής ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ οὐκ ἔχει 
εἶδος, Them. 94, 19 H., 173, 27 Sp. μὴ ἔχειν εἶδος οἰκεῖον μηδὲ μορφήν, Simpl. 225, 
35 οὐδέν ἐστιν τῶν νοητῶν, ἀλλὰ pos πάντα ὑπάρχει ἀμιγῆς : Cf. 225, 37 ἐπεὶ ὅ γε ὡς 
ὁ ἐπιστήμων ἕκαστα γινόμενος δι’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οὐκέτι ἀμιγήῆς. Philop., however, 521, 
28; 522, 31 sqq. supplies τῆς ὕλης with dueyjs, which would be an anticipation 
of 429a 24, and this view was vehemently maintained by Averroes, Aquinas 
and many scholastics. But it seems more reasonable that A. should first call 
attention to the attributes in which intellect and sense agree before passing 
to their dissimilarity. The dictum of Averroes on this passage “non est corpus 
neque virtus in corpore” became a battle-ground of controversy. To my view 
it may be objected that ἀμιγὴς approximates in meaning to ἀπαθής. No doubt 
this is true, but we can easily see how both terms came to be used. Their 
meaning is distinct so long as they are applied to the νοῦς of Anaxagoras; it 
is neither affected by, nor mixed with, the other things in the universe: and the 
predicates of the Anaxagorean νοῦς are transferred, doubtless with some change 
of meaning, to νοῦς as Aristotle conceives it and seeks to define it. Among the 
attributes ascribed to the deity Afefaph. 1073. a 3—11 there are duplicates, for it 
is declared to be οὐσία ἀΐδιος, ἀκίνητος, κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, μέγεθος οὐκ 
ἔχουσα, ἀμερής, ἀδιαίρετος, ἀπαθές, ἀναλλοίωτον. 


478 NOTES III. 4 


4 18. ὥσπερ φησὶν ᾿ΑναξαγόραΞς. Cf. Anaxagoras, frag. 12 Ὁ apud Simpl. in 
Phys. 164, 24 νοῦς δέ ἐστιν ἄπειρον καὶ abroxparés καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενί. Cf. PAys. 
VILI. 5, 256 Ὁ 24 διὸ καὶ ᾿Αναξαγόρας ὀρθῶς λέγει, τὸν νοῦν ἀπταθὴ φάσκων καὶ ἀμιγὴ 
εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ κινήσεως ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν ποιεῖ εἶναι: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως κινοίη ἀκίνητος 
ὧν καὶ κρατοίη ἀμιγὴς év, where A. has just been arguing that there is a cause of 
motion, itself unmoved, ὃ κινεῖ ἀκίνητον dv. Cf. also Plato, Craz. 413 Ὁ, Phaedr. 
270 A. In order to understand the present passage, it 15 most important to 
consult the fragment of Anaxagoras which is quoted entire in the zofe on 
405 8 τό, p. 229 supra. 

aig. ἵνα κρατῇ: To Anaxagoras one of its functions was to rule: it rules 
the rotation of the universe τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης vous ἐκράτησεν. 
Another was to arrange in order (διεκόσμησε) things past, present and future. 
Knowledge is no doubt ascribed to it in the words γνώμην ye περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν 
ἴσχει. But this is something distinct. As A. is adapting the word κρατῇ to an 
account of the mind of man, he must perforce interpret it of cognition. Cf. 
Eth. Nic. 1177 ἃ 14 δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ 
θείων. 

a20. παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ... ἀντιφράττε. The subject must be νοῦς. The 
neuter gender a 15 (ézs5), a 16 is due to a 1ὸ μόριον, with which A. started. It 
was interrupted by the masculine ἀμιγῆ a 18, but is resumed here and a 22 
δυνατόν. I conceive παρεμφαινόμενον to be middle, as in Prodl XXIII. 9, 
932b 22 ἔστι δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ εὐδιοπτότερον τοῦ ἐλαίου. τὸ yap ἔλαιον χρῶμα ἔχει, τὸ δὲ 
ὕδωρ ἄχροον παρεμφαινόμενον σαφεστέραν ποιεῖ τὴν ἔμῴασιν : water is easier to 
see through than oil, for oil has colour, but water, presenting a colourless 
surface, makes the reflection of anything in itself clearer. Here παρεμφαινό- 
μένον appears to be no more than rapadawdpevov, though ἔμῴφασις following 
accords better with παρεμῴαιν μενον. Soin our present passage. The scholastic 
version zufus zuxta apparens lays too much stress upon the preposition ἐν and 
thus, as may be seen from Zabarella, gave the mediaeval commentators needless 
trouble. The force of παρὰ here answers somewhat to “intruding itself along- 
side of the alien object,” παρὰ τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ, viz. in the attempt to receive the 
latter, much as in Zimaews 50 E referred to above παρεμφαῖνον ὄψιν means 
“obtruding its own aspect.” In Plato the receptacle of generation is compared 
to a mass of plastic material capable of assuming all the various shapes im- 
pressed upon it: for this purpose, Plato argues, it must in its own nature be 
destitute of shape, ἄμορφος. For, if it had a shape of its own, it would render 
faultily any opposite or entirely different shape impressed upon it from without: 
(SOE) ὅμοιον yap by τῶν ἐπεισιόντων τινὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας Td τε τῆς TO παράπαν 
ἄλλης φύσεως, ὁπότ᾽ ἔλθοι, δεχόμενον κακῶς ἂν ἀφομοιοῖ, τὴν αὑτοῦ παρεμφαῖνον 
ὄψιν. Similarly with νοῦς. Its function is to receive forms, and this would be 
hindered and obstructed by the actual possession of any form of its own. 
Alex. Aphr. De An. 84, 15 παρεμφαινόμενον yap τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶδος κωλύει τὴν TOU 
ἀλλοτρίου λῆψιν, Them. 94, 21 H., 174, 1 Sp. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ῥᾷστα γνωρίζοι μηδενὸς 
οἰκείου παρεμφαινομένου καὶ συνυπάρχοντος" κωλύσει γὰρ καὶ ἀντιφράξει τὸ ἐνυ- 
wapxov εἶδος τὰ ἄλλα ὥσπερ ἀλλότρια, Simpl. 226, 6 ἔστε γάρ τις πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς 
εἴδεσιν ἀντίθεσις, δι ἣν τὸ καθ᾽ ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν οὐσιωμένον παραποδισθήσεται πρὸς τὴν 
τῶν λοιπῶν ὑποδοχήν, ἀντεφράττοντος ἢ ἀντιφράξοντος τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος πᾶσιν 
αὑτοῖς. The present tense κωλύει calls for some explanation. If A. is describing 
what does not take place, a future or an optative with ἄν, if not a past indicative 
with ἄν, would seem to be required. Themistius, just cited, has κωλύσει καὶ 
avrippd&e, which Prof. H. Jackson has adopted in his 7er¢s, p. 93: cf. 425 a 22 
ἔσται. But it is best to take the sentence as a general statement with respect 


ΤΠ. 4 429 a τ8---δὦ 21 479 


to the validity of a given inference, without any reference to the truth or false- 
hood of the premisses, παρεμφαινόμενον replacing εἰ παρεμφαίνεται and not εἰ 
παρενεφαίνετο or the like: cf. Plato, Phaedr. 228 A εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυ- 
τοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι. ἀλλὰ yap οὐδέτερά ἐστι τούτων. It was probably the difficulty of 
the tense which led some scholars to explain the sentence in a wholly different 
way, making τὸ ἀλλότριον the subject, agreeing with παρεμφαινόμενον : and no 
doubt it is grammatically more natural to take παρεμῴφαινόμενον and τὸ ἀλλότριον 
together. Thus Argyropylus translates: alienum nanque, cum apparet iuxta, 
prohibet atque seiungit. So also Teichmiller, Studfex sur Geschichte der 
Legriffé, p. 333 sqq. zoze, followed by Wallace ad hunc locum, p. 266. But, if 
the sentence is so taken, what is the object of xwAve? What is hindered? 
Presumably the mind is hindered from thinking. So at least Wallace: “the 
side light and radiance of a foreign unrational object would obstruct and inter- 
fere with the action of reason.” My friend, Miss M. Alford, would answer the 
question as follows: “ With κωλύει I think the subject must be τὸ ἀλλότριον, and 
the object unexpressed, being supplied from τὸ ἀλλότριον, which implies another 
ἀλλότριον correlative to it: ‘that which is foreign (to another thing) debars and 
blocks out (that other thing)’; the fact that any νοητὸν εἶδος will be foreign to 
some of the πάντα being taken for granted. I find it difficult to believe that a 
general statement as to what (always) happens—and this must, I think, be the 
force of the present c@Ave—should have as subject ‘it, ‘the thing mingled 
with νοῦς, when the existence of this thing 1s denied.” 

In ἀντιφράττει I see nothing more than a stronger κωλύει, “excludes,” “bars 
out.” A similar use of both verbs occurs Theophr. frag. 3, De Jene ὃ 49 καὶ ἐὰν 
ἐπιβάλῃς τι ἐπὶ τὸ ὕδωρ θερμαίνεται θᾶττον ἢ ψιλόν οἷον γὰρ ἀντιφράττει καὶ 
κωλύει διατμίζειν τὸ θερμὸν ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπιπωματιζόμενα, where, in spite of the 
homely subject, there 1s perhaps a reminiscence of our passage. Trend., 
however, was possessed with the idea that the simile must be from light. He 
accordingly cites passages from A., where ἀντεφράττειν, ἀντίφραξις are used of 
eclipses: Anal. Post. τι. 2, 90a 15 sq., De Caelo Il. 13, 293 Ὁ 23 sqq., ALezeor. 
11. 8, 367 Ὁ 19 sqq., 26. I. 8, 345 ἃ 29 sqq. But in an eclipse it 1s a foreign body 
(the shadow of the earth in an eclipse of the moon) which obscures and eclipses 
the light. Cf. Mefaph. 1044 Ὁ 11 ὡς κινῆσαν καὶ φθεῖραν τὸ φῶς. And, as 
Teichmiiller and Belger (2nd edition of Trend., p. 386) pointed out, since this 
foreign body shuts out the light, Trend. is inconsistent in taking the source of 
light as a parallel to νοῦς. If the simile is from an eclipse, τὸ ἀλλότρεον must be 
the subject of ἀντιφράττει, not, as Trend. supposed, the accusative after the verb: 
as Belger puts it, “neque enim lux, cuius vots similis, sed corpus alienum 
obstruit luci, quod quidem eo ducit, ut ἀλλότριον nominativum putes, evanescat 
propria τοῦ ἐμφαίνεσθαι vis.” In fact, if in this sentence A. 15 influenced by 
Ttmaeus 50 A—51A, there is no need to look for any other metaphor than that 
of a plastic mould assuming successively distinct shapes, a metaphor which 
Plato also uses Theaet. 191 D—192 A, the impression of a seal upon wax 
4248 19 sqq., 435 a 2 sqq. being only a particular application. This simile is 
one of the two which frequently recur in the attempt to conceive how knowledge 
is acquired, whether through sense or intelleet. The other 15 from grasping or 
apprehension, 407 a 10 sqq., Mezaph. 1051 Ὁ 23—25, 1072 Ὁ 21. The simile 
from light in Plato, Ref. vi. and VIL., resolves itself upon closer analysis in its 
ultimate explanation into the latter, Plato, like Empedocles before him and A. 
after him, having his own theory as to the nature of the physiological process 
of vision. 

8. 21 Sore μηδ᾽ αὐτοῦ...22 ὅτι δυνατόν. The μηδὲ goes, not with αὐτοῦ, but 


480 NOTES III. 4 


with εἶναι φύσιν, “mind has not even any other characteristic save this, that it 
has potentiality.” In other words φύσις τοῦ νοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ δύνασθαι, τὸ δυνάμει 
εἶναι. Cf. 4178. 26, 28, Mefapgh. 1019 a 33 sqq., 1046a 11 ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παθεῖν 
ἐστὶ δύναμις, 7 ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ἢ ἣ ἄλλο, 
1046 a 20 δυνατὸν γάρ ἐστι καὶ τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸ δύναμιν τοῦ παθεῖν καὶ τῷ ἄλλο 
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ. The last two citations show the close connexion of δύναμις with 
πάσχειν. A, puts his own interpretation upon freedom from admixture with 
objects of thought. The predicate ἀμιγὲς he interprets as pure potentiality. Νοῦς 
is, then, actual only in the act of thinking. Similarly, when discussing primary 
matter, he argues that this also, if it is destitute of all positive qualities, must be 
a pure potentiality, Jfefaph. τοῖο ἃ 7—26. The potentialities in the two cases 
are quite distinct: the one is a potentiality of receiving νοητὰ εἴδη, the other a 
potentiality of receiving the elemental qualities, hot, cold, wet, dry. 

a 22. ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς vols. The use of the participle here and in 
407 a 4 does not imply that the term νοῦς is misused, though this is sometimes 
the case, ¢.g. τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα. It seems to import “νοῦς in the sense in 
which we use the word,” probably with a suggested contrast to the usage of 
Anaxagoras or to “vows in the special sense.” Thus the meaning might almost 
be called the opposite of that in which the word implies misuse. Cf. Mefaph. 
1058 a 21, where καλούμενον seems to refer more or less definitely to καλῶ in 
1057 b 38. A. is rather endeavouring to mark out more exactly the function 
of thought, as the relative sentence shows. Cf. 432 b 26 τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ 6 
καλούμενος vous. 

a23. ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει, “thinks and frames conceptions,” such 
conceptions, or more vaguely, “views,” being the result of the reasoning process: 
mentis operatio [δεανοεῖσθαι), quae in ὑπόληψεν desinit de rebus, quales apparent, 
certi quid definientem (Trend.). For the difference between ὑπόληψις and 
διάνοια cf. "ΘΙ on 427 Ὁ 16. The form of the sentence recalls 429a 10. In 
neither passage is simple apprehension (ἡ τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις) prominent, 
though γνῶσις and τὸ φρονεῖν (as used in De A.) are vague enough to include it. 
The fact 1s that though we may be able to think ἀδιαίρετα, as soon as we 
interpret such thoughts, even to ourselves, our thinking invariably assumes the 
form of τὶ κατά τινος. “I have the notion good” is translated into ‘This is 
good,” as “I have the sensation of redness” is translated into “ This is red.” 

a24. οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τών ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν. This is restated 429 Ὁ 30 sqq. 
The statement here made of νοῦς may be taken as parallel to the distinction 
elaborated in IL., c. 5 respecting αἴσθησις, viz. that there is both potential sense, 
ἡ κατὰ δύναμιν αἴσθησις or δύναμις and 4 κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις or ἐνέργεια: 
cf. 431 b 24--.8. Potentiality passing into activity is a formula applicable to 
both sensation and intellection. See passage from Them. quoted in zofe on 
429 a 16. 

8. 24. διὸ: a new deduction, not a new proof of an old one, as some have 
supposed. 

a 24 μεμεῖχθαι...25 τῷ σώματι. This plainly follows from the statement made 
429 a 18, that νοῦς 1s ἀμιγὴς in the wider sense preferred above. If, as Simpl. 
Says, νοῦς is in its own nature πρὸς πάντα ἀμιγῆς, it is so in respect of the body. 
The phrase μεμεῖχθαι τῷ σώματι occurred 407 Ὁ 2, where A. was criticising the 
indissoluble union of body and soul, there identified with νοῦς (a4 sq.) in the 
Timaeus. ‘The possibility that some affections of soul were peculiar to soul 
itself and not, like the rest, common to soul and body was distinctly before us 
I., 6.1: see 402 ἃ 9 54., 403a 3—11. We must, however, remember that there 
15 no reason why some parts of the soul should not be separated from the body, 


Ill. 4 420 a 2I—a25 481 


if they are not the actualities of any body whatever, 4138 6sq. True mixture 
is of body with body, one condition being similarity of matter: cf. De Gev. et 
Corr. 1. το, Them. 94, 30 sq. H., 174, 13 sq. Sp. Mixture in this sense is out 
of the question when one of the factors is the intellective soul. If νοῦς were a 
corporeal thing mixed with the body, it would be present in actuality and not 
potentially: cf. Them. 94, 31 H., 174, 14 sy. Sp. This is not, however, what A. 
means, for, the whole soul having been defined in 11.) c. 1 as the entelechy or 
perfection of body, the part of it which thinks can no more be body than the 
soul itself, 41.[8ἃ 20 σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι. But the term “mixture” 
receives a wide extension of meaning and is used again improperly of νοῦς Ὁ 28 
zafra. Cf. Theophr. apud Them. 108, 24 H., μικτόν, 28 διὰ τὴν μῖξιν of the union 
of the two intellects. An incorporeal thing can be said fer accidens to be mixed 
with body, and this improper extension of the term “ mixture” may be used to 
denote the union of form and matter in the concrete thing. It is in this sense 
that A. denies of intellect admixture with the body. As part of the soul, 
intellect resides in the whole body and uses it as its organ. If not exactly 
“mixed with” the body, intellect is at all events dependent upon the body, 
without which it could not be supplied with mental images. It must therefore 
be in respect of its operation that we are now considering the question of 
admixture or non-admixture with the body. The reception of forms which 
constitutes thinking may take place without the intervention of the body, and 
A. would point to profound meditation as a proof of this. It is, as Zeller says, 
“free and unfettered by the body”: cf. Plato, Phaedo 64 E—66 4. 

a 25 ποιός τις yap...26 θερμός. It would cease to be ἀμιγής. Some of the 
properties of the body with which it is ex Avfothest mixed would be transferred 
to the whole or compound of which an ingredient is 6 νοῦς. There can be no 
μεῖξις In the proper sense of the term between any one of the senses and the 
bodily part in which it resides. We have pet&is or κρᾶσις τῶν ἐναντίων in flesh 
and other bodily parts: we have also δύναμις καὶ εἶδος éruywdpevoy τῇ κατὰ τὸν 
τοιόνδε λόγον κράσει τῶν σωμάτων (Alex. Aphr. De Az. 25, 2 sq.): and by an 
improper use of the term we apply to the δύναμις καὶ λόγος the predicates which 
properly belong only to the pets or κρᾶσις. The difficulty in regarding νοῦς, 
for the sake of argument, as hot or cold 15 no greater than in regarding soul as 
moved: cf. 408a 30—33. As to the operation of intellect, a comparison with 
sense at once presents a difference. In respect of the intelligible object, 
intellect has already been declared to be unaffected and unmixed, and ποιὸς 
would contradict this. If intellect, like sense, were dependent on some cor- 
poreal condition for the reception of the object, it would be mixed with 
intelligibles and affected by them, which has been denied. That it is unmixed 
with body in its operation means, as above stated, that it receives intelligible 
objects without any reception occurring in the body. When the form is 
received in the animate compound of body and soul, this animate compound 
must be endued with peculiar qualities, with tangible qualities at any rate, and 
these constitute the reason why the form is received. In order that the eye 
may be receptive of colour, it must be affected with a peculiar and natural 
blending of primary qualities and may be said to be naturally mods, and in one 
respect mixed, although in respect of colour it is unmixed. But intellect has to 
be absolutely unmixed in respect of all things; therefore it must receive 
intelligible forms alone and be unmixed with body in its operation. Otherwise 
it would be mixed with something or other, with some natural blending of hot 
or cold, which would constitute the reason why it receives its intelligible forms, 
and it would no longer satisfy the condition ἀμιγῇ εἶναι, laid down as necessary 
in order that it may think all things. 


482 NOTES tl. 4 


a 26. ἢ κἂν ὄργανόν τι etn, int. αὐτῷ, 1.6. τῷ νῷ. If it were trammelled with 
the body, there would also be some particular part of the body appropriated to 
it for its use, as the whole soul uses the whole body 407 b 26; some part, in which, 
to the exclusion of the rest, the reception of the intelligible form takes place. 
The analogy of the senses points to this conclusion: cf. 424.a 24 αἰσθητήριον dé 
στρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. The primary qualities are differently blended in 
different parts of the body, and hence the special organs of sense: e.g. only in 
the eye, not in fiesh or in any other part, are they so blended as to allow the 
reception of the forms of colour. In bone there is too much earth to allow the 
reception even of tangibles, 435a24sq. A sense-organ, in fact, is merely a part 
of the body appropriated for the reception of forms of a given kind. 

a27. οὐθέν ἐστιν, int. ὄργανον. Cf. 408a 12, where it is implied that νοῦς is 
not a σύνθεσις of bodily parts, and 411 b 18 sq., where we find that it is not that 
which holds together or gives unity to any particular part of the body. But the 
images (φαντάσματα) without which it is impossible to think? The last chapter 
proved that they are xevyoes: they go on ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, but are not them- 
selves bodily parts. 

For this passage cf. Them. 94, 30 H., 174, 13 Sp. σώματος γὰρ πρὸς σῶμα 
pris ἐστιν. ἀνάγκη δὲ σῶμα ὑπάρχοντα ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι καὶ μορφὴν ἔχειν οἰκείαν. 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ὀργάνῳ ἂν χρῷτο τῷ σώματι, ὥσπερ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπολαύσεται 
τῆς τοῦ ὀργάνου ποιότητος, ἣ συνυπάρχουσα ἀεὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα εἴδη 
κωλύσει. δῆλον δὲ μάλιστα ἐκ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς τοῦτο δυνάμεως" αὕτη γὰρ σῶμα μὲν 
οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ χρῆται ὅλως ὀργάνοις σωματικοῖς, συναπολαύει τούτοις τοῦ 
πάθους, Simpl. 227, 10-—-32, especially 16 ὅτε ἡ τοῦ ὀργάνου ζωὴ Kal μεμιγμένη 
τῷ σώματι καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ταῖς ἐν αὐτῷ ποιότησι. Sophonias infers from the 
imputation of a property like cold or heat that A. in ἃ 25 is treating νοῦς asa 
σῶμα and must therefore be at a different point of view in a26 when he de- 
siderates an organ: (124, 30) εἰ γὰρ μέμικται, ἢ κατὰ κρᾶσιν ἐμμέμικται ἢ ὡς εἶδός 
ἐστι τοῦ σώματος, ὥσπερ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ τοῦ πεπτικοῦ ἡ πέψις. ἀλλ᾽ 
εἰ κατὰ κρᾶσιν, ποιός τις ἂν γίγνοιτο, ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμός- εἶ δὲ ὡς εἶδος, κἂν ὄργαν ὅν τι 
εἴη αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ αἰσθήσει μὲν τὸ πνεῦμα ἢ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, πέψει δὲ τὰ οἰκεῖα. 
In other words, Soph. treats ἃ 26 ἢ before κἂν as disjunctive and introducing 
an alternative hypothesis. This furnishes a simpler explanation of a25 ποιός... 
a26 θερμός, but we should have expected #...7, if A. were considering two 
alternative hypotheses as to the nature of μεῖξις, and it seems rather late in 
the treatise to be entertaining so crude a conception as a corporeal soul or 
part of soul. 

a27. τόπον εἰδῶν. No one particular passage can be cited for this expression, 
but it is quite in the spirit of Plato’s idealism. In the Pavimenddes the phrases 
ἐν ψύχαις (132 B), ἐν ἡμῖν (133 C) and παρ᾽ ἡμῖν (134 A), said of the ideas, 
whether representing Plato’s own mature view or not, are an approximation 
to the language of the text. <A.’s approval here is borne out by 431 b 28 sq., 
417 Ὁ 22—24, 410a I0o—13. In all three passages A. has himself used the 
words ev τῇ ψυχῇ, which in our present passage he proceeds pedantically to 
qualify. 

a 28. οὔτε ὅλη, int. ψυχή. To complete the sentence we must supply τόπος 
εἰδῶν ἐστίν (or ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιτο). As it is quite certain (407 8 3 sqq.) that Plato 
meant the thinking soul, this criticism is merely a verbal correction and hardly 
touches the doctrine. 

a 28 obte....29 δυνάμει. The forms occupy the soul not actually, but potentially. 
The correction entirely transforms the doctrine. This quality of being the place 
of forms Them. claims for the sensitive soul as well as for νοῦς: 95, 7 H., 175, 6 Sp. 
πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ ai δύο μόναι δυνάμεις καθ᾽ ἣν τε νοοῦμεν καθ᾽ ἣν τε 


Ill. 4 420 a 26---Ὁ καὶ 483 


αἰσθανόμεθα, οὔθ᾽ οὕτω τόπος ὡς περιέχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς γίνεσθαί mas ἃ νοεῖ καὶ ὧν 
αἰσθάνεται. 

429 bI. ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα αἰσθητοῦ, “after it has been affected by a sensible 
object in excess.” This meaning of the preposition ἐκ, “immediately after” 
or “following,” can be amply illustrated: cf. 7efaph. 1023b 6 μεθ᾽ ὃ τῷ χρόνῳ 
[int. λέγεται τὸ ἔκ Twos], οἷον ἐξ ἡμέρας νὺξ καὶ ἐξ εὐδίας χειμών, De Gen. An. i. 18, 
734 θ 1 ὡς τόδε μετὰ τόδε, οἷον ἐκ τῶν Παναθηναίων 6 πλοῦς, Hist. Ax. IV. 10, 
5378: 17 φέρεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐξ ὕπνου ὄντα. οἷον ψόφου, int. οὐ δύναται 
αἰσθάνεσθαι. 

b4. τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, int. τῶν νοητῶν. The inferiority consists in being less 
purely objects of thought (νοητά), as distinguished from sensibles (aia @nrd) ; 
in other words, things that are less abstract. For A.’s position in regard to 
the various degrees in which the subjects of different sciences are treated as 
more or less abstract see )fezaph. 1077 Ὁ 22 Ssqq., 1078 a 5—-17. See also zofes 
on 402 a 2. 

b5. οὐκ ἄνευ coparos. Cf. De Sensu 1, 436 Ὁ 6 ἡ 8 αἴσθησις ὅτι διὰ σώματος 
γίγνεται τῇ ψυχῆ; δῆλον καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ λόγον χωρίς, De 502»220 1, 45447 
ἐπεὶ & οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὔτε τοῦ σώματος (οὗ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις, 
τούτου καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια: ἡ δὲ λεγομένη αἴσθησις, ὡς ἐνέργεια, κίνησίς τις διὰ τοῦ 
σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστ, φανερὸν ὡς οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος ἴδιον, οὔτ᾽ ἄψυχον 
σῶμα δυνατὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι: this is a neat summary of the entire theory of 
sensation which occupied us almost exclusively from II., c. 5 to III, c. 3. Ais 
in a position to point out the organs of the special senses and, though he cannot 
do this with certainty for the organ of the central sense, he is convinced that it 
is some internal bodily part. 

b5. ὁ δὲ [int. νοῦς] χωριστός [int. τοῦ σώματος]. See 429a 24 8q. It would 
seem that this reference must be intended rather than a18; at least, if the 
explanation given of a18 is correct. If so, A. has already demonstrated to 
his own satisfaction (viz. at a24 sq., though without using precisely the same 
terms) that νοῦς is not so inextricably entangled with the body that it cannot be 
separated from it. The canon laid down 4038 Io was: it is possible for the 
soul to be separated from the body, if any function of soul is peculiar to the 
soul itself and not shared by it with the body. Cf. 4138 ὅ 5ᾳ. Ὁ 24 566. With 
this agrees De Gen. An. Il. 3, 7378 ὃ τὸ σπέρμα τὸ τῆς ψυχικῆς ἀρχῆς, τὸ μὲν 
χωριστὸν ὃν σώματος, ὅσοις ἐμπεριλαμβάνεται τὸ θεῖον (τοιοῦτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ καλού- 
μενος νοῦς), τὸ δ᾽ ἀχώριστον (the seed or germ of the sensitive and nutritive 
principles or faculties of the soul). A. is there treating of the origin of life in 
the embryo. Cf. also De Gen. An. 11. 3, 736 Ὁ 28 οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ 
κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια. If the function of thinking is not shared with the 
‘body, it is possible that the soul, qua thinking soul, 7 νοητική, is separable from, 
or independent of, the body. 

b5. ὅταν δ᾽ οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται. Cf. supra 429 a 24 οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ 
τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν, which implies that in the actual operation of thought the 
mind does become τὰ ὄντα, 1.6. τὰ νοητά. Cf. 430a I, 4308 3 Sq., 430a 19 Sq., 
431 Ὁ 20sqq. If γένηται implies becoming or change, we must beware of 
supposing that this is ἀλλοίωσις in the physical sense. See 407a 32 sqq., 
Phys. VU. 3, 247 Ὁ τ οὐδ᾽ ai τοῦ νοητικοῦ μέρους ἕξεις ἀλλοιώσεις, 2478 28 ἀλλὰ 
μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ διανοητικῷ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, Ζό. Ὁ 9 ἡ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λῆψις τῆς 
ἐπιστήμης γένεσις οὐκ ἔστιν" τῷ γὰρ ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπίστασθαι 
καὶ φρονεῖν λέγομεν. εἰς δὲ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις" ὅλως γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς μετα- 
βολῆς. The mention of λῆψις τῆς ἐπιστήμης is especially significant in view of 
429 Ὁ 8 πρὶν μαθεῖν i εὑρεῖν. We must assume for the thinking soul the twofold 


31I-—2 


484 NOTES Il. 4 


meaning of μεταβολὴ and ἀλλοίωσις elaborated 417a 21 566. for the sensitive 
soul on the analogy of ὁ ἐπιστήμων. Here, as there, we are to understand 
alteratio perfectiva, non corruptiva. 

b6. λέγεται, int. ἐπιστήμων. Cf. 4248 23, mote. See also Jelaph. 1048 a 32 
λέγομεν δὲ Suvdyer...a 34 ἐπιστήμονα Kal τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἐὰν δυνατὸς ἢ θεω- 
ρῆσαι. 

Ὁ 7. ὅταν δύνηται, int. ὁ ἐπιστήμων, although some commentators prefer to 
understand ὁ νοῦς : so Philop. 524, 19—22, Simpl. 229, 37 sqq., and so apparently 
Alex. Aphr. De An. 85, 25 ὅταν yap ἐν ἔξει γένηται διὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἐνεργείας 
τοιαύτῃ, ὡς δι᾽ αὐτοῦ λοιπὸν ἐνεργεῖν δύνασθαι. But Them., whose paraphrase 
here appears to me to betray an acquaintance with Alex. Aphr., seems to have 
taken the verb with ὁ ἐπιστήμων : 95, 12 H., 175, 15 Sp. τηνεκαῦτα τελεώτερος 
γίνεται νοῦς ἀνάλογον ἔχων τῷ ἐπιστήμονι, ὅστις τὰ θεωρήματα τῆς ἐπιστήμης 
συνειληχὼς οἷός τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐνεργεῖν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἰδίᾳ προχειριζόμενος, καὶ 
οὔτε διδασκαλίας ἔξωθέν τινος οὔτε γυμνασίας δεόμενος. From the words of 
Theophrastus apud Prisc. Lyd. 31, ὃ ὡς ἐπιστήμων κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν λέγεται, τοῦτο 
δὲ συμβαίνειν φαμὲν ὅταν δύνηται xré. it is difficult to determine how he took 
the sentence. Probably he made νοῦς the subject to δύνηται δὲ αὑτοῦ ἐνεργεῖν. 

b7. δὲ αὐτοῦ, i.e. without further instruction, unaided. When the ἕξις is 
formed, the savant can apply his knowledge at will, βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν 
417a 27. It is, in fact, this characteristic of free and self-determined energy 
that differentiates the higher form of δύναμις, called ἕξις, from the primitive 
δύναμις of which it is a development. 

b 8. ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως. The subject Is νοῦς, as in 429 Ὁ 3. 
καὶ rére=“then also.” Intellect can be said to be in potentiality in two 
different senses: (1) as it is used of the child before actually thinking at all, 
when νοῦς is destitute of the ideas which are to become its content; (2) after 
it has begun to think and has thus acquired the ideas, e.g. of a horse or a 
triangle, by learning or discovery, the corresponding stage being reached by 
the αἰσθητικὸν at birth, 417 Ὁ 16sqq. At this stage the νοητὰ in the soul are 
in that condition of potentiality and actuality in which αἰσθητὰ are when they 
cause perception, 1.6. they are in a manner potential before and until, but actual 
in, the act of thinking. Now αἰσθητὰ are already ἐνεργείᾳ or ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντα in 
the sense required by 4178 17 sq., 431 a 3—5: yet still they are δυνάμει in 
relation to the more complete actuality which is reached by their causing 
perception, 425 Ὁ 26sq. In the same way at the stage when it is iz haditu 
vous can without external aid think the νοητὰ that are in itself, in one sense 
δυνάμει ὄντα and in another sense ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντα, and thereby think itself, 
430a2sq. There is no difficulty about the first sense of δύναμει, while for 
(2) we have the analogy of ὁ ἐπιστήμων after he has acquired the faculty, 
ἕξις, of knowledge: he is then potentially’a savant, as explained in IIL, c. 5, 
because he can apply his knowledge at will, 417 a 27 sqq., and his change from 
potentiality to active operation is (417 a 32) ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν 
γραμματικήν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δ᾽ eis τὸ ἐνεργεῖν. Cf. also Phys. VIII. 4, 255 a 33 ἔστι 
δὲ δυνάμει ἄλλως 6 μανθάνων ἐπιστήμων καὶ 6 ἔχων ἤδη καὶ μὴ θεωρῶν. So, too, 
vous can think at will, 417 Ὁ 24 διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται. Into 
the process of learning and acquiring knowledge A. does not enter here. He 
explains it Amal. Post. 11., c. το, Metaph. A. c. 1, dwelling on the gradual 
formation of universals, for which sensation, imagination and memory are 
required. Cf. Alex. Aphr. De Am. 85, 11—25, especially (20) ἐγγίνεται δὲ ἡ τοιάδε 
ἕξις τῷ νῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ μετάβασιν ἀπὸ τῆς wept τὰ αἰσθητὰ συνεχοῦς ἐνεργείας 
ὥσπερ ὄψιν τινὰ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν λαμβάνοντος τοῦ καθόλου θεωρητικήν, ὃ Kar ἀρχὰς μὲν 


Il. 4 420 Ὁ 5---Ὁ το 485 


νόημα καὶ ἔννοια καλεῖται, πλεονάσαν δὲ καὶ ποικίλον καὶ πολύτροπον γινόμενον, ὡς 
δύνασθαι καὶ χωρὶς τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ὑποβάθρας ποιεῖν τοῦτο, νοῦς ἤδη. Cf. also 
Them. 95. 9 H., 175, 10 Sp. οὗτος τοίνυν 6 δυνάμει νοῦς γίνεται μὲν καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
νηπίοις. ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τοΐτων φαντασιῶν καὶ τῆς περὶ 
ταῦτα γυμνασίας τὸ καθόλου δύνηται θηρεύειν καὶ συνάγειν τὸ ὅμοιον ἐν τοῖς ἀνομοίοις 
καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις, τηνικαῖτα τελεώτερος γίνεται νοῦς..«(τό H., 20 Sp.) 
ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τηνικαῦτα δυνάμει, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν - ἐγγίνεται 
γὰρ οἷον ὄψις αὐτῷ πρότερον οὐκ ἐνοῦσα ὁρατικὴ τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ τῶν ἀνομοίων καὶ 
ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου καὶ ἀκολούθου καὶ μαχομένου, καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ἑαυτὸν τηνικαῦτα 
δύναται νοεῖν. 

Ὁ 9. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ, int. ὁ νοῦς. 

bg. αὑτὸν τότε δύναται νοεῖν. This conclusion is not at first sight easy to 
follow. Alex. Aphr. De «iz. 86, 14 sqq. gives the steps of the argument 
thus. Mind in active operation has for its object the intelligible form and 
is nothing else than the form which is its object. In thinking it becomes the 
intelligible form, and this form is the thinking mind itself: καὶ ἐπεί ἐστιν ὁ κατ᾽ 
ἐνέργειαν νοῦς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ εἶδος TO νοούμενον, ὥσπερ Kal ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως 
ἐδείχθη, ὃ ἐν ἕξει νοῦς (otros δέ ἐστιν 6 νοεῖν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ δυνάμενος καὶ τὰ τῶν 
νοητῶν εἴδη λαμβάνειν καθ᾽ αὗτά), οὗτος ἤδη δύναται καὶ αὑτὸν νοεῖν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ 
νοούμενον εἶδος αὐτός ἐστιν, εἴ γε νοῶν ὃ νοεῖ γίνεται, 6 ἄρ᾽ ἔξιν ἔχων τοῦ τὰ εἴδη 
νοεῖν, οὗτος ἕξιν καὶ δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦ νοεῖν ἑαυτόν. ὃ γὰρ δύναται νοεῖν, τοῦτο αὐτὸ 
αὐτὸς νοῶν γίνεται. I append in outline the substance of Zabarella’s note. 
Mind thinks itself, not directly, but in contradistinction to other things, νοητά, 
430a2sq4., and so per accidens: cf. Metaph. 10746 35 sq. When Alex. Aphr. 
says εἴ ye νοῶν ὃ νοεῖ γίνεται, this must not be distorted to mean, in the words of 
Zabarella, “ penitus idem quod res intellecta, et sicut eam intelligit se intelligit.” 
For from this it would follow that intellect knows itself primarily and fer se, not 
secondarily and per accidens. It thinks other νοητὰ fer se because they stand 
to it as its primary objects, and would think itself fer se if it were entirely 
identical with them. Experience shows that the mind thinks other things 
without any self-consciousness. The identity of intellect and thing thought 
must be understood as a mental, not a real, identity. For intellect is readizer 
always substance and form and never becomes transformed into another entity. 
In thinking it must be regarded as standing to the εἶδος νοητὸν as matter to 
form and, paradoxical as this may appear when we know that it is also εἶδος 
εἰδῶν, it 15 δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἴδους, 429a 15. In this respect, that its real nature 
remains unchanged, it may be compared with primary matter. Hence intellect 
must know itself as different from the things which it thinks. It knows itself, 
then, by reflecting, or in so far as it reflects, upon its own operation. It knows 
that it thinks; it knows therefore that it has a nature adapted to become every- 
thing, which was zz fofentia before actually thinking. It knows itself indirectly, 
i.e. NON per speciem propriam sed per alienam. So too, we must remember, 
sense perceives substance not directly, but per accicdlens, 418a 20 sqq. It is 
implied in our passage that it is not until it has acquired habits that intellect 
is adapted to think itself. Note how the bounds of thought and knowledge are 
here extended. Above, human intellect has for its primary object all things 
except itself: now, indirectly, it also knows itself. Note also that to know 
itself belongs alike to sense (III, c. 2 ad 2221.) and intellect. 

429 ἢ 10—22. Taking into account the familiar distinction between 
the concrete thing and its form or quiddity, we may say that it will be either a. 
different faculty or a different attitude of the same faculty which apprehends the 
one and the other. The qualities of flesh are judged by sense, the quiddity of 


486 NOTES 11. 4 


flesh by something distinct, by a faculty which is either separated from sense, 
or related to it as the bent line when it is straightened out is related to its 
former self [§ 7]. The same is true of the objects of mathematics. That which 
is straight answers to the concrete thing, the ‘‘snub-nosed,” having extension 
for its matter [ὕλη vonrn]. But its quiddity, the straightness of the straight 
(always supposing we distinguish between the straight and its quiddity) is 
judged either by a different faculty from that which cognizes the straight, or 
by the same faculty in another relation. And, generally, the operations of 
intellect upon different objects vary with the greater or less degree in which 
form is implicated with matter in these objects, i.e. according as such objects 
are εἴδη ἔνυλα, or εἴδη ἄυλα [ὃ 8]. 

429 Ὁ το. ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι. Ch Metaph. Ζ., c. 4, 
especially 1030a 6 sqq. ‘This is the distinction between a thing and its τί ἦν 
εἶναι or quiddity, 1.6. a thing In the concrete and a thing in the abstract. See 
motes on 412 Ὁ 11, 13. καὶ ὕδωρ Kal ὕδατι εἶναι. In calling attention to this 
distinction A. uses two examples; the former, magnitude, taken from the region 
of mathematics, ra ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντα (429b 18), the latter, water, from the 
region of physics. The distinction between the thing and its quiddity is more 
easily seen in the latter region. Water, like flesh, which replaces it as the 
typical example in biz sq., is a compound, σύνολον, of form and matter 
(412 8 6sqq.), its quiddity, aquosity, being the form. The relation of magnitude 
and its quiddity is similar to that between τὸ εὐθὺ and τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι explained 
below in zofe on 429b 18. For the omission of the article before ὕδατε εἶναι 
cf. 416 b 12. 

Ὁ 12. ἐπὶ ἐνίων yap. Cf. Aletaph. 1031 b 12, 1032a 5 sq. It appears that 
this is the case ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ λεγομένων, e.g. good, beautiful, 
Being, One, infinity, curvature. If the concrete and the abstract are thus 
identical, the concrete is not a true concrete, Cf. AZefaph. 1037a 33 καὶ ὅτι 
[int. εἴρηται] τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ Exacrov ἐπὶ τινῶν μὲν ταὐτόν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν 
πρώτων οὐσιῶν, οἷον καμπυλότης καὶ καμπυλότητι εἶναι, εἰ πρώτη ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ 
πρώτην ἢ μὴ λέγεται τῷ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς ὕλῃ. ὅσα δ᾽ ὡς 
ὕλη ἢ ὡς συνειλημμένα τῇ ὕλῃ, οὐ ταὐτό and 1030a IO sq. τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι. 
The apodosis begins here. 

Ὁ 13. [καὶ] ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει, [am unable to retain καὶ before ἢ 
either as “in fact” to emphasise κρίνει or as hinting at «καὶ κρίνει» καὶ xré., 
as if the sense were “judges the two and, what is more, judges them either 
with different instruments or etc.” I suspect a confusion of compendia. On 
the analogy of 426b 17, 430 Ὁ 24, the subject to be supplied here and in b 15, 
17, 21 will be τὸ κρῖνον, which is best understood as the person who judges, 
whether the judgment be through sense or intellect. This accords with A.’s 
own precept 408 b 13 sqq. and makes the use of the instrumental dative much 
simpler: cf. 426 b 14, 17, 23, 4274 14. 431 a 20. Zeller (Avdstotle, vol. It, 
p. 93, # 6, Eng. Tr.) takes ὁ νοῦς to be the subject, which is extremely awkward 
at Ὁ 15, 17, since there Zeller has to explain that νοῦς knows sensibles by means 
of the sensitive faculty, while it is per se that it knows the form; in other words, 
the other faculty, either separable or in the relation of a straightened to a bent 
line, which νοῦς employs, is νοῦς itself. It must, however, be conceded that the 
words 6 vous once stood in cod. E after κρίνει, as they still stand in cod. L. If, 
on the other hand, by τὸ κρῖνον we understand the person judging or discerning, 
since he is possessed of both faculties, he may, 7 αἰσθητικός, employ the sensitive 
faculty for sensibles and, 7 νοητικός, employ the intellect for forms or quiddities. 
With ἄλλῳ understand ἑκάτερον, while in ἄλλως ἔχοντι is implied τῷ αὐτῷ, by a 


111. 4 420 Ὁ 10—b 13 487 


different instrument in the one case and in the other, ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ, or by the 
same instrument in a different relation, τῷ αὐτῷ ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἔχοντι. These 
words, which recur Ὁ 16, 20 sq., have the brevity of a formula. Most authorities 
have supposed sense and intellect to be the two faculties alluded to, and the 
whole discussion as far as b 22 to deal with the part they respectively play in 
intellectual apprehension. There can be no question that, according to A., we 
think as well as perceive concrete substance, e.g. τὸ μῆκος 430b 7 sq., 12, 
TO σιμὸν 431} 12 sqq. As Zeller puts it, lc. “while the simple perception of 
the data of sense belongs to αἴσθησις, and not to νοῦς, yet every judgment 
relating to them is shared in by thought (voids in the wider sense)....Conceptions, 
on the other hand, as such, universal thoughts limited to no individual experi- 
ence, are known by reason Zer se, although the material for them is supplied by 
sense-perception.” Since we know flesh and the like by sense and forms or 
quiddities by intellect, A. appears to be discussing the question, Are sense and 
intellect different or are they the same faculty in two different attitudes? The 
difference between the two faculties has been assumed all along (e.g. 413 b 24 
sqq-, 414 Ὁ 16sqq.) on the ground that animals are found possessed of sensation 
but devoid of intellect. A. may be taking up the question, left undecided in 
429 a II, as to what is the kind and degree of separation between intellect and 
the rest of the faculties. It may seem strange that intellect should after all 
only be sense in a different relation, but many considerations favour such a 
view. Throughout the treatise A. has been hostile to the assumption of distinct 
‘““parts” of soul, and where he accepts it as a working hypothesis, it is under 
protest, e.g. 432a 22 sqq. The essential unity of the soul is emphasised again 
and again. A. has an account to settle with himself, for in Book 11., whenever 
he approaches the subject, his language 15 vague, e.g. 4138 3 sqq., Ὁ 24 sqq., 
415 a6 sqq. Moreover, in others of his writings he approximates sense to 
thought. Thus sense is of the universal, 7 δ᾽ αἴσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν Anal. 
Post. τι. το, 100a 17, though it be merely per accidens, Metaph. 1087 a 19 sqq.; 
while 47h. Nic. 1143.4 35 SQq. νοῦς πρακτικὸς is identified with αἴσθησις. On 
the whole this way of dealing with the passage presents less difficulty than to 
understand by #...7 a hard and fast distinction for which the appropriate 
instances are not easy to discover. It might be plausibly held that, when we 
know physical objects, the instruments are quite distinct, viz. sense for the 
things and intellect for the quiddity, and that, when we know mathematical 
objects, both the thing and its quiddity are cognized by intellect, though in a 
different relation, since in the region of mathematics even the matter is in- 
telligible matter. But the formula ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλως Exavre confronts us kere, where 
flesh has been the instance cited, so that this attempt breaks down (unless we 
are prepared to alter the text). Another hypothesis is that of M. Rodier. He 
assumes that flesh is an ambiguous term, including (1) particular flesh cognized 
by sense and (2) the universal flesh cognized by intellect. When we mean (1), 
flesh and its quiddity are judged by two different faculties: when we mean (2), 
flesh and its quiddity are discerned by the same faculty, viz. intellect, in two 
different relations. Ingenious as this is, it may be urged (1) that it is unlikely 
that A. would use σὰρξ ambiguously without calling attention to its two distinct 
meanings. His readers generally complain of the opposite fault and grow 
weary of the hair-splitting distinctions which he is continually repeating. 
(2) Water and flesh are things objectively existing, flesh universal is a con- 
ception, a fiction of the mind reached by abstraction, properly belonging to 
τὰ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντα, in spite of the fact that this phrase is conventionally 
restricted to the objects of the mathematical sciences. (3) There is no necessity 


488 NOTES Ill. 4 


A ce 


to take #...4 as mutually exclusive, the second ἢ may be no more than “vel 
potius.” When we call the faculty which cognizes the quiddity a distinct 
faculty, we must not forget that to speak of distinct faculties is an accom- 
modation to popular usage and quite compatible with their all being τῷ 
ὑποκειμένῳ ἕν. (4) Μ΄. Rodier assumes that τὸ σύνολον τὸ καθόλου is necessarily 
apprehended by intellect. There is, however, as we have seen, an indirect 
apprehension of τὸ καθόλου by sense. 

Ὁ 14. οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης. This implies that τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι, seeing that it is 
different from σάρξ (4309 Ὁ 10), is ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ΟΥ̓ more precisely, the matter is 
no “part” of the quiddity of flesh (AZedap/. 1035 a 1—7), though it is a necessary 
condition in order that the form or quiddity of flesh, which is εἶδος ἔνυλον, may 
exist (403 Ὁ 2 sq.), 1.6. may appear in αἰσθητὴ οὐσία aS ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία Of 
some σύνολον. It is owing to matter that a thing having a quiddity is different 
from the quiddity: Mezaph. 1043 Ὁ 2—4. τὸ σιμόν, A.’s standing example of 
a concrete thing, τὸ κοῖλον being the corresponding abstract. There can be no 
σιμὸν apart from ὅλη, no camosity without a nose. Cf. MetapA. 1030b 28 εἰ μὲν 
yap τὸ αὐτό ἐστι σιμὴ pis Kal κοίλη pis, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται τὸ σιμὸν καὶ TO κοῖλον. εἶ δὲ μὴ 
διὰ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι εἰπεῖν τὸ σιμὸν ἄνευ τοῦ πράγματος οὗ ἐστὶ πάθος καθ᾽ αὑτό 
(ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σιμὸν κοιλότης ἐν ῥενῇ, τὸ ῥῖνα σιμὴν εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ 
ἔσται εἰρημένον, ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη, ἸΟΖ25 Ὁ 32 sqq., 1064a 23 544. See also 22026 on 
403b II. 

14 τόϑε ἐν τῷδε, this definite form in this definite matter, e.g. κοιλότης ἐν 
pevi in the last citation. τῷ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικῷ. We cannot get to know an 
external object without the aid of sense: 417 Ὁ 19—22, 431 a 3—-5, 4328. 7 sq., 
Anal. Post. τ΄ 18, ὅτε 38 sqq. In De Sens c. 6, A. asserts that hypothetical 
particles too small for sense to perceive are not νοητά: 445 Ὁ τὸ ἔτι τίνε κρενοῦμεν 
ταῦτα ἢ γνωσόμεθα; ἢ τῷ νῷ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νοητά, οὐδὲ νοεῖ 6 νοῦς τὰ ἐκτὸς μὴ μετ᾽ 
αἰσθήσεως. If ὁ νοῦς were, as some hold, the subject of 429 Ὁ 15 κρίνει, then, 
instead of the dative, we should certainly expect pera τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ. 

Ὁ 15. τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν. Cf AZezaph. 1025 Ὁ 34 566. εἰ δὴ πάντα τὰ φυσικὰ 
ὁμοίως τῷ σιμῷ λέγονται, οἷον...σάρξ. Flesh as τόδε τι or σύνολον is judged solely 
by sensibility. Here A. means the accidents by the aid of which particular 
concrete things are perceived by sense, for the substance of concrete things, we 
must remember, is not directly perceived, but only jer acctdenms, indirectly, 
through the sensible forms of its accidents; and in the same indirect fashion 
τὸ καθόλου is perceived by sense, Afefapk. 1087 a τὸ sqq. When the eye 
perceives the whole coloured wall, it is only the colour which directly acts upon 
the eye. The addition of the clause καὶ ὧν. -σὰἀρξ shows that hot and cold are 
only adduced as examples of the essential qualities of flesh: what is said applies 
not only to hot and cold, but to any other qualities, the proportional adjustment 
of which constitutes flesh itself and makes it a sensible object, αἰσθητόν τ. Cf. 
Metaph. τοοῖ Ὁ 32 ἃ δὲ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν δόξειε σημαίνειν οὐσίαν, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ καὶ mip καὶ 
ἀήρ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ σύνθετα σώματα συνέστηκε, τούτων θερμότητες μὲν καὶ ψυχρότητες καὶ 
τὰ τοιαῦτα ττάθη, οὐκ οὐσίαι. Cf. 7d. Ἰογο Ὁ 11 “we may say that sensible bodies 
have heat for form and in another sense cold for privation, whilst for matter 
there is that which is primarily in itself the potentiality of hot and cold, these 
being substances as well as the compounds of which these are elements: in 
fact, any compound constituted, like flesh and bone, of hot and cold.” Since 
hot and cold are αἰσθητά, the argument of 426 Ὁ 14 sq. applies: it must be by 
sense that they are known. 

b 15 καὶ ὦν... τό ἡ σάρξ, i.e. καὶ ἐκεῖνα ὧν λόγος τίς ἐστι» ἡ σάρξ, those qualities 
of which flesh is a certain determining proportion, those qualities which, being 


KIT. 4 420 Ὁ 13—b 16 480 


combined in a certain specific proportion, constitute flesh. The particular 
proportion which determines the proper adjustment (temperies) of flesh is 
λόγος τῆς pei~ews: cf. 408 a 14 ov yap τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον ἡ μεῖξις THY στοιχείων 
καθ᾽ ἣν σὰρξ καὶ καθ᾽ ἣν ὀστοῦν, 4104 I οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντα τὰ στοιχεῖα τούτων 
ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινὶ καὶ συνθέσε. What A. says of the accidents is said of 
the individual compound perceptible to sense owing to these accidents, accidents 
and compound being in the same grade of cognoscibility by vers. Twoof the four 
elements which enter into the composition of flesh are prominently mentioned, 
viz. fire and earth. Cf. 423a 12 sqq., b 27 sqq., 435 a 21—24, De Gen. 4. Il. 1, 
734 Ὁ 29 οὐδὲ πόδα οὐδὲ χεῖρα [int. φήσαιμεν ἂν ποιῆσαε τὸ πῦρ μόνον]. τὸν αὐτὸν 
δὲ τρόπον οὐδὲ σάρκα- καὶ γὰρ ταύτης ἔργον τί ἐστιν. σκληρὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ μαλακὰ 
καὶ γλίσχρα καὶ κραῦρα, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα πάθη ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις μορίοις, θερμότης 
καὶ ψυχρότης ποιήσειεν ἄν, τὸν δὲ λόγον ᾧ ἤδη τὸ μὲν σὰρξ τὸ δ᾽ ὀστοῦν, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἡ κίνησις ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ γεννήσαντος τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος 6 ἐστι δυνάμει ἡ ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, 
ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γινομένων κατὰ τέχνην, Metaph. 1041 Ὁ 17 καὶ ἡ σὰρξ οὐ μόνον 
πῦρ καὶ γῆ ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι (Something further, viz. 
what in the De A. is called λόγος τις: cf. Wefaph. 1043b 7 sqq.). Sense by 
itself is incapable of cognizing this λόγος. Cf. also De Part. An. τ. τ, 642a 22 
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ ἡ σὰρξ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐστί, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων μορίων 
ἕκαστον. Flesh with A., as with Plato, 77z##. 82 c, is a typical example of a 
tissue in which the combination of certain elements produces a thing of entirely 
different qualities from those of its constituents, as in a chemical compound. 
The qualities of the compound depend upon the proportion in which the con- 
stituents are blended and will alter or disappear if this proportion is disturbed. 
Cf. p. 264 supra. 

Ὁ τό ἄλλῳ δὲ Frov...17 ἐκταθῇ. There is no disagreement as to the fact. 
Intellect, τὸ νοητικόν, must be intended. What we want to know is why, 
instead of stating this briefly ἄλλῳ δὲ τῷ νοητικῷ τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι κρίνει, A. has 
used the words of the lemma, presenting two alternative hypotheses. I do not 
think that he is attempting to cover two possible cases, but that he is offering 
two conceivable views of the relation of intellect to sense. Cf 417b 12 τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ 
δυνάμει ὄντος pavOdvov καὶ λαμβάνον ἐπιστήμην ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ 
διδασκαλικοῦ ἤτοι οὐδὲ πάσχειν φατέον, ἢ δύο τρόπους εἶναι ἀλλοιῴσεως. Which- 
ever view we take, whether that intellect is χωριστός (int. τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, which 
must certainly be supplied with ἄλλῳ) or whether it stands to sense as the 
straightened line stands to the bent or broken line, I conceive that he intends 
the words ἤτοι... ἐκταθῇ to be an elucidation of ἄλλῳ as applied to the single 
case of intellect discerning the quiddity of flesh, We may replace ἄλλῳ by 
χωριστῷ Or we may interpret ἄλλῳ by the simile of the line: and these two 
cases correspond roughly to the former alternative Ὁ 13 ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι, 
except that A. has now made more explicit what he intended by that alternative 
and now uses ἄλλῳ of both. By χωριστῷ must be understood “absolutely 
_ separable,” as in 429b 5, 4308 17, 1.6. wholly independent of σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια 
and therefore of the faculties which involve this: cf 408 Ὁ 29, 413 a 6 sq., 
Ὁ 25 sqq. In £té. Nic. 1.,¢c. 13 when A. declines to enquire into the relation 
between the irrational and rational parts of the soul, τὸ ἄλογον and τὸ λόγον 
ἔχον, he uses similar language: 1102a 28 ταῦτα δὲ [int. τὸ ἄλογον and τὸ λόγον 
ἔχον τῆς Ψυχῆς] πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ TOU σώματος μόρια Kai πᾶν τὸ 
μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ 
κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, where, however, the metaphor is not the same. 

If the line preserves its identity, κεκλασμένη cannot mean “broken in two,” 
but must mean “bent at an angle.” Cf. Phys. V. 4, 228b 24, AMefeor. 11. 6, 


490 NOTES Ill. 4 


377b 21 ὥσπερ ἀπὸ χαλκοῦ λείου κλωμένης [int. τῆς ὄψεως, the visual ray which 
is reflected], Prodl. ν. 19, 882 Ὁ 33 ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀνάντεσι τὰ γόνατα κλᾶται εἰς 
τοὔπισθεν. The verb κάμπτεσθαι, which is often used like κλᾶσθαι of two 
straight lines forming an angle, can also be used of curves. In Meteor. IV. 9 
κεκαμμένον is opposed to εὐθύ: 386a I ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς κυρτότητα ἢ κοιλότητα κίνησις 
τοῦ μήκους σωζομένου κάμψις ἐστίν εἶ γὰρ καὶ εἰς τὸ εὐθύ, εἴη ἂν ἅμα κεκαμμένον 
καὶ εὐθύ- ὅπερ ἀδύνατον, τὸ εὐθὺ κεκάμφθαι. If in the simile curved lines were 
intended and not rectilinear segments, 7 κεκαμμένη would have been more 
appropriate. The precise application of the simile in our text is of less im- 
portance than the recognition that it interprets more definitely ἄλλως dyovre 
above, the simile from the bent and straightened line being most suitable for 
the expression of real identity in relative difference. Diametrically opposite 
views have been taken, some maintaining that the straightened line stands for 
intellect and the bent or broken line for sense; others, e.g. Teichmiiller (Stud. 
sur Gesch. der Begriffe, Ὁ. 492 sqq-), as confidently maintaining the opposite, 
that the bent or broken line stands for intellect and the straight line for direct 
perception of particulars by sense. I see no reason for departing from the 
former view, which is that of the Greek commentators: their assumption that 
6 νοῦς is the subject of κρίνει throughout the discussion does not invalidate their 
conclusions: Them. 96, 8—30 H., 177, 3-178, 6Sp., Simpl. 231, 2I—34, 232, I3— 
233, 3, Philop. 526, 3—10, 530, 29—531, 5. An unfortunate use of chiasmus in 
the main passage renders the evidence of Them. somewhat ambiguous, but that 
this is what he meant seems clear from the words (96, 24 H., 177, 26 Sp.) 
συνεξομοιοῦται yap τοῖς πράγμασιν ἃ θεωρεῖ, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ὥσπερ σύνθετος γίνεται, 
ὁπόταν τὸ σύνθετον νοῇ, ποτὲ δὲ ὡς ἁπλοῦς, ὅταν τὸ εἶδος ἐκλαμβάνῃ...γίνεται yap 
ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς ὥσπερ διπλοῦς τηνικαῦτα, ὅταν τὴν ὕλην συμπαρασκοπῇ τῇ μορφῇ. That 
A. regarded a straight line as more truly “one” than the same line when bent 
or crooked is attested MWefath. 1016a 12 sqq. Simpl. also conceives the bent 
line to be a departure from the simplicity of the straight line, 231, 18 λογικῇ δὲ 
γνώσει τὰς συνθέτους καὶ ὅλως τὰς εἰδοπεποιημένας οὐσίας, καὶ ἑτέρᾳ οὔσῃ τῆς τῶν 
εἰδῶν ἀντιληπτικῆς καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οἷον καμφθείσῃ καὶ οὕτω τὰ δριζόμενα 
νοούσῃ. τοὺς γὰρ ὅρους ὀρθῶς καὶ dxapas...(24) ἡ δὲ κλάσις δηλοῖ πὴν μέθεξιν [int. τῆς 
τελειότητος |...(27) καὶ ἢ κλασθεῖσα δὲ εὐθεῖα, τουτέστιν ἡ καμφθεῖσα, ὡς γωνίαν ποιεῖν, 
ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἐκτεταμένης γέγονεν, ἐκβᾶσα δὲ τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ οἷον εἰς μερισμὸν ὑποβᾶσα, 
232, 39 καὶ γὰρ ἡ κεκλασμένη.. τὴν τῶν εἰδοπεποιημένων σύστοιχον δηλοῖ γνῶσιν, 7 
δὲ ἐκταθεῖσα ὡς ὀρθὴ καὶ ἀκαμπὴς τῆς τῶν ὅρων καὶ τελειοτήτων γνώσεως εἴληπται 
σύμβολον. To the same effect on the main issue Philop. 526, 5 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ 
αὐτὴ εὐθεῖα τῷ μὲν ὑποκειμένῳ ἡ αὐτή ἐστι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ διάφορος (7 yap viv εὐθεῖα 
οὖσα δύναται κλασθῆναι καὶ ἐπικαμπὴς γενέσθαι), οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς 6 αὐτὸς ὧν τῷ 
ὑποκειμένῳ ἄλλοτε μὲν εὐθείᾳ ἀναλογεῖ, ὅτε καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐνεργεῖ καὶ τὰ ἄυλα οἶδεν, 
ἄλλοτε δὲ κεκλασμένῃ εὐθείᾳ ἐπικαμπτόμενος πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ ὀργάνῳ αὐτῇ 
κεχρημένος, ὅτε καὶ τὰ ἔνυλα οἶδεν. The opposite view was maintained by 
Zabarella. According to him, the sensitive faculty producing knowledge of 
particular flesh is compared to the straight line, the same faculty producing the 
knowledge of its quiddity to the broken line, and he insists that κεκλασμένη = 
fracta, non inflexa. The straightness of the line indicates that the sense- 
impression (or its product, the φάντασμα) by a direct and immediate course is 
presented to intellect, whereas knowledge of the quiddity implies reflexion 
(ἀνάκλασις). Teichmiiller, too, makes the straight line stand for the sensitive 
faculty and by adducing Azal. Post. τι. 19, 99 Ὁ 36 sqq. endeavours to show that 
the formation of the universal from isolated impressions of sense may be com- 
pared to the bending of a line back upon itself. So also Wallace: “And the 


171. 4 420 Ὁ 16---Ὁ 20 4ΟῚ 


meaning would therefore seem to be that sense and reason stand to one another 
in cognition as two processes, of which the one goes directly at its object, 
whereas the other returns upon itself....In sense, in other words, the mind and 
the object lie apart—a straight line leads from one to the other, but there is no 
means of returning to the mind; in reason the object of knowledge, the essential 
idea, is itself rational, so that the mind veturus upon itself.” Trendelenburg 
called attention to the importance of ὅταν ἐκταθῇ, which must be taken closely 
with ἔχει: Inflexa linea e recta nata posterius aliquid est, cul recta tanquam 
prius subest. Si inflexam in rectam rursus extenders. princeps illud et causa 
restituitur. Ita mens, si notionem, quae rem constituit tanquam lex et causa, 
intellexerit, hoc, quod subest, sublatis, quae materiae natura notioni acciderunt, 
in dignitatem restituit suam (p. 393). M. Rodier, by the entirely different 
interpretation which, as stated above, he gives of the whole passage, is led to 
explain the simile as illustrating, not one of two possible conceptions of the 
relation between intellect and sense, but the relation of the intellect apprehending 
τὸ σύνολον τὸ καθόλου to the intellect apprehending τὸ ri ἦν efvaz. According to 
him, intellect when it takes account of form and matter conjoined in τὸ σύνολον 
τὸ καθόλου resembles the bent line, when it takes account of form only it re- 
sembles the straight line: “L’acte par lequel il saisit une forme pure est, en 
effet, un et indivisible comme cette forme méme et ressemble ἃ la ligne droite. 
Au contraire, Pacte par lequel i] pense une forme avec sa matiére logique est 
déja une discursion, il implique une pluralité d’éléments unis, quoique distincts, 
comme la ligne brisée” (1. p. 448 sq.). 

Ὁ 1:8. ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντων, 1.6. abstractions, and more especially mathe- 
matical objects: cf. first zofe on 403 Ὁ 15. 

Ὁ 18. τὸ εὐθὺ Mathematical objects, though at first sight they might seem 
pure abstractions, have, in fact, matter as well as form: cf. AMefaph. 1036b 35 
ἔσται yap ὕλη ἐνίων καὶ μὴ αἰσθητῶν. i.e. a logical or intelligible, not sensible, 
matter, ὕλη λογικῆ, νοητή, 10364 9 ὕλη δ᾽ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητὴ ἐστιν ἡ δὲ vonry...vonrh δὲ 
ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ 7 αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά, viz. continuity, τὸ 
συνεχές, OF MOre precisely, continuity in space, extension. Thus the straight 
line, τὸ εὐθύ, may be analysed into its matter, continuity or length, and its 
form, tentatively assumed to be duality. Though the geometer’s line is length 
without breadth or thickness, and therefore abstract, yet extension is a sort of 
geometrical matter which enables the conceptions of mathematics to be after all 
concrete. ὡς τὸ σιμόν, int. ἐστι. That is, τὸ εὐθύ, like τὸ σιμόν, is σύνθετόν τι. 
The inseparable matter in the one case is τὸ συνεχὲς and in the other pis. The 
form is (here, at least) in the one case duality and in the other κοελότης. 

big. μετὰ συνεχοῦς γάρ, int. ἐστε τὸ εὐθύ. See PAys. VI. 1, 231 8 25 ἡ γραμμὴ 
μὲν συνεχές. This is true of the mathematician’s line, the abstraction, which 
still has extension for its matter. Cf. De dfem. 1, 450a 7 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν 
οὐδὲν ἄνευ τοῦ συνεχοῦς. When, however, the line is realised, any particular 
actual line is det μετὰ σώματος, 403 a 15. 

b20. ἄλλο, int. ἐστὶ τοῦ εὐθέος. The reading of cod. E, ἄλλῳ, 15 intelligible. 
We must then understand κρίνει to govern τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι here and τὸ εὐθὺ ὡς τὸ 
σιμὸν above, the subject as before being τὸ κρῖνον. Torstrik’s defence of ἄλλῳ 
(Jahrb. f. class. Philol. 1867, p. 245) turns on the tautology of the sentence with 
ἄλλο, a mere echo of érepov : “ But its ri ἦν εἶναι, if there is a difference between 
straightness and the straight line, is something distinct.” But this objection is 
met by Zabarella, who anticipated Bonitz in rejecting ἄλλῳ in favour of ἄλλο, 
not on MS. authority, of which he was unaware, but on that of Them., Simpl. 
and the reason of the case. The clause Ὁ 19 εἶ ἔστιν...20 εὐθύ, he observes, 


492 NOTES 111. 4 


merely means that the question of this identity of τὸ εὐθὺ and τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι is 
reserved for the metaphysician: it is enough for our purpose to assume that 
they are different, precisely as a similar assumption was made at Ὁ 10 supra. 

b20. ἔστω γὰρ Suds, int. τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι. Cf. Metadh. 1043 a 29 δεῖ δὲ μὴ 
ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐνίοτε λανθάνει πότερον σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα τὴν σύνθετον οὐσίαν ἢ τὴν 
ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν μορφήν, οἷον..-«γραμμὴ πότερον δυὰς ἐν μήκει ἢ ὅτι Suds, 1036b 12 
καὶ ἀνάγουσι [int. reves] πάντα εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμούς, καὶ γραμμῆς τὸν λόγον τὸν τῶν δύο 
εἶναί φασιν. καὶ τῶν τὰς ἰδέας λεγόντων οἱ μὲν αὐτογραμμὴν τὴν Sudda, οἱ δὲ τὸ εἶδος 
τῆς γραμμῆς. The form of the mathematical line is perhaps, A. concedes to the 
Pythagoreans and Platonists, the number Two, which represents the line, if 
One represents the point: cf. 404b 20, 22. A straight line is determined, the 
geometer would say, by any two points in it, and hence Euclid’s definition, 
which is a modification of Plato’s in Parw.137E. To Plato and the mathe- 
maticians of his day the point travels and becomes Two in the line, just as the 
line generates the surface and the surface the solid, 409 a 4 sq. 

Ὁ 20. ἑτέρῳ. That in this connexion there is no difference between ἑτέρῳ 
and Ὁ 13 ἄλλῳ seems clear: cf. AZelaph. 1016b 21 ov ταὐτὸ δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς γένεσι 
τὸ ἕν. ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ δίεσις, ἔνθα δὲ τὸ φωνὴῆεν ἢ ἄφωνον" βάρους δ᾽ ἕτερον καὶ 
κινήσεως ἄλλο, De Sensi 7, where the hypothesis first expressed 448 Ὁ 20 by ἅμα 
μέν, ἑτέρῳ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι is afterwards expressed 449a 5 by ἄλλῳ μὲν 
γλυκέος, ἄλλῳ δὲ λευκοῦ αἰσθάνεται μέρει. 

b 21, ἢ ἑτέρως ἔχοντι. The subject knows concrete straightness by one 
faculty, its form, duality, by another, or rather by a different phase of the same 
faculty: ἢ, “vel potius,” introduces the view which A. thinks the more correct. 
It must be intellect and not sense which grasps, not only the essence, straight- 
ness, but also the concrete mathematical line with its ὕλη vonry: cf. the use of 
νοεῖν 431 Ὁ 13, 16 (62s). But, if the concrete line is analogous to σιμόν, the 
attitude of intellect in apprehending it will be analogous to that of sensitivity 
when it apprehends flesh.-: And, if so, this is a different attitude from that of 
intellect when it apprehends pure form, whether of physical flesh or mathe- 
matical straightness. Cf. Them. 96, 30—97, 1 H., 178, 6—21 Sp., especially 
96, 34 H., 178, 12 Sp. ἐπὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ἄμφω ὃ νοῦς ἔοικε κρίνειν, 
λέγω δὲ ἅἄμῴω τό τε σύνθετον ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν 
μορφήν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχων καὶ τηνικαῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ποτὲ μὲν ὡς 
ἁπλοῦς, ποτὲ δὲ ὥσπερ σύνθετος γινόμενος. 

b 21 καὶ ὅλως...22 τῆς ὕλης. The genitive τῆς ὕλης goes with χωριστά, 
“separable from matter.” By τὰ πράγματα are meant the objects, things as 
they are known, τὰ ἐπιστητά: cf. 4308 20, Anal. Post. τι. 19, 100b τό sq. (if the 
last passage be taken in connexion with £74. Nic. 1140 Ὁ 31 sqq.). These 
objects may be either immersed in matter, like τὸ σιμόν, or separable from it in 
thought, like τὸ εὐθύ (οὐ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον χωριστά). ὅλως generalises 
the distinction between the concrete thing and its form or quiddity, a distinction 
of which A. has already given two particular examples, viz. σὰρξ and σαρκὶ εἶναι, 
εὐθὺ and εὐθεῖ εἶναι: transiri enim a singulis exemplis ad notionem universalem 
significat part. ὅλως (Bz. ad Afetaph. 990b 17). Cf. second zoze on 4038 7. 

Ὁ 22. οὕτω kal τὰ περὶ τὸν νοῦν, int. χωριστὰ τῆς ὕλης ἐστί, where τὰ περὶ τὸν 
νοῦν may be a periphrasis for νοῦς. Cf. Jnd. Ar. 579 a 44 interdum ita usurpatur 
[int. formula of περί τινα] ut ab ipso personae nomine non multum differat. But 
the idiom is not confined to proper names. Cf. Them. 97, 5 H., 178, 27 Sp. 
ἡ τοῦ νοῦ θεωρία, Simpl. 234, 12 af τοῦ vot τούτου θεωρίαι. Prisc. Lyd., A@era- 
phrasis in Theophr. VWepi νοῦ, p. 34, 1 ed. Byw., informs us that Theophrastus 
agreed with A. in this statement (ἀμφότεροι ἀποφαίνονται), of which he offers 


II. 4 429 Ὁ 2ο---Ὁ 25 493 


three interpretations. Hence the ancient commentators speak of ὁ ἄυλος vois 
and 6 ἔνυλος νοῦς. According to the degree to which the object of thought is 
involved in matter or free from it, so it is with the mind that thinks the object. 
Three modes of apprehension have been noticed in this chapter, (1) sense, 
which apprehends the qualities of concrete things, (2) mind when it apprehends 
the ἔνυλα εἴδη and (3) mind when it apprehends the ἄυλα εἴδη. But (2) and (3) 
are different attitudes of the same faculty. This sentence contains the con- 
clusion of the whole passage: νοῦς in its operations can separate itself to a 
greater or less degree from matter; to a less degree when it raises the single 
notion from the sense-image by abstraction; to a greater degree when it thinks 
that which is common to the species and the specific essence. In both cases it 
thinks universals, but the latter are higher universals than the former. Cf. 
Them. 97, 5 H., 178, 27 Sp. ὡς οὖν ταῦτα [τὸ εὐθὺ or τὸ τρίγωνον as examples of 
Ta πράγματα) τῷ λόγῳ χωρίζεσθαι μόνῳ δύναται, καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δὲ οὐκ ἂν ὑποσταίη, οὕτω 
καὶ ὃ νοῦς χωρίζειν αὐτὰ τῷ λόγῳ μόνῳ ἐπεχειρεῖ. 

429 b 22. 480 a 9. Two problems remain. The first is: if mind 
is, according to Anaxagoras, unmixed and impassive, how can it think? 
Thinking is being acted upon, and to act and be acted upon implies some 
community between agent and patient [§ 9]. Further, how can mind be an 
object of thought to itself? This might be taken to imply that there is in- 
telligence in all objects of thought, if the object of thought is everywhere one in 
kind: or else that there is in intellect an alien element which makes it an 
object of thought, a hypothesis which is contrary to the view that it is simple 
and unmixed [$10]. The answer to the first question is to be found in the 
consideration that mind is actually nothing until it thinks. Compare the 
subject to a blank writing-tablet with a capacity of receiving written characters 
[8 τι]. As to the second problem, that mind can be its own object follows from 
the consideration (1) that in the case of immaterial things that which thinks and 
that which is thought are one and the same, while (2) in material things such 
objects of thought are only potentially present. This solution suggests the 
enquiry whether mind is always thinking, an enquiry which must be reserved 

12]. 
᾿ The first problem is obviously suggested by a passage in the previous 
exposition, viz. 429 a 13-20, as the second reference to Anaxagoras shows. 
The second problem also, like the first, appears to be suggested by a previous 
remark, viz. 429 Ὁ 9, where νοῦς is said under certain conditions to know itself, 
which implies that it is νοητός. I am therefore not inclined to accept Prof. 
Bywaters emendation of that line, which would excise all previous reference to 
vous cognizing itself. 

429 Ὁ 24. ὥσπερ φησὶν “AvaEayopas. See motes on 405 Ὁ 19, 429 a 18 supra. 
As is there explained, there is no evidence to show that Anaxagoras himself 
used the word ἀπαθὲς of his νοῦς, while A. beyond all doubt does use the term, 
like ἁπλοῦν and καθαρόν, as a predicate of the Anaxagorean νοῦς. If this be 
granted, it seems hypercritical to bracket 429 Ὁ 23 ἀπαθὲς or to substitute ἀμιγὲς 
for it. πῶς νοήσει. The problem was raised 405b 21 as a difficulty which 
Anaxagoras had overlooked. 

b25. πάσχειν τι, as in 429 a 14, where see zoze. 

Ὁ 25. ἢ yap τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν. Cf. De Gen. εἰ Corr... c. 7, especially 323 b 29 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ ov τὸ τυχὸν πέφυκε πάσχειν Kal ποιεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἢ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἢ ἐναντί- 
wow ἔχει, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον τῷ γένει μὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ταὐτό, 
τῷ δ᾽ εἴδει ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐναντίον - πέφυκε γὰρ σῶμα μὲν ὑπὸ σώματος, χυμὸς δ᾽ ὑπὸ 
χυμοῦ, χρῶμα δ᾽ ὑπὸ χρώματος πάσχειν, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ὁμογενὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς. 


404 NOTES 111. 4 


τούτον δ᾽ αἴτιον ὅτι τἀναντία ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει πάντα. ποιεῖ δὲ Kai πάσχει τἀναντία 
im ἀλλήλων. ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη πῶς μὲν εἶναι ταὐτὰ τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, πῶς 
δ᾽ ἕτερα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλλήλοις. See also De A. 416b 35 sqq., where A. refers to 
De Gen. et Corr. τ., c. 7. 

b 26. εἰ νοητὸς καὶ αὐτός, int. ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ἀπορήσειε ἄν τις. 

Ὁ 27. ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει. If νοῦς is νοητός, two alternative 
hypotheses are conceivable: it is νοητὸς either (1) καθ᾽ αὑτόν, οὐ κατ᾽ ἄλλο τι 
or (2) κατ᾽ ἄλλο τι, οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτόν. The first hypothesis, expanded in the clause 
b27 εἰ py κατ᾽ ἄλλο....328 εἴδει leads to the conclusion of the lemma, “all νοητὰ 
will have νοῦς predicable of them,” “all objects of thought will themselves 
think”: cf. Plato, Pari. 132 C ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν. 
Though A. does not say so, this result is paradoxical. The consequence to 
which the second hypothesis leads is contained in the clause b 28 ἢ pepery- 
pévov...29 τἄλλα, “νοῦς will have in it an admixture of something, alien to 
its own nature, which renders it νοητός. The second hypothesis is not directly 
stated, but is to be inferred from the consequence to which it leads. 

Ὁ 27. el μὴ Kar ἄλλο, if it is only by and in itself (in other words, καθὸ νοῦς 
éori) and not through something else that νοῦς is an object of thought. See the 
second zofe on 406a4. If in the act of thought the object is always mind itself, 
we must suppose other things to have an admixture of mind in them in order to 
be thought. 

Ὁ 28. ἕν δέ τι τὸ νοητὸν εἴδει. We must further assume that the object of 
thought is always one in kind or specifically the same. The content of thought 
is homogeneous. The attribute “thinkable,” νοητός, must bear one and the same 
sense, wherever applied: it must not be an ambiguous term. If, then, on this 
first hypothesis some νοητὸν is νοῦς gud νοητόν, this must be equally true of all 
νοητά. In fact, on this view, whatever its object, it is itself that mind thinks and 
so there is κοινόν te ἀμφοῖν. The two problems are really more closely related 
than at first sight would appear. 

b 28 ἢ pepeypévov...29 ὥσπερ τάλλα. If it is not fer se that mind is an object 
of thought, it must be in virtue of something else, car’ ἄλλο τ. Thus we pass 
on to the second hypothesis which, as it is not stated, has to be supplied, viz. 
that νοῦς requires to render it νοητὸς something else in it other than itself. If 
something other than mind is the object of mind, the other something must 
always be in mind for that purpose. In that case this something else, which 
makes mind νοητόν, must be regarded as a foreign admixture, and thus the 
condition laid down by Anaxagoras, and accepted by A., that mind is ἀμιγήῆς, 
is violated. In this connexion it is interesting to notice a remark made by A. 
in his polemic against the Platonic ideas Mezaps. 991 a 14 Ssqq., 1079 Ὁ 18 566. 
that, if the ideas existed in the participant particulars, they might be considered 
causes of their being: οὕτω μὲν yap [int. ἐνυπάρχοντά ye τοῖς μετέχουσιν] ἴσως 
αἴτια δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ὡς τὸ λευκὸν μεμιγμένον τῷ λευκῷ. And this view A. proceeds 
to attribute to Anaxagoras: 1079 b 20 ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος.. ὃν ᾿Αναξαγόρας μὲν 
πρότερος [πρῶτος 991 a 17]...ἔλεγε διαπορῶν κτέ. 

b29 ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν...31 νοῇ. Here begins the solution of the first problem, 
as is shown by 7: see xofe on 403b 8. The words κατὰ κοινόν τί must be joined 
with πάσχειν, not with διήρηται. I take διελεῖν as “to explain”: from Jad. Ar. 
180a 22 sqq.it appears that the verb often means to distinguish, analyse, discuss, 
€.g. 402 a 23, 25: in AWetahh. 1048 a 27 διαιροῦσιν bears the same meaning as the 
preceding Swpicwper (a 26). The clause introduced by ὅτε must contain the 
purport of this previous distinction, 1.6. 6r.=“to the effect that”: it is not a 
causal clause. Such an explanation, distinguishing two meanings of πάσχειν, 


Il. 4 429 Ὁ 25——b 31 495 


was given 417 Ὁ 2sqq. Cf. 4178 18, zo¢e on ὑπὸ τοῦ Gpoiov. The community 
between potential intellect and its objects is that the former is capable of being 
transformed into the latter. This was stated 429a 24, so that the πάσχειν of 
429 a 14 sqq. satisfies the condition κατὰ κοινόν tr. The relation between τὸ 
πάσχον and τὸ ποιοῦν is here “a sort of community”: in the analogous passage 
417 Ὁ 3 sqq. it is described as a carefully qualified similarity, σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ 
δυνάμει ὄντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίον οὕτως ὡς δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς evre- 
λέχειαν. We cannot too strongly emphasise the strained meaning put upon all 
these terms when they are transferred from the mutual action and reaction of 
things corporeal to the mental sphere: πάσχειν is ἐνεργεῖν 4178. 15, bi (cf. 
431 a 4 564ᾳ.). τὸ πάσχον is ἀπαθὲς 429 a 15, and the process which 15 really eis αὐτὸ 
ἐπίδοσις καὶ eis ἐντελέχειαν 417 Ὁ 6 5α. is not only said to be ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις μεταβολὴ 
καὶ τὴν φύσιν 117 Ὁ 15 54., but is even more improperly described as ἀλλοίωσις, 
κίνησις, ττάθος. If intellect were a corporeal thing and τὰ νοητὰ corporeal things 
acting upon it, the κοινόν τε ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχον of Ὁ 25 would be a common matter 
or substratum: De Gen. δέ Corr. 1. 6, 3232 Ὁ 18 sq., 1. 7, 323 Ὁ 29—324a 14. Cf. 
Them. 97, 11—14 H., 179, 4—-8 Sp. 

Ὁ 30 δυνάμει...31 ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέν, a pure potentiality, actually non-existent and 
therefore in no actual relation to an actually existing νοητόν. A.’s solution, then, 
amounts to this: when the mind thinks, we may regard the object of thought as 
acting upon it. But this is no ordinary case of physical interaction. Agent and 
patient have this in common, that the latter, the mind, is potentially the former, 
its objects, and when it actually thinks it becomes identical with them. A. goes 
on to say that the relation of what it is before thinking to what it is when 
actually thinking may be ilustrated by the relation of the unwritten tablet 
to the same tablet with writing upon it. 

b3I. S<vvdpoe δ᾽ οὕτως. No satisfactory explanation of the vulgate is 
forthcoming. The simplest expedient, which, so far as I know, has not occurred 
to anyone, would be to supply after δεῖ δ᾽ οὕτως the words δυνάμει πὼς εἶναι τὰ 
νοητὰ τὸν νοῦν from the preceding sentence. But even then there is not much 
force in δεῖ, as will be seen if we compare, e.g., 429a 15 and a18, where the 
conditions are stated upon which a result necessarily follows. According to 
the view which has found most favour, we should understand after def the verb 
ὑπολαβεῖν or something equivalent. But, in the first place, it is singular that 
there should be such an important omission, especially as there is nothing in 
the context to suggest the missing word. A. goes to great lengths in ellipse, 
but generally the context furnishes a clue. Besides, ὑπολαβεῖν is not enough 
to supply. Accordingly, Torstrik supplements thus: δεῖ δ᾽ οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν 
(γίγνεσθαι τὸ νοεῖν) ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον 
{γίγνεται τὸ γράφεσθαι). He gets γίγνεσθαι τὸ νοεῖν from 42924 13 πῶς ποτὲ 
γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν, which is a long way off. Torstnk’s supplement gives a fair 
sense, but so much cannot be said for M. Rodier’s apparently more simple 
explanation. He would understand συμβαίνειν with dei, removing the stop 
before ὅπερ συμβαίνει, so that the antecedent of ὅπερ is the subject of the 
infinitive συμβαίνειν understood, and in fact of the whole sentence. Thus we 
get: “and what takes place in that which concerns the intellect must take place 
as in a writing-tablet on which there is nothing actually written.” Why “must”? 
So long as we supply ὑπολαβεῖν, δεῖ is perfectly in place, det δ᾽ ὑπολαβεῖν being 
frequently used by A. to introduce his explanation of a process, his conception 
how something goes on. But when he is describing a fact, συμβαίνει is sufficient. 
Cf. 408 b 20 νῦν δ᾽ ἴσως ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων συμβαίνει. The intrusion of δεῖ 
or any verb of necessity would be confusing, though not in the same degree as 


496 NOTES III. 4 


the imperfect ἔδεε. Moreover, by the position of the words, ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ 
Tov νοῦ suggests a distinct clause. 

It is surprising, if δεῖ were the genuine reading, that the commentators 
should all fight shy of it. The lemma of Simplicius certainly contains the 
word δεῖ, but so frequently in the ancient commentators are lemma and in- 
terpretation inconsistent that we are irresistibly led to conclude that the lemmas 
have been tampered with. Alex. Aphr. mentions the simile in his own De An. 
(84, 24 sqq.) and takes occasion to correct the supposition that it is the tablet 
itself which answers to νοῦς tAccos. On the contrary, he maintains that it is 
the aptitude of the tablet for receiving written characters, not the tablet itself, 
which corresponds to the potential intellect. He gives no clue whatever to 
the reading. Take Themistius, again. In his paraphrase of the passage 
(97, 19 sqq. H., 179, 16 sqq. Sp.) there are three distinct adaptations of the 
text. Piece them together and we get the following: ὁ δὲ νοῦς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, 
δυνάμει μὲν ἅπαντά ἐστι τὰ νοητά, ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ οὐδὲν πρὶν ἂν voi ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν 

γραμματείῳ μηδὲν ἔχοντι γεγραμμένον ἐντελεχείᾳ ὅ ὅταν γραφῇ τὰ γράμματα, τελείωσιν 
ἂν εἴποις τοῦ γραμματείου τὰ γεγραμμένα, οὐ πάθος": οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. 
Nearly every word of the vulgate is here introduced, except δεῖ. The interpre- 
tation of Simplicius (236, 13 sqq.) takes no account of δεῖ and, if anything, 
suggests δυνάμε. Nor is there any hint of δεῖ in Philoponus, whose brief note 
is, 533, 25, ἀγράφῳ yap gore γραμματείῳ, and this is not because he has over- 
looked the simile, for he dwells at length upon the egregious misinterpretation 
of Iamblichus, who tried to make out that ἄγραφον = κακόγραφον. Again, 
Priscianus Lydus, who twice mentions the simile, 26, 26 sqq., 35, 23 sqq., 
lends no support to the reading δε. See Appendix, ad few. Lastly, 
Sophonias 125, 37 sqq. gives a paraphrase which betrays the influence of 
Alexander, the subjects of the chapter being treated in an arbitrary manner 
and not in the order of the Aristotelian text. Thus, like Alex. Aphr., Sophonias 
brings the simile into connexion with the τόπος εἰδῶν of 429 a 27. It would 
seem hardly possible that the text of which this, such as it is, is a paraphrase, 
can have contained δεῖ, but highly probable that in place of δεῖ it contained 
δυνάμει. Mr Cornford’s emendation δυνάμει for de (Proceedings of the Camb. 
Phil. Soc. 1906, Ὁ. 13) assumes a compendium dév,, which, according to Bast, 
pp. 805 sq., actually occurs in extant MSS. for δύναμες : through itacism this 
might be confused with de Cf. δ᾽, which Diophantus regularly uses for the 
algebraical δύναμις. The sense is excellent: “but it is all objects potentially in 
the same manner as in a tablet, which has not been actually written upon, the 
writing exists potentially. This is exactly the case with the mind.” 

430a 1. ὥσπερ ἐν ypapparelo...yeypappévoy, int. δυνάμει ἐστὲ τὰ γράμματα. 
The writing-tablet here must not be understood to represent the mind. As 
Alexander points out, it is rather the aptitude of the tablet while yet uninscribed 
which corresponds to the mind, which is potentially everything, yet previously 
to thought actually nothing: cf. Alex. Aphr. De Am. 84, 21 οὐδὲν dpa τῶν ὄντων 
ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶν ὁ ὑλικὸς νοῦς, ἀλλὰ πάντα δυνάμει. πρὸ yap τοῦ νοεῖν οὐδὲν ὧν 
ἐνεργείᾳ, ὅταν νοῇ τι, τὸ νοούμενον γίνεται; εἴ γε τὸ νοεῖν αὑτῷ ἐν τῷ τὸ εἶδος ἔχειν τὸ 
νοούμενον. ἐπιτηδειότης τις ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν ὁ ὑλικὸς νοῦς πρὸς τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν 
ὑποδοχὴν ἐοικὼς πινακίδι ἀγράφῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ τῷ τῆς πινακίδος ἀγράφῳ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῇ 
πινακίδι αὐτῇ. The tablet, Alex. reminds us, is an actually existent thing and, 
as such, whether written upon or unwritten, is comparable to the living animal 
to whom the mind belongs. Priscianus Lydus, who makes the tablet stand for 
potential intellect, is also worth citing: 35, 25 τὸ ἄγραφον ypapparciov...as 
παράδειγμα τοῦ δυνάμει vod προφερόμενον, ἵνα καὶ τὸ ἄγραφον ὡς ἐν νῷ θεωρῶμεν, 


111. 4. 429 Ὁ 31—430a 5 497 


ἔχοντε μὲν κατ᾽ οὐσίαν τὰ εἴδη καὶ τέλεια ἔχοντι, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου νοῦ τελειουμένῳ 
καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ γραφομένῳ. 

a2. orep συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. Until thought is actually operant, the 
δυνάμει νοητὰ are not ἐντελεχείᾳ νοητά. Mind has δυνάμει the interpretation of 
impressions received from without by sense (cf. 432 a 4 ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς 
αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι), in 50 far as it is capable of thinking the universal. The 
difficulty arises from mdoyew: in the next chapter we shall hear that there is in 
vous a part which suffers and a part which is incapable of suffering. καὶ αὐτὸς 
δὲ, int. ὁ νοῦς. Here A. turns to consider the second problem; that is, in 
Torstrik’s words, to distinguish between τὸ νῷ εἶναι and τὸ νοητῷ eivas. The view 
that νοῦς is νοητὸς follows from the main proposition of οί. 1072 Ὁ 20 ἑαυτὸν 
δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν Tov νοητοῦ, where A. is describing the divine mind, 
which 15 τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον. The difficulties attending this conception 
are subsequently discussed Me/faph. A., c. 9, a chapter which should be carefully 
compared: cf. 1074 Ὁ 21 sqq., 1074 b 33 56. and 1075 a 3 cited in note zz/ra@ on a 4. 
That the process of thinking in the human mind and in the divine mind is 
conceived by A. as analogous seems clear from such passages as 1072 b 18—26, 
1075 a 5—IO. 

a3. ἐπὶ comes to much the same as a6 ev: cf. Mefaph. 988 a 12 καθ᾽ ἧς 
[int. ὅλης] τὰ εἴδη μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ δ᾽ ἕν ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσε λέγεται. We think 
a thing either in the concrete, man, triangle, or in the abstract, humanity, 
triangularity. In the one there is matter of some sort, the object 1s a σύνολον, 
though καθόλου, iMetaph. 1035b 27 sqq., 103741 sqq., 1036b 22 sqq. In the 
other case there is no matter. 

a3. τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης. Cf. first mofe on 429b 12. These are πρῶται οὐσίαι, 
simplices res, quae non habent distincta a substantia accidentia, nec con- 
lunctam cum actu aliquo potentiam contrarii, sed integrae sunt substantiae et 
ἐνέργειαι (Bonitz ad Metaph. ©., c. 10, p. 410). They are the ἀδιαίρετα of III, c. 6 
(cf. AZetaph. 1075a6 ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην, 1045 Ὁ 23 ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει 
ὕλην. πάντα ἅπλῶς ὅπερ ἕν TL, 1074a 33 ὅσα ἀριθμῷ πολλά, ὕλην exer), and the 
process by which they are apprehended is compared to direct contact, i.e. to the 
lower faculty of sense. Cf. 407 a 10 sqq., Wetaph. 1051 Ὁ 23—25, 1072 b 20 sq. 
Pariter [int. atque sensus} mens activa, 6 ποιγτικὸς νοῦς, sibi subiectas habet 
simplices aeternasque substantias, quae nihil sunt aliud nisi id ipsum substantiae 
et ἐνέργειαι, harumque cognoscit naturam (Bz. Ὁ. 410, zofe). Cf. 430} 27—3I1. 
"Avev ὕλης is virtually an adjective dvAwy. We often find pera and its com- 
plement similarly equivalent to an adjective: cf. τὰ μετὰ παιδιᾶς Ξκετὰ γελοῖα 
Εχά. Nic. 1177 ἃ 4. 

84 4. ἡ yap ἐπιστήμη. The statement recurs 430a 19 sq. 43ta 1. Cf. 
Metaph. 10746 38 ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα; ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ 
ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν 6 λόγος [τὸ πρᾶγμα] καὶ ἡ 
νόησες. οὖὔχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ 
ἔσται καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ pia. It should be observed that in that context 
A. has previously told us that τὸ εἶναι νοήσει is not the same as τὸ εἶναι νοουμένῳ : 
besides, experience shows that knowledge, sensation, opinion and thought have 
something else for their primary object, and, when they apprehend themselves, 
it is only as a subordinate object. 

a5. οὕτως, int. θεωρητικῶς. 

a5 τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ νοεῖν...6 ἐπισκεπτέον : a parenthetical remark. The question 
is suggested by the conclusion that mind may have itself for object: and, as 
Philop. observes, 528, 11, mind is always present to itself, ἀεὶ δὲ πάρεστιν ξαυτῷ 
ὁ vous. Why, then, if τὸ νοοῦν and τὸ νοούμενον be always present, should there 
be any intermission in the process of thinking ἢ 


H. 32 


498 NOTES 11. 4 


46. ἐν δὲ rots ἔχουσιν ὕλην. If from the sum of νοητὰ we subtract the pure 
forms or πρῶται οὐσίαι, τὰ ἄνευ ὕλης, to which the clause ἃ 3 sq. relates, what 
remains? Merely the things which have matter, the really existing concrete 
particulars in the world, like trees or stones or men. Each of them is ἃ τόδε τι, 
which can be analysed into form and matter, 412 a 6 sqq. Owing to the 
presence of matter their forms are ἔνυλα εἴδη (see vole On 403 a 25, λόγοι ἔνυλοι) 
and, as such, as really existing outside the mind, essentially different from the 
forms which the mind receives in thinking them, ἕκαστον τῶν νοητῶν. Cf. 
4328 4 366. ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά TE ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα, 
καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. They are only potential νοητὰ unless and 
until the mind by thinking them transforms them from potential into actual 
νοητά. Cf. Them. 97, 37 H., 180, 13 Sp. οὐδὲ yap ἦν φύσει ταῦτα [τὰ] νοητά, λέγω δὲ 
τὰ ἔνυλα εἴδη, GAN’ 6 νοῦς αὐτὰ νοητὰ ποιεῖ τῆς ὕλης ἀποτεμνόμενος, καὶ δυνάμει ἐστὶ 
νοητά, οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ. Hence A. infers that material things are not νοῦς, for it is 
not with potential νοητὰ but with actual νοητὰ that νοῦς is identical in the 
operation of thinking. 

a7. ἐκείνοις μὲν; int. τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην νοητοῖς. ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης, to be joined 
with τοιούτων, “to the exclusion of their matter.” 

a8. τῶν τοιούτων, int. τῶν ὕλην ἐχόντων. The stone itself is not in the soul, 
431 b 29, but, when we think the stone, we receive its form without its matter. 
ἐκείνῳ δὲ, int. τῷ νῷ, it will have the attribute νοητός: cf. 429b 28 ἐν δέ τι τὸ 
νοητὸν εἴδει. The sentence is equivalent to the statement ὁ νοῦς νοητὸς ἔσται. 


CHAPTER ΚΝ. 


In this chapter A. introduces a distinction between two forms of intellect 
conventionally known as the passive intellect, ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς, and the active 
intellect, 6 ποιητικὸς νοῦς. He does not himself use the latter term and the 
former is restricted to this chapter, where it occurs but once. I have followed 
the usual practice of editors in speaking of the two things distinguished by their 
conventional names, without thereby committing myself to any positive view as 
to the nature of the distinction. Everywhere else in his writings A. is content 
with the single term ὁ νοῦς, as 11 he accepted the essential unity of intellect. 
I need hardly remind the reader that A. regarded νοῦς as not confined to man: 
see 414} 18sq. Asin Metafh. A., cc. 6—10, when dealing with intellect in higher 
beings than man and in the deity, A. often makes use of intellect in man for 
purposes of illustration, so where, as here and in £74. Nic. X., cc. 7, 8, his 
subject is the human intellect, we may turn for illustration to the chapters in 
the Metaphysics. Indeed, a close study of A., c. 7 and c. 9 is almost indis- 
pensable to the elucidation of the present chapter. Throughout this chapter, 
as in the last, I have derived invaluable aid from Zabarella, who in the main 
follows Alex. Aphr. De Ax. 88, 17—91, 6, Mantissa 106, 19 sq. 

430a 10—825. The distinction recognised in the whole of nature 
between matter and the cause which brings it to actuality holds also of the soul. 
To the intellect which becomes al] objects corresponds the intellect which 
makes all objects, the latter in its operation resembling light, which makes 
potential colours actual. Mind in this respect is separable, impassive, unmixed, 
being in its essence activity [§ 1]. Actual knowledge is identical with its object 
and, although in the individual potential knowledge, that is, the faculty of 
knowing, precedes actual knowledge, no such priority attaches to it absolutely. 
The pnority of actual knowledge implies a mind in whose thought there is no 


111. 5 430 8. 6—a 12 “409 


intermission. Only when separated by abstraction is this intellect seen in its 
true nature, which is immortal and eternal. We have no memory of the thought 
which is eternal, because the causal intellect is impassive. The passive intellect 
is perishable and without this (causal intellect) does not think. 

430a το. ἐπε. The apodosis is a 13 ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν. 

alo. ὥσπερ ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει. To ὥσπερ answers καὶ before ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ» 
Δ. 13. By φύσις is meant “the physical universe,” “external reality,” ὁ οὐρανὸς 
καὶ ἡ φύσις, Metaph. 1072 Ὁ 14: or, as Zabarella puts it, “totus mundus genera- 
tioni et interitui obnoxius”: Jad. Ar. 835b 50 sqq. The exhaustive analysis of 
production, whether by nature (γένεσις) or by art (ποίησις), which we find in 
fetaph. Z., cc. 7—9 starts by distinguishing τὸ ἐξ οὗ, matter, τὸ ὑφ᾽ οὗ, the 
efficient cause or agent and τὸ τί, i.e. ἔνυλον εἶδος (1032 ἃ 17 SG., 1033a 24 56.). 
In .Zetaph. A., c. 3 the language is slightly varied, ὃ replacing ἐξ ot and eis ὃ 
replacing ri. Both accounts relate to sensible substances, αἰσθηταὶ οὐσίαι. A. 
holds that an efficient cause is at once necessary and sufficient to account for 
the transition from matter, or potentiality, to form, or actuality, as is distinctly 
stated AWefaDh. 1045 a 30 τί οὖν τούτου τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τὸ δυνάμει ὃν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, 
παρὰ τὸ ποιῆσαν, ἐν ὅσοις ἐστὶ γένεσις; οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον ἕτερον τοῦ τὴν δυνάμει 
σφαῖραν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι σφαῖραν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἦν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκατέρῳ [int. τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ 
τῇ μορφῇ or τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ], 1045 Ὁ 21 sqq. A.has therefore to find an 
efficient cause by which the transition of νοῦς from potentiality to actuality, 
which is implied in the foregoing chapter, is effected. 

a IO ἐστί τι τὸ pev...Il ἕτερον δὲς The form of the sentence resembles 4098 13 
ἔσται τι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν κινοῦν τὸ δὲ κινούμενον. So here ὕλη τις and ποιητικόν τι 
are the two factors to be distinguished, but the contrast is made more effective 
by τὸ μὲν and ἕτερον δὲ with anticipatory ri. See also 421a 26 χυμὸς ὁ pev,..6 δέ. 
Cf. for the analysis Metapk. 1033b 12 δεήσει yap διαιρετὸν εἶναι aici τὸ 
γιγνόμενον, καὶ εἶναι τὸ μὲν τόδε τὸ δὲ τόδε, λέγω δ᾽ Gre τὸ μὲν ὕλην τὸ δ᾽ εἶδος, 
26. b 18 Sq., 1045 ἃ 34 καὶ αἰεὶ τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δ᾽ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν. ὕλη 
ἑκάστῳ γένει: cf. Metadh. 1089 b 27 καίτοι δεῖ γέ τινα εἶναι ὕλην ἑκάστῳ γένει [each 
category, cf. 4το 8 18]: πλὴν χωριστὴν ἀδύνατον τῶν οὐσιῶν, 2ὖ. 1032 a 20—22, 
1070 Ὁ 19 sq., also 1054a 5, where from a comparison of 1053 Ὁ 22 566. it 
appears that colours, sounds, figures etc. are treated as γένη. 

alr. τοῦτο δὲ 5, that is, as Alex. Aphr., De An. 88, 19 completes the 
sentence, τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν, ὃ πάντα δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ γένει. Matter as 
yet undifferentiated is potentially all the different individual members of a 
given class, though actually it is none of them. 

alr. ἕτερον δὲ, “and, in the second place, that which is agent in ‘virtue of 
making all things.” In Mezafh. 1032a 17 sqq. τὸ ὑφ᾽ οὗ is described as τῶν 
φύσει τι ὄντων and ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος λεγομένη φύσις ἡ ὁμοειδής - αὕτη δ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῳ. 
Again, 1032 b 1 εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι ἑκάστου καὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν, also 
1033 Ὁ 7 τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι" τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὃ ἐν ἄλλῳ γίγνεται ἢ ὑπὸ τέχνης ἢ ὑπὸ 
φύσεως ἢ δυνάμεως. 

aI2 τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα. The exact sense which ποιεῖν bears in this con- 
nexion is thus explained .]17εζαξᾷ. 1033 a 31 τὸ yap τόδε τι ποιεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλως 
ὑποκειμένου τόδε τι ποιεῖν ἐστίν : Cf. 1033 Ὁ 2 τοῦτο δὲ οὕτως ὅτι ἔκ τουδί, ὅ ἐστι 
χαλκός, τοδὶ ποιεῖ, ὅ ἐστι σφαῖρα, b 22 ποιεῖ καὶ γεννᾷ ἐκ τοῦδε τοιόνδε: καὶ ὅταν 
γεννηθῇ, ἔστι τόδε τοιόνδε. Matter being imperishable and form eternal, there 
can be no making and no generation, yéveous ἅπλῆ, of either the one or the 
other, 1033a 28 sqq., 1033b 5 sqq. This is why the term “creative reason” is 
so misleading. 

8. 12. οἷον ἡ τέχνη. This illustrative clause is loosely constructed. As τέχνη 


32—2 


500 NOTES Ill. 5 


here illustrates τὸ αἴτιον, τὸ ποιοῦν, not 7 ὕλη, τὸ πάσχον, the expression οὕτως 
ἔχει would have seemed more appropriate than πέπονθεν. Butcf. 4344 τ4. A. 
uses this example because, as each art stands related to its proper matter in 
manufactured things, so stands the agent or efficient cause to the special 
matter of each genus in the things of nature. The production of health by 
the physician Metaph. 1032 Ὁ 5—30 and the construction of the brazen ring and 
sphere, 1033 a 28—b 11, are stock examples. [ron is potentially all manu- 
factured iron implements, 1.6. all the members of the genus. The art of iron 
manufacture in the soul of the maker (cf. 1032 a 32 sq. Ὁ 5, Ὁ 22 sq.) is an 
active principle by which out of the iron all the implements are made: for 
without some agent the material cannot pass from potence into act (Wefaph. 
1071 Ὁ 29 sq.) and so make the implements (πλὴν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, 1032 a 28 sqq., 
Ὁ 23, 1034 a 9 sqq.). 

8. 13. ἀνάγκη. The construction is, as suggested above, ἐπεὶ, dorep...puce, 
ἐστί τι τὸ μὲν.. ἕτερον O€..., ἀν ἄγκη Kal...bmapyev, “since there is, firstly, matter 
and, secondly, efficient cause, these differences must be found, not only in 
external nature, but also in the soul.” On this view the clause domep...dicer 
should properly come in the apodosis after ἀνάγκη. The only alternative is to 
take these words with ἐστί, which leaves ἐπεὶ without a verb and the sentence 
anacoluthic. The conclusion must be necessary, not probable. The argument 
does not prove the existence of a passive intellect. We already know that there 
is a potential or receptive intellect, a capacity of being affected by intelligibles 
and becoming thus actualised. The receptive intellect is rather the means by 
which the existence of the active intellect is proved. As Zabarella says, datur in- 
tellectus possibilis, qui naturam habet patientem et...potest transire de potentia 
ad actum. Ergo datur ex necessitate aliquod agens quod ducat intellectum 
possibilem de potentia ad actum. As in 412 ἃ 6'sqq. we examined the com- 
posite substance, οὐσέα συνθέτη, ζῷον ἔμψυχον, to find something, namely body, 
corresponding to substratum or δύναμις and something else, namely soul, corre- 
sponding to form or actuality, so here we are told to look in the soul for a 
counterpart of these fundamental differences found in the natural world. The 
word ψυχῇ here would be more precisely τῇ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ. 

8 14. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς, by hyperbaton for the more natural ἔστιν 
ὁ μὲν νοῦς τοιοῦτος. The word τοιοῦτος is predicate and stands for both “‘ passive” 
with 6 μὲν and “active” with ὁ δέ [int. vots]: “the one intellect is passive, like 
matter, in that it becomes all objects, the other intellect is active, like the 
efficient cause, in that it makes all objects.” If τοιοῦτος were attribute and not 
predicate, ἔστεν must mean “there exists” and the sense must be “passive 
intellect exists in so far as it becomes all objects, active intellect, in so far as 
it makes all objects.” Those who press this interpretation deny that A. ever 
really taught the existence of two distinct intellects in the sense in which the 
art which constructs is distinct from the material which it works upon: they 
contend that A.’s one intellect 1s sometimes passive, sometimes active, as it 
is sometimes θεωρητικός, sometimes πρακτικός. 

8. 14. τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι. Argyropylus translates: atque quidam est intel- 
lectus talis ut omnia fiat, quidam talis ut omnia agat atque efficiat, qui quidem 
ut habitus est quidam. With the dative of the infinitive so neatly turned in the 
Latin cf. 408b 23 τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν τι πεπονθένας. Zabarella also paraphrases: 
hic quidem intellectus est talis, ie. passivus vel habens locum materiae, eo. 
quod potest omnia fieri, alter vero est talis, 1.6. activus, eo quod potest omnia 
facere. Cf. 4298 18 πάντα νοεῖ, Ὁ 5 sq. ὅταν ἕκαστα γένηται. The word πάντα 
refers strictly to τὰ νοητά, as the simile from light shows. Light makes potential 


111. 5 430 a 12—a 16 5ΟῚ 


colours actual colours, νοῦς makes potential νοητὰ actual νοητά. For πάντα A. 
substitutes τὰ ὄντα 429 a 24 (45 compared with 429 Ὁ 30) and again 431 Ὁ 21 sqq. 
The term ὄντα must include material as well as immaterial things. Cf. 4308 3 
ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης, ἃ 6 ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην. It was a dictum of Averroes 
that A. posited the active intellect because he did not accept the Platonic 
universals as existing outside the soul. Commenting on this dictum, Zabarella 
shows that it requires correction, for universals outside the mind, however much 
they might be actually intelligible in themselves, would not be so in respect of 
our intellect. In themselves they are actually intelligible and need no intellect 
to make them so, but not as they are presented to our intellect, for they are 
presented shrouded in the phantasmata of their effects and of material things: 
cf. 4328 4 ἐν rots εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι. This is because our intellect 
is a form, gvé& homo est homo, and because cognition comes by abstraction, for 
nothing can be offered to the mind for cognition unless it pass through sense 
and imagination. Hence the active intellect is necessary even for knowing 
immaterial things. If we could cognise them ἄνευ φαντασμάτων, we should 
certainly cognise them without its aid: intellect in that case would not be 
two-sided. But such a mode of cognition is peculiar to intelligences higher than 
man (such as move the heavenly bodies, 434b 4—7). Our potential intellect, 
however, receives everything from the imagination and therefore it is said to 
become all objects, whether material or immaterial, by cognition, which is 
merely through abstraction. 

alI5. ds ἕξις τις. The term és is brought in to explain πάντα ποιεῖν, 
correcting or supplementing the comparison with τέχνη, which was used, 
a 12 sq., to illustrate the efficient cause throughout nature. In various passages 
ἔξις 1s practically a synonym of εἶδος (see Bonitz ad .lefapgh. 1070a 11, who 
cites 26. 1044b 32 τοῦ μὲν καθ᾽ ἕξιν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὕλη), just as εἶδος is some- 
times used (20. 1069 Ὁ 34, 1070b 11) instead of ἕξις for the positive counterpart 
of στέρησις. This interchange of meaning arises from the fact that both εἶδος 
in its distinctive sense of “form” and ἔξις in its distinctive sense of “‘ positive 
quality” or “permanent disposition” are opposed to στέρησις. Cf. 417 τό ἐπὶ 
τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν in contradistinction to bI5 ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις. 
There is, however, a difficulty, for νοῦς which is ἐν ἔξει, as described 429 b 5—9, 
is still δυνάμεε wos. That which is always actual and never potential can only 
be described as a ἔξις by a stretch of the term. Hence ris: cf. De Gen. σέ Corr. 
I. 7, 324b 17 ra δ᾽ εἴδη καὶ ra τέλη ἕξεις τινές, ἡ δὲ ὕλη 7 ὕλη τεαθητικόν. But in 
418b τὸ light is by implication ἕξις, while 418 b 9 it is ἐνέργεια. In Anal. Post. 
Ir., c. 10 all modes of cognition, sense, knowledge and intellect, are described 
as ἕξεις and in £7h. Nic. V1., e.g. 1139b 31, the various intellectual faculties are 
defined as ἕξεις. It is not, however, certain that our text 15 precisely what the 
commentators had before them. For Alex. Aphr. cf. De Az. 88, 23 εἶναί τινα 
δεῖ καὶ ποιητικὸν νοῦν, ὃς αἴτιος τῆς ἕξεως τῆς τοῦ ὑλικοῦ νοῦ γίνεται: where, how- 
ever, Alex. may have substituted αἴτιος τῆς ἕξεως for ἕξις τις On his own authority, 
tacitly correcting A. 

ἃ 15. οἷον τὸ φῶς Cf. 418b 18, “darkness is the absence from the trans- 
parent of the positive quality (és) above described, so that plainly light is the 
presence of this quality.” The comparison must have been suggested by the 
well-known passage in Republic Vi. 508 A sqq., where Plato compares the idea 
of the good as the cause of being and of knowledge to the sun. 

a6. ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. Cf Alex. Aphr. De 
An. Mautissa, 107, 31 ὡς γὰρ τὸ φῶς αἴτιον γίνεται τοῖς χρώμασιν τοῦ δυνάμει 
οὖσιν ὁρατοῖς ἐνεργείᾳ γίνεσθαι τοιούτοις, οὕτως καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρίτος νοῦς τὸν δυνάμει 


502 NOTES III. καὶ 


καὶ ὑλικὸν νοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦν ποιεῖ ἕξιν ἐμποιῶν αὐτῷ τὴν vonrixny. When it is 
dark, the colours exist in external things potentially, when it ts light they exist 
in them actually. It is light which causes the transition from potentiality to 
actuality. So, too, a cause is needed to transform δυνάμει νοητὰ into ἐνεργείᾳ 
νοητά, and this has now been provided. The introduction of ἕξις τις seems due 
to the comparison with light. 

ἃ 17 καὶ otros ὁ vots...18 apiyjs. As Zeller remarks (A4rzstozle, 11. p. 121, 
2. 3, Eng. Tr.) χωριστὸς means here not merely “separable,” but “actually 
separate,” i.e. “not involved in physical life,” and is best explained by De Gen. 
An. τι. 3, 736 Ὁ 28 οὐθὲν yap αὐτοῦ (int. τοῦ νοῦ) τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ 
ἐνέργεια. The three predicates χωριστός, ἀπαθής, ἀμιγὴς were applied to νοῦς 
in III., c. 4 before any mention had been made of the distinction between active 
and passive intellect. Here these predicates are claimed for the active intellect, 
and the clause dei γὰρ τιμιώτερον xré. certainly suggests that the intellect to 
which they were ascribed in c. 4 is the passive intellect, and that @ fortéord they 
belong to the active intellect which, as cause and activity, stands higher in the 
scale of logical priority. It has been objected that καὶ οὗτος δὲ 6 νοῦς is required 
if the sense is “this active intellect also” (as well as the passive intellect). But 
A. may be allowed to say that the attributes in question belong to this intellect 
without adding either “as well as to the other” or again “and not to the other.” 

a 18. τῇ οὐσίᾳ Sv ἐνέργεια. By ἐνέργεια must be understood actual thinking, 
which is νοῦ ἐνέργεια : cf. 4078 20. It is of its very essence to be activity, 
potentiality is altogether excluded. This characteristic is distinctive of the 
active, as compared with the receptive, intellect. The former is, in Zabarella’s 
words, “substantia vere separata per essentiam a materia,” for to such sub- 
stances alone does it belong that they are identical with their own activity and 
that they are so of their own essence and not through something else. Nothing 
material is in its essence its own activity or operation. The passive intellect 
can also be said to be identical with its own operation, but it is not ἐνέργεια 
“secundum suam substantiam,” but because it was brought to this perfection 
and made such by another, its own essence being pure potentiality in relation 
to all intelligibles. Cf. Mefaph. 1071 b 17 ἔτι οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία αὐτῆς 
δύναμις" ob yap ἔσται κίνησις ἀΐδιος - ἐνδέχεται yap τὸ δυνάμει ὃν μὴ εἶναι. δεῖ ἄρα 
εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια, 1074 Ὁ 18 εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτον δ᾽ ἄλλο κύριον 
(οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία νόησις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις), οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία 
εἴη" διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, 1072 Ὁ 26 ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, 
ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια, said of the deity. I have followed Torstrik, Belger and 
Biehl in substituting the nominative ἐνέργεια with Simplicius (243, 15, 27, 37) 
for the dative ἐνεργείᾳ of all the MSS., which most of the commentators read. 
Heinze, the latest editor of Themistius, has substituted ἐνέργεια (106, 5) for the 
dative, which the Mss. of Them. give, citing, after Torstrik, 99, 33 H., 183, 28 sq. 
Sp.; 100, 6 H.,184,15 Sp. Cf. 100, 10 sq. H., 184, 21 sq. Sp., where Them. appeals 
to the express testimony of A.’s own words οὕτω yap μόνως ἂν εἴη, καθά φησιν ’Ap., 
ταὐτὸν ἢ τε οὐσία αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ évépyeo. There are plenty of instances of both 
forms of the expression: e.g. for the nominative Metaph. 1072 a 25 ἀίδιον καὶ 
οὐσία Kai ἐνέργεια οὖσα, 1072b 27 cited above, 1071 Ὁ 20, Alex. Aphr. De Ax. 
89, 16 ἀπαθὴς δὲ ὧν καὶ μὴ μεμιγμένος ὕλῃ τινὶ καὶ ἄφθαρτός ἐστιν, ἐνέργεια dv καὶ 
εἶδος χωρὶς δυνάμεώς τε καὶ ὕλης : for the dative Mefafh. 1051 Ὁ 28, 1071 Ὁ 22, 29, 
Ι0728 5 sq., Ὁ 8, 4178 29, Ὁ 13, 431 a 3 ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος. 

ἃ τῷ, τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος. The possible intellect is its own 
intellection, yet it is not so in its essence, but it is made such by something 
else, being in its nature pure potentiality. That which makes it such, viz. the 


III. 5 430 a 16—a 20 503 


active intellect, must be in essence such, and must be its own intellection in a 
higher degree than the possible intellect. This is proved in the present clause, 
the object of which is to establish, not the three attributes χωριστός, ἀπταθῆς, 
autyns, but τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνέργεια, from which they are deduced. In .J}fefaph. ©., 
c. 9 there is a formal proof that, however good may be the power to do some- 
thing, the actual exercise of that power is higher and better, 1051 a 4 ὅτι δὲ καὶ 
βελτίων καὶ τιμιωτέρα τῆς σπουδαίας δυνάμεως ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον: and this 
holds when the act of thinking is compared with the power to think, J/e¢api. 
1072 Ὁ 20—24, 1074 Ὁ 28—30. Cf. De Gen. An. Ul. 1, 7328 3 βελτίονος δὲ καὶ 
θειοτέρας τὴν φύσιν οὔσης τῆς αἰτίας τῆς κινούσης πρώτης, ἦ ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ 
εἶδος τῆς ὕλης, βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κεχωρίσθαι τὸ κρεῖττον τοῦ χείρονος... 7 βέλτιον γὰρ 
καὶ θειότερον ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, ἣ ἀρρὲν ὑπάρχει τοῖς γινομένοις- ὕλη δὲ τὸ 7 
θῆλυ, Pol. 1333a 21 αἰεὶ γὰρ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονός ἐστιν ἕνεκεν, (αξφρ. 12, 14 Ὁ 4 
ἔτε παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον πρότερον εἶναι τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ. 
Τίμιον and θεῖον are often used to denote incomparable intrinsic worth: cf. 
Metaph. 1074b 20 διὰ yap τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει; Anal. Post. 1. 31, 88a 5 
τὸ δὲ καθόλου τίμιον, ὅτι δηλοῖ τὸ αἴτιον, Dé Caelo 1. 2, 269b 14 ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ 
σώματα τὰ δεῦρο καὶ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἕτερον κεχωρισμένον, τοσούτῳ τιμιωτέραν ἔχον τὴν 
φύσιν ὅσῳπερ ἀφέστηκε τῶν ἐνταῦθα πλεῖον, De Mot. An. 6, 700b 34. Cf. the 
sense of πρότερον in, 6.5. Ῥάρϑδ. VII. 9, 265 ἃ 22 πρότερον δὲ καὶ φύσει καὶ λόγῳ 
καὶ χρόνῳ τὸ τέλειον μὲν τοῦ ἀτελοῦς, τοῦ φθαρτοῦ δὲ τὸ ἄφθαρτον. The logical 
priority of τὸ ποιοῦν over τὸ πάσχον, which is here implied, is affirmed for τὸ 
κινοῦν as compared with τὸ κινούμενον in Aefaph. 1010 b 37 $q., while, according 
to 1049 Ὁ 27, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἐστίν : and herein les the reason why A. 
postulates an ἀρχὴ which is always ἐνέργεια, never δύναμις, nor even ἐνεργοῦν 
τι οὗ ἡ οὐσία δύναμις, Metaph. 1071 Ὁ 14—20, 1074b 18-—21, alike for motion and 
for thought. Cf. 1075 Ὁ 30—-34, De Part. An. τ. 1, 640a 24 τὸ ποιῆσαν πρότερον 
ὑπῆρχεν ov μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ: This language, attributing 
superiority or logical priority to the cause over matter, is of Platonic origin: 
cf. Phaedo 80 A, Philebus 26 E, 27 A τὸ δονλεῦον eis γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ, 28 C, 30 A, 53D 
TO μὲν σεμνότατον ἀεὶ πεφυκός, τὸ δ᾽ ἔλλιπὲς ἐκείνου Sqq., Tzmaeus 34 B, C. 

aig. ἡ ἀρχὴ. To suit ἃ 12 supra, τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, the term must be 
taken in a restricted sense as efficient or final cause: cf. Mefaph. 1025 Ὁ 22 
τῶν μὲν yap ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχή, ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη. 

aig. τὸ δ᾽ αὐτός This remark is repeated 431a I—3. The doctrine has 
been implied in 429b 9, Ὁ 27 sq., 430a2sqq. Knowledge is a function of the 
intellect which becomes all objects: cf. AZe/aph. 1074 Ὁ 38 sqq., as cited in xole 
on 430a 4. The bearing of this sentence upon what precedes is made clearer 
by a comparison with ἤἤέζαῤἪ. A., c. 9. In that chapter two difficulties are 
raised about the divine mind: (1) if its thinking has an external object, its 
essence will be not thinking, but the power to think, and it will not be itself the 
highest and best; (2) what, then, does it thinker A. first refutes the assumption 
that the essence of the divine mind is not actual thinking, but the mere power 
to think. The object of its thought must be the highest and most divine and 
must be immutable. Nothing satisfies these conditions but itself. Hence the 
conclusion: 1074 Ὁ 33 αὑτὸν dpa νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον : it is νόησις νοήσεως. 
This corresponds to the stage reached in our own chapter at 4308 18 τῇ οὐσίᾳ 
ὧν ἐνέργεια, for νοῦ ἐνέργειακενόησις. To this it may be objected that knowledge 
and other products of thought have objects other than themselves; and this 
objection is met, precisely as in the present chapter, by the statement that 
theoretical knowledge is identical with its object, 1074 Ὁ 38—107§a 5. 

a20. τῷ πράγματι, “the thing known,” τῷ ἐπιστητῷ : cf. Metaph. 1074 Ὁ 38 


504 NOTES LI. 5 


ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα. See wzofes on 429 Ὁ 21, 4308 3. ἡ δὲ κατὰ 
δύναμιν, int. ἐπιστήμη. Identity with the thing known is verified for actual 
knowledge, but not for potential knowledge, which is in point of time prior 
to actual knowledge in the individual and is distinct both from actual know- 
ledge and from the thing known. 

a2I. χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, int. ἐστι τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμης. As 
potential knowledge does not precede actual knowledge in other respects, so 
neither does it precede it in time, since before X actually knows something, 
someone else knew it. Potentiality may precede actuality in one individual, 
but this potentiality was preceded by actuality in someone else. The temporal 
priority of ἐνέργεια over δύναμις generally from this point of view is established 
Metaph. 1049b 17 sqq. The words ἐν τῷ évi=in one and the same particular 
man: cf. 412 a 26 ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. If we take the individual, he has a power of 
thinking and knowing before he actually thinks and knows. Cf. 417 a 21 566.) 
especially 417 b 17—19, where the faculty of sense is declared analogous to the 
ἕξις of ἐπιστήμη. For geometry, the typical science, the case is well put AZefapA. 
1051 a 21—33- How do we learn or discover the truths of geometry? <A.’s reply 
is (a 21) εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ, and, after illustrating this by 
one or two examples, he concludes: a 29 ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτε τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς 
ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα εὑρίσκεται. αἴτεον δ᾽ ὅτι νόησις ἡ ἐνέργειαι ὥστ᾽ ἐξ ἐνεργείας 
ἡ δύναμις" καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες γιγνώσκουσιν" ὕστερον γὰρ γενέσει ἡ ἐνέργεια ἣ 
κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν. The potential properties of the figure are thus discovered by being 
transformed to actualities; the reason is that the actuality of these mathematical 
objects is the thinking them. Hence here also the potentiality is preceded by 
actuality, and we get knowledge by the active exercise of thought, for it is only 
in each individual person that the actuality, the exercise of power, is later to 
arise. I take ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν to mean the same as ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν 
ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ of our text. 

a2I. ὅλως δὲ, simpliciter loquendo et non sumendo aliquem singularem 
hominem (Zabarella). This stands in contrast with ἐν τῷ ἑνί, “in the individual.” 
We might therefore expect that ὅλως would mean ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, “in the universe at 
large,” as seems to be the case, eg., Piys. VII. 6, 259b 3 ταῦτα δὴ καὶ δόξαν 
παρεῖχε μή ποτ ἐνδέχεται κίνησιν ἐγγίνεσθαι μὴ οὖσαν ὅλως (at all), διὰ τὸ ἐν τούτοις 
ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς τοῦτο συμβαῖνον. And so (in part) Philop. and Zeller: Philoponus’ 
words are: 557, 25 ὁλικῶς καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ οὐκ ἔστι πρότερον 
τὸ δυνάμει τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ, διότι πάντα ἐξ ἐντελεχείᾳ τινὸς ὄντος προάγεται εἰς ἐνέργειαν 
διὰ τοῦ δυναμένου προάγειν. Themistius, however, 99, 31 H., 183, 26 Sp., sub- 
stitutes ἁπλῶς, which, as we learn from Philop. 557, 27, was actually a variant 
for ὅλως. Bonitz has remarked that in certain passages the meaning of ἁπλῶς 
is much the same as that of ὅλως, καθ᾽ ὅλου: quoniam si qua notio simpliciter 
praedicatur, nihil est additum quod eam distinctius definiat et in angustiorem 
ambitum cogat (Comm. in Metaph., p. 414, ad 1052a 19). Cf. Mefaph. 1039b 21 
ἡ μὲν οὕτως ἐστὶν οὐσία σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ συνειλημμένος ὁ λόγος, ἡ δὲ ὃ λόγος ὅλως, 1033 Ὁ II 
τοῦ δὲ σφαῖραν εἶναι ὅλως εἴ ἐστι γένεσις, ἔκ τινός τι ἔσται, 1033 Ὁ 26 566. 

a 21. οὐ χρόνῳ, int. προτέρα ἐστίν. In the order of thought or being, 
‘potential knowledge is not prior to actual. If in the individual man it comes 
first in the order of development, it does not follow that even this temporal 
priority belongs to it ὅλως, whether we interpret this word by “absolutely” or 
“in the whole universe.” In detaph. 1049b 171050 a 3, where the temporal 
priority, from one point of view, of ἐνέργεια over δύναμις is established, the 
treatment suggests that ὅλως means “if we consider the whole species.” There 
is amactive intellect whose energy is not preceded by a state of mere potentiality. 


Til. 5 430 a 20—a 22 505 


To the divine mind, described J/fe/apf. Δ., c. 7 sqq., this antithesis does not 
apply. All potentiality is there excluded. The energy of this divine mind is 
not associated with a νοῦς παθητικός, much less with a body: in Aristotelian 
phrase, ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ov κινεῖται οὐδὲ πάσχει. 

8. 22. ἀλλ. A. has been remarking, about the intellect that becomes all 
objects, that its knowledge is not always in it actually, but first potentially and 
afterwards actually (and hence it does not always think, 430a 5). Then he 
goes on: “But this is not the case with the active intellect, it has not first potential 
knowledge and afterwards actual knowledge, so that it sometimes thinks and 
sometimes does not think: it is always actually thinking,” sua essentia est sua 
operatio. 

a 22, οὐχ Sré μὲν νοεῖ, int. οὗτος 6 vows. So Alex. Aphr., De An. Wantissa 
109, 27 Sq., 112, 11 (cf. 112, 23—113, 2), Them. 99, 34—36 H., 184, 1—3 Sp. We 
could hardly supply ὁ νοῶν here, because of the next sentence. Some com- 
mentators, who take divergent views, are obviously influenced by dogmatic 
considerations. Thus Averroes made the potential intellect the subject and 
Aquinas the speculative intellect, in which active and passive are combined. 
Both held the immortality of the whole intellect. The effect of the prefixed 
negative extends over the whole sentence: ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δ᾽ οὐ voei=otK ἀεὶ νοεῖ 
and describes intermittent thought, the experience of individual men, who some- 
times think and sometimes do not think. This, then, is denied of the active 
intellect and by implication it is affirmed that it thinks unintermittently and 
perpetually, in marked contrast to the promised enquiry 4308 5 τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ 
νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον, where the subject νοῦς, as so far depicted, must be 
the potential intellect which, as above explained, by acquiring knowledge de- 
velopes into a habit (é&s). There is no need, however, to cut the knot and 
with Simplicius in ancient, and Torstrik in modern times, omit οὐχ, as did the 
scribes of two inferior MSS. When Torst. argues that the text of De A. has 
been tampered with on doctrinal grounds, the probabilities in each case must be 
carefully weighed. Torst. himself ascribes the insertion of οὐχ to Platonising 
influences: but if the text were altered by the School (which has yet to be 
proved), it is at least as probable that their first anxiety would be to make 
Aristotle’s utterances as far as possible consistent, or at any rate to avoid 
introducing such an apparent and glaring contradiction as that between μὴ ἀεὶ 
νοεῖν and οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν κτέ, 

ἃ. 22. χωρισθὲϊς-, “when separated.” The masculine participle goes back to 
otros 6 vous, active intellect. According to 429 a 11, χωρισθεὶς should mean 
primarily “‘ when separated from the other faculties of soul.” Thus the nutritive 
faculty is found separated from the rest in plants, 415 a 2 588. But while, 
according to 414 Ὁ 29—415a 10, the general rule is that the higher faculties 
imply the presence of the lower, the case of θεωρητικὸς νοῦς is peculiar. As a 
matter of fact, it is found apart from the rest, not only in the deity, but also in 
the spirits of the spheres. But we must not overlook the all-important dis- 
tinction that the deity and these spirits are, unlike man, wholly immaterial 
essences: cf. Mefafh. 1073. a 353-13, a 34—1073b 1. In the plainest terms A. 
denies of them μέγεθος, 1073.2 5 μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται, a 38 ἄνευ μεγέθους, 
whereas it is still a problem 431 Ὁ 17—-19 whether human intellect ever is xeyo- 
ρισμένον μεγέθους. It has been maintained that in the case of man “separated 
from the other faculties of soul” comes to much the same thing as “when 
separated from the body,” viz. before birth or after death. But, it may be 
asked, is this transcendental interpretation necessary? Others would explain 
χωρισθεὶς as “separated by abstraction.” No one would ever think twice before 


506 NOTES Il. καὶ 


thus interpreting the aorist of the active verb, as in AMleZafh. 1016 Ὁ 2, 1036 b 7, 
1078 Ὁ 31, 1r086b 4, 5: cf. 1036b 3 ἀφελεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ. This view was clearly 
stated by Zabarella. To begin with, he contends, the participle must mean a 
separation which took place in past time. Hence χωρισθεὶς is not applicable to 
God or the whole genus of abstract substances, the intelligences which move 
the stars: such substances have always been without matter, as they now are. 
Thus χωριστός, which can, and often does, mean “both separable and actually 
separate” 1s the appropriate term for them: or xeywpiopévos, which is used 
with ὧν like an adjective 431b18sq. Again, 1f we mean by χωρισθεὶς a real 
separation from matter, the term does not suit the active intellect, for it would 
imply that the latter was first implicate In matter and that afterwards it was 
separated from matter: cf. Mefaph.989b 4 τῶν yap αὐτῶν pikis ἐστι καὶ χωρισμὸς 
and 989 b I ἄμεκτα δεῖν προὐπάρχειν. If, then, it is not a real separation which 
is intended, it must be merely a mental separation. Hence A.’s meaning is 
that, if we mentally separate it from the relation it has to the passive intellect, 
which in the individual becomes all objects, and if we consider it in itself and 
no longer as active, it is its true self alone, τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί, because it is pure 
quiddity and there is no distinction between the quiddity and that which has 
the quiddity. In case our curiosity is not satisfied and we want to know what 
it is out of relation to the passive intellect and to man, A. lightly touches upon 
what it is in itself, though well aware that this question belongs to the domain 
of metaphysics. He puts us off for the present with τῇ οὐσίᾳ dv ἐνέργεια and 
τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί. Cf. 431 b τ μὴ κεχωρισμένον μεγέθους. Plato by the simile of 
the sea-god Glaucus, Red. 611 A—612 A, intimates his belief that the essential 
nature of soul is not to be confounded with its manifestations within our 
experience. 

8. 22. μόνον. It is not quite clear whether this word goes with χωρισθεὶς or 
with τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί, “it is only when separated that it is what it is” or “when 
separated, it is what it is and nothing else.” From the word μόνον it has been 
inferred that the condition of companionship with other psychical faculties 
incident to the life of the individual in some measure hampers or obscures 
the energy of thought. 

a 23. τοῦτο μόνον, int. τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν. Cf. ΦΖᾷ. Nic. 1177 a τς etre θεῖον ὃν καὶ 
αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἔν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, Ὁ 28 ἡ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, Ὁ 34 τὸ κράτιστον 
τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ, ἤἥεϊαῤῆ. το74 Ὁ 15 δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι [int. ὁ νοῦς] τῶν φαινομένων 
θειότατον. The neuter pronoun is influenced by τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστὶ just before. It 
is best to interpret τοῦτο here in conformity with τοῦτο in the next line (and, in 
my opinion, ἄνευ τούτου in a 25), 1.6. to refer all three to active intellect, or, 
more precisely, to the real nature or quiddity of active intellect, τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί. 

223. ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον. Some, e.g. Zeller (Arzstotle 11. p. 104, 2. 2, Eng. 
Tr.), hold that eternity is involved in the attribute χωριστός. Cf. 408b 25 note. 
The passage of primary importance besides 408 Ὁ 18 sqq., viz. Mefaph. 10704 24, 
is cited in a wofe on 408b 19, p. 277. Here we have a clear statement that 
there 1s nothing immortal in the human soul except the active intellect. A. 
grants that there is an immortal element and tells us what it is. Of the two 
terms ἀίδιον is wider: ἀθάνατον applies strictly only to living beings, death being 
the privation of life. Cf. Plato, Red. 611 A ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ dei ὃν εἶναι, εἰ δ᾽ dei dv, 
ἀθάνατον. The terms are probably not differentiated here, the use of both is for 
greater emphasis. The attempts to differentiate them are not successful. See 
Philop. 537, 1—8, 541, 6—10, who maintains that the other faculties of soul are 
immortal, but only intellect is eternal. Others say that ἀθάνατον refers to future 
immortality, ἀΐδιον to past eternity; or that the active intellect is ἀθάνατον gud 


1Π. 5 430 a 22—a 23 507 


intellect and life, eternal gwé substance. Aquinas, understanding the predicates 
of the whole intellective soul, makes A. declare it ἀΐδεον merely a parte Post, 
which, as Zabarella remarks, however true from the Christian standpoint, would 
not have appeared so to A. He would never have admitted that anything 
could be eternal @ parte post which was not also eternal ὦ parte ante. Cf. 
Theophrastus apud Them. 108, 26 H., 200, 6 Sp. ἔοικε δ᾽ οὖν ὡς ἀγένητος, εἴπερ 
καὶ ἄφθαρτος. 

8. 23. οὐ μνημονεύομεν, “we” as individual human beings, who began to be at 
birth and cease to be at death. In 408b 27 sq. the individual is said not to 
remember when the body is destroyed. But here no such condition is attached, 
and it is arbitrary to force the same meaning out of the two passages. The 
clause seems to answer, not the preceding sentence, but the previous assertion, 
a 22, of perpetual, unbroken thinking, “though it is always thinking, yet we do 
not remember”: and this, too, when we do remember many of our former 
thoughts and can often recall at will what we learned or knew, De em. 1, 
449b 18—22 εὐ saepe. The reference to 4308 22 suggests that the object of 
memory which A. omits to state is the eternal thought of the active intellect. 
But will this explanation suit the reason assigned? An activity of perpetual 
thinking is certainly impassive in a different way from a δύναμις. The latter, 
however often objects are presented to it, never fails to respond by receiving 
them and thus passing from potence into act. The former, being always in 
act, never once does this. For memory two things are requisite, (1) affection, 
πάθος, and (2) time. So far as the active intellect is concerned, there is no 
affection in the composite substance of the individual, nothing μνημονευτόν, 
because nothing φανταστόν. It is true that A. sometimes speaks as if the 
particular man could on rare occasions become directly conscious, as we should 
now say, of the eternal life of the divine element within him, AZezafh. 1072 Ὁ 13— 
30, from which I cite b 14 διαγωγὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ofa ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτως 
γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐκεῖνο (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον) and Ὁ 24 εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, 
6 θεὸς αἰεί, θαυμαστόν - εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὦδε, 1075 a 5---Ἰο, 
especially a 7 ὥσπερ 6 ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, ἢ ὅ γε τῶν συνθέτων, ἔχει Ev rive χρόνῳ" 
οὗ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εὖ ἐν τῳδὶ ἢ ἐν τῳδί, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὃν ἄλλο τε" οὕτως δ᾽ 
ἔχει αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἡ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα. The text of this last important 
citation is not quite certain. Bonitz bracketed ἢ before 6 γε τῶν συνθέτων and 
translated “die menschliche Vernunft, obgleich (ye) das Zusammengesetzte ihr 
Gegenstand ist.” See also Ark. Nic. 11776 26—1178 a 8, 1178 Ὁ 18—32, 
especially Ὁ 26 τοῖς δ᾽ ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ὁμοίωμά re τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας 
ὑπάρχει, and, when he urges us to make ourselves immortal as far as we can, 
Eth, Nic. 1177) 33, he explains his meaning by adding “and spare no pains to 
live in the exercise of the highest of our faculties.” But this rapture of thought 
is rare, even for the most highly favoured of men: of them through the greater 
part of their lives and of the great majority of mankind at all times both the 
statement that we do not remember and the reason, the impassivity of the 
active intellect, hold good. 

There is another way of explaining the passage psychologically, which was 
adopted by Plutarch of Athens (apud Philop. 541, 20 sqq-), viz. to understand it 
as referring to the lapses of memory, the errors, mistakes and forgetfulness 
which, frequent at all periods of life, grow more frequent in old age. But the 
reason assigned, viz. the impassivity of intellect, seems quite unsuitable to the 
effect. Stress must on this view be laid, not on the impassivity of the active, 
but on the corruptibility of the passive intellect. Moreover, other causes, 
mainly of a corporeal nature, are assigned by Δ. himself in his treatise on 


508 NOTES Lil. 5 


memory, De Jen. 1, 450a 30—b II, 2, 453 a 14—b 7, and nothing is there said 
of this cause. Again, instead of the general enquiry why we do not remember 
we should have expected the question why we forget, or rather why we forget 
this or that particular thing. Cf. MWefafh. 1047a 1 ἢ yap λήθῃ ἢ πάθει τινὶ ἢ 
χρόνῳ: ob yap δὴ τοῦ ye πράγματος φθαρέντος, det γάρ ἐστιν. Theophrastus 
attributed not only forgetfulness, but error (cf. 427 a 29 sqq.) and falsehood 
to the union in man of the two intellects: ajud Them. 108, 27 sq. H., 200, 8— 
10 Sp. It is not, however, certain that the allusion is to our lemina. 

Lastly, there is the transcendental view, which most commentators have 
adopted. It is presented in two forms: (1) Why after death do we not re- 
member our past lives, if the intellect is immortal and survives the death of the 
man? (2) Why in this present life do we not remember what the intellect 
knew in previous states of existence, since intellect is eternal and existed before 
our birth? The advocates of (1) make A. say “Why do we men not remember?” 
But after death the man has ceased to exist. Besides, it 1s vain to search for 
the cause when we are ignorant of the fact or effect. We cannot know now 
that we do not remember after death, but the words of the text presuppose a 
known fact. Those who support (1) as against (2) claim that the terms of A.’s 
solution favour their view, since “ perishable” and “impassive” are correct only 
if the remembrance is assumed to take place in a future life. If the remem- 
brance were in this life of a past incarnation, ἀγένητος, γενητὸς ought to have 
replaced ἀπαθής, φθαρτός. A. ought to have said “We do not remember our 
former lives because the active intellect is ἀγένητον, not subject to birth, and the 
passive intellect is born at the same time as the man, and has had no pre- 
existence.” On the other hand, if it be assumed that A. is alluding to Plato, an 
assumption which cannot be proved, then this would make in favour of (2), for 
it was knowledge in this present life which Plato explained by recollection from a 
past existence. It is also a point in favour of (2) that there is no need to qualify 
the remembered past by the words “before birth,” while, if the reference were to 
a future life, we should have expected “after death” or something equivalent to 
τούτου φθειρομένου 408 Ὁ 27. Neither view, then, can be stated without pre- 
senting grave inconsistencies. Though the second view appears the less 
inconsistent of the two, in so far as it assigns the memory in question to this 
life, it is not really more tenable. We cannot remember what we have not 
experienced and, if individual existence began at birth, so also did individual 
experience. In this treatise A. takes no account of soul outside the animate 
body, but always considers it as in the body. See, e.g., 407 Ὁ 13—26, 412 Ὁ 4— 
413 a 10, 414 a 4—28, 415 a 25—b 7. 

8. 24. ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός. The expression occurs nowhere else, 
but the conception is familiar: see, e.g., 4298 13—18. Φθαρτὸς is not the 
proper antithesis to ἀπαθές, unless that word be taken to imply “indestructible,” 
ἄφθαρτον. But see zoze on 408b 25, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές. As, however, aidsov has 
just preceded, I think the argument is not fully stated. 1 should expect it to 
run thus: ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, παθητικὸν δὲ ὥλλο, “but what is capable of 
suffering is something else, not this.” This completes the statement of the reason 
why we do not remember the thoughts of the eternal intellect. If so, φθαρτὸς 
is a further step: the intellect which can suffer, which becomes all objects, is 
not immortal and eternal, but perishable. We may recall the formal proof 
given Metaph. to50b 6—18 of the proposition οὐδὲν δυνάμει ἀΐδιον : things 
perishable are just those ὧν ἡ οὐσία ὕλη καὶ δύναμις, 1050 Ὁ 27: it was ὁ δυνάμει 
νοῦς with which A. started inc. 4. Here, however, the greatest care is needed. 
Intellect is a form, and all forms are uncreated, even if they are not all 


ΤΠ. 5 4308 23—a 25 509 


separable. The passive intellect belongs to the class of objects which are and 
are not without becoming or perishing. It is, therefore, only fer acctdens 
generable or perishable when the particular thing in which it dwells comes to 
be or is destroyed. Cf. .Wefaph. 1043 Ὁ 14—16, 1044 Ὁ 21 sqq. In the text no 
grounds are given for the conclusion φθαρτός. We may conjecture as follows. 
The man cannot think without mental images, which imply sense and imagina- 
tion, and these powers of the soul are conditioned by the body. The dissolution 
of the compound substance, the man himself, puts an end to the processes of 
sensation and imagination, and to the thinking of the man, in so far as mental 
images are necessary thereto. Again, if the passive intellect perishes, it also 
had a beginning, its existence in the man is finite, like the existence of the man 
himself. The single immortal and eternal element in us is obviously not subject 
to the same conditions. 

a25. καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν voet. The advocates of the transcendental inter- 
pretation of od μνημονεύομεν Consider that this is part of the reason why memory 
does not extend from one incarnation to another. Accordingly Simplicius 
(248, 6) makes ὁ ἀπαθὴς νοῦς the subject of νοεῖ and ἄνευ τούτου-- ἄνευ τοῦ 
παθητικοῦ νοῦ. <AS to the latter point Bonitz agrees, Jud. Ar. 491 a 57 56. 
Trend. objected that, upon this interpretation, id quod per pronomina licere 
crederes, tolleretur ἀπάθεια et ipsa agentis intellectus hbertas in quandam 
patientis servitutem assereretur. Simplicius foresaw this objection and met it 
by restricting νοεῖν to things which can be remembered: 248, 4 ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς 
φθαμτὸς ws παθητικός, καὶ ὡς els τὸ μόνιμον συναιρούμενος [Merged in immobility], 
ἄνευ δὲ τοῦ παθητικοῦ ὥς παθητικοῦ καὶ προϊόντος μέχρι τῶν σωματοειδῶν ζωῶν οὐδὲν 
νοεῖ ὁ ἀπαθὴς τῶν ὅσα δηλαδὴ μνημονευτά, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος ἅπερ, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις αὐτὸς 
ἡμᾶς διδάσκει, πάντως ἐστὶ φανταστά. διὸ ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν μνημονευτῶν νοήσει 
δεύμεθα πάντως τοῦ μέχρι φαντασίας ττροϊόντος λόγου, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐδὲ ὁ ἀπαθὴς 
τῶν μνημονευτῶν τι νοήσει. \Vithout some such restriction the statement is 
curiously infelicitous as applied to the eternal something whose essence is 
activity. Zabarella also makes the active intellect the subject of νοεῖ and ἄνευ 
Trourov=without the passive intellect. The active intellect, according to him, 15 
said to think in two ways, (1) secundum se, in which sense, though the active 
intellect is said to think, the man is not said to think and (2) non formaliter, sed 
effective, quia efficit in homine intellectionem, et tunc homo dicitur intelligens, 
non ipse intellectus agens, qui producit in homine intellectionem potius ut 
intelligibilis quam ut intellectus, sicut sol non est videns, sed efficit in oculo 
visionem. Thus he distinguishes human thought in the individual, for which 
the passive intellect is necessary, from the eternal thought of the active intellect, 
and restricts νοεῖ to the former. Zeller (4ristotle 11.. p. IOI, w. 3, Eng. Tr.) 
offers two explanations. In one of them, taking the active intellect as the 
subject of νοεῖ and τούτου to mean the passive intellect, he restricts νοεῖ to the 
thought of the individual, so that there would be no inconsistency with a 22 οὐχ 
ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δ᾽ οὐ νοεῖ, which does not apply to the thought of the individual. 
His second explanation would secure this restriction to the thought of the 
individual by making ὁ νοῶν or ἢ ψυχὴ the subject of νοεῖ, i.e. “no thought is 
possible.” In my opinion the Greek naturally suggests the view that ὁ παθη- 
τικὸς vous is the subject not only of φθαρτός, but also of οὐθὲν νοεῖ. For, if we 
suppose that νοεῖ is one more instance of the omission of the subject and that 
τὸ νοοῦν, then to be supplied, means the composite substance of the individual 
thinker, it by no means follows that ἄνευ τούτου must mean the passive intellect. 
If the active intellect had not been required to complete the theory of how 
thinking comes about (429a 13), this chapter would never have been written, 


510 NOTES III. 5 


for nowhere else is a distinction drawn between two intellects. In order, then, 
that the individual man may think, it is indispensable to assume both forms of 
intellect, that which becomes all objects and that which makes all objects (cf. 
Alex. Aphr. De Am. Mazntissa 112, 20 sq.), and ἄνευ τούτου may be understood 
of either. If, however, as 1 believe, φθαρτὸς is opposed, not to ἀπαθές, but to 
ἀίδιον, and if A. is therefore contrasting the one form of intellect with the other, 
the attribute of corruptibility would naturally be followed by the assertion of 
the dependence of the conditioned upon that which conditions it. I may add 
that, if it were certain that οὐθὲν νοεῖ, like 408 Ὁ 28 οὔτε μνημονεύει, were quasi- 
impersonal, I should certainly advocate a change of punctuation and put a full 
stop after φθαρτός, the new sentence thus summing up the whole chapter: “and 
without the active intellect no thinking is possible.” 


CHAPTER VI. 


This chapter treats of various topics, but all are more or less closely con- 
nected with the main subject, the apprehension of single or isolated concepts. 
If we take the first sentence and the last together, we may infer that the main 
subject of the chapter is intuitive thought and its superiority to discursive 
thinking, in so far as it deals with the indivisibles, in the apprehension of 
which falsehood is impossible. Between these two sentences we find (1) a 
brief discussion of judgment, the process by which the mind puts together 
single notions and forms a new unity, viz. the judgment expressed in the 
proposition, whether it do so by combining or by separating. This section 
ends with the important statement (b 5) that in all such cases it is the intellect 
which makes the unity. (2) We have a sketch of the way in which three kinds 
of single notions are thought and known; firstly, the quantitative notions, like 
length and magnitude, which belong to mathematics; secondly, the infimae 
species of the physical world and, thirdly, the point. This leads to (3) a casual 
mention of the possibility of a self-thinking thought. Why these topics are 
introduced and treated in this order is not stated. A. does not set out to prove 
that the mind thinks indivisibles, but rather, taking that for granted, dwells on 
the various ways in which this comes about. He is dealing throughout with 
units or unities, ἀδιαίρετον being simply a more precise term for the vague and 
ambiguous ἔν : and the obscurity of some parts of the chapter stands in marked 
contrast to the clear account of the subject given elsewhere. Now of unity 
there are various grades, identity, similarity, equality (cf. efaph. 1054.a 29 sqq.): 
in the fullest sense unity attaches pre-eminently to substances. In general, 
those things are eminently one of which the thought which thinks the quiddity 
is indivisible and can effect no separation either in time or in space or in notion, 
more particularly if they are substances, Mefafh. 1016b 1sqq. Material things, 
τὸ συνεχές, τὸ ὅλον, are unities of the lowest order, the test being that when 
such a thing moves, all of it moves together. Then again, the universal, 
whether genus or infima species, is one, and so is the particular: but these 
have unity of a higher order, the test of which is that they are thought as one, 
which is the same thing as saying that the thought which thinks them is one. 
But these are only instances of the application of the predicate of unity. What 
is 1t which constitutes their common nature? A. is careful to deny the propo- 
sition, which he ascribes to the Pythagoreans and Plato, that unity is a separately 
existing entity in the universe, by partaking in which other things become one. 


III. 6 430 a 25—a 26 SII 


There is no objective ἔν, there is only ἔν rz, i.e. something which exists as the 
universal predicate. How, then, can oneness be defined? Not in the ordinary 
way per genus et aifferentram, for unity, like Being, is too wide to come under 
any of the categories, so universal a predicate that it can be applied to all 
things, adding nothing to their content; just as ἄνθρωπος -- ἄνθρωπος ὦν, 50 
also ἄνθρωπος εἷς is no more than ἄνθρωπος, Metaph. 1003 Ὁ 26sq. What do we 
convey by this universal predicate? Just this, that oneness is indivisibleness : 
Metaph. 1052b τό τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαιρέτῳ ἐστὶν εἶναι ὅπερ τῷδε ὄντι καὶ ἰδίᾳ 
χωριστῷ ἢ τόπῳ ἣ εἴδει ἢ διανοίᾳ, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλῳ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ μέτρῳ 
εἶναι πρώτῳ ἑκάστου γένους καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ" ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἐπὶ τἄλλα 
ἔλήλυθεν. Moreover, when we think of a thing as one, we do so without 
reference to any division into parts of which it may be capable, or any dis- 
tinction or difference which presents itself when it is compared with another 
thing, and we think of it moreover as absolutely separate and shut off from 
everything else. Thus oneness is privation of relation. When a fleet is thought 
of as one, the differences between the various ships composing it are ignored. 
We should cease to think of it as one, if we turned our attention to the number 
of individual ships composing it. There are many different colours and various 
distinctions between the shades, but all differences and distinctions are ignored 
when we think of colour as one: and so with triangle, circle, geranium, lion or 
any other notional unity. 

What, then, are the ἀδιαίρετα of our text? They are νοητὰ and immaterial, 
without ὕλη, 430b 31. They are simple, for they take their place as elements 
of more complex νοητὰ in the judgment and in other σύνθετα. They are not, 
however, absolutely unanalysable, if quiddities are included (430b 28), for the 
definition which has the quiddity for its content, lke every λόγος (Mefaph. 
1ol6a 34 Sq., 1034b 20), consists of parts, and the discursive intellect can 
separate these parts, e.g. (gov from δίπουν when it analyses the definition of 
man. Apparently also from 430b 7—r4 it follows that notions of magnitude 
can be divided and recombined. Rather we may say that, as A. holds about 
mathematical objects (431 b 15 sq.) that they are not separate from sensibles, but 
we think them as if they were separate from sensibles, so he holds about forms 
or quiddities and the notions of length and other magnitudes that they are not 
always indivisible, but that the mind thinks them as if they were indivisible. 

430 a 26—b 6. Where thought is dealing with single, indivisible 
notions, falsehood or error is impossible. Truth and falsehood are possible 
only when these irreducible units of thought are put together. As Empedocles 
supposed the limbs of animals to have been first separately evolved before they 
united to form animal bodies, so in the realm of thought separate notions are 
first apprehended and are afterwards united together in a judgment [§ 1]. If 
thought is dealing with the past or the future, time is an additional element in 
the combination. False judgment is due to a confusion, as of not-white with 
white. Or we may use the term disjunction instead of conjunction to describe 
the relation between concepts in every judgment. Time in any case will affect 
the truth or falsehood of the judgment. To unite the isolated concepts in a 
judgment is the work of the intellect [§ 2]. 

On this passage, the best introduction to which will be found in .Wezaph. Υ'., 
c. 7, Ec. 4, @.,¢. το, cf Vahlen, Avisfotelische Aufsdize 1. and Maier, Sydlo- 
gistik des Artstoteles 1., pp. 24---35. 

430a 26. τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων, 1.6. single concepts: ἀδιαίρετον =individuum, like ἕν, 
ἁπλοῦν, ἀμερές, ἄτομον. Cf. 430a 3 τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης, nofe. Such unities are, if 
indivisible, exempt from matter. So long as a νοητὸν 15 διαιρετόν τι, logical 


512 NOTES Ill. 6 


analysis can always go on separating, τὸ μὲν τόδε τὸ δὲ τόδε, so much form, so 
much matter: if no longer sensible matter, then logical or intelligible matter. 
See .lWefaph. 1033 Ὁ 12—19, Z., cc. 10, 11 and 1045 a 33—35. In the words of 
Bonitz, as long as you can distinguish substance from accidents, you have not 
reached primary indivisible essence: Iam duo distinguenda sunt rerum genera, 
compositarum rerum alterum, alterum simplicium. Compositae autem quas 
dicit non sunt intelligendae eae, quae ex pluribus elementis coaluerunt, sed 
eae potius, in quibus cum substantia coniungitur accidens aliquod, veluti homo 
albus, homo sedens, diagonalis irrationalis ac similia (Bonitz ad Metaph. ©., 
C. 10, ἡ. 409). 

a26. περὶ ἃ. In such cases we either do, or we do not, grasp the object in 
thought. The function of νοῦς is intuitive. Truth and falsehood are not in the 
things thought, but in the mind, WezZagf. 1027 Ὁ 25—27. Truth and falsehood 
are due to an affection of the mind, διανοίας τὶ πάθος, 1028a 1. But when we 
think notions οὐχ ἅμα ἀλλὰ χωρίς, in isolation, when the object of thought is the 
simple essence or the quiddity, even the mind itself does not introduce truth or 
falsehood, 1027 b 27 περὶ δὲ ra ἁπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστιν (the ἀδιαίρετα of our text) οὐδ᾽ 
ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ [int. τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές]. Cf. Mefaph. 1051 Ὁ 17-33. What, A. 
asks, is “being” and “not-being,” as truth and falsehood, with regard to these 
uncompounded essences, περὶ ra ἀσύνθετα Where the object is compounded, 
where, as with white wood, incommensurable diagonal, we can distinguish 
predicate from subject, accident from substance, there “to be” means the 
conjunction of accident with substance in rerum natura, and truth means the 
corresponding conjunction of predicate with subject in the mind, while “not- 
being” and falsehood can be similarly explained as disjunction in rerum natura 
and in the mind respectively. But in the case we are considering no such 
analysis is possible. Both “being” and truth must admit of a different explan- 
ation. Here truth is simple apprehension, and not to apprehend is ignorance, 
Metaph. 1051 b 23 ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι...τὸ δ᾽ ἀγνοεῖν μὴ 
θιγγάνειν. We cannot be deceived, except per accidens, about the quiddity 
or the simple essences, which are always in activity and never potential. Thus 
when we have to do with essential “being” and actuality, mistake is impossible: 
we either have or have not the notion, MefapA. 1051 Ὁ 31 περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἀπατηθῆναε ἀλλ᾽ ἢ νοεῖν ἢ μή. 

3. 27. & οἷς δὲ Cf. De Jnterpr. 1, 16a 9, where after a reference to Le 
4., that is, to the present passage, the writer continues ἔστι δ᾽, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ 
ψυχῇ ὁτὲ μὲν νόημα ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι, ὁτὲ δὲ ἤδη ᾧ ἀνάγκη τούτων 
ὑπάρχειν θάτερον, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ" περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσίν ἐστι τὸ 
ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ῥήματα ἔοικε τῷ ἄνευ συνθέ- 
σεως καὶ διαιρέσεως νοήματι, οἷον τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἢ τὸ λευκόν, ὅταν μὴ προστεθῇ τι- 
οὔτε γὰρ ψεῦδος οὔτε ἀληθές πω, Metaph. 1051b 1 τὸ δὲ κυριώτατα ὃν ἀληθὲς ἢ 
ψεῦδος, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διῃρῆσθαι, ὥστ᾽ ἀληθεύει 
μὲν ὁ τὸ διῃρημένον οἰόμενος διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ 6 
ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα. 

8 28. ὥσπερ ἕν ὄντων. This is practically equivalent to ἡνωμένων, “being 
unified.” Them. (109, 8 H., 201, 4 Sp.) observes συντίθησι δὲ οὐχ ὥσπερ σωρόν, 
GAN’ ὥστε ἕν αὖθις τὰ πολλὰ ποιῆσαι καὶ περιαγαγεῖν εἰς μίαν νόησιν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν 
ἁπλῶν σημαινομένων. New wholes or unities are formed out of the old by the 
mind. For ἐν indeclinable, when used predicatively, cf. MWelaph. τοῖς Ὁ 36, 
1016a 12 sq., a 22, a 25 sq. 

a 28 καθάπερ ᾿Εἰμπεδοκλῆς,..20 ἐβλάστησαν. This line is quoted again by Δ. 
with the omission of 7, in De Cae/o 111. 2, 300b 30 sq. Simplicius in his com- 


Ill. 6 430 a 26—b 2 513 


mentary on the De Caelo 587, 1 sq. quotes the two following lines of the poem 
(Emp. frag. 57 Τὸ, 232—234 K): 

γυμνοὶ δ᾽ ἐπλάζοντο βραχίονες εὔνιδες Spov, 

ὄμματά τ᾽ oi(a) ἐπλανᾶτο πενητεύοντα μετώπων. 
This Empedoclean notion of disconnected limbs serves to illustrate isolated 
concepts and single terms. As the former were joined together to form animal 
bodies, so the latter can be combined in the unity of the judgment or pro- 
position. 

a 30. ἔπειτα συντίθεσθαι τῇ φιλίᾳ. This is a summary of Empedocles’ lines, 

Srag. 20, 2 sq. D, 336 sq. K (cf. Simpl. τὲ Phys. 1124, τὶ sqq.): 
ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητε συνερχόμεν᾽ eis ἕν ἅπαντα 
γυῖα, τὰ σῶμα λέλογχε, βίου θαλέθοντος ἐν ἀκμῇ. 

a 30. οὕτω καὶ Here A. returns from the simile to the psychical fact to be 
illustrated, restating what he had affirmed above, a 27, in the words σύνθεσίς ris 
...a 28 ὥσπερ ἕν ὄντων. Sentences framed on this model: “4 like B: so 4” 
are frequent in Plato and Aristotle. Cf. Po/. 1286 a 31 ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ 
πολύ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον. 
See also 423} 19, 2026. 

a 30. κεχωρισμένα, i.e. the separate concepts above designated as severally 
indivisible, individua (ἀδιαίρετα). 

ἃ 31. τὸ ἀσύμμετρον, “incommensurability,” viz. with the side of the square. 
This is with A. a stock instance: cf. Mefaph. 983 a 15 ἢ τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου 
ἀσυμμετρίαν κτέ. 

a 31. ἂν δὲ γενομένων. On the analogy of the opening words of the chapter 
Vahlen thus completes the sentence: ἂν δὲ γενομένων ἢ ἐσομένων νόησις ἢ, τὸν 
χρόνον προσεννοῶν καὶ συντιθεὶς νοεῖ (Maier, I. p. 25, would add ὁ νοῦς as the 
subject of νοεῖ : cf. 430} 6 2277). 

430 Ὁ 1. τὸ γὰρ Ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί, int. ἐστι. There can be no question of 
falsehood until single notions are combined in a judgment, which, when put into 
words, is a proposition. The mind either affirms or denies whatever it can thus 
think as something predicated of something else, τὶ κατά τινος, Mefaph. 1012za 2 
πᾶν τὸ διανοητὸν καὶ νοητὸν 4 διάνοια ἢ κατάφησιν ἢ ἀπόφησιν. See more on a 27, 
SUDA. 

b2. ἂν τὸ λευκὸν μὴ λευκόν, Int. λέγῃ or vow. The example illustrates the 
application of the term σύνθεσις to falsehood. The thing, πρᾶγμα, is λευκόν, 
white. By confusion of thought it is asserted to be not-white. The man 
substitutes for “white,” which is true, “not-white,” which is false. This is the 
typical case of false judgment and false proposition, and it must continually 
occur in the region of the contingent, as distinct from the necessary. Some 
accidents are always conjoined with certain substances, others are sometimes 
conjoined, sometimes disjoined, ἐνδέχεται τἀναντία: cf. Metaph. 1051 Ὁ 9 sqq. 
Mistake is possible, even frequent, because the thing itself is subject to change. 
Cf. 428b 1 sqq. Another way of expressing the nature of contingent things is 
to say that the same proposition respecting them is both true and false, ie. true 
of them at one time when the accident 15 jomed with the substance, false at 
another time when it is not, AZefapkh. 1o51b 13-15. On this view A, takes the 
simplest case, a positive and not a negative judgment, if “not-white” be a single 
notion. Even then falsehood involves σύνθεσις, the predicate “‘not-white” in 
the proposition is asserted of a subject not mentioned. When Anaxagoras 
affirmed snow to be not-white, in his judgment he still conjoined “ not-white” 
with snow. In this instance A. has simply substituted λευκὸν for the more 
general word ὄν, which we find in his description of falsehood in Mezaph. 


H. 33 


514 NOTES 11. 6 


ΤΟΙ b 26 τὸ μὲν yap λέγειν τὸ ὃν μὴ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὃν εἶναι ψεῦδος. According to 
the restoration of the text by Torstrik and Vahlen (see critical ~ofes), there are 
two examples. A. is made to say “For even if we assert white to be not-white 
or not-white to be white, we make a conjunction.” Them. (109, 27—3I1 H., 
202, 2--- Sp.) and Philop. (548, 9—11) are assumed to have had two examples 
before them. See Vahlen, 4u/sdize τ., pp. 11 sq. His ingenious restoration is 
attractive, the chiasmus, as he shows, p. 13, being characteristic of A. But it 
is hardly necessary. Simpl. (250, 37—39) gives only one example of false 
judgment. 

Ὁ 3. συνέϑηκεν, int. ὁ λέγων or ὁ νοῶν. With Vahlen’s reconstruction συνέθηκεν 
must be taken absolutely, as συντιθείς, 430 Ὁ 1 supra. But with the traditional 
text the verb governs τὸ μὴ λευκόν, “the thinker combines ‘not-white,’” Le. with 
the white thing. The gnomic aorist with ἂν in the protasis corresponds to the 
present tenses a 31 συντίθεται, Ὁ 4 fort 1 admit that negative, as well as 
affirmative, judgments are described as συνθέσεις Metaph. 1027 Ὁ 24 λέγω δὲ τὸ 
ἅμα καὶ τὸ χωρὶς ὥστε μὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλ᾽ ἕν τι γίγνεσθαι, 101244 Grav μὲν ὡδὶ 
συνθῇ paca ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, ἀληθεύει, ὅταν δὲ ὧδί, ψεύδεται. But in our passage, 
I think, A., to avoid unnecessary complication, treats “not-white” as a single 
notion. If the examples of true judgments do not involve negation (430a 31 
ἀσύμμετρον, not οὐ ovpperpov), why should it be necessary in false judgments? 

Ὁ 3 ἐνδέχεται δὲ...4 πάντα: As Vahlen remarks, of. cit., p. 15, there are two 
possible ways of taking this sentence. The words may mean (1) all that has 
been said of σύνθεσις may also be said of διαίρεσις, viz. that it may be false as 
well as true and that it is both ἁπλῇ and κατὰ χρόνον. All this would be true of 
διαίρεσις, if the word meant a negative judgment. But, again, the meaning may 
be (2), we may also give the name διαίρεσις to all which we have called σύνθεσις. 
Up till now σύνθεσις has stood for positive and negative judgments, ἀπόφασις 
and κατάφασις : but διαίρεσις may be used with the same extended meaning to 
include both ἀπόφασις and κατάφασις. Vahlen can cite no authority for διαίρεσις 
in this extended sense, but thinks the second explanation, which is that of the 
ancient commentators, to be quite clear from the context. Against (1), which 
refers the sentence to negative judgments only, it may be urged that it unduly 
restricts πάντα, takes no account of dei Ὁ 2 and, as I believe, misunderstands the 
words ἐὰν τὸ λευκὸν μὴ λευκόν. As already explained, I consider A.’s statements 
to hold of all judgments, whether positive or negative, true or false, though his 
examples are confined to positive judgments, first true a 31, then false Ὁ 2 sq. 
The words of the lemma now present another and complementary theory of the 
judgment. It has been described as σύνθεσις : it might just as well be described 
as διαίρεσις, for it involves and implies, not only conjunction by the mind, but 
also separation and analysis by the mind. A. does not state why, but probably 
it is because, as he explains, e.g. PAys. 1. 1, 1848 21—26, what is presented to, 
and better known by, us is a confused whole, whether sensation, mental image 
or notion. The data of sense, imagination and thought are as a rule συγκεχυ- 
μένα, confused wholes: Socrates walking, a centaur, the notion of man. 
Analysis is required, whether these data are presented at first as separate 
or as a confused whole. In the one case it is the mind that puts them together 
and refers the parts to the whole, the accidents to the substance, before it can 
form a judgment. In the other case the confused whole is analysed and from 
τὸ καθόλου we proceed to τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, PAys. 1. τ, 184a 23 διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου 
eis τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα δεῖ προιέναι.: By such disentanglement and resolution into its 
single elements of the confused presentation of Socrates walking we distinguish 
the accident from the subject and so form the judgment; and by analysis of the 


III. 6 430 b 2—b 6 515 


notion of man we get the judgment “man is a biped animal.” Neither σύνθεσις 
nor διαίρεσις alone is sufficient to describe the mental process. On the import- 
ance of this remark, thus mterpreted, both for logic and psychology it is 
unnecessary to dwell. In every judgment elements are isolated and combined. 
If Maier’s tentative proposal to transpose this sentence were adopted (see 
critical zofes) the admission that what has hitherto been called σύνθεσις might 
just as well be called διαίρεσις would immediately precede the recognition of 
vous as the unifying principle. But the force of ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ye would be weakened. 
Cf. Vahlen, p. 16 sq. 

b4. ἀλλ᾽ otv...ye, “but at any rate”: cf. Plato, Cryef. 411 Ὁ ἢ φρόνησις" 
φορᾶς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ῥοῦ νόησις. εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ὄνησιν ὑπολαβεῖν φορᾶς: ἀλλ᾽ οὖν περί 
γε τὸ φέρεσθαί ἐστιν, Top. VI. 13, 150487 εἰ δὲ μήπω τὸ εἰρημένον σφόδρα ἅτοπον 
διὰ τὸ καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων συμβαίνειν τὸ τοιοῦτον... ἀλλ᾽ οὖν τό γε τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν 
αὐτοῖς παντελῶς ἄτοπον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι. οὐ μόνον. Torstrik would transpose 
these words to follow Ὁ 4 ἀληθές, but for their position in the text, due to 
hyperbaton, Vahlen cites Ref. 1. 4, 1360a 31, I. 15, 1377 a 3 Sq., Il. 25, 
1402 Ὁ 32 sq., Fol. 1267 a 16 Sq., 1282 ἃ 20 sq. 

b5. ἀλλὰ kal ὅτι ἦν ἢ ἔσται. Them. (110, 1 H., 202, 17 Sp.) observes δύο 
τοίνυν ἴδια ταῦτα τοῦ νοῦ, τό τε πολλὰ δύνασθαε νοήματα εἰς Ev συνάγειν ὥσπερ ἕν, 
καὶ τὸ προσεννοεῖν τὸν χρόνον. Whether we describe the judgment as con- 
junction or disjunction, if the content of thought belongs to past or future, the 
temporal relation is necessary to complete it and must be simultaneously 
thought. τὸ δὲ ἕν ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς ἕκαστον. The meaning of ἕκαστον (see 
γο δ ON 424 ἃ 22) is “whether that which unifies does so in this way or in that 
way,” i.e. whether the σύνθεσις be rightly or wrongly performed, or, possibly, © 
whether the unification be called conjunction or disjunction. Cf. Vahlen, lLc., 
p. 17: “das ἑνοποιεῖν τὰ κεχωρισμένα, wie es die σύνθεσις, richtig oder unrichtig, 
vollzieht, ist Sache des νοῦς, and Wallace: “the process of thus reducing our 
ideas into the unity of a single judgment is in each case the work of reason” 
(p. 163). It may be asked whether ἕκαστον is accusative governed by ποιοῦν or 
nominative in apposition with it. I incline to the latter view. In either case 
its place at the end of the sentence 15 due to the interposition by hyperbaton of 
τοῦτο 6 vous, and is no more remarkable than the similar position of ἕκαστον in 
425b 24. Simplicius takes the former view: 251, 8 τὴν δὲ λέξιν ὧδε συντακτέον " 
τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν συμπλεκομένων νοημάτων ἕν rowdy, τοῦτο 6 vous ἐστι: Cf. Philop. 
548, 29 τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ἕν 6 νοῦς. If this were right, Bekker’s 
comma before τοῦτο would be of doubtful utility, for it would separate ποιοῦν 
from its object ἕκαστον. Vahlen, p. 17, presents the sentence without a comma. 
The meaning on the view of Simplicius is “that which makes each and every 
σύνθετον one.” 

430 b 6—20. What is whole and indivisible is either (1) potentially or 
(2) actually so. When we are dealing with what is quantitative, there is no 
difficulty in thinking an actually indivisible whole, e.g. a unit of length or a line, 
or in thinking it in actually indivisible time. Divisibility or indivisibility of 
time goes with divisibility or indivisibility of units of length. [Here, then, we 
have a unitary whole. Let us see what can be made, first of the half, and then 
of the double, of such a unit.] If we suppose the time divided, we cannot say 
what is thought in each half of the time. The two halves of the line have no 
.actual existence unless the line be actually divided. If, however, we think each 
.of the two halves of the line separately, we simultaneously divide the time also. 
The one line has then virtually become two lines (olovel μήκη), and if we think 
the double, or the one whole line as made up of two halves, the time in which 


33-—2 


516 NOTES It. 6 


we think it is also made up of two halves of time [§ 3]. But there is another 
class of indivisible, viz. the notional, not quantitative, unit. This also we think 
in an indivisible time and by an indivisible mental act. But the divisibility of 
the notional unit is to be distinguished from the divisibility of the quantitative 
unit. The notional unit is also divisible, but its divisibility is incidental. It 
can be separated into parts, but such divisibility is external and foreign to it 
and no part of its essence. It is not divisible in so far as the act of thought and 
the time taken to accomplish it are divisible: when we deal with notional units 
the act of thought and the time it takes are instantaneous and absolutely in- 
divisible. Herein lies the distinction between the notional unit and the 
quantitative unit. In the notional units also there is an element of indivisi- 
bility, the same which, when we are dealing with quantitative magnitudes, 
makes units of the time and the length; and this element constitutes the unity 
of everything which is continuous, as well as of time or length [ὃ 4]. 

430 b6. διχῶς. It is a question whether λέγεται or dariy should be supplied. 
For the former may be cited 417 a 12 διχῶς ἂν λέγοιτο καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ἡ μὲν ὡς δυνά- 
pret, ἡ δὲ ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ, 456 a 23 διχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τῶν 
μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν : for the latter 419 Ὁ 4 ἔστι δὲ διττὸς 6 ψόφος" 
ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ τες, 6 δὲ δυνάμει, 428 ει 6 αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἤτοι δύναμις ἣ ἐνέργεια, 
Phys. τν. 3, 210a 26 διχῶς δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, ἤτοι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἢ καθ᾽ ἕτερον, De Caelo 
Ill. I, 299 a 20 τὰ δὲ πάθη διαιρετὰ πάντα διχῶς" ἢ γὰρ κατ᾽ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ συμ- 
βεβηκός. As there are two sorts of sensation and two sorts of sound, so there 
are two sorts of indivisible, the one potential, the other actual. For the latter 
cf. Ὁ 8 z2zfra, for the former Ὁ τι. The indivisible whole, potentially existent, 
is illustrated by the half of an undivided line which, so long as the mind thinks 
the whole line as undivided, though it is implicitly present, does not actually 
exist. Cf. Metaph. 1048 a 32 λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ 
ὅλῃ (int. γραμμῇ] τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἄν. The statue exists in the wood and 
the half of the line in the whole potentially, because it is possible for the wood 
to be carved and the whole line to be divided into two halves, and then the 
statue and the half line would come into actual existence. Cf. PAys. VIII. 8, 
2638, 28 ἐν δὲ τῷ συνεχεῖ ἔστι μὲν ἄπειρα ἡμίση, GAN οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει. 

Ῥ 6. ἢ ϑυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳφ. These words, I regret to say, are mistranslated on 
p- 137. As just explained, the sentence should have run thus: “ according as 
the whole, which is indivisible, is either potential or actual.” The Greek com- 
mentators supposed these words to mean “either not potentially, or not actually, 
divisible.” So Them. rio, 5 H., 202, 22 Sp. ἢ yap ὅτι μήτε δυνάμει μήτε ἐνεργείᾳ 
τοῦτό ἐστι διαιρετόν, ὥσπερ εἶχε τὰ ἄυλα εἴδη καὶ ἡ στιγμή, ἢ ὅτε δυνάμει μὲν διαιρετὸν 
ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον, ὥσπερ ἡ γραμμὴ καὶ πᾶν μέγεθος, Simpl. 251, 14 τὸ μὲν ὡς 
τὸ εἶδος οὐδαμῇ ὃν διαιρετὸν οὔτε ἐνεργείᾳ οὔτε δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ μῆκος καὶ πᾶν 
συνεχὲς ἐνεργείᾳ μόνον ὃν ἀδιαίρετον, δυνάμει δέ πως διαιρετόν, ἢ καὶ τῷ ὄντι πεφυκὸς 
διαιρεῖσθαι. Philop. 549, 5—7 has a different, but not a better, account. There 
are very grave objections to the way in which Them. and Simpl. take the words. 
(1) It does not do justice to 7...7. Them. says that both of his divisions are 
ἐνεργείᾳ ἀδιαίρετον, for which he substitutes οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ διαιρετόν, the difference 
bemg that the second is, what the first is not, δυνάμει διαιρετόν. (2) They 
confuse “potentially indivisible ” with “not potentially divisible,” and without 
the strongest evidence it is impossible to believe that A. was guilty of this 
confusion. Throughout his logic he invariably distinguishes between the two 
propositions “This is not B” and “This is not-&.” Cf., however, 2 εζαῤλ. 
1073 a 23 ἡ μὲν yap ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός, which must mean “has no motion, either proper to it (καθ᾽ αὑτὸ) or 


Ill. 6 430 Ὁ 6—bir 517 


accidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός). i.e. οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινητόν. (3) Accord- 
ing to Them., δυνάμει ἀδιαίρετον has the priority: it is more truly indivisible 
than ἐνεργείᾳ ἀδιαίρετον. But surely this is contrary to all that we are told by 
A. of the relationship of δύναμις to ἐνέργεια. (4) Apparently the object of this 
interpretation is to force the distinction δυνάμει ἀδεαίρετον, ἐνεργείᾳ ἀδιαίρετον 
into correspondence with τῷ εἴδει ἀδιαίρετον, κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον below. 
Themistius’ examples of ἐνεργείᾳ ἀδιαίρετον are line and magnitude, which are 
κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδ., and those of δυνάμεε are ἄυλα εἴδη, immaterial forms, with the 
addition of points. The fact is that the inconveniences of a negative attribute 
“indivisible” are very great when what is meant is a positive conception, like 
“ single,” “one,” “whole.” Similar inconvenience attaches to the use of other 
negative terms, “absolute,” “infinite,” “unknowable,” “unconditioned,” when 
they are used, as they often are, to denote positive conceptions. If an object 
of thought is in its own nature divisible, so that the act of thinking it may 
become two acts and the time in which it is thought two times, to apply the 
term “indivisible” to object, act and time is a severe strain on its meaning. 

b7. οὐθὲν κωλύει. This answers to Ὁ 6 ἐπεί. It is because the indivisible 
whole 1s sometimes potential, sometimes actual, and so subject to becoming, 
that the mind by thinking the line or whole of length can at the same time 
bring τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, which is as yet only δυνάμει νοητόν. into actual existence. 

Ὁ 8. ἀδιαίρετον yap ἐνεργείᾳ, Apart from the act of the mind thinking it, τὸ 
ἀδιαίρετον in the case of a line or any magnitude would never have actual 
existence, for a line or magnitude is in itself divisible ad infinitum. The mind 
thinks the whole of length without reference to the parts into which it may be 
divided. For the mind, which thinks it as such, it is actually indivisible as well 
as undivided. 

b8. ἐν χρόνῳ ἀδιαιρέτῳ: Not only does the mind’s act make the length, 
which is in itself divisible, indivisible at the time it is thought: it also causes 
the same transformation in time, which is Jer se continuous and divisible. Cf. 
De Sensu 6, 446a 30 ὃ δὲ χρόνος πᾶς διαιρετός. If the object thought be 
ἀδιαίρετον, 50 also must be the time in which it is thought. The act of thinking, 
which to A. is symbolised not by motion, but by rest or pause (407 a 32 sq.), 
may take time, but at every instant of such time the act is complete in itself: 
ἅμα νοεῖ καὶ vevdnxev. Cf. Phys. 1V. 10, 218b 29 εἰ δὴ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι εἶναι χρόνον 
τότε συμβαίνει ἡμῖν, ὅταν μὴ δρίζωμεν μηδεμίαν μεταβολήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ 
φαίνηταε ἡ Ψψυχὴ μένειν, ὅταν δ᾽ αἰσθώμεθα καὶ ὁρίσωμεν, τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι 
χρόνον, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς χρόνος, where the 
protasis expresses the writer's own conviction. 

b 9 ὁμοίως ydp...10 μήκει. Break length or anything continuous, συνεχές, in 
two, and you think it in two portions of time: keep it whole, and you think it in 
one. Cf. Phys. VI. 2, 233 a 10 φανερὸν ὅτι was χρόνος ἔσται συνεχής. ἅμα δὲ 
δῆλον καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος ἅπαν ἐστὶ συνεχές" Tas αὐτὰς yap καὶ τὰς ἴσας διαιρέσεις 6 
χρόνος διαιρεῖται καὶ τὸ μέγεθος. 

Ὁ ΣΟ. ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει.. ἑκατέρῳ, int. τοῦ χρόνου. 

bII. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν, int. ἑκάτερον τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ μήκους. | 

bII χωρὶς δ᾽ ἑκάτερον...13 μήκη. If we mentally divide the line and think 
each of the two halves separately, they become in their turn virtually indivisible, 
wholes of length, and the time is similarly divided into what are virtually 
indivisible wholes of time. ἅμα brings out the full force of Ὁ 9 sq. supra. 
οἱονεὶ μήκη, int. νοεῖ. Whether the line be actually divided or not, it is mentally 
divided, and the unifying principle, the mind, makes its parts, as it were, new 
wholes of length. 


518 NOTES 11. 6 


Ὁ 13. ds ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, int. ὃν τὸ μῆκος νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς. The conception of the unit is 
more completely brought out if we contrast it first with half, then with double. 
First the line was thought as undivided whole, then each of its two parts was 
thought separately; now the mind considers the whole or double as made up of 
its two parts. 

Ῥ14. ἐπ᾿ ἀμφοῖν, int. νοεῖ. The force of the preposition seems to be 
“corresponding to,” “in the times which correspond to the two halves of the 
divided line.” The whole time of thinking is regarded as made up of the times 
in which each half is thought separately. 

Ὁ 14. τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ ποσὸν..«τῷ εἴδει, int. ddsaiperov. So far we have been 
dealing with continuous objects, length and time, which 267 se are divisible and 
only ger accidens indivisible. We now come to another class of objects of 
thought, which are fer 56 indivisible and only er acctdens divisible. A clue to 
the distinction is furnished by JZe/aph. 1016 Ὁ 23 πανταχοῦ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἢ τῷ ποσῷ ἢ 
τῷ εἴδει ἀδιαίρετον, τοῦ3 ἃ 18 οὕτω δὴ πάντων μέτρον τὸ ἕν, ὅτι γνωρίζομεν ἐξ ὧν 
ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία διαιροῦντες ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἕν ἀδιαίρετον, 
ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον ἑκάστων ἀδιαίρετον. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ πᾶν ἀδιαίρετον, οἷον ποὺς καὶ 
μονάς, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντῃ, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἀδιαίρετον πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐθέλει, 1053 Ὁ 4 
τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι μάλιστά ἐστι..-μέτρον τι, καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ, εἶτα τοῦ ποιοῦ..«ἔσται 
δὲ τοιοῦτον τὸ μὲν ἐὰν ἢ ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐὰν κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, 1084 Ὁ 14 
ἀλλ᾽ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ τρόπον 
ἄλλον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ λόγον τὸ δὲ κατὰ χρόνον (cf. Pseudo-Alex. ad loc. 774, 3—15 
H.), 1052 a 31 ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὖν τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀδιαίρετον, εἴδει δὲ τὸ τῷ γνωστῷ καὶ 
τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, 9998 I—6. Of the latter I cite a 2 ἀδιαίρετον δὲ ἅπαν ἢ κατὰ τὸ 
ποσὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, πρότερον δὲ τὸ κατ᾽ εἶδος. As Bonitz in his commentary 
aa loc. observes, the distinction between the two kinds of ἀδιαίρετον under 
consideration must not be confused with that between numerical unity, ἕν τῷ 
ἀριθμῷ, and specific unity, ἐν τῷ εἴδει. Two or more things which fall under the 
same species are said to be ἕν τῷ εἴδει, 1.6. specifically identical, but the term 
ἐν xara τὸ εἶδος is applied to an infima species, which cannot itself be further 
subdivided. And this is why logical priority is differently defined in the one 
case and in the other. For numerical unity, ἕν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, denotes a more 
perfect unity than ἐν τῷ εἴδει, the former comprehends the latter and all other 
kinds of unity (ὃν τῷ εἴδει, τῷ γένει, τῷ Kar’ ἀναλογίαν) But in the distinction 
we are investigating between ἀδιαίρετον τῷ εἴδει or κατὰ τὸ εἶδος and ἀδιαίρετον 
κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, logical priority attaches to ἕν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, because εἶδος is the 
constitutive form which makes the thing what it is, while ποσὸν is more nearly 
akin to matter: in fact, τὸ συνεχὲς is logical or intelligible matter. Hitherto we 
have been dealing with wholes indivisible κατὰ τὸ ποσόν. We are now intro- 
duced to the infimae species: ὃν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ea est species, quae non ipsa 
iterum in species dividitur (Bonitz, ad Meraph. 999 a I—6). The members of 
such a species are united by the single notion or definition which comprehends 
them all, Mefaph. 1016 Ὁ 33 εἴδει δ᾽ [int. ἐν] ὧν 6 λόγος εἷς. The infima species 
may be divided into its members, but not as a genus is divided into species, 
th. 9994 5 ov γάρ ἔστε γένος ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων. As we shall see, 
A. calls the division of an infima species a division Jer accidens. Any species 
incapable of further division into subspecies would answer to the description of 
the text, “a whole not quantitatively indivisible” (and therefore not συνεχές ri, a 
continuous whole of magnitude), “but specifically indivisible.” Cf. also Afezadh. 
1087 b 33 sqq.: “Plainly the One signifies a measure and in each class of 
things the One which is measure is predicated of a different subject. In music - 
the unit is a quarter tone, in length or magnitude a finger’s-breadth or a foot or 


11. 6 430 b 15---Ὁ 16 519 


some similar unit, in rhythm a beat or a syllable, and similarly in weight some 
definite standard of weight. And so generally of whatever the unit is predi- 
cated; in things which have quality the unit is something which has quality, 
in quanta the unit is a quantum, and the unit-measure is indivisible, in the first 
case specifically, in the latter as presented to sense, 1087 a 37 καὶ κατὰ πάντων 
δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ποιοῖς ποιόν τι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ποσοῖς ποσόν τι (καὶ 
ἀδιαίρετον τὸ μέτρον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν). And all this 
implies that there is no unity existent fer se.” 

bI5. ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. If this meant a part or faculty of the soul, the 
omission of any accompanying noun or pronoun, like μέρει or τινί, could be 
paralleled. Cf. 426 b 29 ἀχώριστον καὶ ἐν ἀχωρίστῳ χρόνῳ, 427 a 14 ἔστιν ὡς 
κεχωρισμένῳ, both of which passages are very similar to the one before us. Cf. 
also De Sesz 7, 449 a 8 ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕν τι εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ ἅπαντα αἰσθάνεται, 
448 Ὁ 20 ἅμα μέν, ἑτέρῳ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀτόμῳ, οὕτω δ᾽ [ἢ οὕτω, 
coni. Ross] ἀτόμῳ ὡς παντὶ ὄντι συνεχεῖ, 449 a 19 ὥστε καὶ αἰσθάνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἅμα 
τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἑνί. Here the faculty seems to be identified with its operation, 
ἐνέργεια. Cf. Metaph. 1075 a 3—5: if νοῦς, when it thinks ὅσα μὴ ὅλην tye, iS 
identical with τὸ νοούμενον and ἡ νόησις is identical with rd νοούμενον, then 
ἡ νόησις is identical with νοῦς. Themistius supplies νοήσει: 10, 18 H., 
203, 11 Sp. ἐν χρόνῳ ἀδιαιρέτῳ νοεῖ καὶ νοήσει ἀδιαερέτῳ [so Heinze], 110, 24 H., 
203, 19 Sp. ἀμερεῖ τῇ νοήσει. Two of our inferior MSS., T and V, actually read 
ψυχῆς νοήσει. For τῆς ψυχῆς, not τοῦ νοῦ, cf. 4308 13, 431 a 14. 

Ὁ 16 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς...17 ἀδιαίρετα. As we are here dealing with actual 
thinking, I take ᾧ νοεῖ to mean a single thought, one link in the chain of 
thoughts of which actual thinking consists: 407a 7 ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα. It 
need not always mean, as ᾧ διανοούμεθα does 414 a 12 sq., 429 a 23, a part of the 
soul. Beyond this it is rash to assert anything confidently about the meaning 
of this sentence. Still, we may make conjectures and state divergent views. 
We have to find a predicate which κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς may qualify and a subject 
for that predicate. It would be natural to attach κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς to something 
expressed in the preceding sentence, which might serve as predicate; but this 
can hardly be νοεῖ or ἀδιαίρετον or ἀδιαιρέτῳ, for the specific unity 15 not κατὰ 
συμβεβηκὸς νοητὸν nor κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀδιαίρετον and, even if the act of thinking 
it and the time in which it is thought were fer accidens indivisible, the fact 
would not help to explain the words which follow. It only remains to under- 
stand διαιρετὸν or διαιρετά. Something, we may assume, is declared to be 
accidentally divisible. What is Jer se indivisible may be fer accidens divisible 
and, if we take this clue, there are two possible subjects for the predicate 
“accidentally divisible.” These are (1) the notional unity itself and (2) the act 
of thinking it and the time which that act takes. 

Suppose we take (1): the specific unity, then, is accidentally divisible, but, 
the writer continues, not in the sense that the act of thinking it and the time 
in which it is thought are divisible, but in the sense that they are indivisible, 
Their indivisibility, then, we learn, renders any divisibility which can be attached 
to the specific unity purely extraneous, adventitious, foreign to its nature. It 
appears to follow that the act of thinking an infima species, e.g. humanity, is. 
instantaneous. As Them. would say, we do not think half the notion when 
we hear the first two syllables “human-” and the rest of it when we catch 
“ity”: cf. Them. 110, 22 H., 203, 17 Sp. ἀκούει μὲν yap ἐν χρόνῳ, νοεῖ δὲ ove 
ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅπερ ἢ οὐδὲ ὅλως χρόνος ἐστὶν ἢ ἀμερὴς χρόνος. καὶ 
αὐτὸς δὲ ἀμερεῖ τῇ νοήσει νοεῖ, οὐ συμπαρατεινόμενος τῷ ὀνόματι οὐδὲ κατὰ μόριον 
τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην συλλαβὴν προσλαμβάνων τι μόριον τοῦ νοήματος, 


520 NOTES III. 6 


ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὄνομα διαιρετόν, ἀδιαίρετον δὲ τὸ νόημα. εἰ δὲ Kat τὸ νόημα διαιρετὸν 
φιλονικοίη τις λέγειν, κατὰ [τὸ] συμβεβηκὸς ἂν αὐτὸ λέγοι διαιρετόν, καὶ οὐχ ἣ αὐτὸ 
διαιρετόν...πολλὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς διαιρετὰ καὶ οὐχ ἣ αὐτὰ διαιρετά, ἀλλ᾽ ἧ ἐκεῖνα 
δι’ ὃν γνωρίζεται [by ἐκεῖνα Them. intends here τοὔνομα καὶ ἢ φωνή]. On this 
view ἐκεῖνα anticipates ᾧ νοεῖ...17 χρόνῳ and refers exclusively to the act of 
thought, and the time, relative to the specific unity, while 7, “so far as,” 
approximates to “because”: οὐχ #...dAX’ 7, non quo...sed quia. Or, again, 
it is conceivable that ἐκεῖνα, ᾧ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ may refer back to the act 
and time of thinking τὰ μήκη, and then 7 will mean “in the same way as,” 
implying ταύτῃ with the predicate διαιρετόν. For when the object is a quantum, 
the act of thinking it may become two acts, the time two times, as we saw 
b 9—13 supra. 

(2) But let us suppose that the time and the act of thought are made the 
subject to a predicate “accidentally divisible.” We have now to enquire what 
is meant by ἐκεῖνα. Presumably it is the act and time of thinking in the former 
case when the object was something continuous, like length. Or it might be 
ra μήκη themselves. Then the words mean: “but in this case the act and time 
of thinking are ger accidens divisible, not in the same way (viz. fer se) as the 
act and time of thinking in the former case [or the objects of thought in the 
former case] are divisible, but in the same way (viz. Der acctdens) as they are 
indivisible.” Formerly, when the object was a quantum, the act and time of 
thinking, like the object, were Zer se divisible and only fer accidezis indivisible ; 
now that the object is an infima species, the act and time of thinking it are 
per se indivisible and only fer acczdens divisible. 

Prof. Bywater’s transposition (see critical zofes) would have the effect of 
referring this passage and what follows it as far as b20 μήκει exclusively to 
the first kind of ἀδιαίρετα, which are quanta, and he would alter Ὁ 16 ᾧ νοεῖ 
into ὃ νοεῖ (Ξετὸ μῆκος). But see Maier, of. οξ. 1., Ὁ. 32, 2.1. Yorstrik was led 
to bracket the words b17 ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀδιαίρετα by his construction of the previous 
line, viz. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἐκεῖνα [int. νοεῖ], διαιρετὰ, ᾧ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν 
ᾧ χρόνῳ. Thus the way in which he took 7 ἐκεῖνα [int. νοεῖ] led ‘him justly to 
the conclusion that 7 ἀδιαέρετα comes to the same thing and is’ superfluous. 
Biehl followed Torstrik in bracketing the clause; but, if recourse must be had 
to the knife, it would be preferable to adopt Prof. J. Cook Wilson’s suggestion 
and bracket ἢ τό ᾧ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ. Then ἐκεῖνα must refer to τὰ μήκη and 
it is not impossible that a marginal gloss ὃ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, pointing this out 
correctly, should, when incorporated in the text, become altered to @ νοεῖ κτέ. 
by assimilation to b15 ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. 

Ὁ 17. fern γὰρ κἀν τούτοις. Taking the text as we find it, we must by 
τούτοις understand τοῖς τῷ εἴδει ἀδιαιρέτοις. Thus τούτοις, as contrasted with 
b 16 ἐκεῖνα, will be the specific unities themselves, as distinct from something ; 
either, on one view, from the act and time of thinking them, or, on another 
view, from the act and time of thinking τὰ μήκη, or from τὰ μήκη themselves. 
It is true the Greek commentators unanimously refer τούτοις to τὰ συνεχῆ: 
‘Fhem., 110, 36 sqq. H., 204, 7 sqq. Sp., Simpl. 256, 4 sqq., Philop. 551, 22 566. 
(the last more definitely makes them time and mental image, obviously con- 
mecting κἀν τούτοις with 430b 16 ᾧ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ). It is not, however, 
necessary that, because ἀδιαίρετόν τι makes both time and length one, time and 
length and other continuous quantities should be intended by κἀν τούτοις. If we 
attend to the καί, the presumption is rather the other way. 

Ὁ 18. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ov χωριστόν. This phrase, defining the nature of that unity 
οὗ indivisibles which belongs to ra τῷ εἴδει ἀδιαίρετα, I take to be a disclaimer of 


Ill. 6 430 Ὁ 16—b 19 521 


the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine of unity, for which see JeZ2Gh. 1053 Ὁ 9--- 
1054a 19. Unity is, A. holds, no separately existent entity in the universe, there 
is nO οὐσία τις αὐτοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τοῦ ἑνός, 2b. 1053b 11, 1088 a 3, no φύσις τις 
χωριστὴ τῶν ἄλλων, 1053b 22. Unity is to be found in the things which the 
mind thinks as one, whether species or quantities, and nowhere else. The 
same question is treated even more fully in Mefafh. 1045a 7—b7: the con- 
clusion reached is stated most explicitly 1045 a 31 οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον ἕτερον 
rou τὴν δυνάμει σφαῖραν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι σφαῖραν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἦν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκατέρῳ 
and 1045 a 36 ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει ὕλην, μῆτε νοητὴν μήτε αἰσθητὴν, εὐθὺς ὅπερ ἕν τι [εἶν αἰ] 
ἐστιν ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ καὶ ὅπερ ὅν τι, τὸ τόδε, τὸ ποιόν, τὸ ποσόν. διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔνεστιν 
ἐν τοῖς éptopots οὔτε τὸ ὃν οὔτε τὸ ἕν, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι εὐθὺς ἕν τί ἐστιν ὥσπερ καὶ 
ὄν τι. διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερόν τι αἴτιον τοῦ ἕν εἶναι οὐδενὶ τούτων, οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄν τι 
εἶναι" εὐθὺς γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ὄν τι καὶ ἕν τι] οὐχ ὡς ἐν γένει τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῷ Evi, 
οὐδ᾽ ὡς χωριστῶν ὄντων παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. The sphere presents the more 
ordinary case of something compounded of form and matter, though here the 
ὕλη iS νοητὴ, NOt αἰσθητή: the line, τὸ μῆκος, with which we have been dealing 
430b 8 sqq. in this respect resembles the sphere. The cause of the unity of 
the line, as of the sphere, is the τί ἦν εἶναι. From such compounds A. passes 
on to quiddities, which have no matter, and asserts in the plainest terms that 
they require no external cause of unity, αἴτεον rot ἕν εἶναι, for each of them is 
the cause of its own unity, being itself ri ἢ» εἶναι, and nothing else. Yet they 
are immanent in, not separate from, particular things, οὐδ᾽ ὡς χωριστῶν ὄντων 
παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. With this agrees precisely JeZadh. 1052a 29 τὰ μὲν δὴ 
οὕτως ἕν ἧἦ συνεχὲς ἢ ὅλον, τὰ δὲ ὧν ἂν 6 λόγος εἷς ἧ. τοιαῦτα δὲ ὧν ἡ νόησις μία- 
τοιαῦτα δὲ ὧν ἀδιαίρετος- ἀδιαίρετος δὲ τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου εἴδει ἢ ἀρεθμῷ The term 
“‘one” is applied not only to things centinuous, but also to those things which 
have a single concept or a single definition, and such are those which can be 
thought in a single mental act, in an indivisible act of thought, the mental act 
being indivisible, provided its object is itself either specifically or numerically 
indivisible: whence it follows that primarily unity belongs to that which makes 
substances one, Mefaph. 1052 a 33 ὥσθ᾽ ἐν ἂν εἴη πρῶτον τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις αἴτιον τοῦ 
ἑνός. No one who has followed the argument so far can fail to identify this 
with the ri ἥν εἶναι. Cf. 2ὖ. 1016a 32—b 3, of which I cite 1016 b 1 ὅλως δὲ ὧν 
ἣ νόησις ἀδιαίρετος ἣ νοοῦσα τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ μὴ δύναται χωρίσαι μήτε χρόνῳ μήτε 
τόπῳ μήτε λόγῳ, μάλιστα ταῦτα ἕν, καὶ τούτων ὅσα οὐσίαι. Maier, however, whose 
exposition has greatly contributed to clear up the whole passage, takes the 
words of our lemma somewhat differently, I., p. 32, moze. He compares χωρὶς 
biz supra and understands A. to assert here that the mental act is incapable 
of being logically divided, whereas in contemplating a length the act, though 
itself one and indivisible, could, if we chose, be separated or divided. In that 
case nothing is added by οὐ χωριστόν, for that the act is ἀδιαίρετον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ is 
implied in 430b 15—-17 on Maier’s own interpretation of that passage. ὃ: “and 
this it is which,” a use of the relative more frequent in Latin than in Greek. Cf. 
428 Ὁ 24, zofe. Whatever it is which constitutes the unity of the specific notion 
also makes continuous quantities one. 

big. μῆκος. Supply ἕν. Cf. Mefaph. 994 Ὁ 23 οὐ yap ὅμοιον ἐπὶ τῆς γραμμῆς, 
ἢ κατὰ τὰς διαιρέσεις μὲν οὐχ ἵσταται, νοῆσαι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ στήσαντα. καὶ τοῦθ᾽ 
ὁμοίως...20 μήκει. This sentence shows that length and time merely stand for 
continuous, and therefore divisible, quantities in general. The emphasis is on 
τῷ συνεχεῖ. That the continuity and therefore the unity of the continuous has 
its cause in the form and quiddity: may be inferred from AZefaph. 10524 19 sqq., 
where, after laying down that what is continuous is zgso facfo in a greater or 


522 NOTES 1. 6 


less degree one, A. continues (a 22) ἔτι τοιοῦτον [int. ἐν] καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ ὅλον καὶ 
ἔχον τινὰ μορφὴν καὶ eiSos: μάλιστα δ᾽ εἴ τι φύσει τοιοῦτον καὶ μὴ βίᾳ...ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει τι 
ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῷ τοῦ συνεχὲς εἶναι. Cf. Metadbh. 1053 ἃ 24 ἴσως γὰρ πᾶν 
συνεχὲς διαιρετόν. Surfaces and solids, no less than lines, are continuous 
and divisible, eis συνεχῆ δυνάμει διαιρετά, according to Mefaph. 1020a 8—14. 
This is the fundamental assumption of the mathematical sciences, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν 
λαμβάνουσι διαιρετόν, De Caelo U1. 7, 306 8. 27, and it applies to μῆκος no less 
than to σῶμα, of which A. is there speaking. 

430 b 20--81. As to the way in which we know the point and 
indivisibles of that kind, it is like the way in which we know privation 
(στέρησις). The point, being the negation or antithesis of the divisible, is 
known exactly as evil and black are known by negation of the positive 
qualities good and white [ὃ 5]. And, if this be so, the knowing subject will 
be a potentiality of contraries contained within itself. If there is any knowing 
subject in whose thought there is no contrary, this knowing subject will be 
its own object of knowledge, will be actually operant and immaterial [§ 6]. 
All predications which connect an attribute with a subject are true or false, 
but this is not always the case with thought. When we think the concept in 
terms of the quiddity, we do not predicate any attribute of a subject. Such 
exercise of thought upon immaterial objects corresponds to the exercise of 
a special sense on its proper object, which is never fallacious [§ 7]. 

430 Ὁ 20 ἡ δὲ στιγμὴ...23 γνωρίζε. A new paragraph should begin here. 
On this passage see Them. 111, 13—31 H., 204, 27—205, 24 Sp., Simpl. 256, 
19---257, 10, Philop. 552, 2—26. πᾶσα διαίρεσις, “every dividing mark.” This 
will denote the geometrical point, in so far as it serves to divide lines or lengths, 
or forms a kind of limit or boundary: cf AZefaph. 1060 Ὁ 14 sq., 994b 2354. It 
will also denote, as Them. and Simpl. hold, the present instant, the “now,” 
regarded as dividing time past from time future: probably also the arithmetical 
unit, μονάς. The line and surface may also be included, but only in so far as 
they are privations, i.e. the surface because it is without thickness and the line 
because it is without breadth or thickness. Cf. Metaph. 1016 Ὁ 24 τὸ μὲν οὖν 
κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ 9 ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον, τὸ μὲν πάντῃ καὶ ἄθετον λέγεται μονάς, τὸ 
δὲ πάντῃ καὶ θέσιν ἔχον στιγμή, τὸ δὲ μοναχῇ [int. διαιρετὸν] γραμμή, τὸ δὲ διχῇ 
ἐπίπεδον, τὸ δὲ πάντῃ καὶ τριχῇ διαιρετὸν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν σῶμα. In Metaph. 
1002 a 18 ἔτι δὲ φαίνεται ταῦτα [int. τὰ μήκη καὶ αἱ στιγμαὶ] πάντα διαιρέσεις 
ὄντα τοῦ σώματος, τὸ μὲν εἰς πλάτος, τὸ δ᾽ εἰς βάθος, τὸ δ᾽ εἰς μῆκος. πρὸς δὲ 
τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ στερεῷ ὁποιονοῦν σχῆμα ἢ οὐδέν, 16. ἃ 34—b 11, 
994 Ὁ 22—-25 not only is the point treated as the division of a line, but the 
line as the division of a surface, and the surface as the division of a solid. 
When the divided parts are reunited, the divisions disappear. Thus if 4C 
and C4, the segments of the line 4, are reunited, the point C, which had 
two functions, serving as the extremity of 4C and the extremity of CB, dis- 
appears. 

Ὁ 21. τὸ οὕτως ἀδιαίρετον. The point and the “now” are indivisibles of 
another order from those previously considered. They are indivisible not 
καθ᾽ αὑτά, but by absence or privation of extension and divisibility, τῇ στερήσει, 
τοῦ συνεχοῦς (Them. 111, 15 H., 205, 1 Sp.), πάντῃ μὲν ἀδιαίρετα, κατὰ τὴν 
ἀπόπτωσιν δὲ τῶν διαιρετῶν ἔχοντα τὸ ἀδιαίρετον (Simpl. 256, 20 sq.). The surface 
is less continuous and therefore less divisible than the solid through the absence 
of the dimension of depth ; the line less continuous and divisible than the surface, 
because it has neither breadth nor depth, although it is still extended, and 
therefore divisible, in the one dimension of length; the point, losing even this 


III. 6 430 b 19—b 25 523 


last dimension, ceases to be divisible at all: unlike the line and surface, it 15 
πάντῃ ἀδιαίρετον, Simpl. 256, 21—27, Philop. 552, 16—18. δηλοῦται, “is dis- 
closed or discovered to us.” - Cf. Mefaph. 1054 a 26 λέγεται δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ 
δηλοῦται τὸ ἕν, 1032 Ὁ 4 ἐκείνης yap [int. τῆς ὑγιείας] ἀπουσίᾳ δηλοῦται ἡ νόσος. 
The word δηλοῦν is a vague, non-technical term like γνωρίζειν, however the 
knowledge be obtained. ὥσπερ ἡ στέρησις. As, e.g., rest is perceived by the 
negation of motion, τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαι, and number by the negation of continuity, 
τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς, 425 a 18 sq. So, too, unity by the negation of plurality, 
as from the beginning of our experience we are more familiar with the many 
than the one, Mefraph. 1054 a 20—29. 

Ὁ 23. Set δὲ Suvdper εἶναι τὸ γνωρίζον, “but the apprehending mind must be 
potentially the contraries.” That is, if you are to know κακόν, you must have 
ἀγαθὸν to know it. Cf. Simpl. 256, 33 τὸ σκότος τῷ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ φῶς [cf. 425 Ὁ 
20—22], καὶ τὸ κακὸν τῷ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐπεὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐννοίᾳ 
καὶ τῇ τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ σκότος γινώσκομεν, ὡς τῇ τοῦ κανόνος ὀρθό- 
τητι τὸ στρεβλόν (cf. 4118 5 54.). 

b 24. ἐνεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ: If we adopt this reading, the subject is τὸ δυνάμει 
ἐναντίον : “the potential contrary must be in it (the apprehending mind).” 
Biehl follows cod. L in writing ἐν εἶναι and omits the preposition ἐν before 
αὐτῷ. By ὃν must then be understood one of the two contraries, which 
Bywater’s conjecture ἐναντίον εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ more clearly expresses, though we 
might have expected ἐν τῶν ἐναντίων. Biehl’s text is open to the objection 
that it would naturally be taken to mean “the knowing subject must be one and 
the same with it,” i.e. with the contrary. I may add that the reading καὶ ἐν 
εἶναι is by a slip attributed to cod. E in the Berlin Aristotle, whereas upon 
430 a 23 Bekker had noted that a leaf of cod. E beginning there was missing. 

Ὁ 24. εἰ δέ τινι μή ἐστιν ἐναντίον. There can be no doubt that this is an 
allusion to the supreme cause, the πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκινητὸν of Metaph. 1075 Ὁ 20 
καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ TH τιμιωτάτῃ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναί τι ἐναντίον, 
ἡμῖν δ᾽ οὔ" οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντίον τῷ πρώτῳ οὐδέν. As we know from Meleph. Δ.» 
cc. 6---το, this supreme cause thinks itself and is a being free from matter and 
necessarily free from contrariety. You know the ἐναντίον in virtue of the ἐναντίον 
in your own mind. The supreme cause has no contrary to it. Thus here there 
is nothing that helps us to understand the working of the human mind. Cf. 
Them. 111, 35 H., 206, 2 Sp. τοιοῦτος δὲ ὅ re ἔξωθεν καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον τὸ πρῶτον 
αἴτιον ὅσῳ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπήλλακται τοῦ δυνάμει" διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὗτος καὶ τὸ μάλιστα 
ὃν καὶ τὸ μάλιστα εἶδος νοεῖ καὶ πορρωτάτω στερήσεως καὶ ἀμορφίας τοιοῦτος δὲ 
αὐτός, ἑαυτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν οὗ τὴν ὀὐσίαν ἐνέργειαν λέγειν προσήκει καὶ 
ὃν ἀκριβῶς χωριστόν, οὐδὲ ἀκαρεὶ πττροσαρμοζόμενον τῷ δυνάμει. 

Ὁ 25. [τῶν αἰτίων]. These words seem out of place, for we have been dealing 
with the knowing subject, τὸ γνωρίζον, and there seems to be no reason why at this 
point we should pass to consider the causes and principles of things. Moreover, 
the position of the words would seem to imply that τὸ γνωρέζον is itself an αἴτιον. 
By ἐναντίον must be meant the opposite, by becoming which a thing ceases to 
be what it is, in accordance with A.’s own explanation of becoming, γένεσις 
ἁπλῆ: see Mefaph. 1069 Ὁ 3—20. Such becoming is inexplicable without the 
assumption of ὕλη, and when all contrariety, contingency, matter and potenti- 
ality are excluded, there remains nothing but ἐνέργεια, which, according to A., 
takes the form of thought. In Afe/aph. 1075 a 25—1076a αὶ [με criticism of all 
preceding systems turns on their assumption of contraries for principles, and 
A. claims that not only τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν, but also matter, in his own system has 
no contrary: 26. 1075 a 34 ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἡ pia οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον. Form no doubt is 


524 NOTES III. 6 


contrasted with, and antithetic to, matter, as (Afezaph. 983 a 31 sq.) end to the 
moving cause, but not all ἀντικείμενα are ἐναντία. I therefore follow Zeller in 
bracketing τῶν αἰτίων, being content to take rwi as standing for τῶν γνωρι- 
(évreav τινί. Bywater, p. 60, supposes the words to have crept in from a 
marginal gloss. 

b 26. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν φάσις τι κατά τινος. With re κατά τινος supply κατηγορού- 
μενον. Assertion is something said of something; that is, a predication of a 
certain attribute of a certain subject. A. here uses the term dors in the wider 
sense, in which it includes both κατάφασις, positive assertion or affirmation, and 
ἀπόφασις, negative assertion or negation. Sometimes, however, he uses it for 
κατάφασις only, as in Metaph. 1008 a 34 ἔτι εἰ Grav 7 φάσις ἀληθὴς 7, ἢ ἀπόφασις 
Ψευδής, κἂν αὕτη ἀληθὴς ἧ, ἡ κατάφασις ψευδής, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ αὐτὸ dua φάναι καὶ 
ἀποφάναι ἀληθῶς, De Interpr.21b 21 φάσεις καὶ ἀποφάσεις : also Metaph. ΤΟΥΣ ἃ 4 
ὅταν μὲν ὡδὶ συνθῇ φᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, ἀληθεύει. Cf. 431 κι 9 καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα 
followed 431a 16 by φήσῃ ἢἣ ἀποφήσῃ; 431} 8 by ὅταν εἴπῃ, which last is like 
φάσις here. Cf. also Bonitz ad Metaph. ©., c. 10, p. 410, mole, cited supra in 
mote on 430a 3. As may be seen from Soph. 263 E sqq. cited p. 459 supra, Plato 
has opposed φάσις to ἀπόφασις as affirmation to negation. Neither κατάφασις 
nor xaraddya appears in Plato’s writings. The inconvenience of using the same 
term both in a generic and specific sense no doubt led to the adoption of κατά- 
gaois for “ affirmation.” 

Ὁ 27. ἀληθὴς ἢ Ψευδὴς πᾶσα. Such assertion must in every case be either 
true or false. If we compare 430a 27 sqq., it will appear that φάσις here, as used 
of predication, is more precisely the particular kind of σύνθεσις νοημάτων ὥσπερ 
ἕν ὄντων in which truth and falsehood reside. ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, Int. ἀληθὴς ἢ 
ψευδής ἐστι. This simply repeats the opening words of the chapter, and our 
next clause proves that under ἀδιαίρετα there the ri ἣν εἶναι is included. 

Ὁ 28. ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, Int. νοῦς, which, however, must be used 
here to denote the mind when it thinks and therefore can differ hardly at all 
from νόησις. Cf. Mefaph. 1075a 3—5. The genitive τοῦ ri ἐστι is objective. 
For the relation of ri ἐστι, the generic notion or “What” of a thing, to ri ἣν εἶναι, 
its constitutive essence or quiddity, see moves on 412b 11 and 4028 12. The 
force of κατὰ seems to be restrictive, “as determined by,” or “in conformity 
with, the quiddity.” Cf. 404b 5, zo7e. ἀληθής, not liable to be false as well 
as true, as is the case with a predicate. A. expresses this by saying “is true 
and not a predication,” something predicated of something. Cf. 428a 17 τῶν 
ἀεὶ GAnOevdvrwy...oiov...vois. 

b29. ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοῦ ἰδίου dAnOés. The objective genitive would be 
more natural if ἡ ὄψις had preceded, instead of ro ὁρᾶν. Cf. Philop. 557, 3 
τί ἐστι τὸ δρᾶν τοῦ ἰδίου; ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶν τὸ ἴδιον καὶ ἰδιοπραγεῖν, οἷον τὸ ὁρᾶν τὸ 
λευκὸν καὶ μόνον, μηκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἧτινι τὸ λευκὸν τοῦτο ὑπάρχει. Them. 
avoids the difficulty when he paraphrases 112, 16 H., 206, 25 Sp. ἡ ὄψις μόνον 
μὲν κρίνουσα τὸ λευκὸν xré. If it is not an objective genitive, it can hardly be 
regarded as partitive, but it might be a genitive of respect, to which Simpl. 
262, 2 7 ὄψις. «ἀεὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἀληθής, “true in respect of its proper objects,” lends 
some support. But it must be pointed out that Simpl. has previously used 
expressions which imply an objective genitive: 261, 35 τῇ τῶν ἰδίων ὁρατῶν ὄψει 
and 261, 36 πᾶσαι τῶν ἰδίων ἀληθεῖς καὶ ἁπλῶν εἶσι γνώσεις. 

b 30. οὕτως ἔχει ὅσα ἄνεν ὕλης: so it is with pure or immaterial concepts or 
quiddities. The mind either apprehends them or it does not. There we have 
true unities, This explains the remark 430 Ὁ 14 sq. about τὸ εἴδει ἀδιαίρετον and 
its instant apprehension by one indivisible mental act. When we are in posses- 


111. 7 430 b 25—431 a 3 525 


sion of such a concept, there is no question of its truth. When, however, the 
mind comes to predicate one of these concepts, e.g. goodness, of a given subject, 
then error is possible: just as with objects of sense we may be mistaken in 
judging the white object to be Cleon. 


CHAPTER VII. 


In this chapter A. is still dealing with the operation of thought. He now 
makes the transition from theoretical to practical intellect, frequently employing 
the analogy of sense-perception. 

431 a 1—820. Actual knowledge is identical with the thing known. 
Although in the individual potential knowledge, i.e. the faculty of knowing, 
precedes actual knowledge, no such priority attaches to it absolutely. For all 
becoming implies some actual existence as its cause. Thus we find that it is 
the sensible object which raises the sense from potential to actual existence, a 
transition which, properly speaking, is no passive affection or qualitative change 
at all, but rather an activity: and if we do call it motion, of which qualitative 
change is a species, we put a different meaning on the term motion, motion 
being by the definition activity of what is incomplete, while activity in the 
absolute sense, activity of that which is complete, is something distinct from 
motion in the ordinary sense [§ 1]. Perceiving something by sense, then, 
corresponds to simply naming it in language or apprehending it in thought. 
So far there is neither affirmation nor negation. But desire of what is pleasant 
or aversion to what is painful, as it were, converts the simple assertion of sense 
that there is an object into an affirmation or negation respecting it. There is 
not one faculty of desire and another faculty of aversion, but to feel pleasure or 
pain is to energise with the sensitive mean upon good or bad, as such. And, 
when we thus energise, we feel actual desire or actual aversion, though logically 
the faculty of sense can be distinguished from that of desire or aversion [§ 2]. 
For the thinking soul mental images take the place of present sensations and 
its affirmative or negative judgment of good or bad is desire or aversion. 
Hence the soul never thinks without a mental image. Here the analogy holds 
with sense. In desire and aversion there is a single faculty of thought which 
affirms or denies, just as there is a single central faculty of sense to which 
impressions of the several special senses are referred [§ 3]. 

43IaI τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό ἐστιν...3 χρόνῳ: This passage seems as much in place 

here as in 430a 19—21. Themistius, however, having paraphrased it there, 
‘omits it here. Philop. and Simpl. attest the repetition and try to account for it. 
What is more important is that Alex. Aphr. found the text in its present 
condition: cf. Philop. 558, 4 ἐνταῦθα δὲ γενόμενος ᾿Αλέξανδρός φησιν ὅτι τετάρακται 
6 λόγος, εἴπερ καὶ ἄνω διέκρινε τὸν δυνάμει νοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ νῦν δὲ τὸ 
αὐτὸ ποιεῖ. The suggestion that the passage is intrusive in either context 
should be scouted. In c. 5 it is absolutely necessary, and here the clause a 3 
ἔστι yap ἐξ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα will not stand without it. Why 
should not A. repeat himself when in the present chapter he comes to deal with 
διάνοια πρακτικὴ and to contrast it with sense? 

a3. ἔστι ydp...rd γιγνόμενα. These words may be understood quite gener- 
ally: cf. 4178 17 sq. In Mefaph. Z., cc. 7—~9 becoming, whether in nature, in 
art or even in τοῖς ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου (1032 a 13), is exhaustively discussed. 
Although A. there has other objects in view, the truth of this principle is 


526 NOTES Ill. 7 


sufficiently established for the first of A.’s categories (οὐσίατετόδε τι), e.g. 
1034 Ὁ 16 ἀλλ᾽ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας ἐκ τούτων λαβεῖν ἔστιν ὅτι ἀνάγκη προὐὔπάρχειν 
ἑτέραν οὐσίαν ἐντελεχείᾳ οὖσαν ἣ ποιεῖ, οἷον ζῷον, εἰ γίγνεται ζῷον. Actual exist- 
ence precedes becoming, is its logical prdus: cf. Metaph. 1071 Ὁ 14—-22. The 
efficient cause is always actually existent, though the material cause may be 
described as potentiality or even as non-existent: cf. MWetaph. 1069 Ὁ 15—20. 
Again, in the sphere of becoming, there is a close correspondence between the 
producing cause and the effect produced. The cause is already that which the 
thing produced becomes: cf. Metaph. 1069 Ὁ 31 ὥστ᾽ εἰ καὶ ἡ ὕλη pia, ἐκεῖνο 
ἐγένετο ἐνεργείᾳ ὃ ἡ ὕλη ἦν δυνάμει, also 1049b 24 αἰεὶ yap ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος 
γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὃν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ 
μουσικοῦ, αἰεὶ κινοῦντός τινος πρώτου" τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἐστίν, 1072 Ὁ 30— 
1073a 3; see especially 1072 Ὁ 35 τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, 
καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον" οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν 
φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ 
σπέρμα. The purpose of Aristotle in 2}. ©., c. ὃ is to establish the priority 
of ἐνέργεια to δύναμις in the wider sense of δύναμις as πᾶσα ἀρχὴ κινητικὴ ἢ 
orarixyn: Cf. 1049 Ὁ 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πρότερον διώρισται ποσαχῶς λέγεται, φανερὸν ὅτι 
πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς ἐστιν, and 1049 Ὁ 10 πάσης δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης [int. 
δυνάμεως) προτέρα ἐστὶν 7 ἐνέργεια καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ" χρόνῳ δ᾽ ἔστι μὲν ὥς, 
ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ: i.e., as he goes on to explain 1049 Ὁ 18, τὸ τῷ εἴδει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦν 
πρότερον, ἀριθμῷ δ᾽ οὔ. “Take a man now existing and now seeing, or corn 
now ripe in the field: these doubtless, before they came into their present 
condition, must have pre-existed in Potentiality ; that is, there must have pre- 
existed a certain matter—-seed or a something capable of vision—which at one 
time was not yet in a state of Actuality. But prior to this matter there must 
have existed other Actualities [of the same species] by which this matter was 
generated” (Grote’s Paraphrase, vol. I1., Ὁ. 363, 1st edition, p. 616, 2nd edition). 
Again, cf. De Gen. An, Il. 1, 734 8. 29 λόγος δὲ τούτου, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος 
τὸ δυνάμει ὃν γίνεται ἐν τοῖς φύσει ἣ τέχνῃ γινομένοις, date δέοι ἂν τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν 
μορφὴν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι. 

a 4 φαίνεται δὲ τὸ μὲν αἰο᾿θητὸν...5 ἐνεργείᾳ ποιοῦν, 1.6. ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθητικὸν ποιοῦν. 
We find the general rule that all which comes into being is derived from some- 
thing actually existent confirmed in the case of the several senses, as was 
explained 418 a 3—6, also 417 Ὁ 20 τοῦ μὲν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔξωθεν, τὸ 
δρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, 417 Ὁ 3 “sometimes it [ré πάσχειν} is rather a preservation 
of what is potentially existent by what is actually existent and like it, so far as 
likeness holds as between potentiality and actuality,” 417b 16 “the sensitive 
subject...once generated possesses sensation exactly in the same sense as we 
possess knowledge. And to have actual sensation corresponds to exercise of 
knowledge,” of which latter it is said 417 b 6 sq. ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἢ ἕτερον 
γένος ἀλλοιώσεως, and again 417 Ὁ 13 ἤτοι οὐδὲ πάσχειν φατέον ἢ δύο τρόπους εἶναι 
ἀλλοιώσεως, 425 Ὁ 28 “It is possible to have hearing and yet not hear; again, 
that which is resonant is not always sounding. But when that which is capable 
of hearing actually hears and that which is capable of sounding sounds, the 
actual hearing and the actual sound occur simultaneously.” Cf. also Metafh. 
ΙΟΙΟ 35 οὐ yap δὴ ἥ γ᾽ αἴσθησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς ἐστίν, GAN ἔστι τι καὶ ἕτερον παρὰ THY 
αἴσθησιν, ὃ ἀνάγκη πρότερον εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ γὰρ κινοῦν τοῦ κινουμένου φύσει 
πρότερόν ἐστι. κἂν εἰ λέγεται πρὸς ἄλληλα ταῦτα, οὐδὲν ἧττον. 

a6. διὸ ἄλλο εἶδος τοῦτο κινήσεως. AS mentioned in 2026 on 417 Ὁ 6, Alex. 
Aphr. proposed to call this a sort of γένεσις (γίγνεσθαί mas). Philop. 558, 31 
calls it simply μεταβολή, following 417 Ὁ 14—16. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1174 Ὁ 12 οὐδὲ 


III. 7 4318 3—a 9 527 


γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ 
γένεσις" οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς. ὅλον γάρ τι, alSo 1174 a 13—17. 

a7. ἡ 8 ἁπλώς ἐνέργεια, “activity in the absolute sense.” The test is that 
we can say ἅμα νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν, ἅμα ὁρᾷ καὶ ἑώρακεν, but no γένεσις or κίνησις 
proper is in this sense instantaneous. See #ofe on 4178 16. Cf. Simpl. 265, 13 
ἡ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀτελοῦς οὖσα ἐνέργεια. Moreover, γένεσις or κίνησις is always for the 
sake of some end and ceases when this end is achieved, whereas the activity is 
for its own sake and instantaneously attains its end. Even if it has duration in 
time, like ed ζῆν, εὐδαιμονία, ἡδονή, it is complete (ὅλον τι) and perfect in every 
instant of such duration. Cf. generally ΖΦ Ζλ. Nic. 1174a 13—1175 a 21, Metaph. 
1048 Ὁ 18—35, Io50a 23—b 2. ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου, when that which functions, 
ἐνεργεῖ, has attained its full development and perfection. Them. (112, 31 sq. H., 
207, 14 sqq. Sp.) illustrates by the exercise and application of the ἐπιστήμων. 
He has completely formed the habit, and his exercise of it is complete. We are 
here thinking of the distinction between the continued process (xivnots) and the 
result (ἐνέργεια) as compared in Eth. Mic. 1174a 19 sqq. Of the former, κίνησις, 
Them. says: 112, 33 H., 207, 17 Sp. γενέσει μᾶλλον προσέοικεν ἢ τελειώσει. 

a8. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι. The transition from θεωρητικὸς to πρακτικὸς 
νοῦς, according to Simpl. (263, 37) and Philop. (558, 11), begins in the last 
section 4318 4 φαίνεται xré. As in 111.) c. 4 A. made sense the starting-point 
for νοῦς θεωρητικός, so here again he makes sense the starting-point for νοῦς 
πρακτικός, This is to start with what is better known to us: experience shows 
that in whatever forms of life sensation is found, appetence goes with it. As 
Philop. brusquely says, 559, 7 δέον εἰπεῖν ὅτε ὃ πρακτικὸς νοῦς μετ᾽ ὀρέξεως 
ἐνεργεῖ, εἶπεν αὐτὸς ὅτι μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως [int. ἐνεργεῖ], because it has been proved 
that ὄρεξις and αἴσθησις are τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ identical. See xofeon414br. In 
fact, the link between αἴσθησις (= ὄρεξις) and νοῦς πρακτικὸς is logical enunciation 
(φάναι). Perception in this connexion may be compared to simple naming of 
the subject and simple apprehension by the mind, Metaph. 1051 b 23 sqq. cited 
in next moze. The passage 431 a 8—20 merely expands what has been implicitly 
stated 426b 21 λέγει dpa τὸ αὐτός, ὥστε ὡς λέγει, οὕτω καὶ νοεῖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται, 
viz. unity of the judging faculty, whether in sense or thought. Cf. 4328 16 
τῷ τε κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθήσεως. But the work of διάνοια, not 
fully explained 431 a 13—16, comes out more clearly when we reach 431 b 2 566. 

a8. τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν. As just explained, φάναι, like λέγει 426 Ὁ 21, 
is the simple naming of a thing. Sense in apprehending its appropriate qualities 
is hardly ever mistaken (427b 11 sq., 428b 18 sq., 430b 29) and the same is 
true of νοῦς, so far as it is concerned with ἀδιαίρετα: 4308 26 περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ 
ψεῦδος. Cf. Metaph. 1051 Ὁ 23 ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς [ἢ ψεῦδος, τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν 
καὶ φάναι [ἀληθές] (οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ κατάφασις καὶ φάσις), τὸ δ᾽ ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν. 
The implicit judgment of sense in cases of this kind is not so much “this is 
yellow,” “that is green,” ri κατά τινος, as “it is yellow,” “it is green”; or “this 
sensation is a sensation of yellow or of green.” 

a9. ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, int. ἢ τὸ αἰσθητόν (Torst.). To keep the subject, 
viz. 7 αἴσθησις, the same in the dependent as in the principal clause, ὄν τι 
αἰσθάνηται might equally well be supplied. οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα. The 
feminine participles show that ἡ αἴσθησις must be understood. By οἷον the 
analogy between sense and judgment, as well as their essential difference, is 
brought out. Sense does not really perform a synthesis such as was assigned 
to thought in 430 ἃ 27—b 4. What it does is to pursue or shun. But therein 
is implied an inchoate synthesis, viz. of τὸ αἰσθητὸν and τὸ ἡδὺ or of τὸ αἰσθητὸν 
and τὸ λυπηρόν, an implicit judgment asserting that the sensible causes pleasure, 


528 NOTES Ill. 7 


i.e. is relatively good, or that the sensible causes pain, 1.6. is relatively evil. In 
short, pursuit or avoidance in the region of sense corresponds to a logical judg- 
ment of affirmation or denial, as is laid down 7A. JVic. 1139 a 21 ἔστι δ᾽ ὅπερ 
ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ᾽ ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή" ὥστ᾽... δεῖ... 
τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν,...καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ 
διώκειν. Cf. 414} 4 8q., Simpl. 265, 35 ἐπειδὴ ἐν συμπλοκῇ πως καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη 
συνίσταται κρίσις τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ὡς γνωστοῦ καὶ ὡς ἡδέος: διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο οἷον 
κατάφασις. τὸ δὲ οἷον, ἐπειδὴ κυρίως ἐν λογικῇ ἀνελίξει fF τε κατάφασις καὶ 7 
ἀπόφασις...266, 5 τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ διώκει ἡ αἴσθησις ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὡς κακὸν 
φεύγει ἡ αἴσθησις - λογικῆς γὰρ διακρίσεως τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡδέος διορίζειν πολ- 
λάκις, τὰ δὲ κακὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ λυπηροῦ. Sense takes what is pleasurable at the 
moment for what is so absolutely and for absolute good, 433 Ὁ 8—Io. 

alo καὶ tom τὸ ἥἤδεσθαι.. 11 ἣ τοιαῦτα. A. is obviously affecting a technical 
phraseology which I have tried to reproduce in my translation. The same 
conclusion as before is now put without the analogy of speech and thought, 
which, as always in A., gotogether. Cf. Simpl. 266, 12 διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν 
σωματικῷ ὀργάνῳ πάντως χρῆσθαι τὰ ἐκείνου σωτήρια ἢ φθαρτικὰ πάθη γινώσκει τε 
καὶ ὡς οἰκεῖα ἢ ἀλλότρια τὰ μὲν ἀγαπᾷ τὰ δὲ φεύγει, where the language seems 
coloured with the associations of the later schools. A. “defines pleasure and 
pain,” says Grant, Ethics 15, p. 256, “to consist in the ‘consciousness, by means 
of the discriminating faculty of the senses, of coming into contact with good 
or evil’” This is in accordance with Grant’s conviction that occasionally the 
modern term “consciousness” is best fitted to express the deeper signification 
of ἐνεργεῖν. Cf. Simpl. 266, 5 δηλοῖ δὴ ἡ δίωξις τὴν οἷον ἀγάπησιν καὶ μεταδίωξιν, 
ἡ δὲ φυγὴ τὴν ἀποστροφὴν καὶ ἀπόστασιν. καὶ ἐν μὲν. τῷ ἥδεσθαι ἡ αἴσθησις ὡς 
ἀγαθοῦ ἀντέχεται τῆς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας, ἐν δὲ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι ὡς κακὴν ἀναίνεται. The 
words of the text recall Ζχᾷ. Wic.1174b 14 sqq., the well-known passage be- 
ginning αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, in which A., who 
consistently maintained that pleasure was akin to ἐνέργεια as distinct from 
κίνησις, expounds his theory that pleasure is the concomitant of normal 
activities and attends upon the functions of every faculty of sense or thought, 
though the highest pleasure is only experienced when the faculty, being perfect, 
works upon a perfect object: 1174 Ὁ 18 καθ᾽ ἑκάστην δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια 
τοῦ ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑφ᾽ αὐτήν. In τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι 
we get a reminder of the unity of sense: cf. ζῶ 431a19. We have been told 
before (424 a 4 sqq.) that sense is a sort of mean between the opposite sensibles 
and that it is in virtue of this that sense pronounces on its object, since the mean 
pronounces on the extremes, becoming to each of them the opposite extreme ; 
from which the dictum “excellens sensibile corrumpit sensum,” 424a 28 sqq., is 
simply a corollary. ἢ τοιαῦτα. Philoponus rightly explains these words: 
559, 10 καλῶς πρόσκειται τὸ ἢ τοιαῦτα" οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὰ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ ἀγαθά ἐστιν 7 
κακά, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ζῷον, ὡς τὸ μὲν σῶζον λέγεσθαι ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ φθεῖρον 
λέγεσθαι κακόν : cf. 433 a 28, Ὁ 8—10. Simpl. appears to have read ἢ τὰ 
τοιαῦτα: 266, 15 τὸ δὲ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα πρόσκειται τῷ ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά, διότι οὐδέποτε 
ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακὸν ὡς κακὸν κρίνει, ἢ τὸ μὲν διώκει τὸ 
δὲ φεύγει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν ὡς κακὸν τὸ μὲν διώκει τὸ 
δὲ φεύγει. 

αι 12. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ...ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν. The qualification ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν must 
be supplied with ἡ φυγή. It may be objected to ταὐτό, the reading of codd. 
LTV adopted by Biehl, that it makes the text unnecessarily paradoxical: 
“actual aversion and actual desire, and not merely the faculties in question, 
are identical,” though the paradox must of course be qualified by the customary 


Ill. 7 4318 g—a I5 529 


ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο. We had better acquiesce in τοῦτο (=rd ἐνεργεῖν), read by 
Bek. Trend. and Torst. Torstrik proposed conjecturally τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο here and 
would bracket 7 κακὸν in the preceding line, where cod. L reads ἣ τοιοῦτο in 
place of #7 roatra. Then τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, like rotro,=réd ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ 
peoornte, There seems no need to change ἡ before κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν with Trend. 
to 7 in order to bring out an antithesis between # τοιαῦτα and ἣ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν: 
quatenus res in universum vel bonae vel malae sunt (4 τοιαῦτα, quod genus 
significat) animus vel gaudet vel dolet; quatenus in nos ipsos agunt (ἢ κατ᾽ 
ἐνέργειαν), vel concupiscimus vel fugimus (p. 425). 

ἃ. 13 Kal οὐχ ἕτερον...14 ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο, i.e. we do not desire the pleasant 
by one faculty and shun the painful by another. There is only one faculty of 
aversion and appetence, and this is identical with the sensitive faculty, though 
logically distinct. The same qualification has already been used for the identity 
of sense-organ and faculty 424a 25, of actual sensation and actual sensible 
425b27. Sensation and appetence ought no more to be confused than sensation 
and pleasure: cf. Evh. Mic. 1175 b 34 οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ ye ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ᾽ 
αἴσθησις (dromoyv γάρ), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεταί τισι ταὐτόν. - 

8. 14 τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ Wuyy...I5 ὑπάρχει. This is repeated 432a 9, with the 
significant addition πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης. In 4208, 4 56. we learned that imaginations 
persist and resemble sensations, διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν (int. ras φαντασίας) καὶ ὁμοίας 
εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι The stone is outside me: when I perceive it, its εἶδος 
αἰσθητὸν is “in” my sensitive soul, but the change (κένησις), which I call per- 
ception, has set up in me a distinct change, resulting in an image which, if 
certain circumstances are fulfilled, persists or is recalled, and then I am said 
not to perceive, but to think the stone (εἶδος νοητόν): and the presentation of an 
image is just as indispensable if the object of thought is not a particular but an 
universal. The case of the universal is referred to 417 b 22—25 and more fully 
investigated Amal. Post. 11. 19, looa 15—b3. See De Mem. 1, 450a I—7. 
The part taken by images in memory is explained in De Jfem., c. 1, the twofold 
function of the image as a mere thought and as recalling a former perception is 
explained there 451a 1 ἕν re τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ μὲν γίγνεται ὥσπερ νόημα μόνον, τὸ δ᾽ ὡς 
ἐκεῖ ὅτι εἰκών, μνημόνευμα. The necessity of the mental image of a triangle in 
mathematical reasoning is enforced in the same chapter 449b 31 καὶ νοεῖν οὐκ 
ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος - συμβαίνει yap τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ὅπερ καὶ ἐν 
τῷ διαγράφειν ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οὐθὲν προσχρώμενοι τῷ τὸ ποσὸν ὡρισμένον εἶναι τοῦ 
τριγώνου, ὅμως γράφομεν ὡρισμένον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν- καὶ 6 νοῶν ὡσαύτως, κἂν μὴ 
ποσὸν voy, τίθεται πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποσόν, νοεῖ δ᾽ οὐχ 7 woody: ἂν δ᾽ ἡ φύσις ἢ τῶν 
ποσῶν. ἀορίστων δέ, τίθεται μὲν ποσὸν ὡρισμένον, νοεῖ δ᾽ ἣ ποσὸν μόνον. οἷον 
αἰσθήματα. Cf. Them. 113, 14 H., 208, 13 Sp. πρόκειται ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ αἰσθήματα 
τῇ αἰσθήσει. In Meftaph. 1010b 32 sq. αἴσθημα is said to be τοῦ αἰσθανομένου 
πάθος. See zofe on 417 b 20, 

alI5 ὅταν δὲ dyadov...16 διώκει. The subject of the verbs φήσῃ, διώκει is 
probably ἡ διανοητικὴ Ψυχὴ or τὸ διανοητικόν. With ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν we must 
understand φαντασθὲν as contrasted with the ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρὸν of ag supra, which, 
is αἰσθητόν. Pursuit or avoidance, i.e. desire or aversion, comes within the 
sphere of νοῦς πρακτικὸς only in so far as the pursuit or avoidance can be 
resolved into affirmation or negation. Strictly all that a thinking faculty can 
do is to command (κελεύειν; ἐπιτάττειν, λέγειν 432 Ὁ 30 sqq.), 1.6. to determine 
either an end or means to an end. The process indicated seems to be that of 
combining or separating, conjoining or dissociating the ideas of good and evil 
from some object present to the mind. So Them. 113, 16 H., 208,15 Sp. ὅταν 
οὖν αὐτὰ συμπλέξῃ οἷον τὸ φάντασμα καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ τὸ φάντασμα καὶ τὸ κακόν, 


Η. 34 


5.30 NOTES ΠῚ. 7 


τότε φεύγει ἢ διώκει καὶ ἔοικε καταφάσει ἡ δίωξις, ἀποφάσει δὲ ἡ φυγή. It must 
be remembered, however, that φαντασία may lead to action either on its own 
account, 4298 5 sqq., or as an indispensable condition of the activity of the 
vous πρακτικός. 

a I6 ϑιὸ οὐδέποτε...17 ἡ ψυχή. Because the thinking soul, being incapable of 
perception, has no sensations before it, it must have images to serve instead of 
sensations. That the image or pictorial presentation is indispensable to thought 
is often affirmed, e.g. 432a 8, 13 sq. and, making allowance for the tentative 
tone of an introductory chapter, 403 a 8 εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο [int. τὸ νοεῖν] φαντασία 
ris ἢ μὴ ἄνεν φαντασίας, De ALem. 1, 449 Ὁ 31. 

8 17 ὥσπερ 8%...20 πλείω. There is apparently no apodosis, the effect of 
ὥσπερ extending to the last co-ordinate sentence a19 τὸ δ᾽ ἔσχατον [int. ἐστίν] 
ἔν xré. Cf. Ind. Ar. 872 Ὁ 29 omittitur etiam interdum ea enunciatio demon- 
strativa, ad quam membrum relativum a part ὥσπερ incipiens referatur. See 
also 4178. 7 καθάπερ, 4038 12, 409 a 32, De Sensu 3,439a 18 sqq. The com- 
munication of motion in sensation, for which cf. De Jzsom. 2, 459a 28—b 5, 
is traced from the air to the sense-organ and thence to some internal part, but 
the last point which this motion reaches is the organ of the central sense in or 
near the heart. It is true that, except for 426 Ὁ 15 sq., no mention was made of 
this organ in III.,c. 2: but, having established the existence of the faculty, A. takes 
for granted τὸ μόριον ἐν ᾧ ἐστί (to which repeated reference is made in the Parva 
Naturaiia) on the principle laid down 4248 24—28. This organ may be styled 
μεσότης (cf. all supra) on the same grounds as any special sense-organ: cf. 
4248 4 sqq. and see zorfe on 431a 10. The connexion of thought is not obvious, 
but the wording of 431 Ὁ 2 τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη κτέ. suggests a fresh start after a 
digression ; and this makes against all proposals by means of transposition to 
bring a 14.77 δὲ...17 ψυχὴ into close juxtaposition with Ὁ 2 544. zu/ra. If the 
point of comparison is unity in diversity, a 19, 28 sq., we should expect the 
parallel between images and sensibles to be more fully elaborated, whereas in 
431 a 20—b 1 we seem still to be dealing with sensibles. . 

43la 20Ο-Ὁ 19. Here we must recall the explanation previously 
given (426b 8 sqq.) of the operation by which judgment is passed upon a 
plurality of sensibles simultaneously presented. The judging faculty is one, 
ἔν τι, and one in the same sense as a point is one, i.e. its unity is not incom- 
patible with a plurality of relations. The single judging faculty deals with 
heterogeneous sensibles, sweet and white, precisely as it deals with opposite 
sensibles, e.g. black and white, belonging to the same genus colour [ὃ 4]. To 
return to the thinking soul, which thinks the forms of objects as implicated in 
mental images: as the object of pursuit or avoidance is therein defined for it, 
so, when it is outside the range of sensation and dealing with mental images, 
we are thereby moved to action. Thus the mental picture of something to be 
avoided or pursued in its effect on the thinking soul may be compared with the 
beacon light in motion, the conventional signal of the enemy’s approach [§ 5]. 
As the eye sees the one, so the mind sees the other, and the man is roused to 
calculate and deliberate, weighing the future against the present, and pursuit 
or avoidance follows upon the pronouncement of thought precisely as it does 
upon the pronouncement of sense that an object is pleasant or painful: and so 
in general where action is concerned. [But the intellect is not wholly practical.] 
Truth and falsehood, the object of the speculative intellect, are generically one 
with good and evil, the object of the practical intellect; but, while truth and 
falsehood have an absolute validity, good and evil are always good or evil for 
some person or some thing [8 6]. Such abstractions as form the objects 


111. 7 431 8 15—a 22 531 


of mathematics the mind thinks precisely as it might think the camused as 
concave in contradistinction to the camused as such, i.e. without separation 
from the substratum in which it is found. Though mathematical objects are 
not really separate from things, the mind conceives them as if they were [§ 7]. 
In fine, the mind, when it thinks, is actually the things which it thinks. The 
question whether the mind can think anything that is immaterial and un- 
extended without being itself immaterial and unextended must for the present 
be postponed. 

4318 20. τίνι δ᾽ ἐπικρίνει. The subject is left vague: it must be τὸ ἐπικρῖνον, 
whether ὁ ἄνθρωπος or ἡ ψυχή. A comparison of the statement of the same 
problem 426 b 14 (κρίνομεν, αἰσθανόμεθα) favours the former view. In any case, 
by rive and a 21 ἕν re we are to understand what is technically known as ἡ κοινὴ 
αἴσθησις or (De Sensit 7, 449 a 17) τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πάντων. 

a2I. πρότερον, viz. 426 Ὁ 12—427 a 14. ὧδε, “as follows.” Nothing is 
added to the explanation before given, nor is it easy to see why it should he 
summarised here. Hence it is not strange that Them. in his paraphrase should 
have entirely passed over 4318 17—b I, or that Torstrik should have included 
the same passage in the /oci imstticig which, according to him, interrupt the 
course of the argument. Neuhaeuser, however (4ristoteles’ Lehre, Ὁ. 52). 
translates ὧδε “in einer andern Weise.” If it be urged that in this passage 
stress is laid on the unity of the object, we may reply that throughout III., c. 2 a 
single faculty implies a single act of perception, and a single act of perception 
implies a single object. ἔστι γὰρ fy ru. Οὗ 426} 18 δεῖ ἑνί τινι ἄμφω [int. ra 
κρινόμενα αἰσθητὰ] δῆλα εἶναι, 426 Ὁ 20, 21 λέγει ἄρα τὸ αὐτό, Ὁ 22 οὐχ οἷόν τε 
κεχωρισμένοις κρίνειν τὰ κεχωρισμένα, Ὁ 30 τὸ αὐτὸ ἣ ἀδιαίρετον, 427a 2 ἀριθμῷ 
ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον, 427 8. II. 

8. 22. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὡς ὅρος. Our authorities vary very considerably: see 
critical zozes. Codd. LV omit καὶ ὡς ὅρος and give a shortened text οὕτω δὲ καὶ 
ταῦτα ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον xré., but the words of Simpl. (271, 6) ἔστι yap, φησι καὶ αὐτός, 
ἕν τι αὐτὸ τὸ κρῖνον ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὅρος and Philop. (560, 21) pia οὖσα, φησίν, ὥσπερ 
ὅρος are conclusive against the omission. Cod. T, on the other hand, has οὕτω 
δὲ ἡ στιγμὴ Kat 6 ὅρος, which led Torstrik to conjecture that our text is defective 
rather than redundant here. It need not surprise us that what is successively 
called στιγμή, σημεῖον, πέρας in III., c. 2 should here be designated ὅρος. It 
might even have been called διαίρεσις, 430b 20. Such a boundary point implies 
at least two things which it separates. 

a 22 καὶ ταῦτα...23 πρὸς ἄλληλα. All attempts to make anything of the 
traditional text τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὃν ἔχει having been fruitless (see Neuhaeuser, p. 53 
sqq.), a new chapter in the interpretation of this obscure passage opened with 
the adoption by Freudenthal and Neuhaeuser of the reading ὃν for ὃν on the 
authority of Simplicius and the old Latin Translation. If it were certain that 
the subject of a 23 ἔχει must be what is known as 7 κοινὴ αἴσθησις, such a result 
could be more easily reached by extruding ὃν or ὃν altogether from the text, or 
by transposing a 22 καὶ ravra...23 τῷ ἀριθμῷ to precede a 22 οὕτω δέ, In the 
latter case we should get ἔστι γὰρ ἕν τι" καὶ ταῦτα [int. τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν] ἕν 
τῷ ἀνάλογον ἢ τῷ ἀριθμῷ: οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὡς ὅρος ὃν ἔχει πρὸς ἑκάτερον ὧς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς 
ἄλληλα, a statement so plain that confusion or perplexity would seem impossible. 
The attitude of the central sense to two heterogeneous sensibles which it dis- 
criminates would then be declared to be the same as the attitude of every 
special sense to the ἐναντία which come under its ken, as laid down 424 a 6 
γίνεται yap πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων: and this would accord 
perfectly with the next sentence in which white and black emerge. Or, if ὃν be 


, 34-—2 


532 NOTES Ill. 7 


deleted, the transposition is unnecessary, provided that a 22 καὶ ταῦτα...23 τῷ 
ἀριθμῷ is treated as parenthetical and enclosed in round brackets. If, however, 
we decline to evade the difficulties before us, it certainly seems to me that ταῦτα 
must be the nominative to ἔχει πρὸς ἑκάτερον, that it is a mistake to supply 
a second ἑκάτερον before πρὸς ἑκάτερον to balance ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα, and that 
a 22 ἕν τῷ dvdAdcyov...a 23 ὃν is an attributive clause, in which ὃν has been 
substituted for ὄντα through the influence of the predicate ἕν. Attraction to 
the gender of the predicate is common, to the number rare, but there are 
instances, e.g. 422 b 19 πότερον πλείους εἰσὶν ἢ pia. Here ἡ ἁφὴ must be the 
subject and εἰσὶν is attracted to the number of πλείους. Cf Melaph. 1048 a ὃ 
αὗται μὲν yap πᾶσαι pla ἑνὸς roinrixh,...dore momoe, De Sensit 7, 447 Ὁ 26 τὸ 
λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει dv, Plato, Protag. 340A ἧ τό re βούλεσθαι καὶ 
ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸν dv, καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά. For 
attractions of gender cf. 4048 25 56.,) 419b 10 πληγὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἢ ποιοῦσα. A 
better instance is Alefaph, 1002a 2 τὸ δὲ σῶμα... «μόνον ὑπομένει, ὡς ὄν τι καὶ οὐσία 
τις οὖσα. Thus understood, the sentence affirms, not that the central sense is a 
μεσότης, related to each of its heterogeneous objects as these heterogeneous 
objects are related to each other, but that this proposition holds of the object of 
the central sense, viz. the two heterogeneous sensibles when they have coalesced 
into unity of one sort or another. It means then that the single object (ταῦτα) 
formed by the unity of the two sensibles stands related to each sensible in turn 
(πρὸς ἑκάτερον) as these sensibles in isolation (ἐκεῖνα) stand to one another. 
I have adopted the reading ἢ τῷ ἀριθμῷ because I take it that the type of unity 
differs according as the qualities compared are in the same or in different 
objects. If they are in different objects, the only unity they can have is the 
unity of analogy, because sweet is the positive extreme of the genus flavour, as 
hot is the positive extreme of the genus temperature. When things are so 
related thatas 4 :8:: C: D, A and C are said to be by proportion or analogy 
one, and similarly B and D are by proportion or analogy one: there is an 
identity of relation: cf. £74. Nic. 1131 a 31 ἡ yap ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, 
Metaph. 1016b 34 κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν δὲ [int. ἐν] ὅσα ἔχει ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο with 
Alex. Aphr. ad Joc. 369, 24 ἀναλογίᾳ μὲν γὰρ ἔν, ὡς πηγὴ πρὸς ποταμόν, οὕτω 
καρδία πρὸς τὸ ζῷον" οὐ μὴν καὶ ὁμογενῆ ταῦτα, πηγὴ καὶ καρδία ἢ ποταμὸς καὶ ζῷον. 
Cf Poet. τ457 Ὁ τό τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχῃ τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ 
πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον πρὸς τὸ τρίτον" ἐρεῖ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ τέταρτον 
ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ τετάρτου τὸ δεύτερον, which Butcher translates: “Analogy or propor- 
tion is when the second term is to the first as the fourth to the third. We may 
then use the fourth for the second, or the second for the fourth.” Here it is 
plain that the second and fourth are by analogy or proportion one and similarly 
the first term and the third are by analogy or proportion one. If the two 
qualities belong to the same external thing, they will be κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 
numerically one, exactly as “musical” and “just” are numerically one because 
they happen to be qualities of Coriscus: Mefaph. 1015 Ὁ 16—36. (I may add 
that the Ms. authority for καὶ in place of ἢ before τῷ ἀριθμῷ is cod. T only, not, 
as reported by Hayduck, crzt. aff. ad Philop. 560, 23, codd. ET. From 
430 a 24 to 431 b 16 we are without the testimony of cod. E.) In the result so 
obtained there is nothing, I believe, to conflict with the teaching of the treatise. 
We have been told that ψόφησις κεάκουσις and that both reside ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι, 
1,6. ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ, and what has been established for each and all of the five 
senses must hold of the single faculty, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πάντων, in which they are 
alt merged. In the act of perception, then, the central sense and its object, 
which is a pair of heterogeneous sensibles, are one and the same, though 


~ 


Ill. 7 4318 22—a 24 533 


logically distinct. Moreover, our sentence itself proves (1) that the object, 
the pair of heterogeneous sensibles, is under the given conditions a unity, 
(2) that the object is related in one way to one, in another way to the other of 
the two heterogeneous sensibles of which it consists. That is, sweet-hot is 
sweet as compared with hot and hot as compared with sweet, so that we have 
here that plurality of relations which makes the same piece of road diverse, 
because it can be regarded now as uphill, now as downhill. As to (1), the fact 
that the pair of heterogeneous sensibles is under the given conditions a unity 
seems to be confirmed by De Sensit 7, 449 a5 εἰ δὲ δὴ ἄλλῳ μὲν γλυκέος ἄλλῳ δὲ 
λευκοῦ αἰσθάνεται ἢ ψυχὴ μέρει, ἤτοι τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἕν τι ἐστὶν ἢ οὐχ ἕν. ἀλλ᾽ 
ἀνάγκη ἕν" ἕν γάρ τι τὸ αἰσθητικόν ἐστι μέρος. τίνος οὖν ἐκεῖνο ἑνός; οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ 
τούτων ἕν. <A. desiderates unity in the object, but is unable to find it, presum- 
ably because sweet and white do not coalesce in the same way into a μεῖγμα, as 
e.g. the two notes blended in an octave, which, according to De Sevszu 7, 
4478 17 sqq., Ὁ 9—13, are simultaneously perceived by the ear because they 
have coalesced into unity. Yet the conclusion of De Sensu is not incompatible 
with the interpretation I propose of our present passage, since in 449 a 5 sqq. 
the denial of unity applies only to the hypothesis there under consideration, 
viz. the simultaneous apprehension of sweet by one part, and white by another 
part, of the soul, an hypothesis which A. is there refuting, as he again refutes it 
De A.426b 17. Even in De Sensz 447 b1 an accidental unity of heterogeneous 
sensibles is conceded: οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ ὀξέος ἕν γενέσθαι GAN ἢ κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός. This I take to be the meaning of ἢ τῷ ἀριθμῷ [int. ἔν], 431 a 22. 

Neuhaeuser explains ταῦτα as the sensations, ἐκεῖνα as the objective qualities 
outside of sensation. He is, therefore, forced to understand <éxdrepov> πρὸς 
ἑκάτερον. M. Rodier virtually does the same: though he explains ἔχει by 
“contains” and makes the subject of the verb the central sense, with which ἐν 
τῷ ἀνάλογον...ὃν 15 in agreement, yet it is clear from his translation (“étant un 
par analogie et numériquement, il a en lui ces qualités diverses, dans le méme 
rapport, Pune vis-a-vis de l’autre, que celles-ci sont entre elles dans la réalité ”) 
that he supposes the accusative after ἔχει to be something like this: ταῦτα 
ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἔχοντα ὡς... ἄλληλα. Simplicius, I believe, made no stop 
after ὅρος, for he certainly says that the two sensible qualities are one, not only 
with each other but with the knowing faculty (271, 21 sqq.). 

a 24 τί γὰρ διαφέρει...25 οἷον λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν; This question, introduced 
abruptly, implies that the central sense is necessary wherever two sensibles are 
compared, whether they are heterogeneous, like sweet and warm, or the opposite 
qualities of the same genus, like white and black. Some such connexion as 
this may be imagined: “Not only in the case stated, but in every case; for etc.” 
The point is worth urging, for some of those who have handled this perplexing 
passage trust rashly to the provisional statement of 426b 10, and erroneously 
suppose that white and black are discriminated from each other by the single 
special sense of sight. Philop. puts the case the other way: 561, 4 μὴ ἀπόρει, 
φησίν, πῶς τὰ ὁμογενῆ οἶδεν ἡ κατὰ μέρος αἴσθησις, εἴπερ οὐκ ἀπορεῖς πῶς τὰ 
ἀνομογενὴ oldev ἡ κοινὴ αἴσθησις. He, too, thinks that sight by itself is capable of 
pronouncing a judgment of difference or identity. Neuhaeuser also, p. 59, takes 
the meaning to be that whether we investigate the discrimination of hetero- 
geneous qualities by the central sense or of opposite qualities by a single sense 
does not affect the problem: as if the discrimination of opposite qualities by a 
single sense 426 b 10 sqq. had not to be qualified by the whole subsequent 
discussion, particularly the remarks of 426b 29—-427a 1, where the argument 
applies to any special sense as much as to the central sense. Cf. De Sewsz, c. 7, 


534 NOTES Ill. 7 


where the impossibility of two sensations occurring simultaneously is first 
established for a single sense (448 a 1—13) and then used to prove @ fortzorz 
a similar impossibility where the two sensibles are perceived by different senses 
(448 a 13—-19). Upon the principles laid down 426 b 12—-427a 14 a judgment 
of difference is not possible, unless the two sensibles are simultaneously pre- 
sented to the same judging faculty. But each special sense judges its objects 
successively, not simultaneously, and even in the extreme case when that object 
is a mixture of two or more components ἐξ ὧν & τι γίγνεται, it is still a single 
object which the single sense judges, an object numerically one, De Sevsz 7, 
447 Ὁ 9--- 3. ᾿ 

a24. τὰ μὴ ὁμογενῆ. The omission of μὴ from four of our MSS. here is an 
old error, for Simpl. also read ra ὁμογενῆ, which he nevertheless interpreted to 
mean heterogeneous sensibles, like sweet and warm: 272, 3 παραδεΐγματι χρησά- 
μενος τῷ γλυκεῖ καὶ θερμῷ, ὁμογενέσι μὲν οὖσιν ὡς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ πορρωτέρω ἀλλήλοις 
κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τὰ ἐναντία. This does not tend to inspire confidence in his 
guidance. Philop. explains correctly: 561, 6 ὁμογενῆ δὲ ἐκάλεσε τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ 
λευκόν" ὑπὸ τὸ χρῶμα γὰρ ἄμφω" ἀνομογενῆ δὲ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ..ὡς διαφόροις 
αἰσθήσεσιν ὑποπίπτοντα (cf. also 2b. 478, 1 sq., 25; 480, 5 sq.). The γένος of a 
special sensible is determined by the sense which perceives it, according as it is 
ὁρατόν, ἀκουστόν, ὀσφραντόν, γευστὸν or ἅπτόν. The several opposite qualities, 
because perceived by the same sense, belong, like other contraries, to the same 
genus. Thus they are not so far removed from each other as heterogeneous sen- 
sibles. Cf. De Semsu 7, 448 a 13 εἰ οὖν πλεῖον ἔτι ἀπέχει ἀλλήλων καὶ διαφέρει τὰ 
συστοίχως μὲν λεγόμενα ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ γένει τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει λεγομένων (οἷον 
τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν GAN ὧς σύστοιχα, γένει δ᾽ ἕτερα. The extremes which fall 
under the different senses are called σύστοιχα, De Sensu 7, 447 Ὁ 29 ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρως 
ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων [int. 7 αἴσθησις κρίνει] ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως ἑαυταῖς τὰ σύστοιχα, οἷον 
ὡς ἡ γεῦσις τὸ γλυκύ, οὕτως ἡ ὄψις τὸ λευκόν" ὡς δ᾽ αὕτη τὸ μέλαν, οὕτως ἐκείνη τὸ 
πικρόν. κρίνει, int. τὸ κρῖνον. 

ἃ 25. τὰ ἐναντία. Opposites belong to the same genus, though specifically 
distinct: De Sensu 7, 447 Ὁ 26 λέγω δὲ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἴσως τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, 
ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει ὄν, ἡ αὐτὴ [int. αἴσθησις) κρίνει. See also the citation from De Ge. 
et Corr. 1. 7, 333 Ὁ 9 sqq., Ρ. 493 sq. supra. Opposite sensibles are perceived 
by the same sense De 4. 422b 23—27, 422 Ὁ 10.sq., De Semsu 7, 448 a 3 ὑπὸ δὲ 
τὴν αἴσθησιν τὴν μίαν ἐναντία ἐστίν. Cf. Alex., De Sesu 142, 29 W οὐ yap ἄλλως 
μὲν ἡ ὄψις ἕξεως καὶ στερήσεως τῶν ἐναντίων ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ἄλλως δὲ ἡ ἀκοὴ τῶν 
ἐν αὐτῇ ἐναντίων, καὶ ἄλλως πάλιν ἡ γεῦσις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι τῶν 
ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτὰς ἐναντίων ὁμοίως ἀλλήλαις καὶ ἀνάλογον: τῶν γὰρ συστοίχων ἀλλήλοις 
σύστοιχοι καὶ ai ἀντιλήψεις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις, 16. 163, 14—17 W. 

a 25 ἔστω δὴ...431 b I τὸ λευκόν. Besides its exact relation to the foregoing, 
which is by no means clear, this passage presents several difficulties. (@) What 
are [and A? (6) What use is made of ὥστε καὶ ἐναλλάξ (c) What is meant 
by κἀκεῖνο ὁμοίως ἢ Let us assume that, in resorting to symbols and probably to 
a diagram, the writer intended to make clearer what he had already said in the 
last sentence but one. As the text now stands, that sentence affirms that two 
objects simultaneously judged constitute a unity of some sort. (1) If the two 
objects are homogeneous opposites, let them be represented by A and B. We 
postulate another pair of opposites, and A. Then not only.is I to A as A to 
B, but alternando T:A::4:B. The purpose with which the proportion 
alternando is introduced is perfectly clear: it is the only way in which ΓΔ, the 
third and fourth terms of the proportion, and AB, the first and second terms, 
can be brought together so that each pair becomes a unity by analogy or 


ΤΠ. 7 431 a 24---8. 25 535 


proportion. See the passages cited for ἕν τῷ ἀνάλογον in mole on 431 a 22 καὶ 
ταῦτα. So long as the proportion takes the form Τὶ : A::A:B, we may attribute 
unity by analogy or proportion to AT or to BA, but not to AB ortoTA. To take 
the instance in Poet. 1457 Ὁ 16 sqq.: when the cup is to Dionysus as the shield 
is to Ares, the cup is analogous to or one with the shield, but not with 
Dionysus. By the proportion alternando, then, we obtain here two unities by 
analogy or proportion, ΓΔ and AB, and the conjunction of the terms forcibly 
reminds us of ταῦτα ἕν τῷ ἀνάλογον. A further step may be taken. Assume 
that the pair of opposites TA belong to the same logical subject, ἑνὶ ὑπάρχει. 
Then κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς this pair TA will be ἕν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, exactly as “ musical” 
and “just” are in the same way ἕν τῷ ἀριθμῷ if they are both qualities of 
Coriscus. Thus we have instances of unity by analogy and one instance of 
numerical unity. We may then transfer to TA and AB the conclusion stated in 
the words above about ταῦτα, which comes, as I have said, to this, that each 
pair is an identical unity with diversity of relations. Both TA and AB have 
been proved to be a unity of some sort, while their relations to their constituents 
taken severally are diverse; the relation of TA toT is not that of TAto A. If, 
again, ΤΔ are attributes of a single subject X, then of X also the same conclusion 
holds: it, too, is an identical unity with diverse relations. The above solution 
makes no attempt to determine what r and Aare: provided that they are ἐναντία 
and can be ἑνὶ ὑπάρχοντα, it makes very little difference whether they are another 
pair of opposite sensibles or opposite κινήσεις of an αἰσθητικόν, cf. 426 Ὁ 31 56. 
The presumption is that, like the pairs hot-sweet, white-black, sweet-white, 
they are sensibles, as Simpl. conjectured (272, 12 sq.). But with the explanation 
I propose they will help us to answer the question τίνι ἐπικρίνει, even if they 
are not sensibles. (2) If the objects are heterogeneous, like sweet and white, 
let them again be represented by AB. We must postulate another pair of 
heterogeneous objects TA such thatl:A::A:B. Then elternandoT:A::A:B. 
We have once more two unities by analogy or proportion, ΓΔ and AB, and the 
proof follows the same course as before to the conclusion that, as TA, so also the 
heterogeneous sensibles AB must form an identical unity with diverse relations, 
for the relation of AB to one of its constituents A is not that of AB to B. 
Simplicius, whose solution has found an ardent advocate in M. Rodier, 
regards the whole passage as directed to confirm the assertion implied, though 
not explicitly stated, in the last sentence, οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ἀπορεῖν xré. Accord- 
ing to Simpl. (272, 3 sqq.), then, TA are sweet-bitter, or any similar pair of 
contrary sensibles. By ὥστε καὶ ἐναλλὰξ A. means that the proportion 
white : black :: sweet : bitter involves the further proportion white : sweet :: 
black : bitter. By κἀκεῖνο ὁμοίως Simpl. apparently understands the terms of 
the proportion alternando, viz. AT, white-sweet or BA, black-bitter: 272, 25 καὶ 
πρός ye τὰ ἐναλλάξ. In other words, we started with the homogeneous con- 
traries white-black, sweet-bitter, as attributes of one and the same subject 
(a 27 εἰ ἑνὶ εἴη ὑπάρχοντα) and we get the result that what holds of these 
contraries, viz. identity conjoined with diversity of relation, has been proved to 
hold likewise of the heterogeneous pairs white-sweet, black-bitter. But we 
might have started, A. goes on to say (a 29 sq.), with the heterogeneous pairs, 
and then we should have been led to a similar conclusion respecting contraries. 
The gist of the illustration, then, according to Simpl., is that, if we once admit 
the office of central sense in respect of contraries like black and white, we are 
bound in consistency to concede a similar office in respect of heterogeneous 
sensibles ; and similarly, if the office of the central sense be assumed for hetero- 
geneous sensibles, its office for contraries will follow as a necessary consequence 


536 NOTES Ill. 7 


of such an assumption: 272, 18 ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ καὶ τὸ ἐναλλὰξ χώραν ἔχει, καὶ 
ἔσται ὡς τὸ A πρὸς ToT, οὕτω τὸ Β πρὸς τὸ A. τοῦτο δὲ παρείληπται, ἵνα μὴ μόνον 
ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν [immo dvopoyevar] τὸ ἕν γινόμενον 
νοῶμεν, ὅταν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἕν τὸ γινῶσκον ἅμα ἦ τὰ διάφορα. τότε γὰρ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν 
καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ ἐν γίνεται καὶ τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ἅπερ οὐκ ἐναντία μέν, ὁμογενῆ 
[immo ἀνομογενῇ] δὲ ὅμως καὶ αὐτὰ κατά τε πορρώτερον γένος τοῦ χρώματος. 6 
τοίνυν ἐνδοὺς πρὸς τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ἀλλήλοις ἐν γίνεσθαι τὰ ΑΒ ἢ τὰ TA καὶ θάτερα 
δώσει, καὶ τερός γε τὰ ἐναλλάξ. Philop. (561, 10 544.) understood TA of the λόγοι 
or εἴδη of black and white: more precisely (since he desired to establish a close 
connexion with what has preceded and what will follow about διάνοια πρακτεκή, 
555, 7 566.) the νοητὸν εἶδος of each, which is presented to the same single 
judging faculty, νοῦς, as the sensible qualities white and black are presented to 
the single judging faculty, the central sense. 

Neuhaeuser, as we have seen, regards ταῦτα and ἐκεῖνα a 22 Sq. Supra as 
meaning respectively the sensations before the central sense and the objective 
qualities giving rise to those sensations. This distinction, he thinks, is here 
reproduced, AB answering to ἐκεῖνα, TA to ταῦτα, 1.6. to the sensations, here of 
black and white. It is these, and not the objective qualities, which, as he 
contends, are present to the judging faculty. Hence Neuhaeuser retains the 
words a26 ws ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα (repeated from a23), which Christ, Freu- 
denthal, Baeumker and Biehl rejected as spurious. According to Neuhaeuser, 
A. admits that a single sense is competent to discriminate the contraries in its 
own genus: black and white are judged by the single sense sight. If TA, the 
two sensations to be judged, belong to the same sense, they will be related as 
the corresponding qualities, so far as these latter belong to one and the same 
object. That is, they will be ὃν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, though logically distinct. And 
the same relation will hold between the sense and its object (kdkeivo ὁμοίως). 
At 8. 29 68 αὐτὸς λόγος the proof is resumed. What has been established for 
a single sense and its object can similarly be demonstrated for the central 
sense and its object, the pair of heterogeneous sensations. The point of the 
illustration, then, is that, as contrary sensations, white and black, stand related 
to one of the special senses, sight, so heterogeneous sensations, white and sweet, 
are related to the central sense. A. seeks to prove that from the numerical 
identity joined with logical distinctness implied in the former case can be 
deduced the same numerical identity joined with logical distinctness for the 
latter case, both as between the heterogeneous sensations themselves and as 
between the heterogeneous sensations and the central sense. The analogy 
between the union of different or even opposite qualities in the same external 
thing and the union of different or even opposite relations of the one judging 
faculty, which is nevertheless numerically identical, is used, as Neuhaeuser points 
out, by A. himself De Semsz 7, 449413 ἢ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἐνδέχε- 
ται, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ THs ψυχῆς. τὸ yap αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν ἀριθμῷ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ ἐστι, 
καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, εἰ μὴ χωριστὰ τὰ πάθη ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑκάστῳ. 
ὁμοίως τοίνυν θετέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν εἶναι ἀριθμῷ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν 
πάντων, τῷ μέντοι εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον τῶν μὲν γένει τῶν δὲ εἴδε. But, as I 
have tried to show above, it seems a mistake to attribute to sight or any of 
the special senses the power of discrimination between homogeneous objects 
simultaneously present, except in so far as a special sense is employed as an 
instrument by the central sense: cf. De Seusu 7, 449 a 8 ἀνάγκη dpa ἕν τι εἶναι 
τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ ἅπαντα αἰσθάνεται, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἄλλο δὲ γένος δι’ ἄλλου, 
1.6. ὁρατὸν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, ἀκουστὸν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς κτέ. Sight, as a special sense, 
apprehends white and black successively: sensus communis, employing sight as 


III. 7 431 a 25--- 2 537 


its instrument, apprehends white and black simultaneously. On the other hand, 
if Simpl. has the right interpretation, it is surprising that A., whose real point, 
according to Simpl., is to establish the proposition for κἀκεῖνο ὁμοίως (τὸ 
ἐναλλάξ), 1.6. for AI or BA, should be at the pains to establish it first for TA, 
a conclusion which does not advance us beyond the point from which we 
started, the pair of contraries TA being in all respects similar to the pair of 
contraries AB. I suspect Simpl. is no more right about ὥστε καὶ ἐναλλὰξ than 
about ra ὁμογενῆ, his lectio fais at 431a 24. He just assumes that, being simul- 
taneously apprehended, A and B are one: 272, 15 εἰ οὖν τὰ AB ἕν πρὸς ἄλληλα 
γίνεται, ὅταν ἅμα γινώσκηται, καὶ τὰ TA ὁμοίως ev γενήσεται ἢ ἀριθμῷ ἢ ἀναλογίᾳ, 
ἀριθμῷ μὲν διὰ τὸ ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ γνωρίζεσθαι, ἀναλογίᾳ δὲ διὰ τὸ κατὰ διαφόρους 
λόγους μηδὲν μᾶλλον θάτερον ἢ ἧττον. ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ καὶ τὸ ἐναλλὰξ χώραν 
ἔχει κτξ, These remarks precede the introduction of σπέζοζγηαζωῶο. He appears 
to understand by ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ AB “as we know A and B to be,” whereas 1 take 
these words to be a part of the inference: “and so will AB be related.” Again, 
if TA are αἰσθητά, not αἰσθήματα, the single subject to which they belong ought 
to be the external thing rather than the central sense. Neuhaeuser indeed, 
p. 60, explains κἀκεῖνο ὁμοίως as referring equally to the thing in which the 
sensible qualities inhere and the sense or sentient subject in which the sensa- 
tions inhere: “jenes eine Princip, der Sinn und das Object.” Lastly, Simpl. 
states (272, 28) that at ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος A. resumes ὅπερ διὰ τοῦ ἐναλλὰξ ἐνεδείξατο. 
If so, and if the alzernando has no purpose in what precedes, why was it 
gratuitously anticipated? 

a27. ὥστε καὶ ἐναλλάξ, int. ἀνάλογον ἔσται. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1131 Ὁ 5 ἔσται dpa 
ὡς ὁ a ὅρος πρὸς τὸν B, οὕτως 6 γ πρὸς τὸν ὃ, καὶ ἐναλλὰξ ἄρα, ὡς 6 a πρὸς τὸν γ, 
6 β πρὸς τὸν δι For the omission of a verb after ὥστε καὶ cf. 26. 1131 b 7 ὥστε 
καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, De Part. An. 1. 3, 642 Ὁ 35 ἀναγκαῖον yap τῶν καθ᾽ 
ἕκαστον ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῶν διαφορῶν ἑκάστην, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἀντικειμένην and the 
citations in wzofe on 406b 1. τὰ TA, an abbreviation for τὸ Τ' καὶ ro A. 
Sometimes the singular article τὸ is prefixed in the same sense: cf. Piys. V1. 
5, 258 a 9—18 in the light of 258 a I—5. 

a 29. κἀκεῖνος There is a strong temptation to adopt the conjecture κἀκεῖνα 
and make “they also” recapitulate, referring to TA, the subject of a 28 ἔξει. 
Or this might still be possible with the singular κἀκεῖνο, since TA form a unity. 
I have translated it differently, referring it to the single subject, in which Τ' and 
A ex hypothesi inhere. 6 δ᾽ αὐτὸς Adyos. The same argument will apply if 
we take heterogeneous, instead of opposite, sensibles. See 2025 on 4318. 25, 
ἔστω On, Supra. 

431 Ὁ 2 τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη...12 καὶ rwl A. now returns to νοῦς πρακτικὸς or 
(a 14) ἡ διανοητικὴ ψυχὴ and the part it plays in moving us to action, alike (1) in 
present sensation and (2) apart from sensation, when we are dealing only with 
the images and ideas in the mind. The first case is illustrated by the beacon 
fire, the second case is stated in general terms Ὁ 6—9 ὁτὲ δὲ... διώκει. When we 
see the signal of an enemy’s approach we are moved to action, at other times 
the mere imagination or idea in the mind is sufficient to prompt pursuit or 
avoidance after calculation and deliberation. The general sense is clear, though 
there are difficulties in detail. 

Ὁ 2. τὸ νοητικὸν. Cf. Simpl. 273, 26 δηλαδὴ τὸ πρακτικόν" τοῦτο yap τὸ 
διῶκον ἢ φεῦγον. A. may have this chiefly in mind here, but, as the φάντασμα 
is Just as indispensable for νοῦς θεωρητικός, 432 a 8, the statement should be 
taken quite generally. Cf. supra 431 a 14 Sq. ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, The 
sense conveyed by ἐν here and 4328 4 sq. hardly differs from that of οὐκ ἄνευ 


538 NOTES Il. 7 


431a 17: cf. 432a 8,13. The statement is repeated here in order to draw the 
inference that rational desire has a freer range than that ἐπιθυμία which is 
prompted by present sensation to pursue what is pleasant. 

b3 καὶ ds ἐν ἐκείνοις...5 κινεῖται. The main purpose is to bring out the 
difference between νοῦς πρακτικὸς and αἴσθησις, which is a consequence of the 
employment of φαντάσματα. ᾿ Νοῦς πρακτικὸς not only operates under the stimulus 
of actual sensation, of which an illustration is given by the fire-signal ; but it can 
also, as above explained, operate through φαντάσματα apart from and indepen- 
dently of present sensation (see 431 a 14, 428 b 27), and this is illustrated by the 
process of calculation and deliberation, when only images are before the mind, 
b6 ὁτὲ &€...9 διώκει. The details are obscure, e.g. ἐν ἐκείνοις, αὐτῷ and the 
subject to κινεῖται. To take the last first. In the illustration the subject of 
γνωρίζει, being qualified by αἰσθανόμενος and ὁρῶν, must be the individual 
man: cf. 408b13. This will also suit Ὁ 7, 8 λογίζεται, βουλεύεται, εἴπῃ. We 
can hardly be wrong, then, in taking the same subject for κινεῖται, which, if 
it means ὀρέγεται, includes both φεύγει and διώκει of bg. In spite, then, of 
the opening sentence b2 τὸ vonrixdv...voei, throughout this section A. leaves’ 
the faculties for the concrete possessor, the subject or individual who perceives, 
deliberates and desires. It is true, τὸ νοητικὸν might be the subject of κινεῖται: 
cf. Mfetaph. 1072 a 30 νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται. But, if we go back to 
faculties, it must be τὸ dpexrexdv, as we shall see 433b 17 κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινού- 
μενον 7 ὀρέγεται, Ὁ 27 7 ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, TavTn ἑαυτοῦ κινητικόν. But the 
expression here is rather parallel to 433 Ὁ 18 τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον: cf. 
4338. 24. As for αὐτῷ, although it is very natural to take it as τῷ νοητικῷ 
and ὥρισται as recalling 431 a 15 ὅταν δὲ...16 διώκει, it is Just as easy to refer 
it to the individual man, and the decision must lie with ἐν ἐκείνοις. From καὶ 
ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως it may be inferred that Ὁ 3 ὧς... «φευκτὸν has to do with 
sensation: compare the illustration b 5 sq. This would make it impossible that 
ev ἐκείνοις Should mean ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασιν. 

Ὁ 4. καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως. I take καὶ as “even” or “also.” Because the 

mind distinctly cognises good to pursue and evil to avoid among the νοητὰ impli- 
cated in the imaginations of sense, even in the absence of actual sensation we are 
moved toact. If ὡς...καὶ be taken to correspond to each other, “as...so also,” 
the clause ds...devxroy will refer exclusively to the case when there is an actual 
sensation, and ἐν ἐκείνοις must be taken to mean ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς : cf. below Ὁ 8 
ὅταν εἴπῃ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν. So Simpl. 273, 35 ἐν ἐκείνοις λέγων τοῖς 
αἰσθητοῖς, καθάπερ αὐτὸς σαφῶς ἑρμηνεύει ἀντιδιαιρῶν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, 
ἅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ φανταστάς. Hammond in his translation (p. 124) appears to join 
καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως with ὡς ὥρισται, and not with κινεῖται, understanding 
ἐν ἐκείνοις to mean ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασιν. So taken, the words become quite 
pointless. 
' bq ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ἧ. Torstrik supplies τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτὸν as 
the subject: as remarked above, I prefer ὁ νοῶν. Eiva ἐπὶ c. gen. means to 
attend to, to be occupied with, as e.g. in Demosthenes ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπεὶ 
τοῦ πολεμεῖν εἶναι. 

Ὁ 5. κινεῖται, 1.6.ὄ 15 moved to action: apparently meant to include φεύγει ἢ 
διώκει under one expression, as in 433 Ὁ 17. Cf. 433 Ὁ 27 sq. and 433 a 24 sq. 
That διανοεῖσθαι is in popular view a κίνησις was admitted 408 Ὁ 3 sq., 6. Simpl. 
273, 38 τουτέστιν ἐγείρεται eis λογισμὸν καὶ βουλὴν τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν seems to me a 
little too precise. 

' -b 5 οἷον αἰσθανόμενος...6 πολέμιος. This illustrates the case of present 
sensation: “if we see something alarming—the beacon torch in motion, for 


111. 7 431 Ὁ 2—b 8 530 
instance—we are immediately moved to action” (Bywater). Here νοῦς plays 
its part. Cf. Simpl. 274, 10 καὶ γνωρίζει 6 νοῶν συντιθεὶς τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, 
τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ ταῦτα λόγου ἀναφέρων εἰς τὸ τὸν φρυκτὸν παρουσίας πολεμίων 
εἶναι σύμβολον. τὸν φρυκτὸν. The corruption to φευκτὸν in five of our MSS. 
can be traced in Them.: see Heinze’s critical apparatus on Them. 114,1. By a, 
military convention, a beacon fire or torch, if stationary, signified the approach 
of friends, while torches in motion were a warning of the approach of the enemy: 
Thuc. 11. 94, 111. 22, 80, VIII. 102, Cf. the Scholiast on Thuc. Il. 94 φρυκτοί 
εἶσι λαμπάδες τινὲς ἀπὸ ξύλων γιγνόμεναι, ἅστινας βαστάζοντες ἄνωθεν τῶν τειχῶν 
ἐσήμαινον τοῖς πλησιοχώροις ἢ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὅτ᾽ ἄν τινας ἑώρων πολεμίους ἐπιόντας, 
ὡς δεῖ προφυλάξασθαι. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμέων τοῦτο ἐποίουν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ. 
φίλων - ὅτ᾽ ἂν ἑώρων βοήθειαν αὐτοῖς ἐρχομένην, ἐσήμαινον πάλιν διὰ τῶν φρυκτῶν 
ὡς οὗ δεῖ θορυβεῖσθαι. καὶ ὅτ᾽ ἂν μὲν φίλους ἐδήλουν, ἐβάσταζον τοὺς φρυκτοὺς 
ἠρεμοῦντες" ὅτ᾽ ἂν δὲ πολεμίους, ἐκίνουν τοὺς φρυκτούς. 

Ὁ 5. [τῇ κοινῇ], int. αἰσθήσει: but it is impossible to reconcile this with the 
conclusion of III, c. I, viz. that there is no αἰσθητήριον for τὰ κοινὰ distinct 
from, and additional to, the ordinary five senses. It is by sight alone, τῇ ὄψει, 
and not by the common meeting place of all the five senses, that the beacon 
in motion’ is perceived in the case before us. Simplicius was aware of the 
difficulty and proposed to meet it by transposing γνωρίζει to precede ὅτι πολέ- 
μιος and punctuating after κινούμενον and before γνωρίζει thus transposed (274, 
I4—17). The sentence then reads τῇ κοινῇ ὁρῶν κινούμενον, γνωρίζει ὅτι πολέ- 
ptos. Thus Simpl. joins τῇ κοινῇ closely with ὁρῶν κινούμενον, not with γνωρίζει, 
and explains τῇ κοινῇ as τῇ τῶν κοινῶν (274,68q.). Torstrik made a decided 
improvement upon this lame explanation by conjecturing κινήσει for κοινῇ: 
cf. his proposal of κοινῇ in 4258 17 in place of the κινήσει of the Mss. The 
pleonasm τῇ κινήσει ὁρῶν κινούμενον is not in itself decisive against this 
conjecture. Bywater’s proposal (Journ. of Phil. XVII. p. 61) to excise τῇ 
κοινῇ aS a marginal gloss is the most satisfactory solution of the difficulty. 
As he says:—“ The antithesis here is simply between what we see (δρῶν) 
and what we only as if were see (ὥσπερ ὁρῶν), i.e. imagine; and it 15 weakened 
or rather utterly spoilt by the addition of a superfluity like τῇ xoww7—which 
seems due to some annotator who was aware that κίνησις was one of the κοινὰ 
αἰσθητά, but did not understand the Aristotelian theory as to how we know 
them.” 

b6 ὁτὲ &...8 παρόντα. Here we pass ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως to the cases where 
the mind is taken up with its own ideas and imaginations, employing them in 
the deliberation which precedes action. As we shall see 433 Ὁ 29, 4348 7, 
imagination so employed by rational beings is’ termed λογιστικὴ or βουλευτικὴ 
φαντασία, and the procedure of weighing the future against the present is 
further elucidated 433 Ὁ 5-10, 434 8 5---ἰο. The accusative τὰ μέλλοντα Ὁ 8 
is governed by λογίζεται, to which καὶ βουλεύεται is attached by a sort of after- 
thought. Cf. Plato, Zheaet. 186 A ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ 
παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. 

Ὁ 8 καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ...9 φεύγει ἢ διώκει. Deliberation ends in a decision or 
pronouncement, which takes the form of a judgment or proposition, either 
of which can be denoted by εἴπη: cf. λέγει 426 Ὁ 20, 21, 22, φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ 
431a 16. The question arises whether ἐκεῖ and ἐνταῦθα are antithetical.: They 
can hardly be so in the way Torstrik supposes, viz. éket=in the future, ¢vravda= 
in the present; et si dicit futurum esse iucundum quid vel triste, iam nunc fugit, 
vel persequitur. Nor is Wallace’s account more satisfactory, viz. that écet=in 
the speculative sphere, ¢vrav@a=in the practical sphere. If an antithesis must 


540 NOTES Ill. 7 


be found, it would be better to make ὡς ἐκεῖ refer to αἰσθητά, the expression 
seeming to recall Ὁ 3 ὡς ἐν éxeivars...peverdv. But, if so, the sentence 15 extra- 
ordinarily brief and elliptical: ὅταν εἴπῃ [int. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν] ὡς ἐκεῖ [int. 
εἶπε] τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, the word ἐνταῦθα implying τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν to balance 
τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν. Thus ὡς is comparative and is not used to introduce a clause 
in indirect speech. Some indeed take εἴπῃ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρὸν to Mean 
‘pronounces that there lies pleasure or pain,” as if the clause with ὡς contained 
the substance of the pronouncement. To this view Torstrik objects that A. 
of all men would be least likely to make rational action depend solely upon 
pleasure and pain. It may be urged that pleasure and pain are the ordinary 
motives of human action and that in £724. Ne. Vil. and X. the highest good is 
almost, if not altogether, identified with pleasure. But, granting all this, why 
should A. assign to rational desire the same ὀρεκτὸν as to irrational desire or 
ἐπιθυμία, whether in man or brute, if all along his object is, as we have shown, 
to distinguish νοῦς πρακτικὸς from αἴσθησις ἢ And why should he do this when a 
moment before he has been describing the calculation and balancing of the 
future against the present, which is only possible for creatures who have a 
perception of time and are swayed by the conflicting impulses of Adyos and 
ἐπιθυμία! Cf. 433 Ὁ 5 566. 

Ὁ το. καὶ ὅλως ἐν πράξει. With these words repeat φεύγει ἢ διώκει. There 
will then be no need to conjecture with Trend. οὕτως for ὅλως. Cf. Simpl. 275, 4 
apdrres δὲ ἢ rod ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιδιώκων μετάληψιν ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἀποδιοπομπούμενος. In 
spite of this sensible note, Simplicius would seem to have missed the con- 
struction and supplied ἐστὶν with ἐν πράξει: 275, 3 καὶ καθόλου πράττει re. 
τοῦτο yap δηλοῖ τὸ ὅλως ἐν πράξει Even then we are not justified in translating 
with M. Rodier: “et d’une maniére générale, il passe a la pratique.” Cf. 
Metaph. 1078 a 31 τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕτερον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐν πράξει, τὸ 
δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις). 

Ὁ IO καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως...12 τινί. Intellectus practicus non est penitus 
diversus ab intellectu theoretico: nam verum et bonum in eadem συστοιχίᾳ 
continentur, item falsum et malum: differunt ita ut bonum semper referatur 
ad aliquem vel ad aliquid’cui bonum est, verum non item (Torst.). The 
truth and falsehood which are contemplated independently of action must 
belong to νοῦς θεωρητικός. Simplicius, however, refers this sentence also to 
νοῦς πρακτικός, understanding the distinction intended by τῷ ἁπλῶς καὶ τιὶ 
to be the distinction between general propositions and particular cases, or 
between the major premiss and the minor premiss of the practical syllogism: 
275, 18 ἄνευ.. τοῦ πράττειν τι σκοπῶν τὰ πρακτὰ καὶ ὁποῖον τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀληθές 
τε καὶ Weudos, ὡς πρακτικὸς καὶ τότε ἐνεργεῖ, οὐχ ὡς τότε πράττων τι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὅτε 
δέοι πράττειν, τῇ φανείσῃ αὐτῷ καθόλου χρησόμενος ἀληθείᾳ: an unnatural inter- 
pretation, which ignores De A. 433 a 14 διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. 
Cf. Eth. Nic. 1139 a 27 τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς 
τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος. What the genus is which includes 
τὸ ἀληθὲς and τὸ ἀγαθὸν may be gathered from Mefaph. 1072 a 26—b 4, where 
τὸ ὀρεκτὸν τὸ πρῶτον and τὸ νοητὸν τὸ πρῶτον are identified. But the primacy 
is given to νοητὸν (ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις), and the series or list, συστοιχία, of what 
is Der sé νοητὸν is said to include not only ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἁπλῇ καὶ Kar ἐνέργειαν, but 
also τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν. To the same positive side of the table would 
belong τὸ ἀληθές. The subject of 431 Ὁ 12 διαφέρει is τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν or 
τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ κακόν. In the first case τῷ ἁπλῶς καὶ τινὶ is abbreviated for 
τῷ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἀληθὲς καὶ τῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τινὶ εἶναι ἀγαθόν. This does 
not mean that good is πρός τὸ in the sense that there is no absolute good, but 


111. 7 431 Ὁ 8—b 12 541 


‘that of the two senses of good or end-in-itself distinguished 415 Ὁ 2 (see 22926 
ad loc.) we are dealing with τὸ 6 and not with τὸ οὗ. Truth is constant, it is 
not τὸ φαινόμενον, 404 a 28 sq., whereas the good for a particular person or 
thing may very well be, and often is, other than τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν. It is only in 
the judgment of the truly good man that they coincide, £74. Mc. 1113 a 22—b 2, 
1129 b I—6, 1152 b 26 sq., Ark. Lud. Vil. 15, 1248 Ὁ 26 sq., Il. I, 1228 Ὁ 19, VII. 2, 
1235 Ὁ 31 sq., Melaph. 1029b § καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ 
ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθά, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ 
γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα. The task of the moralist is 
to make good absolute my good, the task of the thinker is to rise from the 
most familiar facts of experience to the laws of nature. 

biz τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει Acydpeva...16 ὅταν voy ἐκεῖνα. See Bywater in /ourv. of 
Phil. XV, Ὁ. 62: “The construction here has been misunderstood by some, 
through failure to see that in the clause ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ xré. the relative has as a 
grammatical antecedent the οὕτω before τὰ μαθηματικά, the sentence being in 
point of form just lke that in III. 6, 430a 28—30 (καθάπερ...οὕτω xré.) where 
the punctuation has been duly set right by Vahlen. And as regards the ἂν 
after ὥσπερ, I take it to be an anticipation of the ἄν in the apodosis (ἄνευ τῆς 
σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει), So that ὥσπερ ἂν ef 15 not to be understood in the same way as 
what 1s sometimes written womepavei. The general sense of the passage, if we 
for a moment ignore all difficulties of detail, seems clear enough. As for ra 
μαθηματικά, though they are really inseparable, we think them as separate from 
matter, just in the same way as, if one thought the σεμὸν as simply hollow, one 
would think it so as apart from the flesh (the nose), the particular matter wherein 
it is found.” For τὸ σιμόν Ξεκοιλότης ἐν ῥινὶ (AMefadh. 1030 Ὁ 32) see wore on 
429 Ὁ 14. The present passage affords a striking proof of the impossibility to 
the Greek of the time of conceiving τὸ σιμὸν as merely hollow without thinking 
of a nose, the imperfect indicatives εἰ ris ἐνόει...ἂν ἐνόει serving to express 
unfulfilled conditions: “if any one conceived (as he never does).” Bywater, 
thinking it impossible to get the required meaning out of the text as it stands, 
would reconstruct the earlier part of the passage as follows: ra δ᾽ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει © 
λεγόμενα νοεῖ, ὥσπερ ἄν, εἴ <tis> τὸ σιμὸν F μὲν σιμὸν οὔ [κεχωρισμένως), 7 δὲ 
κοῖλον [εἴ Tis] ἐνόει, ἐνεργείᾳ <vody > ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει ἐν ἢ τὸ κοῖλον, οὕτω 
τὰ μαθηματικὰ κτέ. In this reconstruction b 14 «νοῶν» comes from b17 and 
Ὁ 14 [κεχωρισμένως] is due to the variant κεχωρισμένως for Ὁ 16 κεχωρισμένα 
attested by Simpl. 278, 32. But the irregularity of the traditional text is partly 
explained if we reflect that of the two clauses 7 μὲν σιμόν... ἢ δὲ κοῖλον it is only 
the second clause which is challenged: for the purpose of the argument it is 
superfluous to drag in the first at all, though this is done idiomatically to 
point the antithesis, and the antithesis is heightened by the scrupulous 
pedantry with which οὐ κεχωρισμένως is set over against ἄνευ τῆς σαρκός. 
When we come to b 16 ὅταν νοῇ ἐκεῖνα, it is scarcely possible to determine 
whether ra ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα, the classic phrase for rd μαθηματικά (see 
7025 on 403 Ὁ 15 ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως), is felt by A. to be so far distinct from τὰ 
μαθηματικὰ as to justify him in using ἐκεῖνα instead of αὐτάς. Bonitz and Vahlen 
conjecture ἢ ἐκεῖνα. Trend. and Torst. understand τὰ αἰσθητὰ by ἐκεῖνα, but 
such a technical use of this pronoun is without authority. The way in which 
mathematical conceptions are abstracted and regarded by the mathematician 
has been explained on 429 Ὁ 18—22, where see wzofes. See also 403 a 12—15 
with zofes. As the word νοεῖ implies, the mathematical conceptions are νοητά, 
although the material objects from which alone they can be abstracted are 
αἰσθητά. Such is the plain teaching of 432 a 4 54.: cf. De Caelo 111. 7, 306 a 27 


542 NOTES 111. 7 


ai μὲν γὰρ [int. ἐπιστῆμαι] καὶ τὸ νοητὸν λαμβάνουσι διαιρετόν, ai μαθηματικαί, 
Metaph. 1077 Ὁ 34—1078 a 31, especially 1078 a 21 ἄριστα δ᾽ ἂν οὕτω θεωρηθείη 
ἕκαστον. εἴ τις TO μὴ κεχωρισμένον θείη χωρίσας, ὅπερ 6 ἀριθμητικὸς ποιεῖ καὶ 6 
γεωμέτρης, 1061a 28—b 3. The present passage explains the statement 7Ζεζαῆ. 
1051 a 30 αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι νόησις ἡ ἐνέργεια [int. τῶν μαθηματικῶν ], as will be seen if 
the whole context 1051 a 2I—33 be carefully examined. See first ποθ on 430a 21 
σα. ; 

Ὁ 17. [νοῶν]. The balance of authority (codd. LU, the first hand of E, 
Philop.) is against the retention of this word: Delevi Ὁ 17. νοῶν, quod deteriores 
libri aliquot addunt: legebatur enim: ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν 6 κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ra 
πράγματα νοῶν. Sine dubitatione ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν νοῦς est ὁ νοῶν vows: sed illud 
satis erat dixisse (Torst.). We have had the statement before 4308 3—9 and 
get it again directly 431 b 21. 

Ὁ 18. τῶν κεχωρισμένων τι, See zofe on 403 Ὁ 15, 7 δὲ κεχωρισμένα. The 
fact that we do think τὰ κεχωρισμένα and that this is indeed the province of the 
metaphysician or First Philosopher is not questioned. The doubt is whether 
from this fact of experience any inference can be drawn as to the nature of 
intellect. ὄντα αὐτὸν μὴ κεχωρισμένον. The perfect participle κεχωρισμένος 
used as an adjective would seem to stand to χωριστὸς as διῃρημένος to διαιρετός. 

Ὁ 19. σκεπτέον ὕστερον. Where this enquiry should come is matter for 
conjecture. From the form of the reference in De Mem. 1, 4508 7 διὰ τίνα 
μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ συνεχοῦς, οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ χρόνου τὰ μὴ ἐν 
χρόνῳ ὄντα, λόγος ἄλλος, it would seem that when that treatise was composed it 
was not yet forthcoming. 


CHAPTER VIII. 


431b 20—4382a 14. To sum up: the soul is in a manner the uni- 
verse of things, which is made up of things sensible and things intelligible: and 
knowledge is in a manner identical with its object, the intelligible; sense with 
its object, the sensible. This statement calls for further explanation [§ 1]. 
Sense and knowledge, whether potential or actual, are distributed over things 
potential or actual, as the case may be. In the soul, again, the sensitive faculty 
and the cognitive faculty are potentially their respective objects. These objects 
must therefore exist in the soul, not indeed as concrete wholes, form and matter 
combined, which is impossible: it must be the forms of things which exist in 
the soul. Thus within the soul intellect 1s the form of forms, 1.6. of intelligible 
forms, and sense the form of sensibles, precisely as in the body the hand is the 
instrument of instruments, i.e. the instrument by which other instruments are 
acquired [§ 2]. The world of things consists of extended magnitudes which 
sense can apprehend; and nothing else, it would seem, has independent exist- 
ence. In the forms which sense apprehends are to be found the forms which 
the mind thinks; the abstractions of mathematics no less than the properties 
and conditions of sensible things. And this is why sense-perception is indis- 
pensable to the acquisition of knowledge and to understanding. And when the 
mind is applying its knowledge and actually thinking, mental images are 
indispensable, and these serve instead of present sensations. The imagining 
faculty, however, is something distinct from affirmation and negation, for it is a 
combination of notions which makes truth and falsehood. If it be asked, how 
the simplest notions are distinguishable from imaginations of sense, we reply 


111. ὃ 431 Ὁ 12—b 24 , 543 
that in no case is the notion the image, even though it is never independent 
of an image [8 3]. 

431 Ὁ 20. τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαντεςς. We proceed to sum up the con- 
clusions as to thought already reached, viz. in 111.., cc. 4—7, and those for sense, 
mainly in 111.. 6. 2. The solution of the problem of knowledge amplifies and 
expands various intimations given in the course of the treatise. 

b2x. πάλιν, “over again,” not simply “as our predecessors have said before 
us,” although it is true that A. discovers the germs of his own doctrine in the 
interpretations which Empedocles and Plato gave of the principle that like is 
known by like: compare 404 Ὁ 8—15, 16—18, 409 Ὁ 27 ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν ra 
πράγματα τιθέντες. Nor is πάλιν used quite in the sense noted Jzd. Ar. 559 Ὁ 
13 “πάλιν Omnino progressum in narrando enumerando quaerendo significat.” 
The re-statement here introduces the discussion which substitutes ra τῶν ὄντων 
εἴδη for the unqualified τὰ ὄντα. 

Ὁ 22 ἔστι 8’...23 τὰ ἐπιστητά mas. See 4308 3—9, especially a 4, 5, 430 a 19, 
20,431a1. Here Alex. Aphr., De Am. 91, 7—92, 11 1s excellent. 

Ὁ 23. ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά, int. πώς. From 425 b 26—426a 26 πὼς ap- 
pears to represent the addition of κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν to ἐπιστήμη... ἐπιστητά, αἴσθησις 
...aio@nrd : but it is better referred to the qualification given Ὁ 28 sqq. z2/ra. 

Ὁ 24. τέμνεται otv...elg τὰ πράγματα. The authority for the text is not _ 
strong (see crit. zozes), but in Ὁ 25 and Ὁ 26 there is no variant of eis: hence 
Torstrik’s proposal to replace eis in a 24 by ὥσπερ καί, though apparently 
favoured by Bonitz (Jad. Ar. 754 a 30), leaves half the difficulty untouched. At 
the same time there can be no doubt that Torstrik’s proposal gives the true 
sense; knowledge and sense-perception are divided by the same dichotomy as 
things. As things are either potentially or actually existent, so knowledge and 
sense may be either potential or actual. Thus Themistius, though we need not 
suppose, as Torstrik does, that he had os or ὥσπερ καὶ or anything else but eis 
before ra πράγματα: 115, 15 H., 211, 27 Sp. ra ὄντα τοίνυν τὰ μὲν δυνάμει τὰ δὲ 
ἐνεργείᾳ, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ μὲν δυνάμει εἴδη ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ" Grav μὲν yap 
ἔχῃ τὴν ἕξιν τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, μὴ ἐνεργῇ δέ, δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, ὅταν δὲ 
ἐνεργῇ ταῖς ἔξεσιν ἀμφοτέραις, ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα. That εἰς with τέμνεται should 
mean “according to,” i.e. by the same divisions, as something else, has no 
exact parallel. In Plato, Laws 738 26 δὲ τῶν τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίων 
[int. ἀριθμὸς] εἴς re πόλεμον καὶ ὅσα κατ᾽ εἰρήνην πρὸς" ἅπαντα ra ξυμβόλαια καὶ 
κοινωνήματα, εἰσφορῶν. τε πέρι καὶ διανομῶν, οὐ πλείους μιᾶς δεουσῶν ἑξήκοντα 
δύναιτ᾽ ἂν τέμνεσθαι τομῶν, the exact meaning of εἰς is made clear by the 
following πρός: the number 5040 has 59 divisors suitable alike for war and 
the transactions and associations of peace. The sense of εἰς is more un- 
mistakeably final in Pol. 1330a 11 καὶ τούτων ἑκατέραν [int. ἀναγκαῖον] διῃρῆσθαι 
δίχα πάλιν, τῆς μὲν κοινῆς TO μὲν ἕτερον μέρος eis τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας, τὸ 
δὲ ἕτερον εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην. In PAYS. VIL. 5, 250a 17 εἷς γὰρ ἂν 
κινοίη τὸ πλοῖον, εἴπερ ἣ τε τῶν νεωλκῶν τέμνεται ἰσχὺς εἰς τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τὸ 
μῆκος, ὃ πάντες ἐκίνησαν, the construction is not different from εἰς δὺο τέμνειν, as 
may be seen if εἰς ἑκατὸν be substituted for εἰς τὸν ἀριθμόν. If the force employed 
in towing the vessel over a certain distance be the component of (say) 100 
separate forces exerted by as many separate individuals, then, A. argues, it will 
follow that each single man moves the vessel, viz. one hundredth part of the 
distance. If, however, A. had written els τοὺς vewAxovs, as he very well might 
have done, in place of els τὸν ἀριθμόν, the expression would have closely 
approximated to that before us, τέμνεται eis ra πράγματα. With διαιρεῖν we find 
κατὰ similarly used, e.g. Ret. 1. 8, 1365b 27 ra δὲ κύρια διήρηται κατὰ ras 


544 NOTES II. ὃ 


πολιτείας" ὅσαι yap ai πολιτεῖαι, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύριά ἐστιν. In the Polztics we 
have sometimes κατὰ and sometimes πρὸς with διαιρεῖν : 1200 Ὁ 18 πότερον κατὰ 
τὸ πρᾶγμα δεῖ διαιρεῖν [int. τὰς ἀρχὰς] ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ἕνα τῆς 
εὐκοσμίας [int. πότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ] ἢ παίδων ἄλλον καὶ γυναικῶν, 1300 Ὁ 6, 
1329 a 41, [298 Ὁ 11 διῴρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευύμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας, 
1336 Ὁ 37 δύο δ᾽ εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διῃρῆσθαι τὴν παιδείαν. It 
might also be suggested that in our present passage τέμνεται eis should be 
taken to mean “is distributed between” or “among.” This meaning is ex- 
pressed by μερίζειν with eis in Pol. 1265 Ὁ 3 διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς 
ὁποσονοῦν πλῆθος, 1321 Ὁ 37 ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν οὖν μερίζουσι καὶ ταύτην [int. τὴν ἀρχὴν] 
εἰς πλείους, ἔστι δὲ μία κύρια τούτων πάντων. Torstrik enquires: Cur τέμνειν 
dixit, non διαιρεῖν, quod in hac re solemne est? an propter Timaei τμῆσιν ἢ If 
there is a Platonic reminiscence, it is more likely to be of the divided line in 
Rep. Vi.: cf. $11 Ὁ, E καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν 
τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτω... .καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον. 

b 25 ἡ μὲν δυνάμει...26 εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ. It is a delicate question whether we 
should follow the two best MSS. in reading δυνάμεις, .«ἐντελεχείας (cf. Soph. 
138, 37), or give the preference to τὰ δυνάμει... τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ, the text of the 
inferior MSS., which is supported by the weighty authority of Them.115, 15 sq. H., 
211) 27 sqq. Sp., Simpl. 281, 6—8, Philop. 567, 9g—-11. The expressions are 
equivalent and both are found in A., but his use of the abstract nouns in the 
plural is less frequent. It is quite clear that here the words governed by eis do 
not denote parts into which the whole is divided, but provinces to which the 
divisions of the whole are assigned or correspond, that in fact τέμνεται is no 
effective part of the predicate. Potential sense and potential knowledge are 
thus assigned to things potentially existent as their province, actual sense and 
actual knowledge to things actually existent. Cf. MZefaph. 1087 a 15—19. 

Ὁ 27. δυνάμει ταῦτά ἐστι. “So the greater number of MSS. If ταὐτόν be 
read, it would seem better, with” the late “ Prof. Chandler, to continue—ré μὲν 
ἐπιστητῷ, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητῷ " (Wallace, p. 283). Cf. Them. as cited above in zoze on 
431 b 24 ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἔχῃ τὴν ἕξιν τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, μὴ ἐνεργῇ δέ, δυνάμει 
ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα. See, e.g., 417 Ὁ 17 sqq., 429 Ὁ 5—9. 

Ὁ 27. τὸ μὲν, 1. 4. τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν. τὸ δὲ, 1. q. τὸ αἰσθητικόν : chiasmus, 
since Ὁ 26 τὸ αἰσθητικὸν preceded b 27 τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν. 

b 28. ἀνάγκη δ᾽ ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἴδη elvar. The subject is τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ 
ἐπιστημονικὸν and the predicate αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἴδη, where by αὐτὰ must be understood 
αὐτὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ and αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπιστητὰ respectively. Cf. Philop. 567, 25 νῦν φησιν 
ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ἣ αὐτὰ τὰ σύνθετα εἴδη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἶναι, τουτέστι μετὰ τῆς ὕλης καὶ 
τὸ εἶδος, ἢ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ ἕαυτὸ τὸ εἶδος, Simpl. 281, 18 ἐὰν μὲν ἦ σύνθετος ἡ οὐσία ἡ 
ἐπιστητή, οὐκ ἔσται αὐτὴ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος αὐτῆς. αὐτὰ μὲν δὴ...20 ἐν 
τῇῷ ψυχῇ. A.’s summary takes no account of the case where the thing known 
and its quiddity are identical, as in 429 Ὁ 12. The stone is a type of σύνθετος 
οὐσία. Cf. 410 a 10—13. . 

Ὁ 29. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος. Cf. 4298 27 τόπον εἰδῶν, mofe and 417 b 23: the 
universals, which are the content of knowledge, are in a manner in the soul 
itself. This correction probably renders precise the πὼς of Ὁ 21 and the 
advance which A. supposes he has made upon Empedocles. 

4328. 2. ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων. Cf. Philop. 567, 33 ὃ λέγει τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὅτι 
ὥσπερ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανον οὖσα τοῦ σώματος ὀργάνοις κέχρηται, οἷον σκεπάρνῳ, εἰ τύχοι, 
τέκτων ἢ καλάμῳ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτὴ εἶδος οὖσα ἄλλων εἰδῶν ἐστι δεκτική, διότι 
τοὺς λόγους τῶν εἰδῶν ἔχει wrap’ ἑαυτῇ. This is not the whole of what is implied 
in the simile. We use other instruments with the hand, but further the hand 


111. ὃ 431 Ὁ 24—432 a3 545 


itself shapes the instruments it uses. Cf. De Part. An. Iv. 10, 687 ἃ 7—23, of 
which I cite (a 19) ἡ δὲ χεὶρ ἔοικεν εἶναε οὐχ ἐν ὄργανον ἀλλὰ πολλά" ἔστι γὰρ 
ὡσπερεὶ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων. Anaxagoras had said that man is the most 
rational being because he has hands. Aristotle replies that man has hands 
because he is the most rational being, for the instrument must be adapted to its 
function, not the function to the instrument. The choice of the instrument is 
after all determined by the end in view, and the hand is so ingeniously con- 
trived for various purposes that it takes the place of all other tools. Nature, who 
gives to each animal the instruments it can use, has given man hands because 
he has the intelligence to use them. In Prodlents XXX. 5 the question proposed 
is why we learn more quickly in youth, but have greater powers of mind in 
mature life. The solution begins by stating that we have two instruments in 
ourselves with which to make use of external instruments, and these are, in the 
body, the hand and, in the soul, νοῦς : (955 b 23) ὁ θεὸς ὄργανα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἡμῖν 
δέδωκε δύο, ἐν ols χρησόμεθα τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὀργάνοις, σώματι μὲν χεῖρα, ψυχῇ δὲ νοῦν. 
For intelligence is, as it were, a natura] instrument in us, as distinct from the 
sciences and arts, which are instruments made by ourselves: (26. Ὁ 25) ἔστι γὰρ καὶ 
ὁ νοῦς τῶν φύσει ἐν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ὄργανον ὑπάρχων" ai δὲ ἄλλαι ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ τέχναι 
τῶν ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν ποιητῶν εἰσίν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῶν φύσει...(Ὁ 36) ἔστι γὰρ νοῦ μὲν ὄργανον 
ἐπιστήμη (τούτῳ γάρ ἐστι χρήσιμος, καθάπερ αὐλοὶ αὐλητῇ), χειρῶν δὲ [int. ὄργανα] 
πολλὰ τῶν φύσει ὄντων. The writer of this problem, who has made use of the 
passage in De Part. An. above referred to, may be putting his own construction 
on the simile of our text, but at any rate he is right in saying that the arts and 
Sciences are useless without intelligence to apprehend and, as it were, hold 
them. 

a2. καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν. Bywater (/ourn. of Phil. XVII., p. 63) thinks that 
νοητῶν must have dropped out after εἰδῶν. “In the expression εἶδος εἰδῶν the 
word εἰδῶν does not mean ‘forms’ generally —it seems to mean par excellence 
the νοητὰ εἴδη: but this is not the sense it bears in the immediate context, where 
we have two instances of the use of the word in the more general sense of 
‘form,’ one just before this passage (431 Ὁ 29), the other two lines further on 
(432 a 5 ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά [scil. εἴδη] ἐστι. Elsewhere the 
special meaning of εἶδος Ξε εἶδος νοητὸν is without ambiguity in the context where 
it occurs, e.g. 429 a 15, 28, 431 Ὁ 2. 

a 3 ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ rpdypa...6 ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. Join κεχωρισμένον with πρᾶγμα and 
τὰ αἰσθητὰ with μεγέθη. The absence of a proper punctuation placed the ancient 
reader at a great disadvantage, as A. remarks A4ez. 111. 5, 1407 Ὁ 12—18, but 
the comments of Philop. 568, 10 sqq. and Simpl. 284, 13-22 are astonishing. 
Simpl was right in taking κεχωρισμένον with πρᾶγμα, though the transposition 
which he proposes for this purpose is unnecessary; but he failed to see that 
τὰ αἰσθητὰ goes with τὰ μεγέθη, and took ὡς δοκεῖ τὰ αἰσθητὰ together. Them. 
alone understood the construction: 115, 35 H., 212, 26 Sp. οὐδὲν εἶναι πρᾶγμα 
δοκεῖ παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον. The judgment of Simpl. was no 
doubt biassed by philosophic anxiety to vindicate the existence οὗ κεχωρισμένον 
τι τοῦ μεγέθους (431 b 18 sq.). He overlooked the qualification ὡς δοκεῖ, by the 
use of which A. abstains from committing himself. Alex. Aphr. recognised one 
exception to the universality of this statement, viz. τὰ κινητὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εἴδη, 
χωριστὰ ὄντα (apud Simpl. 284, 23 sqq.). Simpl. himself goes further: 283, 36 ὁ 
vous τὰ εἴδη ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ φανταστοῖς νοεῖ, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἅπαντα (ov γὰρ καὶ 
τὰ GvAa)...(285, I) καὶ ὅπερ διὰ τοῦ δοκεῖν πρότερον ἐνεδείξατο, ἐναργέστερον νῦν 
σαφηνίζει ἀφορίζων, τίνα κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν αἰσθητά, ἃ οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὧν καὶ 
τὰ νοητὰ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ φανταστοῖς ἐστιν εἴδεσι. 


546 NOTES 111. ὃ 


a6. τῶν αἰσθητῶν. These words might conceivably go with ὅσα, but it 
makes a better sense if we take them with ἕξεις καὶ πάθης Cf. Metaph. 
983 b 13—16, lool Ὁ 29—1002 a 2, 1015 Ὁ 28—34, 1020a 17—22, 1061 a 7——I0, 
De Gen. et Corr. 1. 10, 327 Ὁ 15—17, De Mem. 2, 451a 21—-28. These passages 
show that the accidents which are predicated of substance and are supposed to 
inhere in it are often referred to comprehensively as ἕξεις, πάθη or διαθέσεις, 
when they are contrasted with substance itself. 

a'7 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο...8 οὐδὲ ξυνίοι. The reason why the defect of a sense 
necessarily implies a corresponding defect of knowledge is clearly stated 
Anal, Post. τ. 18 Induction and demonstration are the only roads to know- 
ledge, and both are closed in the case assumed, induction from particulars being 
impossible without sense-perception, Amal. Post. 1. 18, 81b 5 ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ 
ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν ἀδύνατον. τῶν yap καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡ αἴσθησις, while the ultimate 
major premiss from which a demonstration starts involves an apprehension of 
universals, for which induction, and therefore sense-perception, will be again 
necessary: 23. 81a 40 ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν KaOddov...ddvvaroy δὲ τὰ 
καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι᾽ ἐπαγωγῆς. The failure of a single sense cuts us off, 
not only from all the particulars of a given kind, but from the universals 
which the intellect might under other circumstances discern to be latent in 
those particulars and disentangle from them. Torstrik followed Bekker in 
restoring ξυνείη which, as heard, owing to itacism, no scribe could discriminate 
from €vvio.. His note is: quum aoristo opus sit, ex Bekkeri coniectura sic 
scripsi, non ξυνέοι : si ἰδία coniectura est vocanda: nam libri LP [now styled y] 
S praebent ξυνή. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1179 Ὁ 27, where two MSS. give, the one ovvin, 
the other συνίησιν, in place of cuvvein. As to the appropriateness of the verb 
used, from £74. Nic. 1143 a 11—18 it would appear that the special meaning 
of συνιέναι is to understand what is said to one, and that by means of knowledge 
which one already possesses, while from 70. IX. 3, 165 Ὁ 32 it appears that 
μανθάνειν itself might bear this meaning as well as the more obvious meaning 
of acquiring fresh knowledge. Thus under the disabilities imposed by the 
defect of a sense we can neither learn for ourselves nor be instructed by the 
conversation of a teacher. 

a8. ἅμα φαντάσματι, 1.6. οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματος. Here again our authorities 
differ (see critical #o¢es), E being supported by Them. 116, 8 H., 213, 10 sq. Sp. 
and Philop. 569, 5 sq. against inferior MSS. and Simpl. 284, 13. Mistake was 
inevitable if the archetype resembled, let us say, the papyrus in which the 
᾿Αθηναίων ἸΤολιτεία has been preserved. It was repeated apparently by the 
scribes of Philoponus: 569, 5 ἐπαναγκές ἔστι τὸν νοῦν ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν, 
τουτέστιν ὀργάνῳ τῇ φαντασίᾳ «- κεχρῆσθαιϊ»...(7) διὰ τούτων... «λέγει ὅτι ὃ νοῦς ἅμα 
φαντασίᾳ ἐνεργεῖ, where ἅμα φαντασίᾳ makes it quite clear that Philop. intended 
φαντάσματι and not φάντασμά τι. 

aio. πλὴν ἄνευ ὕληΞ. This qualification must be understood even where, as 
in 4318 15, it is not expressed. Compare 431 b 2-~5. We must remember that 
by the definition 428b 30—429 a 2 (cf. 428 Ὁ 10—30) imaginations are impres- 
sions of present sensations, or of past sensations resembling present sensations, 
except in so far as their matter is not present. Indeed, A. is careful to point 
out that one species of φάντασμα, viz. memory, is not infrequently mistaken for 
a present sensation, De lem. 1, 451 a 2—I12. 

alo. ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως. As here used, ddots=xarddacts, an 
affirmation, τὶ κατά τινος : cf. mofe on 430b 26! 

a II συμπλοκὴ γὰρ...12 WeiSos. See on 430 a 27, where the term is not 
συμπλοκή, but σύνθεσις, 


11. ὃ 432 ἃ 6—a 12 547 


8 12 τὰ δὲ πρῶτα...13 ἄνευ φαντασμάτων. The question is put whether τὰ 
πρῶτα νοήματα are anything distinct from images of sense, and it is clearly 
answered in the affirmative. If we adhere to the traditional text, it would seem 
as if the answer implied some sort of inference: οὐδὲ τἄλλα, exgo ne haec quidem. 
No explanation, then, of the text will be satisfactory unless (1) τὰ πρῶτα are 
opposed to τὰ ἄλλα, and unless (2) the sense given to τὰ πρῶτα is such that, 
when the conformity of ra ἄλλα νοήματα to the law previously laid down 
(431 a 16) that the mind never thinks without an image is admitted, the con- 
formity of τὰ πρῶτα νοήματα to the same law follows as a matter of course, and 
the suspicion entertained about them vanishes. If, on the other hand, we alter 
τἄλλα tO ταῦτα or interpret ra ἄλλα as meaning τὰ πρῶτα, we make A. allay the 
suspicion to which he has just given utterance by a mere 2256 dixz¢ without 
reason assigned. The above-mentioned conditions will be satisfied if we take 
σερῶτα to mean ἁπλᾶ, 1.6. ἀσύνθετα. It will then follow that τὰ ἄλλα -ετὰ σύνθετα, 
i.e. the notions employed by discursive thought in dealing with τὸ ὃν as ἀληθὲς 
and τὸ μὴ ὃν ὡς ψεῦδος, the region in which, as we have just been reminded, 
there 15 συμπλοκὴ (or σύνθεσις) νοημάτων ὥσπερ tv ὄντων (430 a 27 Sq.). In 
other words, all νοήματα are either (2) πρῶτα καὶ ἁπλᾶ or (δ) συμπλοκαὶ νοημάτων 
πρώτων καὶ ἁπλῶν, judgments, whether implicit or explicit. I assume that 
A. regards (4) as the more familiar case and that here the truth of the proposi- 
tion “The notion is something distinct from the image which is indispensable 
to it” is more easily recognised. Cf. Them. 116, 10 sq. H., 213, 12—14 Sp. 
cited below. In every logical judgment and in every compound notion capable 
of further analysis the part played by νόημα and φάντασμα is recognised as 
distinct. Cf. Them. 116, 18 H., 213, 24 Sp. ov yap ταὐτὸν τό re νόημα τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ 
Σωκράτους καὶ ἡ φαντασία, ἀλλὰ ra μὲν φαντάσματα τύπος τις καὶ ἴχνος αἰσθήσεως 
καὶ ὥσπερ πεῖσις, εἴ μοι τὴν πεῖσιν vooins ὡς πολλάκις προειρήκαμεν, τὸ νόημα δὲ 
ἐνέργεια τοῦ νοῦ περὶ τὸ φάντασμα ὑποκείμενον. ταύτῃ τοι καὶ ποικίλως αὐτῷ [the 
word νόημα] χρῆται καὶ ταῖς πτώσεσιν ἐξαλλάττων καὶ τοῖς ἄρθροις. If in the 
judgment or the compound notion capable of further analysis there is both 
νόημα and φάντασμα which are quite distinct ; and if, further, the judgment and 
the compound notion are nothing but συμπλοκαὶ νοημάτων πρώτων καὶ ἁπλῶν, it 
follows that these two are present as distinct in that στοιχεῖον of discursive 
thought, the πρῶτον νόημα. For, if we resolve πρῶτα νοήματα into φαντάσματα 
and nothing else, we ought in consistency to find nothing but φαντάσματα in the 
products of such πρῶτα νοήματα, 1.6. in judgments and in compound notions 
capable of analysis. On this view of the passage it becomes superfluous to 
determine whether ra πρῶτα are the highest notions, as Trend. supposes (ra 
πρῶτα νοήματα, ut πρῶτοι ἀριθμοί, ea esse videntur, a quibus reliquae veritatem 
repetunt) or the first results of abstraction, as Torst. holds: τὸ πρῶτον νόημα 
est prima abstractio, quae fit ubi a repraesentatione (τῷ φαντάσματι) elus quod 
τῷ ἀριθμῷ individuum est (6 ris ἄνθρωπος) transimus ad id quod τῷ εἴδει indi- 
viduum est (6 ἄνθρωπος) : quod discrimen potest rudiorem quemque latere. They 
need not invariably be, what Simpl. calls them, quiddities: 286, 2 πρῶτα καλῶν 
Ta τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτῶν γνωστικὰ καὶ μάλιστα τὰ τῶν ἀύλων εἰδῶν. From Anal. 
Post. 11.. c. 19 we should certainly infer that in our experience the lower uni- 
versals are formed first, the higher and the highest of all afterwards, for 
thought can separate as well as combine. A notion can be simple and 
uncompounded in the logical sense without being indivisible. Cf. 430a 26— 
b6 and Metaph. Θ., c. το. 

Others take the opposite view, according to which the question Is sufficiently 
answered by the mere reassertion that images are indispensable to ra πρῶτα 


35- 2 


548 NOTES ΤΙ. 8 


νοήματα. Torstrik substituted ταῦτα for τἄλλα, a change approved by Freudenthal. 
Torstrik’s critical note is: ταῦτα scripsi ex Them. The reading ταῦτα is pre- 
sented by all the mss. of Them. (116, 18), but the latest editor of Them., Heinze 
(not Hayduck, as is incorrectly printed in my critical σποδός)» is obviously not 
convinced that the paraphrase as a whole justifies the word ταῦτα, for, against 
the authority of all the Mss. of Them., he has replaced it by τἄλλα. Cf. Them. 
116, τὸ H., 213, 12 Sp. fore δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα Kal vootvpeva 
φανερῶς ἕτερα τῶν φαντασμάτων. After illustrating this by examples, Them. 
resumes: 116, 15 H., 213, 19 Sp. καὶ atrae πᾶσαι ai συμπλοκαὶ διαφέρουσιν 
ἀλλήλων τε καὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων, from which it may be argued that in the 
opinion of Them. the difference between imagining and thinking was more 
evident for the judgment than for the single notion. Nor is there any gain to 
the sense by reading ταῦτα, however the word be interpreted. Torst., as above 
noted, interprets it as the lowest universals, i.e. the least removed from sense, 
like the πρῶτον καθόλου of Anal. Post. τὶ. 19, τοῦ ἃ 15—b 3. By A.’s own 
doctrine, he says, that αἰσθητὰ εἴδη are in sensible things and νοητὰ εἴδη in the 
forms of sensible things, thinking is made to depend upon sensation and 
sensation upon the sensible thing. But this doctrine can be perverted into 
a denial that there is any thinking at all, as distinct from imagining: and the 
less remote notions are from sensations, the more plausible will be the per- 
version. Here, if anywhere, there would be a confusion between thought and 
image. Freudenthal also supports ταῦτα, though by τὰ πρῶτα νοήματα he 
understands, not with Torstrik the lowest universals, but, as I think rightly, 
simple, isolated, uncompounded notions, “unverkniipfte Begniffe.” He thinks 
that, if A. meant solely the most general notions, hke Unity, Being, he would 
not have raised the question, since such notions are least liable to be confounded 
with images. The activity of thought, we must repeat from 430a 27—b 6, is 
shown both in combining and in separating. The judgment is a whole, a unity 
which the mind has made out of simpler elements, precisely as 1t can frame 
one φάντασμα out of several, 434a9 sq. But it can also separate and analyse, 
and its powerful solvent can be applied to those apparently simple unities, the 
quiddities, resolving man into biped animal etc., and converting simple appre- 
hension of a quality, e.g. colour, into an assertion respecting 11, ri κατά τινος. 


CHAPTER IX. 


From the discriminating faculties of sense and intellect, which have mainly 
occupied us from 11.) c. 5—-IlIl., c. 8 inclusive, we now pass to the faculty of 
locomotion which occupies JIL, cc. 9—11. The reason why intellect was taken 
first has been explained in the opening remarks on III., c. 4. 

432 a 15—b 7. Of the two principal characteristics of the soul of 
animals we may dismiss the one, the discriminating faculty, now that sense 
and intellect have been determined, and turn to the latter, the power of local 
movement. We have to determine whether this power (1) belongs to the whole 
soul or (2) to a special part, and if it belongs to a special part, whether this 
special part has already been brought under our notice [§ 1]. This suggests 
the further enquiry, in what sense we can speak of “parts” of the soul. How 
many such parts should be recognised? From one point of view the parts 
of the soul are very numerous and the ordinary distinctions of rational and 
irrational soul, or of reason, spirit and appetite, are inadequate. If we look 


Ill. 9 432 a l2—a 10 549 


to the differences on which such divisions are based, there is much more to 
be said for the classification adopted in this treatise. The distinction between 
our nutritive, sensitive, imaginative and appetitive faculties rests on wider and 
more fundamental differences; e.g. nutrition and growth belong to plants as 
well as to animals. Sensation cannot rightly be classed as either rational or 
irrational [§ 2]. Imagination is logically distinct from all the other faculties, 
whether it is locally separate or not. Appetency, again, stands apart. In the 
rational soul we find it appear as wish, in the irrational as anger and desire. 
If the soul be divided into three parts, appetency is found in each [§ 3]. 

In this digression A. returns once more to criticise the views of his prede- 
cessors, 1n particular the Platonic tripartite division of the soul, for which see 
2016 on 411 Ὁ 5. 

432a 15. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ.. .τῶν ζῴων. Cf. the very similar opening of III., c. 3, 
427 a 17--19. The soul of animals, as distinguished from plants, has been 
defined by two faculties or powers: a reference probably to 413 a 20—b 13. 
In that passage, after τὸ ἄψυχον had been separated from τὸ ἔμψυχον by the 
absence of growth, nutrition and decay, and the animal parted off from the 
plant by the minimum endowment of at least one sense, viz. touch, the con- 
clusion is established that soul is determined by the principles of nutrition, 
sensation, understanding and motion, 413 Ὁ 11 ἡ Ψψυχὴ.. τούτοις ὥρισται, θρεπτικῷ, 
αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσει. Our present statement is limited to the soul of 
animals ἡ τῶν ζῴων, and therefore @pemrixdv, which plants share with animals, 
is not regarded as a defining attribute of the animal, and, as we shall soon see, 
τὸ κριτικὸν combines under one τὸ αἰσθητικὸν and τὸ διανοητικόν. Moreover, 
stationary animals, like the zoophytes, to which attention was drawn in 413} 2 
sqq., are overlooked here, though they reappear later in this chapter 432 b 19 sqq., 
so that this more general statement of A.’s formula lacks somewhat of precision. 
As it stands, it bears a striking likeness to the summary of the views of his 
predecessors, or rather to the current ἔνδοξον on the subject, which A. gives in 
403 Ὁ 25 sqq., repeated with modifications in 405 Ὁ 11 566. and in 409 Ὁ 19 sqq., 
A1ob 16 sqq. Hence Philoponus (570, 12) is disposed to see in our passage a 
direct reference to the views of former thinkers: εἰ μεμνήμεθα, κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τῆς 
παρούσης ἔλέγετο πραγματείας ὅτι πάντες of φυσικοὶ δύο τούτοις ὁρίζονται τὴν 
Ψψυχήν, τῷ δὲ γνωστικῷ καὶ τῷ κατὰ τόπον κινητικῷ - πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ ἀπεῖδον. 
καὶ ἀπεδέχετο μὲν αὐτούς, διότε ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐθήρευον. 
It is not, however, to their crude views, but rather to A.’s own restatement of 
so much of them as he accepts, that ὥρισται refers. 

αι 16. τῷ τε κριτικῷ. See nozes on κρίνειν 426b 10, 427a 18. Sense implies 
judgment or discrimination of sensibles 418 a 14, 422 a 21, 424 ἃ 5 sq., 426 Ὁ τὸ 
sqq-, 429 Ὁ 14—16, 431a 20. The same function belongs to imagination 428 a I 
sqq-, cf. De Jnsomn. 2,460b17. Hence the author of De Motu Anim. 6,700b 17 
ὁρῶμεν δὲ τὰ κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν 
καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία 
καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ νῷ χώραν ἔχουσιν" κριτικὰ γὰρ πάντα. 

aly. κινεῖν τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν. For the accusative see 229255 on 406 a 31, 
Alo b 20: cf. infra Ὁ 9 sq., Ὁ 14, De Caelo 111. 8, 307 a 5 56. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς 
κίνησιν εὐκίνητα. 

a IQ πότερον ἕν τι...20 ψυχή. The possibilities considered imply three dicho- 
tomies. Locomotion is due (4) to a part, or (4) to the whole, of the sou]. If to 
a part, such part may be (c) in magnitude, i.e. spatially, or (d) in thought and 
logically, separate and distinct. Again, it may be a part (¢) not hitherto 
considered, to which this function is peculiar, or (7) identical with one of 


550 NOTES IIL. 9 


those already discussed. Cf. 411a 30—b 5 (especially b 1 πάσῃ...2 κιν οὐμεθα), 
413b 13 sqq., 4208 11 sq., Eth. Nic. 1102 ἃ 28—32. 

4 20. ἢ μεγέθει ἢ λόγῳ. See wofes on 413b 13 and 4298 12: cf. 433b 24 
λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα, μεγέθει δ᾽ ἀχώριστα. - 

ἃ 21. κἂν εἰ. See “016 on 4228 ΤΙ. 

4. 21 ἴδιόν τι παρὰ τὰ...22 εἰρημένα. Are we to assume a separate “part,” 
τὸ κατὰ τόπον κενητικόν, aS was done provisionally or by implication 410 Ὁ 
16---21, 411 b 22, 4138 23 sq., b 21 sq., 4144 32, Ὁ 17, 415a7, Ὁ 2I—23? The 
Greek commentators distinguish τὰ εἰωθότα λέγεσθαι from τὰ εἰρημένα, referring 
the former to the Platonic tripartite division, Them. 116, 31 sq. H., 214, 
15—17 Sp., Simpl. 287, 27—31, Philop. 573, 21 sq., and understanding by 
εἰρημένα the faculties previously recognised by A. himself, Simpl. 287, 25 54.» 
Philop. 573, 22—24. But there seems no ground for thus limiting the meaning 
of λέγεσθαι and εἰρημένα, since A. throughout has adopted terms in current use, 
though endeavouring to make them more precise than his predecessors had 
done. The reference is probably quite general. Cf. a 28 277. 

a 22. ἢ τούτων ἕν τι, eg. τὸ dpextixdv, Which was proved to belong to every- 
thing which has sensation in 414b 1—15. ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς. The precise 
form in which the simple enquiry “ What is it in the soul which imparts spatial 
motion?” has just been elaborated introduces a digression, 4328 22—b 7, upon 
the old question in what sense we can speak of parts or faculties of the soul. 
Cf. 402 b 1—11, 413 b 13—-16 and 414b 20—415a13. It should be remembered 
that, in spite of his numerous cautions and explanations, A. has persistently 
used μόριον for nearly all his faculties, even when the term seems most in- 
appropriate, e.g. 429 a 10 of νοῦς, 413 Ὁ 7), Ὁ 27. In fact, by keeping this an open 
question, A. considers himself entitled to use indifferently the terms μόριον, 
apxn, δύναμις and διαφορὰ throughout. 

a24. ἄπειρα. Trend. (p. 441): Si animum partir velis, partes sunt quasi 
infinitae; adeo varius est et uberrimus actionum fons, ut, quoniam singula 
quaeque quasi partes tenere licet, infinitae sint partes, Them. 117, 6 H., 215, 
3 Sp. σχεδὸν yap οὐκ εὐαρίθμητα φαίνεται τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ τοιαύτας λαμβάνοι 
τις τὰς διαφοράς, αἷς τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν χωρίζουσι. 
καὶ οὐ μόνον...25 ἐπιθυμητικόν. See again 22926 on 4IIb 5. 

8. 26. τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. This division is directly attributed to 
Plato by the author of the Magna Moralia I. 1, 1182 8 23 μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ Ἰϊλάτων 
διείλετο τὴν ψυχὴν εἴς te τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ eis τὸ ἄλογον ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἀπέδωκεν 
ἑκάστου ἀρετὰς προσηκούσας : and Timaeus 69 C sqq., where ἀρχὴ ψυχῆς ἀθάνατος, 
τὸ θεῖον, is distinguished from ἄλλο ψυχῆς εἶδος τὸ θνητόν, proves the dichotomy 
to have been the basis of Plato’s tripartite division. But more probably the 
division was current long before Plato’s time, and A. himself uses it as a 
popular opinion in £72. Nic. 1102 a 26 λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς 
λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ 
λόγον ἔχον, where it serves as a basis for the distinction between ἠθικὴ and 
διανοητικὴ ἀρετή, an application of popular psychology in a popular treatise. 
Cf. H. Diels, Veber die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles in Monatsbericht der 
Berl. Akad. 1883, pp. 483 sqq. 

a 26 κατὰ γὰρ rds διαφορὰς...28 τούτων. The error here censured is a logical 
error. What is required is a scientific classification in which the various classes 
and sub-classes do not overlap and are marked off from each other by essential 
distinctions. When tested by the rules laid down in the Analytics, the classi- 
fications of previous philosophers are faulty, and A.’s own classification as given 
in this treatise, if not ideally perfect, is far superior to the rest. 


1110 4328 I9g—b 5 551 


a 28. καὶ viv, 1.6. in the present treatise: καί, “as a matter of fact,” 
emphasises εἴρηται, cf. 424 Ὁ 24 36. For νῦν Ξενυνδὴ cf. Phys. VIU. 3, 253b 5 
νῦν ῥηθέντος, 26. 254a 17 viv διορισθέντων. 

a 29 τό τε θρεπτικόν...30 kal τὸ αἰσθητικόν. These nominatives take up a 27 
καὶ ἄλλα...μόρια, “namely, the nutritive part and the sensitive part.” The 
omission of these “parts” is the most striking defect of the Platonic tripartition, 
a defect to be explained by the purpose which Plato had in view, and his 
divergent conception of the soul, which in the Aefudiic and in most of the 
Timaeus means the human soul. 

a3I. τὸ φανταστικόν. The position of imagination in A.’s scheme has 
never been cleared up. Images are results of sensations, but distinct from 
them, 428 Ὁ 11 sq.; but they serve as materials for thought, 431a 14—15, 
Ὁ 2---5, 4328 8—1I14. If it is not a distinct faculty, except from the logical 
aspect, should it go with sense or reason? In De Mem. 1, 450a 10—1q it is 
by implication classed with sense, but with the qualification that it is fer 
accidens related to thought. Cf. 429a 4—8, 4338 10, 432 b 29 566. 

4320 1. τῷ μὲν εἶναι πάντων ἕτερον. Cf. 413 Ὁ 29 τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι ἕτερα, φανερόν " 
αἰσθητικῷ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ δοξαστικῷ ἕτερον, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ δοξάζειν. 
Similarly here τὸ φανταστικῷ εἶναι is not the same as τὸ αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι, τὸ 
νοητικῷ εἶναι or τὸ δοξαστικῷ εἶναι because, as was shown in detail 4288 5—24, 
φαντασία itself is not the same as αἴσθησις nor the same as νοῦς nor the same as 
δόξα. τούτων, probably, like πάντων, the parts or functions assumed to be 
separate, quite generally, whatever they are. In a27, 28 sufra the pronoun no 
doubt refers to Plato’s three parts or the division into rational and irrational. 
But there is no need to restrict the meaning here, any more than in a 22 supra. 

b3. ὃ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἕτερον. [ is logically distinct, and its functions, 
1.6. the activities which are the basis for assuming such a faculty, are also 
distinct. Cf. Simpl. 290, 38 τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτικὸν ἐναργῶς τῷ λόγῳ ἐστὶν ἕτερον, ὡς 
καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ δηλοῖ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἀποδοτικὴ δύναμις " διὸ καὶ πρόσκειται 
τῷ λόγῳ ἡ δύναμις, Them. 117, 17—19 H., 215, 20---22 Sp. 

b 4. καὶ ἄτοπον δὴ. A. contends that appetency is a part or faculty distinct 
from all the foregoing. Hence a further defect in the current classifications. 
If you begin with rational, irrational, you must include appetency under both 
(ἄτοπον...Ὁ 6 ὁ θυμός). If you prefer the tripartition, you have appetency in 
each of your three main divisions (Ὁ 6 εἰ δὲ rpia...7 ὄρεξις). The defect in 
classification here noted may be illustrated from the classification of animals. 
The infimae species have certain characteristics, zofae, διαφοραί, and by dicho- 
tomy we cannot reach these marks, De Part. An. 1. 3, 6438. 16 φανερὸν τοίνυν 
ὅτε οὐκ ἔστε λαβεῖν τὰ ἄτομα εἴδη ws διαιροῦνται οἱ εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες τὰ ζῷα ἢ καὶ 
ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν γένος. If, e.g., we start with land animals and water animals, we 
shall have the same groups of characteristics on both sides of the dividing line, 
land fowl and water fowl, land reptiles and water reptiles and so on. The 
important genera ἔναιμα, ὄρνιθες will be split up. 

b5. τὸ τοῦτο Saordv. The verb διασπᾶν, to tear asunder, is usually 
applied to a whole which is split up or divided into parts, e.g. ὁ ἀὴρ διασπώ- 
μενος 411a 20, 416a 7. Cf. De Part. An. τ. 2, 642b 10 ἔτι δὲ προσήκει μὴ 
διασπᾶν ἕκαστον γένος, οἷον τοὺς ὄρνιθας τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῇδε τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῃ διαιρέσει... 
b 16 εἴπερ οὖν μηδὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν διασπαστέον, ἡ εἰς δύο διαίρεσις μάταιος ἂν εἴη " 
οὕτως γὰρ διαιροῦντας ἀναγκαῖον χωρίζειν καὶ διασπᾶν" τῶν πολυπόδων γάρ ἐστι τὰ 
μὲν ἐν τοῖς πεζοῖς τὰ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἐνύδροις. So Themistius 117, 19 H., 215, 23 Sp. 
καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον ἴσως τὸ διασπᾶν ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τιθέναι αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν τῷ 
λόγον ἔχοντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ, καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ταύτην χωρὶς ὥσπερ ἐκείνων 


552 NOTES Ill. 9 


ἕκαστον. But the splitting of the whole into parts implies the severance of 
one part from the rest. Cf. Rez. τι. ὃ, 1386a τὸ τὸ διασπᾶσθαι ἀπὸ φίλων καὶ 
συνήθων ἔλεεινόν. It is in this way that Simplicius takes διασπτᾶν here: 291, 5 
ἄτοπον οὖν καλῶς ἀποφαίνεται τὸ διασπᾶν τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων. 

5. ἡ βούλησις. In the present discussion, cc. 9---11,) this term signifies 
rational wish, desire for the good, ὄρεξίς ris, viz. ὄρεξις λογιστική. With this 
agrees the summary of eZ. 1. 10, 1368 b 37 καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι’ ἔθος τὰ 
δὲ δι ὄρεξιν τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ δι᾿ Groyovs ἔστιν δ᾽ ἡ μὲν βούλησις 
ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις" οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὅταν οἰήθη εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἄλογοι δ᾽ ὀρέξεις 
ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία: also Eth. Nic. 1111b 19 sqq., Pod. 1334 Ὁ 22 θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ 
βούλησις, ἔτε δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς 
καὶ ὃ νοῦς προϊοῦσιν ἐγγίνεσθαι πέφυκεν. Like every form of ὄρεξις, βούλησις 
will appear before the rational faculty is fully matured. 

b6. Kal ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ..«θυμός. Cf. 221. Nic. 1102b 30 τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ 
ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει was fint. τοῦ λόγου], 7 κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. 
el δὲ τρία...7 ὄρεξις. If, like Plato, we recognise three, not two, parts of the soul, 
appetency isin allthree. Cf. 414b 2. 

432 b 7—433 a8. To return tothe question before us. The power 
of local movement must be kept distinct from the processes of growth and 
decay common to all animals and originating in the nutritive faculty ; and, 
further, from the processes of respiration and expiration, of sleep and waking, 
which from their obscurity call for separate treatment (viz. in the Parva 
WNaturaléa) [ὃ 4]. What is it, then, that communicates to the animal local 
movement, or, more precisely, movement of progression? It is not (1) the 
nutritive faculty, for animal locomotion is always directed to an end and has 
either imagination or appetency for its concomitant. When not under com- 
pulsion, the animal moves only in order to seek or to avoid something. Again, 
if local motion were due to the nutritive faculty, plants as well as animals would 
have organs of locomotion [§ 5]. Nor is it (2) the sensitive faculty, for this view 
is disproved by the existence of stationary animals, possessed of sensation, 
which are at the same time neither mutilated nor imperfect. If the locomotive 
and sensitive faculties were identical, such animals would possess organs of 
progression [ὃ 6]. Nor is it (3) the reasoning faculty or intellect. The 
speculative intellect has nothing practical for its object. None of its assertions 
concern pursuit or avoidance. And even when intellect speculates on practical 
questions it does not prompt pursuit or avoidance, e.g. an imagination may be 
terrible or agreeable, may make the heart beat or the mouth water, without the 
least suggestion of progressive movement [§ 7]. Lastly, when the practical 
intellect enjoins avoidance or pursuit, it is Hable to be thwarted by desire, 
1.6. appetite, as in the case of the incontinent man. And, generally, art or 
science alone is not sufficient to ensure scientific production or action. Some- 
thing else is requisite. But again it is not (4) appetency alone which produces 
this local motion ; witness the continent man who thwarts his inclinations and 
obeys reason [§ 8]. 

432b7. καὶ δὴ καὶ Resumptive particles after the digression. 

b8. τὴν μὲν yap. By γὰρ A. shows that he is restricting the enquiry to 
locomotion, or, as he more precisely expresses it below Ὁ 14, ἡ πορευτικὴ κίνησις. 
It is not the movement of growth and decay with which we are concerned, 
though that also in a sense goes on in space, as was explained in the zoze on 
406a 16. If it were, the nutritive faculty would be a sufficient cause. But A., 
having put the question as to what causes motion in space, deals parenthetically, 
as it were, Ὁ 8—13, with certain kinds of Spatial motion due to soul other than 


III. 9 432 b 5—b 16 553 


ἢ πορευτικὴ κίνησις. Cf. Phys. VIII. 2, 253 ἃ 14 αὐτὸ δέ φαμεν [int. τὸ ζῷον» ἑαυτὸ 
κινεῖν ov πᾶσαν κίνησιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν κατὰ τόπον. There in the Physics 2538 7—20, 
A. denies that the phenomena of animal motion (2ὖ. ag τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἐμψύχων) lend any support to the view that motion has an absolute commence- 
ment, (ἃ 11) ὁρῶμεν yap ἀεί τι κινούμενον ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ τῶν συμφύτων τούτου δὲ τῆς 
κινήσεως οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ περιέχον ἴσως : and this he illustrates 
by the act οὗ awaking from sleep. Cf. also the parallel passage ᾷγς. VIII. 6, 
259 Ὁ I—20, especially b 8 ἔνεισιν ἄλλαι κινήσεις φυσικαὶ τοῖς ζῴοις, ds οὐ 
κινοῦνται δι’ αὑτῶν, οἷον αὔξησις, φθίσις, ἀναπνοή, ἃς κινεῖται τῶν ζῴων ἕκαστον 
ἠρεμοῦν καὶ ov κινούμενον τὴν ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ κίνησιν. τούτου δ᾽ αἴτιον τὸ περιέχον καὶ 
πολλὰ τῶν εἰσιόντων, οἷον ἐνίων τροφή κτὲέ. 

89. ἅπασιν. Not only all animals, but all plants as well, τοῖς ζῶσιν. 

bir περὶ δὲ ἀναπνοῆς...12 ἐπισκεπτέον. The processes of respiration and 
expiration, of sleep and waking, involve motions of particular bodily parts. 
This reference is to the separate tracts of the Parva Naturalia, De Somuo, 
De Respiratione, in which they are discussed. 

b 13. τί τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ζῷον. If we may be allowed to anticipate, the result 
of c. 10 1s that κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον is virtually cancelled, being replaced by 
ὀρεκτικόν, 433 8. 21, 31 56.) Ὁ 10 56.,), 27 sq. For this result we have already 
been prepared: see 406b 24sq. The key to the whole discussion is the 
assumption that apart from desire or aversion no animal moves, unless it be 
under compulsion, cf. 432 Ὁ 16sq., Ὁ 28 sq. In this chapter A. seeks to obtain an 
answer by a process of exhaustion, precisely as in 111.) c. 3 he applied the same 
process to answer the question, What is imagination? The claims of several 
faculties, the nutritive, the sensitive, the intellectual and the appetitive itself 
having first been examined, it appears as if, although some of these under 
certain circumstances originate local movement, no one of them is invariably 
the sole moving principle. The next chapter corrects and explains this pro- 
visional result. 

bI4. τὴν πορευτικὴν κίνησιν. The conception of local motion is circum- 
scribed as motion of progression. The whole, and not merely a part, is moved 
and changes its place. This restriction must be understood in what follows, 
both for κινεῖσθαι as in Ὁ 17, κινητικὰ b 18, κινῶν Ὁ 27, κίνησις Ὁ 28. ὅτι... 
15 δύναμις, int. ἐστὶ τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν πορευτικὴν κίνησιν. The faculty of 
nutrition is the first claimant that we dismiss. 

ΙΒ. del re yap ἕνεκά του ἡ κίνησις αὕτη. This motion of progression has a 
common characteristic, viz. that it is directed to an end. The local movements 
of animals are made with the purpose of obtaining food or of avoiding harm. 
It is true that movements of growth and decay are also in a sense évexd του, for 
they tend to realise nature’s end; so that this taken alone is hardly sufficient. 
It recurs 4338 15 of ὄρεξις. 

Ῥ τό. ἢ pera φαντασίας ἢ ὀρέξεώς ἐστιν. This second condition, the presence 
of either φαντασία or ὄρεξις, contributes further to differentiate the local 
movement in question. In the local movements of growth there is nothing 
corresponding to φαντασία or to ὄρεξις in any of its senses. The disjunction 
4...4 seems natural at this point. A. takes as sufficient for the purpose of 
rejecting θρεπτικὴ a form of the view, perhaps a current view, from which he 
starts in III., c. 10, viz. φαίνεται δέ ye δύο ταῦτα <td> κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, 
εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα. Here, as will be observed, the 
disjunction recurs. The next clause b 16 sq. οὐθὲν yap xré. no doubt antici- 
pates the conclusion that ὄρεξις of some kind is always present. Φαντασία and 
ὄρεξις here must be taken as corresponding to νόησις and ὄρεξις in 433 a 9 Sq., 


554 NOTES Ill. 9 


φαντασία being here named instead of νοῦς to include the cases mentioned 
4298 5 sqq.; while in 4338 9 564. where A. is dealing more especially with man, 
such φαντασία is included under νόησις by what is probably a greater straining 
of language. Them. paraphrases 7...) by καὶ..«καί: 117, 30 H., 216, 7 Sp. dei 
γὰρ ἕνεκά τινος ἡ κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τόπον Kal μετὰ φαντασίας καὶ διώξεως ἢ φυγῆς τοῖς 
μὴ βίᾳ κινουμένοις ἀλλ᾽ ἑκουσίως. It seems to me not worth while to enquire 
whether, as Philop. thinks, ὄρεξις is here used in the narrower sense of ἐπεθυμία 
(cf. zole on 433a 6 ad fin.), 582, 14 ὅσα γὰρ τῶν ζῴων φαντασίαν ἔχει, καὶ ὄρεξιν 
ἔχει, ra δὲ μὴ ἔχοντα φαντασίαν μόνην ὄρεξιν ἔχει. καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία, 
συγκινεῖται τῇ ὀρέξει, ἐφ᾽ Sv δὲ μή ἐστιν φαντασία, ἀρκεῖ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις: or whether 
Simplicius is right in thinking the opposition intended is that between ῴαντα- 
στικὴ ὄρεξις and λογικὴ ὄρεξις, 292, 21 ἡ δὲ ἀντίθεσις δοκεῖ μοι οὐχ ἅπλῶς γνώσεως 
καὶ ὀρέξεως εἶναι, διότε γνωστικὸν ὄνομα ἡ φαντασία (πάντως γὰρ καὶ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ 
γνωστικὸν τὸ κινοῦν), ἀλλὰ τῆς ὀρέξεώς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διαίρεσις, ἢ φανταστικῆς 
οὔσης, ὅπερ δηλοῖ τὸ μετὰ φαντασίας, ἢ λογικῆς. 

Ὁ τό οὐθὲν yap...17 ἢ Bla. The movement of progression is simply the 
natural and spontaneous movement of animals in pursuit of something (ὀρεγό- 
μενον = διῷῶκον) or in avoidance of what is painful and harmful. Cf. 431 a 13. 

Ὁ 17 ἔτι...19 ταύτην. Two fresh arguments. If the nutritive principle were 
identical with the moving principle, then (1) plants, which have only the 
nutritive principle, would exhibit motion of progression, and accordingly 
(2) would have the parts instrumental to progression, which nature would 
not have neglected to supply in a whole class of things, 432b 21 sqq. 

brI9. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, int, as before, ἐστι τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν 
πορευτικὴν κίνησιν. πολλὰ ydp...21 διὰ τέλους. See 410 Ὁ 19 and second 2926 
ad loc. | 

b2r. εἰ οὖν. The clause introduced by dore, Ὁ 25, takes the place of an 
apodosis. μήτε ποιεῖ μάτην μηθὲν, the teleological postulate so often previously 
assumed in this treatise, stated 415 Ὁ 16 sq. and restated explicitly 434 a 31 sq. 
Cf. De Part. Ant. 1, 641 b 12—29 ἡ φύσις ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ πάντα. φαίνεται γάρ, 
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς ἐστὶν ἢ τέχνη, οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἄλλη τις 
ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τοεαύτη, ἣν ἔχομεν καθάπερ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ παντός κτέ. 
For parallel statements consult 724. Ar. 836 Ὁ 28—37, De Gen. An. Vv. 8, 788 b 20 
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ὑποτιθέμεθα, ἐξ ὧν ὁρῶμεν ὑποτιθέμενοι, οὔτ᾽ ἐλλείπουσαν οὔτε 
μάταιον οὐθὲν ποιοῦσαν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων περὶ ἕκαστον, Pol. 1256 Ὁ 20 εἰ οὖν ἡ 
φύσις μηδὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην. There is normally in nature no useless 
excrescence, περίεργον, no random effort, ἀλόγως, ὡς ἔτυχε, no makeshift con- 
trivance, reviypas, Pol. 1252b 1 sqq. 

b 22 πλὴν...23 ἀτελέσιν. Cf. 415 a 27 ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα, where see 
note. That ἀτελῆ and πηρώματα denote two quite distinct conditions may be 
inferred from 425 a I0. 

Ὁ 25. ὥστ᾽ elyev ἂν...τῆς πορείας. If αἰσθητικὸν τεκινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, then 
such animals would be capable of progressive motion and, since nature 
would not fail to provide what is necessary, they would also have the parts 
requisite for locomotion. This argument has already been applied to plants 
b 18 supra. 

Ὁ 26 ἀλλὰ μὴν...27 ὁ Kiwav, 1.6. the one cause of motion, and therefore of 
progressive motion. See analysis sugva. This is the Platonic view. Καὶ is 
explicative. For ὁ xadovpevos νοῦς cf. 407 ἃ 4, 429 a 22. 

Ὁ 27. ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς : μὲν is answered by Ὁ 28 dei δὲ ἡ κίνησις Kré. A. 
first shows that speculative intellect has nothing to do with action, while animal 
movement implies pursuit or avoidance, i.e. rpaxrdy τι. 


Ill. 9 432 Ὁ 16—433 a7 555 


Ὁ 28. ἡ κίνησις, int. τοῦ ζῴου. This must be understood, like Ὁ 17 κινεῖται, 
in the restricted sense pointed out in 2026 on b 14 supra. 

Ὁ 29. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον. Here A. passes to the intellect which 
does concern itself with action, cf. 431 a 15 sq. Hence the subject of θεωρῇ 
here must be ὁ νοῦς without qualification, and not 6 θεωρητικὸς νοῦς, as in the 
last sentence. By τι τοιοῦτον is meant πρακτόν τι or, which is the same thing, 
φευκτὸν ἢ διωκτόν τι, - 

b 30. ἤδη κελεύει. The thought, even in this case, does not immediately 
prompt to movement: Them. 118, 10 H., 217, 3 Sp. ὁ δὲ πρακτικὸς νοεῖ μέν τι 
περὶ τούτων, κύριος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τῆς κινήσεως. πολλάκις γοῦν τι διανοεῖται φυγῆς 
ἄξιον καὶ οὐ φεύγει, οἷον σεισμὸν ἢ θηρίον, ἀλλὰ πάλλει μὲν ἡ καρδία καὶ φρίττουσιν 
ai τρίχες, μένει δὲ ἐν τόπῳ τὸ ζῶον: πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἡδύ τι λογιζομένου μόριον μέν 
τι τοῦ σώματος συναισθάνεται, ἠρεμεῖ δὲ ὅλον τὸ ζῶον. 

b 30 οἷον πολλάκις Stavoctron...31 φοβεῖσθαι. The point of the illustration has 
been missed by some of the commentators. If the intellect were the sole 
moving principle, why, asks A., does not motion ensue upon the presentation of 
an idea to the mind? The mere thought of something terrible is not sufficient 
to prompt flight, though it may be so vivid as actually to make the heart beat fast. 
As Themustius sees (118, 11 H., 217, 4 Sp.), φοβεῖσθαι implies not only fright but 
its consequence, actual flight: πολλάκες γοῦν κτέ, (see the citation in last zoZe). 

Ὁ 31. ἡ δὲ καρδία κινεῖται. This involuntary perturbation under excitement 
is ἃ very different thing from the movement of progression of which A. is seeking 
an explanation. Not understanding this, Philoponus (583, 17) is obliged to 
confess that A. has chosen his illustrations badly. Cf. 408b 8, 403 a 21 sq., 
427 Ὁ 22 εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν. 

433841. ἔτι This is a third step, the second having been introduced by 
(432 Ὁ 29) ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ Grav θεωρῇ xré. FEXeven the imperative command of the 
intellect does not invariably lead to action, for it is set at naught by the ἀκρατής, 
who in the conflict between λόγος and ἐπεθυμία obeys the latter. 

a2. ov κινεῖται, int. τὸ ζῷον. 

a3. ὁ ἀκρατής. See £7%. Nic. VII. cc. I—3. 

a4. καὶ ὅλως δὲ ὁρῶμεν. A further and general argument to show that 
knowledge in itself is not sufficient to control action; its possessor, e.g. ὁ ἰατρός, 
further requires purpose (προαίρεσις). 

a5. ποιεῖν. To produce health designedly from sickness, ἰᾶσθαι, belongs to 
art and not to nature: hence ποιεῖν, ποίησις are More appropriate terms than 
γεννᾶν, γένεσις. See Metlaph. 1032 a 25—30. 

a 6 ἀλλὰ μὴν...7 κινήσεως. Having dismissed the claims of ἡ θρεπτική, ἢ 
αἰσθητικὴ and τὸ λογιστικόν, we now proceed to enquire whether the moving 
faculty is identical with ὄρεξεο. As pointed out above (ofe on 432 Ὁ 13), τὸ 
ὁρεκτικὸν iS unquestionably A.’s term for the faculty he is in search of, see 
433 Ὁ 10 sq. If therefore he here disallows the claims of ὄρεξις he must be 
using the term in the narrow sense in which it denotes only ἄλογος ὄρεξις, i.e. in 
its more frequent shapes of θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία. Cf. λέξι τ. το, 1369 a 1 sq. de 
ὄρεξιν [int. πράττουσι] τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ Se ἄλογον. It is of 
course only ἄλογος ὄρεξις which is at variance with νοῦς and λόγος. Cf. a8 
infra, 433 Ὁ 5 sqq.- 

a7. οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς. Continent men, as distinguished from the virtuous 
σώφρονες, have depraved desires but do not obey them. £74. Nic. 1102 Ὁ 26 
πειθαρχεῖ your τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς, 2b. 1151 Ὁ 34 6 τε yap ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν 
παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὃ σώφρων, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὃ δ᾽ 
οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὃ δ᾽ 


οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ un ἄνεισθαε. 


556 NOTES Ill. 10 


CHAPTER X. 


433 a 9-30. Apparently, then, there are two faculties which produce 
local movement, appetency and intellect, wherein we include imagination as a 
process of intellect. It is imagination, not thought or reasoning, which prompts 
the motion of animals, and in men knowledge is often counteracted by imagina- 
tion [8 1]. By intellect must be understood the practical intellect, which 
calculates the means to an external end, not the theoretical intellect, which 
finds its end in its own activity. Like practical intellect, appetency is always 
directed to an end: indeed, the practical intellect starts from this end of 
appetency, and the last step in its process of reasoning is the first step in action 
[8 2]. So, too, when imagination originates motion, it does not do so apart 
from appetency. If motion had two distinct and independent originations, we 
should be bound to assume some other common faculty, in virtue of which these 
two independent powers communicated motion. But the fact is that intellect 
does not cause motion apart from appetency, while appetency does cause 
motion apart from intellect [§ 3]. There is, however, this difference, that 
intellect is always right, appetency and imagination are sometimes mistaken. 
For the object of appetency is not always the good, but sometimes the apparent 
good, where by good is meant the practicable good: and this belongs to the 
sphere, not of the necessary, but of the contingent, and will be different in 
different circumstances [ὃ 4]. 

433a9. φαίνεται. In the foregoing enquiry certain facts are clear. There 
are cases where ὄρεξις, i.e. ἄλογος ὄρεξις, prompts to movement, e.g. in the 
ἀκρατὴς and in irrational animals. There are other cases where the movement 
is determined by intellect or intelligence. The approximate result, then, is that 
both νοῦς and ὄρεξις in the narrower sense are principles of motion. Either one 
or the other controls movement under given conditions. This approximate 
result will, however, be modified as we proceed. I accept Prof. Bywater’s 
insertion of ra before κινοῦντα ( Journ. of Philol. vol. XVII., p. 64). 

aged tis τὴν φαντασίαν...1Ὸ τινα. Cf. 427 Ὁ 14—21, 27 sq., where see zoZzes. 
We have been told that φαντασία determines action, not only in irrational 
creatures, but under certain circumstances in men, 429 a 5 sqq., and there 
(429 a 5) πολλὰ κατ᾽ αὐτὰς [int. τὰς φαντασίας] πράττει ra ζῷα seems a Sufficient 
defence of πολλὰ in 433a 10. Unless φαντασία be ranged with νοῦς, it would 
appear as if there were three, and not two, springs of action. 

8. 13. νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις. Here ὄρεξις is still ἄλογος ὄρεξις. 

ἃ 14. νοῦς δὲ.. πρακτικός. In the last section it must be understood that by 
νοῦς we mean the calculating intellect, which has an end in view, i.e. the 
practical, as opposed to the speculative, intellect. The distinction between 
them has been mentioned in passing 431 a 8—17 and 432b 27—433a 1. See 
also ΞΖ. Vic. Vi., c. 2, especially 1139 a 26 sqq., a 35 sqq. Peters renders the 
latter: “ Mere reasoning, however, can never set anything going, but only 
reasoning about means to an end—what may be called practical reasoning 
(which practical reasoning also regulates production; for in making anything 
you always have an ulterior object in view—what you make is desired not as an 
end in itself, but only as a means to, or a condition of, something else; but 
what you do is an end in itself).” 

84. 15. τῷ τέλει. Cf Them. 118, 32 H., 218, 7 Sp. διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ 
τῇ πολλάκις εἰρημένῃ διαφορᾷ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν αὐτὴ τέλος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τῷ πρακτικῷ δὲ 7 
ὄρεξις ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκεν wrap’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐνέργειαν. According to IL, c. 6, the 


IlI. 10 433 a 9-—a 19 557 


speculative intellect has two modes of operation, viz. the thinking of indivisibles, 
φάναι ἢ νοεῖν, or the combining (συντιθέναι) of two notions in a judgment, with 
all the supplementary processes of deductive reasoning. In neither of these 
two modes of operation is the speculative intellect concerned with action. 
Practical intellect, on the other hand, has the problem set it of determining 
the means to a givenend. How it treats this problem may be illustrated from 
Metaph. 1032 Ὁ 6—26 and Erk. Nic. 1112 Ὁ 11—20: “It is not about ends, but 
about means that we deliberate...having some particular end in view, we consider 
how and by what means this end can be attained, and if it appear that it can be 
attained by various means, we further consider which is the easiest and best: 
but if it can only be attained by one means, we consider how it is to be 
attained by this means, and how this means itself is to be secured, and so on, 
until we come to the first link in the chain of causes, which is last in the order 
of discovery” (Peters, £74. /Vic., p. 70). 

aI5 οὗ γὰρ ἡ Spefts...16 νοῦ: αὕτῃ is the antecedent of od and is assimilated to 
the gender of ἀρχή, and οὗ ἡ ὄρεξις [int. ἐστί] Ξετὸ ὀρεκτόν. Cf. for the attraction 
Eth. Nic. 1143 Ὁ 4 ἀρχαὶ yap τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται [int. τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον 
καὶ 97 ἑτέρα πρότασις (1143 Ὁ 3), i.e. the particulars, ἔσχατα, which constitute the 
minor premiss]. The practical intellect starts, in the manner exemplified in the 
passages just cited from £74. iVzc. and MWetaps., with the result desired and 
considers the conditions upon which its attainment depends, until it arrives at 
one which can be realised, τὸ ἔσχατον of the next clause. 

84 16. τὸ δ᾽ ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. When the practical intellect has 
reached its conclusion, 1.6, has found some means to the end sought which 
is capable of realisation, e.g. bodily movement, its work is ended. Then begins 
the task of πρᾶξις or ποίησις, as the case may be. The expert or craftsman 
sets about doing or constructing, taking the last step in the intellectual process 
for his starting-point. His work continues until the end in view, which was 
the starting-point of the intellectual process, has been achieved. Cf. Them. 
118, 34 A, 218, 10 Sp. ὁ γὰρ σκοπὸς ep ὃν ἡ θεωρία καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις, οὗτός ἐστιν 
ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ" πρὸς τοῦτον γὰρ ὁρῶν λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν 
πρακτέων" καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως, εἰς ὃ ἵσταται βουλευόμενος, ὅπως ἂν 
τὸ τέλος περιποιήσαιτο, ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως καὶ αὖ πάλιν τὸ πέρας τῆς πράξεως ἡ τῆς 
νοήσεώς ἐστιν ἀρχή. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1143 Ὁ 2 ὁ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς [int. νοῦς] τοῦ 
ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου [int. καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν) καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως. In the 
second edition of Trend. the view that in our present passage, De 4. 4338. 16, 
τὸ ἔσχατον πετὸ κινοῦν ἀκίνητον, 1.6. τὸ dpextdv, is defended by a reference to 
Eth. Nic. 1143b 2. Cf. Trend.’s explanation of both passages in A/zstor. Bettr. 
sur Philosophie, UW. 375 sqq., ad Atk. Nec. 1143.a 34. According to Trend., 
τὸ ἔσχατον (d. h. nach der Seite der Erscheinung hin) is “das im Handeln 
unmittelbar Einzelne,” the particular act with which the series of acts ter- 
minates, the act the effort to realise which originates action. But I prefer to 
understand by τὸ ἔσχατον the particular action at the other end of the series, 
with which the series starts, the first step taken, which may not be, and often is 
not, τὸ ὀρεκτὸν itself, but only a means towards it. 

al7. ὥστε εὐλόγως. The two springs of action are now seen to hinge upon 
τὸ dpexrdv. It is the object of the one faculty, τὸ dpexrixdy, and it is the starting- 
point of the other faculty, διάνοια πρακτική, whose deliberations are concerned 
with the means by which it is to be realised. 

a 18. τὸ ὀρεκτὸν γὰρ κινεῖ, int. τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι, bizinfra, Wallace 
followed the inferior MSS. in reading ὀρεκτικόν. 

aig καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια Kivel...20 ὀρεκτόν. This simply repeats a 15 οὗ 


558 NOTES Ill. 10 


yap...16 πρακτικοῦ νοῦ Supra. The understanding or practical discursive in- 
tellect is a moving cause, in so far as its syllogism points to a certain 
conclusion, 1.6. an act to be done, whereupon action follows, as explained 
434.419 infra ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου: ἢ ἄμφω. Cf. Atk. Mic. 1147 a 
24—28, De Motu An. 7, 7ota 7--Ὁ το. So far as διάνοια is an intellectual 
process, all it can do is to prescribe a course of action, 4318 15 34: 4338 2 
λεγούσης φεύγειν τε ἢ διώκειν, Ε:λ. Nic. 1147a 34. For διὰ τοῦτο...ὅτι cf. 4358 
24 54.9ω. 4348 10 αἴτιον τοῦτο...11 ὅτι. 

a20. καὶ ἡ φαντασία. ἄνευ ὀρέξεως. What holds of διάνοια πρακτικὴ in man 
must hold of φαντασία in the lower animals. Cf. 429a 4—8, 4338 Io—12. 

8. 21. ἕν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. Cf. Simpl. 297, 32 ἤτοι τὸ dpexrdv- 
διπλῇ γὰρ ἡ γραφή. ᾿Ορεκτόν, the reading of ἘΠῚ Νν, Bekker, Trendelenburg, 
Belger and Wallace, was changed by Torstrik, who is followed by Biehl and 
Rodier, to ὀρεκτικόν. Torst. defends his choice thus: Scripsi τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, 
propter ea quae his opponuntur: ei yap δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις (ἢ. e. τὸ ὀρεκτικόν), 
ἐκίνουν. It seems more probable that A. should complete his determination 
of the faculty, the immediate business in hand, before he refers animate motion 
to its prime movent, its ἀκίνητον κινοῦν. If so, having up till now consented 
to admit two moving causes, he prepares to make one of them subordinate to 
the other, practical reason to appetency. 

a 21 εἰ γὰρ δύο...22 ἐκίνουν. A conditional clause of this grammatical form 
ordinarily implies that the condition is not fulfilled, while hitherto the two 
springs of action have been consistently affirmed more than once, 433a 9, 
17sq. But the elasticity of the grammatical canon is notorious. See Postgate, 
Transacttons of the Camb. Philol. Soc. vol. 11., Ὁ. 63: “The presence of ἂν here” 
(i.e. in the apodosis) “‘marks the consequence as ideal, but not necessarily unful- 
filled....The relation between the condition and the consequence is primarily 
one of limited possibility, not of strict conditional connexion between events 
assumed to be unreal.” 

a 22. κατὰ κοινὸν ἄν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος, “in virtue of some characteristic which 
they shared in common.” Cf. Them. 119, 9 H., 218, 26 Sp. εἰ δὲ ἦν δύο καὶ erepa 
ἀλλήλων νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνει δὲ ἄμφω, ἄλλη ἄν τις δύναμις ὑπῆρχεν ἀμφοτέροις 
κοινή, ἧς ἀμφότερα κοινωνοῦντα ἐκίνει τὸ ζῶον, ὡς τῷ δίποδι καὶ τῷ τετράποδι τὸ 
πόδας ἔχειν. νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως (εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι καὶ 
ἡ βούλησις ὄρεξις), ἡ δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ ἄνεν νοῦ. νῦν δὲ When we examine the 
actual facts, we see that the two springs of action are not independent, for 
wherever νοῦς impels to action ὄρεξις is present, being found in the guise of 
βούλησις = ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ, while motion often takes place contrary to reason under 
the influence of ὄρεξις ἄλογος. 

a 23. ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις. See above 414b 2, 432b 5. 

a 24. κινῆται, The subject of this verb, as of κινεῖται, is τὸ ζῷον, in this 
case man: cf. 433b 18. 

a 25 ἡ δ᾽ ὅρεξιε.. .26 τίς ἐστιν. Cf. Them. 119, 13 H., 219, 3 Sp. ὄρεξις γάρ 
ἐστι καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινεῖ πολλάκις. 

« 26. νοῦς μὲν οὖν was ὀρθός. Cf. ΦΖ2λ. Vic. 11 39a 23 δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε 
λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, 1130 Ὁ 4 διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς 7 προαίρεσις ἢ 
ὄρεξις διανοητικῆ. The rectitude attributed to intellect as a spring of action 
consists, as we shall see, in this, that the good at which it aims is real, and 
not apparent, good. Hence Themistius (119, 17 H., 219, 7 Sp.) inserts in his 
paraphrase after νοῦς the words 6 ye κυρίως, “if it is to deserve the name of νοῦς 
proper.” ὄρεξις δὲ...27 ὄρθή. Here, again, irrational springs of action are 
intended, dpefis in the narrower sense: Them. 119, 18 H., 219, 8 Sp. φαντασία 


III. 10 4338. Ig—a 29 559 


7 χωρὶς νοῦ. These will be οὐκ ὀρθαὶ when they aim at apparent, and not real, 
good. 

a 27 86 del...28 ἀγαθὸν. Cf. Them. 119, 20 H., 219, 11 Sp. ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν νοῦν 
τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ φαινόμενον δὲ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὸν θυμόν [int. κινεῖ], Eth. 
Vic. 1113 a 15——b 6, from which I cite a 23 ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν 
εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον, 1114 31 πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου 
ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὁποῖός ποθ᾽ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ 
τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ, Eth, ud, Vil. 2, 1235 Ὁ 25 τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλητὸν ἢ τὸ 
ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. 

8. 290. οὐ πᾶν δέ... ἀγαθόν. Good as the end which sets appetency in motion 
is limited to practical, i.e. contingent, good. Cf. Them. 119, 22 H., 219, 15 Sp. 
οὐ πᾶν δὲ ἀγαθὸν κινητικὸν τῆς ὀρέξεως - οὐ yap τὸ πρῶτον οὐδὲ εἴ τι dards ἀγαθὸν 
καὶ ἀίδιον τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἴσως κοινὸν ἅπασι τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον ὃν ὕστερον 
ἐπισκεπτέον. νῦν δὲ τὸ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζώων αἴτιον τῆς κινήσεως ἐπιζητοῦμεν, ὅπερ 
ἤδη τὸ ἐν μέρει ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ 
μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ τινὶ καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πρὸς τόδε. πρακτὸν δ᾽ ἐστὶ...30 ἔχειν. Con- 
tingent events are assigned to the λογιστικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, as distinct from 
the ἐπιστημονεκόν, Eth. Nic. 1139 a 6 sqq. (especially a 12—14), 1140 Ὁ 2 ἐνδέχεται 
τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, also 1141 b 10 βουλεύεται δ᾽ οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων 
ἄλλως ἔχειν. 

4995 31—b30. We have, then, to recognise an appetitive faculty 
related to the object of appetency. Any division of faculties of the soul which is 
based upon functions must be elastic enough to admit a great variety of such parts. 
Such faculties as the sensitive, nutritive, ratiocinative, deliberative, appetitive differ 
from each other more widely than appetite or desire does from spirit or passion 
in the scheme of the Republic [8 5]. The conflict of motives is explained as 
follows: reason and desire may be at variance in beings which have perception 
of time. Desire takes the pleasurable of the immediate future for the absolutely 
pleasurable and the absolutely good. Thus it prompts to indulgence. Reason, 
out of regard to the more distant future, bids us refrain. The motive principle 
is always specifically one and the same, viz. the faculty of appetency as such, 
which has for its prime unmoved movent the object of appetency; the latter 
originating motion by being thought or imagined. There is, however, numeri- 
cally a plurality of springs of motion [§ 6]. The elements of motion are (1) the 
movent, whether (2) immovable or (δ) moved; (2) that with which it produces 
motion ; (3) that in which motion is produced. Here (a2), the unmoved movent, 
is the practical good, the good which is the end of action, while (4), the movent 
which is itself moved, is the faculty of appetency set in motion by the object of 
appetency and communicating motion to the appetent subject gud appetent. 
Again, (3) that which is moved is the animal, and in (2), the instrument of 
motion, we come to that which is corporeal (e.g. a limb). This bodily instru- 
ment by which appetency produces its effect must be studied, among the 
functions which are common to body and soul [8 7]. Briefly, this instrument 
is found where the same thing is the beginning and end, e.g. the ball and socket 
joint, where the concave and convex act together, the one being the end and the 
other the beginning, so that, while one point is at rest, the other 15 in motion. 
Locally inseparable, they are logically distinct. All movement comes about by 
pushing and dragging, and consequently implies a fulcrum or point at rest [§ 8]. 
Hence, generally, the animal, gvé appetitive, 1s capable of self-motion, but it is 
not appetitive apart from imagination, and imagination, again, is derived from 
sense or from intellect. And in this faculty (imagination) animals other than 
men participate [§ 9]. 


560 NOTES III, 10 


4338 31 ὅτι μὲν ovv...433b I φανερόν. Here, then, is the result of the 
investigation begun in agsufra. The faculty of soul which originates motion 
is ἡ καλουμένη ὄρεξις in the wider sense of that term, 1.6. τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, a 21. 

433 Ὁ 1. τοῖς δὲ διαιροῦσι. At this point A. indulges in one more criticism of 
the Platonic tripartition in the Repudlic. If we are to make parts of the soul, 
basing our partition upon division of function, among such parts ὀρεκτικὸν is 
entitled to a place: cf. Them. 119, 33 H., 219, 28 Sp. μεθ᾽ ὧν δὴ καὶ τὸ dpexrixoy 
τοῦτο περὶ ov ὁ λόγος διώρισε. 

b 3. βουλευτικόν. Comparing this list of five “parts” with that given 4148 
31 sq., we see that κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον is absent and for the first time in the 
treatise BovAeurixdy is introduced (cf. 434a 12) Cf. Ark. Hud. 11. 10, 1226 
b 25 BovAeurixdy τῆς ψυχῆς. In Magna Moralia 1... c. 35 it has to do with 
contingent matters: 1196b 27 τὸ δὲ βουλευτικὸν καὶ προαιρετικὸν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ 
καὶ ἐν κινήσει, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα ἐν γενέσει τε καὶ φθορᾷ ἐστίν. βουλευόμεθα γὰρ ὑπὲρ 
τούτων ἃ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι προελομένοις. Thus it fairly 
corresponds with τὸ λογιστικὸν of Eth. Nic. 1130 ἃ 12 sqq., as distinct from 
τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, these two being the subdivisions of the λόγον ἔχον. Τὸ 
βουλευτικὸν can hardly therefore be a division of the same rank with the other 
four. The mention of νοῦς πρακτικὸς 4338. 14, διάνοια πρακτικὴ 4338 τὸ and the 
admission 432 Ὁ 29 that νοῦς does sometimes deal with the contingent would 
seem to involve some similar division of τὸ νοητικόν, hitherto used as a com- 
prehensive term for the faculty corresponding to νοῦς. The term ἐπιστημονικὸν 
has occurred 431 b 27, and recurs 434 a 16, and we might have expected 
ἐπιστημονικόν, βουλευτικὸν here instead of vonrixdy, βουλευτικόν. In 432b 26 
λογιστικὸν 15 aS vague as νοῦς. 

Ὁ 5 ἐπὲὶ δ᾽...13 τὰ κινοῦντα. This is a cumbrous and complicated sentence. 
Omitting parentheses, we obtain the gist of it in a simpler form ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὀρέξεις 
γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις. ..εἴδει μὲν ἐν ἂν εἴη τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ἣ ὀρεκτικόν, 
πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν.. «ἀριθμῷ δὲ πλείω τὰ κινοῦντα. Thus simplified, the 
inference drawn from the conflict of desire is that the unity of the appetitive 
faculty does not preclude a plurality of springs of motion. 

Ὁ 5. ὀρέξεις γίνονται... ἀλλήλαις. The examples show that ὀρέξεις here must 
be taken in the wider signification, so as to include both λόγος (or λογισμὸς or 
βούλησις) and ἐπιθυμίαι Hence the conflict can be seen in the case of the 
ἀκρατὴς and the éyxparnys: cf. 433a I—3, 6—8. Cf. also 4348 12—14. 

b7. ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν, preeminently, if not exclusively, in 
man. Cf. Them. 120, 11 H., 220, 16 Sp. καὶ μάλιστά ye ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ" otros yap 
αἰσθάνεται χρόνου καθ᾽ αὗτό, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐ yap τοῦ χρόνου ἀλλὰ 
τοῦ πάθους οὗ ἔπαθε πάλαι: ἀμέλει τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐδὲν αὐτῶν αἴσθησιν ἔχει, ὅτι 
μηδὲ πάσχει τι ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι- εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐν μύρμηξι καὶ μελίτταις καὶ τοῖς ἀπο- 
θησαυρίζουσι τὴν τροφὴν ἔστι πως καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἴσθησις χρόνου. ἄνθρωπος 
δὲ μόνος “ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω" μόνος γὰρ νοῦν ἔχει ᾧ τὸ πρότερον ἀριθμεῖ καὶ 
τὸ ὕστερον, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς οὗτος χρόνος ἐστίν. Them. goes out of his way to 
criticise Alex. Aphr. for calling man ποιητὴς τοῦ χρόνου, which, according to 
Them., implies that time has no objective existence. 

b7 ὃ μὲν γὰρ vois...8 τὸ ἤδη. With ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει cf. 432 Ὁ 30 κελεύει 
διώκειν ἢ φεύγειν, b 31 ov κελεύει δὲ φοβεῖσθαι. Hence we must complete the 
second clause thus: ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη «- διώκειν κελεύει; . The antithesis 
is between the more distant future and the moment immediately following, 
TO ἐγγὺς τοῦ παρόντος νῦν χρόνου, as Trend. well observes: Subtiliter scriptor τὸ 
ἤδη, nec vero τὸ νῦν posuit. Cupido enim non temporis punctum, quod adest 
(in hoc enim haud acquiescit), sed quod instat, intuetur. Cf Péys. IV. 13, 


III. 10 433 a 31—b 13 561 


222b 7 τὸ δ᾽ ἤδη τὸ ἐγγύς ἐστι τοῦ παρόντος viv ἀτόμου μέρος τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου, 
Them. 120, 22 H., 221, 4 Sp. [ὧν] ὁ μὲν [int. 6 νοῦς] διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκει, ἡ δὲ 
ἐπιθυμία τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκει. 

Ῥ 8 φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἤδη...9 ἁπλῶς. This illustrates 433 a 28 τὸ φαινόμενον 
ἀγαθόν. The first mistake is the confusion of immediate and relative pleasure 
with absolute pleasure: cf. Ath. Mic. 1099a LI—15, 1155 Ὁ 26—33, 1176a 8—209. 
A.’s standard is ὁ σπουδαῖος, and true pleasure that which he thinks so: cf. E¢h. 
Nic. 1113 a 25—b 2, 1176a 15 sqq. The second mistake is to confuse pleasure 
with good absolute. Absolute good is indeed absolutely pleasant, ΖΦ Ζᾷ. Nic. 
1156 Ὁ 22 sq., but the converse 15 not always true, ΖΦ. 1113 a 31—b 2. 

bio. διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον. The subject of ὁρᾶν may be τὸν ὀρεγόμενον 
or τοῦτον ᾧ φαίνεται. 

bir πρῶτον δὲ πάντων...12 φαντασθῆναι. This is parenthetical: cf. Simpl. 
300, 20 πρὶν δὲ πάλιν ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς τὸ εἴδει μὲν ἂν ἕν εἴη “πλείω δὲ τῷ ἀριθμῷ," 
διότι δύο τὰ ὀρεκτικὰ καὶ μαχόμενα ἐνίοτε ἀλλήλοις, τό τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀλόγως 
ὀρεγόμενον, ἐν μέσῳ ὑπέμνησεν ὡς πρὸ τοῦ ὀὁρεκτικοῦ τὸ ὀρεκτὸν κινεῖ, The 
parenthesis serves to explain 433 8 9 564.. where φαντασία was included under 
vous as a cause of movement. 

b 13. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ κτὲ The grammatical structure of the sentence is 
obscure. Alex. Aphr. (ap. Philop. 590, 39 sq-) rightly held that there was no 
apodosis to ἐπειδή. Plutarch of Athens (ap. Philop. 591, 1 sqq.) supposes the 
suppressed apodosis to be τέτταρα dpa ἐστὶ τὰ τῇ κινήσει συμβαλλόμενα: since 
three things are implied in motion and one of them appears in a twofold form, 
therefore the things which contribute to motion are really four. Apparently 
the missing apodosis, which seems extraordinarily feeble as so supplied, should 
have come after b15 τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον. This view is accepted by 
Simpl. 300, 34—301, 1, who sees a natural transition to the enumeration of all 
four in Ὁ 15—21. His words are: (300, 1) ἐφ᾽ ois εὐλόγως καταριθμεῖται, τίνα τὰ 
τέσσαρα. Both these views admit anacoluthia: indeed, the only alternative 
would be to suppose that A. introduced an apodosis with δέ, either at Ὁ 15 ἔστι 
δὲ or, less probably, at b 14 τὸ δὲ κινοῦν. But in the judgment of Bonitz (Arist. 
Stud, Il., 111..0 pp. 124—129) there is no adequate evidence that A.so far departed 
from the ordinary usage of Attic prose. The simplest explanation is to assume 
an oversight of the writer, which is more startling in a comparatively short 
sentence like the present than in some of the long and involved sentences 
which commence with ἐπειδὴ and ἐπεί, such as 4148 4 sqq., 427a 17—b 8 or 
that commencing with εἰ οὖν 434.a 32—b8. “Zweifelhaft ist, ob die Erinnerung 
an die sprachlich untergeordnete Form des Vordersatzes erhalten geblieben 
ist,” says Bonitz of less irregular constructions. In thé present case, if we 
disentangle the thought from the confused form of the expression, it will be 
*‘ Since there are three (or rather, four) things implied in motion generally, we 
must discover something corresponding to each of them in this particular case 
of motion.” 

b 13. tpla. That motion cannot be explained without assuming this series 
of three factors, namely (1) the unmoved movent, which communicates but does 
not receive motion, (2) the movent which is itself in motion, (3) that which is 
moved but not itself a movent, is the doctrine laid down in the PAysics, e.g. 
VII. 5, 256b 14 τρία yap ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τό Te κινούμενον καὶ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ ᾧ κινεῖ. 
τὸ μὲν οὖν κινούμενον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖν δ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, τὸ δ᾽ ᾧ κινεῖ, καὶ κινεῖν 
καὶ κινεῖσθαι: συμμεταβάλλει γὰρ τοῦτο ἅμα καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ κινουμένῳ ὄν. 
δῆλον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τόπον κινούντων “ ἅπτεσθαι γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἀνάγκη μέχρι τινός" 
τὸ δὲ κινοῦν οὕτως ὥστ᾽ εἶναι μὴ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἀκίνητον. It is also stated Metaph. 


Ἡ. 36 


562 NOTES III. 10 


1072 a 24 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον Kal κινοῦν, καὶ μέσον τοίνυν ἐστί τε ὃ οὗ κινούμενον 
κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα. Here, however, the threefold analysis 
becomes fourfold (Them. 120, 27 H., 221, 11 Sp. τρία τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὧν χωρὶς οὐκ 
ἂν γένοιτο 7 κίνησις αὕτη τοῖς ζώοις, μᾶλλον δὲ τέτταρα), for the bodily instrument 
is here distinguished from ὄρεξις and both belong to (2) κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον, 
while (1) is τὸ ὀρεκτόν, i.e. πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, and (3) 1s τὸ ζῷον. 

14. τὸ δὲ κινοῦν διττόν. Here A. obtains his series by starting with τὸ 
κινοῦν, which he divides into τὸ κινοῦν ἀκίνητον and τὸ κινοῦν Kal κινούμενον, 
while in the Mefaphysics as cited above he appears to start with κινούμενον, 
which he divides into κινούμενον κινοῦν and κινούμενον μὴ κινοῦν, at least if we 
may trust the lost paraphrase by Themistius of that passage, as represented 
in a Latin version of an older Hebrew version: “cum igitur detur mobile 
movens et mobile non movens, necessario datur et movens non mobile.” See 
Prof. Jackson in Journ. of Phil. vol. XXIX., p. 141 56. 

Ὅτε ἔστι δὲ τὸ pev...16 ἀγαθόν. The practical good, although belonging to 
the region of the contingent, is nevertheless fixed and constant for appetency. 
Si τὸ πρακτὸν ita supra definiebatur, ut id esset, quod etiam aliter se habere 
posset: quod nunc immotum dicitur, non repugnat. Quatenus enim cupidinem 
movet, ipsum immotum est extra animi vicissitudines positum: quatenus appe- 
titus ad id ipsum tendit, mutationes admittit (Trend.). Cf MJetaph. 1072 a 26 
κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν [κινεῖ ov κινούμενα]. τούτων τὰ mpOra τὰ αὐτά. 
ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὃν καλόν. ὀρεγό- 
μεθα δὲ Score δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότε ὀρεγόμεθα- ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις, De Motu 
An. 6,700 Ὁ 35 τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν 
κινούμενον κινεῖ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον τῶν κινουμένων οὐκ ἀνάγκη κινεῖν οὐδέν. This 
last treatise, though not by Aristotle, is useful for illustration. 

Ὁ 17 κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον...18 ἢ ἐνέργεια. All modern editors, from 
Trend. to Rodier, take ὄρεξις as the subject of the second clause. The two last 
words are variously given: as 7 ἐνέργεια, not only by Bek. and Trend., but also, 
as should have been mentioned in the critical zozes, by Biehl; as 7 ἐνεργείᾳ by 
Torst. “quia ὄρεξις est etiam ea quae est duvdyue” (Torst., p. 207 2026); as 
ἢ ἐνέργεια by Rodier. I adopt the latter and, with this exception, have printed 
the text of Trendelenburg’s first edition and translated accordingly. But it is 
unsatisfactory because (1) it fails to explain the divergence between codd. E L 
ἡ κίνησις ὄρεξις τις and the other MSS, which read either ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησίς ris or 
ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησις, (2) the first clause “the animal which is moved is moved in so 
far as it desires,” though true, is irrelevant, if A. wishes to prove that τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν 
is κινούμενον, and the ancient commentators refer this clause, not to the animal, 
but to the faculty, while (3) 1t is open to Torstrik’s telling objection: Manifestum 
autem est non omne τὸ κινούμενον etiam ὀρέγεσθαι: si lapis iacitur vel cadit, 
κινεῖται μέν, ὀρέγεται δ᾽ ot. The materials for a more satisfactory restoration of 
the text are before us in cod. E and Philoponus 591, 12 κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν ἡ 
ὀρέγεται, 591. 16 καί φησιν ὅτι ἡ yap ὄρεξις ἢ κίνησίς ἐστιν ἣ ἐνέργεια. I con- 
jecture that A. wrote κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν 7 ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἢ κίνησίς τις (or simply 
κίνησις) ὄρεξις ἢ ἐνέργεια. Then τὸ κινοῦν τε τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. I fully endorse 
Torstrik’s opinion: quum τὸ ὀρεκτικόν et moveat et moveatur, hoc loco noluit 
Ar. explicare qui moveat: cf. Ὁ 19—21: explicavit vero quomodo moveatur. 
That ὄρεξις should be called κίνησις or κίνησίς ris is quite in accord with 
408 Ὁ 1—11 (cf. Phys. VUI. 3, 254 8 26—30), since all mental activities involve 
some corporeal change. However, to prevent any misconception, ἢ ἐνέργεια is 
added: cf. 417a 14—17, 418a 1—3. If the genuine text were what I conjecture, 
cod. E comes very near to it, but the fatal change of ἢ κίνησις to ἡ κίνησις would 


III. 10 433 b 13—b τὸ 563 


be very likely to lead to the further change of ἡ κίνησίς tis ὄρεξις into ἡ ὄρεξις 
κίνησίς τις: and similarly of τὸ κινοῦν into τὸ κινούμενον and in turn to τὸ 
ὀρεγόμενον. But the further question arises: in what way has A. proved his 
point that the appetent faculty is moved, where we ought to understand “with 
spatial motion”? For in a chain of moved movents mediating between the 
first cause of the system and that which is merely moved without imparting the 
motion to anything else the motion transmitted ought to be of the same species 
throughout. Hence the use of the terms κενοῦν ἀκίνητον, κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον, 
κινούμενον μόνον, which is quite in place 416b 25 sqq., and 434 Ὁ 29 sqq., where 
physical bodies are spoken of, seems only permissible here by way of analogy. 
The motion which appetency imparts is spatial motion, but the motion with 
which it is moved cannot be of this nature. According to Simplicius, Alex. 
Aphr. met this objection by affirming {πεῖ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν is moved with spatial 
motion merely κατὰ συμβεβηκός, following strictly 408 a 30—34: cf. Simpl. 302, 
28—30. This is exactly what we should expect, when we compare Alex. Aphr. 
De An. 78, 24—80, 3, where he emphatically asserts that the appetitive soul 
κινεῖ TO ζῷον ov κινουμένη and that, even when the phrase ὕπό τινὸς κινεῖσθαι is 
less strictly applied to τὸ κατ᾽ αὐτὸ [int. τὸ κινοῦν] κινούμενον, this vague sense 
applies to the animal, which is moved κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, κατὰ τὸ ἔμψυχον εἶναι, but 
not to the soul or any part of the soul. Them. also understood κινούμενον, as 
well as κινοῦν, of spatial motion: (120, 30 H., 221, 16 Sp.) αὕτη γὰρ [int. αὶ ὄρεξις 
κινεῖ τὰ ζῶα κινηθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ: 4 yap κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τόπον οὐδὲν ἄλλο 
ἐστὶν ἢ τῆς ὀρέξεως εἰς τοὐμφανὲς πρόοδος καὶ ἐνέργεια. 1 agree with Heinze, the 
latest editor of Them., that this paraphrase points to the reading ἡ κίνησις 
GpeEis τίς ἐστιν. The spatial motion of the animal, Them. argues, is the 
appetency realised in act. What then? The animal moves spatially, but 
the appetent faculty can only be said to do so fer acctdens. Plutarch of 
Athens, as reported by Simplicius, explained κίνησις as exactly equivalent to 
ὀρεκτικὴ ἐνέργεια, thus making the movement attributed to appetency a mental 
act, and not spatial motion at all: Simpl. 302, 25 6 WWAovrapyes οὕτως ἐξηγεῖται, 
αὐτὴν τὴν ὀρεκτικὴν ἐνέργειαν κίνησιν εἰρῆσθαι Ἰλατωνικῶς φάμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ 
᾿Αριστοτέλους νῦν. Simpl. (302, 23—303, 2) and Philop. (591, 12—19) accept 
this way out of the difficulty, but the former with considerable qualifications, 
suggesting (302, 37 sq.: cf. 302, 26 564.) that the ὄρεξις may be called κίνησις 
because it is an actuality terminating in κίνησις, and again (302, 27 sq.) that A. 
uses κίνησις, not for the passive state of being moved, but for the active function 
of causing motion. 

Ὁ 18. τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον. The animal as a whole, and not regarded as 
an appetent subject, corresponds to the third term of the series, that which 
receives, but does not communicate, motion. 

b 19. ἤδη seems to imply that up to this point A. has been dealing with 
mental activity. 

bI9. σωματικόν. In the bodily instrument employed by ὄρεξις, the faculty 
of soul, A. finds a fresh example of τὸ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον : but, whereas ὄρεξις 
is wholly psychical, the bodily instrument is wholly corporeal. Thus good or 
apparent good moves the faculty of ὄρεξις, the latter moves the bodily instru- 
ment, and this in turn sets the animal in motion. Cf. De Gen. An. τι, 6, 
742 ἃ 22 δύο δὲ διαφορὰς ἔχει καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα" τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, τὸ δὲ 
ᾧ χρῆται τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον τό τε γεννητικὸν καὶ τὸ ὀργανικὸν τῷ γενομένῳ - 
τούτων γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ πρότερον, τὸ ποιητικόν, οἷον τὸ διδάξαν τοῦ μαν- 
θάνοντος, τοὺς δὲ αὐλοὺς ὕστερον τοῦ μανθάνοντος αὐλεῖν: περίεργον γὰρ μὴ 
ἐπισταμένοις αὐλεῖν ὑπάρχειν αὐλούς. The Greek commentators identify this 


36—2 


564. NOTES ΤΠ. 10 


σωματικόν, this corporeal instrument, with connatural spirit, σύμφυτον πνεῦμα: 
Them. 121, 3—18 H., 221, 26—222, 17 Sp., Simpl. 303, 31 sqq., Philop. 587, 24— 
589, 26, no doubt following De Motu An. c. 10, 703 a 9—28. For the part 
assigned by A. to σύμφυτον πνεῦμα in sensation and the transmission of sense- 
images see Beare, Greek Theories, pp. 333-—336. 

Ὁ Ig 816 ἐν τοῖς Kotvois...20 περὶ αὐτοῦ. Cf. De Part. An. 1. 3, 643 a 35 sqq. 
Philop. thinks the reference is to Ast, Az.: Trend., arguing from the cross 
reference in De Motu An. 6, 700b 4 περὶ μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς, εἴτε κινεῖται ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ 
κινεῖται, πῶς κινεῖται, πρότερον εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς διωρισμένοις περὶ αὐτῆς, concludes 
that A. intended to treat of the subject in a separate treatise. The treatise 
which has come down to us in the Aristotelian corpus is generally believed to 
be a later Peripatetic compilation. 

Ὁ 21 νῦν δὲ...22 γιγγλυμός. The mechanism of animal motion is here given 
in outline. We may profitably compare the fuller treatment in De Motu An., 
especially c. 1, 698 a 14—b 4, c. 7, ζοι ἃ 36—b 32, c. 8 throughout, 7orb 33— 
702 b 11, from which Them. supplements his paraphrase. All animal movement 
is by pushing and pulling. This implies a fixed central point from which the 
moveable member works backward and forward to push and pull the creature 
along. Thus with the elbow joint the upper part of the arm, being stationary, 
moves the lower part up and down. The elbow joint serves as a sort of fixed 
centre from which to work, where the stationary ἀρχὴ and the moveable τελευτὴ 
meet. They form one complex whole, being one and the same, locally or in 
magnitude inseparable, yet different logically or in aspect. Cf. De Part. An. τι. 
9, 654a 35 ἵνα χρῆται ἡ φύσις [int. τῷ ὀστῷ] καὶ as ἑνὶ καὶ συνεχεῖ καὶ ὡς δυσὶ καὶ 
διῃρημένοις πρὸς τὴν κάμψι, Metaph. to16a 12—17. 

b2I. τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς ὅπον. Cf. Them. 121, 5 H., 221, 28 Sp., who 
supplies θετέον : ἐν τοιούτῳ θετέον μέρει τοῦ σώματος, ἐν οἵῳ δύναιτο av καὶ ἀρχὴ 
καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι, λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα μεγέθει δὲ ἀχώριστα. 

Ὁ 22. ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό. By ἀρχὴ is meant the stationary point or 
pivot, τὸ ἠρεμοῦν, by τελευτὴ that which is moved, ὃ κινεῖται. In the hinge-joint, 
say of the elbow, the concave surface or socket is the pivot and relatively at 
rest. The convex surface, or ball fitted in the socket, is left free to move. As 
motion begins from the concave and terminates in the convex, the former is 
called ἀρχὴ and the latter τελευτή. 

Ὁ 22. οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός, “for instance, the hinge-joint.”. The term is found 
in the Hippocratean writings 411, 12 (p. 111 ed. Kiihn) in the tract περὶ τόπων 
τῶν κατ ἄνθρωπον. We there find πρὸς δὲ τὸ γόνυ τὸ ὀστέον τοῦ μηροῦ τοιόνδ᾽ 
ἐστὶ δίκραιον. τῷ δὲ δικραίῳ τούτῳ τὸ ὀστέον 7 κνήμη καλεομένη οἷον ἐν γιγγλυμῷ 
ἐνήρμοσται. In Hzst. An. IV. 4, 529a 32 τὸ γιγγλυμῶδες is the hinge of the 
bivalves, a species of shellfish: ra δὲ δίθυρα ἐν τῷ γιγγλυμώδει [int. τὴν μήκωνα 
ἔχει]. The more common term with A. is καμπή, Metaph. 1040b 12 τῷ ἀρχὰς 
ἔχειν κινήσεως ἀπό τινος ἐν ταῖς καμπαῖς. Alex. Aphr., as we learn from 
Simplicius 304, 12 56.) explained as follows ὅτε περὶ μίαν περόνην ἑστῶσαν 
κρίκος περικείμενος αὐτῇ εἴσω τε καὶ ἔξω στρεφομένῃ τῇ θύρᾳ συνεργεῖ. Con- 
sequently Alex. treated the words immediately following, 433 Ὁ 24 sq., as 
parenthetical: (Simpl. 304, 26) οὐκ ἀκούει ὡς ἐπὶ rod γιγγλυμοῦ τὰ ἐφεξῆς 
ἐπαγόμενα, τὸ ἀχώριστα εἶναι τῷ μεγέθει τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος, καὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν 
καὶ κινούμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ ἡμῶν ταῦτα εἰρῆσθαι, ὅταν τῶν ἀντικειμένων μερῶν, 
λέγω δὲ τῶν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἢ τῶν δεξιῶν καὶ ἀριστερῶν καμπτομένων, καὶ θατέρου 
μένοντος τῶν ἀντικειμένων, θατέρου δὲ κινουμένου, ἡ μεταξὺ ἐπιφάνεια ὡς πέρας 
μὲν τοῦ κινουμένου «κινουμένη: ἢ καὶ αὐτή. Plutarch (ap. Simpl. 304, 9 544.) 
understood by γιγγλυμὸς in the present context δύο κρίκων συμπλοκή, τοῦ ἑτέρου 
εἷς τὸν λοιπὸν ἐμβεβλημένου, ὅτε τὸ κυρτὸν τοῦ ἑτέρου τοῦ κοίλου ἐφάπτεται τοῦ 


III. 10 433 Ὁ r9g—b 30 565 


λοιποῦ. Philop. follows Plutarch, but substitutes ὀστοῦν for κρίκος: 588, 17 
γιγγλυμὸς δέ ἐστι σύνταξις δύο ὀστέων, τοῦ Kuptod ἐμβάλλοντος eis τὴν κοιλότητα. 
καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ λόγῳ διάφορά ἔστιν (ἐν ἄλλῳ γὰρ σώματί ἐστι τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ ἐν 
ἄλλῳ τὸ κοῖλον) τῷ δὲ ὑποκειμένῳ τὰ αὐτά εἶσιν - συναρμόζουσι γὰρ ἀλλήλοις, καὶ 
γίνεται ἡ κίνησις οὐ τῶν δύο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κυρτοῦ μόνου: περὶ τὸ κοῖλον γὰρ μένον 
καὶ ἀκίνητον ὃν ἡ τοῦ κυρτοῦ γίνεται κίνησις. τοιαύτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ ἀγκῶνα τῶν 
χειρῶν ἡμῶν διάρθρωσις. ᾿ 

Ὁ 24. διὸ τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται. Prof. Bywater makes this “a mere 
parenthesis, a sort of corollary to what precedes.” τὸ μὲν ε΄ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, 
τὸ S€=7 τελευτή, Thus the upper part of the arm relatively at rest is the ἀρχὴ 
which moves the lower part up and down. Cf. Them. 121, 12 H., 222, 9 Sp.: 
περὶ yap τὴν περόνην μένουσαν οἱ γιγγλυμοὶ παραλλὰξ κινοῦνται. λόγῳ... 
25 ἀχώριστα. As Prof. Bywater has seen, this refers to τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον 
which make up the hinge-joint τὸ κενοῦν ὀργανικῶς. This implies that the two 
surfaces in contact are parts of one complex whole, being locally and in exten- 
sion inseparable, and therefore one and the same thing. For the formula see 
sores ON 429a 11, 413 b 14: cf. also 432 a 20. 

b 25. amdvra...xi.wetrar. This sentence gives the reasons for the statement 
433 b 21 τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό: “it is no part of the 
illustrative digression on the subject of the hinge-joint, but refers back to what 
precedes it; and it is not to be taken as true of motion generally, but only of 
the motion of animals” (Bywater, Arist., Journ. of Philol. vol. XVI, p. 65). Cf. 
De Incessu An. 2, 704b 22 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τῶν κινήσεων τῶν κατὰ τόπον 
ἀρχαὶ ὦσις καὶ ἕλξις. In ἄγε. vil. 2, 2438 17 sqq. four varieties of local 
movement are enumerated, ὄχησις and δίνησις being added after ὦσις and ἔλξις, 
but (243 Ὁ 19) ὄχησις is κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κίνησις due to one of the other three 
varieties and (2444 2) δίνησις σύγκειται ἐξ ἕλξεώς re καὶ ὥσεως. Ch. De Mot. An. 
10, 703a 19 τὰ δ᾽ ἔργα τῆς κινήσεως ὦσις καὶ ἔλξις, ὥστε δεῖ τὸ ὄργανον av§dve Gal 
τε δύνασθαι καὶ συστέλλεσθαι. 

b 26 διὸ δεῖ ὥσπερ...27 κίνησιν. The circle is supposed to be generated by 
the motion of a point which is always at a given distance from another fixed 
point, the centre of the circle. When such a circle moves, as when a wheel 
revolves, the centre is at rest relatively to the circumference. Similarly, both 
in the animal body as a whole and in the organic parts, i.e. the joints, there 
must be some point or pivot relatively stationary for the animal body as a 
whole: this was to A, the heart. Cf. De Part. An. Ill. 3, 665a τὸ ἡ μὲν yap 
καρδία ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κεῖται, ἐν ἣ τὴν ἀρχήν pape τῆς ζωῆς καὶ 
πάσης κινήσεώς τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως, De Mot. An. i. 698 ἃ 14 sqq., Them. 121, 15 ff., 
222, 13 Sp. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν κύκλῳ μένειν δεῖ τὸ σημεῖον καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρχεσθαι τῆς 
κινήσεως τὴν περιφέρειαν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ ζώῳ μένειν ἀνάγκη τι ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καὶ mapa 
χούτου καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν κίνησιν γίνεσθαι τῶν μερῶν, 2b. 121, 7 H., 222, 2 Sp. 
τοιοῦτος δὲ 6 περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος ἐστίν - αὕτη yap ἀρχὴ καὶ τελεντὴ τῶν τε δεξιῶν 
καὶ τῶν εὐωνύμων καὶ τῶν ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καθ᾽ ἃ τοῖς (wos ἡ κίνησις. 

Ὁ 28. ἑαυτοῦ κινητικόν. Cf. PAys. VII. 2, 253 4 14 56. 

b 28. ὁρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας; int. ἐστί. We have been prepared for 
an extension of the meaning formerly given to φαντασία. In 111. 3, ὃ 13 it was 
connected with sensation. Now it seems as if high mental operations, such as 
λογισμός, imply pictorial images. But λογισμὸς is an exercise of the discursive 
intellect, διάνοια, and we have been told 431a 14 that for διάνοια sensations 
are replaced by images: τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα 
ὑπάρχει, 4328 8 ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φαντάσματι θεωρεῖν. ΟΕ. 72. αι 13 ἢ 
οὐδὲ τἄλλα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων. 

Ὁ 30. ταύτης μὲν οὖν, 1.5. τῆς αἰσθητικῆς φαντασίας. 


566 NOTES ΠῚ. 1 


CHAPTER XI. 


433 b31-—4384a Ql. To take the case of imperfect or undeveloped 
animals, possessing only the sense of touch. What is the moving power in 
them? Is it or is it not possible that such creatures should possess imagination 
and desire? Plainly they feel pleasure and pain and, this being so, must feel 
desire also. How can they have imagination? We reply: the movements of 
these inferior creatures are so vague and indeterminate that, if they possess the 
power in question, it can only be in a vague and indeterminate manner [8 1. 
Images of sense are found in all animals. But rational animals have also 
deliberative imagination, calculation being required in the selection of means to 
a given end; a single standard, moreover, being necessary if we are to deter- 
mine which is the greater good to pursue. Hence it is that the less perfect 
animals seem to be without opinion, as they do not possess that form of 
imagination which is based upon the syllogism and which presupposes opinion 
{§ 2]. Thus appetency does not imply deliberation. In the struggle with 
rational wish it sometimes prevails, sometimes is vanquished, under the con- 
ditions of incontinence. In fact, the higher principle has a natural supremacy 
and determines movement, as is illustrated by the motions of the spheres [§ 3]. 
The cognitive faculty is not in motion, but stationary. In the practical syllogism 
the major premiss is a general proposition, while the minor deals with particular 
facts. The major premiss is of the following form: “A person, one of such and 
such a character, should do such and such an act.” The minor asserts: “ This 
is such and such an act and I am of the character defined.” It is this particular 
minor rather than the general proposition which causes us to act; yet in 
different ways both may be said to do so [§ 4]. 

433 Ὁ 31. περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν. This does not mean maimed or mutilated animals 
(anpapara) which have not the full development of their kind, but the lowest 
types of animals, which are less fully developed than other kinds. 

434a I πότερον...2 kal ἐπιθυμίαν. It would seem as if ἐπιθυμία here replaced 
ὄρεξις in the narrowest sense, as the term is used in 4338 6—14. It will be 
remembered that in 413 Ὁ 19—23 (cf. 413 Ὁ 8 sq.), where A.’s attention is 
directed even to some of the lowest forms of animal life, e.g. insecta, which 
live when divided, the powers of sensation, local movement, imagination and 
desire are attributed to them; the proof being that sensation implies pleasure 
and pain, while pleasure and pain imply desire (413 Ὁ 23 54... But in 414b 3— 
16 animals which have only the sense of touch are credited with ὄρεξις, but their 
possession of φαντασία is reserved for future discussion, while in 415 a 10 sq. we 
have the definite statement that some mortal things, obviously animals from the 
context, do not even possess φαντασία, much less λογισμός. A.’s solution is that 
the doubt does not affect the existence but rather the degree and kind of 
imagination possessed by the lowest forms of animal life. Their movements 
are vague and undetermined, κενεῖται ἀορίστως. Cf. Simpl. 307, 9 δοτέον οὖν ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης αὐτοῖς τὴν φαντασίαν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ᾿Αριστοτέλης συλλογίξεται διὰ τοῦ λύπην καὶ 
ἡδονὴν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς τοιούτοις ζῴοις. 

a5. καὶ ταῦτ΄, int. φαντασία with its φαντάσματα and ὄρεξις in its lowest 
form of ἐπιθυμία. Cf. Them. 122, 11 H., 224, 1 Sp. φαντάζεται ἀορίστως, ὥστε ἔχει 
μὲν φαντασίαν, ἀδιάρθρωτον δὲ καὶ συγκεχυμένην, καθάπερ δὴ Kat τὴν αἴσθησιν - 
καὶ γὰρ ταύτην ἔχει ἀτελῇ καὶ ἀόριστον. ἀορίστως, cf. 2243. Ar. 70b 42 “ἀόριστον 
dicitur id, quod vel nondum circumscriptum est certis finibus vel non potest 


Ill. 11 433 b 31---4248 12 567 


certis finibus circumscribi.” Cf. Philop. 592, 29 ἀορίστως λέγει ἀντὶ rod ἀμυδρῶς 
Kal πετλανημένως. 

a6. ὥσπερ εἴρηται, in 433 Ὁ 29 sq. 

a7. ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ, int. φαντασία. This is the third grade of imagination, 
distinct alike from the αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία of the normal animal and from that 
fainter, vaguer type of φαντασία which A. has just claimed for the lower species. 
ἐν rots λογιστικοῖς, int. ζῴοις, 1.6. in those that possess reason (λόγος). Delibera- 
tion is confined to man and, like other modes of discursive thought, employs 
pictorial images. For an instance of their application see 431 b 6 sqq. and 
Eth. Nic. 1112b 15—20. See also moze on 433415, τῷ τέλει. In 431 Ὁ 6 sqq. 
the whole passage is concerned with the mental images of the type of βουλευτικὴ 
φαντασία so graphically described £¢h. Nec. loc. cit. and with what is obviously 
an operation of διάνοια πρακτική. 

a 7 πότερον yap...10 ποιεῖν. I have enclosed all this in brackets in order to 
make clear what in my opinion is the antecedent of τοῦτο, viz. the fact that the 
lower animals possess imagination only in one of the two forms in which it is 
found in man. 

a8. λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον. If speculative thought involves images, they 
are just as indispensable to practical thought and deliberation. Cf. De Mem. 2, 
4538. 13 καὶ yap τὸ βουλεύεσθαι συλλογισμός τίς ἐστιν, Eth, Nic. 1112 Ὁ Τὶ sqq 
ἑνὶ: neuter, meaning a unit or standard. Deliberation implies comparison, 
which is impossible if there be no fixed standard. For One in the sense of 
unit or standard see zzprimis Metaph. 1052 Ὁ 11—1053 Ὁ 8. 

a9. δύναται, int. τὰ λογικὰ ζῷα, man, in virtue of possessing deliberation 
(433 b 3) and deliberative imagination. So Simpl. 309, 18—32, who uses 
masculine participles. Philop. 592, 35—593, 4 prefers to regard 7 βουλευτικὴ 
φαντασία as subject. ἕν, int. φάντασμα. 

ἃ 1Ὸ καὶ αὕτιον τοῦτο. ΕΙΣ ἔχειν. The subject of ἔχειν is doubtless τὰ ἄλλα 
(Sa, cf. supraa 6, i.e. τὰ ἄλογα (Ga. Bywater supposes the words to have fallen 
out of the text, thinking it unlikely that they can be “readily supplied by the 
mind” at this interval. Probably to meet this difficulty M. Rodier suggests that 
the words (a 7) ἡ δὲ BovAeuriKy...(a 9) ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν form a 
parenthesis. But see zoze on πότερον a 7 supra. Anyhow, what A. means to 
say here is clear. The lower animals seem, at first sight, to be destitute of 
“judgment” (δόξα) because incapable of ratiocination (συλλογισμός), and there- 
fore unable to form images following on ratiocinations. The close connexion 
between φαντασία and ὑπόληψις, of which latter δόξα is a species, was em- 
phasised 427 Ὁ 16, There is a similar statement in Eth. Nic. 1147a 35 Sore 
συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγον mas καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ 
κατὰ συμβεβηκός---ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡ δόξα---τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ" ὥστε 
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ᾽ 
ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην. 

all. τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ, int. φαντασίαν [not δόξαν], i.e. what has been 
called above τὴν βουλευτικὴν φαντασίαν and 433b 29 τὴν λογιστικὴν φαντασίαν. 
From De Mem. 2, 453.4 13, too, cited in moze on ἃ ὃ supra, we know that 
“ syllogism” of some sort is involved in deliberation. 

all. αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην, int. ἔχε. Deliberative imagination implies opinion or 
judgment. Deliberation will issue in some conclusion, as the debate of the 
Homeric chiefs ended in the decision which they announced to the people: 
Eth. Nic. 1113a 8 sq. 

8 12. διὸ τὸ βουλευτικὸν οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὄρεξις. Once more the ambiguous term 
ὄρεξις confronts us without the qualification which we find, eg. in Ae7. I. Lo, 


568 NOTES Ill. If 


1369 a 1 sq. δι᾽ ὄρεξιν [int. πράττουσι] τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ δι᾽ ἄλογον. 
It is here used, as in 4338 6, 8, for ἄλογος ὄρεξις, 1.6, in particular, θυμὸς καὶ 
ἐπιθυμία. The conclusion is that irrational desire does not imply the deliberative 
faculty. The alternative is to understand καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν, appetency as such, unless 
A. intended to qualify the sentence, eg. by adding “in irrational animals.” 
Action may be purposive or impulsive, and purpose implies previous deliberation. 
See £th. Nic. 11134 2 βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη 
τὸ προαιρετόν " τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθὲν προαιρετόν ἐστιν, 20. 1135 Ὁ 10 προελό- 
μενοι μὲν [int. πράττομεν] ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσ᾽ ἀπροβούλευτα. 
In 1139 ἃ 23 προαίρεσις =dpekis βουλευτικήῆ. Cf. Zeller, Arvzstozle, Eng. Tr. 11.) 
p. 118 and ποζάς. 

ἃ 12 νικᾷ δ᾽ ἐνίοτε...12 ταύτην. What is the subject to νικᾷ I assume it to 
be ἡ ὄρεξις in the narrower sense. The impulsive and irrational desire some- 
times prevails over βούλησις, which, as we know, is restricted to rational beings 
(432 b 5) and is always of the good (fev. I. 10, 1369a 2 sqq.). Thus νικᾷ τὴν 
βούλησιν [int. 7 ἄλογος ὄρεξις] gives a perfectly clear sense and ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη 
ταύτην, ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν will mean “at other times the rational desire, βούλησις, 
prevails over the irrational ὄρεξις, one appetency thus prevailing over another 
appetency,” in the second case as much as the first. The words ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν 
ὄρεξιν form a sort of ~ésumé of both cases and serve to remind us that the 
rational βούλησις, as well as the irrational ἐπιθυμία, is ὄρεξις. The first clause 
is exemplified in ἀκρασία in the strict or narrower sense, the second in ἐγκράτεια, 
both clauses being included under ἀκρασία in the wider sense. The words καὶ 
κινεῖ present some difficulty, for hitherto what is set in motion has been the 
ζῷον. Cf. 4338 23 ἡ yap βούλησις ὄρεξις- ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ 
κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται (int. τὸ ζῷον). See the comments of Alex. Aphr. referred 
to in mote on 433b17. Prof. Bywater (Journ. of Philol. vol. XVI1., p. 66) takes 
νικᾷ as intransitive, and continues: “The words καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν are 
thrown in parenthetically to explain the consequence of νικᾷ, without affecting 
the construction of what follows, which proceeds just as if we had νικᾷ and 
nothing more than that: another instance of the same kind is in IL. 7, 431 7, 
λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ mwapdévra—where the construction of 
the words is, λογίζεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα, with καὶ βουλεύεται thrown in 
to show that λογίζεται practically means βουλεύεται." J so far agree as to think 
καὶ κινεῖ is thrown in as a sort of afterthought to νικᾷ almost in the sense of νικᾷ 
τὴν βούλησιν ὥστε κινεῖν but I take τὴν βούλησιν as the object to νικᾷ (cf. De 
Gen. An. IV. 4, 770b τό ὅταν μὴ κρατήσῃ τὴν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος 
φύσις), for without this object the next clause ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην is meaningless. 
There seems to be no other instance of κινεῖν τὴν βούλησιν. M. Rodier makes τὸ 
βουλευτικὸν the subject of νεκᾷ and translates “ Mais celle-ci,” Le. la faculté de 
délibération, “chez l’homme, triomphe quelquefois [du désir appétitif] et meut 
le désir raisonné.” In this way he makes ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα, 
ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν alone depict ἀκρασία, which he interprets strictly as the state 
of the ἀκρατής. Simplicius, however, is probably right in giving to ἀκρασία 
a wider sense, conflict of desires generally, (310, 28) καὶ ἔοικεν ἀκρασίαν νῦν 
καλεῖν πᾶσαν τὴν διαμάχην, κἂν μὴ τὸ φαυλότερον ἀλλὰ τὸ κρεῖττον ἐπικρατῇ, καθ᾽ 
ὅσον ὅλως μὴ ἑνὸς τὸ κράτος, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν θατέρου, ποτὲ δὲ τοῦ λοιποῦ. “Βαϊ in 
the abnormal condition called incontinence (ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται |. 14) the soul 
is in a state of anarchy, first one desire getting the upper hand and then another, 
at one moment desire 4 overpowers desire B, at another desire B overpowers 
desire A (ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην 1. 13)—the will being moved by whichever happens 
to have the mastery at the time (νικᾷ, καὶ κενεῖ τὴν βούλησιν), so that it is simply 


III. IL 4348 I2—a 13 569 


tossed to and fro like a shuttle-cock or ball (ὥσπερ σφαῖρα 1. 13) instead of 
being moved by some rational motive” (Bywater, Journ. of Phitol. vol. XVI1., 
p. 66). It may be objected that the use of a transitive verb like κινεῖ in a διὰ 
μέσον construction immediately before an accusative case is very awkward, but 
the fact that we are discussing ri τὸ κινοῦν ἐστίν helps to make it possible: and 
we have as a matter of fact a similar absolute use two lines lower down, a 15. 
καὶ κινεῖ and again inaig. In the present case a13 κινεῖ must be understood 
to mean “produces motion,” 1.6. in the animals. 

8. 13. ὥσπερ σφαῖρα. The extreme brevity of this illustration, even if we take 
Into account the words φύσει δὲ... κινεῖσθαι (a 14 Sq. 2%/ra), adds to the obscurity 
of the passage. On the whole, nothing seems to be gained by departing from 
the traditional view that cd@aipa=sphere, which we learn both from Themistius, 
who adopts it, and from Simplicius, who abandons it and takes ogaipa=ball: 
Them. 121, 34 H., 223, 10 Sp. κινεῖ δὲ ἡ κρατοῦσα [int. ὄρεξις] τὴν κρατουμένην οὗ 
παύουσα τῆς ὁρμῆς ἀλλὰ συμπεριάγουσα ἑαυτῇ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς σφαίρας τῆς οὐρανίας 
ἡ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν τῶν πλανήτων (sic Heinze) οὐχ ἵστησιν, ἀλλὰ κινουμένη ἰδίαν 
κίνησιν ὅμως ἑαυτῇ συμπεριάγει. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ παντὸς ἡ φύσει κρείττων αἰεὶ 
κρατεῖ (ἡ γὰρ ἀνωτάτω φύσει ἀρχικωτέρα)" ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε ἡ φύσει 
κρείττων ἡττᾶται ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀκρασίαις. καὶ τρεῖς ἤδη τηνικαῦτα κινήσεις εἴποις 
ἂν εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, δύο μὲν τὰς τῶν ὀρέξεων, μίαν δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑπ᾽ 
ἀμφοῖν ἀντισπωμένην, Simpl. (310, 30) οἵ γε μὴν ἐξηγηταὶ (probably Alexander 
and Plutarch) τὴν τῆς σφαίρας εἰκόνα ἐπὶ τῶν οὐρανίων ἀκούουσιν, ὡς τῆς ἀπλανοῦς 
καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν κίνησιν ἐνδιδούσης ταῖς πλανωμέναις, ἵνα καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν πλανωμένων 
ἰδίαν κινῆται κίνησιν καὶ αὐτὴ 7 ἀπλανὴς τὴν ἑαυτῆς, καὶ τρίτη ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπλανοῦς 
ἐνδιδομένη κρατῇ τῆς δευτέρας. ἐπειδὴ φύσει, τουτέστιν κατὰ φύσιν ἡ βούλησις 
κρείττων καὶ ἀρχικωτέρα, ἅτε καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς ὅλη δυναμένη ἐγείρεσθαι καὶ ws τὸ 
ἀγαθὸν σκοπὸν τιθεμένη, κατὰ φύσιν ἂν αὕτη κινοίη τὴν δευτέραν. It will be 
noticed that Simplicius gives a different explanation of the words φύσει δὲ κτέ. 
(434a 14) and does not, like Themistius, work them into the simile from the 
spheres. Yet it is noteworthy to find the unusual word φοράς, which is 
peculiarly applicable to the heavenly spheres, in place of κινήσεις. Cf eg. 
Melaph. 1073b 17 sqq., 22 sqq., 1074a 48q., 24—3I. 

The hypothesis that the fixed stars were, as their name implies, fastened in 
the celestial sphere, which revolved uniformly round the earth supposed at rest, 
accounted sufficiently for their apparent motions. But to explain the apparent 
motions of the planets, including the sun and moon, which were planets or 
wandering bodies to the ancients, this hypothesis had to be modified. Besides 
the sphere in which the planet was set, other spheres were assumed to regulate 
it. To A., then, the fabric of heaven connotes spheres each with its own 
peculiar motion, fitting closely so as to leave no empty space between them 
and connected in such a way that the inner or lower are carried round by 
the outer or higher. The illustration turns on this last assumption. When 
βούλησις controls ἄλογος ὄρεξις it is like the outermost celestial sphere which 
imparts its motion to all the inner and lower spheres, and when one ὄρεξις 
prevails over another after conflict, 1.6. when there is ἀκρασία in the wider 
sense, the resultant action of the man is like the movement of one of the 
planets which is regulated by several spheres, including, of course, the outer- 
most celestial sphere. 

Simplicius (who has been followed by Wallace, Bywater and Rodier) was 
aware of this explanation, which did not satisfy him. He refers the simile to 
the game of ball, when the ball is thrown from one player to another. Success 
depended upon the violence of the stroke, (310, 26) νικᾷ, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν σφαιριζόντων 


a 


570 NOTES ΠῚ: 11 


ὁ σφοδρότερον πλήξας. Apparently only two players were assumed and the 
object of each was to throw the ball so violently that the other failed to catch it. 
This Simpl. applied both to the ἐγκρατὴς and to the ἀκρατής : sometimes the 
worse, sometimes the better nature prevails. On this interpretation, the will 
is apparently the ball or shuttle-cock (σφαῖρα) “being moved by whichever 
happens to have the mastery at the time” (Bywater), and the conflicting 
players are the different irrational desires. But then βούλησις itself is an ὄρεξις, 
though a rational desire, and the simile would not account for the case when 
βούλησις determines conduct, and we must strain the interpretation of the 
simile if it is to include ἐγκράτεια. The main objection is the case of σφαῖρα, 
which should, if this explanation be accepted, be altered with cod. y to σφαῖραν. 
In its present position it should illustrate τὸ νικῶν καὶ κινοῦν rather than τὸ 
κινούμενον. Moreover on this view the words (a 14 sq.) φύσει δὲ...ἤδη κινεῖσθαι 
have nothing to do with the simile. Again, in the words of Trend.: Consilium 
et cupidinem inter se fluctuare, ut nova momenti vis accedere debeat, ne verbo 
quidem significatur. 

8. 14 φύσει δὲ.. 15 καὶ κινε. The introduction of the celestial sphere, even as 
an illustration, calls for an important qualification. There is no such thing as 
ἀκρασία or vacillation or contingency in the celestial region. The sphere of the 
fixed stars is never deposed from its rightful place as prime moved movent. 
Hence dei is emphatic, in contrast with Ὁ 12 ἐνίοτε above and Ὁ 13 ὁτὲ δ. 9With 
ἡ ἄνω we are inclined to understand σφαῖρα, but φορὰ would come to the same 
thing, and ἡ ἄνω φορὰ is frequently found, e.g. in MMJeteorologica. It should be 
remarked that the whole complicated system of celestial spheres was excogitated 
simply and solely because certain of the heavenly bodies present to the ob- 
server very irregular apparent motions. “Accordingly, so far as the movements 
of the separate stars varied from a perfect circle, or progressed at unequal rates, 
they were regarded as composite movements capable of being analysed into 
pure and uniform rotations. Therefore,” free motion in space being in that day 
inconceivable, ‘each star required as many spheres as were found necessary for 
the resolution of its apparent movement into pure circular revolutions ” (Zeller, 
Aristotle, Eng. Tr. 1, p. 494). Cf. Metaph. 1073 Ὁ πλείους γὰρ ἕκαστον 
φέρεται μιᾶς τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρων. The rotation, φορά, is the scientific fact, 
the sphere being supposed necessary if we are to conceive it. By ἄνω is meant, 
as in 418b 9, 12, “at the circumference of the universe,” the higher or celestial 
region, contrasted with the sublunary region of mutability. For κινεῖ with φορὰ 
cf. Meteor. 1. 5, 342 a 27 πάντων δὲ τούτων airiov...as δὲ τὸ κινοῦν ὁτὲ μὲν ἡ ἄνω 
φορά. The sphere of the fixed stars is a movent of every one of the planets, 
according to the fantastic hypotheses of Eudoxus and Callippus, provisionally 
accepted in Metaph. Δ., c. 8. 

Them. understands the sentence as referring to the physical universe: 
121, 37 sq. H., 223, τῷ sq. Sp. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ παντὸς ἡ φύσει κρείττων αἰεὶ κρατεῖ 
(7 γὰρ ἀνωτάτω φύσει ἀρχικωτέρα), “in the universe at large the naturally 
stronger impulse always prevails, for the impulse at the very summit (or 
exterior) is naturally more adapted to control,” i.e. the revolution of the first 
heaven controls the movement of the rest of the universe. Whether Them. 
intended κίνησις or ὄρεξις to be supplied with ἡ φύσει κρείττων and ἡ ἀνωτάτω 
makes no difference. Cf. De Caelo 11. 5, 288 a 3 ἔστι δὲ καθάπερ τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς 
εὐθείας φορῶν ἡ πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον τιμιωτέρα (θειότερος yap 6 ἄνω τόπος τοῦ κάτω). 
For the views of Alex. Aphr. upon the celestial motions see Simpl. zz Phys. 1261, 
30—-1262, 2. Simplicius appears to understand ἡ βούλησις by ἡ ἄνω, if his words 
(310, 34) ἐπειδὴ φύσει, τουτέστιν κατὰ φύσιν ἡ βούλησις κρείττων καὶ ἀρχικωτέρα 


Ill. 11 434 3 13—a 16 571 


refer to this passage. He continues ἅτε καὶ dd’ ἑαυτῆς ὅλη δυναμένη ἐγείρεσθαι 
καὶ @s τὸ ἀγαθὸν σκοπὸν τιθεμένη, κατὰ φύσιν ἂν αὕτη κινοίη τὴν δευτέραν. 

4 15. ὥστε τρεῖς φορὰς ἤδη κινεῖσθαι. I take this statement as referring, like 
the rest, to the celestial movements. Any single planet, however irregular its 
motion, has but a single path, but we cannot explain its motion unless we 
assume at least three simultaneous component rotations, of which its single 
path is the resultant. The simplest assumption of Eudoxus resolved the 
motion of the sun and moon into three rotations. Cf. Metaph. 1073 Ὁ 17—21: 
Eudoxus supposed that the motion of the sun and moon respectively depended 
on three spheres, whereof the first was that of the fixed stars, the second 
belonged to the circle which passes through the signs of the zodiac, and the 
third belonged to the ecliptic, which crosses latitudinally the course of the 
signs. The first of these apparent motions is due to the diurnal rotation of the 
earth on its axis, the second to the annual revolution of the earth round the sun, 
the third to the inclination of the earth’s axis. Cf. Zeller, l.c. 1, p. 499 56. 
The fact that in AZedaph. A., ς. 8 A. is not content with three spheres for the sun 
and moon is no argument that he may not have used a current hypothesis for 
purposes of illustration here. If this be so, it seems idle to seek any exact 
correspondence between the three rotations of the sun and the tendencies or 
forces which alternately control the irregular motion of the ἀκρατής. The 
broad fact of similarity stands out clearly, viz. that the actual course of the sun 
in its orbit is very different from that which it would take if any one of the three 
forces acted solely upon it. 

Them. in his paraphrase of the sentence adds ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ: 122, 2 H., 
223, 18 Sp. καὶ τρεῖς ἤδη τηνικαῦτα κινήσεις εἴποις ἂν εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, δύο μὲν 
τὰς τῶν ὀρέξεων, μίαν δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν ἀντισπωμένην. Apparently 
he makes the three φοραὶ to be (1) that to which λόγος and (2) that to which 
ἐπιθυμία prompts and (3) that of the man who is influenced by both impulses 
which draw him in opposite directions. Cf. Zeller, l.c. p. 500, according to 
whom all the planetary spheres except the first and second, i.e. in the simplest 
case, that of the sun, the third alone, “were meant to explain the variations which 
are observable between the apparent motion of the stars and that produced by 
the two first spheres.” Them.’s explanation, then, easily lends itself to the 
supposition that the three φοραὶ are concurrent and simultaneous, being the 
resolution of one irregular motion into three rotations. Simplicius, however, 
supposes the three φοραὶ to be three distinct cases of conduct, each determined 
by the relative preponderance of conflicting motives. He assimilates the three 
φοραὶ to (1) ἐγκράτεια, (2) ἀκράτεια, (3) σωφροσύνη. In (1) λόγος prevails, in 
(2) it is beaten, in both cases after a struggle, while (3) exemplifies the sway 
attended by no struggle which reason, λόγος, naturally and rightfully exerts over 
the passions. This is plausible, but it requires, unless the text be altered, that 
ἐγκράτεια should be read into the words νικᾷ δ᾽ ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν, 
which, as we have seen, M. Rodier has accordingly done. See ote sugra δα loc. 

8 16. τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιστημονικὸν... μένε. Cf. 407 a 32 5q. The variant κινεῖ for 
κινεῖται, found in codd. T WX, is attested by Simplicius 311, 7 τὸ δὲ ἐπιστη- 
μονικὸν ov κινεῖ Frou οὗ κινεῖται (διπλῆ yap ἡ γραφὴ φέρεται). It was possibly due 
to 432 b 26—29. A. now returns from τὸ λογιστικὸν Or βουλευτικόν, as employed 
by the practical intellect, to rd ésrtornpovexdy, which is purely theoretical and 
determines the end which the practical intellect seeks the means to attain, as 
explained above 4338 14—17. The operation of τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν is concerned 
with a general notion, ὁρισμός, or a universal proposition, either invariably true, 
dei, or generally true, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ: Metaph. 1039b 32, 10034 15. 

a6. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ μὲν καθόλον ὑπόληψις Kal λόγος, i.e. ἐπεὶ ὑπόληψις ἐστιν ἡ μὲν 


572 NOTES Ill. 11 


καθόλου ὑπόληψις ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ὑπόληψις. This grammatical device of 
subdividing the whole into two or more parts can be illustrated, e.g. 433 Ὁ 14 τὸ 
δὲ κινοῦν διττόν. This sentence introduces the practical syllogism, as it is called, 
1.6. the reasoning process which precedes action. Like other syllogisms, it 
starts with a general proposition or major premiss. Here ὑπόληψις denotes a 
premiss viewed as a judgment or unspoken proposition and differs hardly at all 
from δόξα, which is similarly used in £74. Mic. 1147 ἃ 25 ἡ μὲν yap καθόλου δόξα. 
See note on ὑπόληψις 427b 16. The words καὶ λόγος are added to make this 
meaning more definite, not necessarily implying the spoken proposition, cf. a 17 
infra ἡ μὲν yap λέγει xré. The minor premiss is obtained from αἴσθησις ΞΔ. 
Nic. \.c. ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρα [int. mpéracis] περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη 
κυρία. However, in the syllogism it must, like the major, appear as ὑπόληψις 


καὶ λόγος. 
8. 17. ἡ μὲν, int. 7 καθόλου. 
8 18, ἡ δὲ, int. 7 τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. ὅτι τόδε τοίνυν τοιόνδε, int. ἐστί. The ὅτι 


15 practically equivalent to inverted commas, the premiss being given in oratio 
recta. Perceiving this, Torstrik restored τοίνυν from Simplicius. Note that 
this formula for the practical syllogism is of the most general kind, much wider 
than the examples given in £7h. Nec. 1147 a 5 5846. ὅτε παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει 
τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε. Or again, “all sweet 
things are pleasant, and this thing is sweet”; or that in De Motu An. 7, 701 ἃ 13 
παντὶ βαδιστέον ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος. 

alg. ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου. [{15 the latter, viz. the particular 
judgment, and not the universal, which moves to action. Cf. £¢h. Mic. 1147b9 
ἐπεὶ & ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων, 1143a 32 
ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά, Metaph. 981 ἃ 16 ai 
δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν εἶσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον 
ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων, πλὴν GAN ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτην, 
Anal. Prior. τὶ. 21, 67 a 9 566. 

a 20 ἢ ἄμφω...2Ὶ ἡ δ᾽ οὔ. This provisional decision in favour of the minor 
premiss is corrected by A. Both judgments are springs of action, but there is 
this difference between them, that the universal, ἡ μὲν [int. καθόλου, 1s fixed, the 
other ἡ δ᾽ [int. rod καθ᾽ ἕκαστα] is not, but varies with the circumstances. So 
Simpl. 314, 38 ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν npepodoa μᾶλλον, ὅτι ov κινουμένη αὐτὴ κινεῖ. μένει γὰρ ἢ 
αὐτὴ ἀεὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβαλλομένη οὐδὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχουσα: ἐπιστημονικὴ γὰρ ἦν. 
The general maxims βαδιστέον ἀνθρώπῳ, παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρὰ hold 
universally, or for the most part, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, the particular cases to which 
they apply are constantly changing. Thus the universal proposition does not 
prompt to any particular act, does not inform me what I am to do under given 
circumstances. It is comparatively quiescent and ineffective. Themistius, 
however, took the words differently. He understood them as expressing 
negatively the fact that all action takes its rise with particulars. A desire is 
associated only indirectly with the end to which the universal points. It is 
directly excited by the apprehension of the particular means by which delibera- 
tion has shown this end can be realised: Them. 122, 18 H., 224, 11 Sp. ἡ δὲ 
(the minor) τῇ κινήσει συνάπτουσα [int. κινεῖ. To this Torstrik objects (p. 219): 
A. enim hoc dicit: propositio minor maiore facilius μεταπίπτει : in singulis enim 
rebus spectatur motio et alteratio et interitus. But I doubt if μᾶλλον justifies 
“facilius ” or Trend.’s “ut alterum magis quiescat.” It may be added by Greek 
idiom to contrast the major, ἠρεμοῦσα, with the minor, κινουμένη κινοῦσα. CF. 
St Luke xviii. 14 (A.V.) “This man went down to his house justified rather than 
the other.” 


III. 12 434 ἃ 16—a 22 573 


CHAPTER XII. 


It remains to consider the part taken by the several faculties of soul in the 
maintenance of life; in other words, why living things are found to possess one 
or more of these faculties, and what is the end which each such faculty sub- 
serves. A. now proceeds to redeem his promises made, e.g. 413b 9 sq., 4144 1, 
b 33. To enquire the reason why the facts are as they are brings us to a final 
cause, τὸ οὗ évexa. Having assimilated the order and regularity of the natural 
world to human action directed towards an end (415 Ὁ 16 ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς 
ἕνεκά Tov ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ φύσις), A. sees evidence of adaptation and 
design in the structure of animals and plants, e.g. 412 Ὁ 1---, 432 Ὁ 17--τῖρ, 25. 
Every vital activity is also an activity guided by a purpose: 420b 16—27, 
432b 15. Other passages may be adduced: 407 Ὁ 25 sq., 411 b 23, 412 a 28— 
Ὁ 4, 415 Ὁ 15—20, 416b 23—25, 420a 9—1I, 424 Ὁ 22—425 a 13, 432b 17—26. 
The whole treatise is pervaded with the spirit of the teleology which A. inherited 
from Plato’s Zzwaews. The method of enquiry in this chapter is that pursued 
in the De Part. An., where its nature is explained in the opening chapter, 
especially 642 a I—17, a 31—b 4. The oft-recurring phrases ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, 
ἐξ ἀνάγκης are there explained to mean ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, dv οὐκ ἄνευ, 
necessary conditionally or for a given purpose. The end determines the 
conditions. The performance of a function is impossible without adequate 
instruments. If the axe you are making is to cut, it must be hard: thus its 
material, bronze or steel, is determined. So also with the body: if it is to 
subserve certain functions of the soul, it must be τοιονδὶ καὶ ἐκ rotwvdi. Not 
only its parts, the several limbs, but the tissues of which they are made are 
determined by their functions. See 2025 on 407b 25 δεῖ yap and 416a 13. 
Similarly in the present chapter, if anything which has life is to exist at all, it 
must be nourished. If it is to be preserved when in contact with other things, 
it must have the sense of touch and, either for further protection when it is 
capable of locomotion or in order to develop a higher existence, it must have 
the other senses also, sight, hearing and smell. Obviously all this implies the 
conception of organic existence as a continuous and orderly development, a 
progression from lower to higher, in which each successive step includes all 
that went before; in short, precisely that conception which is unfolded in A.’s 
other zoological and biological works. 

434a 22—b 8. The nutritive faculty is indispensable to all living 
things, to plants as well as to animals, from birth to death. All alike must 
grow, attain to maturity and decay; and these processes necessarily imply 
nutrition, and therefore a nutritive capacity, in other words, a nutritive soul 
[8 1]. The sensitive faculty is not universally necessary. Where the body 
consists of only one element or where the living thing is incapable of receiving 
the forms of objects apart from the matter, viz. in plants, there touch and 
a forttoré all other senses must necessarily be absent [§ 2]. To the animal, 
however, sensation is indispensable, if we once admit design in nature. With- 
out sensation an animal capable of progressive movement would inevitably 
perish and thus fail to attain that perfection which it is the end of its nature to 
realise. Without sensation all except stationary animals would fail to procure 
food [8 3]. If it be argued that an animated being possessed of soul and 
discriminating reason, capable of progressive movement and produced by 
generation, may exist and yet be destitute of sensation, why, we ask, should 


574 NOTES Ill. 12 


this be so? The absence of sensation will not be better either for the soul or 
for the body of such an animal. The soul will not any the more be able to 
think [without images derived from sense] and the body will not any the more 
be able to exist. No non-stationary body, then, will be endowed with soul, 
without having sensation [§ 4]. 

4343 22 τὴν μὲν οὖν θρεπτικὴν...22 ἂν ζῇ. We now return somewhat abruptly 
to the proposition enunciated 413 a 20 sqq., that there are various manifestations 
of life in living things and that the faculties of the soul or vital principle must 
be arranged in a corresponding scale, ascending from nutrition and growth 
through sense to intelligence. That the nutritive soul must be present wherever 
any of the higher faculties are found has been laid down 413a 31 sq., the proof 
being that in plants the nutritive soul exists independently of the other faculties. 
So also 4158 I—3, 415 ἃ 23 sq. There is the same distinction between ὅτι περ 
ἂν ζῇ and ξῷον as there is between ζῆν and ζῷον εἶναι 413 b I Sq., namely, that 
the former includes, and the latter excludes, plants. 

a 23. Kal ψυχὴν ἔχει..-.φθορᾷς. As it is necessary, so it is a fact that every 
living thing possesses soul from birth to death. Torstrik urges that this is a 
point made against the Orphic doctrine (410 Ὁ 28—30), according to which the 
soul enters from the surrounding air in the act of respiration. Plants do not 
breathe, and yet are animate. If, with Christ, we change ἔχει into ἔχειν, there 
seems distinctly less reason for a repetition of ψυχήν, which he accordingly 
omits. Them., who appears to have also read ἔχειν, gives (122, 22 H., 224, 15 Sp.) 
καὶ συμπαρατείνειν αὐτῷ τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἄχρι φθορᾶς. 

a 24 ἀναγκὴ yap...25 ἀδύνατον, as already stated 415 b 26—-28. This has been 
explained in 416 Ὁ 11 sqq., the conclusion being, 416 Ὁ 17—23: “‘ Hence the 
above described principle of the soul is the power to preserve in existence that 
which possesses it, in so far as it is a definite individual, while nutrition prepares 
it for activity. Therefore it cannot live when deprived of nutriment. There 
are, then, these three things, that which is nourished, that with which it is 
nourished and that which nourishes it. The last of the three is the primary 
soul, that which is nourished is the body which contains the soul, that where- 
with it 1s nourished is nutriment.” As we were told 413a 25 sqq., plants are 
thought to live: they contain within themselves such a power and principle as 
enables them to grow and decay in opposite directions, and they continue to 
live so long as they can assimilate nutriment. Cf. also 414b 7 sq., where in τὰ 
ζῶντα πάντα A. includes plants, as well as animals. 

a 26. πᾶσι τοῖς φυομένοις. The participle seems expressly chosen because 
A. is thinking specially of plants: τὰ φυόμενατετὰ φυτά, as in 4134 25 just 
cited. Cf. the Ciceronian expressions De Finibus v. ὃ 33 ea quae terra gignit, 
De Nat. Deor. it. ὃ 33 ea quae gignuntur e terra. 

a 27. αἴσθησιν δ᾽ οὐκ...τοῖς ζῶσιν. With τοῖς ζῶσιν cf. a 22 supra ὅτι περ ἂν 
ζῆ, 414 Ὁ ὃ. The introduction of sense breaks up τὰ (@vra into φυτὰ καὶ ξῷα. 
Cf. 413b 1 54., also 4248. 32 566. οὔτε γὰρ...28 ἁφὴν ἔχειν. Touch being the 
most rudimentary sense, if touch is absent, no higher sense can be present. 
Cf. 414b 3, 4154 3 5ᾳ. But where the body consists of a single element, i.e. is 
ἁπλοῦν, not μεικτόν, there cannot be even the sense of touch, 4238 II sqq., 
425a6sqq. Plants, however, are composed chiefly, if not entirely, of earth: 
De Resp. 13, 4778 27 τὰ μὲν yap ἐκ γῆς πλείονος συνέστηκεν, οἷον τὸ τῶν φυτῶν 
γένος, De Gen. An. Ill. 11, 761 Ὁ 13 τὰ μὲν γὰρ φυτὰ θείη τις ἂν γῆς. Themistius 
is careful to qualify A.’s expression: (122, 29 H., 224, 26 Sp.) ὅσα τοίνυν τῶν 
ζώντων ἢ ἐξ ἁπλοῦ παντάπασι σώματος ἢ ἐγγὺς ἁπλοῦ. In the reasons assigned 
by Themistius why plants cannot have touch (122, 33 H., 225, 2 Sp.), ὅτε τὸ σῶμα 


111. 12 4348 22—a 31 575 


αὐτῶν ἐγγὺς ἁπλοῦ καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε δέχεσθαι τὸ εἶδος ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, τῆς τοιαύτης 
μεσότητος ἅτε ἐστερημένον καὶ πλείονος μετέχον τῆς γῆς, he correctly follows the 
lines laid down in 424b1—3. See zod¢es ad loc. 

a 28 [οὔτε dvev...29 εἶναι ζῷον]. Them. and Philop. pass over these words. 
Simpl. read them, as is plain from his comment 318, 21 τὸ οὖν οὔτε συντακτέον 
πάλιν λαβόντας τὸ προειρημένον τὸ “ἄνευ ταύτης (τουτέστι τῆς ἁφῆς) οἷόν τε οὐθὲν 
εἶναι ζῷον," καὶ τῷ ῥητῷ τούτῳ συντάξαντες καὶ τὸ ὕστατον ἐπενεχθὲν οὔτε, οὕτω τὸ 
λοιπὸν τῆς λέξεως ἐποίσομεν ὅσα μὴ δεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ἵνα διττὴ 
ἀποδοθῇ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ πάντως τὰ θνητὰ ζῷα τὴν ἁπτικὴν ἔχειν αἴσθησιν, μίαν μὲν τὴν 
ὅτι οὐκ ἄνευ ταύτης αἱ λοιπαί, ἑτέραν δὲ τὴν ἐπειδὴ ὅλως Coa ὄντα καὶ ἐπικτήτως τῶν 
γνωστικῶν εἰδῶν ὄντα δεκτικά (τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἄνευ ὕλης αἰσθητικὰ εἶναι), ἀν άγκη 
καὶ αἰσθητικὰ παθητικῶς. The clause may serve as a parenthetical reminder of 
what has been said before 4148 2 sq., even if it is virtually repeated 434 a 30. 
See further 435 a II 566. 

a 29 οὔτε ὅσα...30 τῆς ὕλης. See 424b 1 quoted above. 

a 30. τὸ δὲ tdov ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν ἔχειν. The proof amounts to this; 
animals which move from place to place must have sensation in order to find 
their food, or they would inevitably perish, and then nature’s design in producing 
them, viz. that they should come to maturity and continue their species, would 
be frustrated. This proof, A. admits, does not apply to zoophytes which draw 
their nourishment from the spot on which they grow. 

a 31. εἰ μηθὲν μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις. This, the general assumption underlying 
the whole teleological argument, has appeared already, Ζζ 92" 7225 verbts, in 
432 b 21, where see 2016. Cf. 415 Ὁ 16sq.: Nature, like human intelligence, works 
to an end (ἕνεκά του rrotet). 

a 31 ἕνεκά tov...32 ἢ συμπτώματα... ἕνεκά του, “all things in nature are either 
designed with a view to an end, or will be found to be coincidences of what 
is so.” A. accepts the law of universal causation and in the domain of nature 
assumes design, wherever causality can be established. But this leaves a 
margin of effects strictly due to a causation which cannot be said to be 
designed, events which he denotes by συμπεσεῖν and σύμπτωμα. Efficient 
causes have always a definite object in view, but they frequently fail of its 
accomplishment, owing to the indiscriminate nature of the matter which they 
use, while at other times, owing to the same disturbing cause, they incidentally 
produce results which they did not originally design. Hence there arise συμπτώ- 
para or παρὰ φύσιν δυμπίπτοντα, of which A. says De Gen. An. IV. 10, 778 a4 
βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῖς τούτων (int. τῶν ἄστρων ἀριθμοῖς ἀριθμεῖν τὰς γενέσεις 
καὶ τὰς τελευτάς, οὐκ ἀκριβοῖ δὲ διά τε τὴν τῆς ὕλης ἀοριστίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι 
πολλὰς ἀρχάς, αἷ τὰς γενέσεις τὰς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰς φθορὰς ἐμποδίζουσαι πολλάκις 
αἴτιαι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν συμπιπτόντων εἰσίν. Such events in nature are parallel to 
the effects of chance, τύχη, in human agency. Cf. PAys. 11. 5, 196b 17 τῶν δὲ 
γινομένων τὰ μὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ" τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, τὰ 
δ᾽ οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἄμφω δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρὰ 
τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἔστιν ἔνια περὶ ἃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του. 
ἔστι δ᾽ ἕνεκά του ὅσα τε ἀπὸ διανοίας ἂν πραχθείη καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ φύσεως. τὰ δὴ 
τοιαῦτα ὅταν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γένηται, ἀπὸ τύχης φαμὲν εἶναι. Ταὐτόματον is a 
wider conception than τύχη, as the latter is restricted to undesigned results 
following upon purposed action (προαιρετόν). Cf. Phys. 11.6, 197b1sqq. Hence 
Metaph. 1032a 12 τῶν δὲ γιγνομένων τὰ μὲν φύσει γίγνεται, ra δὲ τέχνῃ; τὰ F ἀπὸ 
ταὐτομάτου, 26. ἃ 28 τούτων δέ [int. τῶν ποιήσεων τινες γίγνονται καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτο- 
μάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης παραπλησίως ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ φύσεως γιγνομένοις. Thus 
a “contingent” or “accidental” event is caused by the diversion of free or 


576 NOTES 171. 12 


compulsory purposive action to results alien from its purpose through the 
influence of external circumstances. (Akin to this, but unimportant for our 
present investigation, is the coincidence in time of two circumstances between 
which no causal relation exists, eg. a walk and an eclipse of the moon. Such 
a coincidence A. calls σύμπτωμα, De Div. per Somn. τ, 462 Ὁ 26 sqq.) Now 
since these disturbing causes are always found in the character of the material 
means by which ends are realised, and in the system of nature to which these 
means belong, contingency, in A.’s sense of the word, may be defined as the 
disturbance by intermediate causes of an activity directed to a purpose. 

When this relation of σύμπτωμα to συμβεβηκὸς is understood A.’s usage of 
the term is easy to follow. It is opposed as here to ἕνεκά rov in De Resp. 5, 
Α72 Ὁ 26 ἀλλ᾽ ὡς περὶ συμπτώματός τινος ἀποφαίνονται μόνον. καίτοι ye κύρια 
ταῦθ᾽ ὁρῶμεν τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τελευτῶν : cf. Metaph. 1093 Ὁ 16 διὸ καὶ ἔοικε συμπτώμασιν, 
Categ. 8,9 D15 ἔκ τινων φυσικῶν συμπτωμάτων, De Gen, An. τν. 10,777 Ὁ ὃ δε’ ἄλλα 
συμπτώματα φυσικά, So also Phys. τι. 8, τοῦ Ὁ 27 ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα γενέσθαι, 
ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν. Further, like all that is contingent, coincidences are opposed 
to what is regular and usual, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, much more to what is invariable 
and necessary, De Div. per Somn. τ, 463 Ὁ 10 τὸ yap σύμπτωμα οὔτ᾽ dei οὔθ᾽ ds 
ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεται, Theophr. Aetaph. (p. 320, ed. Br., frag. XI. § 28 W) ἀλλὰ τὰ 
μὲν συμπτωματικῶς τὰ δ᾽ ἀνάγκῃ τινί, See Zeller, Aristotle, E.T., 1., pp. 358—372. 

a 32 εἰ οὖν πᾶν...Ὁ 8 αἰσθήσεως. The apodosis begins at Ὁ 7 οὐθὲν ἄρα. The 
desire of an early apodosis led Trend. to conjecture ἔχοι for ἔχον a 33, and Torst. 
εἴη or γένοιτο for wav. The apodosis at Ὁ 7, introduced by ἄρα, follows from two 
premisses (1) a 32—bI1 εἰ οὖν...ἔργον, (2) Ὁ 3—5 οὐχ οἷόν τε... ἀγένητον. The 
other clauses 434 b 1--2 πῶς γὰρ θρέψεται...πεφύκασιν and Ὁ 5—7 διὰ τί... ἐκεῖνο 
are interjected parentheses. As so frequently happens when the protasis is 
introduced by ἐπεί, A. has almost forgotten the structure of the sentence by 
the time he reaches the apodosis. Thus there is no μὲν in a 32 to balance 
οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ of Ὁ 3 and, though οὐχ οἷόν τετΞ ἀδύνατον, A. would probably have 
written μὴ if he had been conscious of a preceding εἰ. 

a 33. πᾶν σώμα πορεντικόν. This restriction and those subsequently intro- 
duced b4 μὴ μόνιμον by, γενητὸν δὲ are thus emphasised by Them. 123, 2 H., 
225, 10 Sp. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἡ αἴσθησις ἀναγκαία τοῖς οὐ μόνον ζῶσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη καὶ ζώοις, 
καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ ζώοις πορευτικοῖς, καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀποχρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γενητοῖς 
καὶ φθαρτοῖς. The ambiguous term σῶμα, as in Ὁ 3 izfra, means “animate 
body” or what biologists now call “organism.” 

434 Ὁ τ. εἰς τέλος οὐκ ἂν Alo. Cf De Gen. An. Iv. 6, 775 a 20 πάντα γὰρ 
τὰ ἔλάττω πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἔρχεται θᾶττον, 1.6. sooner come to maturity, reach 
perfection. So ἔχειν τέλος Melaph. 1021 Ὁ 24 κατὰ τὸ ἔχειν τέλος τέλεια [int. 
λέγεται] In our passage it is the task of nature that animals should attain 
maturity, 1.6. become τέλεια, and nature’s intention would be frustrated if they 
did not fulfil her design in their production. Cf. Them. 123, τὸ H., 225, 21 Sp. 
Bore μάτην ἂν ἡ φύσις τοσαῦτα ζῶα παρήγαγε μὴ μέλλουσα αὐτὰ mpodkew eis τὸ 
οἰκεῖον τέλος. Them., however, understands by this intention the continuance 
of the species: 123, 12 H., 225, 23 Sp. τέλος δὲ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῶν γενητῶν ζώων 
τὸ γεννῆσαι οἷον αὐτό. Simpl. more plausibly understands by it the preservation 
of the individual: 319, 23 τὸ τῆς σωτηρίας, ὡς εἴρηται, αἴτιον. Cf. 432 Ὁ 24 σημεῖον 
δ᾽ ὅτι ἔστι γεννητικὰ καὶ ἀκμὴν ἔχει καὶ φθίσιν, which comprehends both. 

bi, ὅ ἐστι φύσεως ἔργον. It is nature’s task or function that the animal 
should do so, should come to maturity and perfection. This, however, must 
not be taken as if nature were a power outside the individual. It is, as we saw 
412 b 16 sq., an inherent, indwelling cause and principle in the animal. See 


Ill. 12 4348 31---Ὁ 4 577 


motes On 4068 14, 415 Ὁ 18. It is, then, the animal’s own nature which works 
to an end and realises itself when the animal comes to maturity or fulfils its 
purpose. Cf. also De Gen. An. Ul. 1, 731 Ὁ 32 ἡ φύσις τοῦ τοιούτου γένους cited 
Pp. 341 in xofe on 415b6: also De Gen. et Corr. τι. 6, 333b 16 τῶν δὴ φύσει 
ὄντων αἴτιον TO οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ 4 ἑκάστου φύσις αὕτη. πῶς yap θρέψεται; Int, 
τὸ πορευτικὸν ζῷον μὴ ἔχον αἴσθησιν. It will not find nourishment on the spot, 
like plants and stationary animals: Them. 123, 5 H., 225, 13 Sp. od yap éyyvéev 
ἔχει THY τροφὴν ἐπιρρέουσαν, οὐδὲ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, ἐν ois ἐσπάρη καὶ ἐφυτεύθη, 
ἀλλὰ δεῖ πορίζεσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ μετιέναι. 

Ὁ 2. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις, not only plants (De Part. An. 11. 10, 656a 1), but 
Stationary animals (zd. Iv. 5, 681 b 34), as ὀστρακόδερμα, zoophytes, e.g. sponges 
and sea-anemones. Cf. 410b 19, where see o/e. 

b2. ὑπάρχει τὸ ὅθεν πεφύκασιν. Supply eis τροφὴν understood from πῶς γὰρ 
θρέψεται; De Gen. An. Wl. 11, 762 Ὁ 12 τροφὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῖς μὲν ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ; τοῖς δὲ 
τὰ ἐκ τούτων, ὥσθ᾽ ὅπερ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις θερμύτης ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς ἀπεργάζεται, τοῦθ᾽ ἡ 
τῆς ὥρας ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι θερμότης ἐκ θαλάττης καὶ γῆς συγκρίνει πέττουσα καὶ 
συνίστησιν. It appears, then, that ὅθεν πεφύκασιν must be γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ, the 
stationary animals beiny confined to the water, Hist. dz. 1.1, 487 Ὁ 7 ἔστι δὲ ra 
μόνιμα ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ, τῶν δὲ χερσαίων οὐδὲν μόνιμον. The same principle applies to 
higher forms of life; in vermiparous, oviparous and viviparous animals the surplus 
material (τὸ λειπόμενον) beyond that which is drawn upon in the process of 
generation is reserved for the sustenance of the immature offspring, while it is 
unable to provide for itself. Cf. De Gen. An, I. 1, 732 a 25 566.) WI. 11, 
763a9 sqq., 11. 2, 752b 19 sqq., Pol. 1256b 10 sqq., 1258a 23 Kal τροφὴν τὴν 
φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι, 2b. a 35 φύσεως γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον 
τροφὴν τῷ γεννηθέντι παρέχειν" παντὶ γὰρ ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, τροφὴ τὸ λειπόμενόν ἐστιν. 

b 3 οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ σῶμα...4 γενητὸν δέ.{. The subject of this clause, σῶμα μὴ 
μύνιμον ὄν, γενητὸν δέ, is practically equivalent to πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικὸν of a 33. 
In both σῶμα must be taken as σῶμα φυσικὸν in the limited sense, μετέχον ζωῆς, 
and, as A. did not recognise climbing plants, in the still more limited sense of 
animal. The clause asserts that such a ζῷον cannot be a ζῷον ἔμψυχον by the 
possession of the higher intellectual faculty (νοῦς κριτικός) without possessing 
the lower faculty of sense. This case would seem to be covered by the general 
rule laid down 415 a 8 sq., where the insertion of τῶν φθαρτῶν is significant. 
Torstrik however appeals to 432 a 7 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν 
οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ Evvion and De Sensu 6, 445 Ὁ 15 τίνε κρινοῦμεν ταῦτα 7 
γνωσόμεθα; ἣ τῷ νῷ. ἀλλ᾽ od νοητά, οὐδὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς τὰ ἐκτὸς μὴ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως 
ὄντα. Both passages relate exclusively to the human mind. Whatever view be 
taken of the genuineness of the succeeding clause, there can be no doubt that 
the carefully-worded description of our lemma is intended to exclude, not only 
plants, but also τὰ οὐράνια, τὰ ἀΐδια τῶν αἰσθητῶν, i.e. the stars, which are κινητά, 
but at the same time are ἀΐδια or ἀγένητα. 

b 4. [ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον]. This clause was read by Alex. Aphr. and in 
some of the copies known to Simpl., whose words are: (320, 28) ἔν τισι δὲ 
ἀντιγράφοις πρόσκειται τὸ ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον, ὅπερ ὁ μὲν Ἰϊλούταρχος ἐξηγεῖται, 
ὡς νῦν τοῦ ᾿Αριστοτέλους καὶ τοῖς οὐρανίοις ἀποδιδόντος αἴσθησιν - οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ 
ἀγένητα, διότι μὴ καθ᾽ ξαυτὰ τόπον ἐκ τόπου ἀμείβοντα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μόνιμα ὄντα, 
ἀμοιρεῖν αἰσθήσεως. φαίνεται δὲ 6 ᾿Αριστοτέλης μηδαμοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπὶ τῶν 
οὐρανίων προσιέμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφεξῆς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀναινόμενος. διὸ κάλλιον, οἶμαι, 
ὅ ᾿Αλέξανδρος ἐξηγεῖται τὸ ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον, ἀξιῶν ἀκούειν πρὸς τὸ αἴσθησιν 
ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὸ προσεχῶς εἰρημένον ἦ ἐπαγόμενον, πρὸς τὸ οὐχ οἷόν τε σῶμα 
ἔχειν μὲν ψυχήν, αἴσθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ ἐἐ αἴσθησιν δὲ οὐκ 


Hw. 37 


578 NOTES 111. 12 


ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ζῶσιν. οὔτε yap ὅσων τὸ σῶμα ἁπλοῦν, ἐνδέχεται ἁφὴν 
ἔχειν" ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν ἔχειν. Thus Alex. Aphr. 
connects the words with ἁφὴν ἔχειν (434 ἃ 28), supplying ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν 
ἔχειν. Even then the interjected parenthesis separates two closely connected 
clauses beginning with οὔτε, and the introduction of τὸ ἀγένητον is extremely 
abrupt. Plutarch on the other hand defended the clause, at the same time 
(1) maintaining that the heavenly bodies do possess sensation and (2) reading 
διὰ ri οὐχ ἕξει (Ὁ 5), whereas Alex. Aphr. read there διὰ ri ἔξε. See Philop. 595, 
36—596, 32. If the clause be cancelled (see critical ~oZes) or transposed (in 
accordance with Alex. Aphr.’s suggestion), 11 will be necessary to understand διὰ 
τί.. «ἐκεῖνο Of the same subject as before, viz. σῶμα μὴ μόνιμον ὄν, γενητὸν δέ. 
Simpl. and Torst. have so explained them, although there is a little awkward- 
ness in saying that the possession of soul and discriminating intelligence without 
sensation is better for the soul. Even if the clause be retained, it might still 
be treated as a parenthesis, and διὰ τί... ἐκεῖνο be understood in the same way 
of ζῷον πορευτικόν. But there would be a natural tendency to make τὸ ἀγένητον 
the subject, as Them. does, 123, 24—-32 H., 226, 12—24 Sp., and as Philop. 
informs us both Alex. and Plut. also did: see Philop. 595, 39—596, 12 for Alex. 
Aphr. and 596, 14—32 for Plutarch. 

b5. διὰ τί γὰρ ἕξει; The meaning to be given to this rhetorical question 
and also the sequel as far as δι᾽ ἐκεῖνο (Ὁ 7) all depend upon the view taken of 
the preceding clause. Alex. Aphr., followed in the main by Them. and Philop., 
retaining the impugned clause, interprets A. as arguing that sensation is 
not required by τὰ οὐράνια, for its possession will not improve their rational 
souls or their bodies. Cf. Philop. 595, 39—596, 12. The weak point here 
is that, as Simpl. expressly testifies, Alex. Aphr., having supplied ἀναγκαῖον 
αἴσθησιν ἔχειν after ἀγένητον, goes on to supply ra οὐράνια αἴσθησιν with the 
question. So that, if the correctness of the first supplement be successfully 
challenged, the latter is not likely to be maintained. 

Plutarch opposed Alex. on the issue of fact, whether in A.’s system ra 
οὐράνια (perhaps we should say more precisely, the spirits which move the 
spheres, assumed as necessary for the explanation of the movements of the 
stars and planets) have or have not the faculty of sense. Alex. Aphr. denied it, 
Plutarch affirmed it, and in justice to him it should be remarked that, apart 
from the present passage, there is nothing in A.’s writings which contradicts his 
view. Plutarch accordingly read διὰ ri γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει [int. αἴσθησιν τὰ οὐράνιαῖ; 
Whether he inserted οὐχ on his own conjecture we are not informed. The 
reading, however it originated, appears in five of our MSS., and unfortunately we 
have not cod. E. Thus, reading οὐχ ἔξει, Plutarch can interpret the arguments 
which follow the question as urged in support of the view that it is better both 
for the souls and bodies of the stars that they should have sensation. Sensitivity 
is better than its absence and the perceptions of the heavenly bodies are not, 
like ours, dependent upon τὸ πάσχειν, so as to infringe upon their impassivity 
and immortality. Nor will it be a hindrance to their thought, for the particulars 
of sense lead up to the universal, and sense in them need not disturb reason as 
in us (Philop. 596, 12—32). 

Simplicius confines the argument to the non-stationary generated body of 
the animal; we must then supply διὰ ri yap ἕξει Ψυχὴν μὲν καὶ νοῦν κριτικόν, 
αἴσθησιν δὲ οὐχ ἔξει; And so I have translated. Why should the non-stationary, 
generated body have soul and discriminating reason without having sense? 
(As the δὲ clause is the more important, the reading οὐχ ἔξει would naturally 
arise and we need not suppose Plutarch to have arbitrarily altered the text.) 


Ill. 12 434 Ὁ 4---Ὁ 9 579 


Suppose, then, a case of this kind: a non-stationary body, i.e. not a plant, but 
generated, 1.6. not one of the οὐράνια. If any one maintains that it is possible 
for such a body to have reason without having sensation, he must maintain that 
the absence of sensation is better either for the soul or for the body of the 
animal, which is a compound of the two: Simpl. 320, 11 καὶ γὰρ 4 λογικὴ ψυχὴ 
οὐκ ἄλλως πρὸς τὸ νοεῖν ἡ ὅλη πρὸς σῶμα ῥεύσασα ἐγείρεται, εἰ μὴ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως τὴν 
πρώτην, καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι συνεργῷ αὐτῇ [int. αἰσθήσει} καὶ τῇ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς χρῆται 
φαντασίᾳ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα οὐ διὰ τοῦ νοῦ μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως σώζεται τῆς τοδὶ 
μὲν βλαβερὸν αὐτῷ δεικννούσης, τοδὶ δὲ σωτήριον. 

This argument Torstrik puts tersely and cogently: quem ad finem corpus 
quod nec plantae est nec sideris (de his enim non agitur), quum careat sensu, 
animam habeat et intelligentiam ad res oblatas discernendas? Ponamus enim 
quod negamus, carere sensu, praeditum esse intelligenti4, aut profecto ea 
animam iuvabit aut corpus (ἢ τῇῷ ψυχῇ βέλτιον ἢ τῷ σώματι). At neutrum 
verum est (νῦν δ᾽ οὐδέτερον). Si animam dicis iuvari intelligentia, falleris: 
nihilo enim magis intelliget (ἡ μὲν yap οὐ μᾶλλον νοήσει), sive habet sive non 
habet intellectum: sensum enim non habet, at nihil est in intellectu. quod 
non fuerit in sensu:...Sin corpus putas intellectu iuvari, iterum falleris: corpus 
enim nihilo magis vitam suam (cf. Ὁ 14 et 26 εἰ μέλλει σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον et 17 
ἀδύνατον ἔσται σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον) servabit (τὸ δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἔσται μᾶλλον), propterea 
quod in intellectu practico minor propositio semper singulas res 5101 subicit 
(434 a 16—21): at harum cognitione privata erit, siquidem sensu caret. (Cf. 
De Sensu et Sens. 1, 436b 18—437 a 3.) 

b 5. βέλτιον. What is the subject? Torstrik apparently thought νοῦς 
κριτικὸς (intelligentia, ea: see the citation in previous moze). I have taken it 
to be τὸ μὴ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν, or rather the whole clause τὸ ἔχειν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ 
νοῦν κριτικόν, αἴσθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν. Either view makes the meaning clear, 
and the fact that two views are possible would quite sufficiently account for 
the variant Ὁ 5 οὐχ ἕξει. For the teleological assumption cf. 407 Ὁ 9—11. 

Ὁ 6. viv δ᾽ οὐδέτερον. Torst. would understand ἀληθὲς or οἷόν re, but surely 


ἔστιν is enough. Cf. 423b 4 τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, 434 Ὁ 27 τοῦτο δ᾽ ἂν εἴη. ἡ μὲν, 
1,6. ἡ ψυχή. | 

Ὁ 7. τὸ δ᾽, 1.6. τὸ σῶμα. δι᾿ ἐκεῖνο; 1.6. owing to the possession of reason 
unaccompanied by sense. οὐθὲν dpa...8 αἰσθήσεως. The conclusion estab- 


lished is that a body never has life without sensation, unless it be stationary. 
The exception certainly includes plants and possibly the stars, which Alex. 
Aphr. regarded as stationary because fixed in their revolving spheres. This 
conclusion follows from the two premises (1) that sensation is necessary to 
preserve animals with the power of locomotion from destruction, and (2) that 
the rational soul in non-stationary and generated animals implies sensation. 
434 b 9-24. The body of the animal may conceivably be either 
simple or composite, i.e. may consist of one elernent or be compounded of 
several. If, however, it is to possess sensation, it must be composite, for, if 
constituted of a single element, it would not have the indispensable sense of 
touch. ‘Touch the animal must possess, if it is to preserve itself in safety, since 
by touch alone it perceives tangible objects, i.e. all bodies with which it may 
come in contact, whereas the other senses perceive through media distinct 
from themselves. Unless, therefore, it has touch, it will be unable, when it 
comes into contact with other bodies, to avoid some and take others [§§ 5, 6]. 
Hence taste is a special form of touch. Food, the object of taste, is a tangible 
body, no nutriment being derived from colours, sounds or odours: and therefore 
taste, the sense which has for its object what is not only tangible but nutritive 


37—2 


580 NOTES 111. 12 


as well, must be a variety of touch. Thus taste and touch are the two indis- 
pensable senses, and without touch no animal can exist [§ 7]. 

434 Ὁ 9 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε αἴσθησιν ἔχει...10 μεικτόν. Whether the animal possesses 
sensation or not, it will still be true that the body must be either simple or 
compound. The meaning is, therefore, “taking the case of those animals 
which possess sensation, let us consider the constitution of their bodies. The 
body must consist of a single element or be compounded of more than one 
element.” 

bio. ἁφὴν yap οὐχ ἕξει, as shown above 434 a 27 sq., 423 a 11 sqq. ἔστι 
δὲ ἀνάγκη ταύτην ἔχειν. Cf above 414 ἃ 3. 


bII. τοῦτο, 1.6. ὅτε ἀνάγκη τὴν ἁφὴν ἔχειν. ἐκ τῶνδε, “from the following 
considerations,” viz. 434 Ὁ 11—24. ἐπεὶ γὰρ...14 τὸ ζῷον. Since it is a body, 


the animal must come in contact with other bodies near it and must have the 
discriminating power of touch, if it is to preserve itself: Them. 124, 1 H,, 
227, 3 Sp. ἐπεὶ yap rd ζῶον σῶμα ἔμψυχόν dort, σώματι δὲ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη 
ἅπτεσθαι τῶν πελαζόντων σωμάτων, ἀνάγκη διὰ τοῦτο τῷ ζώῳ καὶ ἀἅπτικῷ εἶναι καὶ 
κρίνειν τό τε οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον, εἰ μέλλοι σώζεσθαι. 

12. ἅπαν ἅπτόν. Here we must stretch the meaning of “tangible” to 
mean “capable of touching, 1.6. coming in contact with” other bodies, whether 
the simple contact is or is not attended by sensation. The same wider meaning 
15 required elsewhere, e.g. zz/fra Ὁ 18—22. 

b 15. δι ἑτέρων, “through other things as media.” In the case of the 
telepathic senses the media are distinct from the organs. Cf. 423b 4—6, 14, 
424 b 29. 

Ὁ 1:7. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, 1.6. εἰ μὴ δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν [βλαβερὰ φεύγειν τὰ δὲ [ὠφέλιμα] 
λαβεῖν. 

Ὁ 18 διὸ, because αἰσθητὸν ἁφῇ τὸ ἅπτόν, this being implied in what 
precedes or inferred from Ὁ 12 convertendo. ‘This suggestion is due to Miss 
Alford. Cf. 424b 27 ὅσων μὲν αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι αἰσθανόμεθα, τῇ ἁφῇ αἰσθητά 
ἐστιν. The syllogism then runs: whatever is tangible is perceptible by touch ; 
food is tangible; ergo, food is perceptible by touch. Hence taste, the sense 
which has to do with the nutritive species of what is tangible, is a variety of 
touch. 

b 22. τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ, 1.6. τροφῆς, which is said Ὁ το to be τὸ σῶμα 
τὸ ἁπτόν. Cf. the similar use οὗ θρεπτικὸν in De Sensu 1, 436 Ὁ 17 6 χυμός ἐστι 
τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ πάθος, 2b. 5, 445 ἃ 30 ὅπερ ὁ χυμὸς ἐν τῷ θρεπτικῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ 
τρεφόμενα, ἃ ὃ διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν τῶν θρεπτικῶν ἐστὶ πάθος τι (ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐν 
τῷ ἁπτῷ γένει). On the point whether food itself, τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἅπτόν, or its 
flavour 15 more properly called the object of taste see 4228 10 τὸ σῶμα ἐν 6 ὁ 
χυμός, TO γευστόν, Hole. αὗται μὲν οὖν, the senses of touch and taste. 

434b 24—435a10. The other senses exist in order to well-being ; 
they are found in certain species and not in all animals indiscriminately. An 
animal capable of progression must have them in order to escape destruction ; 
for it must be aware of objects, not only when in contact with them, but also 
from a distance. To ensure this, it must be capable of perceiving through a 
medium, the object affecting the medium and the medium the percipient [§ 8]. 
The transmission of the modification which occurs in sense-perception through 
media is similar to the transmission of spatial motion. The first moving cause 
propels without being propelled, the last member in the series is propelled only 
and does not propel, the numerous other members both propel and are propelled. 
The qualitative change or modification which occurs in sense-perception is also 
a movement, propagated, like the movement of translation, but the movent, i.e. 


Ill. 12 434 Ὁ 9—b 29 581 


the sensible object, acts upon the percipient, the subject of the modification, 
without displacing it. Different bodies exhibit great diversity in the propagation 
of movements or impressions, wax being affected more than stone, but less than 
water, and still less than air. Air, the medium of sight and hearing, is eminently 
mobile, receiving and communicating impressions so long as it remains an un- 
broken whole. Hence, as regards the reflexion of light, the theory that vision 
issues as a stream of fire from the eye and undergoes reflexion [Plato, 7zmaeus 
46 a] is less satisfactory than that which makes the form and colour of objects 
affect the air and this air itself in turn affect the eye. If the surface on which 
the air impinges be smooth, the image remains unbroken, much as if the mark 
of a seal upon wax penetrated to the other side of the wax [§ 9]. 

434 Ὁ 24. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι, int. αἰσθήσεις, viz. ὄψις, ἀκοή, ὄσφρησις. τοῦ τε εὖ 
ἕνεκα. Similarly the use of the tongue, not for taste, but for speech, is ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ 
420 b 17—20. Complexity of structure attends such higher developments, De 
Part. An. 11. 10, 656a3 τὰ δὲ πρὸς τῷ Civ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα πολυμορφοτέραν Exe 
τὴν ἰδέαν, καὶ τούτων ἕτερα πρὸ ἑτέρων μᾶλλον, καὶ πολυχουστέραν, ὅσων μὴ μόνον 
τοῦ (nv ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἡ φύσις μετείληφεν. γένει ζῴων...25 τισίν, οἷον τῷ 
πορευτικῷ. Cf. for the expression πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικόν, 4348 33. This is an 
unequivocal statement that locomotion is not a universal attribute of animals, 
and accords with the recognition of stationary animals in 410 Ὁ 19, 432 Ὁ 20. 
otev probably means “namely” and not “for example,” as it is translated on 
p- 159. See De Sensu 1, 436 Ὁ 18 as cited in next mote. The division into 
stationary and progressive seems fairly exhaustive. 

b 26 εἰ yap μέλλει...27 ἄποθεν. So De Sensu 1, 436 Ὁ 18 αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν 
αἰσθήσεις τοῖς πορευτικοῖς αὐτῶν, οἷον ὄσφρησις καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄψις, πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς 
ἔχουσι σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως διώκωσί τε προαισθανόμενα τὴν τροφὴν 
καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ φεύγωσι, τοῖς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως τυγχάνουσι τοῦ εὖ 
évexa. Thus for progressive animals these telepathic senses are necessary for 
preservation and at the same time subservient to the higher ends of φρόνησις. 

b27. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἂν εἴη, εἰ, “this will be possible, if” etc., the means required 
being a medium for each of these three senses, transmitting the impression or 
movement from the sensible object to the sense. 

b 28 τῷ exetvo.:.29 κινεῖσθαι. Ἐκεϊνοτετὸ μεταξύ, the medium, air or water, as 
explained in II. cc. 7—9. 

b 29. αὐτὸ δὲ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου. This is part of the infinitive construction, τῷ αὐτὸ 
ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου πάσχειν καὶ κινεῖσθαι. Αὐτὸ is τὸ ζῷον 7 αἰσθητικὸν and ἐκείνου is the 
medium. 

Ὁ 29 ὥσπερ yap...30 μέχρι του μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ. Μέχρι του Ξε μέχρι rivds, which, 
according to Torst., is intended by Bekker’s μέχρι τοῦ. I append Torstrik’s 
note: scripsi μέχρι του, violat4 encliticarum regula quam εἰ Bekkerus et alti 
plurimi sibi scripserunt. Recte Sophonias μέχρι τινός. He then cites Phys. 
VILL. 5, 256 Ὁ 14—20, presumably for the sake of Ὁ 18 δῆλον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ 
τόπον κινούντων" ἅπτεσθαι γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἀνάγκη μέχρι τινός. The change which 
takes place in sensation is not φορὰ or κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, but more properly 
ἀλλοίωσις: and this is illustrated (1) by κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, (2) by the impression 
of a seal on wax. A. is careful to note 435 a 1 sq. the difference between the 
motion of translation and the modification which constitutes sensation, viz. that 
in the latter case there is no displacement. It is merely the transmission of an 
effect through intermediaries which is the point of similarity in the two cases. 
Necesse est animalia non solum eo quod tangunt sed etiam procul sentiant : 
id autem fiet si id quod inter obiectum et sensorium medium interpositum est 
et patiendi et agendi vices sustinet, ut patiatur ab obiecto, agat in sensorium. 


582 NOTES 111. 12 


Patitur autem et agit peralterationem. Explicat hanc sententiam A. eo patiendi 
et agendi genere quod fit per loco motionem: haec enim nobis notior est 
alteratione. Si in lineé recta plures pilae positae sunt, si primam pellis, 
secundam illa feriet, haec tertiam, et sic porro. Idem in alteratione fit, nisi 
quod particulae locum non mutant. Color agit in proximas aeris particulas, 
hae in vicinas, et sic porro: ultimae in superficiem oculi agunt, superficies 
in interiores oculi partes, quae sentiunt. Ad eandem rem illustrandam A. 
utitur sigilli et cerae exemplo: oculus ita afficitur ut charta afficeretur si cera 
non solum in superficie sed usque ad confinium cerae et chartae per sigillum 
fingeretur. Si A. novisset photographiam quam vocamus, hoc fortasse usus 
esset exemplo (Torst., p. 222). 

b 3%. Kal τὸ doav. Torst. (p. 223) changes Scav to acGév, objecting to the 
statement “res quae pepulit in causa est ut alia res pellat.” He continues: 
Manifesto enim legendum est “res pulsa” τὸ ὠσθέν. But cf. De Jnsomn. 2, 
459 a 30 τὸ γὰρ κινῆσαν ἐκίνησεν ἀέρα τινά, καὶ πάλιν οὗτος κινούμενος ἕτερον. 
Also the general statement of the case for motion of translation through inter- 
mediaries in Phys. VIII. 10, 266 Ὁ 27-267 a 17, esp. 267 a 2 ἀνάγκη δὴ τοῦτο μὲν 
λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον κινῆσαν ποιεῖ οἷόν τε κινεῖν, ἢ τὸν ἀέρα τοιοῦτον ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ 
ἢ τι ἄλλο ὃ πέφυκε κινεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται κινοῦν καὶ κινού- 
μενον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον μὲν ἅμα, ὅταν ὁ κινῶν παύσηται κινῶν, κινοῦν δὲ ἔτι 
ἐστίν. In such cases the production of motion does not cease simultaneously 
with the cessation of the impulse communicated. The top set spinning goes on 
for a time: the gong continues to sound after the stroke has ended. 

435a 1 οὕτω <Kal> ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοιώσεως...2 ἀλλοιοῖ, So it is in that species of 
ἀλλοίωσις which we call sense-perception, except that the sensible causes 
modification, viz. of the sense-organ, without any displacement: A. does not 
say of what. As a matter of fact, there is no change of place in either (1) the 
sensible object or (2) the sense-organ and the percipient. Them. supposes 
μένοντος to refer to (1), the object: 124, 28 H., 228, 12 Sp. μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ 
τόπῳ Tov ἀλλοιοῦντος. Philop. refers μένοντος to (2), the percipient: 605, 7 
ἡ δύναμις, φησίν, ἡ κατὰ τόπον κινοῦσα οὐκ ἐᾷ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ τὸ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ 
αἰσθητὸν ἀλλοιοῦν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ αὐτὴν ἐξ. The latter view is to 
be preferred. Even in spatial motion the first member of the series is assumed 
to be ἀκίνητον Ὁ 32 supra, so that there would be no difference in this respect 
between φορὰ and ἀλλοίωσις. The ungrammatical genitive absolute does occur 
in A. Cf. 420b 26 διὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἴσω dvamveopévou εἰσιέναι τὸν ἀέρα and nore. 
There seems to be no reason to substitute, with Torst., the medium for the 
sensible object, the proximate for the ultimate efficient cause: indeed, it would 
be difficult to establish this immobility of the medium in the case of hearing. 
Cf 419 b 25—27, b 34—420a 2, 4—9, 25 sq., De Sensu 6, 446 Ὁ 8 διὰ τὸ μετασχη- 
ματίζεσθαι φερόμενον τὸν ἀέρα, 2b. Ὁ 30 δοκεῖ δ᾽ ὁ ψόφος εἶναι φερομένου τινὸς 
κίνησις. A. admits the fact that there is φορὰ in hearing and smelling and 
that the ἀλλοίωσις takes time to travel along the medium, although seeing, he 
contends, takes place instantaneously. See the question discussed De Sensu 
6, 4468 20—447 4a II. 

a3. ἐκινήθη, int. ὁ κηρός. λίθος δὲ...4 πόρρω, int. κινεῖται. 

a 4 ὁ δὲ ἀὴρ..." ἐὰν μένῃ καὶ εἷς 9. Cf 419 b 21---420 8. 2. 

a 5 διὸ καὶ περὶ...8 ἡ εἷς. Philop. detects hyperbaton: 605, 31 ἀναγνωστέον δὲ 
τὴν λέξιν ἐν ὑπερβατῷ οὕτω - διὸ βέλτιον τὸν ἀέρα πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρώματος ἣ τοῦ 
σχήματος, ἢ ὑποτίθεσθαι τὴν ὄψιν ἐξιοῦσαν ἀνακλᾶσθαι, “it is better to suppose 
that the air is affected by colour or shape than to suppose” [with Empedocles 
and Plato, Tim. 45 B—46C] “that vision issues from the eye and is reflected 


III. 13 434 Ὁ 29—435 a 14 583 


back toit.” Refraction, as a term of modern optical science, does not correspond 
with ἀνάκλασις. Torst., not recognising the hyperbaton, bracketed the words 
περὶ ἀνακλάσεως as a sort of marginal heading: Ferri non possunt, propterea 
quod non id demonstrat A. τῆς ἀνακλάσεως alterum modum alteri esse prae- 
ferendum, sed ἀνάκλασιν in hac re omnino negat esse (p. 224). Plato in his 
explanation of vision (Z7z. 1.6.) assumes three fires (1) that which streams from 
the eye, the visual current, ὄψεως ῥεῦμα, or body which sees, (2) that of daylight 
in the air, (3) that in the object seen, which is the cause of the visibility. The 
first two are homogeneous and combine into a uniform substance. This sub- 
stance, meeting the rays from the visible external object, receives the motions 
of these rays and transmits them to the eye. This theory of vision Plato 
extends to the seeing of images in a mirror as follows. A mirror, owing to its 
smooth shining surface, arrests the rays from visible objects and brings them 
into contact with the visual current which has combined with the fire of 
daylight. Upon the coalescence of these two fires, the external fire from the 
object imaged and the internal fire from the eye, indirect vision takes place, 
le. the objects are seen in the mirror. See Archer-Hind ad foc. From the 
similarity of the language to that of 419 b 27—-4204 2 it is possible that A. here 
has echo in his mind as well as reflection of light. See zo¢e on 4208 I λεῖον. 

a8. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ λείου ἐστὶν ets. Smooth surfaces, such as water and polished 
metal (cf. 419 Ὁ 27—420a 2 and woZes), allow a layer of air to retain its unity and 
continuity, while rough unequal surfaces full of cavities and windings break up 
the air. οὗτος, int. 6 anp. 

8. 9. μέχρι τοῦ πέρατος, through the whole depth or thickness of the wax to 
the other side. 


CHAPTER XIII. 


435 a11—b 3. The bodies of animals cannot consist exclusively 
of a single element. It has been proved that, tf they have not touch, they 
cannot have any other sense. The other elements, except earth, might become 
organs of sense, but, as they serve as indirect media, none of them would 
constitute a body capable of touch, i.e. the one sense which operates, not 
through an indirect medium, but by direct contact of the animal with the object. 
Nor can the animal body consist solely of earth, for touch is a sort of medium 
for all tangibles and the organ of touch is capable of receiving all tangibles, 
and not merely such as are qualities of earth. Hence with the tissues which 
consist of earth only, with bones, hair and the like, we have no sensation, and 
plants, which consist mainly of earth, have no sensation. Thus the organ of 
the one indispensable sense, touch, cannot consist exclusively either of earth or 
of any one of the other elements which serve as media for the telepathic 
senses [§ 1]. 

435a 14. πᾶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, viz. 434 Ὁ 10 sqq., the proof extending to Ὁ 24. 
In 423 a 12—15 the proof is different, viz. that neither air nor water would 
constitute a solid body such as the animal requires. πᾶν, the whole body, and 
not any separate organ, as in the case of the higher senses. Only the surface 
of the body would come into contact with the external object, so that πᾶν 
practically means “at every point of the surface.” From the remarks below 
a 24. about hair being insensible it follows that A. looked upon the hair as an 
excrescence and would restrict the surface of the body to flesh. 


584 NOTES Ill. 13 


8 14. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἔξω γῆς, int. στοιχεῖα : αἰσθητήρια will then be predicate. A. 
should rather have said “air and water.” See 4258 3 τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν ἐκ δύο 
τούτων αἰσθητήρια μόνον ἐστίν, ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος... τὸ δὲ wip ἣ οὐθενὸς ἢ κοινὸν 
πάντων (since none of the sense-organs is independent of heat). From this 
interpretation of our passage Professor Beare dissents. He says (Greek 
Theories, Ὁ. 198, 2. 1): “The obvious opposition here between τὰ ἄλλα and 
ἡ ἁφή below” (435 a 17) “makes it certain that by ἄλλα is meant not στοιχεῖα, 
but αἰσθητήρια." Accordingly he renders: “‘Now the other organs of sense 
might conceivably be formed without earth, since they all effect sensation by 
some medium or third thing, external to the body, through which each per- 
ceives its object.” The hyperbaton in itself is no objection to the proposed 
construction, but the close proximity of ra ἄλλα to ἔξω γῆς would naturally 
suggest that earth is one of the class of things to which ra ἄλλα belong. The 
preposition properly means “ outside of,” “apart from,” “except,” and its force 
is strained if γέγνεσθαι ἔξω means “to be formed without including,” 1.6. to 
exclude from their composition, earth. Noram I satisfied with the opposition 
which Prof. Beare discovers between τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια and ἡ ἁφή, for he has 
himself quite rightly pointed out (p. 245) that sometimes, e.g. 424b I sqq., A. 
has used αἰσθητήρια in a narrower sense and treats the mediated organs of sight, 
hearing and smell as if they alone were called αἰσθητήρια. 

a 15 πάντα δὲ τῷ δι᾽ Erépov...16 διὰ τῶν μεταξύ. See 424 Ὁ 24 sqq. 

8 17. αὐτῶν, int. τῶν αἰσθητῶν. or more specifically τῶν ἁπτῶν. So 423 11, 
424 Ὁ 28, 29, 426 Ὁ 16. τοὔνομα. The sense of touch, touching, derives its 
name from the contact which is its necessary condition, 1.6. the contact between 
the external body and the surface of the animal body. Bodies can be in 
contact without any sensation resulting. See wofe on 434 Ὁ 12. Cf. 4238 23— 
b 1 and 424 a 32—b 3, where plants are said to have no sense of touch, though 
not only in contact with but affected by, 1.6. warmed or cooled by, contact with 
external objects. As just before A. has said or implied that ἁφή, the sense 
of touch, discerns by touching, 1.6, being in direct contact, so immediately 
afterwards he reminds us that the other or telepathic senses also discern by 
contact, τῇ ἁφῇ, though by indirect contact. 

a τὸ καίτοι... ΤῊ érépov. Cf. 423b I sqq., where it is shown that for touch the 
flesh is an inseparable medium, while the three higher senses perceive objects 
at a greater distance than tangibles: cf. 423 Ὁ 4—6. See 419 a 26—28, 434 Ὁ 20--- 
435 a 2. 

ag. αὕτη δὲ δοκεῖ μόνη δι᾽ αὑτῆς. Strictly construed, this would make flesh 
the organ of touch, whereas A. has declared it to be the medium and not the 
organ 423b 22 sq. But δοκεῖ implies popular opinion, to which he does not 
necessarily commit himself, cf. 427a 19sq. If the interpretation of 426 Ὁ 15—17 
which I have given is correct, A. in that passage, as also in 424 Ὁ 27—30, has, in 
spite of his dissent in 11..0 c. 11, returned to the popular opinion and used it 
where his distinction is unimportant for the question under discussion. See 
mote On 422 Ὁ 34, p. 405, 

8. 10. τῶν μὲν τοιούτων στοιχείων, the elements which serve for the con- 
struction of the sense-organs in the narrower sense of the word noted above on 
a 14, 1.6. the organs of sight, hearing and smell, which might be formed of air, 
water and fire. Cf. Simpl. 327, 10 συμπεραίνεται οὖν, ὡς τῶν λεπτομερῶν στοιχείων 
Kav τινα ἦ αἰσθητήρια, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τοιοῦτον αἰσθητήριον, οἷον τὸ τοῦ ὅλου 
ζῴου ἐστὶ σῶμα. 

ἃ 21. γήϊνον. Cf ἃ 2: infra γῆς ἐστίν. See also 410a 30 Sq. and 4238 12--- 
15, where it is assumed that the body cannot consist solely of earth. πάντων... 


Ill. 13 435 a 14—b το 585 


μεσότηΞ. From 424 a 32—b 3 we learn that plants, although they are affected 
by tangibles, have no sense of touch, αἴτιον yap τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα (424 Ὁ 1), ie. 
(20. b 2) τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οἵαν τὰ εἴδη δέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, words which clearly 
explain what is meant by μεσότης. A change (κίνησις) is necessary for per- 
ception, and a sensible which is equally warm or equally cold with the sense- 
organ will not produce a change of temperature (423 b 31—424 a το). 

a 22 ov μόνον ὅσαι...23 ἁπάντων. Not only the different qualities of earth, but 
the different qualities of body generally as such (423 Ὁ 27—29), are tangible. 

a 24 rots oorots...25 γῆς ἐστίν. A body constituted of earth alone would be 
incapable of apprehending qualities which belong to the other elements but not 
to earth (cf. 410a 30—b 2). 

435 b. διὰ τοῦτο.. ὅτι γῆς ἐστίν. If a single bodily part, consisting wholly 
or mainly of earth, is ¢jso facto incapable of sensation, much more will this be 
the case with plants, in the entire composition of which the element of earth 
preponderates. Cf. zo/e on a 17 supra, τοὔνομα. 

Ὁ 2. ἄλλην, int. αἴσθησιν. Cf. 4354 12 54., 415 a 3 56. 

b2. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, i.e. τὸ ἁπτικόν. We note that the form of the 
inference implies that ἁφὴ is an αἰσθητήριον and thus the term ἁφὴ does not 
escape the ambiguity so notorious for ὄψις, ἀκοή, which we have also found in 
ὄσφρησις and γεῦσις 423 Ὁ 19, 4228. 32 sq. As we learn from 4238 12—15 flesh 
and whatever is analogous to flesh, whether it is properly the organ or the 
mecium of touch, must be a compound substance containing the other elements 
as well as earth. This sentence completes the proof of the proposition 
enunciated at the beginning of the chapter, 435 a 11, viz. “it is evident that the 
body of an animal cannot consist solely of a single element.” 

435 b 4—19. Touch is the only sense, the lack of which involves the 
destruction of the animal. Without touch a living thing would not be an 
animal, but a plant. Colours, sounds and smells in excess do not injure the 
animal, but destroy the corresponding sense-organ. Incidentally they may 
destroy animal life, if conjoined with a shock or blow or other fatal mischief 
operating by contact. So, too, poison operates fatally in so far as incidentally 
it affects touch [ὃ 2]. Tangibles in excess, however, are destructive to the 
whole animal, for the sense which they destroy is the one sense with which the 
animal cannot dispense [§ 3 to 435 b 19]. 

435 Ὁ 5 οὔτε ydp...6 μὴ ζῷον. From the parallel clause which follows (Ὁ 6 οὔτε 
...7 ταύτης) we are justified in supplying ὃν with μὴ ζῷον. If anything which has 
life, ζῶν ri, μετέχον τι ζωῆς, is without the sense of touch, we do not call it an 
animal (ζῷον), but only a plant. The stress of predication in this and similar 
sentences is on the participial phrase μὴ ζῷον [int. ὄν] The words literally 
mean “if it be not an animal [but only a plant] it cannot have this sense of 
touch.” The implication is, as already stated, “a living thing cannot have the 
sense of touch without being zso facto an animal, as distinct from a plant.” 
This accords with a previous doctrine of the treatise (411 b 27——30, 413 a 22— 
b4, 414a 2 sq., a 32—b1, b3, b6—r14, 415 a I1—6). It is restated ζῶα 
435 b 16 sq. 

b 6 οὔτε {Gov ὃν...7 πλὴν ταύτης. The facts are given 413b 4—7, 4148. 2—3, 
415 a 4—6 ἀφὴ... αἴσθησιν. 

bg. ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ αἰσθητήρια. See on 424 a 28—32, 426a 30—b 2, b 7. 
Cf. 4298 31—b 3. 

Ὁ ΤΟ. κατὰ συμβεβηκός, nisi quid coniunctum est, quod simul in tactum agat 
(Trend.). otoy...II πληγή. Cf. 424b ro—12. A. is thinking of the thunder- 
bolt, Simpl. 328, 35—-39. In commenting on 424 Ὁ 10—12 I omitted to cite the 


586 NOTES III. 13 


passage from De Caelo 11. 9, 290b 31 sqq., where A., possibly accommodating 
himself to the popular view, most unmistakeably describes the splitting of stones 
and the hardest of bodies as the effect of very loud noises, such as thunder. 
The passage is interesting because A. starts from the position which he reaches 
at the end of De A. τι., c. 12, viz. that bodies inanimate and therefore incapable 
of sensation may nevertheless be affected by sensibles. Arguing against the 
Pythagorean “‘music of the spheres,” A. concedes that the authors of that 
theory make some show of explaining why the celestial sounds should fail to 
make us hear them; but it is strange, he urges, that we should not be affected 
by the sounds even apart from sensation: 290b 31 οὐ yap μόνον τὸ μηθὲν ἀκούειν 
ἄτοπον, περὶ ot λύειν ἐγχειροῦσι THY αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν πάσχειν χωρὶς 
αἰσθήσεως. Here should be compared De 4. 424b 16 τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι 
παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι; Kré A. Continues 290b 34 of yap ὑπερβάλλοντες ψόφοι 
διακναίουσι καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων τοὺς ὄγκους, οἷον 6 τῆς βροντῆς διίστησι λίθους 
καὶ τὰ καρτερώτατα τῶν σωμάτων. To ascribe great and mischievous physical 
effects not to the air as in a gale, not to anything like a fireball or thunderbolt 
or the all-dreaded thunder-stone descending from the clouds, but to mere noise, 
is a curious error to result from association. 

bir. καὶ ὑπὸ ὁραμάτων. Trend. asks: quomodo a specie (ὑπὸ) mover dici 
potest? A. must be thinking of animals killed by lightning,, though he prob- 
ably had no very clear conception of the process, which Simpl. (329, 9) 
represents as follows: οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν οἷον ἡ φλὸξ οὐχ ὡς φωτοειδὴς ἄγαν 
καὶ ἀσύμμετρος τῷ ὄμματι φθείρει τὸ ζῷον (ταύτῃ γὰρ μόνον τὸ δρατικόν [int. 
φθείρει). ἀλλ᾽ ὡς θερμὴ ἀθρόως ἐνίοτε προσπίπτουσα: προσπίπτει δὲ ὡς ἁπτὸν 
ἅἁπτικῷ τῷ ὅλῳ. καὶ ὀσμῆς, the case of suffocation by a noxious vapour. 
Simpl. 329, 8 (the sentence is mutilated) διὰ τὴν τῶν παθητικῶν ποιοτήτων dovp- 
μετρίαν φθεῖρον τὸ ὅλον. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς δυσῶδες. Cf. 421b23—25. In any case, on 
A.’s view, the shock to the organ of sight or smell is conjoined with another 
and fatal shock to the entire system (ἔτερα κιν εἴται). 

Ὁ 12 καὶ ὁ χυμὸς δὲ...13 ταύτῃ φθείρε. Take death from the effect of poison. 
Poison, gwd gustable, acts only upon the sense of taste, but, like every gustable, 
poison is also a tangible (422a 8, 11, 423 Ὁ 2 sq., 434b 18 sq., 21), and, if a 
tangible, capable of reacting upon the flesh, the organ (or medium) of touch; 
and it 1s therefore gwd tactile that incidentally it kills. 

15. παντὸς μὲν γάρ. «αἰσθητήριον. Cf. 424 a 28—30 with the parallel 
passages in the zoZzes ad loc. 

Ὁ 16. τὴν ἁφήν, the faculty residing in the sense-organ (cf. zm/ra Ὁ 17 sq.), 
the relation between the two being that laid down 424 a 24—~28. ταύτῃ δὲ 
ὥρισται τὸ ζῆν. With the infinitive supply the dative τῷ ζῴῳ. If we compare 
415b 12 sq. 4318 19, 431 b 3, this seems a more probable supplement than 
either the genitive or the accusative. Plants are ζῶντα, though not ζῷα. Cf. 
4138 22—b 4. The reference in ὥρισται is probably to the present chapter, 
435b4—7. See zofes ad loc. 

bI9. μόνην ἔχειν ταύτην, Le. τὴν ἁφήν. The neuters μόνον, τοῦτο would have 
been ambiguous in view of αἰσθητήριον preceding. 

435 b 19-25. The other senses, as said above, are means not to 
being, but to well-being. Sight is necessary in order that the animal assumed 
to live in air or water may see. Taste is required because of the pleasurable 
and painful, in order that it may discriminate them in food and feel a desire 
for food and regulate its movements accordingly. Hearing it possesses that 


something may be signified to it and a tongue that it may signify something 
to another [§ 3]. 


Ill. 13 435 Ὁ 10o—b 24 587 


This summary should be compared with the fuller and more precise state- 
ment in De Semsu 1, 436b 18 sqq., which differs from it in several important 
particulars. (1) In De Sensi, having previously, 436 b 12 sq., associated taste 
with touch as necessary to all animals (as indeed was done De A. 434 b 22), 
A. treats of sight, hearing and smell, but not taste, as functions of animals 
capable of locomotion. An animal capable of locomotion is pro tanto more 
perfect than one incapable: cf. Simpl. 329, 23 ὡς δὲ πορευτικὸν τοῦ ζῴου ἁπλῶς 
[ὄντος] τελειότερον. (2) These three senses in all animals which possess them 
subserve a double purpose: (a) they are necessary to existence, σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν, 
436 Ὁ 20, (δ) they promote well-being, rot εὖ ἕνεκα, 437a 1. (3) It is utility to 
animals endowed with intelligence that alone is there declared to be rod εὖ ἕνεκα, 
(4) Superior utility is claimed for the sense of hearing, even above sight, but 
such utility belongs to it only incidentally, 4378. 11 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ πρὸς 
φρόνησιν ἡ ἀκοὴ πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται μέρος. (5) The part played by the tongue 
as the organ of speech is not mentioned. There can be no doubt that this 
account in De Semsu must be taken as the authoritative statement, supple- 
menting the condensed and hasty sketch before us in De A. 

435 Ὁ 20. ὥσπερ εἴρηται, viz. 434 Ὁ 24. οὐ τοῦ εἶναι ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ ev. For 
εἶναι in the sense of “exist” cf. 415 Ὁ 12 sq., 416b 14, 16, 20, 434b 7. Cf. 
420 Ὁ 20, moze. Τὸ εὖ is there opposed to what is necessary (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον). So 
here it is opposed to bare existence (τὸ εἶναι). As is stated 413 a 30 54., b7 sq., 
415 a 1 sq., animal life needs nourishment for its support: to provide this 
nourishment touch, or its variety, taste (434 Ὁ 18—-23), would suffice. What 
is said in 413 a 30 54. καὶ (ἢ διὰ τέλους ἕως ἂν δύνηται λαμβάνειν τροφὴν (cf. 
4348 22—26) is as true of the lowest forms of animals as it is of plants. All 
that goes beyond this indispensable minimum A. here puts down to the account 
of well-being (τὸ ed) or a higher life (τὸ εὖ ζῆν) to which the telepathic senses 
are the necessary means and adjuncts; from the humble beginnings said (De 
Sénsu 1, 436 Ὁ 20) to be σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν to the lofty achievements incidentally 
realised in animals endowed with intelligence, and particularly in man (De 
Sensi I, 437 a 2—I15). 

Ὁ 21. ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, int. ἐστίν : the two elements “in” which ὡς ἐν τόπῳ 
animals live, 423a29—br. Animals are roughly divided into terrestrial and 
aquatic. Cf. Meteor. Iv. 4. 38246 καὶ ἐν γῇ καὶ ἐν ὕδατι ζῷα μόνον ἐστίν, ἐν 
ἀέρι δὲ καὶ πυρὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅτι τῶν σωμάτων᾽ ὕλη ταῦτα. Land-animals are sur- 
rounded by or immersed in air, τὸ περιέχον : Phys. IV. 4, 211 a 24 λεγόμεν εἶναι 
ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, διότι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, οὗτος δ᾽ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι δὲ 
οὐκ ἐν παντί, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἔσχατον αὐτοῦ καὶ περιέχον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι φαμὲν εἶναι. 

Ὁ 22. ὅπως ὁρᾷς Cf. Mefaph. τοῖξο 8 9 τέλος δ᾽ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν 
4 δύναμις λαμβάνεται. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ὄψιν ἔχωσιν δρῶσι τὰ ζῷα, GAN ὅπως ὁρῶσιν 
ὄψιν ἔχουσιν. Cf. De Sensu 1, 437 a 5 διαφορὰς μὲν γὰρ πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς 
ἡ τῆς ὄψεως ἀγγέλλει δύναμις διὰ τὸ πάντα τὰ σώματα μετέχειν χρώματος, ὥστε 
καὶ τὰ κοινὰ διὰ ταύτης αἰσθάνεσθαι μάλιστα, Metaph. οὅο ἃ 21---27. ὅλως δ᾽ 
ἐπεὶ ἐν διαφανεῖ, int. ἐστίί Transparency is an attribute both of air and water 
418 Ὁ 6. 

b 22 γεῦσιν δὲ...23 ἐπιθυμῇ. This was explained 414 Ὁ 11—-14, which serves 
to qualify and interpret 414b 3—9. Cf. also De Sensu 1, 436b15—18 ἡ δὲ 
γεῦσις διὰ τὴν τροφήν lint. ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης]. τὸ yap ἡδὺ διακρίνει καὶ 
τὸ λυπηρὸν αὐτῇ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φεύγειν τὸ δὲ διώκεεν. 

Ῥ 24. καὶ κινῆται. Possibly κατὰ τόπον should be supplied. Cf. 434 b 16 
ἁπτόμενον δέ, εἰ μὴ ἕξει αἴσθησιν, ob δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν φεύγειν τὰ δὲ λαβεῖν, and 
De Sensu .c. 436 Ὁ 16—18, cited in last ποῦζθ. But the part played by taste as 


588 NOTES III. 13 


an incentive to seek food is small in comparison with that played by smell. 
Further, it would generally involve the mechanism of φαντασία, upon which A. 
here does not enter. As noticed above in the passage of De Sensu, A. associates 
taste with touch, as necessary to existence and therefore found in all animals, 
rather than with the higher senses rod εὖ ἕνεκα. Simplicius (329, 24 sq.) 
naturally enquires why taste (γεῦσις) is now reckoned among the higher senses 
when we were previously told that, as a variety of touch, ἀφή τις, it was abso- 
lutely necessary for existence. He can only surmise that taste is a higher sense 
as contributing to the prolonged existence of the animal; 329, 26 διότι πρὸς τὸ 
διαμένειν padAov...kal πρὸς τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ov πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἁπιλῶς συντελ εἴ. 

Ὁ 24. ὅπως σημαίνηταί τι αὐτῷ. This reading agrees with Themistius and 
the old Latin translation. Torstrik has the merit of expelling the absurd σημαίνῃ 
τι αὑτῷ and of introducing the passive and αὐτῷ. If he is right in rejecting the 
last clause of the treatise, he is also right in notinserting τὸ γλῶτταν δὲ. Trend. 
cites De Resp. 4, 4768 17 τῷ αὐτῷ ὀργάνῳ χρῆται πρὸς ἄμφω ταῦτα ἡ φύσις, καθάπερ 
ἐνίοις τῇ γλώττῃ πρός τε τοὺς χυμοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἑρμηνείαν. Linguae inter sensus 
mentionem mireris. Sed ab auditu vel invita offerebatur. Neque a consilio 
aliena. Nam etiam linguae sermone, si vitam, detractis ornamentis, ad necessi- 
tatis angustias redigere velis, vitae conservatio carere potest. This is a lame 
apology, for A. has been dealing with animals in general and not with man in 
particular. And, if we grant to M. Rodier that the use which has just been 
assigned to hearing only belongs to it der accidens, this is hardly a sufficient 
reason for introducing as a pendent an adventitious use of the organ of a 
different sense which has already been dealt with. However, Themistius must 
have found the remark in its present context and, though it might seem more 
appropriate to De Part. An., it is fully endorsed by the teleological passage 
420b 16—20. Plato also opposes the reception of food, implying the necessary 
use of the tongue, to the utterance of speech which is the employment of that 
organ τοῦ εὖ évexa, 777. 75 E: “For all that enters in to give sustenance to the 
body is of necessity; but the stream of speech which flows out and ministers to 
understanding is of all streams the most noble and excellent” (Archer-Hind’s 
translation). 

Here the teleological study breaks off. A. does not go on to consider the 
part taken by φαντασία or λογισμὸς in those animals which possess these powers, 
although some such discussion might have been expected from the words of 
414b 33 διὰ τίνα δ᾽ αἰτίαν τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχουσι σκεπτέον: ch. 415 a 10 οἷς δ᾽ 
ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμός. 


APPENDIX. 


The age and authority of Theophrastus entitle him to a 
respectful hearing when he comments upon the teaching of his 
master. I accordingly follow Trendelenburg in citing the more 
important of the few fragments of his, taken from the treatises 
Ilepi φυσικῶν and Ἰ]ερὶ κινήσεως, which relate to the subject of 
intellect. Themistius at the end of his own commentary on 
111., c. 5 adduces Theophrastus as the earliest and most important 
witness. Apparently he quotes two separate passages verbatim 
and gives one other short sentence and the condensed outline of 
passages which he does not quote. Priscianus Lydus furnishes a 
much larger number of excerpts, mostly short scraps. When we 
compare the manner in which citations common to the two are 
presented in Themistius and in Priscian, we find a great diversity 
of arrangement. If the order of the sentences in Themistius is 
consecutive, that in Priscian certainly is not. Either the one or the 
other rearranged his author to suit his particular purpose, and the 
more probable view is that Priscian did so. Theophrastus may 
have repeated the phrase οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον once, as a comparison 
of Prisc. 25, 28, attested by Them. 107, 34, with Prisc. 26, 2 sq. 
certainly suggests. But when Priscian uses the phrase a third 
time (30, 29), it is probable that this is not a fresh citation in a 
different connexion, but that Priscian is reverting to a passage 
formerly cited. Cf. 30, 29 διό φησιν, ovy οὕτω ληπτέον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς 
ἐλέχθη πρότερον ἐν οἷς ἠξίον κατὰ ἀναλογίαν Kré. with 26, 2 sqq. 
cited below. Cf. also the similar repetitions of τί τὸ πάθος ἢ ποία 
μεταβολή 28, 15 from 27, 10, of ὑπὸ Tivos οὖν ἡ γένεσις, εἴτε ἕξεως 
καὶ δυνάμεως εἴτε οὐσίας 31, 24 sq. from 31, 11 sq., of πῶς ἑκάτερα 
33,17 from 32, 31, οὗ οἰκείως ληπτέον 35, 23 sq. from 34, 30 sq., and 
the like. In some cases, as in excerpts 2, 3, 7, 8, it is not easy to 
determine whether Priscian is citing Theophrastus or Aristotle 
directly, for he is not always exact in his citations. See, eg., 
Prisc. 36, 9—-13, where he professes to give the substance of 
Aristotle, though Bywater can find no nearer parallel than De A. 
4308 10, 430a 3. The version is repeated 36, 25. Cf. also Prisc. 


500 APPENDIX 


37, 6 sq. with De A. 430a 5 sq. However, as Theophrastus would 
appear on the evidence of excerpts I and 12 to have repeated 
Aristotelian phrases both verbatim and with slight variations 
(cf. my note on παρεμφαινόμενον, 429 a 20), I have given him the 
benefit of the doubt. The text here presented differs from that of 
Wimmer. For Themistius I have followed Heinze, except once, 
where I think Heinze’s second thought ὑπ᾽ ἀσωμάτου decidedly 
preferable to his first thought ὑπὸ σώματος (Them. τοῦ, 2 54ᾳ.. Cf. 
Prisc. 28, 29 καὶ πῶς νοητὸν ὑπὸ νοητοῦ πάσχει; For Priscian 1 
have followed Bywater. In what is common to both Themistius 
and Priscian I follow the version of the former, with the one 
exception just mentioned. 

In dealing with his subject Theophrastus appears to start with 
the account as we find it in De A. 111., ςο. 4 and 5. The excerpts 
which I have numbered I—7 seem all to refer to 429a 10—29. In 
no. 8 there is a citation of 429 Ὁ 5—g9, no. 9 deals with the subject 
of 429b 10—-22, nos. 10, 11 relate to the ἀπορίαι discussed in 
429 Ὁ 22—-430a 9, no. 12 to III, c. 5 and no. 13 to the same subject 
as L, Cc. 4, 408a 34—b29. Under the numbers 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 
I have ventured to put together excerpts which seem closely related, 
though I am well aware that they may have been separated in 
Theophrastus by matter which Priscian has omitted. 


ε .᾿ “᾿ Ὰ \ -*» aA Ν Ψ > Ff 
I. ὁ δὲ νοῦς πῶς ποτὲ ἔξωθεν ὧν καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπίθετος 
Ψ / Ν , ε , 3 ~ ἈΝ Ν Ν Ν 
ὅμως συμφυής; καὶ τίς ἢ φύσις αὐτοῦ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν 
εἶναι κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ 
¥ θ > Ἃ Ὁ λ ΄ J WY > “ με ξ 
αιἰσθησις. οὗν yap οὕτως ΛΉΠΤΕΟ ὡς OVOE αὑτὸς [int. ο 
> 
Ἀριστοτέλης ἔλαβεν]: ἐριστικὸν γάρ: ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὑποκειμένην 
τινὰ δύναμιν καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξωθεν 
Ψ . nw 
apa οὐχ ws ἐπίθετον, ἀλλ᾽ ws ἐν TH πρώτῃ γενέσει συμπερι- 
λαμβανόμενον θετέον. 
“~ ia . 
πῶς δέ ποτε γίνεται [int. ὁ νοῦς] τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τί τὸ 
? ε » “~ a 
πάσχειν «ὑπ αὐτῶν; δεῖ γάρ [int. πάσχειν], εἴπερ eis 
9 2 its θ a ε ¥ θ 9 a ‘ € > 2 
ἐνέργειαν ἥξει καθάπερ ἡ αἴσθησις. ἀσωμάτῳ δὲ ὑπ᾽ ἄσω- 
’ , Ν (θ Ἂ ΄ λ , ‘ 7 > 3. 5 ed 
Patov τὶ τὸ πάθος ἢ ποία μεταβολή; καὶ πότερον ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου 
ε 3 Δ A 3 > 3 ~ "Ἂ Ν “ 2 3 - 5 ΄ id 
Ἢ ἄρχη ἢ ἀπ᾿ αὑτοῦ; τῷ μὲν yap πάσχειν ἀπ ἐκείνου δόξειεν 
¥ ὑδὲ μΝ 9 39. ε ῪᾺ ~ > eA -~ ‘ > Ἃ 4 
ἄν (οὐδὲν yap ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τῶν ἐν πάθει)" τῷ δὲ ἀρχὴν πάντων 
> A “ς 5 > ~ ‘ ~ N μ᾿ -ν “~ 
εἶναι καὶ ET GUT@ TO νοεῖν, Kal μὴ ὥσπερ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, 
ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ. 


- 3 ἃ ‘4 ~ 
τάχα δ᾽ ἂν φανείη καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, εἶ ὁ νοῦς ὕλης ἔχει 


APPENDIX ΣΟΙ 


φύσιν μηδὲν ὧν ἅπαντα δὲ δυνατός οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ληπτέον 

ὑδὲ ’ ΜᾺ 9 ᾽ν ΜᾺ ~ -~ > \ 7 e 
οὐδὲ πάντα νοῦν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ Suedelv. ποῖος οὖν Kal τίς ἡ 
διαίρεσις; ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὕλη οὐ τόδε τι, ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἰ μὴ οὕτω, 
τί ἂν ἕτερον; κατὰ ἀναλογίαν οὖν καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ληπτέον ἐπὶ 
τοῦ ψυχικοῦ VOU: ὡς γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦν. 

Them. 107, 31—34, Them. 107, 34 sq. (=Prisc. 25, 
28 sq.), Them. 107, 35, Them. 108, 1—6 (= Prisc. 27, 8— 
14), Them. 108, 6 sq. (= Prisc. 26, 1 sq.), Prisc. 26, 2—6. 

7. συμπεριλαμβάνον codd. Them., correxit Brandis || r1. ὑπὸ σωματὸς Them. ] 
15. Virgulam post μὴ Heinze, post γοεῖν transposui. 


Cf. Them. 107, 30 ἄμεινον δὲ καὶ ra Θεοφράστου παραθέσθαι περί re τοῦ δυνάμει 
a ‘ a) , \ ᾿ > - , , , ε A κι 

νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δυνάμει τάδε φησίν " 6 δὲ νοῦς mwis...(108, 7) 
ἅπαντα δὲ δυνατός. καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς μακρὸν ἂν εἴη παρατίθεσθαι καίτοι μὴ μακρῶς 
εἰρημένα, ἀλλὰ λίαν συντόμως τε καὶ βραχέως τῇ γε λέξει: τοῖς γὰρ πράγμασι μεστά 
3 ~ Q > ~ ~ \ 3 id ~ Ν᾿ »; ea 93 
ἐστε πολλῶν μὲν ἀποριῶν, πολλῶν δὲ ἐπιστάσεων, πολλῶν δὲ λύσεων. ἔστι δὲ ἐν 
τῷ πέμπτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν, δευτέρῳ δὲ τῶν Περὶ ψυχῆς, ἐξ ὧν ἁπάντων δῆλόν ἐστιν, 
ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ σχεδὸν τὰ αὐτὰ διαποροῦσιν, εἴτε ἔξωθέν ἐστιν εἴτε 
συμφυής, καὶ διορίζειν πειρῶνται, πῶς μὲν ἔξωθεν πῶς δὲ συμφυής. (Frag. {111 Ὁ 
W, p- 226---227, 9.) 


2. ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶ τὰ νοητά. Prisc. 28, 3. 
Ῥχιβο. 28, 1 διὸ μία ἡ ἀμφοῖν, τοῦ τε νοῦ περὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τῶν νοητῶν εἰς τὸν 
νοῦν ἡ ἐνέργεια. καθὸ οὐ διέσπασται ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς...τὰ νοητά. Cf. De A. 429 Ὁ 30. 
3. τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια. Prisc. 28, 12. 
Prisc. 28, 11 Sq. καὶ γὰρ τῇ..«ἐνέργεια δευτέρως καὶ ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς. Cf. De A. 
4308 18. 
4. εἰ γὰρ ὅλως ἀπαθής, οὐδὲν νοήσει... ἀπαθὴς γὰρ ὃ 
[κα > ‘ >» ἂν , 3 ε ‘N , 3 ‘ 
vous, εἰ μὴ apa ἄλλως παθητικός... οὐχ ὡς TO κινητικόν, ἀτελὴς 
‘ € ‘4 3 > ¢€ > - ~ “ - »Ὰ 
γὰρ ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει. χρῆσθαι 
δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐνίοτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν. 
Prisc. 28, 16 sq., 20 sq. (= Them. 108, 15 sq.), Prisc. 
28, 21----2 3. 


Cf. Prisc. 28, 16 εἰ γὰρ..-.ἀπαθής, φησίν, οὐδὲν νοήσει, τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν 
τελείωσιν πάθος καλῶν, ἐπεὶ πάντῃ καθαρεύειν τὸν νοῦν ἀνάγκη. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ 
τῶν νοητῶν κατ᾽ οἰκείαν τελειοῦται ἐνέργειαν, διὰ τοῦτο κοινότερον ἀλλ᾽ οὗ κυρίως ἂν 
τοῦ πάθους ἐκείνου ἀκούοιμεν - ἀπαθὲς γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, φησὶν ὃ Θεόφραστος, εἰ μὴ ἄρα... 
ὀνόμασιν : Them. 108, 14 λέγουσι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν ἀπαθῇ καὶ χωριστόν, ὥσπερ 
τὸν ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸν ἐνεργείᾳ" ἀπαθὴς γάρ, φησίν, ὁ νοῦς... .«παθητικός, καὶ ὅτι τὸ 
παθητικὸν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ οὐχ ὡς τὸ κινητὸν ληπτέον (ἀτελὴς yap 4 κίνησις), ἀλλ᾽ ὡς 
ἐνέργειαν. 


XN ἴων x ε “ ἴων 4 4 a) > «A 
5. καὶ πῶς νοητὸν ὕπὸ VONTOV πάσχει;...καὶ πῶς AUTOS 
ε ‘ ~ ‘N XN ’ ΕῚ > » 
ἑαυτὸν τελειοῖ ;...καὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεί; 
Prisc. 28, 29, 21; 29, I. 


592 APPENDIX 


—_ 


Prisc. 28, 29 (post lacunam) καὶ πῶς...πάσχει; ἐπειδὴ ὡς νοητὰν δεύτερον, 
τουτέστιν ὡς ἐνεργητικὸν καὶ ὡς ἄρχον καὶ αὐτενεργήτως ὁριζόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείτ- 
τονος. καὶ πῶς. ..τελειοῖ; διότι, ὧς εἴρηται, καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείττονος αὐτενεργήτως 
δέχεται. Kar...del; ἢ ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐκ ἀεὶ χρῆται καὶ παρόντι τῷ 
νῷ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὰ σώματα στροφῇ. ἐοίκασι δὲ οἱ ἄνδρες οὗτοι, καὶ 6 ᾿Αριστοτέλης καὶ 
ὁ Θεόφραστος, ὅπερ καὶ ἤδη ἔφαμεν, νοῦν ἐνίοτε καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν λογικὴν προσαγορεύειν 
Cwiy, ὅπου γε καὶ μέχρι φαντασίας τὸ τοῦ νοῦ διατείνουσιν ὄνομα. 

5 Ν ν © 79 € “2 le \ > “2 > A 
6. ἐπεὶ TO ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου κινοῦντος τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τοῦ 
fn ~ 3 “ of -~ 
νοῦ Kat ἄλλως ἄτοπον, καὶ πρότερόν τι ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἕτερον TOU 
ων ‘\ 3 373 ε “~ Ν ἴω > ’ LAX € an o~ 
VOU, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ TO νοεῖν, εἰ μὴ TLS AAOS ὁ κινὼν νοῦς. 
Prisc. 29, 12——I5. 

Prisc. 29, II τελεοῦται δὲ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ad’ ἑαυτῆς τε ἀρχομένη καὶ ἑαυτὴν 
προσάγουσα τῷ νῷ, καὶ αὐτενεργήτως καὶ τὴν dm’ ἐκείνου δεχομένη τελείωσιν " ἐπεί, 
φησί, τὸ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου...ὃ κινῶν νοῦς. καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἴτε τὴν μετεχομένην ὑπὸ ψυχῆς 
ἀμέριστον οὐσίαν καλοίη νοῦν, εἴτε αὐτὴν τὴν λογικὴν ψυχήν. 

> ‘ 3 “ [4 Ν, , ,ἤ δὲ aN 
7. εἶ yap ἐνεργῶν γίνεται τὰ πράγματα, τότε δὲ μάλιστα 
i“ A ¥ ς wn > a y 
ἑκάτερόν ἐστι, TA πράγματα ἂν Ely) ὃ VOUS...apa οὖν, ὅταν μὴ 

fans ‘ a “\ 4 ὃ ‘ ~ > fe 5S 5 > ὃ a 

ΜΟΊ): RY ὧν Τὰ T pPAayylpata OVOE VOUS COTLVY ;.. .«αβα ονψΨ OVOEV 
~ » - a 
ἐστι πρὶν νοεῖν ;...«καὶ yap ἄτοπον εἰ δυνάμει μὲν ὧν μηδέν 
3 3 ’ δὲ Ψ Ψ ‘ € Ν ~ ~ δὲ LAX μ᾿ 
εσ τιν, ενεῤγέιῳ € eTEpos OTaV μὴ EAUTOV VOY, τω OC A O και 
» ~ ΕἸ 2 e > td ¥ - Ψ XN 
ἄλλο νοεῖν οὐδέποτε ὁ αὐτός. ἄκριτος yap τις αὕτη γε Kal 
¥ e , 3 7 , ΄ ‘ δ . ε 
ἄτακτος ἡ φύσις.. οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον... αὕτη μὲν γὰρ [int. ἡ 
Ψ ε Ν 

αἴσθησις οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὃ δὲ χωριστός. 

Prisc., 29, 18-20, 22 54., 26; 30, 22—25, 29; 31, I sq. 

Cf. Prisc. 30, 19 κἂν οὖν μὴ πάντα Gua, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄλλα γινώσκῃ, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο 
καὶ ἔστιν ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ οὐδέποτε τὰ αὖτά, διότι οὐ πάντῃ μεταβάλλεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι 
τι καὶ τὸ μένον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, καθὰ ἀεὶ ἕστηκεν ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ πράγματα. καὶ γὰρ 
ἄτοπον, φησίν, εἰ...ἡ φύσις---ἄρειστα ἐλέγχων τοὺς δυνάμει πάντα καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι καθ᾽ 
αὑτὸν <Trov> νοῦν ὑποτιθεμένους. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὅταν μὴ von οὐδὲν ἔσται- 
ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ νοῶν, ὅταν ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἕαυτὸν᾽ νοῇ, ἕτερόν τε ἔσται καὶ οὐκ αὐτός, καὶ 
ἄλλοτε ἄλλος καὶ ἀεὶ μεταβαλλόμενος. διό φησιν, οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς 
ἐλέχθη πρότερον ἐν οἷς ἠξίου κατὰ ἀναλογίαν ἀκούειν τὸ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ μὴ 
ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ- τόδε γάρ τι εἶναι τὸν νοῦν" μηδὲ μὴν ὡς ἐπὶ 
τῆς αἰσθήσεως: αὕτη μὲν γάρ, ὡς καὶ νῦν ἐπάγει, οὐκ ἄνεν.. .χωριστός: Them. 
108, 17 καὶ προϊών φησι τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, τὸν δὲ νοῦν χωριστόν. 
Cf. De 4. 429} 4 sq. 

8 Ψ Ν 9 μή [4 ε 3 ΄ 5 

- OTaVY γὰρ οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ἐπιστήμων κατ 

3 7 id ~ 
ἐνέργειαν λέγεται, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνειν φαμὲν ὅταν δύνηται δι 
ε ~ 3 “ » | > ‘ 4 , 
EQUTOU ἐνέργειν, ἐστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὗ μὴν 
ε ν᾿, Ν \ A Α ~ 
ὁμοίως καὶ πριν μαθεῖν καὶ εὑρεῖν. ὑπὸ Tivos οὖν ἡ γένεσις 

Ἁ ~ y 3 > ¥ ΕΥ̓ 
καὶ πῶς, εἴτ᾽ οὖν ἔξεως καὶ δυνάμεως εἴτε οὐσίας; ἔοικε δὲ 

~ 4 Ὁ a 
μᾶλλον ἕξεως, αὕτη δὲ οἷον τελεοῦν τὴν φύσιν. 


Prisc. 31, 8—13. 


APPENDIX 593 


Prise. 31, 5 καὶ ἐπειδὴ συμφυής ἐστι τοῖς ἐπιστητοῖς, ὅταν ὁτιοῦν ἐπίστηται, 
ἐνεργείᾳ οὖσα ὅπερ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν οὐχ ἑτέρα ἐστὶν ἑαυτῆς, διότι αὕτη κατὰ τὰ ἐπιστητὰ 
πάντα οὐσίωται: ἀλλὰ δὴ φαίνεται καὶ γινομένη πως. ὅταν γὰρ...τὴν φύσιν. Cf. 


De A. 429 b 5—9. 


~ / . “~ -~ ~ 
9. πῶς ἑκάτερα [int. θεωρεῖ ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς];...πῶς τὰ ἐν 
ὕλῃ καὶ ἀφαιρέσει... ἃ UV ἑτέρῳ ἣ ETE 3 ΐ ἢ 
ἢ ρ «««ἄἀραὰ οὖν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἑτέρως ἔχοντι κρίνει...ἢ 
κι > oo” Ve ΄ 3, Ψ 
τῷ αὑτῷ Kal ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι;.--ὅλως δὲ ὡς χωριστὰ τὰ πράγ- 
ματα τῆς ὕλης, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν νοῦν. 
Prisc. 32, 31 54.; 33, 25, 26 sq., 32 sq. 


Prisc. 32, 30 ἐπειδὴ ἀμφοτέρων [int τῶν ἀύλων εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν] 
θεωρητικὸς ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς, ζητεῖ, πῶς ἑκάτερα, καὶ πῶς τὰ.. ἀφαιρέσει: καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ 
τὰ ἔνυλα ἢ κατὰ τὸ συναμφότερον ἢ κατὰ μόνον θεωρεῖ τὸ εἶδος, 33, 25 ἄρα οὖν... «κρίνει 

f »Ρ Ἀ ν «ΨΚ ν Ἧ 3 Ψ κὺ \ Ὁ 3 ? ᾿ vn “~ 3 “~ 4 
τά τε ἄυλα καὶ τὰ ἕνυλα, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕλῃ αὖ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ... «ἔχοντι, 33, 
32 ὅλως δὲ.. τὸν νοῦν ἀμφότεροι ἀποφαΐνονται ὅ re ᾿Αριστοτέλης καὶ Θεόφραστος. 


Cf. De A. 430 Ὁ 18—22. 


IO. αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα τὸν νοῦν Kat δυνάμει καὶ 
> / ? > / ὃ , Ν Ν Ν ξ ὃ la 
ἐνεργείᾳ ληπτέον oiKeiws...duvdmer μὲν τὰ νοητὰ ὃ δυνάμει 
νοῦς... ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ οὐδὲν πρὶν νοεῖν. 

Prisc. 34, 29---21; 35, 29 54., 22 sq. 


Prisc. 34, 29 πάλιν δὲ ὑπομιμνήσκει φιλοσοφώτατα ὁ Θεόφραστος ὧς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ 
εἶναι... οἰκείως, ἕνα μὴ ὡς ἐπὶ ὕλης κατὰ στέρησιν τὸ δυνάμει, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἔξωθεν καὶ 
‘ a A ¢ , > \ . ¢ 3. yy > Ld a \ 
παθητικὴν τελείωσιν τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπονοήσωμεν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ws ἐπὶ αἰσθήσεως, ἔνθα διὰ 
τῆς τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κινήσεως ἡ τῶν λόγων γένεται προβολή, καὶ αὕτη τῶν ἔξω 
, > 8 , > \ - a 4 ~ Y 4 “ ὶ 4 ἐν ί t x 
κειμένων οὖσα θεωρητικὴ" ἀλλὰ νοερῶς ἐπὶ νοῦ καὶ τὸ Suvape καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι τὰ 
πράγματα, ληπτέον, 35, 24 καί μοι δοκεῖ ἐπισημήνασθαι κἀνταῦθα τὸ δεῖν οἰκείως 
~ ~ =~ 3 
λαμβάνειν ὑπιδόμενος τὸ ἄγραφον γραμματεῖον, ἐνταῦθά mov ὑπὸ τοῦ ᾿Αριστοτέλους 
ὡς παράδειγμα τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ προφερόμενον, ἵνα καὶ τὸ ἄγραφον ὡς ἐν νῷ θεωρῶμεν, 
ἔχοντι μὲν κατ᾽ οὐσίαν τὰ εἴδη καὶ τέλεια ἔχοντι, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου νοῦ τελειουμένῷῳ 
x“ > ᾽ ia 4 3 fa XN € * ~ , 3? ων 
καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ γραφομένῳ. τὸ γὰρ ἀμέριστον καὶ ἡνωμένον τῆς τελειότητος ἐκεῖθεν. 
΄- > 3 3 é 
δυνάμει μὲν.. νοῦς, as καθ᾽ ὑπόβασιν μὲν καὶ μετά τινος érepdrynros, GAA’ ἐγειρόμενος 
nm ~ ~ ΄ ~ 3 4 

ag’ ἑαυτοῦ εἰς τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου νοῦ ἀμέριστον τελειότητα τοιοῦτον yap TO νοερὸν 
δυνάμει- ἐντελεχείᾳ... νοεῖν, τουτέστιν οὐκ ἀμερίστως οὐδὲ ἡνωμένως, πρὶν ὑπὸ τοῦ 


πρώτου τελειωθῆναι. Cf. De A. 429 Ὁ 20 --31. 
II. ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν γένηται καὶ νοηθῇ δηλονότε ταῦτα [int. 
"ἢ Ψ ° ε A \ Ν ν 5“ ¥ e 3 ΄ 
τὰ évuda | ἔξει [int. ὁ νοῦς], τὰ δὲ νοητὰ ἀεί, εἴπερ ἢ ἐπιστήμη 
ἡ θεωρητικὴ ταὐτὸ τοῖς πράγμασιν, αὕτη δὲ ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν 
id 7 ? -~ -~ Ἂ \ N > N € 4 
δηλονότι: κυριωτάτη γάρ. τῷ νῷ τὰ μὲν νοητὰ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει... 
‘ \. ¥ a ~ “ 3 ‘ ~ ao ie id 
τὰ δὲ ἔνυλα, ὅταν vonOy, καὶ αὐτὰ τῷ νῷ ὑπάρξει. 
Prisc. 27, 24----20. 
Prisc. 37, 24 τοῦτο δὲ (De A. 430a 7---ο) διαρθρῶν 6 Θεόφραστος ἐπάγει" ἀλλ᾽ 


ὅταν..«τῷ νῷ, φησί, τὰ μὲν νοητά, τουτέστι τὰ ἄυλα, acl ὑπάρχει, ἐπειδὴ Kar’ οὐσίαν 
αὐτοῖς σύνεστι καὶ ἔστιν ὅπερ τὰ νοητά: τὰ Bt ἕνυλα.. ὑπάρξει, οὐχ ὡς συστοίχως 


H. 38 


594 APPENDIX 


2% + 4 ν “ 3» μ 3 2 ὦ ε a . 5 
αὐτῷ νοηθησόμενα" οὐδέποτε yap τὰ EvvAa τῷ νῷ ἀύλῳ ὄντι" ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν 6 νοῦς τὰ ἐν 
αὐτῷ μὴ ὡς αὐτὰ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ os αἴτια τῶν ἐνύλων γινώσκῃ, τότε καὶ τῷ νῷ 
ὑπάρξει τὰ ἔνυλα κατὰ τὴν αἰτίαν. Cf. De A. 4308 3—9. 

~ / 5 ᾿ »᾿ 
12. ἐκεῖνο ἐπισκεπτέον, ὃ δή φαμεν ἐν πάσῃ φύσει τὸ 
\ ε Y ‘ ’ \ δὲ »” Ν ΄ ΄ > 
μὲν ὧς ὕλην καὶ δυνάμει, TO δὲ ALTLOV καὶ ποιητικόν...τίνε οὖν 
wm a \ ε / kal 
αὗται ai δύο φύσεις; Kat τί πάλιν TO ὑποκείμενον ἢ συνηρτὴη- 
wn ~ \ FA ¢ a » ~ 
μένον τῷ ποιητικῷ; μεικτὸν yap πως ὃ νοῦς EK TE τοῦ 
rN 3 ‘ s 4 ε ἴω 
ποιητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ δυνάμει. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύμφυτος ὁ κινών, 
ΜᾺ ‘ ‘ o 
καὶ εὐθὺς ἐχρῆν καὶ ἀεί: εἰ δὲ ὕστερον, μετὰ Tivos Kal Tas 
€ ra ¥ ? εχ ξς 9 / ¥ ‘ »¥ Q 
ἡ γένεσις ; ἔοικε δ᾽ οὖν ws ἀγένητος, εἴπερ καὶ αφθαρτος. 
- A ‘ ’ ,ὔ \ 5 
ἐνυπάρχων δ᾽ οὖν διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεί; ἢ διὰ τί λήθη καὶ ἀπάτη 
‘ Ἃ Ν Ν n 
Kat ψεῦδος; ἢ διὰ τὴν μεῖξιν. 
Them. 108, 19—-21, 22—28. 


Them. 108, 18 ἁψάμενος δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ποητικοῦ νοῦ διωρισμένων 
᾿Αριστοτέλει ἐκεῖνό φησιν ἐπισκεπτέον... ποιητικόν, καὶ ὅτι ἀεὶ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν 
τοῦ πάσχοντος, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης. ταῦτα μὲν ἀποδέχεται, διαπορεῖ δέ: τίνε οὖν... 


διὰ τὴν μεῖξιν. (Frag. Lit. Ὁ W, p. 227, 14—228, 4.) 
ε \ > “2 \ 5 , \ 9 4 \ 

13. at μὲν ὀρέξεις Kat ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ ὀργαὶ σωματικαὶ 
κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσιν, ὅσαι δὲ 
κρίσεις καὶ θεωρίαι, ταύτας οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ἕτερον ἀναγαγεῖν, 
3 > 9 3. “Ὁ ΝᾺ ~ \ ὦ 3 ‘ \N € 93> 92 N ‘ 4 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ TH ψυχῃ Kal ἢ ἀρχὴ Katy ἐνέργεια καὶ TO τέλος, 
¥ \ A ς “~ ~ / a ’ Ψ \ » 
εἴ ye δὴ καὶ 6 νοῦς κρεῖττόν τι Kat θειότερον, ἅτε δὴ ἔξωθεν 
ἐπεισιὼν καὶ παντέλειος.. ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων σκεπτέον, εἴ 
τινα χωρισμὸν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ὄρον, ἐπεὶ τό γε κινήσεις εἶναι 
καὶ ταύτας ὁμολογούμενον. 

Simpl. 22 Phys. 964, 31—965, 4; 965, κ5ὶ 8q., Fr. viz. W. 


Simpl. 22 Phys. 964, 29 ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον ἀρέσκει τῶν ᾿Αριστοτέλους 
ἑταίρων τὸν Θεόφραστον ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἱϊερὶ κινήσεως αὐτοῦ λέγοντα, ὅτι at μὲν 
ὀρέξεις... .καὶ παντέλειος. καὶ τούτοις ἐπάγει ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν.. «ὁμολογούμενον. 


In these excerpts I see nothing to justify the supposition that 
Theophrastus modified the conclusions of our treatise. The last, 
no. 13, tallies exactly with the position provisionally assumed in 
De A.1.,c. 4: whereas Theophrastus speaks of κρίσεις and θεωρίαι 
as admittedly κινήσεις, A. himself not only says 408 Ὁ 3 sq. that, 
amongst other mental acts and conditions, διανοεῖσθαι is thought to 
be κίνησις, but also approves of saying that the man thinks with 
his soul, 408b 14.sq. Again, the last words of no. 4 are obviously 
inspired by 418a 254. χρῆσθαι ἀναγκαῖον... ὡς κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν. 
I take it, then, that the object of Theophrastus is to confirm the 


APPENDIX 595 


conclusions of our treatise and that his method, which Themistius 
found so perplexing, is to do this indirectly by thinking out the 
only possible alternatives, which A. sometimes left unexpressed, 
and showing exactly what difficulties beset our path if we take 
the one or the other of two conflicting views. The conclusion 
enunciated in no, 2, if we may trust its setting by Priscian, would 
seem to be that to which the cogent reasoning of no. 7 must lead. 
In no. 6 he seems to be arguing that the doctrine of intellect as 
capacity or potentiality is incomplete unless we assume that τὸ 
κινοῦν iS ἄλλος νοῦς. Both here and in no. 7 he may have in view 
and be leading up to the position that intellect thinks itself 
(cf. 430a 2 καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά): or he 
may be preparing the way for the twofold nature of intellect 
with which no. 12 deals. On this last important problem he gives 
no uncertain sound. Intellect, presumably the human intellect, 
is in a manner composite, μεικτόν mas: cf. the last words διὰ τὴν 
μεῖξιν. One of the two elements, viz. that which serves as sub- 
stratum or correlate to the other, the active element, he identifies 
with the capacity or potentiality of thinking, ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς. As 
to that which is the agent, ὁ κενῶν, it must be both ἀγένητος and 
ἄφθαρτος. But we have our choice of alternatives: either we may 
assume it to be connatural with the man, σύμῳυτος, in which case 
it must have been active from the moment of birth and uninter- 
mittently ; or we may suppose it to be a later growth, and then we 
must perforce explain how it springs up in him and what brings it 
there. (This dilemma recalls Azaé. Post. Il. 19, 99 b25 καὶ πότερον 
οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι αἱ ἕξεις ἐγγίνονται ἢ ἐνοῦσαι λελήθασιν KTé.) Why, then, 
do we not always think, and whence come forgetfulness, mistake 
and falsehood in our thought? Theophrastus answers, because the 
two elements are in the human mind intermingled: and just at 
this interesting point the citation breaks off, leaving the impression 
that Theophrastus had no more to say on 4308 23—-25. But from 
the first excerpt it is clear that on the origin of intellect as a whole 
he accepted the conclusions of De Gen. An. II., c. 3. 

There is one other matter of minor importance, which relates to 
the setting provided by Priscian for excerpt no. 10. I should infer 
from the expression (35, 24) «ad μοι δοκεῖ ἐπισημήνασθαι κἀνταῦθα 
TO Sev οἰκείως λαμβάνειν ὑπιδόμενος TO ἄγραφον γραμματεῖον that 
Theophrastus had not himself, or at any rate in that context, 
mentioned the simile of the unwritten tablet at all. It is Priscian 
who puts this gloss upon the scrap which he here cites as δεῖν οἰκείως 
λαμβάνειν, but 34, 30 Sq. aS ληπτέον οἰκείως. It would seem incon- 

38-—2 


506 APPENDIX 


ceivable that Theophrastus should here be citing De A. 429 Ὁ 31, 
where our MSS. have δεῖ δ᾽ οὕτως. The likeness to 26, 2 ody οὕτω δὲ 
ληπτέον and 26, 5 κατὰ ἀναλογίαν οὖν.. «ληπτέον is too strong to permit us 
to consider the one a comment upon Aristotle and the other a 
citation from him. Priscian in his own interpretation of the simile 
follows the path of Neo-Platonic orthodoxy. Whereas Alexander 
had brought the tablet into connexion with 429 a 27 sq., “the place of 
forms,” the Neo-Platonists preferred to interpret it by 430a 15 sqq., 
making the unwritten tablet answer to the colours, which need the 
sunlight to bring them into actuality. See Prisc. Lyd. 26, 21 τοῦ 
ἐνεργείᾳ τελεοῦντος δεῖται νοῦ, καὶ...καταλάμψεως and 26, 29—2z7, 7, 
where the idea is fully developed without any fresh voucher from 
Theophrastus for such an interpretation. In the words (27, 5) μὴ 
δεῖν οὕτω λαμβάνειν παρακελεύεται, ζητεῖν δὲ κτὲ. it is a mere 
coincidence that οὕτω should follow δεῖν, and we have here only 
another adaptation of οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον. I conclude, then, that 
there is no evidence to be got from Priscian as to the genuine 
reading in 429b 31. 


INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND PROPER NAMES. 


The references are to pages. 


Achelous 89, 387. 

Alemaeon 17, 217, 231Sq.3 XXII sq., XXVII. 

Alexander of Aphrodisias LXIV sq., LXVI, 
LXXIX. 

Anaxagoras 13, 17, 19, 131, 133, 216 sq., 
219 Sq., 225, 228Sq., 2308q., 236, 47758q., 
493 59-5 XXIVSQ., XXVI, XXXVII. 

Anaximenes 230; XXVII. 

Aphrodite 23, 25r. 

Aquinas LXVI. 

Archytas L, 22. 

Averroes LKVI. 

Avicenna LXV sq. 


Body and Soul 7, 9, 27, 29, 49-—53, 57. 59: 
65, 194564., 201—263, 305 544.» 327— 
331, 341 8qq.3; XLII—XLIV. 


Cleon 111, 137. 
Critias 17, 238. 


Daedalus 23, 251. 

Democritus 11, 13) £5) 23, 35; 37, 81, 212— 
219, 225—228, 233, 251, 281—283, 286 
SQ-> 373 56.» 422 56.) 440, 455; XXV Sq., 
XXXVII, 1.11. 

Diares 77. 

Diogenes of Apollonia 17, 226, 230, 2352; 
XXVI 864. 

Dreams LIII sq. 


Empedocles 13, 31, 39,411 05, 79, 1215 1375 
22%, 233, 270 Sq., 289—296, 343 56.» 
370—372, 4548q., 512 564.; XXII-—XXIV. 

Eudemus, the Dialogue 263, 265—267. 

Euthydemus XXVIII. 


Faculties of Soul 147, 550—552: 

Nutritive and Generative 63—71, 157; 
338 sqq-, 573 84-3 XLVI sq. 

Sensitive: see Sense. 

Appetitive 57, 59, 61, 147, 149—155> 
332, 551 56.) 555 8qq.3 LXIX—LXXIl. 

Imaginative: see Imagination. 

Intellective: see Intellect. 

Locomotive 147—157, 548 sqq. 


Gorgias XXVIII. 


Harmony, a definition of Soul 29, 31, 
263—273. . 

Heraclides of Pontus L, 7. 

Heraclitus 17, 231; XXI, XXVIII, XXXIV. 


Hesiod xx. 
Hippon 17, 232. 
Homer 13, 121; XX sq. 


Illusions of Sense and of Imagination 77, 
113, 125, 127, 129, 432, 463, 468 sqq.; 
LIII sq. 

Image, mental, indispensable to Thought, 
141, 143, 145, 529 SQ-, 537 5664., 546— 
548; LVIII. 

After-Image or After-Percept 463; 1111. 
Imagination 12I—129, 452 sqq.; LIII 566. 
Intellect 33, 13I1—145, 276—279, 474.8qq;; 

LVIII—LXIX. 


Judgment 119, 121, 137, 445 546.» 511 sqq. 
Leucippus ΣΙ, 215, 233; XXV. 
Memory and Recollection L1V—LVIII. 


Orphic Poems 43, 295 6q.- 
Sect and Doctrine XX sq., XXIII, XXIX. 


Parmenides XXII. 

Philippus 23, 251. 

Philoponus LXXIX——LXXXIII. 

Pindar Xx. 

Plato 15, 222—225, 434, 482; XXVIII— 
XXXVI. 

Plato and Platonists tacitly criticised 
[9—29, 238—263, 300, 327, 383 Sq-; 
805. 459 8Q-, 465 SQ-, 550---552,) 554: 

ο 


560. 

Priscianus Lydus 589 sqq.; LXXIX sq. 

Protagoras XXVII Sq., XXXIV. 

Pythagoras XXI. 

Pythagoreans 11, 29, 216sq., 262, 383, 
44.2; XXI. 


Sense in general 7I—75, 105, 107, 118) 
ΤΙ7, 157, 349 S94» 415 5664.» 437—443, 
573 $qq.; XLVII—LII. 

Senses, the five special 109, rrr, 158—163, 

_422—426, 579 Sqq-: 
Sight 77 544.» 364 544. 
Hearing 83 sqq-, 375 566. 
Smelling ΟἹ sqq-, 390 566. 
Tasting 95, 97, 398 546. 
Touch 97 sqq-, 402 sag. 

Sensibles 75, 77, 129, 360 sqq., 468 sqq.: 
Objects of Sensus Communis 75, 77, 111; 

113, 129, 360—362, 426—432. 


398 INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND PROPER NAMES 


Sensibles: 
Colour 77 sqq., 364 544. 
Sound 83 sqq., 375 566. 
Vocal Sound 87, 89, 385—390. 
Odours οἱ sqq., 390 Sqq- 
Flavours 95, 97, 398 546. 
Tangibles 97, 99, 103, 402-405, 412-—— 
415. 
Sensus Communis 111, 113, 426—432. 
Its functions: 
Discrimination 119,121, 141,143, 443-— 
452, 530—537> 
Self-consciousness 113, 433—436. 
Simplicius LXV, LXXIX-—~LXXXIIIL 


Sleep 1111 sq. 
Sophonias LXXIX sq. 
Syllogism, practical 157, 571 Sq.; LXXI sq. 


Teleology 89, 113, 157-~163, 388 sq., 432 
564. 573—588. 

Thales 17, 43, 226, 231, 297. 

Themistius LXIV sq., LXXIX sq., LXXXII. 

Theophrastus 589 sqq., LXIV, LXXIX. 

Timaeus, the Platonic 15, 23—27, 222, 


252 566. 


Menocrates 225,279—288; XXXVI, XXXVIII. 
Xenophanes XXI sq. 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS. 


The number 400 should be added to each of the page-numbers given. 


The 


references will then be to Bekker’s pages (402—435), columns (a or b) and 


lines. 


A, τὸ 17 a 29, 314 25, 28, Ὁ 1. 

ἀγαθός : τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ δι᾽ αὑτὸ 
opposed to τὸ μὲν de’ ἄλλο, τὸ δ᾽ ἑτέρου 
ἕνεκεν 6b 9: τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ ἐν τῷ 
αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος 
ΞΙ Ὁ τι: τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν 33 4a 28: 
τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν 5338. 20, Ὁ 163 ἀγαθὸν 
ἁπλῶς 339; τὸ ἀγαθὸν 10a 12, 26 Ὁ 25, 
28a 30, 31ἃ 11, 18. 

ἀγγεῖον 10 Ὁ 26. 

ἄγειν 17 Ὦ 10, 26b 4. 

ἀγένητον 54. Ὁ 5. 

ἄγευστον ΔΙ Ὁ 8, 228. 30. 

ἀγνοεῖν 3b 8, το Ὁ 4. 

ἄγνοια τὸ Ὁ 2. 

ἄδηλος 7b 5, 13 ἃ 5, 8, 14 Ὁ 16, 234 12. 

ἀδιαίρετος : of atoms ἀδιαιρέτων σωμάτων 
5a 10, ἀδιαιρέτους σφαίρας 6 b 20, ὧν ὃ 
τόπος ἀδιαίρετος, καὶ αὐτὰ Qa 24: δυνάμει 
τὸ ἀδιαίρετον τἀναντία opposed to τῷ 
ἐνεργεῖσθαι διαιρετὸν 27.2 63 τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ 
ἀδιαίρετον 26 Ὁ 30: of the faculty of 
sensus communis ἀδιαίρετον opposed to 
διαιρετὸν 27 a 4, 113 ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον 
opposed to τῷ εἶναι κεχωρισμένον 27a 2, 
τόπῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον opposed to τῷ 
εἶναι διαιρετὸν 27a 5: ἡ τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων 
νόησις 30 a 26, b 7: τὸ κατὰ ποσὸν 
ἀδιαίρετον opposed to τὸ τῷ εἴδει ἀδιαίρε- 
τον 30 Ὁ 14: χρόνος ἀδιαίρετος “6 Ὁ 31, 
80 Ὁ 8, 15, opposed to χρόνος διαιρετὸς 
30 Ὁ 9: ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς 30 Ὁ 15: 
Ὦ ἀδιαίρετα opposed to ἢ ἐκεῖνα διαιρετὰ 
80 17: τὶ ἀδιαίρετον ποιεῖ ἕνα τὸν χρόνον 
καὶ τὸ μῆκος 30b 18: ἀδιαίρετον ὡς στιγμὴ 
30b 21: ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ 30 Ὁ 6. 

ἀδιάφορον ga 2. 

ἀδυνατεῖν 15 Ὁ 3, 19 Ὁ 2, I7- 

ἀδύνατος : incapable 21 Ὁ 7, 22a 28, Ὁ 2, 
24. Ὁ 4, 7- 

ἀεὶΞε πᾶσιν 28a 8. 

ἀέξεται (Emped.) 27 a 23. 

ἀέρινος 35 a I2.- 

ἀήρ: πάντων λεπτομερέστατον καὶ ἀρχὴν 
5 a 22: διασπώμενος ὁμοειδὴς I1 a 20, 
διαφανὴς 18b 6, 7, 19 a 14: TO μεταξὺ 
ψόφων τὸ a 32, 21 Ὁ 9 (cf. 20 Ὁ 158» 
24D 34, 258 1, 35b 21): κενὸν 10Ὁ 34: 
ἀκοῇ συμφνὴς (ν.]. ἀέρι ἀκοὴ) 20 ἃ 4: 
εὔθρυπτος 20 a 7 34.: ἀόριστος 24. Ὁ 16: 


ἐξ ἀέρος ἀδύνατον συστῆναι τὸ ἔμψυχον 
σῶμα 23 8 12: ἁπλοῦς 24 Ὁ 30, 258 4: 
ἡ ἀκοὴ ἀέρος 258. 5 (cf. 24 Ὁ 33, 258 3 56., 
8): ἐπὶ πλεῖστον κινεῖται 35 a 4. 

ἀθάνατος 5 a 30, 31, 118. 13, 304 23. 

ἀθροῦς 204 25. 

αἴγλη νῆστις (Emped.) τὸ ἃ 5. 

ἀΐδηλος (Emped.) 4 Ὁ r4. 

ἀΐδιος 7 a 23, 13 Ὁ 27, 18 Ὁ 9, 30a 23- 

αἰθὴρ 4“ Ὁ 14 (ὠξ-). 

αἷμα 34 31, Β Ὁ 4, 5 (425), γ. 

αἰσθάνεσθαι: οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος 3a 6 5αᾳ.; 
τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι σωματικὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν 
278 27; ψυχῆς οἰκειότωτον 5b 6: αἰσθά- 
νεται οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ μετέχει ψυχῆς 15 b 24: 
κίνησις εἶναι δοκεῖ 8 Ὁ 3 54ᾳ., πάσχειν Te 
καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ 8. 25, 248 1, 294 14: 
ᾧ αἰσθανόμεθα διχῶς λέγεται 14 ἃ 4: τὸ 
αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγομεν διχῶς 17 a IO, τό 
re δυνάμει ὃν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ 17 a 133 
τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ὁμοίως 
λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν 17 Ὁ 18 sq., διαφέρει τοῦ 
θεωρεῖν 17 Ὁ 19: αἰσθάνεσθαι distinguished 
from δοξάξειν 15 Ὁ 30, from φρονεῖν 27 Ὁ 
6 sqq-, from νοεῖν 27 Ὁ 8 sqq., b 27: τὸ 
αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐκ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ 17 Ὁ 24: κατὰ 
συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθάνεται Διάρους νἱοῦ 18 a 
21 54.: πάντων αἰσθανόμεθα διὰ τοῦ μέσου 
23 Ὁ 7 (cf. 23 Ὁ 48q., Ὁ 13 sq.): ἐπετιθε- 
μένων ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται 
23 Ὁ 248q.: τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ 
οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα 24.0 2 54. (cf. 24a 7 54.): 
τῶν κοινῶν αἰσθανόμεθα ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει 
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 258. 15 (cf. 25a 248q., 
ἃ. 20): αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν 25 Ὁ 12,13: 
αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅτι διαφέρει τὰ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην 
αἴσθησιν αἰσθητὰ 26 Ὁ τ4: τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι 
ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν 31a 8: μὴ 
αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι 32a 7: 
τὸ αἰσθανόμενον οὐ μέγεθος 44 ἃ. 26: τὰ 
αἰσθανόμενα ob πάντα κινητικὰ το Ὁ Ig: 
διὰ τί τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται 24a 33: 
αἰσθάνεσθαι with gen. 4 Ὁ 0, τἂν 24, 10a 
24, b 1, 18a 22, 23, 21a 14, Ὁ ro, b 22, 
228 12, Ὁ Lo, 23a 8, 18, 19, Ὁ 7, 9.» 135 
25, 242 3, 7, Ὁ 28, 254 2, 15, 26b 19, 
27a 4, With acc. το Ὁ τό, 18 a 9, 12, 
20a 10, 23b 5», 254217, 20, 22, 30, 278 
20, 27, 28b 1, 31b 5, 35 Ὁ 23. 

αἴσθημα 314 15, 32a Q. 


600 


αἴσθησις: πάθος THs ψυχῆς g Ὁ 16; one of 
the modes of life 13 a 23; ἀλλοίωσίς τις 
εἶναι δοκεῖ 18 Ὁ 243 ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ 
πάσχειν συμβαίνει 16 Ὁ 333 διχῶς ἂν 
λέγοιτο ἡ αἴσθησις, ἡ μὲν ὡς δυνάμει, 7 
δὲ ws ἐνεργείᾳ 17a 12. 268 23, ἢ δύναμις 
ἢ ἐνέργεια 282 6 (εἴ. 28 Ὁ 13, 20 ἃ 2); 
τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἴσθη- 
σις as distinguished from ἐπιστήμη 17 b 
22: ἢ αἴσθησις οἷον μεσότης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐν 
τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως 248. 4: ὁ λόγος 
248. 31, 26 Ὁ 3, 7; οὐ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ λόγος 
τις καὶ δύναμις τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου 248. 27; 
οὐ δύναται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα 
αἰσθητοῦ 29 a 31 86..; κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητὰ 
248 8, δύναμις καθ᾽ ἣν κρίνομεν καὶ ἀλη- 
θεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα 28 ἃ 4, τὸ Κριτικὸν 
διανοίας ἔργον καὶ αἰσθήσεως 5358 τό (cf. 
4b 26); τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν 
ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης 24. 8 18, τὸ πάσχειν τὰ 
εἴδη τῶν αἰσθητῶν 27 a 9; τὰ αἰσθητά 
πως 31b 23; τέμνεται εἰς τὰ πράγματα, 
ἡ μὲν δυνάμει εἰς τὰ δυνάμει κτὲ. 41 Ὁ 243 
εἶδος αἰσθητῶν 328. 2; ἀπὸ τωνδὲ as dis- 
tinguished from ἀνάμνησις 8 Ὁ 17; πότερον 
πάντων ὁμοίως ἐστὶν 23 Ὁ τ 54.: ἀπελθόν- 
τὼν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔνεισιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἐν 
τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις Δ Ὁ 24. 54ᾳ.: ἢ τοῦ αἰσθη- 
τοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἣ αὐτή 
ἐστι καὶ μία 5 Ὁ 26: αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα 
ὅτι διαφέρει τὰ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν 
αἰσθητὰ 26 b τ4: αἴσθησιν ἄνευ τῆς ἐν 
τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀρχῆς οὐθὲν ἔχει 11 Ὁ 30; 
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν ὑπάρχειν ἐν ἅπασι 
τοῖς ζῶσιν 34a 27; τὰ φυτὰ οὐ μετέχει 
αἰσθήσεως τὸ Ὁ 23, 25 Ὁ £3 τὸ ζῷον 
ὑπάρχει διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως 13 Ὁ 2 
(cf. 28a 8, 348 30); οὐθὲν ἔχει ψυχὴν 
σῶμα μὴ μόνιμον ὃν ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως 34Ὁ 8; 
ὅπου αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ 13 Ὁ 23, 
Ι4 Ὁ 4 (cf. 34 a 3); ἑκάτερον τῶν μορίων 
τῶν διαιρουμένων ζῴων αἴσθησιν ἔχει 
rrb ar (ch 12} “21)---τὰ μὲν ζῷα ἔχει 
“πάσας αἰσθήσεις, τὰ δὲ τινάς, τὰ δὲ μίαν, 
τὴν ἁφὴν 14a 2 34., b 3; τίνος ἕνεκα 
πλείους ἔχομεν αἰσθήσεις 25 Ὁ 4; οὐκ ἔστιν 
αἴσθησις ἑτέρα παρὰ τὰς πέντε 24 Ὁ 22— 
ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστον ἐστὶν οὐχ ἢ ἕκαστον 
λέγεται, ἀλλ᾽ 7 τοιονδὲ 248. 22 8q.3 ἑκάστη 
αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, 
ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ 26b 8, κρίνει 
τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφορὰς 
26 Ὁ το, ὃν αἰσθάνεται 25 a 20; πᾶσα 
αἴσθησις μιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως εἷναι δοκεῖ (πλὴν 
ἀφῆς) 22 Ὁ 23, 25 (cf. 18 8 18 56.)---τῶν 
κοινῶν ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν κοινὴν 25 a 27, 
ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα κατὰ συμ- 
βεβηκὸς 258. 13; τὰ δ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἔδια κατὰ 
συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθάνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις, οὐχ 
ἢ αὐταί, GAN ἢ μία 25 a 308q.3 ἡ αἴσθησις 
τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθὴς 27 Ὁ 12, 28 a Τί, 
ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος 28 Ὁ 19 
(cf. 18a 12, 30 Ὁ 20), περὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ 
συμβεβηκότα μάλιστα ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι 
κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν 28b 28. 20, 18 ἃ 15 56.; 
διὰ τί τῶν αἰσθήσεων (= sense-organs) 
αὐτῶν ov γίνεται αἴσθησις 17 ἃ 3; αἱ ἄλλαι 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


αἰσθήσεις (πλὴν apis) δι᾿ ἑτέρων αἰσθάνον- 
Tac 534 Ὁ 14. οὐ τοῦ εἶναι ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ 
εὖ 35 Ὁ το sqq-, 34 Ὁ 24: 7 ὅλη αἴσθησις 
12 Ὁ 24, πᾶσα αἴσθησις 16b 32, 24a 17— 
(Platonic) αἴσθησις ὁ τοῦ στερεοῦ ἀριθμὸς 
4b 22, αἴσθησις σύμφυτος ἁρμονίας 6b 30. 


αἰσθητήριον : τὸ αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ 


αἰσθητοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης 25 Ὁ 23; αἰσθητή- 
ρίον πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις 242 
241 ὑπὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ κινεῖται ἑκάτερον τῶν 
αἰσθητηρίων 19 a 28 (cf. 19 ἃ τα 56.), 
πάντα τὰ αἰσθητήρια (πλὴν apis) ἁφῇ 
αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλὰ δι᾿ ἑτέρου 358 18, 15 Ξ6.; 
ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἀναίσ- 
θητον 23 Ὁ 17, 23b 20 8q., b 534. 54. (cf. 
19a 12, 26,28); τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ 
φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια 2.,.ἃ 298qq-, 35 Ὁ 
15. ἢ 75644., 18; ἀνάγκη εἴπερ ἐκλείπει 
τις αἴσθησις καὶ αἰσθητήριόν τι ἐκλείπειν 
24 Ὁ “6 5α.; εἰ ἐξ ἀέρος ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον 
24 Ὁ 33, τῶν ἁπλῶν ἐκ δύοτούτων alc θητήρια 
μόνον ἐστίν, ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος 25a 3 5q., 
οὐθὲν ἔστιν αἰσθητήριον ἔξω ὕδατος καὶ 
ἀέρος 25a 8, τὰ ἄλλα ἔξω γῆς αἰσθητήρια 
ἂν “γένοιτο 35 ἃ τά 34.: τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν 
αἰσθητήριον οὖκ ἔστιν ἀκριβὲς αἵ ἃ 12, 
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων 
ξῴων δἵ Ὁ “26 sq. (οἷ. arb 32 5qq.), δυνάμει 
ξηρὸν 222 7; φανερὰ τὰ αἰσθητήρια τῆς 
ὄψεως, τῆς ἀκοῆς, τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ἕτερα 
ὄντα 23 ἃ 11: τὸ γευστικὸν αἰσθητήριον 
ἀνάγκη μήτε ὑγρὸν εἶναι ἐντελεχείᾳ μήτε 
ἀδύνατον ὑγραίνεσθαι 551} 1 5η.. Ὁ 45q.: 
παρὰ τὸ ἁπτικὸν αἰσθητήριόν εἶσιν ἄνθρω- 
ποι evmuets καὶ ἀφνεῖς 21a 23 5(.; τί τὸ 
αἰσθητήριον τὸ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ 25 1) 203 τὸ 
πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ 252} 223 
πότερόν ἐστιν ἐντὸς 22 b 345 τὸ αἰσθητή- 
ριον τὸ ἁπτικὸν ἐν ᾧ ἢ adh πρώτῳ δυνάμει 
θερμὸν xré. 23 Ὁ 30; τὸ ἀἁπτικὸν αἰσθη- 
τήριον δεκτικὸν οὐ μόνον ὅσαι διαφοραὶ “γῆς 
εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπτῶν ἁπάντων 
325 ἃ 22 864ᾳ.; τὸ ἁπτικὸν αἰσθητήριον οὐκ 
ἔστιν οὔτε “γῆς οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν στοιχείων 
οὐδενὸς 35 Ὁ 2 54.: τῶν κοινῶν οὐχ οἷόν 
7 εἶναι αἰσθητήριον ἴδιον 25 ἃ τ4: τὸ 
ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον 26 b 16 (cf. 31 ἃ 10). 
In 424 Ὁ 31—~425 a 8 the word is 
apparently used in a restricted sense for 
ihe organs of telepathic senses only. 


αἰσθητικός: jicdicative 24 b 33, 27 a 18, 


34 b 28, οὐθὲν dvev θερμότητος αἰσθητικὸν 
25a 6; αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι 13 Ὁ 29, 244 27 
-- τὸ αἰσθητικόν, part of the seul rob 26 
(cf. 8a 13, 14a 32, b 1, 31, 15a 2, 17, 
3ra 14. b26, 33b 3); οὔτε ἄλογον οὔτε 
λόγον ἔχον 32a 30; corresponding to 
νοῦς 2b 13, ΤΟ 22, 294 173 τὸ αἰσθητι- 
Koy οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον 
178.6 (cf. 17b 30—18 4 1), δυνάμει ἐστὶν 
οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη dvredexelg 18a 3.56. 
(cf. 31a 48q.), τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν 
δυνάμει τὸ αἰσθητὸν 31 b 246---., 8 ; τοῦ 
αἰσθητικοῦ ἡ πρώτη μεταβολὴ γίνεται ὑπὸ 
τοῦ γεννῶνγος 17 Ὁ 163 % τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ 
ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ 26a τὰ; μέα 
ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνέργεια ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἡ τοῦ 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


αἰσθητικοῦ 26 a 1554.; οὐ τὸ κινοῦν τὸ 
ζῷον τὴν πορευτικὴν κίνησιν 32b 193 τῷ 
αἰσθητικῷ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν κρίνει 
20 Ὁ 153 οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀπάθεια τοῦ 
αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητικοῦ 29a 29 sq. ; 
τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος 20 Ὁ 5; 
τῷ αἰσθητικῷ ὄργανον ἔστιν 29 a 56: τὸ 
τοῦ ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικὸν (=sense-organ) 28 Ὁ 
23: αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ 78 5, ἀρχὴ τι Ὁ 30, 
μεσότης 31a 11, ζῷον 15a 6 (cf. 24 Ὁ 9), 
σῶμα 12 Ὁ 25. 

αἰσθητός : τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ 
2Ὸ τό, 15a 22 (cf. 29a 17): τὰ αἰσθητὰ 
distinguished from τὰ νοητὰ 31 b 223 τῶν 
καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν 17b 27 54., 
21} λέγεται τριχῶς τ8ε. 8; τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ 
αἰσθητῶν τὰ ἴδια κυρίως ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ 
18a 25; κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητὸν 18a 
20 ; ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἰσθητὸν 
17b 25; κἀν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις τῶν αἰσθητῶν, 
ry Ὁ 263; ἐν ἑτέρῳ αἰσθητῷ τὰ κοινὰ 
ὑπάρχει 25 Ὁ 93 φαίνεται τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐκ 
δυνάμει ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ 
ποιοῦν 31a 48q-: διχῶς 26a 23---22 8 0, 
242 20. b2, 18, 31, 25 Ὁ 24, 26, 26a τί, 
16, Ὁ 8, 10, 324 3, 4, 5, 6 35b 7, 


15. 

αἴτημα 18 b 26. 

αἰτία: τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς 
οὐσίαις 2b 18, αἰτία καὶ ἀρχὴ 15 Ὁ 8, 
138sq.—5b 17. Τ7Ὁ Ὁ, 7, 8a 22, 13a 1895 
r5b 12, 15. 164 10. 

αὕτεον : τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικὸν 30a 12— 
4b 2, 7b 8, 1rb 5, 13a 20, 15b 12, 
16a 8, 14, 17 Ὁ 22, 18a 31, 20b 21, 
2ia 9, 228 8, 24b 1, 30a 6, b 25, 
34 ἃ το. 

ἀκάλνφες 22 ἃ 1. 

ἀκίνητος 20a £0, 32 b 20, 33 b 15, £6. 

ἀκμὴ IIa 30, 32 b 24, 348 24. 

ἀκοή: sense of hearing (see 11., c. 8) ψόφου 
18a 13, τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ καὶ ἀνηκούστου 
2 Ὁ 4.54.. ψόφου τε καὶ σιγῆς 224 23, 
ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος 22 Ὁ 24.54.; δι᾽ érépov 
αἰσθάνεται 34 Ὁ 153; τὸ ζῷον ἔχει ἀκοὴν 
ὅπως σημαίνηταί τι αὐτῷ 35 Ὁ 243 διττὸν 
ἡ ἀκοὴ 26a 75q.3 ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν 25b 28, 
31, 26a 3, 18, ἡ τοῦ ἀκουστικοῦ ἐνέργεια 
262 7: ἡ φωνὴ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἔστιν ὡς ἕν 
ἐστι 262 27 54.; λόγος 26a 20: Τ0 Ὁ 4, 
21 4, 22 Ὁ 33, 23 τ 0, 24 Ὁ 23, 25b 28 
—the ear (=sense-organ) ἀέρος 25a 4; 
τὸ ὀξὺ Kal τὸ βαρὺ ὑπερβάλλον φθείρει τὴν 
ἀκοὴν 26a 30 54.: 19 b 8, 20 ἃ 4 (d25), 
23 Ὁ 18, 31a 18. 

ἀκολουθεῖν 5b 27, 25 Ὁ 5, 8, 28a 22, 33a 8, 
IX. 

ἀκούειν : τὸ δυνάμει ἀκοῦον 17 a το, τὸ 
δυνάμενον ἀκούειν 25 Ὁ 30; ἀκούεται ἐν 
ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι ΤΟ 18, 204 τι (cf. 19b 34, 
35, 20a 18)—-I7 a II, 204 5, [4, 18) 
25b 12, 20. 

ἄκουσις 264 1, 7, 12. 

ἀκουστικὸς 26a 7. 

ἀκουστὸς 17 Ὁ 21, 21b 4, 22a 24 (δὲς). 

ἀκρασία 34. 8. 14. 

ἀκρατὴς 33a 3. 


601 


ἀκρίβεια, 2a 2. 

ἀκριβὴς 21a 10, 12, 18, 20: ἀκριβῶς Ig a τό, 
2ἴ. 20a 10, 28a 13. 

ἀκριβοῦν 21a 22. 

ἄκρος: exterior surface 23a 26: extremes 
(of sensibles) 24a 7: terms of the syllo- 
gism μέσον καὶ ἄκρον 7a 20. 

ἀκτὶς 4A 4. 

ἀλήθεια 2a 5, 44 31. 

ἀληθεύειν 27 Ὁ 21, 28a 4, 17. 

ἀληθής: TO ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον 4.8. 28, 
27 Ὁ 3; εἰπεῖν ἀληθὲς 6a 32; αἴσθησις 
τῶν ἰδίων 27b 12, 28a τι, 15, Ὁ 18 (cf. 
20 Ὁ 20), οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀεὶ 30b 303 κίνησις 
(ΞΞ φαντασία) 28b 17, 28, δόξα 27 Ὁ Io, 
28 ἃ 19, Ὁ 8, 7, ὑπόληψις 28b 3, φάσις 
30b 27, νοῦς 309 28; συμπλοκὴ νοημά- 
τῶν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος 32a IT, ἐν 
οἷς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς 304 27, Ὁ 4» 
21 Ὁ το---ἀληθῶς Ita 26. 

ἀλλάττειν τόπον 15 Ὁ 3. 

ἀλλοῖος (Emped.) 27 a 25. 

ἀλλοιοῦν 17 a 31, b 6, 8, 18 a 3, 24 Ὁ 13, 
314 5, 35 4 2. 

ἀλλοίωσις : κίνησίς τις, distinguished from 
φορά, φθίσις, αὔξησις 6a 13, 8 Ὁ II, 
15b 23 (cf. 35a 1); of αἴσθησις 15 Ὁ 24, 
16 b 34; δύο τρόποι ἀλλοιώσεως 17 Ὁ 14 
(cf. 17b 7). 

ἀλλότριος 18 Ὁ 6, 20a 17, 22a 9, 29 a 20. 

ἀλλοῴφρονεῖν (Homer) 4 ἃ 30. 

ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι 29 b 13 (cf. 20 Ὁ 16). 

ἁλμυρὸς 22a 19, Ὁ 12, 26 Ὁ 5. 

ἄλογος 328 26, 30, b6; ἀλογώτατον 8b 32: 
ἀλόγως 44 5. 

ἅμα: preposition 3a 18, 8a 25, 23 Ὁ 15, 
32a 8, 35 Ὁ 10: adverb, with participle 
3b 20, 238 2. 

ἀμαυρὸς 3 ἃ 21. 

ἀμαύρωσις 8b 20. 

duBrvs 20 Ὁ 1, 2. 

ἀμερὴς 2b 1, 7a 9, 19 (d25), Qa 2. 

ἀμιγής : of νοῦς 5a 17, 29 a 18, 304 18; 
of sensibles 26 Ὁ 4. 

ἄμφω: ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν 3b 9 (cf. συνέπλεξαν 
ἐξ ἀμφοῖν 4b 29, ἀπ’ ἀμφοῖν § a 1); τὸ 
ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσία τ48 τό, ἔμψυχον τ48 175 
εἰ ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ ἐπ’ 
ἀμφοῖν 30 Ὁ 13 sq. 

ἀνάγειν 5 Ὁ 12. 

ἀναθυμίασις (Fleraclitus) 5 a 26. 

ἄναιμος 20 Ὁ 10, 21 Ὁ 11, 20. 

ἀναιρεῖν 8a 25, 35 Ὁ 14. 18. 

ἀναίσθητος 21 Ὁ 17. 

ἀνακάμπτειν 7 ἃ 28, 30. 

ἀνακλᾶσθαι 19 Ὁ 29, 31, 358 6. 

ἀνάκλασις 19 Ὁ 16, 35 4 5. 

ἀνάλογον 12a 25, Ὁ 3; ἀνάλογον ἔχειν 
12b 23, 20b 1, 218 17; τὰ μὲν ἔχουσι 
τὴν ἀνάλογον ὀσμὴν καὶ χυμὸν 21a 28; τὸ 
ἀνάλογον 22 Ὁ 21, 23a 15, ὃν τῷ ἀνάλογον 
ἢ (ν. 1. καὶ) τῷ ἀριθμῷ 31a 22. 

ἀνάμνησις 8 Ὁ 17. 

ἀνάπλεως 23 ἃ 27. 

ἀναπνεῖν: opposed to ἐκπνεῖν 21a 2, Ὁ 14 
(is); τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος 20b 27: 33 
(cf. 2ο Ὁ 17, 26)—4a 13, 10 b 29, 118 I, 


602 


19 Ὁ 2 (zs), 2145, Ὁ 18, 20, 26, 228 
25 4; 5- 

ἀναπνοή: opposed to ἐκπροὴ 32 Ὁ 11— 
42 Io, 5 Ὁ 28, 20 b 23, 25. 

ἄναπτος 24a 12 (625). 

ἀνασπᾶν 21 Ὁ 30. 

ἀνατολὴ 18 Ὁ 25. 

ἀναύχενες κόρσαι (Emped.) 30a 29. 

ἄνεμος 3 Ὁ 5, Io Ὁ 30. 

ἀνήκουστος 2 Ὁ 5, 22a 26. 

ἀνθέλκειν 33 Ὁ 8. 

ἀνθρώπινος 2 Ὁ 4. 

ἄνθρωπος : opposed to other animals in 
general or to distinct species 2b 7, 4b 6, 
14 Ὁ 18, 33, 21a 11, τό, 20, 23, Ὁ 26, 
29a 8, φρονιμώτατον τῶν ζῴων za 225 
a type of air-breathing animals rg Ὁ 1, 
21b r4, 19, 243; an instance of τὸ 
σύνολον ob 32, τοῦ 9, 1τ---ῤ ἃ 9g, 8b 
I4, 17 a 23, 24, 28 ἃ 14, 30b 29, 
(Emped.) 27a 23. 

ἀνίστασθαι 6 b 4. 

ἁνομοιομερὴς 11 a 21. 

ἀνόμοιος 17 a 19, 20, 27 Ὁ 4. 

ἀνόσῴφραντος 21 Ὁ 6 (47s). 

ἀντικείμενον : object, especially sensible 
object, 2b 15, 15 a 20, 24a τὰ; thing 
contrasted 11 a 4, 164 34. 

ἀντιλύπησις, 4. ἃ 30. 

ἀντιστρέφειν Oa 32, 23 8. 21. 

ἀντιφράττειν 20 a 20. 

ἄνω: opposed to κάτω 6a 28, 13a 28, 
16a 1, 2, 3; τὸ ἄνω σῶμα τῷ Ὁ g, 123 
ἡ ἄνω 344 15. 

ἀνώνυμος 18a 1, 17, 19 ἃ 4, 32, 268 13, 
14, 18. 

ἀόρατος : πῶς λέγεται 22a 26—18b 28, 
21 Ὁ §, 22 ἃ 20, 21, 22, 24a 11. 

ἀδριστος 24. Ὁ 151 ἀορίστως 344 4, 8. 

ἀπάθεια 29 a 20. 

ἀπαθής: τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τὸ a 23; 
16a 32: οὗ νοῦς 5b ar, 8 Ὁ 25, 29, 
294 15, Ὁ 23, 30a 18, 24. 

ἀπαιτεῖν 8a 18. 

ἀπαντᾶν 21 Ὁ 12. 

ἀπατᾶν 18a 12, 15, 28 b 3, 27 b τ, 28b 


25. 

ἀπάτη 24 b 4: 5. 

ἀπεῖναε 28 Ὁ 20. 

ἀπειράκις 7 ἃ 14. 

ἄπειρος .8. τ, 78. 13, 94 24, 28, Ὁ 29, 
324 24} πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον 11 Ὁ 14 
(cf. 25 Ὁ 16); αὔξησις εἰς ἄπειρον 16a 


18. 
ἀπελθεῖν 26 Ὁ 24. 
ἄπεπτος 16b 5, 6. 


ἁπλοῦς : ὄργανα τὸ Ὁ 2; opposed to μεικτὸς 
534 Ὁ 9,10, 35ar1l,of νοῦς 5a τό, 20 Ὁ 23, of 
flavours 22 Ὁ 11, of σῶμα 3248. 28; ἁπλᾶ 
σώματα 16a 28, τὰ ἁπλᾶ (-Ξ τὰ στοιχεῖα) 
24 Ὁ 30, 25a 3—unambiguous, of terms 
17b 2, 3ο-- ἁπλῶς : opposed to τινὶ 
ΔΙ Ὁ 12: 4a 28, 10a 30, 164 I0, 14, 
318 7, 33b 9g (bts); ws ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν 
18b 5; ἁπλῶς (vaguely) λέγειν 17a 22, 
26 a 26 (dz). 

ἀποβάλλειν τῷ Ὁ 25, 28 Ὁ 5. 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


ἀποβλέπειν 4b 7, 8a 6, br. 

ἀπόδειξις 2 a τὸν 19, Ὁ 25, 7a 26 (d2s). 

ἀποδιδόναι 2b 23, 3b 1, 584,17, 68 27, 
8a 3, 9b 16. 

ἄποθεν, opposed to actual contact 23 Ὁ 3, 
34 Ὁ 27. 

ἀποθνήσκειν 35 Ὁ 5. 

ἀποκαλύπτειν 22 δὶ 2. 

ἀπολαμβάνεσθαι Il a IQ. 

ἀπολείπειν : intransitive 8a 28, 12 b 20; 
transitive 32 Ὁ 22. 

ἀπολλύναι 8 Ὁ 29. 

ἀπολύεσθαι 7b 3, 94 20. 

ἀπομνημονεύειν 5 aA τὸ. 

ἀπονέμειν Sa 1. 

ἀπορεῖν 2b 15. 8a 34, roa 11. Ὁ ro, 14» 
23 8 22, 24 Ὁ 3, 29 b 22, 318 24. 

ἀπορία 2a 21, 3a 3, Sa 24, 9b 22, 
Ioa 27, Ita 9, 13 b τό, 16a 20, 
17a 2, 22 Ὁ 19, 28, 258 Ὁ 17, 32a 22, 
Ὁ 2, 13. 

ἄπορον 21 Ὁ 13. 

ἀπορροὴ τ Ὁ 18. 

ἀπόρροια 22a 15. 

ἀπότασις 20 b 8, 

ἄποτος 22 a 32. 

ἄἅπους 22 8. 20. 

ἀποφαίνεσθαι 3b 22, 4b 29, 5 ἃ , 8, 
b 2, 9, 9 b 20. 

ἀποφάναι : opposed to καταφάναι 31 9, to 
φάναι 31 ἃ 16. 

ἀπόφασις 25 a 193 
32a ΓΙ. 

ἅπτεσθαι: to be in physical contact, as 
distinguished from ἔχειν αἴσθησιν, 34b τό: 
similarly 3a 13, 14, 19a 26, 23 ἃ 4, 
24, 26, 28, Ὁ 1, 3, 11, 20, 24 Ὁ 28, 30, 
26b 16, 34 Ὁ 27, 35a TY. 

ἁπτικός : capable of coming into physical 
contact, of χυμὸς 35 Ὁ 13: capable of 
tactile sensation, of σῶμα 35a 14, τὸ τοῦ 
fpov σῶμα 34 Ὁ 131 ἁπτικὴ αἴσθησις 
13 Β 9: τὸ ἁπτικόν, the faculty of 
touching, ἄνευ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων 
αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει 15a 3, 22 Ὁ 20, 
23 τό, b26: τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ ἁπτικὸν 
23 Ὁ 30. 

ἁπτός : σῶμα ἅπαν ἁπτόν, ἁπτὸν δὲ τὸ 
αἰσθητὸν ἁφῇ 34 Ὁ 12, ἁἅπταί εἶσιν al 
διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ἢ σῶμα 243 Ὁ 27, 
τὰ ἁπτὰ αἰσθητὰ πλείω 20 Ὁ το, ἐν τῷ 
ἁπτῷ πολλαὶ ἐναντιώσεις 22 Ὁ 25—14b 11, 
20a 30, 22 ἃ 8, 11, b17, 23 a 18, 
Ὦ 9, 12, 14, 23, 24 ἃ 12, 13, 14, 34, 
b 12, 25 (5), 34 Ὁ 19, 22, 354 21, 23, 
b 13, 16, 18. 

ἀπύρηνος 22 a 20. 

ἀπωθεῖν 19 Ὁ 27. 

ἀργία opposed to ἐνέργεια τό Ὁ 3. 

ἄργυρος 6 Ὁ ro. 

ἀρετὴ 8a 32. 

ἀριθμός : οὗ ordinary arithmetical numbers 
2a 22, 7a 8, ga 7, 8 (dis), 26, ἁρμονι- 
kot 6 Ὁ 29; idea-numbers, assumed Ὁ 
the Platonists τὸν τοῦ ἐπιπέδου δόξαν, 
αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ 4 Ὁ 23, 24, 27, 
29, 8b 32, gar, Ὁ 4, 6, 8, 12, ὁ τῆς 


opposed to φάσις 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


ψυχῆς ἀριθμὸς ga 6, 25, τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ 
κινοῦν Q a τ17---ὀὠὀρριθμῷ πλείω 33 Ὁ 12, 
ἄπειρα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ob 20; ἀριθμῷ ταὐτὸ 
καὶ ὃν 15 Ὁ 5, opposed to εἴδει ὃν 15 Ὁ 7 
(cf. rx Ὁ 21); opposed to τῷ ἀνάλογον ὃν 
318 23; ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον 
opposed to τῷ εἶναι κεχωρισμένον 27a 2, 
to τῷ εἶναι διαιρετὸν 27a 5—one of the 
common sensibles 18a 18, 25 a 16, 10, 

ἁρμόξειν 8a I. 

ἁρμονία : πῶς λέγεται 8a 6 sqq., κρᾶσις καὶ 
σύνθεσις ἐναντίων 7 Ὁ 30, λόγος τις τῶν 
μειχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις 7b 321; ἁρμονία 
τις 7b 30, 8a 4—7b 34, 8a 2, 18, 29 
—6 Ὁ 30. 

ἁρμονικὸς 6 Ὁ 20. 

ἀρτηρία 20 b 29, 21 8 1. 

ἀρχαῖος : of ἀρχαῖοι 27a 21τ. 

ἄρχειν : rule rob 13; ἄρχεσθαι, begin 
33 b 26. 

ἀρχὴ : origin, beginning, starting-point, 
τῆς ζητήσεως 3b 24 (cf. 13a 20), ἐν τοῖς 
κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς λόγοις 27 a 20, ἀποδείξεως 
2b 25, 74 26, 28, 30, γεύσεων τὸ ποτὸν 
22 ἃ 31, τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ 33 a 16, τῆς 
πράξεως 533. τὶ 17, τῆς διανοίας 353 ἃ 19, 
ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ 33 Ὁ 22, 24-—orligin, 
principle: joined with αἰτία, τοῦ ζῶντος 
σώματος 15b ὃ (cf. ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν κινήσεως 
καὶ στάσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ 12b 17), τοῦ ζῆν 
rb 14, τῶν ὥἄῥων 2a 6, τῶν φυτῶν 
εἰ Ὁ 28 (cf. 13b 1), αἰσθητικὴ ἀρχὴ τι Ὁ 30 
(cf. 27a 15, 24b 2); joined with δύναμις 
13a 27 (cf. 16b 18); contrasted with ὅλη 
30a 19; τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων τὰ Ὁ 12— 
principle or principles of things, ἀρχὴ 
πάντων, τῶν ὄντων 5a 15, 18, 22, 28. 
ἀρχαὶ ἄλλαι ἄλλων 2a 22, 4b 10, 18, 
24, 30, 521, 12, τό, το, 23, 10 b 2, 
12 ἃ 12, joined with στοιχεῖα Io a 19. 

ἀρχικωτέρα 34a 18. 

ἀσαφὴς 13 ἃ 11, 12. 

ἀσπάλαξ 25 ἃ II. 

ἀσπὶς 23) 15, 16. 

ἀστὴρ 5 Ὁ 1. 

ἀσύμμετρος 304 31. 

ἄσφαλτος 21 b 24. 

ἀσώμωτος 4b 31, 5b 12; μάλιστα 58 7; 
ἀσωματώτατον 5a 27, 9b 21. 

ἀτὰρ (Emped.) 4 Ὁ 14. 

ἀτελής: of animals 25a 10, 32b 23, 33D 31; 
κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς 31a 6 (cf. 17 a 
16). 

ἀτιμότερος 4h 4. 

ἄτομος 4.a 2: τὸ ἄτομον εἶδος 14 Ὁ 27. 

ἄτοπον 7b 13, 8a 13, 9b 1, τὸ ἃ 23, 
Ira 14, 16, b 23, 32 b 4. 

αὐλὸς 7 Ὁ 25, 20 Ὁ 7. 

αὐξάνεσθαι 16a 8, 30. 

αὔξεσθαι 13a 28, 15 Ὁ 26, 16a 12. 

αὔξη (v. 1. adénow) τι a 30. 

αὔξησις: a κίνησις 6a 13, 32 Ὁ 9; joined 
with φθίσις 12a 14, 134 25, 27, 15 Ὁ 25, 
34.2 24, b20, with τροφὴ 16a το, with 
μέγεθος 164 17, with ἀλλοίωσις 15 Ὁ 23: 
τοῦ πυρὸς 16a 15—15b 29, 16a 24. 


603 


αὐξητικὸς τό Ὁ 12, 13. 

αὐστηρὸς 21 ἃ 30, 22 Ὁ 13. 

αὐτόματος 15 ἃ 28. 

αὐτός : self, joined with reflexive pronoun, 
αὐτῆς Kad αὑτὴν and the like, 6b 15, 
17a 8, 22a 19, 25 Ὁ 15; 16; αὐτὸ Ξε αὐτὸ 
καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ 8b 25, 16a τι; δι᾿ αὐτοῦτε 
δι᾿ ἑαυτοῦ 128 14 (cf. δι’ αὑτοῦ 29 Ὁ 7): 
εἰς αὐτὸ -- εἰς ἑαυτὸ 17 Ὁ 6—elliptical οἷον 
αὐτὸ 15a 28, Ὁ 7, 16 Ὁ 24, 25, 248 I: 
ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν (int. τὸ ζῷον) 13 a 23; 
αὐτοῦ -Ξ- τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ 26 Ὦ 16, τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ 
19b 8; αὐτών-ε τῶν ἁπτῶν 22 Ὁ τῖ, 24 Ὁ 
28, 29, 358. 173; ἐπὶ αὐτῷ (int. τῷ νοοῦντι) 
17 Ὁ 24, 25νἐν αὐτῷ (ν.}.} (int. τῷ γνωρί- 
ζοντι) 30 Ὁ 24: alone, per se αὐτὴ ἄνευ 
αἰσθήσεως 27 Ὁ 15, οὐχ ἢ αὐταί (distinct), 
ἀλλ᾽ 7 μία 25 a 31—(Platonic) αὐτὸ τὸ 
ζῷον Ξε τὸ αὐτόξῳον 4b το. 

αὐτός, 6: neuter ταὐτὸν 4 ἃ 28, 18 Ὁ 13. 
248. 25, 278 22, b6, 29 b 12, 32 b 1: 
joined with εἷς 23a 20, 25 Ὁ 26, 26a 28, 
31a 28, ὃν καὶ ταὐτὸν 18 Ὁ 13, ταὐτὸ καὶ 
ὃν 15 Ὁ 4 (cf. 26b 30, 27 8 6): ἡ αὐτὴ by 
attraction=rTat7é 27 b 17 (cf. 4a 28, 
33 Ὁ 22): ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ 35a 2, ἐν τῷ 
αὐτῷ without τόπῳ ga 22, 23, Ὁ 3, 18b 
17: ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ of the person 12a 26 
of the sensible object 25 Ὁ 1. 

ἀφαιρεῖν ga 8. 

ἀφαίρεσις: ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως 3 Ὁ 15, τὰ ἐν 
ἀφαιρέσει ὄντα 20 Ὁ 18, λεγόμενα 31 Ὁ 12, 
328 5. 

ἀφάλλεσθαι 20a 22, 26. 

ἁφή: sense of touch (see 11., c. 11) δύναται 
χωρίζεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων 13 Ὁ 6, 
158. 4 (cf. 35 Ὁ 6 54ᾳ.), αἰσθήσεως πρῶτον 
ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἁφὴ 13 Ὁ 5, οὐχ οἷόν τε 
ἄνευ ἁφῆς εἶναι ζῷον 34 Ὁ 24, ἄνευ ἀφῆς 
οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἔχειν 
35a 13, Ὁ 1, τὰ ἔῴφα πάντ᾽ ἔχουσι τὴν 
ἁφὴν τα Ὁ 3, τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην αἴσθησιν 
148. 3 (cf. 25 Ὁ 5---7, 17), ἀφῇ ὥρισται 
τὸ ζῆὥν 358 Ὁ 16, ἀνάγκη μόνης ταύτης 
στερισκόμενα τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὰ ζῷα ἀπο- 
θνήσκειν 55 Ὁ 4, ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τὴν 
ἁφὴν πολλῴ τῶν ἄλλων ἔων διαφερόντως 
ἀκριβοῖ 21 a 213; ἢ ἁφὴ πλείους ἔχει 
διαφορὰς τϑ 8. 14, εἰ μὴ μία ἐστὶν αἴσθησις 
ἀλλὰ πλείους 22 Ὁ 18, τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ 
ἀνάπτου 24 ἃ 12, πάντων ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν 
ἁπτῶν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ μεσότης 55 ἃ 21 (cf. 
248. 10), τῷ αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαί ἐστιν, διὸ 
καὶ τοὔνομα ἔχει 35 ἃ 17 (cf. 23 Ὁ 3), 
ὑπερβολὴ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ φθείρει τὴν ἁφὴν 
45: Ὁ τό, ἡ ἁφή ἐστι τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησις 
Ι4 Ὁ 7, 9. ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης ἁφὴ 23.417, 
γεῦσις adh τις 21a 19, 34b 18, 21—14b 
15, 18a 19, 194 30, 22a 10, 34, Ὁ 6, 17, 
33, 234 11, 20, Ὁ 31, 24b 23, 24, 26, 28, 
26b 6, 34a 1, Ὁ το, 13, 35a 18—physical 
contact 35 Ὁ 12—organ of touch 25a 7 
(cf. 35 Ὁ I 54:). 

ἀφιέναι ἢ Ὁ 13, 14 Ὁ 27. 

ἄφοβος 21a 15. 

ἀφορίζεσθαι 16 a 20. 

ἀφρονέστατος τὸ Ὁ 5. 


604. INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


ἀφυὴς 21a 24, 25. 

ἄφωνος 21 8. 4. 

ἄχρους 18 Ὁ 27, 28. 

ἀχώριστος 34215, Ὁ 17, 26b 20 (425), 27 a 2, 
33 Ὁ 25. 

dyogos 18 Ὁ 27, 20a 7. 

ἄψυχος 3b 26, 13a 21, 20b 6, 7, 24b 13. 


B, τὸ 31 a 26, 28, br. 

βάδισις Ga 9. 

βάθος 4b 21, 234 22. 

βάπτειν 35a 2, 2. 

βαρὺς opposed to ὀξὺς 20a 29, 31; 32, 22 Ὁ 
25, 26a 31, Ὁ 6 

βαρύτης 22 Ὁ 30. 

βελόνη 20 a 24 (d25). 

βὴξ 20b 33. 

βήττεψ 20b 321. 

βία: βίᾳ opposed to φύσει 6a 22, 23, 25, 
26, Ὁ 6, 32b 17. 

Βίαιος 6a 26, 7b 1, (of sound) 22a 26. 

βλαστάνειν (Emped.) 304 29. 

βλέπειν 8 Ὁ 22. 

βλέφαρον 21 b 29. 

βοήθεια 4 ἃ 15. 

βούλεσθαι: joined with ἐπιθυμεῖν tra 28: 
TO αὐτὸ βούλεται 27a 25, εἶναι βούλεται 
78 4 (οἴ, 23a 14): βουληθεὶς 17 a 27: 
ὁπόταν βούληται 17 Ὁ 24, 27 Ὁ 18. 

βουλεύεσθαι 31 Ὁ 8. 

βουλευτικὸς 353 Ὁ 3, 348 7, 12. 

βούλησις: an ὄρεξις 14b 2, 338. 23, ἐν τῷ 
λογιστικῷ γίνεται 32 Ὁ 5 (cf. 33 a 24): 
νικᾷ καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν 34 ἃ 13. 

βράγχιον 20 Ὁ 13. 

βραδὺς 20 a 32, Ὁ 4. 

βραδυτὴς 20a 33. 

βροντὴ 24. Ὁ Τῷ. 


T, τὸ gra 26, 24. 

γαῖα (Emped.) 4 Ὁ 13 (dz). 

γεγωνεῖν 204 I. 

γελοῖος τῷ b 25. 

vyéverts «τό Ὁ 18: αὐτομάτη 15a 27, opposed 
to φθορὰ 34a 23, to αὔξησις τό αι 23: 
προτέρα, τῇ γενέσει 12a 26. 

γενητὸς 34. Ὁ 4. 

γεννᾶν 15. a 26, τό Ὁ 16, 24, τῇ Ὁ 17 (615). 

γέννησις 18 a 23. 

γεννητικὸς τό a IQ, Ὁ 25, 32 Ὁ 10, 24. 

γένος : summum genus, category 24 23, 10a 
18, 12 a 6: genus (opposed to εἶδος, 
species) 2b 3, ἕτερα τῷ γένει 24 Ὁ 32, 
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει 31 Ὁ τι, ὕλη ἑκάστῳ 
γένει 30a 11: distinct species (like εἶδος), 
ἕτερον γένος ψυχῆς 13 Ὁ 26, ἀλλοιώσεως 
17 Ὁ 7, mankind 21a 16, 23 (cf. γένει 
τῶν πῤων οὐ τῷ τυχόντι 34 Ὁ 24, Td γένος 
καὶ ἡ ὕλη τ7 ἃ 27}. 

γεύεσθαι 22 Ὁ 8. 

γεῦσις: sense of tasting (see 11., c. 10), 
χυμοῦ 18a 13 (cf. 26a 18, 22), πικροῦ 
καὶ γλυκέος 22 Ὁ 25, τοῦ γευστοῦ καὶ 
ἀγεύστου 22 a 20, τροφῆς 34 Ὁ 18, κρίνει 
γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν 26b 11, δοκεῖ εἶναι τῷ 
ἅπτεσθαι “5 Ὁ 3, ἁφή τις 518 18, 34 Ὁ 18, 
21 (cf. 23a 20), ἡ τοῦ γευστικοῦ ἐνέργεια 


26 8. 14, ἀναγκαῖον ἔργον τῆς γλώττης 
20b 10: ἀκριβεστέραν ἔχομεν τὴν γεῦσιν 
21 8 18: τοῦ εὖ ἕνεκα, ἵνα αἰσθάνηται τὸ 
ἐν τροφῇ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρὸν 35 Ὁ 22: ὑπερ- 
βάλλον φθείρει 26 Ὁ τ; φθαρτικὸν τῆς 
γεύσεως 22 ἃ 31, 33~—flavour (ΞΞ χυμὸς) 
22 ἃ 32. 

γευστικὸς 22 Ὁ 5, 15, 26a τρ. 

γευστός : τὸ γευστὸν ἅπτόν τι 22a 8, τὸ 
σῶμα ἐν ᾧ ὁ χυμὸς 228 το, ὁ χυμὸς 228 
17, ὑγρὸν 228 34, τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐντελεχείᾳ 
τοῦ γευστικοῦ 22 Ὁ 15—~22 a 29, Ὁ 3 (ds). 

γῇ: πάντα στοιχεῖα κριτὴν εἴληφε πλὴν τῆς 
γῆς 5 b 83 κάτω φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν 
16a 1,7,6a 28; μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ 
περιέχοντος 18 Ὁ 22: διαφοραὶ “γῆς 35 a 
22; τὰ φυτὰ γῆς ἐστὶν 35 Ὁ 1, σῶμα 
μεικτὸν ἐκ γῆς KTé. 238 54; ὅσα ἐστὶν ἐν 
τοῖς τῶν ζῴων σώμασιν ἁπλῶς γῆς τοῦ 30 
(cf. 358 258): τὰ ἄλλα ἔξω γῆς αἰσθητήρια 
dv γένοιτο 358 15, ἐνόντος ἐν ταῖς αἰσθή- 
σεσιν (==sense-organs) πυρὸς καὶ γῆς 17 ἃ 
4 (cf. 254 6), τὸ ἁπτικὸν αἰσθητήριον οὐκ 
ἔστι γῆς 35 Ὁ 3. 

γήϊνος 35a 21. 

γῆρας 8 Ὁ 20, 22. 

“υγγλυμὸς 33 Ὁ 22. 

γέγνεσθαι: comes into being, γίνεται τὸ 
σαφὲς 13 ἃ II, λόγος κοινὸς τά Ὁ 22, τὸ 
ἔχον τὴν ἐπιστήμην 17D 5, ἡ πρώτη μετα- 
βολὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννῶντος 17 Ὁ 17, ἃ Kar’ 
ἐνέργειαν ψόφος τὸ Ὁ 9, τι (cf. 25 Ὁ 32), 
πληγὴ το Ὁ 13, 20, daw καὶ πληΎ} 535 Ὁ 
IO, ἠχὼ τὸ Ὁ 25, 27, φῶς τοῦ 30, τοῦ 
φωτὸς γιγνομένου (v. 1. τεινομένου) ποτὲ 
μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς κτὲ. τῷ Ὁ 22, ἡ κατὰ τόπον 
κίνησις τοῖς {ou 11 8. 20, αἴσθησις 22 Ὁ 
21 (cf. 23a 1, 16, 25 Ὁ 1), αἰσθητήρια 
358. 15, al κινήσεις 23a 10, 28} 13, 26, 
29a 2, ἁφὴ 22 Ὁ 7,76 ὁρᾶν 192 18, φάντασμα 
ἡμῖν 2802, φαντασία 27b 13 (cf. 28b 12}; 
τὸ νοεῖν 29a 13, ἡ βούλησις 32.b 5, dxpa- 
σία 34414, πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα 318 3, 
τὸ γενόμενον 348,24, ὀστέα λευκὰ (Emped.) 
10a 6---πολλὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων 16a 24, ἐκ τῶν 
Δημοκρίτου σφαιρίων ἐὰν γένωνται στιγμαὶ 
ga 15--εῖ γένοιτο κενὸν τὸ μεταξὺ 19 ἃ 
16, 20, πρὸς ἑκάτερον γίνεται θάτερον τῶν 
ἄκρων 248 6 and often—happen, οὕτω 
γένεται καὶ κατὰ λόγον 144 25, 19 b 21, 
33 Ὁ 6, τὰ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ 21 Ὁ 
831, γενομένων ἢ ἐσομένων 30 8. 31. 

γιγνώσκειν: τὸ γινώσκειν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ 
rra 26 (cf. 11a 24); γινώσκεσθαι τῷ 
ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον 4b 17, 5b 15, toa 2 
(cf. τὸ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ 5 a 28, τῷ 
εὐθεῖ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ καμπτύλον Χ1 ἃ 5}; γνῶναι 
τὴν οὐσίαν 2a 14, τὸ τί ἐστι 2b 17; 
joined with αἰσθάνεσθαι 4b 9, 9 Ὁ 30, 
with νοεῖν 10a 26, with φρονεῖν 29 ἃ 10, 
with θεωρῆσαι 2 ἃ 7: of the soul, with 
κινεῖν, as both cognisant and movent, 
5a 18, 23. 

yradupwrépws 5 a 8. 

γλυκὺς opposed to πικρὸς 21 ἃ 27, 22b 1, 
25. 26 Ὁ 11, 31; γλυκεῖα ὀσμὴ Opposed to 
πικρὰ ὀσμὴ 26 Ὁ 2. 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


γλῶττα: καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπί re τὴν 
γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον 20 Ὁ 18, ἔχει τὸ 
Spov ὅπως σημαίνῃ re ἑτέρῳ 25 Ὁ 243 ἡ 
σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γὙλῶττα πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ 
αἰσθητήριον 22 Ὁ 17; ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης 
ἁφὴ 23 ἃ 17 (οἴ. ἁπάντων τῶν ἁπτῶν 
αἰσθάνεται κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον καὶ χυμοῦ 
23 ἃ 17); μήτε κατάξηρον οὖσαν αἰσθά- 
νεσθαι μήτε λίαν ὑγρὰν 22 Ὁ 6, πλήρει 
πικρᾶς δγρότητος 22 Ὁ 93 ἔστι τῇ Ὑλώττῃ 
ψοφεῖν 20 Ὁ 30. 

γνωρίζειν: τὰ συμβεβηκότα 381, τὸ νεῖκος 
το 6, ἄμφω ἅμα 454 24; without object 
5b 21; τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον 9 Ὁ 26, 27 Ὁ ὅ 
(cf. 102 8, 20); τῷ ἐναντίῳ πως γνωρίζει. 
δεῖ δὲ δυνάμει εἶναι τὸ γνωρίζον καὶ 
ἐνεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ (v.1.) 30b 23, 24 (cf. 30 Ὁ 
22); interpreting κρατῇ (Anaxag.) 29 a 
19; joined with αἰσθάνεσθαι gb 25, 31, 
rob 16 (cf. 31 b 6), with κρίνειν 27 a 21. 

γγωριμώτερος 13 a 12. 

Ὑνωριστικὸς 4b 28. 

γνῶσις ἃ 5. 

Ὑονὴ 5 Ὁ 3, 4. 

Ὑβραμματεῖον 304 TI. 

γραμματικὴ τῇ a 25, Ὁ 1. 

Ὑραμμὴ 2b 19, 3b 19: φασὶ κινηθεῖσαν 
Ὑραμμὴν ἐπίπεδον ποιεῖν, στιγμὴν δὲ 
γραμμήν, καὶ αἱ τῶν μονάδων κινήσεις 
γραμμαὶ ἔσονται Oa 4, 5, εἰ μὴ διαιροῦνται 
αἱ γραμμαὶ εἰς στιγμὰς 9a 30. 

γράφειν 12 b 22, 30a I. 

γραφὴ 27 Ὁ 24. 

γωνία 2b 20. 


A, τὸ 31a 26, 27. 

δακτύλιος 24.2 IQ. 

δεινὸς 27 b 21, 24. 

δεκτικὸς τῷ Ὁ 27, 25 Ὁ 23, 29215, 348 29, 
35a 22: τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν 
ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης 24a 18, μορφὴ καὶ εἶδός τι 
καὶ οἷον ἐνέργεια τοῦ δεκτικοῦ 14.4 1ο. 

δέρμα 204 14. 25 8 Il. 

δέχεσθαι: τοῦ δεξομένον σώματος 7b 21, 
οὐδὲ φαινομένου τοῦ τυχόντος δέχεσθαι τὸ 
τυχὸν 14a 24, τὸν ἀέρα 20 Ὁ 16, 21 ἃ 8: 
228. 1, τὸ σημεῖον 24a 20, τὰ εἴδη τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν 24. Ὁ 2. 

δηλοῦν : τὸ ὅτι 138. 14, ὅτι πλείους 23 ἃ 175 
αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ψοφούντων δηλοῦνται 20a 
27, δηλοῦται ὥσπερ ἡ στέρησις 30b 21. 

διὰ implying a medium: διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ 
21 Ὁ 9, 228, 9, 13. 24b 29, 34 Ὁ 28, 
35a 16, διὰ μέσου 23 Ὁ 12, 34. Ὁ 31, διὰ 
τοῦ μέσου 253 Ὁ ¥, δι᾽ ἑτέρου 35a 16, 10. 
δι᾿ ἑτέρων 23 Ὁ 4, 34 Ὁ 1g, de’ ὑμένος 23 Ὁ 
9. δι᾿ ἑνὸς 24. Ὁ 31, δι’ ἀμφοῖν 25 ἃ 2, δι᾽ 
αὑτῆς 35a 19, δι’ οὗ “3 ἃ το, 16. 

διάδηλος 21 a 14, 31. 

διαδιδόναι 35 a 9. 

διαδύνειν 4a 7. 

διάθεσις: τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις 17 Ὁ 18. 

διαιρεῖν: primarily to split, bisect, cut up 
6b 32, 74 1, 9a 30, τὰ φυτὰ 13b 17, τὰ 
φυτὰ καὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔνια gag, 11b 10, 
τὸν χρόνον 30b 12, τῶν διῃρημένων 27a 


4, 30b τι: hence to distinguish δια, 


605 


peréov 17a 21, διήρηται πρότερον 29 b 30, 
διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν 2a 23, τὰ μέρη 
τῆς ψυχῆς 33 Ὁ 1, 2: τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν 
κατηγοριῶν 24 25, 10 8 18. 

διαίρεσις : as logical term 2a 20, 30 Ὁ 3--- 
as geometrical term 30 Ὁ 20. 

διαιρετὸς Irb 27, 278 3, 55 7. 119 12, 30 Ὁ 
9, 10. 

διαλεκτικὸς 3 ἃ 29: διαλεκτικῶς 3a 2. 

διάλεκτος 20 Ὁ 8, 18. 

διαμένειν 14 Ὁ 5, 6. 

διάμετρος 30 a 3:1. 

διανοεῖσθαι: λέγω νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ 
ὑπολαμβάνει ἢ ψυχὴ 29 a 23, ἡ ψυχὴ 
τοῦτο ᾧ διανοούμεθα πρώτως 14. 8. 13: 
βέλτιον λέγειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ Ψυχῇ 
διανοεῖσθαι 8 b 14, τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ 
φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ νοῦ πάθη 8 Ὁ 
25, κίνησις εἶναι δοκεῖ 8b 3 sa. (cf. 8b 6, 
9); διανοεῖσθαι ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψευδῷς 247 Ὁ 
133 διανοεῖσθαι φοβερόν τι ἢ ἡδὺ 32 Ὁ 30, 

διανοητικός: τῇ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ 31a 14: τὸ 
διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς ται Ὁ 18, without 
article διανοητικῷ 13 Ὁ 13, 14 a 32. 


διάνοια : joined with λογισμὸς το a 8; 
ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν 214 25; φαντασία 


ἕτερον διανοίας 27 Ὁ 185, τὸ κριτικὸν 
διανοίας ἔργον 328. 16; δεάνοια πρακτικὴ 
33. ἃ 18, 19 (cf. λεγούσης τῆς διανοίας 
φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν 33 a 2): many animals 
without it 10 Ὁ 24—meaning, intention 
44 17. 

διαπνεῖσθαι τὶ Ὁ 90. 

διαπορεῖν 3 1) 20. 

διασαφεῖν 4b 1, 14 b 14, 16b 30, 170 Ὁ 
28. 

διασπᾶν τι ἃ 20, 16a 7, 32 Ὁ 5. 

διάστασις 32a 28. 

διάστημα τ b 28. 

διατελεῖν 11 Ὁ 23, 27 Ὁ 2. 

διατέμνεσθαι 13 Ὁ 21. 

διατίθεσθαι 14a LI. 

διαφανές : τί τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τί τὸ φῶς 18b 
4--14, τὸ φῶς ἐστὶ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τιψὸς 
παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ 18b 16 (cf. 18 Ὁ 
1g), ἡ ἐντελέχεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς 1ο ἃ 11, 
τὸ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς γίνεται διαφανὲς 
Iga 24, 253 ἄχρουν 18b 28, ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ 
ἄμφω διαφανῆ 25a 1 (cf. 35 Ὁ 22, 19a 
33): τὸ χρῶμα κινεῖ τὸ διαφανὲς τὸ ἃ 13; 
τὸ διαφανές ἐστιν ἐντελεχείᾳ ἢ δυνάμει 
18} 30 (cf. 18 Ὁ 12); τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν 
διαφανὲς 18 b 1, 19a Jo (i.e. light, cf. 
18 Ὁ 98q.): τὰ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ 
arb 31. 

διαφέρειν : εἴδει ἢ γένει 2 Ὁ 3, μεγέθει ἢ 
μικρότητι QAL4, τῷ ἁπλῶς καὶ τινὲ 31 Ὁ 
12, τῷ τέλει 338 14; διαφέρων ἀριθμὸς 
gb 5: 24 26, 3b 26, ga 3, 10, bg, 17b 
10, 21 b 26, 23 Ὁ 12, 26 Ὁ 14, 28 b 26, 
318 20, 24, 32412, 33b 4“--διαφέρονται 
περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν 4 Ὁ 30, περὶ τὸ πλῆθος 

a 2. 

διωρβερόντως 3a 20, 21a 22. 

διαφθείρειν 35 Ὁ 8. 

διαφορὰ ga 20, 21, 18a 1, 27b 26, 298 12; 
42 27, ἔχει διαφορὰν τό Ὁ 4, διαφορὰν 


606 


τῶν ζῴων (difference between animal and 
animal) 14a 1, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 304 14, δύο 
διαφοραῖς δρίζονται μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν 
27a17 (cf. 3 Ὁ 25—27)—distinguishing 
quality διαφορὰν τῶν ἁπτῶν 24.8.13: often 
in plural, varieties τῆς ψυχῆς 13 Ὁ 20, τῆς 
ὑπολήψεως 27 Ὁ 25, τοῦ σώματος Ἢ σωμᾶ 
23 Ὁ 27, at τὰ στοιχεῖα διορίζουσι 23 Ὁ 
28, γῆς 358 22, τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ 
26 Ὁ το, τῶν ψοφούντων 20 a 26, τῶν 
χρωμάτων 214 14, περὶ χρῶμα 22 Ὁ 32, 
χυμῶν 22b 14, τῆς κινήσεως 20a τὸ; 7 
ἁφὴ ἔχει πλείους διαφορὰς 18 ἃ 14. 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


δὲ οὐ χρόνῳ 304 21, 31 a 2: δύναμις 
opposed to ἐντελέχεια 17 a 21, Ὁ 4, to 
ἐνέργεια 28 a 6: οὐχ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ 
δυνάμει λεγομένου 17 Ὁ 30: δυνάμει alone 
18 Ὁ το, 30a 6, bri, 23; δυνάμει τοιον δὶ 
σῶμα 12 Ὁ 27, τοιοῦτον 22a 7, 23 Ὁ 531, 
29a 16, ἐκεῖνα 20 ἃ 11, ταῦτα 31 Ὁ 27, 
τὸ σῶμα τὸ δυνάμει ὃν 13 ἃ 2, δυνάμει 
ξωὴν ἔχοντος 12a 20, 28, δυνάμει ὃν ὥστε 
Civ τ2 Ὁ 263 τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος λόγος ἡ 
ἐντελέχεια 15 Ὁ 14: ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει 
δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον τά Ὁ 20, ἐν τῷ δυνάμει 
ὑπάρχοντι ἡ ἐντελέχεια τά4 ἃ 26: δυνάμει 


ὃν opposed to ἐντελέχεια 17 Ὁ το: τῶν ἐν 
δυνάμει ὄντων opposed to ἐντελέχειά τις 
22a 26; δυνάμει opposed to ἐντελεχείᾳ 
13 Ὁ 19, 17b 3, 12, 18a 4, b30, 22b 
15, 29a 29, Ὁ 30, 31, 31 b 25 (625), to 
évepyeia τῇ ἃ 7, 13, 14, 19b 5, 224 18, 
24ἃ 2.0. 308 τό, Ὁ 7, 318 4, to évep- 
γοῦν 17a το, to Kar’ ἐνέργειαν 20 b 8, to 
τῷ εἶναι 27a 63 καὶ Adyw καὶ δυνάμει 
32 Ὁ 4; κατὰ δύναμιν opposed to ἐντε- 
λεχείᾳ 17a 30, to κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν 26a 4, 
19, 24-(δύναμις τῶν τοιούτων 30 a 8, 
ἐντελέχεια καὶ λόγος τοῦ δύναμιν ἔχοντος 


διαχεῖν 19 Ὁ 21. 
διαψεύδεσθαι 28 Ὁ 20. 
διδασκαλία, 17 Ὁ 1:1. 
διδασκαλικὸς 17 Ὁ 13. 
διδόναι 7 Ὁ 20. 

διεέργειν 23 Ὁ το. 

διεξιέναι 7 a 14. 

διερὸς 23 δ 25, 23 Ὁ 1 (ὀΖε). 
διέρχεσθαι g b 22, 20a 6. 
διευρύνεσθαι 22 8. 3. 
διικνεῖσθαι 23. ἃ 8. 

διιστάναι 24. Ὁ 12. 

διορίζειν 2b ri, 4Ὁ 19, 128 5. 1380; 21, 


15a 21, bg, 16a 20, b 32, 17 Ὁ 29, 188 
I, 19b 4, 26, 20b 5, 238 το, b28, 278 
15, 29, Ὁ 20: 328 18, 25. 

δῖος (Emped.) 4b 14. 

διότι, “that” 4a 19: “‘why” 25a 4. 

δισσαχῇ 6 Ὁ 32. 

δισσῶς Ga το, 16 Ὁ 20. 

διττὸς 15 Ὁ 2, 16b 26, 19 b 5, 268 7, 8, 
33 b 14. 

διχῶς Oa 4, 128 10, 22,14 a 4, 17 a IO, 
12, 26a 23, 30b 

δίψα 14 Ὁ 12, 13. 

διώκειν : opposed to φεύγειν 318 9, 16, Ὁ 9: 
32 Ὁ 29, 30, 338 2; τὸ μεῖζον διώκει 
34 ἃ 0. 

διωκτὸς 31 Ὁ 3, 32 Ὁ 28. 

δοκεῖν 2a 4, 9 and often. 

δόξα: ἕξις καθ᾽ ἣν κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ 
ψευδόμεθα 28a 4, τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφορὰ 
(:Ξ ὑπόληψίς ταὶ 27 Ὁ 28; τὰ ἄλλα ὥρα 
(πλὴν ἀνθρώπου) δόξαν οὗ δοκεῖ ἔχειν 34.8. 
10; ἀληθὴς 27 Ὁ το, 28 Ὁ 5, ἀληθὴς καὶ 
ψευδὴς 288. τὸ; δόξῃ ἕπεται πίστις 28 8. 20 
(οἴ. 28a 22); μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως, dt’ αἰσθήσεως 
288. 25: συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως 
(definitions of φαντασία] 28 a 26 (cf. 28a 
27, 28, 30); ἡ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα distin- 
guished from ἡ καθόλου 34 a Ig sq.— 
(Platonic) κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα, δόξῃ 4b 
26, δόξαν τὸν τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν 4b 23 
mo τῶν προτέρων δόξας 3b 22 (cf. 7b 
247). 

δοξάζειν Ira 27, 27 Ὁ 20, 21, 28a 20, br: 
distinguished from αἰσθάνεσθαι 13 b 31. 

δοξαστικὸς 13 Ὁ 30. 

δριμὺς 21a 30, Ὁ 2, 22 Ὁ 18. 

δυὰς 20 Ὁ 20. 

δύναμις : ἡ ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δ᾽ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια 
128 9: 148 16; πρότεραι τῶν δυνάμεων 
αἱ ἐνέργειαι 15 a 19, ἣ κατὰ δύναμιν 
ἐπιστήμη χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως 


εἶναι τοιούτου 14a 28: power, faculty, 
function σώματος ἡ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως 
38. 27, τοῦ ὀργάνου 13a 1 (cf. 24a 25, 
28), τῆς ψυχῆς 14a 29, 31, 15a 25, Ὁ 23, 
16a 19, 21, 228 15, 33a 31,62, ΤῸ 15; 
joined with ἀρχὴ 13a 26, 16b 18, with 
λόγος 24a 28, with és 28a 3; θρεπτικὴ 
32 Ὁ 15, 34 a 26, θεωρητικἢ 13 b 25: 
χρῆται τῷ νῷ ws δυνάμει τινὶ 4 ἃ 30. 

δύνασθαι στρατηγεῖν 17 Ὁ 31, δύναται ἐνερ- 
γεῖν δι᾽ αὑτοῦ 20 Ὁ 7, αὑτὸν νοεῖν 20 Ὁ 0, 
ψοφῆσαι 19b 7, αἰσθάνεσθαι 29 a 31, ὃν 
ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν 3449; 
τὸ δυνάμενον κινεῖν ἑαυτὸ 60 1, κινεῖσθαι 
20a 21, ὑγραίνεσθαι σωζόμενον 22 b 4, ἰδεῖν 
24 Ὁ 5, ἀκούειν, ψοφεῖν 25 Ὁ 30. 

δυνατὸς 17a 26, 208 22, θεωρεῖν 17a 28, 
οὐδὲ τῶν δυνατῶν αἰσθάνεσθαι 24. Ὁ 8--- 
δυνατὸν ἢ ἀδύνατον 17 ἃ (cf. 13a 31). 

δυσμὴ 18b 26. 

δυσχέρεια 10a 27. 

δυσώδης 21b 22. 


ἐγγίγνεσθαι 88 21, Ὁ χ8, gb 6, 14a 27, 

26a 5. 

ἐγγύθεν 21 b 16, 25 Ὁ 6. 

ἐγκατοικοδομεῖσθαι 20 a 0. 

ἐγκρατὴς 33a 7. 

ἐγρήγορσις 12 a 24, 25, Ὁ 28, 32 Ὁ 12. 

ἐγχεῖν 6 Ὁ 19. 

εἴδησις 2a I. 

εἶδος : specific form, ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος 
3b 6, κατὰ κοινὸν εἶδος 5358. 22; joined 
with λόγος 3 Ὁ 2, 148. 14, with μορφὴ 
7 Ὁ 23, 12 a 8, with μορφή, Adyos 
and ἐνέργεια £44 9: τὸ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια 
128 10, 148 17; οὐσίαν ὡς εἶδος 12a 20 
(cf. r4a 15); ὁ λόγος εἶδος (ν.]. ὅδε) τοῦ 
πράγματος 3 Ὁ 2, εἴδη τῶν πραγμάτων 
4.6 27: τὰ εἴδη τῶν αἰσθητῶν 24 Ὁ 2, 
λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος 27a 8, εἶδος αἰσθητῶν 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


32a 3, τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν 24.4 18, ἐν 
Tots εἴδεσι Tots αἰσθητοῖς 32 a 5, so εἴδη 
alone 31 Ὁ 28, 29, 34a 30: εἶδος Ξε νοητὸν 
εἶδος 29 4a 15, 29, 31 Ὁ 2, εἶδος εἰδῶν 
32a 2, τόπον εἰδῶν 29 a 28—Platonic 
ideas 4 Ὁ 24~—~species, τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ 
ἄτομον εἶδος 14. Ὁ 27, ἄλλο εἶδος κινήσεως 
31a 6, τὰ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν 21a 17, 22 Ὁ 
το; τὸ τῷ εἴδει ἀδιαίρετον 30 Ὁ 14, ὃν 
τὸ νοητὸν εἴδει 29 b 28, ἕν εἴδει op- 
posed to ἀριθμῷ πλείω 23 Ὁ το, to ὃν 
ἀριθμῷ 15 Ὁ 7, τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ εἴδει, εἰ 
καὶ μὴ ἀριθμῷ τι Ὁ 41 (cf. ga το), εἴδει 
ἢ γένει 2b 3. 

εἰδωλοπτοιεῖν 27 Ὁ 20. 

εἰκάξειν 3a I. 

εἰλικρινὴς 26b 4. 

εἶναι : τὸ εἶναι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται 12 b 8: 
ὃν δυνάμει, is=is possible 8a 21, 18a 27, 
2ΟὉ 30, 250 28, 27 b 19. 28 Ὁ 10, 13, 25, 
208. 4, 30b 1o—dv ἐνεργείᾳ, is=actually 
exists, εἰ ἔσται 3b 3, 6a 21 (dts), 7a 24, 
gb 28, 15b 12, 13, 16a 7, 8, br4, 16, 
20, 17a 6, 22, 24, 18} 4, 23a 24, Ὁ r2, 
24 Ὁ 22, 28a 8, 27 b 16, 24, 29a 27, 
30b rr, 24 Ὁ 7, 35 b 20, ἔστω 27 Ὁ 26, 
31a 25, ἐσομένων 30 Ὁ 1—dv ws ἀληθές, 
is==Is sO, is true, οὐκ ἔστιν 23 Ὁ 4, 20 Ὁ 
20, ἔστω ΟὉ 30. See also ὄν. 

— τὸ εἶναι, quiddity: τὸ σαρκὶ elvar 20 Ὁ 12, 
17 (cf. 8a 25), τῷ τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις τοῦ 
ξῷῴονυν 8a 26, τὸ πελέκει εἶναι 12 Ὁ 18. 
αἰσθητικῷ elvac καὶ δοξαστικῷ 13 Ὁ 30 
(cf. 2..,ον 27), τροφῇ καὶ αὐξητικῷ εἶναι 
16b 12, τὸ χρώματι εἶναι, τὸ κινητικῷ 
εἶναι τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς τοῦ 10, 
τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι 29 Ὁ το, ὕδατι εἶναι 20 Ὁ 
IL, τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι 29 Ὁ 20: τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι 
30b 28, τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι 12 Ὁ τι (ΞΞ οὐσία 
ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον 12 Ὁ 10, 11), joined 
with ὁ λόγος 12 Ὁ 15: τῷ εἶναι κεχωρισ- 
μένον 27 ἃ 3, διαιρετὸν 27 ἃ 8, ἕτερον 
32 Ὁ 1, τῷ εἶναι opposed to δυνάμει 
27 ἃ 7; ἐστὶ ταὐτόν, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἕτερον 
24.4 25, 26. 16, οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ 25 b 27, 
31a 20: πλείω 31a 19, ἄλλο BL a 14 
(cf. τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι ἄλλο 29 Ὁ 19). 

els: τὸ ὃν πολλαχῶς λέγεται 12b 8: εἷς ὁ 
λόγος ἢ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην (ν.1. ἕκαστον) ἕτερος 
2Ὁ 55) 14.b 20: ὃν ἀριθμῷ opposed to εἴδει 
ὃν 15 Ὁ 4 and often (οἴ. τα Ὁ ar): ὃν τῷ 
ἀνάλογον ἢ τῷ ἀριθμῷ 31a 21 56.: ἐντε- 
λεχείᾳ μιᾶς Opposed to δυνάμει πλειόνων 
13 Ὁ 18——-(Platonic) ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέα 4 b 20, 
νοῦν τὸ ὃν 4b 22. 

εἰσέρχεσθαςε 204 12. 

εἰσιέναι 6 Ὁ 4. το Ὁ 29, 20 Ὁ 27- 

εἴσω 20 8. 5, b 26. 

εἰωθέναι : εἴωθε λέγεσθαι 7 Ὁ 4, παρὰ τὰ 
εἰωθότα λέγεσθαι 32 ἃ 21. 

ἕκαστος : ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕκαστον κρίνομεν 26 Ὁ 
12--τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον contrasted with τῶν 
καθόλου 170 Ὁ 22, 28, 34a 17η--ἦ αἴσθησις 
ἑκάστου οὐχ % ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται 
248. 22, 23---τὸ ὃν ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς 
ἕκαστον 3090 Ὁ 6 (cf. 25 Ὁ 24). 

ἑκάτερος : διὰ τί τούτων ἑκάτερον 58.0: πρὸς 


607 


ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν 24a 6, ἔχει πρὸς ἑκάτερον 
31a 23. 

ἐκεῖ: opposed to ἐνταῦθα in a metaphorical 
sense 14.b 21, 23 Ὁ 21, 31 Ὁ 9 (cf. 13 8 3). 

ἐκθλίβειν 4a IT. 

ἐκκρίνεσθαι 4a 14. 

ἐκλείπειν 24 Ὁ 26, 27, 25 a 13. 

ἐκπνεῖν Opposed to ἀναπνεῖν 21a 2, Ὁ [8. 

ἐκπνοὴ opposed to ἀναπνοὴ 32 Ὁ 11. 

ἔκστασις 6 Ὁ 13. 

ἐκτείνεσθαι: ὅταν ἐκταθῇ 29 Ὁ 17. 

ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως 31 Ὁ 4. 

ἐλέγχειν 5ὶ Ὁ 4. 

ἐλεεῖν 8 Ὁ [4. 

ἔλεος 3 ἃ τῇ. 

ἕλιξ (in the ear) 20a 13. 

ἕλκειν τὴν τροφὴν 12 Ὁ 4. 

ἕλξις : joined with dots 33 Ὁ 28. 

ἔλυτρον 21 b 20. 

ἐμβάλλεσθαι 22 a 12. 

ἐμμένειν 20 8. 4. 

ἔμπαλιν : τοὔμπαλιν τό ἃ 31. 

ἐμποιεῖν: ψόφον ἐνεργείᾳ 19 Ὁ g—(sc. τὰ 
σώματα) 24 Ὁ 14. 

ἐμφαίνεσθαι 13 a 18. 

ἔμψυχος: διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου 
τῷ ζῆν 138 21, τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου 
δυοῖν μάλιστα διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει τε 
καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι 3b 25 (cf. 4b 7): τὸ 
ἐξ ἀμφοῖν (ὕλης καὶ εἴδους) ἔμψυχον 14a 
17: ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἐμψύχων 15 Ὁ 113 τὸ 
ζῷον σῶμα ἔμψυχόν ἐστι 34 Ὁ 123 τὸ 
ἔμψυχον ἂν εἴη σῶμα τὸ τρεφόμενον, ἣ 
ἔμψυχον 16b 9, 10, ἢ τροφὴ πρὸς ἔμψυχόν 
ἐστι καὶ οὗ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τό Ὁ τι; 
“ποσόν τι τὸ ἔμψυχον 16b 13: πᾶν ἔμψυχον 
ἔχει θερμότητα 16b 29: ἐξ ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος 
ἀδύνατον συστῆναι τὸ ἔμψνχον σῶμα 23a 
13 (cf. τὸ σῶμα without ἔμψυχον 35a 11, 
12); τὸ σῶμα ἁπτικὸν τὸ ἔμψυχον πᾶν 
35 a 14; ψόφος ἐμψύχου 20 Ὁ 6, δεῖ 
ἔωψνχον εἶναι τὸ τύπτον καὶ μετὰ φαντα- 
σίας τινὸς 20b 31; τὸ κινησόμενον μέρος 
καὶ ἔμψυχον 20a 7: ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων 
καὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων 14 Ὁ 30—according to 
some 7@ ἀπολαμβάνεσθαί τι τοῦ περιέ- 
χοντος ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἔμψυχα τὰ ξῷα γίνεται 
τὶ ἃ 20. 

ἔναιμος 20 Ὁ ro, 2Ι Ὁ rt. 

ἐναλλὰξ 31 a 27. 

ἐναντίος: ἐξ ἐναντίας μεταβαλὼν ἕξεως τῇ ἃ 
32; φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου 17 Ὁ 3: 
δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τροφὴ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ 
16a 22 (cf. 16a 31, 32, b 6): ἀδύνατον 
ἅμα τὰς ἐναντίας κινήσεις κινεῖσθαι τὸ 
αὐτὸ ἢ ἀδιαίρετον 26b 30 (cf. 27 ἃ 6): 
δοκεῖ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ 
εἶναι 27 Ὁ 6 (cf. 11 a 3 36., τῷ ἐναντίῳ 
“τως γνωρίζει 30b 23): 5 b 24, 25, 7b 31, 
32, 13a 28, 16a 23, 18b 18, 22 Ὁ ΤΙ, 
27 Ὁ 4, 30b 25, 31 4 25, 33 Ὁ 5, 6— 
τοὐναντίον adverbially 11 Ὁ 7, 21 a 293 
els τἀναντία φερόμενα 16a 6—évarriws 
aya I. 

ἐναντίωσις 5b 23, 118. 4, 22b 23, 26, 29, 
248 Be 

ἐνάργεια 18 Ὁ 24. 


608 


ἐναργὴς 3a 19-—évapyas 28a 14. 

ἐναρμόζειν 14a 23. 

ἐνδέχεσθαι 40329, 11 and often: ely ἂν 
ἐνδεχομένη 28 Ὁ 15, ἅπαξ ἐνδεχόμενον 7 a 
15, ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν 33 a 30. 

ἔνδηλος 22 Ὁ 33. 

ἐνδύεσθαι 7 Ὁ 23, 25. 

ἐνεῖναι 10a 7, 8, Io, It, τ τό, 174 4, 
22 Ὁ 26, 25 Ὁ 24, 30b 17, 24 (ν.]. ἐν 
εἶναι), 34.2 3, 4. 5 (d25), 28. 

ἕνεκα: τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ δὲ ᾧ 
tsb 2 (cf. 15 Ὁ 21): ὁ νοῦς ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ 
καὶ ἡ φύσις 15b 16 (cf. 338 14), ἕνεκά Tov 
ἡ κίνησις αὕτη 32 Ὁ 15, ἢ ὄρεξις 334 15, 
πάντα τὰ φύσει 348. 31, συμπτώματα τῶν 
ἕνεκά τοῦ 34 8 323; ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ 20b 20, 
24 Ὁ 24, οὐ τοῦ εἶναι ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὖ 
25 Ὁ “σἵἷ; οὗ ἕνεκα 1ῷῈ b 11, 20b 23, 
(ἕνεκεν) 15 Ὁ τῶ; τίνος ἕνεκα 25 Ὁ 4— 
3 8 27, b6, 6b το, 15 Ὁ 1, 20. 

ἐνέργεια : δοκεῖ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἡ τῶν ποιη- 
τικῶν ὑπάρχειν τά a 12 (εἴ, 26a 5): 
πρότεραι τῶν δυνάμεων I5 8 19; ἢ τοῦ 
αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως 25 Ὁ 26 (οἴ. 
26a 11, 16), τῆς αἰσθήσεως 28b 13 (cf. 
28 Ὁ 26), τοῦ ψοφητικοῦ 26a 6, τῆς ὄψεως, 
τοῦ χρώματος, τοῦ γευστικοῦ 26a 14, τοῦ 
χυμοῦ α6 ἃ 15, τοῦ διαφανοῦς 18b 0, οἷον 
ἐνέργεια τοῦ δεκτικοῦ Ifa 9. ἢ ἁπλῶς 
818 7, ἡ τοῦ ἀτελοῦς 31a 7 (cf. 17a 16); 
τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνέργεια 30a 18, κίνησίς τις 
ἢ ἐνέργεια (νν.11.) 33 Ὁ 18, ἤτοι δύναμις ἢ 
ἐνέργεια “88. 6: μεταβάλλει εἰς ἐνέργειαν 
ἐξ ἀργίας 16b 2: τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας 
17 Ὁ 20: ἐνεργείᾳ 178 18, 19 bg, 288 0; 
29a 24, 30 Ὁ 8, 31 b 14. Opposed to 
δυνάμει 178 7, 13, 14, 19b 5, 22a 18, 
24a 2, 8, 302 17, D7, 25, 31a 5: Kar’ 
ἐνέργειαν 17 Ὁ 19, 22, 18b 1, 19 a Io, 
b 9. 20a 27, 25 b 28 (dis), 31 (625), 290 2, 
Ὁ 6, 31a 12, Ὁ 17, opposed to κατὰ 
δύναμιν 26a 3, 24, 304 20, 318 I. 

ἐνεργεῖν 122 26, 16b 19, 17a 15, br, 28a 
13, 29b 7, 31a Lo, τὸ ἤδη ἐνεργοῦν 17a 
12, ὅταν évepyy 25 Ὁ 20: ἐνεργεῖσθαι 274 


7. 

ἐνιστάναι 22 Ὁ 8. 

ἐννοεῖν 30 Ὁ 10. 

ἑνοποιεῖν : τὸ évorrolofy 10 b rx (cf. rd ἂν 
ποιοῦν 30 Ὁ 5). 

ἐνσημαΐίνειν 23 a 4. 

ἐνταῦθα 28b 20, opposed to ἐκεῖ 14 Ὁ 22, 
23 Ὁ 21, 31 Ὁ 9: τῶν ἐνταῦθα 28 Ὁ 20. 

ἐντελέχεια :- ἐν τῷ δυνάμει ὑπάρχοντι καὶ τῇ 
oikela ὕλῃ 14 ἃ 25; τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος 
λόγος 15 Ὁ 15 (cf. 14a 27); ἡ πρώτη 
128 27. Ὁ 53 τὸ κυρίως (ὃν καὶ ὃν) évre- 
λέχεια 12 Ὁ 09, ἡ τμῆσις, ἡ ὅρασις, ἡ 
ἔγρήγορσις 12 Ὁ 283 τοιούτου σώματος 
128 21 (cf. 15 ἃ 7, 8, 148 [8), τῶν 
μερῶν αὐτῶν 13.4 6, τοῦ διαφανοῦς 19 a 
11: ἡ οὐσία ἐντελέχεια 12a 21, τὸ εἶδος 
128. 10, 148 17: ἐντελέχεια contrasted 
with δύναμις 2a 26, 12 a 10, 17a 21, 
b 5, 7, 31 Ὁ 25, with δυνάμει ὃν 17 b ro: 
ἐντελεχείᾳ ὃν 31a 3, ὑγρὸν 22b 1: ἔντε- 
λεχείᾳ contrasted with δυνάμει 12 Ὁ 18, 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


17a 9, 29, b4, 13, 18a 4, b 12, 30, 
22 Ὁ τό, 29a 28, b 31, 30a I, 31; 
b 26. 

ἐντεῦθεν 26 Ὁ 24. 

ἔντομος: τὰ ἔντομα 11 Ὁ 20, 13 b 20. 

ἐντός : ἐπὶ τοῦ μυκτῆρος ἐντὸς 21 Ὁ τό: 
πότερόν ἐστι τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἐντὸς ἢ οὔ, 
ἀλλ᾽ εὐθέως ἡ σὰρξ “2 Ὁ 34 (cf. 22 Ὁ 22, 
23 Ὁ 23): θερμότητα τὴν ἐντὸς 20 Ὁ 21 
(cf. ἔσω 8 Ὁ 25). 

ἔνυδρος: τὰ ἔνυδρα τῶν ζῴων 19a 35, 21 Ὁ 
10. 

ἔνυλος: λόγοι ἔνυλοι 3 a 25. 

ἐνυπάρχειν 44 14, lla 23, Ὁ 25, 13a 15, 


23. 

ἐξέρχεσθαι 6 Ὁ 3, τι Ὁ 8, 19 b 17. 

ἐξιέναι 35a 6. 

ἕξις 17 a 32: τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν con- 
trasted with ras στερητικὰς διαθέσεις 17 Ὁ 
16: δύναμις ἢ ἕξις 28a 3: ἕξεις καὶ πάθη 
328 6: ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς 30a 15 (cf. 
18b 19). 

ἐξίστασθαι 6 Ὁ 138. 

ἔξω: ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω τῇ a 4: κινουμένου τοῦ 
ἔξω ὁ εἴσω κινεῖται 20a 5—preposition 
ἔξω τοῦ ἡλιοιμένου 19 b 30, ὕδατος καὶ 
ἀέρος 25 ἃ 8, γῆς 35 ἃ 18. 

ἔξωθεν 17 Ὁ 20: τῶν ἔξωθεν 17a 28, Ὁ 28. 

ἐοικέναι : ἔοικε 402 Ὁ 16 and often: ἔοικεν 
ὅτι 20 Ὁ 8. 

ἐπανιέναι 5 Ὁ τό, 12 ἃ 4. 

ἐπεισιέναι 4a 13. 

ἐπέρχεσθαι 13a 13. 

ἕπεσθαι 6 4, 28a 20, τῶν κοινῶν καὶ 
ἑπομένων τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν αϑ ὮὉ 22. 

ἐπίδοσις 17 Ὁ 7. 

ἐπιζητεῖν 24 7, YIAI, cha 16. 

ἐπίηρος (Emped.) τὸ ἃ 4. 

ἐπιθυμεῖν 53 ἃ 7, 11a 28, Ὁ 6, 33a 7, 35 
23. 

ἐπιθνμητικὸς 78 5, 328 25, 323 4. 

ἐπιθυμία 13b 24. 14Ὁ 5. 348 2, 3: ὄρεξίς 
τις 338. 25, 16 Ὁ 2, τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις τ4Ὁ 6: 
πεῖνα καὶ δίψα ἐπιθυμία ται Ὁ 12: ἂν τῷ 
ἀλόγῳ 3515. 6: κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει 
33a 3: ὁ λόγος καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ἐναντίαι 
33 Ὁ 6: ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει διὰ τὸ ἤδη 
33 b 8. 

ἐπικάλυμμα 224 2. 

ἐπικαλύπτειν 20 a 7. 

ἐπικρίνειν 318. 20. 

ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι “8 Ὁ 6. 

ἐπίπεδον 2a 22, Ὁ τῷ, 3b 19, 20a 2 (des): 
(Platonic) 4b 23. 

ἐπίπονος 7 Ὁ 2. ; 

ἐπισκέπτεσθαι 5b 31, Ob 23, 148 1, Ὁ τό, 
808 6, 32b 12. 

ἐπισκοπεῖν 3 Ὁ 20, 64a IL. 

ἐπίστασθαι 14a 5, 6, 17 a 20. 

ἐπίστασις 7a 33. 

ἐπιστήμη : ἕξις, καθ᾽ ἣν κρίνομεν καὶ ἀλη- 
θεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα 28 as, τῶν ἀεὶ 
ἀληθευόντων re 28a 17: With φρόνησις 
and δόξα ἀληθὴς included under r6 νοεῖν 
ὀρθῶς 27 Ὁ το, under ὑπόληψις 24 Ὁ 25: 
distinguished from θεωρεῖν 12 ἃ 10, 22, 
23, προτέρα τῇ γενέσει 12a 27, contrasted 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


with αἴσθησις 17b 23, as ᾧ ἐπιστάμεθα 
distinguished from ψυχὴ 14a 5: μορφὴ 
Kal εἶδος τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ 14a 8, τὰ 
ἐπιστητά πὼς 3t Ὁ 22: H ἐπιστήμη ἡ 
θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτὸ 
goa 4 (cf. 30a 2, 318 1): τέμνεται eds 
Ta πράγματα 31 b 24: αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν 17 Ὁ 26: ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπι- 
στήμην 234 5, παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην 33a 
I1—17a 24, Ὁ 6, 12, 18, 27 Ὁ 6, 33a 6--- 
(Platonic) 4 Ὁ 26, ἐπιστήμην τὰ δύο 4 Ὁ 
22. 

ἐπιστημονικὸς 142 10, 21 Ὁ 27, 34a 16. 

ἐπιστήμων 17 ἃ 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 20 Ὁ 6. 

ἐπιστητὸς 30a 5, 31 Ὁ 23, 27. 

ἐπιτάττειν 33 a 1. 

ἐπιτιθέναι 1g a 20, 23 Ὁ 24, 25. 

ἐπιχειρεῖν 7 ly 20, Ob 15. 

ἑπομένως 5 a 3 

ἔπος : τοῖς ᾿Ορφικοῖς ἔπεσι καλουμένοις ro Ὁ 
28. 

ἐπωνυμία, 17 Ὁ τι. 

ἐργάζεσθαι τὸ ἃ 13, b 28. 

ἔργον : φύσεως 3. b 1, τῆς ψυχῆς dis- 
tinguished from πάθημα 3a το, joined 
with πάθος 3b 12, 8a 4, ΟΡ 18: 
λογισμοῦ ἔργον 34a 8: τοῖς κοινοῖς σῴ- 
μᾶτος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις 33. Ὁ 20---Ὦ Ὁ 12, 
1 15a 20, 27, 162 5, 21) 20] 17, 32a 
16. 

ἔρια τῷ b 6, 15- 

ἑρμηνεία, 20 Ὁ rg. 

ἐρωτᾶν 6 bb 22. 

ἔστιν ws 17a 18, 19, 25 Ὁ 22, 26a 28 (625), 
27a 3, 4, 14. 

ἔσχατον : τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον 26b τό 
(cf. 31a 19): τὸ ἔσχατον (τῶν ὠθουμένων) 
341 33: τὸ ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως 
33a 16: exterior surface 23a 27, b 22. 

ἔσω 8b 25. 

ETEPOMAKNS 13 a 17. 

ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἑτέρως ἔχοντι 29 Ὁ 20: ἑτέρως κινεῖ 
τὴν αἴσθησιν 27 8 1- 

ἑτέρωθε 4 15) 2. 

ἑτέρως 27 ἃ I. 

εὖ 29a 27: τὸ εὖ 20b 22: ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ 20b 
20, 34b 24, 35 Ὁ ar. 

εὐδιόριστος 212 7. 

εὐεξέταστος 8 ἃ το. 

εὔθρνπτος 20 a 8. 

εὔθυνα 7b 29. 

εὐθυπορεῖν 7a 20. 

εὐθύς : τὸ εὐθὺ 2b 19, 38. 13 (S75), 15, 11 a 
5, 7», 20 Ὁ 18, 20 (dis)\—evdbéws 21 Ὁ 31, 
22 Ὁ 34, 23 ἃ 3: εὐθὺς adverb 27 Ὁ 22, 
32a 22. 

εὐθνωρία 6b 3:. 

εὐκινητότατος 5 ἃ 12. 

εὐλαβεῖσθαι 2b 5, 3 Ὁ 24. 

εὔλογος 6a 30, 8a το, 34, Iob 14, 21 ἃ 13, 
29 ἃ ,25--εὐλόγως 2a 4, 20 Ὁ rr, 18» 
33 a 17. 

εὐμαρὴς 3a I. 

εὐπορεῖν 3b 21. 

εὑρεῖν 49 Ὁ 90. 

εὕρεσις 13 ἃ 19. 

εὕστερνος (Emped.) 10a 4. 


HH. 


609 


εὔτηκτος 22 a 10. 

εὐφυὴς 21a 24, 26. 

εὐώδης 21 Ὁ 23. 

ἐφαρμόζειν 8 8. 5, 14b 23. 

ἐφεξῆς : τῷ ἐφεξῆς 7a 8, 14 Ὁ 29, 32: τὰ 
ἐφεξῆς 14 Ὁ 22. 

ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν 27 Ὁ 18, 20 (cf. ἐπ αὐτῷ 17 Ὁ 24, 
28). 

ἔχειν : ὕλην 30a 6, εἶδος καὶ μορφὴν 7b 23, 
τέλος 7a 27, θέσιν ga 6, 7, κίνησιν καὶ 
θέσιν 8a 7, βάθος “38. 22, ἀρχὴν κινήσεως 
καὶ στάσεως 121 16, δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν 
123 a 26, δύναμιν 14 a 28, μηθὲν κοινὸν 
20Ὁ 24, μεμειγμένον re ΖΟῸ 28, διάστασιν 
32a 28, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον 8a 14: τοὔνομα 
35a 18, ἐπωνυμίαν 17 Ὁ 11, ἀέρα 20a 6, 
19, θερμότητα τό Ὁ 29 (cf. 20 Ὁ 24), 
ὑγρότητα 22 18, ὕδωρ 23 a 25, 27, 
μεσότητα Δι Ὁ 1, αἴτιον rod εἶναι δρατὸν 
18a 31, χρῶμα [9a 12, 24a 22, 25 Ὁ 10, 
ψόφον το Ὁ 6, 7. φωνὴν 25 Ὁ 20. ὀσμὴν 
19a 34, 2tb 7, χυμὸν 21a 27, 228. 30, 
dtapopay τῶν ἁπτῶν 24 a 13; ψυχὴν 
5a 20 and often, μόριον ψυχικὸν 24a 33, 
θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν 34a 22, ζωὴν 12a 13 (625). 
17: 20, 28, γένεσιν 15 a 28, αὔξησιν 
16a 23, ἀκμὴν καὶ φθίσιν 232b 25.348. 24, 
τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικὸν I5 A 7, TO 
αἰσθάνεσθαι 17 Ὁ 18, αἴσθησιν τι Ὁ 22 
and often, ἁφὴν τ4 a 3 and often, ὄψιν 
15a 5, ἀκοὴν 25 Ὁ 28, γεῦσιν 21a 18, 
αἰσθητήριον 24 Ὁ 32, 25a 2, 9, ὄργανα 
τι b 23 (ch 32b 18, 25), ὀφθαλμοὺς 
25a11, φράγμα Δι Ὁ 28, 31, ἐπικάλυμμα 
22a 2%, φάρυγγα “21 a 4, 5, τὴν ἐκ 
συλλογισμοῦ (φαντασίαν) 34a 11, δόξαν 
28 Ὁ 5, 7. 34a τι, ὑπόληψιν 28b 5, 
ἐπιστήμην 17a 24, Ὁ 5, γραμματικὴν 
17 a 25, ἰατρικὴν 33a 4, ὄρεξιν 33a 8, 
λόγον 32a 31, διάνοιαν [ob 24, νοῦν 
aga 6, 34b 3, 5, τὰ εἰρημένα 28 Ὁ 30— 
ψεῦδος 28b 19: ἀπορίαν 3a 3 and often, 
ὑπεναντιώσεις Ob 22, δυσχερείας 10a 27, 
διαφορὰν 16 b 4, 18 a 14, λύσιν 22 Ὁ 27, 
διάνοιαν 4a 17. τὸ βουλευτικὸν ἡ ὄρεξις 
34 a2 12---ἔχονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις 25 a Q— 
ἕξομεν λέγειν 2 Ὁ 25, 22-——-with object 
unexpressed ἐὰν πεφυκὸς μὴ ἔχῃ ἢ φαύλως 
22a 28: contrasted with ἐνεργεῖν ΤΏ 8 
26—7d ἔχον 3a 4, 28 b 17 (ch τὸ 
ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα 16b 22, 18), opposed 
to ἀποβεβληκὸς τῷ b 26, τοῦ ἔχοντος 
ἐκεῖνο, ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει 8 Ὁ 27-—éxducera 
2 Ὁ 12, τῶν ἐχομένων 15 a T5—1n- 
transitive οὕτως ἔχει 3 a 25 and often; 
ws δύναμις πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν 17 Ὁ 5, πρὸς 
ἑκάτερον ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα 31 a 23. 
ὡς ἡ κεκλασμένη πρὸς αὑτὴν ὅταν ἐκταθῇ 
2ΟὉ 17 (cf. 23 Ὁ 19): ὁμοίως ἔχει 15 Ὁ 26, 
17b 26, 19 a 30, 23a 29, bro, 26b 12, 
29a τό, ὡσαύτως 27b 23, παραπλησίως 
14b 28, ἄλλως 29 Ὁ 13, 338 30, ἑτέρως 
29b 21, érwooiy toa 1, πῶς 7 Ὁ 16, 
καλῶς 17 Ὁ 8, ἀνάλογον 20 Ὁ 1, 21 a 
17. | 

ἕως 48 16, 13 ἃ 30: μέχρι τούτου, ἕως 
ἔβαψεν 354 3. 

2a 


610 


ζέσις 3.8. 31. . 

ζῆν : διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ 
ζῆν 13a 22: τοῦ ζῆν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένου; 
κἂν ἕν τε τούτων ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό 
φαμεν 13a 22, 23 (cf. 11 Ὁ 3): τὸ ζῆν διὰ 
τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην (τὴν θρεπτικὴν) ὑπάρχει 
τοῖς ζῶσι 13 Ὁ 1, 2 (cf. 15a 25, 348 23), 
τὸ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ eval ἐστιν 15 Ὁ 13, 
φαίνεται τὰ φυτὰ ζῆν τὸ Ὁ 23 (cf. 13 8 26, 
30), ἔχοντα αἴσθησιν ζῷα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ 
ζῆν μόνον 15 Ὁ 4, ταύτῃ (τῇ ἁφῇ) ὥρισται 
τὸ ζῆν (sc. τῷ ζῴῳ) 35 b τό: ᾧ ζῶμεν 
διχῶς λέγεται [4 ἃ 4, ἡ Ψυχὴ τοῦτο ᾧ 
ζῶμεν 14a τ2---τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος 12} 
23, 1 Ὁ 8 (ch r2b 5, 6)--τὰ ζῶντα, 
including both plants and animals 14b 8, 
Ifa 27, b22, 348. 273 πολλὰ διαιρούμενα 
ζῇ οἵ 9, 11 b 19,13 Ὁ 17--τὰ δὲ (τῶν 
ζῴων) μόνῃ φαντασίᾳ ζῶσιν 15 ἃ τι-- 
(Atomists) τοῦ ζῆν ὅρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοὴν 
4 ἃ 9: 15--ἰῆν derived from few 5 b 
2 


ζητεῖν 2b 10 and often. 

ζήτημα 2a 12. 

ζήτησις 3 Ὁ 24. 

ζοφερὸς “6 Ὁ (τ. 

ζωὴ: ξωὴν λέγομεν τὴν δι᾿ αὐτοῦ τροφήν 
τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν 12a 14-ππτ2ξ 13, 
15. 17, 20, 28, 15 Ὁ 28, 16b 9. 

ζῷον : τὸ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου 2b 7; τί ποιήσει 
διαφορὰν τῶν ζῴων 14a 13 ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ 
σῶμα ζῷον 13a 3, σῶμα ἔμψυχον 34 Ὁ 12: 
τὸ ζῷον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως 13 Ὁ 2 
(cf. 13b 3, 4.27 Ὁ 12 56., 34a 30); οὐχ οἷόν 
τε ἄνευ ἁφῆς εἶναι (pov 348. 29, Ὁ 13. 14.» 
L7-19, 24, 35 Ὁ 554., 17 (cf 13b 8, 9, 
[4 Ὁ 3, 23): οὐχ οἷόν τε ἁπλοῦν εἶναι τὸ 
τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα 35a II, 34 Ὁ ἴο (ef. 
354 20, 238. 12 50.) : πολλὰ τῶν Spur οὔτ᾽ 
ὄψιν οὔτ᾽ ἀκοὴν οὔτ᾽ ὀσμῆς αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν 
:5ἃ 5»; Spd τινὰ μόνιμα κατὰ τύπον 
1ob 20, 320 20 (cf. 34b 2), οὐ πάντα 
ἀναπνέουσιν tira 1 (cf. 10 Ὁ 1, 2,21 b 20), 
πολλὰ οὐκ ἔχουσι φωνὴν 20b 9, φαίνεται 
πολλὰ διάνοιαν οὐκ ἔχει. 1ὸ Ὁ 24 (cf. 
308 6, 338 12), ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Kors οὐ 
νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία 
33 a 12 (cf. 15a 8 saqq.), τῆς αἰσθητικῆς 
φαντασίας μετέχουσι 33 Ὁ 30, 34a 6, 
ἐνίοις δ᾽ ἀορίστως ἔνεστιν 33 Ὁ 31—34a8 5: 
ἔνια τῶν ἐντόμων διαιρούμενα ζῇ 11 Ὁ 20, 
94a 9. 13b 20: τὰ ἔνυδρα τῶν ἔζων 
19a 35, τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ζῷα 23a 31, 
ζῴα ἀτελῆ καὶ πεπηρωμένα 25 ἃ 0 Sq., 
320 2256. (cf. 15a 27), τοῖς λογιστικοῖς 
(ζῴοις) 34a 7: ζῷον (ποιεῖ) ζῷον 15a 29--- 
(Xenocrates) συμβαίνει κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ 
ἀριθμοῦ ob 7 (cf. gb rx). 


ἢ: answered by ταύτῃ 15b 5, 27 8 10, 
33 Ὁ 27, 35 Ὁ 12: τῷ εὐθεῖ, ἢ εὐθὺ and 
the like 3 a 13, bro, 18b 10, 22 Ὁ 3, 
23 Ὁ 27, 24 Ὁ 25, 26b 9, 33 Ὁ 11: τὸ 
αἰσθητικόν, ἢ τοιοῦτον and the like 12b 25, 
16b 18, 18a 23, 318 11 (cf. 24a 24) 
—3b 12, 14, £5, 18, 5 a 23, 24, 15 a 20, 
16 b 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 18 Ὁ 7 (zs), 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


248 21, 23, D9, 25a 31 (425), 26 Ὁ 30, 
274 4, IT, 12, 13,14, 29 b 25, 30b 16, 
17, 31b 13, 14, 33 b 17—-whereby, ἢ καὶ 
δῆλον 23 Ὁ 22, 26b 15—where, (Emped.) 
30a 20. 

ἥδεσθαι 31 a 10. 

ἤδη 58. 27, 9a 7, 12a 8, 16b 16, 178 12, 
a5, 28, Ὁ 18, 18a 4, 20 b τό, 25 ἃ 27, 
a8b 20, 25, 30a 28, 32 Ὁ 30, 33b 19, 
34a 8, 15, 19, b25: τὸ ἤδη 33 Ὁ 8, 
τὸ ἤδη ἡδὺ 33 Ὁ 9. 

ἡδονὴ g Ὁ 16: ὅπου αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε 
καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ 
ἐπιθυμία 13 Ὁ 23. 14b 4 (cf. 348 3). 

ἡδὺς 26 Ὁ 3, 5, 3129, 32b 31, 334 1, bg: 
τὸ ἡδὺ 14b 5, 6, 214 12, 31 b 9, 33 |) 9, 
35 b 23. 

ἧδυσμα 14 b 13. 

ἡλικέα 17 Ὁ 32. 

ἥλιος § b 1,) 28b 3. 

ἡλιούμενος 19 Ὁ 31. 

ἥμισυς 30 Ὁ το, 12. 

qv: is, as we saw, 8b 28, rya 0, 24ἃ 11. 
Zl, 31a 7. 

ἠρεμεῖν 4.2 12,68 24, 25, 33D 24, 342 20: 
τὸ ἠρεμοῦν 25a 18. 

ἠρέμησις 6 Ὁ 22, 72 32. 

ἠρεμία 6a 24, 27, 18a 17. 

ἠχεῖν 20 a τό, IQ. 

ἠχὼ τὸ Ὁ 28: πότε γίνεται 19 Ὁ 25. 


θαρραλέος 27 Ὁ 22, 24. 

θαρρεῖν 3 ἃ 7, 8 2. 

θάρσος 34 17. 

θαυμασιώτερος 22a 3. 

θεᾶσθαι 27 Ὁ 24. 

θεῖον, sulphur, 2ὲ Ὁ 25. 

θεῖος: τὰ θεῖα § a 32, ToD ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου 
15a 29, b 3, ὁ νοῦς θειότερόν τι 8 Ὁ 50. 

Geos 2b 7, 7b 10, Ob 32, 1ob 5» 
rr1ra 8. 

θερμαίνειν 24 Ὁ I. 

θερμαντὸς “6 b 6. 

θερμὸς 44 I, 31 a 20: contrasted with 
ψυχρὸς 5 Ὁ 25, 14 b 8, 12, 22 Ὁ 26, 
23 b 28, 24 a 3, 10, 29 a 26, b 15, 
35a 23, big: τὸ θερμὸν 3b 1, 5 Ὁ 27; 
τό b 29, 20 Ὁ 25. 

θερμότης τό b 29, 20 b 20, 25 ἃ 6. 

θέσις 8a 7, 9a 6, 7: 21. 

θεωρεῖν : joined with γνῶναι 2a 7, with 
νοεῖν 8 b 243 contrasted with ἐπεστήμῤνη 
12a 11, 23, with ἔχειν (ἐπιστήμην) καὶ 
μὴ ἐνεργεῖν 12 a 25, 17 ἃ 28, το: illus- 
trating τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθάνεσθαι 
17 b 19--2 Ὁ 17, 3a 28, 12 Ὦ 17, 
158 21, 17 Ὁ 5, 32 ἃ 8, 9, Ὁ 29, 
33 Ὁ 20. 

θεωρητικός : νοῦς 158. LI, 32b 27, 33a 15, 
δύναμις 13 Ὁ 25, ἐπιστήμη 30 a 4, 
νοήσεις 7a 28. 

θηρίον: τῶν θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν 
ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ᾽ ov 28a 23 (cf. 28a το), 
οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις 28a 21, οὐκ ἔχει 
νοῦν 29 a 6—14.b 33. 

θιγγάνειν 23 a 2—(of ὁ νοῦς considered as 
a circle) 7 ἃ τό, 18. 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


θίξις : ἡ rots μορίοις 7 a 18, 
ἀνομοίου 27 b 4. 

θνήσκειν : τὰ τεθνεῶτα τῶν ζῴων 6b 5. 

θνητός : τὰ θνητὰ tob 6, 13.4 32. 

θρεπτικός : θρεπτικὸν λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον 
μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ καὶ τὰ φνόμενα 
μετέχει τῷ Ὁ 7, 12, 148. 31, 32 Ὁ 15 (cf. 
144 33, 328 20, 348 22, 26): ἡ θρεπτικὴ 
ψυχὴ καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμις, 
καθ᾽ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν τα 8. 23: 
τὸ θρεπτικὸν 13 Ὁ 5, 158 17; τοῦ αἰσθητι- 
κοῦ χωρίζεται ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς τῆι 23 ἄνευ 
χοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν 
15a 1; ὑπάρχει δυνάμει ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ 
t4 Ὁ 31; τὸ γεννητικὸν καὶ θρεπτικὸν 
32b it (cf. 16a 19)—rob ἁπτικοῦ καὶ 
θρεπτικοῦ (i.e. τῆς τροφῆς) αἴσθησιν Ξ4. Ὁ 22 
(cf. 14b 6, 7). 

θρίξ : ἁπλῶς γῆς, οὐθενὸς 
δοκεῖ 10b 1, 35 a 2.536. 

θρύπτεσθαι 19 b 26, 20a 8 

θρύψις 19 Ὁ 23. 

θυμικὸς 32a 25, 33 Ὁ 4. 

θύμον, thyme, 21 Ὁ 2. 

θυμὸς 32 17, b 18; ὄρεξίς τις τ4ᾳ Ὁ 2, ἐν 
τῷ ἀλόγῳ 32b 6. 

θύραθεν 44 13. 

θυρὶς 4a 4. 


τὴν τοῦ 


αἰσθάνεσθαι 


ἰᾶσθαι 334 4. 

ἰατρικὴ 33 ἃ 4. 

ἰατρὸς 3b τ... ’ 

ἰδέα 4 Ὁ 20. 

ἔδιος: τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων 2a 18, 
ἴδια πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς 2ἃ 9, 38 4, 8, II, 
12.) μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς 32 a 21. εἶδος καὶ 
μορφὴν 7. Ὁ 23, στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀμχὰς 104 10, 
λόγος 14 b 24, 26, τὸ ἀτόπο" 9 1, 
ἴδιον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων 21b 19, ἀδύνατα 
8b 34, τῶν κοινῶν αἰσθητήριον 25 a 14, 
αἴσθησιν 25a 21,28; opposed to ἀλλότριος 
of ψόφος 204 18: ἔδιον αἰσθητὸν contrasted 
with τὰ κοινὰ 184 10, 17, 19, 254 10, 30; 
27 b 12, 28 Ὁ 18, 23, 30 b 29, λέγω 
δ᾽ ἴδιον ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει 
αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται 
ἀπατηθῆναι 18a τι, τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ αἰσθη- 
τῶν τὰ tata κυρίως ἐστὶν αἰσθητά, καὶ πρὸς 
ἃ ἡ οὐσία πέφυκεν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως 
18 ἃ 24—ldlws 25 ἃ 7. 

ἵππος 2b 7. 

ἰσόπλευρος 13 8, 18. 

ἱστορία 2a 4. 

ἰσχυρός: πάθημα 3a 19-—of sensibles 21b 24, 
a2b 8, 26b 2, 2gb 2; κίνησις ἰσχυροτέρα 
τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου 24.4 30. 

ἴσως (modeste asseverantis) 5 Ὁ 31, 8b 9, 
13, 20, 29, 9b 29, 11a 8, 30b 18. 

ἐχθῦς 19 a 5, 20 b 10, 218 4. 


καθάπερ : introducing a sentence with verb 
or predicate expressed εἴπομεν, εἴρηται, 
φασὶ and the like 7 Ὁ 4,8 a 31,94 31, 
b 8 roa 2, 13 b 28, Ig 8 185, 30, 
16b 34, 17a £7, 19, 184 4, 20 b 30, 
22 Ὁ 2, 8, 30a 28: elliptical, requiring 
the preceding verb or predicate to be 


OIl 


understood ἀπεφήναντο, καθάπερ Ἵππων 
(ἀπεφήνατο) 5 Ὁ 2, ἄλλαε ἄλλων ἀρχαί, 
καθάπερ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἐπιπέδων (ἄλλαι 
ἀρχαὶ 2a 22, εἷς ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστί, 
καθάπερ ζῴου (εἷς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ) 2b 6, 
so 5b 6, 8 23, 10a 27, 12 Ὁ 11, 21, 
13 Ὁ 27, 148 5, 16a 30, I9b 29, 
20 Ὁ 17, 22 8. 14, 25, followed by οὕτω 
15 Ὁ 19: elliptical, requiring apodosis 
with fresh verb or predicate to be 
supplied καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ, ἣ εὐθύ, πολλὰ 
συμβαίνει (οὕτως ἔχει καὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν 
ψυχὴν, cf. 29 b 22) 3a 12, διὸ καθάπερ 
TO καυστὸν οὐ καίεται (οὕτω συμβαΐίνει 
wept τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν) 
178. 7. 

καθεύδειν 17 a τι. 

καθόλου: τῶν καθόλου 17 Ὁ 23; ξῴον τὸ 
καθόλου 2b 7. ἡ καθόλου ὑπόληψις 34a 17, 
20, τοῖς καθόλου λόγοις 17 ἃ 13 καθόλου 
εἴρηται 12 b 10, καθόλον περὶ πάσης 
ψυχῆς 10 b 26, περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως 
248. 14. 

καθορᾶν 2b 20. 

kal: explicative 2a 24, 44 I, 17a 27, 
24a 24 and often: in fact, 12a τό 
(v.1.) and often—xal ταῦτα, and this too, 
Ira iL. 

καίειν 17a 8 (S75). 

καιρὸς τῇ Ὁ 29. 

κακός : contrasted with ἀγαθὸς 26 Ὁ 25, 
318. 11, τό, DIL; πῶς τὸ κακὸν γνωρίζει 
30 Ὁ 22. 

καλεῖν : καλεῖσθαι: ὀνομάζεσθαι 5 Ὁ 29, ἣν 
καλοῦσί τινες στιγμὴν 27 ἃ τὸ ; τὰ καλού- 
μενα ξύσματα 4.2 3, τοῖς ᾿Ορφικοῖς ἔπεσι 
καλουμένοις το b 28, ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς 
72 4, 29a 22, 32 Ὁ 26, ἡ καλουμένη 
ἁφὴ 23 b 30, ὄρεξις 33 a 31, ἀρτηρία 
20 b 28. 

καλὸς 2a 1: καλῶς 2b 25, 3 b 23 (425), 
4b 2, 7a 2, tra 26, 148. 19, 15 Ὁ 28, 
16a 2, 17 Ὁ 8, 19 a 15, 262 20. 

κάμνειν 164 25, 20a [14, 15, 22b 8. 

καμπύλος contrasted with εὐθὺς 2b 10. 
Ira 5, 6. 

κἄν : (=Kal ἐν) 17 Ὁ 26, 30b 17: (=xal 
ἐὰν in protasis) 4a 20, 138 22, 17a ΤΊ, 
27 Ὁ 22: {Ξε καὶ ἂν in apodosis) 6 a 22, 
25 Ὁ 8, 29 a 26, 32 b 17, τ8---κἂν el 
(ὧν anticipatory) 2b 8, 6a 23, 8b 12, 
22 8. 1τἴ, 23 Ὁ 9, 26b 19, 324 21. 

κανὼν r1a 6. 

καρδία 3a 31, 8b 8, 20 Ὁ 26, 32 b 31. 

καρπὸς 12 Ὁ 3, 27. 

κατά : limiting ὁ κατὰ φρόνησεν νοῦς 4b 5, 
12 b 10, 17 Ὁ 10, 24 ἃ 24, 264 3, 4: 
30 Ὁ 28 and often: καθ᾽ αὑτὸ 12 ἃ 7, 
17 a 8, opposed to καθ᾽ ἕτερον 6 a 5, 7; 
τι (cf. τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατὸν 18a 30, Ὁ 5), 
opposed to κατὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα 174 5, 
τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ αἰσθητὸν opposed to τὸ κατὰ 
σνμβεβηκὸς 18a 8, 24: καθ᾽ ἕτερον 68 4: 
κατ᾽ ἄλλο 29b 27. 

κατακάμπτειν 6 Ὁ 31. 

κατάξηρος 22 Ὁ δ. 

καταφάναι: καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα 31 a 9. 


39—2 


ΘΙ2 


κατάφασις 30 Ὁ 27. 

καταχρῆσθαι 20b 17. 

κατάψυξις 5 Ὁ 29. . 

κατέχειν: χώραν ga 23, Tov ἀέρα, τὸ πνεῦμα 
21a 3 (dis), Ὁ 15. 

κατηγορεῖσθαι 2b 8. 

κατηγορία 2a 25, loa 15. 

κάτω contrasted with ἄνω 6a 28, 13 ἃ 20, 
15b 29, 164 2, 3. 

καῦμα 3b 5. 

καυστικὸς 17 a 8. 

καυστὸς 16a τό, 17 a 7. 

κεῖσθαι (ELomer) 4a 30. 

κεκλασμένη (sc. γραμμὴ) 29 Ὁ τό. 

κελεύειν (of νοῦς) 32 b 30, 31, 332 Ὁ &. 

κενὸς 19 τό, 20, Ὁ 34: τὸ κενὸν (i.e. the 
alr) κύριον τοῦ ἀκούειν 19 Ὁ 33, ἀκούειν τῷ 
κενῷ καὶ ἠχοῦντι 20a 18---ἰκαὉενῶς 2 ἃ 2. 

κεντεῖν : τὸ ὀξὺ οἷον κεντεῖ 20 Ὁ 2. 

κέρας τὸ a 5, 20a 16. 

κεφάλαιον: ἐν κεφαλαίῳ 33 Ὁ at. 

κεφαλὴ τό ἃ 4, 19 4 5. 

κηρὸς 12 Ὁ 7, 244 19, 358 2, 0. 

κινεῖν: διχῶς κινουμένου παντός (ἢ γὰρ καθ᾽ 
érepov ἢ καθ᾽ αὑτό) 6a 4 sqq.3 κινεῖσθαι 
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 6a 10:8 ἃ 31 (cf.6b 78q.), 
φύσει, βίᾳ Ga 22, 32 Ὁ 17, παρὰ φύσιν 
7b 2, ἄνω, κάτω 6a 28, κύκλῳ 7a 16, 
ὅλη opposed to κατὰ μόρια μεθισταμένη 
6b 2, ἀορίστως 348 4: οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ 
κινοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι 6a 3, 26a 6 
(contrast the opinion 3 Ὁ 30, 4 8 24); 
ἀδύνατον ἅμα τὰς ἐναντίας κινήσεις κινεῖσ- 
θαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἣ ἀδιαίρετον “6 Ὦ 30; ἔστι 
κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου 
28 Ὁ το; εἴδει ἕν, ἀριθμῷ δὲ πλείω τὰ 
κινοῦντα κατὰ τόπον τὸ ζῷον 535 Ὁ fo, 
ἐστὶ τρία, ὃν μὲν τὸ κινοῦν, δεύτερον δὲ 
ᾧ κινεῖ, ἔτι τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον 33 Ὁ 13, 
τὸ κινοῦν διττὸν 35 Ὁ 14 (cf. τό Ὁ 27); 
transmission of motion in general 34 Ὁ 
30—35a 1; the particular case of animal 
locomotion 33 Ὁ 21—-27; movement of 
animals in a wider sense κινεῖται τὸ κι 
νούμενον (v.1.) 7 ὀρέγεται 33 Ὁ 17 (cf. 33b 
27, 28), ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως κινεῖται 31 Ὁ 
85 338 2, 38. 21 (cf. 8 Ὁ 5---ἰ 1)---κιν εῖν 
joined with ποιεῖν, κινεῖσθαι with πάσχειν 
7b 18, 19, 10a 25, 16" 33, 17a 17, 
34 Ὁ 29 (ch. x1 Ὁ 2, 17 a 15})---κινεῖν "τὴν 
αἴσθησιν 20a 30, Ὁ 3, τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν 
vonow 26b 31, τὴν βούλησιν (?) 348. 13, 
τὴν ὄψιν 35a 9, τὸ διαφανὲς 19a 13, τὸ 
αἰσθητήριον 19a 14. 27 (cf. τὸ κινησόμενον 
μέρος 20a 6)—of air in motion το Ὁ 18, 
35. 204 4, 5, 17. 21, 214 3, 35a 4- 
opinions noticed or criticised ψυχὴν εἶναι 
τὸ κινοῦν, τῶν δὲ κινουμένων τι ὑπέλαβον 
εἶναι 3b 29---48 9, τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν 4a 21; 
πῦρ κινεῖταί τε καὶ κινεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πρώτως 
58. 7; τὸ πᾶν ἐκίνησε νοῦς 4 ἃ 27 (cf. 
5.8 18). 

κίνησι5: ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελὴς μέντοι 17 a 16, 
31a 6, ἔκστασις τοῦ κινουμένου ὅ b 12 
(cf. 26a 2); κινήσεις τέσσαρες 6 a 12, 
15 Ὁ 22sqq.; ἀδύνατον τὰς ἐναντίας κινή- 
σεις κινεῖσθαι “6 Ὁ 30; ἄλλο εἶδος κινήσεως 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


31a 6 (cf. ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιώσεως 17 Ὁ 
7. 14); διὰ μέσου ἡ κίνησις 34 Ὁ 32: con- 
trasted with στάσις 12 Ὁ 17, 138. 23, 25a 
16 (cf. 25 a 18): ἢ φαντασία κίνησίς τις 
29a 1 (cf. κινήσεις ἢ μονὰς 8 b 18), ὄρεξις 
κίνησίς τις ἢ ἐνέργεια (vv. ll.) 33 b 18, 
κίνησις κατὰ τροφὴν 13a 24, κατ᾽ αὔξησιν 
καὶ φθίσιν 35 Ὁ 0. 

κινητικὸς 4 Ὁ 28, 5 ἃ 10, 19, 25, 9 a 2, 
to Ὁ 10, 18 a 31, 19 a 10, 32 b 18; 
κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον 33 a 13, ἑαυτοῦ 
κινητικὸν 35 Ὁ “χ8--:τ,ὖὁ κινητικὸν 5 ἃ 4, 
20 8 3, κατὰ τόπον 14. Ὁ 17, 15 a 7 (cf. 
14,4 32), τὸ κινητικώτατον 4b 8, 9b 20, 
ob 173 ἡ τοῦ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ 
πάσχοντι ἐγγίνεται 26.0 4. 

κινητὸς 9 & 3. 

κλᾶν : see κεκλασμένη. 

κοῖλος 19 b 15, 16: contrasted with σιμὸς 
31 Ὁ r4, 15, with κυρτὸς 33 Ὁ 23. 

κοινὸς 21) 8, 38 4, 5b 20, 10a 16, 12b 4, 
19a 32, 21b 18, 22a 33, 25a 6, 20} 24, 
25, 33 b 20; κοινὴ μέθοδος 2217, κοινὸς 
λόγος 14. Ὁ 23, 25, kowdraros λόγος 12.2 5, 
κοινοτάτη δύναμις 15 ἃ 2.---τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ 
ἀπόλωλεν 8b 29—xowd αἰσθητὰ opposed 
to tia 18a 10, 17, 19, 25 ἃ 14.» 27, 25 
b 10, ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ κοινὰ 25 b 6, τῶν 
κοινῶν Kal ἑπομένων 28 Ὁ 22---κοινὴν alo- 
θησιν 25a 29 (cf. τῇ κοινῇ 3th 5) -κοιν ἢ 
16 b 532---ἐν κοινῷ 7b 29—KaTa κοινόν τι 
20 Ὁ 30, εἶδος 353 ὃ 22. 

κοινωνεῖν 1ι 1) 28, 15 b 3, 5, 27. 

κοινωνίαν 7 b 18, 

κόρη : pupil, lens 13 a 3, 20 ἃ 14, 25 ἃ 4, 
ZL a 17. 

κόρσαι (Emped.) 30a 20. 

κρᾶσις 7 Ὁ 31. 

κρατεῖν (Anaxag.) 20 a 10. 

κρεῖττον: joined with ἄρχον τὸ 1) 13. 

κρίνειν : joined with γνωρίζειν 27a 20, with 
γινώσκειν 16a 38qq., With both νοεῖν and 
αἰσθάνεσθαι 27a 18; δυνάμεις ἢ ἕξεις Kad’ 
ἃς κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα 
28a 3—of sense κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητὰ 244 5, 
ἑκάστη περὶ τῶν ἰδίων 18 a 14, ἑκάστη 
τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφορὰς 
26 Ὁ το, τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ 
ψυχρὸν 20 Ὁ 15, τῇ ὄψει κρίνομεν καὶ τὸ 
σκότος καὶ τὸ φῶς 8 b 21, τὸ σκότος ἣ 
ὄψις 22 a 21—ol serests communis ἕκασ- 
Tov πρὸς ἕκαστον κρίνομεν χα Ὁ 14, κεχω- 
ρισμένοις κρίνειν τὰ κεχωρισμένα “Ο ἴ» 23, 
278. 18, ὅτι ἕτερον “6 Ὁ 17, τὰ μὴ ὁμογενἢ 
ἢ τὰ ἐναντία 31 4 24: τὸ κρῖνον 27a 3, 
Kplvew τὸ κρῖνον 26 b 14-——-(Platonic) 
κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα 4b 25. 

κριτὴς 5 Ὁ 8, τι 8 6. 

κριτικός : τὸ μέσον 44.8. 6, νοῦς 34 Ὁ 5, τῷ 
κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθή- 
σεως 32 8. 16. 

κρόκος 21 b 2. 

κρούειν 20 8, 23, 24.4 32. 

κυβερνᾶν τό Ὁ 26. 

κύκλος 6 Ὁ 31, 32, 7a 1, 16, 17, 20 (dis), 
22, b 6, 7, 10, 8a 30, 238 7, 33 Ὁ 26. 

κυκλοφορία 7a 6. 


LLIVUDLA UL GRAAK γὼ κα Ν 


κύριος : κατὰ, φύσιν ὁ νοῦς rob 14 (cf. κυριώ- 
τατον τὸ Ὁ rr); ψόφον το Ὁ το, τοῦ ἀκούειν 
Ig b 33, τοῦ ποιεῖν 33 ἃ 5, ταύτης τῆς 
κινήσεως 33 a 6; κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν τ8 ἃ 3 
(cf. κυριώτατα λέγομεν 8a 6)---κυρίως ἕν 
καὶ ὃν ἣ ἐντελέχεια 12 b 0, ἐπιστάμενος 
17a 20, αἰσθητὰ t8a 24. 

κυρτὸς 33 Ὁ 23. 

κύων 2 Ὁ 7. 

κωλύειν 4 ἃ 14., 16a 7, 17a 28, τὸ Ὁ 26, 
20 ἃ 8, 30b 7, τί κωλύει g a 23, οὐθὲν 
κωλύει 13 ἃ 7, 30 ἢ 7, κωλύει καὶ ἀντι- 
φράττει 20 ἃ 20, 

κωλυτικὸς 3 Ὁ 4. 

κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλος 6b 17. 


λαμβάνειν : contrasted with φεύγειν 34b 17; 
τὰ καλῶς εἰρημένα 3b 22, τροφὴν 138. 30, 
αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν 13227, ὄμμα Sb ar, 
κριτὴν ΑἿ) ὃ, ὄνομα 214 32, 290 3, τινὰ, 
πίστιν 2211, ἐπιστήμην τῇ Ὁ 12—grasp, 
understand rls ὁ τρόπος 2a 18, 580 38 5, 
12 22, 158 15, 16a 2, 24a 17. 

λάμπειν 19 2 4. 

λαμπρὸς 22a 22, 25, 26b 1. 

λανθάνειν 2b 5, 11 ar, 18b 23, 25, 26, 
232 30, Ὁ 7, 8, 9, 25 Ὁ 5, 7, 28b 8. 

λάχε (Emped.) roa 5. 

λέγειν: λέγω δέ, I mean 2a12 and often: 
πῶς λέγεται Ob 23, ἁπλῶς λέγομεν 17a 
22, 26a 26, λέγεται διχῶς, δισσῶς 6a το, 
Iza 2% [44 4, 178 το, 12, 26a 23, 
ἀμφοτέρως λέγειν τό Ὁ 6, τριχῶς 18 a 8, 
Iq¢ ἃ τὸ, πλεοναχῶς 12 Ὁ 9, πολλαχῶς 
Ιο ἃ 13, 15 b 0, ὁμοίως 17 Ὁ 19, οὕτω 
26a 17, καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα 20 ὮὉ 7, 21 Ὁ 8, 
κατὰ μεταφορὰν 20 ἃ 20, 28 ἃ 2, κατὰ 
δύναμιν 26 ἃ το, δυνάμει 17 Ὁ 30—ap- 
parently elliptical καθ᾽ ἣν λέγεται τόδε 
721226, ἡ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων Ἀέγεται 24. ἃ 
23, ὁ ἐπιστήμων λέγεται 6 Kar’ ἐνέργειαν 
29 Ὁ 6—pronounce, λέγειν ὅτι ἕτερον 26 
b 20, 25 Ὁ 2, 26 Ὁ 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 
31 Ὁ 8, 32 b 28, 34 a 18, joined with 
ἐπιτάττειν 33a 2. 

λεῖος 19 b 7, 15, 16, 32, 204 I, 2, 23, 
35a ὃ. 

Aetéryns: φωνῆς, contrasted with τραχύτης, 
22 Ὁ 31. 

λείπεσθαι ga 8, b 23, 28 a 18: of the only 
alternative 19 a 19, 23 ἃ 13, 25a 7: to 
be inferior 21a 21. 

λεπὶς τὸ a 5. 

λεπτομερὴς 5 a 6, 22, ga 32, b 21. 

λεπτομέρεια (v.1.) 5 a ΤΊ. 

λεπτὸς 5 a 24. 

λευκὸς δὰ 18, 10a 6, 18a 21, 22, 22h 24, 
23 b 22, 24a 8, 25 a 26, Ὁ 7, 26b το, 
13, 18, 21, 27a 1, 8, 28a 28, Ὁ τ, 21 (δῖ), 
80 Ὁ 2, 3 (625), 5, 30, 318 25, 26, Ὁ 1— 
(earlier thinkers) οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν 
ἄνευ ὄψεως 26a 21. 

λίθινος τῷ Ὁ 21. 

λίθος 3b 5, 58 20, ΙΟ ἃ II, 21 Ὁ 20, 35 
a 


λιπαρὸς 218. 30, 22 Ὁ 12. 
λογίζεσθαι 531 Ὁ 7, 33 8 14. 


613 


λογισμὸς gb τό, 15a 8, 9. 10, 33.4 12, 24, 
25, 34a ὃ. 

λογιστικὸς 32 a 28, 33 Ὁ 29, 34 a 73 τὸ 
λογιστικὸν 32 Ὁ 5, 26. 

λόγος : speech, discussion, oratio, λόγῳ 
εἰπεῖν 18 a 273 ἐν κοινῷ γιγνομένοις 7b 
29, 12, 15a 12, 16b 31, περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν 
καὶ πάσχειν 17a 2, 27a 20, Ὁ 26, 32 b 8: 
hence, subject, ἕτερός ἐστε Λόγος 8b 11, 
19 8 7, 21 a 6—account, explanation, 
ratio, λόγος was ὁρισμὸς ἢ ἀπόδειξις 7 a 
25, τοῦ συμπεράσματος 13a 18, ὁ αὐτὸς 
λόγος περί, ἐπὶ 19225, 22 Ὁ 17, 24b 8, 
26a 8, 3rb1, ὅμοιος 30 Ὁ 22—form or 
notion, ἔνυλοε λόγοι 3.2 25, b 8 (δὲς), 15 Ὁ 
I4, 244 31; joined with εἶδος 3b 2 (425), 
148 13, with τί ἣν εἶναι 12 Ὁ τό, with 
μορφή, εἶδος, ἐνέργεια τᾷ 8. 9, with ἐντε- 
λέχειά τις 144 27. with δύναμις 248, 27, 
32 Ὁ 3; contrasted with ὕλη 16 a 18; 
οὐσία ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον 12 b ri (cf. 24 
δι 24); χωριστοῦ κατὰ λόγον contrasted 
with κατὰ μέγεθος 209 ἃ 12, ἢ μεγέθει ἢ 
λόγῳ 32a 20 (cf. 33 Ὁ 24), λόγῳ F καὶ 
τόπῳ 13 Ὁ 15, λόγῳ ἕτερα 13 Ὁ 20, οὐ 
τῷ λόγῳ GAN ὅτι xré. 18a 3ο---κατὰ τὸν 
λόγον γνωριμώτερον 138 12, πρότερα Τῷ 
8. 20, but κατὰ λόγον ΞΞ εὐλόγως 14a 25--- 
definition, the notion expressed in words, 
more precisely ὁριστικὸς Ad-yos 13 a ΤΆ, 
λόγοι τῶν ὅρων 13. a 16,50 2b 5, 3 ὃ 4, 
gob 15.128 6, 14 Ὁ 20, 23, 25, 27, 15 
a 13—<cefining formula, ratio, proportion, 
λόγος τῶν μειχθέντων 7b 32, 8a 9, τῆς 
μείξεως 8 a 4, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23 
(δὲς), 27, toa 2, 8, 26a 28, 29, Ὁ 3, 4, 
47, 29 Ὁ 16, πέρας καὶ λόγος 16a 17—- 
theory 7b 14, 9 Ὁ 26, ro a 28, opposed 
to fact 18b 24—the arguiment personified 
ΤΙ Ὁ τῷ (ef. 7 Ὁ 15)—reason, calculation 
27 Ὁ 14, 28a 23, 24, Τὸ λόγον ἔχον 32 
a 26, 31, 33 Ὁ 6—logical premiss 348 17. 

λνυγρὸς (Emped.) 4 Ὁ 15. 

λύεσθαι 24 ἃ. 30. 

λυπεῖν: λυπεῖ (ν.]. λύει) 26 Ὁ 7: λυπεῖσθαι 
8 Ὁ 2, 5: 31a I0. 

λύπη: joined with ἡδονὴ go Ὁ 17. 13 Ὁ 23, 
14 b 4,34,5} 35. | 

λυπηρόν: contrasted with ἡδὺ 14 Ὁ 5, 21a 
12, 31a 9, Ὁ 9, 35 Ὁ 23. 

λύρα 20b 7. 

λύσις 22 Ὁ 28. 


μαθήματα 2b το. 

μαθηματικός, ὁ 3 Ὁ 15: τὰ μαθηματικὰ 5831 
b 15. 

μάθησις 17 a 31. 

μακάριος 72 34. 

μαλακός: v onbrsted with σκληρὸς 22b 27, 
23 Ὁ 4, 248. 3. 

μαλακόσαρκος 21 a 26. 

μανθάνειν 8 Ὁ 14,17b 12, 29 Ὁ 9, 324 7- 

μαντεύεσθαι gb 18. 

μαραίνειν 8b 24. 

μαρτυρεῖν το ἃ 20. 

μάτην 35 Ὁ 21, 344 31. 

μέγας (of sound) 22 ἃ 26, 29 Ὁ 1. 


614 


μέγεθος: opposed to μικρότης ga 14; (of 
vocal sound) 22 Ὁ 30; τὸ τρίτον μέγεθος 
23a 23; μεγέθους καὶ αὐξήσεως 16a 17: 
κεχωρισμένον μεγέθους 31 Ὁ 19; μέγεθος 
καὶ μεγέθει εἶναι 29b 10: κατὰ μέγεθος op- 
posed to κατὰ λόγον 20 ἃ 12, μεγέθει ἢ 
λόγῳ 328. 20 (cf. 233 Ὁ 25); κατὰ μέγεθος 
ἢ κατὰ στυγμὴν 78. 12,14—one of the com- 
mon sensibles 18a 18, 258 16,17, 18, Ὁ 6, 
9. 28b 24—of νοῦς 7a 3, 10, 17: μέγεθός 
τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον as opposed to αἐσθη- 
τικῷ εἶναι 24. ἃ 26, “47---τὰ μεγέθη τὰ 
αἰσθητὰ 32 a 4, τῶν μεγεθῶν 8 a 6, 
opposed to ἀριθμὸς 7 ἃ 9. 

μέθη 8b 23. 

μεθίστασθαι κατὰ μόρια 6 Ὁ 3. 

μέθοδος 2a 14, 16, 17, 20. 

μειγνύναι 5 ξι τ, 7b 33, 8a 0») 17, 228 14, 
15, 258. 7. 29b 28 ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ μεμεῖχθαι 
11a 7, τῷ σώματι 7b 2, 298 24. 

μεικτὸς 118. 10, 23 8 14, 26b 5, 34 Ὁ το. 

μεῖξις 8 ἃ 14, 15, 18, 22, 25, 28. 

μέλας 22 Ὁ 24, 24 a 8, 26a 21, Ὁ 11, 27a 
8, 30 Ὁ 23, 31a 25, 26. 

μέλι οἱ Ὁ 2. 

μέλιττα 28 a 11. 

μέλλειν : διὰ τὸ μέλλον 33 Ὁ 8, ὁρᾶν τὸ 
μέλλον 33 Ὁ 10, τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ 
παρόντα 531 Ὁ 8. 

μέλος, limb: μέλεσι (v.l. μέρεσι) 8 ἃ 21. 

μέλος, melody 20 Ὁ 8. 

μέν: solitarzum 12a 7, 18a 14—answered 
by «ai 18a 27. 

μένειν 6 Ὁ 21, 7b 11, 9a 12, 24 Ὁ 15, 33 
Ὁ 26, 34 a τό, 35a I, 5. 

μερίζεσθαι 6 Ὁ 29. 

μεριστὸς τι Ὁ 5, 7, 12, 13 ἃ 5: Opposed to 
duephs 2b 1, 7a το (dés). 

μέρος: τῶν φντῶν 12 Ὁ 1, ἐντόμων 13b 21, 
τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη 32b 28; 3a 27, 88 
10, Tr, 12 Ὁ 18, 22, 13 ἃ 6: ὡς τὸ μέρος 
πρὸς τὸ μέρος, οὕτως ἡ ὅλη αἴσθησις πρὸς 
τὸ ὅλον σῶμα τὸ αἰσθητικὸν 12 Ὁ 23, 24; 
THs ψυχῆς Ἰο Ὁ 25, 13 ἃ 4, 33 b τ---τῆς 
ἐναντιώσεως IL a ---συμβάλλεται μέγα 
μέρος 2 1» 22—(Emped.) roa 5. 

μέσος 7 8. 29, 138 10, 22 Ὁ 7, 12, 34 Ὁ 31, 
33: 3581, τὸ μέσον κριτικὸν 248 6 

μεσότης 248 4: Ὁ 1, 31a II, 19, 358 21- 

μεταβάλλειν 16 a 33, Ὁ 2, 17 a 32---οὗ 
spatial motion 6 Ὁ 2, 34 Ὁ 30. 

μεταβολή: ἡ μεταβολὴ πᾶσιν els τὸ ἀντι- 
κείμενον ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ 16 a 33, ἐπὶ τὰς 
στερητικὰς διαθέσεις 17 Ὁ 15, τοῦ αἰσθη- 
Τικοῦ 17 Ὁ 17. 

μεταξύ: preposition 18 Ὁ 22, 10 Ὁ 8, 22 Ὁ 
13: 238 23; adverbial 23a 27--- περὶ τῶν 
μεταξὺ 6 a 30, μεταβολὴ eis τὸ μεταξὺ 
16a 34: κενὸν τὸ μεταξὺ 19 ἃ 16, ὑπὸ 
τοῦ μεταξὺ τὸ a 20, ἀναγκαῖόν τι εἶναι 
μεταξὺ 19a 2ο---τπὸ μεταξύ, the medium 
between sense and sensible 19 a 27, 32, 
22 Ὁ 22, 23a 15, Ὁ 14 (ds), 15, 26, ὡς τὸ 
μεταξὺ 22a 16, διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ 21 Ὁ 0, 
22 8. 9. 13, 534 Ὁ 28, διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ 24 
Ὁ 29. 358 τό. 

μεταπείθεσθαι 28 b 6. 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


μεταπίπτειν 28D 8. 

μεταφορὰ 20a 29, 28a 2. 

μετεῖναι 27 Ὁ 8. 

μετέχειν 6a 12, 22, ἸΟ Ὁ 23: 128 18, 13 
Ὁ 8, 15 2 29, Ὁ 5, 25, 16 b 9, 32 b 30. 

μετρεῖν 3. ἃ 0. 

μέχρι: ἐκείνης (τῆς ψυχῆς) 8 Ὁ τό, μέχρι 
τούτου ἐστὶν τό Ὁ 14, 354 3 (cf. 344 23), 
μέχρις ἀκοῆς 20a 3, μέχρι Tov 53. ὃ 30, 
μέχρι πόρρω 358. 4, τοῦ πέρατος 35a 0--- 
conjunction 35 ἃ 7. 

μῆκος 30b 8, το, 13, 19, 20—(Platonic) τοῦ 
πρώτου μήκους 4b 20. 

μῆνυγξ 20a I4. 

μηνύει (v.l. for σημεῖον) 3 ἃ 10. 

paris (Emped.) 27 ἃ 23. 

μικρομέρεια, (v.l. for λεπτομέρεια) Ra 11. 

μικρός: of odour arb 7. of sound 22a 25, 
of flavour 22a 30, of tangible qualities 
24a 13. 

μικρότης τ opposed to μέγεθος 9 a 153 Of 
vocal sound 22 Ὁ 30. 

μισεῖν contrasted with φιλεῖν 3a 18, 8b 26. 

μνημονεύειν 8b 28, 20a 24. 

μνημονικός : ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς 27 Ὁ 10. 

μόλις ὁρώμενον τῷ 1») 28. 

μοναδικός: στιγμὴ 0 ἃ 20. 

μονάς: κινουμένη 9a 1, τῶν μονάδων κινήσεις 
gas, θέσιν ἔχουσα ga 6, αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι 
Qa 22, φερομένας gb 10: ga 8, τι, 16, 
10. 22, Ὁ 0. 

μοναχῶς 4 Ὁ 22. 

μονή: κινήσεις ἢ μονὰς (κινήσεων) 8b 18. 

μόνιμος: τινὰ μόνιμα τῶν ξῴων κατὰ τόπον 
1ob 19, 32b 20, 34 Ὁ 2, 4, 8. 

μόνος : ταύτην μόνην τῶν κινήσεων το Ὁ 203 
χωρισθείς ἐστι μόνον τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστὶ 30 
a 22, and often. 

μόριον : τοῦ παντὸς 11 a 23: Of the living 
body or organism (cf. μέρος) ὁ ἃ 8, 8a 
26, 27, 11b 18, 14a 7, 20b 14, 23, 24, 
28, 21a 5, 23 8 6,18, b 31, 33 ἃ I, 35 
ἃ 28, ὀργανικὸν 32 b 18, τῶν ἐντόμων 
IIb 21, 24: “parts” of the soul (seldom 
expressed by μέρος) 2 Ὁ 9, 10, 12, 6 b 3, 
1 10. b 3, 14, 16, 25, 13b 7, 14 (dzs), 
27, 29a 10, 328 19, 21, 23, 28, b 2, 
μόριον ψυχικὸν 24 a 33—-(according to 
some) τὸ ὅλον rots μορίοις ὁμοειδὲς 11 a 
17—of νοῦς in the Ziviaens πότερον 
ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ τῶν αὑτοῦ; μορίῳ δ᾽ ὄτοι 
κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ κατὰ στιγμήν, εἰ Set καὶ 
τοῦτο μόριον εἰπεῖν 7a 11 94.,) 16, 18. 

μορφή : joined with εἶδος 7 Ὁ 24, 12a 8, 
14a 0. 

ptew 28a 16. 

μῦθοι: ἸΠνθαγορικοὶ 7b 22. 

μύκης 19 ἃ 5. 

μυκτὴρ 21 Ὁ τό. 

μύρμηξ 19a 17, 288 τι. 


νεῖκος (Emped.) 4. Ὁ 15 (25): 
νέος 8b 22. 

γεῦρον το b 1. 

νηνεμία 4. ἃ 20. 

γῆστις (Emped.) toa 5. 
γνικἂν 34 8. 12. 


cf. τοῦ 6. 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 615 


νοεῖν : joined with γινώσκειν τοῦ 26, with 
θεωρεῖν 8 Ὁ 24: ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι 
47 Ὁ 27 (cf. 29 Ὁ 10—22, 27 Ὁ 8---τ τ); 
νοῆσαι ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθά- 
νεσθαι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ 1. Ὁ 24:1 εἴ ἐστιν 
ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη 
ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον 208. 13 
(cf. 29 Ὁ 24, 25); νοεῖ οὐδέποτε ἄνευ 
φαντάσματος 31a 17 (cf. 32a 8), τὰ εἴδη 
ἐν rots φαντάσμασι 31 b 2 (cf. εἴ ἐστε φαν- 
τασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ évdé- 
χοιτ᾽ ἂν οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι 
3a 8—I10, νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι 33 b 
12); τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι 
τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις 27 1) 27 56. (cf. 338 Lo}; 
τὸ νοεῖν distinguished from τὸ νοητικὸν 
18a 1τὃ, from νοῦς 2b 13; μάλιστ᾽ ἔοικεν 
ἔδιον τῆς ψυχῆς 3a 8, μαραίνεται ἄλλου 
τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένου, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθὲς 8 Ὁ 
24: εἰ πάσῃ τῇ ψυχῇ νοοῦμεν ττ Ὁ 1, ᾧ 
νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ 30b 16: πῶς γίνεται 
τὸ νοεῖν 20 ἃ 135 ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ 
ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς 27 Ὁ 9; τοῦ μὴ 
ἀεὶ νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον 20a § (contrast 30a 
22}; ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἔστι τὸ 
νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον 30a 4; κατὰ τὸ 
νοοῦν καὶ φρονοῦν 17 Ὁ το: πρὶν νοεῖν 
240 24 (cf. 29b 31): νοῶν 31 Ὁ 17; οὐ 
μᾶλλον νοήσει 34 Ὁ 6---πάντα 29 a 18, 
ἄνευ τούτοι. οὐθὲν 30a 25, σφόδρα νοητὸν 
20 Ὁ 3, τὰ ὑποδεέστερα 20 b 4, αὑτὸν 29b 
9, τὸ ἀδιαίρετον 30 Ὁ 7, τὸ μῆκος 30b 8, 
ἑκάτερον τῶν ἡμίσεων 30 Ὁ 12. τὸ τῷ εἴδει 
ἀδιαίρετον 30 Ὁ 15, τὸ σιμόν, ἢ μὲν σιμόν, 
οὐ κεχωρισμένως, 7 δὲ κοῖλον, εἴ τις ἐνόει 
ἐνεργείᾳ, ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει 31 Ὁ 
13-8,), τὰ μαθηματικὰ οὐ κεχωρισμένα 
ὡς κεχωρισμένα 531 Ὁ 16, τῶν κεχωρισμένων 
τι 31b 18, μονάδα κινουμένην 9 a 1— of 
simple apprehension αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον 
τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν 31a 8; of judg- 
ment ὡς λέγει, οὕτω καὶ νοεῖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται 
6 Ὁ 22—(of earlier thinkers) δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ 
νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι 
27 α 19 (cf. 27 ἃ 18), σωματικὸν ὑπολαμ- 
βάνουσιν 272 26, λέγουσί τινες ἄλλο μὲν 
τῆς ψυχῆς νοεῖν ἄλλο δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν τα Ὁ 6; 
(objections to Plato) πῶς νοήσει μέγεθος 
ὧν 7a Lo, 14, 17, 18, 22, 32- 

γόημα 7a 73 σύνθεσις νοημάτων 30a 28, 
συμπλοκὴ 328 11, TA πρῶτα νοήματα 32a 
12, φαντάσμασιν ἣ νοήμασιν 21 Ὁ 7. 

νόησις 6b 28, 338 10, 12: μία καὶ συνεχὴς 
7 8 7. ἡ νόησις τὰ νοήματα 78 7) accord- 
ing to Plato νοῦ κίνησις νόησις 7 a 20, 
περιφορὰ 7a 21 (cf. 7a 22), but according 
to Aristotle ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει 78 323 τῶν 
πρακτικῶν νοήσεων ἔστι πέρατα, αἱ δὲ 
θεωρητικαὶ τοῖς λόγοις ὁμοίως ὁρίζονται 
78. 243: ἡ τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις 30 8 26 ; 

joined with αἴσθησις 27 4 1, 9; distin- 
guished from ὑπόληψις 27 Ὁ 17- 

vonrixés: ἡ νοητικὴ Ψυχὴ 29 a 28; τὸ 
νοητικὸν 15a 17, 29a 30, 31 Ὁ 2, vonri- 
κὸν 33 Ὁ 3. 

νοητός: τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ νοῦ 2b 16, τοῦ 
νοητικοῦ 1§ a 22 (cf. 298 18); vonra 


distinguished from αἰσθητὰ 31 Ὁ 223 ἢ 
μεμειγμένον TL ποιεῖ νοητὸν 29 Ὁ 28, εἰ 
νοητὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς 29b 26, 308 2. 
κατ᾽ ἄλλο 20 Ὁ 28, ἕν τι τὸ νοητὸν εἴδει 
20 Ὁ 28, τῷ νῷ τὸ νοητὸν ὑπάρξει 30a 8, 
δυνάμει ἐστὲ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς 20 Ὁ 30, ἐν 
τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστον τῶν 
νοητῶν 30a 7, ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς 
τὰ νοητά ἐστι 328. 5; σφόδρα νοητὸν 20 Ὁ 
3—29 4 I4, 304 3. 

νόος (Homer) 27a 26. 

νόσος 8 Ὁ 24, 208 7. 

νοῦς: distinguished from νοεῖν 2b 13, from 
αἰσθητικὸν 2b τό, 29217, from αἴσθησις 
32a 18—one of the modes of life 13 a 23, 
confined to men and higher beings 14 Ὁ 
18, 29a 6, 7, 4b 53 ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς 7a 
5, 2904 22, joined with τὸ λογιστικὸν 
32b 26: κριτικὸς 34b 33 προγενέστατον 
καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν to Ὁ τι (cf. τὸ b 
12—14); δύναμις ἢ ἕξις καθ᾽ ἣν κρίνομεν 
καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα 28a 5 (con- 
trast τῶν ἀεὶ ἀληθενόντων 28a 18), ὁ νοῦς 
οὐ πᾶς ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς 30b 27, ὁ τοῦ τί 
ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι ἀληθής. καὶ οὔ τι 
κατά τινος 30b 28 (cf. δυνάμει τινὶ περὶ 
τὴν ἀλήθειαν 4 ἃ ἌΣ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς 
158. 8 12, ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ θεωρητικὴ δύναμις 
153 Ὁ 24, ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ 
τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ 
τὸ ἀίδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ 13b 25 sq., εἷς καὶ 
συνεχὴς 78. 6, ἤτοι ἀμερὴς ἢ οὐχ ὡς μέγεθός 
τι συνεχὴς 78. 0. ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία 
ris οὖσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι 8 Ὁ 18, θειό- 
τερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθὲς 8b 29; joined with 
τὸ διανοητικὸν τῷ Ὁ 18: ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ 
ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχὴ 29 a 23 (cf. ᾧ 
γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ 29a το); 
ἀπαθές, δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἴδους καὶ δυνάμει 
τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο 20 ἃ 18, ἀμιγὴς 
4208 18, ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ ὅτι δυνατὸν 29a 22, 
οὐθὲν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν 29 24 
(cf. 29 Ὁ 30); ουδὲ μεμεῖχθαι εὔλογον τῷ 
σώματι 292 245q., οὐθὲν ὄργανόν ἐστι τῷ 
νῷ 208 27; χωριστὸς Opposed to οὐκ ἄνευ 
σώματος 29b 5; νοῦς distinguished from 
αἴσθησις as regards ἀπάθεια 20 Ὁ 3 564-; 
διχῶς δυνάμει 20 Ὁ 5---8, αὐτὸς αὑτὸν τότε 
δύναται νοεῖν 29 Ὁ 9; τὰ περὶ τὸν νοῦν 
20 Ὁ 22; πῶς νοητὸς καὶ αὐτὸς 20 Ὁ 26— 
308 9 (cf. 29 Ὁ 9); δυνάμει πως τὰ νοητὰ 
20 Ὁ 30; τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην οὐχ ὑπάρξει 
νοῦς 30a 7 (contrast ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς 
ὑπάρξει 29b 27), ἄνευ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ νοῦς 
τῶν ἐχόντων ὕλην 308. 8 --νοῦς ὁ τῷ πάντα 
ποιεῖν distinguished from 6 τῷ πάντα 
γίνεσθαι 30 ἃ 14 5α.; χωριστὸς 302 17, 
ἀπαθής, ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνέργεια 
30 a 18, ἀεὶ νοεῖ, χωρισθείς ἐστι μόνον 
τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστὶ 30a 22, μόνον ἀθάνατον 
καὶ ἀίδιον 30a 23---ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρ- 
τὸς 304 24-τὸ ὃν ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς 
ἕκαστον 30b 6, ὁ νοῦς ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν τὰ 
πράγματα 31 Ὁ 17, εἶδος εἰδῶν 535 ἃ “2---τὸ 
πρακτικὸς νοῦς: ὁ ἕνεκά τον λογιζόμενος 
338 14, distinguished from ὁ θεωρητικὸς 
338 14.36.,) 352 Ὁ 27 sqq., πᾶς ὀρθὸς op- 


616 


posed to ὄρεξις and φαντασία 33a 26, b7 
(cf. 33 a 8), τὸ ὀρεκτὸν ἀρχὴ 3538 16, 
κινητικὸς κατὰ τόπον 33 8 13 (cf. 338 0, 
21), οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως 33 a 23 (cf. 33 8 
2), ὁ νοῦς ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ 15 Ὁ 16—~earlier 
thinkers: (Anaxag.) ἀρχὴν μάλιστα πάν- 
των 5a 15 (cf. 4a 27, 5218), ἁπλοῦν, 
ἀμιγῆ, καθαρὸν 5 a τό sq., ἀπαθῇ, κοινὸν 
οὐθὲν οὐθενὶ ἔχειν 5 Ὁ 20 (cf. 20 Ὁ 23), ἐν 
ἅπασιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ζῴοις 4 Ὁ 3, ἕτερον 
ψυχῆς 58 14 (ch. ἧττον διασαφεῖ 4 Ὁ 1); 
τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς 4b 2: 
(Democr.) ἁπλῶς ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν καὶ νοῦν 
48. 28, 31, 529, οὐ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὡς 
δυνάμει τινὲ wept τὴν ἀλήθειαν 4a 30, 
made of spherical atoms 5a 13: ἐκ τῶν 
στοιχείων ποιοῦσιν τὸ Ὁ 22, μέρος Te τῆς 
ψυχῆς rob 25: (against doctrine of parts 
of soul) ποῖον μέρος ἢ πῶς ὁ νοῦς συνέξει 
αὶ Ὁ 18 (cf. 8 ἃ 12): (Platonic) βέλτιον 
τὸν νοῦν μὴ μετὰ σώματος εἶναι 7 Ὁ 4, νοῦ 
κίνησις νόησις 7a 20, 21, νοῦν τὸ & 4b 
22, κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα νῷ ab 26. 

νῦν: οὕτω λέγει, καὶ νῦν, καὶ ὅτι νῦν 26 Ὁ 28 
and often: as a matter of fact, under 
present conditions 8 Ὁ 20, 12 b 15, 138 
16, 23a 2, Io, 20, 23 Ὁ 2, ro, 11, 240 28: 
25429, 22, bg, 29a 27, 33a 22, 34b 6: 
somewhat similar are 17 4a 21. 23a 12: 
viv=vuvd) τὸ a 29, 32a 28. 


ξανθὸς 25 Ὁ 2, 3. 

ξηρὸς 23.2 26: contrasted with ὑγρὸς 14b 7, 
12, 22a 6, Ὁ 26, 23 Ὁ 28. 

ξύλινος 6 b το. 

ξύλον 3b 6, 24 Ὁ 12. 

ξυνίοι (v. 1. ξυν εἰ) 32 a 8. 

ξύσματα 4a 3, τ8. 


ὁδὶ 3b 6, 28b το: ἀπὸ τωνδὲτε ἀπὸ τῶν καθ᾽ 
ἕκαστον αἰσθητῶν 8 Ὁ 17. 

ὀδμὴ 24 Ὁ 8. 

ὄζειν 19a 20, 24 Ὁ 16. 

οἰκεῖος: ὕλῃ 14a 26, εἶδος τᾷ Ὁ 27, χρῶμα 
Iga 2, 6, κίνησις 20a 16, λόγος 15 a 13, 
16 Ὁ 31: with genitive 5b 6, 6a 8,7 
125; with dative 4a 22, 27 Ὁ 1. 

οἰκία 3b 3. 

οἰκοδομεῖν Bb 13, 17 Ὁ 9. 

οἰκοδόμος τῇ Ὦ 0. 

οἰκουμένη, 7 “8 Ὁ 4. 

οἷον : as it were, ἀρχὴ 2a 6, ἥδυσμα 14b 13, 
ἐνέργεια 144 9, χρῶμα 18 Ὁ τι, ὑμένα 
234 3, μεσότητος 24a 4, αἰσθήματα 318 
15, κεντεῖ, ὠθεῖ 20 Ὁ 2, καταφᾶσα ἢ 
ἀποφᾶσα 3180: for instance (citing ex- 
amples) 2b 6 and often: namely, that is 
to say (when the instances cited are ex- 
haustive) 14.b 18, 32, 20b 7, 10, 21 Ὁ 9, 
24 Ὁ 30, 292 6, 8, 34 Ὁ 15, 25, 35 Ὁ 8, 
probably also 138 23, 15a 17, 22, 194 
4, 26a 12, 334 3. 

olovel 30 Ὁ 13. 

ὀλἔγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος 28 Ὁ το. 

ὅλος: ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου 10b 20, ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ 118. 7, 
τὸ ὅλον τοῖς μορίοις ὁμοειδὲς r1 a 17 (cf. 
rr Ὁ 26): φύσις 4 ἃ 5, οὐρανὸς 5 b 1, 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


κύκλῳ opposed to τοῖς μορίοις 7 ἃ 17, 
μορίῳ τινὶ τοῦ σώματος ἢ καὶ ὅλῳ 14a 8--- 
similarly opposed to μόριον or μέρος: τὸ 
ξῶν σῶμα τὸ Ὁ 23, αἴσθησις 12 Ὁ 24, ψυχὴ 
2b10, 6b 2, 11a 30, 11 b 15, 27; ψυχὴ 
opposed to νοητικὴ 29 a 28, περὶ πάσης 
ψυχῆς οὐδὲ περὶ ὅλης ovdeulas rob 27— 
ὅλως : wholly, absolutely 21 b 7, 22a 27, 
goa 21, 31a 2, probably also 26b 5—(in 
negative or virtually negative sentences) 
at all 7a17, 8b 31, 9b ro, 18b 14, 19a 
2%: generalising from particular cases 
6b 24,8a2, ΤΟ 7, 12b 7, 53 Ὁ 17. 
31 Ὁ 10, 16, 338 4, Ὁ 27, ὅλως dpa 29b 
21—(after enumerations) in short 3 ἃ 7, 
rra 28, 35 b 22. 

ὁμαλὸς 20a 25. 

ὄμβρος 3b 5. 

ὄμμα 8 Ὁ 21, 21 b 28, 22a 1, 23 b 22, 
a7b τ. 

ὁμογενὴς 31 a 24. 

ὁμοειδὴλ 2b 2 (25), 
Ὁ 25. 

ὁμοιομερὴς Il ἃ 23. 

ὅμοιος : τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον 4b 17 and often 
--“ὁμοίως 4b 18, 6b 19 and often. 

ὁμοιότης : καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα 20b 6, τῶν πραγ- 
μάτων ΣΙ Ὁ 1. 

ὁμοιοτρόπως 4b 21. 

ὁμοιοῦσθαι τ8 ἃ 6. 

dv: πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος loa 13: 
τὰ ὄντα 31 Ὁ 21, 22, 45) 0, 58 τό, 28, ob 
25. rob 8, 15. τό, τ2α 6, ταῦ 26, 27 ἃ 
21. 29a 24. 

ὄνομα ἃ Ὦ 26, 19a 4, 218 32, 2943, 35a 
17, κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν 18 ἃ 3. 

ὀνομάζειν 5 Ὁ 28, 26a 12. 

ὀξύς: of sound, opposed to βαρὺς 20a 20, 
30, 32, 22 Ὁ 24, 26a 31, b 6; Of odour 
21a 30; of flavour 22b 14; of tangibles, 
opposed to ἀμβλὺς 20b 1, 2—26b 4. 

ὀξύτης Of sound 22 Ὁ 30. 

ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντα τὸ ἃ I. 

ὅραμα 28a 16, 35 Ὁ rx. 

ὁρᾶν - τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαϊ ἐστιν δρᾶν 25 b 
18, πάσχοντος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ γίνεται τὸ 
ὁρᾶν 19a 183 ὁρᾶται χρῶμα ἣ τὸ ἔχον 
25 Ὁ 18 (cf. 19a 19), πᾶν τὸ ἑκάστου 
χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶται 18b 3 (cf. 19 8, 
9. 22, 20a 28, 208 4 and contrast 19a 
2, 6, 7), πῦρ ὁρᾶται ἐν σκότει καὶ ἐν φωτὶ 
198. 23, τὸ χρῶμα οὐχ ὁρᾶται τῷ μείγ- 
γυσθαι οὐδὲ ταῖς ἁπορροίαις 22a 153 μὴ 
κινήσας μηδ᾽ ἀνασπάσας τὰ βλέφαρα οὐχ 
ὁρᾷ 21b 30, τὰ σκληρόφθαλμα εὐθὺς dpa 
ατ Ὁ 31, ἐάν τις θῇ τὸ ἔχον χρῶμα ἐπ᾽ 
αὐτὴν τὴν ὄψιν, οὐκ ὄψεταε το ἃ 13, ἐκ τῶν 
ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων ἡ αἴσθησις οὐ δύναται 
ὁρᾶν 20 Ὁ 33 τὸ ὁρᾶν τοῦ ἰδίον ἀληθὲς 
80 Ὁ 20; αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὁρῶμεν 25b 12, 
13, εἰ ὄψεταί τις τὸ ὁρῶν, χρῶμα ἕξει τὸ 
ὁρῶν πρῶτον 25 Ὁ 19 (cf. 25 b 22): τὸ 
δυνάμει ὁρῶν 17 ἃ τι, τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον 
ἰδεῖν 24. Ὁ 5, τὸ μόλις ὁρώμενον 18 Ὁ 29; 
ὥσπερ ὁρῶν λογίζεται τὰ μέλλοντα 31 Ὁ 7 
(cf. 33 Ὁ 10): observe 4 ἃ 24, 13 Ὁ 19, 
258. 30 and often; understand χ2 Ὁ 16; 


Ira 17, 18, 21) 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


consider 28 a 18—(Democr.) εἰ γένοιτο 
κενὸν τὸ μεταξύ, ὁρᾶσθαι ἂν ἀκριβῶς 19 a 
16 (contrast 19 a 21). 

ὅρασις: ἐντελέχεια 12 b 28, ἡ τῆς ὄψεως 
ἐνέργεια 262 13, 28a 7. 

dparés: οὗ ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις 18a 26, χρῶμα καὶ 
ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τ 32 
26, 29, 22a τό, οὐκ ἄνευ φωτὸς 18b 2 
(contrast οὐ πάντα ὁρατὰ ἐν φωτί ἐστιν 
χρῶ τὴ: τὸ ὁρατὸν δι᾿ ἑτέρων αἰσθανόμεθα 
23 Ὁ 5, ποιητικὸν τῆς ἐνεργείας, ἔξωθεν 
17 Ὁ 20, διαφέρει τῶν ἁπτῶν 23 Ὁ 12, τὸ 
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατὸν 18a 30, Ὁ 5: opposed 
to ἀόρατος 21 b 5, 22a 20, 248 Io. 

ὀργᾶν 34 22. 

ὀργανικός : σῶμα ὀργανικὸν = φυσικὸν δυνάμει 
fwhy ἔχον 12a 28, b 6, μόριον 32 Ὁ 18, 
μέρη 32 Ὁ 25--ὀργανικῶς 43 Ὁ 21. 

ὄργανον 7 Ὦ 26, 12b 12, 13a 1, ἕτερα καὶ 
ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἔργοις 16a 5: of plants r2b1; 
of animals 11 Ὁ 23, 20 Ὁ 22, 3228, 2, ᾧ 
κινεῖ ἡ ὄρεξις 33 Ὁ 193 πάντα τὰ φυσικὰ 
σώματα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανα 15 b 19; of 
νοῦς 20 2 26 Sq. 

ὀργή: ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως 34 30, ζέσις τοῦ 
περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος ἣ θερμοῦ 30 31. 

ὀργίζεσθαι 3 ἃ 7, 22, 26, 8b 2, 8, 12. 

ὀρέγεσθαι: πάντα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου 
ὀρέγεται 15 b 1, οὐθὲν μὴ ὀρεγόμενον ἢ 
φεῦγον κινεῖται ἀλλ᾽ ἢ βίᾳ 352 b 17 (οἴ. 35 Ὁ 
17), οἱ ἐγκρατεῖς 33 4 7. 

ὀρεκτικός: οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας 33 Ὁ 28: εἰ 
τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν τ4. Ὁ 1, οὔχ 
ἕτερον τοῦ φευκτικοῦ οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, 
ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο 31a 13 (cf. 32 b 3); 
τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ἢ ὁρεκτικὸν 33 Ὁ 
rr, ἃ 21 (cf. 33 Ὁ 27), κινοῦν καὶ κινού- 
μενον 33 Ὁ 17-πτϑ ἃ 13, 14.ἃ 31. 33 Ὁ 3. 

ὀρεκτός: τὸ ὀρεκτὸν κινεῖ 33 ἃ 18, 28, 
b rx sq., ἀρχὴ τῆς διανοίας 33a 20, ἢ τὸ 
ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν 334 28. 

ὄρεξις : κίνησίς τις ἢ ἐνέργεια (vv. Il.) 533 Ὁ 
18, τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἁφὴν ὑπάρχει 14. Ὁ 15 (of. 
13 Ὁ 23), ἕνεκά του πᾶσα 33 4 15, ὀρθὴ 
καὶ οὐκ ὀρθὴ 33.4 26, ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις 
23} 5; ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις 
14b 2 (cf. 32b 7, 338. 23, 26), contrasted 
with φυγὴ 31a 12: τὰ κιψοῦντα ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ 
νοῦς 33a 9 (cf. 33 ἃ 13, 18, do, 22, 23, 
b 19): ὄρεξις Ξε ἄλογος ὄρεξις 33.4 6, 8, 25, 
34412: ἡ καλουμένη 33b 1: 34 30, 118 
28, 32b 16, 2338 16, 348 14. 

ὀρθογώνιον 13 a τῇ. 

ὀρθός : (sc. ywria) 2b 20, 338 26, 27 (dis)— 
ὀρθῶς τό Ὁ 8, 9, 18k 20, 19 Ὁ 33, 26a 22 
(dis), δ Ὁ g (ter), το; τοῦ ὀρθῶς 4 Ὁ 2. 

ὁρίζειν 3a 29, 5 Ὦ II, 13, 78 25, 9b 10, 
13 5 12, 202 19, 274 17, 31 Ὁ 3, 328 
18, 35 Ὁ 16, σκιᾷ τὸ φῶς ὁρίζομεν 
Το Ὁ 33. 

ὁρισμὸς 2b 26, 7a 25, 30, 9 Ὁ 13. 

ὁριστικὸ λόγος 18 ἃ 14. 

ὁρμαθὸς ψάμμον 19 b 24. 

ὅρος: definition 3a 25, 13 a 14, 16, 18: 
limit 4a 9: boundary point 31a 22. 

8s: antecedent contained in relative clause 
ᾧ χρῆται ὄργάνῳ σωματικόν ἐστιν 33 Ὁ Ῥ 


617 


234 23, 278. ΤΟ; suppressed ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ᾧ 8 Ὁ 
23, 8.32, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν 24. Ὁ 11. 

ὀσμᾶσθαι το 2. 21 ἃ 1ἴ, Ὁ 14, 15, 228 4: 
τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι 24. Ὁ 17 (cf. 
24 Ὁ 16): ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ὀσμῶν ἡ αἴσθησις 
οὐ δύναται ὀσμᾶσθαι 20 Ὁ 3. 

ὀσμή (see II.,c. 9): odour (ΞΞ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν») 
108 25, 27, 32, 21 a 8, 16, 18, 27, 28, 
29, 30, 32,21 b 24, 22a 6, 24 Ὁ 4, 6 (62:5), 
14, 20b 2, 29b 2, 35 bo, 11; οὐ τρέφει 
84 Ὁ 20 (cf. 14 b 11), οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τὰ σώ- 
para “4 Ὁ το; ἔχειν ὀσμὴν arb 4, τὸ 
ἔχον τοῦ 34, ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι 21b το, 
21, 238. 9, ἔχειν αἴσθησιν ὀσμῆς 19 b 1, 
15 a 6—once used for ὄσφρησις, the sense 
of smelling, and distinguished from ὀσ- 
φραντὸν 21a 7 (cf. 19 Ὁ 4, 22b 17). 

ὀστοῦν 8a 15, 9b 32, 10a 3, 6,9, br, 35a 


24. 
ὀσφραίνεσθαι 24a TY, b25, 228 5, 24. Ὁ 


4. 7: 

ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον 21 Ὁ 32, 22a 7. 

ὀσφραντὸς 21a 7, Τί, Ὁ 22: δε ἑτέρων 
αἰσθανόμεθα 23b6, εἰ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν ὀσμὴ 
24b 6: opposed to ἀνόσφραντος Ζῖ Ὁ 6. 

ὄσφρησις : sense of smelling 23 a 10, 24 Ὁ 23, 
τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ καὶ ἀνοσῴράντον “21 Ὁ 5 54." 
καὶ δυσώδους καὶ εὐώδους 21 Ὁ 23, διὰ τοῦ 
μεταξὺ 21 Ὁ 9, 34 Ὁ 15, ἡ ἰσχυρὰ ὀσμὴ 
φθείρει 26 Ὁ 2—the sensation or act of 
smelling (ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ὄσφρησις): ἢ 
ὀσμὴ ποιεῖ καὶ Ὁ 6—the organ of smelling 
23 το, ἢ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος ἐστὶν 25 ἃ 5. 

ὅτε, τὸ 26D 27. 

ὅτι, τὸ 13 ἃ 18. 

οὐρανὸς 5b 1, 78. 2, b6, 19a 17. 

οὖς 204 9, 13, 16, 17. 

οὐσία: τριχῶς λεγομένης THs οὐσίας I4a 15: 
joined with φύσις 2a 8, with τὸ τί ἐστι 
28. 13 (cf. 2b 24)---τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία 
28. 24, 16b 13; SO 10a 17, 20, 21, γένος 
ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων 12a 6: οὐσίαι μάλιστα 
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα 128. ΤΊ, 
185, ὡς συνθέτη 12 8. τό, τρίτον τὸ ἐκ 
τούτων (ὕλης καὶ εἴδους) 12a g (cf. 148 16); 
τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην ἕτερον δὲ μορφὴν 

. καὶ εἴδος 128. 7, 144 1556.; τῶν συμβεβη- 
κότων ταῖς οὐσίαις 2b 18 (cf. 2a 8)— 
οὐσία ws εἶδος 12a 19, ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον 
12b 10, 10, 13: ἡ οὐσία ἐντελέχεια, αὕτη 
δὲ λέγεται διχῶς 12a 21, 22, αἰτία ws ἣ 
οὐσία 18 b 11, 12, τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι 
πᾶσιν 15 13: ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως 18a 253 
(of νοῦς) οὐσία tis 8 Ὁ 19, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν 
ἐνέργεια 30 a 18 (contrast τὴν φύσιν 
εἶναι ὅτι δυνατὸν 29 a 21)—Iin criticism 
of Plato 5b 32, 6a 17, b7, 14,15, 7 Ὁ 1, 


oty ὅτι Iga 21. 

ὄφελος τοῦ 7. 

ὀφθαλμός: ὕλη ὄψεως 12b 20 (cf. 12 18 54α.); 
ἡ κόρη καὶ ἡ ὄψις 12a 2, ὁμωνύμως 12b ar: 
1098. 5, 258 11. 

ὄψις : sense of seeing (see II., c. 7): οὐσία 
ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον 12 Ὁ 10, 
δύναμις aS opposed to ὅρασις 28 a 6, 
μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι 29 a 3: οὗ ἐστὶν 


39-.5 


618 


18 a 26, χρώματος 18a 13, λευκοῦ καὶ μέ- 
Aavos 22b 24, τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καὶ dopdrov 224 
20, 24.4 LI, τοῦ λαμπροῦ 22 a 253 οὐχ 
ὃν τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι 25 Ὁ 20, κρένει 
τὸ σκότος 228. 21, καὶ τὸ φῶς 25 Ὁ 21 56.» 
λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν 26 Ὁ τι, δι᾽ ἑτέρων 
αἰσθάνεται 34. Ὁ 15, τὸ σφόδρα λαμτρὸν 
ἢ ζοφερὸν φθείρει 26b τ: κίνησίς τις 
αἰσθητὴ ἁφῇ καὶ ὄψει 18 a 20, τῇ ὄψει 
τὸ γλυκὺ αἰσθανόμεθα 25 ἃ 22, τῇ ὄψει 
αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὁρᾷ 25 Ὁ 13, ἡ τῆς ὄψεως 
αἴσθησις 25 Ὁ 16, distinguished as αἰσθητὸν 
from χρῶμα 28 Ὁ 14: ὄψιν ἔχει τὸ Spor 
ὅπως ὁρᾷ 35 Ὁ 21: 12 b 20, 138 1, 3, 
I5 a 5, 238 9, 24Ὁ 23, 25 Ὁ 7, 18, 
26 a 13, 21—eye, organ of vision 19a 13, 
23 Ὁ 18, 35 a 8—(criticism of earlier 
thinkers) visual ray τὴν ὄψιν ἐξιοῦσαν 
ἀνακλᾶσθαι 35 a 6. 


πάθημα : (Ξε πάθος) 3a τι, (=76 ποιητικὸν 
πάθους) 3 a 20, 

πάθησις opposed to ποίησις 26a το. 

παθητικός : σῶμα, 24. Ὁ 14, νοῦς 30a 24. 

πάθος : attribute, accident (like συμβεβηκός, 
ἴδιον); τὰ πάθη joined with ἔργα 3b 12, 
88. 4. 9b 15, with ἕξεις 32 a 6; λόγοι 
ἔνυλοί εἰσιν 3 ἃ 253 τῆς ὕλης τὰ μὴ 
χωριστὰ 3 b 10, τοῦ ἁπτοῦ ἢ ἁπτὸν 
24. Ὁ 25; 28 9, 838. 3, τό, Ὁ 15; 17; 
8 Ὁ 26, 19 a 33, 25 ἃ 12; τοῦτο τὸ 
πάθος (νόησι5) ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν 27 Ὁ 18—in ἃ 
narrower sense, emotion 29 ἃ 7, τοῦ 
φοβουμένου 3a 24—effect, opposed to 
ποίησις : ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστὶ 26a 2 

mais 177 Ὁ 31. 

πάμπολλα 533 Ὁ 2. 

πανσπερμία 4 ἃ 4. 

παντελὴς 4.4 20, 27: παντελῶς 12 b tI. 

πάντῃ 28 10, 132 29, 19 Ὁ 30, 30a 5, 
6 (5). 

πάντως 2a To. 

παραδέχεσθαι 8a 8. 

παραδιδόναι 5 Ὁ 29, 7 Ὁ 27, 9 Ὁ 19g, 
12 a 3. 

παραλαμβάνειν 3b 27. 

παράλογος [La 14: 18. 

παραπλήσιον 7b 24, 14 a 2---παραπλησίως 
5a 20; bi4, 6b 17, 14 Ὁ 28. 

παρασκευάζειν τὸ Ὁ το. 

παραχωρεῖν rob 265. 

παρεῖναι 28 a 8, Ὁ 27, 283 τὰ παρόντα 
31 Ὁ 8. 

παρεμφαινόμενον 29 a 20. 

παρεὸν (Emped.) 27 a 23. 

παρέχειν 4a 9, IT. 

παρίσταται (Emped.) 27 a 28. 

“παροξύνεσθαι 3 8, 20. 

παρουσία 18 b 16, 20. 

was: τὸ πᾶν 4a 26,5 a 19, 6 Ὁ 30,74 3, 
Ila 23, τό a 3— διὰ παντὸς 4 a6, μάλιστα 
πάντων 5a τό. 

πάσχεν : οὐχ ἁπλοῦν τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ 
μὲν φθορά τις, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον 
17 Ὁ 2 (cf. 17 b 14, 18a 53)---κατὰ κοινόν 
Tt 29 Ὁ 29—H τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν 
τῷ πάσχοντι 26a 5 (οἴ, 26a 10)—con- 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


trasted with ποιεῖν 2a 6,7b 18, τι Ὁ 3; 
17a 2, 26a 5, 10, 28b 17, 29b 26, 
30a 19, 38 a 5; joined with κινεῖσθαι 
16b 33, 17a 17, 34b 29, with κινεῖσθαι 
and ἐνεργεῖν 17 a 15, with διατιθέναι 
148. τι, with ἀλλοιοῦσθαι 31a 5: πάσχειν 
τι 548 1, 29b 25, πάσχειν τι καὶ κινεῖσθαι 
το & 25, πάσχειν τὰ εἴδη 27 ἃ Q (οἴ. 
24 Ὁ 25q.); ὄζει ὁ ἀὴρ ὥσπερ παθών τι 
Δ4 Ὁ 16, 183 τί ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ 
τὸ πάσχειν τι 24 Ὁ 17: πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα 
3a 18, ἡ Ψυχὴ 8 Ὁ 23, ἡ τροφὴ 16a 34, 
τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τοῦ 17, πάσχει τὸ ἀνόμοιον, 
πεπονθὸς δ᾽ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν 17 a 20 (cf. 
16 Ὁ 35, 17a 19, 18a 5); πάσχειν ὑπὸ 
Tod αἰσθητοῦ 18a 23, 34 Ὁ 29, ὑπὸ τοῦ 
γευστοῦ 22b 2, ὑπὸ τῶν array 24a 34 
(cf. 24 a 23), ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ 29 ἃ 14--- 
of objects devoid of sense ὑπ’ ὀδμῆς 
24 Ὁ 3, 7, τὰ φυτὰ πάσχει μετὰ τῆς 
ὕλης 24 Ὁ 3—ofinanimate objects 24b 13, 
15, 35 a 7—Iis the case with: πέπονθεν 
ΤΟ Ὁ 27, 24a 14, 304 13. 

πατάξαι 20a 24, 23 b 16. 

πεζὸς τὸ b 1, 20 Ὁ 25. 

πείθειν 5b 3, 28a 23. 

πειθὼ 28 ἃ 23. 

πεῖνα 14 Ὁ It, 12. 

πειρᾶσθαι 8a 4, 128. 4, 13a 12, 21 Ὁ IQ. 

πέλεκυς 12 Ὁ 12, I4, 18, πελέκει εἶναι 
12 b 13. 

περαίνεσθαι : δρισμοὶ 7a BI. 

πέρας 7 ἃ 24, 16a 17, 35 a το: point 
27 ἃ 13. 

mweparoly 7a 28. 

περί: in the title of a treatise or course 
of lectures, ἐν rots περὶ φιλοσοφίας 4b 19g, 
περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν 17a 2, περὲ 
τῶν στοιχείων 25 Ὁ 20, περὶ ἀναπνοῆς καὶ 
ἐκπνοῆς καὶ ὕπνον καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως 32 11: 
more vaguely περὶ αὐτῆς (rpopfs) 16 b 21, 
wept τούτων 17 Ὁ 28, περὶ wy τῆς διαφορᾶς 
27 Ὁ 26, περὶ αὐτοῦ 33 Ὁ 20: the cross 
reference, if any, in another form with- 
out περὶ 6a 3, 7b 12, 20, 178 17, 1927, 
831 Ὁ xg. 

περιέχον, τὸ 48 1ο, 11 ἃ 19, 18b 22. 

περικάρπιον 12 Ὁ 2 (δὲς). 

περιτείνειν 23 8. 3. 

περιφέρεσθαι 8 ἃ 30. 

περιφορὰ 7a 21 (bis), 22, 23, 30, 31. 

περιφύεσθαι 23 ἃ 7. 

πέττειν 16a 33, Ὁ 5, 7, 28. 

πεφυκέναι 2b τι, 6b 21, 131 b 7, 13 ἃ 8, 
14a 26, 184 25, 22a 28, 34 Ὁ 2. 

πέψις τό Ὁ 29. 

πηγρνύον 4.8, 18- 

πηδάλιον τό b 26. 

πηροῦν 25a το. 

πήρωμα τῷ a 27, 22 Ὁ 22, 24. 

πιθανὸς 7 Ὁ 27. 

πικρὸς 22 Ὁ 8, 25 Ὁ 13 contrasted with 
γλυκὺς 21 a 27, 22 Ὁ 12, a5, 26b 2, 
Il, 27a 1. 

πιστεύειν 24 Ὁ 24, 28a 21, b 4. 

πίστις 24 ΤΊ, 28a 20, 21, 22, 23. 

πλάνη 2a 21. 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


πλάτος 4b 21. 

πλάττειν 6a 27, τί Ὁ 18. 

πλεοναχῶς 12 Ὁ 8, 13 a 22. 

πλεύμων 20b 24. 

πληγὴ Ig b Io, 14, 17, 20, 20 Ὁ 27, 
35 b 113 οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φορᾶς 19 Ὁ 13. 

πλῆθος 5a 2. 

πλήν: preposition §b 8, 14, 358 7: πλὴν 
τῷ φοβερῷ and the like 21a 15, 328 10, 

223; τίς ἂν εἴη διαφορὰ πλὴν θέσις 

9a 21; with participle 5a 15; πλὴν 
ὅτι 29 a 28, 35 a 1, πλὴν ef 5 bd 9; 
pleonastic πλὴν el μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 

πλήρης Ina 8, 22 Ὁ 9. 

πλήττειν τῷ b 15, 21, 22. 20 ἃ 1, 23b ΤΆ; 
16, 17. 

πλίνθος 3b 6, 

πλοῖον 6a 7, 13a 9. 

πλωτὴρ 62 6, 10, 13a 9. 

πνεῦμα 20 Ὁ 20, 21 Ὁ 18. 

ποδιαῖος 28 b 3. 

ποιεῖν : without object, πεαςί, ἕνεκά rou 
15b τό, κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην 338. 5—act 
upon 23 Ὁ 14, 24. 2, bro, 12, 26a ro, ἐν 
τῷ ποιουμένῳ (-τεπάσχοντι) 26a 2 (cf. 
262 10); contrasted with πάσχειν 3.8. 7, 
7b 18, 1rb 2, 17a 2, 26a το, 28b 16, 
29 b 26, 304 19, 35a 5—cause, produce, 
διαφορὰν τῶν ἕῴων 13 Ὁ 33, ἕτερον οἷον 
αὐτὸ 15 ἃ 28, ὑμένα 23a 3, αἴσθησιν 
17 ἃ 4, 19a 3, 30, τὴν αἴσθησιν roa 26, 
35 ἃ 16, ψόφον τὸ Ὁ 14, το, πληγὴν 
10 Ὁ 17, σκιὰν τὸ Ὁ 32, χυμοῦ αἴσθησιν 
45 τὶ 17, τὴν ὄσφρησιν, τὶ 24. Ὁ 6, οὔτε 
αὔξησιν οὔτε φθίσιν 3.4. Ὁ 20, μηθὲν 32b 21, 
344 31, πάντα 302 12, 15, ὃν ἐκ πλειόνων 
φαντασμάτων 34a 10, κύκλῳ φέρεσθαι 
7 Ὁ τὸ, ἀκούειν 19 b 34, μεταβάλλειν 
34.1) 30, ὥστε ὠθεῖν 34 b 31—with pre- 
dicate δῆλον 25 Ὁ 10, τοιανδὶ 31a 18, 
οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ 24 1, νοητὸν 29b 20; 
τὰ δυνάμει χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα 
30a 16 (cf. 418 5), ὃν 30b 6,183 πρὸ 
ὀμμάτων τι ποιήσασθαι 27 Ὁ 19—pregnant 
πο τῷ λόγῳ ποιεῖν : ἀρχὰς σωματικὰς 4b 31, 
50 5b 14, 19, 23, lob 22,118 3——describe 
in verse 4a 29. 

ποίησις 26a 2, 9. 

ποιητικός : τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικὸν 304 12; 
% τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια 
26a 4 (cf. 14a 11); τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ 
ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος 17 a 18, τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς 
ἐνεργείας 17 Ὁ 20, τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐντελεχείᾳ 
αὐτοῦ 22 Ὁ 15—predicative τό Ὁ 15. 

mows; the category 2a 24, loa 14; 20--- 
ποιός τις ἂν γίγνοιτο 29a 25. 

ποῖός ris 7 Ὁ 20, 218 δ 

πολέμιος 31 Ὁ 6. 

πολλάκις 7 a 14, 31, 32, 17 a 31, 32 b 
30. 

πολλαχοῦ 4 Ὁ 1. 

πολλαχῶς 8a ΤΙ, roa 13, 15 Ὁ 9. 

πολλοί, οἱ 5 a 20. 

πολυμερὴς τι Ὁ 11. 

πορεία 32b 26. 

πορευτικὸς 324 14, 348 33, b 25. 


619 


πόροι: τῶν φλεβίων καὶ τῶν πόρων 224 3. 

πόρρω 28 Ὁ 20, 358 4. 

πόρρωθεν 21 Ὁ 12, 16, 23 Ὁ 6. 

ποσόν : the category 2a 24, 1ΙΟ ἃ 14, 20, 
21 (d¢s)—ro ποσὸν {- πλῆθοΞ) g a 13, I5 
—predicative 16a 25, ποσόν re 16b 12; 
τὸ κατὰ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον 30 Ὁ τά. 

ποτὸς 22a 14: Opposed to ἄποτος 228 31, 


ποῦς 6a ο. 

πρᾶγμα 3b 2, 4 Ὁ 18, 25, 27, 9 Ὁ 24, 
13 ἃ 20, 28 b 6, 9, 30 ἃ 20, 2321 a I, 
Ὁ 17, 25, 328. 3; καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν 
πραγμάτων 21 Ὁ 1; ὡς χωριστὰ τὰ 
πράγματα τῆς ὕλης 20 Ὁ 22. 

πραγματεύεσθαι 2a 18. 

τρακτικός : νοήσεις 7a 23, νοῦς 33a 14, Τό, 
διάνοια 33 8. 18. 

πρακτὸς 32 Ὁ 27; τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν 33.4 20. 
Ὁ τό; πρακτόν ἐστι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ 
ἄλλως ἔχειν 33 ἃ 20. 

πρᾶξις 31 Ὁ Io (S25), 33 a 17; joined with 
ἐνέργειαι 15 a 10. 

πραότης 34 17. 

πράττειν 15 b 1, 33a 8, 348 73 κατὰ, 
φύσιν 15b 2, κατὰ τὰς φαντασίας 208 5, 
κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν 33a 3. 

πρεσβύτης 8 Ὁ 21. 

“Γροαίρεσις 6 Ὁ 25. 

προγενής : παρὰ τῶν προγενεστέρων 3b 27, 
προγενέστατον Τὸ Ὁ 14. 

προγευματίζειν 22 Ὦ 7. 

προέρχεσθαι 3 Ὁ ar, 18a 28. 

προιέναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον τὶ Ὁ 13. 

π“ροσαγορεύειν τό Ὁ 24. 

προσγίγνεσθαι τό Ὁ 3. 

προσδιορίζειν 7b 16, 21, 14a 23. 

προσεννοεῖν 30 b 1. 

προσέτι 7 Ὁ 3. 

προσήκειν 10b 2, 11 b τό. 

προσλαμβάνειν 7 a 19: 

προσπεφνκὸς 23 a τό. 

"“ροστιθέναι 15 Ὁ 28. 

awporepos: οἱ πρότεροι 3 Ὁ 213; of πρότερον 
12 ἃ 3, 14 8 22, 26 ἃ 20; πρότερον 
εἴρηται and the like 6a 3, 5a 14. ΟὉ 17, 
28a 16, 29b 30, 31a 21: προτέρα τῇ 
γενέσει 122 26, χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, 
ὅλως δὲ οὐ χρόνῳ 208 21, 31a 2, ἐν 
τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον 
14 Ὁ 30. 

προτίθεσθαι 3 Ὁ 24. 

πρῶτος : φιλόσοφος 3b τό, ἐντελέχεια 12 ἃ 
27, Ὁ 5. Ψυχὴ 16b 22, 25; δύναμις 15 a 24, 
μεταβολὴ τῇ Ὁ 17, ὑγρὸν 22 Ὁ 7, αἰσθητή- 
ριον 22 Ὁ 22, 24a 24 (cf. 23 Ὁ 31), τὸ 
ὁρῶν 25 Ὁ 10, κίνησις 28 Ὁ 27, νόημα 
328. 12, κατὰ τόπον κινοῦν 84 Ὁ 32 (cf. 
35 Ὁ 11): ἐν πρώτοις 2a 4, ἐπὶ τῆς 
πρώτης (αἰσθήσεως) 25 Ὁ 17, ὅθεν πρῶτον 
15 b 21—the former, οἱ πρῶτοι 17 a 30— 
predicative with δεῖται 20 Ὁ 26—(earlier 
thinkers) τὸ κιωητικὸν τὴν φύσιν τῶν 
πρώτων 5a 4; τὰ στοιχεῖα πρῶτα τῶν 
yruv 10b 18 (cf. 5 a 23); (Atomists) 
τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀδιαιρέτων σωμάτων 
58. το; (Hippon) ψυχὴν 5b 5; (Plato) 


620 INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


μῆκος, πλάτος, βάθος 4b “ο---πρώτως 
587, 13 Ὁ 2, 148 13, μάλιστα καὶ 
πρώτως 3 Ὁ 20. 

πῦρ 4 ἃ 1, 2, Ὁ 14 (dzs), 5.8 5, 13, Ὁ 18, 
6a 28, 11a 10, 15, 16a 2, 6, 9, 18» 
18, 27 (des), 17a 4, 9, 18 Ὁ 12, 14, 16, 
19a 23, 25a 5, 31 Ὁ 5. 

πύρινος 35a 12. 

πυρώδης 19 a 3- 

πὼς 7a 27 and often. 


ῥάδιος 7a 34, 9b 18. 

ῥᾳδίως 32 ἃ 31. 

ῥαπίζξειν τὸ b 23. 

ῥεῖν Ra 27. 

ῥίζαι - αἱ ῥίξαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον 12 Ὁ 3 
(cf. χό 8 4). 

ῥυσμὸς 44 7. 


σάρξ : μεικτὸν ἐκ "γῆς καὶ τούτων (ἀέρος καὶ 
ὕδατος) βούλεται εἶναι 23a 143 λόγος Τῆς 
μείξεως καθ᾽ ἣν σὰρξ 8a 153 τὸ θερμὸν 
καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὧν Ἀόγος Tis ἡ σὰρξ 
20 Ὁ τό; ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ 
ἀνάλογον 22b 421; τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ 
ἡ σὰρξ 23b 26 (cf. 22 Ὁ 21, 23ἃ 1, Ὁ 17); 
οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον 26b 15 τ 
τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι 88. 25, 20Ὁ 12, 17 (contrast 
ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ τὸ 
σιμόν, τόδε ἐν τῷδε 29b 13 54.}--ο Ὁ 32, 
23 8 2, τὸ, 25, 31 Ὁ 15. 

σαφὴς 19 b 28. 

σείεσθαι 20 a 26. 

σελήνη 5 b I. 

σημαίνω loa 14, 35 Ὁ 24, 25. 

σημαντικὸς 20 Ὁ 32. 

σημεῖον: evidence 19a If, (ν.1. μηνύει) 3 ἃ 
IQ, 204 18, 21a 1, 23, 22 Ὁ 5, 23 8 1, 
22 Ὁ 24—impression 248 20, 21, 352 9 
—point 27 ἃ 12. 

σήπεσθαι τι Ὁ 0. 

σιγὴ 22a 23. 

σίδηρος 5a 21, 24 a IQ. 

aids 29 Ὁ 14, 19, 31 Ὁ 13 (des). 

σκέπασμα 3 Ὁ 4, 12 Ὁ 2. 

σκέπτεσθαι: σκεπτέον 2 Ὁ 1 and often, 

σκέψις 7b 12, 13a 21, 15 a 14. 

σκιὰ 19 Ὁ 32. 

σκληρὸς 35 Ὁ 14: contrasted with μαλακὸς 
22 Ὁ 27, 23 Ὁ 4, 244 2. 

σκληρόσαρκος 21 a 28. 

σκληρὀφθαλμος 21 a 13,) Ὁ 28, 30. 

σκοτεινὸς 18 Ὁ 20. 

σκότος τϑ Ὁ 11, 18, 31, 19 ἃ 3) 23, b 30, 
22 8 21,) 23, 24 Ὁ 10, 25 Ὁ 21; τί ἐστι 
18 Ὁ 18. 

σκώληξ 284 II. 

σπέρμα 12b 27. 

σπόγγος 19 Ὁ 6. 

στάσις Opposed to klynois 12 Ὁ 17, 138 24, 
25a 16. 

στερεῖσθαι τό Ὁ 19. 

στερεὸς 4b 24, 18 Ὁ 7,19b 7, 20, 23a 13. 

στέρησις 18 b 19, 30 Ὁ 21. 

στερητικὸς 17 b 15. 

στερίσκεσθαι 35 Ὁ 5. 

στιγμὴ 38 14, 78 12, 13, 08 4, 6, 12, 


20, 2%, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, b 4, 55 7: 
27210, 30b 20. 

στοιχεῖον : μίαν τινὰ αἰτίαν καὶ στοιχεῖον 
ὃν 5b 17, στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχὰς 10a 19; 
ὕλῃ ἔοικε το Ὁ 11; δεαφοραὶ al τὰ στοιχεῖα 
διορέξζουσι 3 Ὁ 283 τῶν σωμάτων ἢ τῶν 
στοιχείων 16a 11; τοῖς σωματικοῖς τὸ ἃ 
28, μάλιστα ἀσώματον 5 a δ: ἡ μεῖξις 
τῶν στοιχείων Sars (cf. 88 17, τοῦ 2), 
πᾶν ἤτοι στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ στοιχείου ἑνὸς ἢ 
πλειόνων ἢ πάντων το Ὁ 8, ἐκ τῶν στοι- 
χείων 4 Ὁ 114, 17. 25, 5b 10, 14, Ob 28, 
9b 24, 10a 21, Ὁ 17, 22, 11ἃ 3, 28; 
πάντα τὰ στοιχεῖα ΒὉ 8: 4a 5, 10a 7, 
17, b6, 15, 178 59 358 20, Ὁ 3——éy τοῖς 
wept τῶν στοιχείων 23 Ὁ 29—(Platonic) 
ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων οἱ ἀριθμοὶ 4. Ὁ 25. 

στόμα τῷ Ὁ 3. 

στοργὴ (Emped.) 4 Ὁ τα (dés). 

στρατηγεῖν 17 Ὁ 32. 

στρυφνὸς 22 Ὁ 13. 

συγγενὴς 8 ἃ 8. 

συγκεῖσθαι 7b 31. 

συγκεφαλαιοῦν 3r Ὁ 20. 

συλλογισμὸς 7 ὃ 27, 34. 34 ἃ IT. 

συμβαίνειν: (of attendant circumstances) 
happen, οὕτως ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον, τοῦτο or 
ὅπερ σνμβαίνεε and the like 13 Ὁ 20, 
29b 7, 33 Ὁ 6, 8b 21, 30a 2, 3a 20, 
23, 8b g, το Ὁ 30, 13 b Lo, 14 a 2, 
15 b 29, 16 Ὁ 34, 19 b 28, 20a 13, 23 
b 17, 28 ἢ 18—(logical consequence) 
result, follow 2 Ὁ 26, 9 a 15, 20 b 3; 
23b 23, 26a 25 (d/s), 28b 4—especially 
when the consequences of a theory are 
urged as οἱ κοι ον against it συμβαίνει 
ἀμφοτέρως ἄτοπον καὶ παράλογον 11a 13, 
᾿ΕΙμπεδοκλεῖ ἀφρονέστατον εἷναι τὸν θεὸν 
tob 4, 5807 b 13, 8a 16, b 34, ga 31, 
b 7, 12, 25, toa 22—to be conjoined 
with as attribute or accident τῷ εὐθεῖ, 
ἢ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει 32a 13, $O 20 
8, 18a 22, 25 a 26, 28b 20, 385 ') ra, 
συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς 28 24: hence 
τὰ συμβεβηκότα, like πάθη, =attributes, 
accidents 2 b 18, 21, 23, 26, ὁ b 14, 
17a 6, 28 b 23: κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς = fer 
actidens 2a 15, 6a τῷ, 17, 19, b 5, 8, 
7b 7, 8a 34, 14 b 9, 16b 11, 18 ἃ 9, 
20, 21, 25 ἃ 15, 25, 28, 30, 26 b 26, 
28 Ὁ 2, 30b 16, 35) ro. 

συμβάλλεσθαι 2a 5, Ὁ ar, 141 Yo. 

συμπαραλαμβάνειν 3b 22. 

συμπάσχειν 27 Ὁ 22. 

συμπέρασμα 7a 27, 13a 16, 18. 

συμπίπτειν 25a 23. 

συμπλέκειν 4b 29, 6b 28, gb rr. 

συμπλοκή: δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως 28a 25, 
20, νοημάτων 32a It. 

σύμπτωμα 348. 32. 

σνυμῴφανὴς 5 Ὁ 22. 

συμφυὴς 20a 4, 12, 238 8. 

σύμφυτος 6 Ὁ 30. 

συμφωνία 24a 31, 26a 27, 29, b 6. 

συμῴφωνοὶ φοραὶ 6 Ὁ 31. 

συνάγειν 4 ἃ Io, rs. 

συναίτιον contrasted with αἴτεον τό ἃ 14. 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


cuvavelopyew 4a 15. 

συνάπτειν 6b 31, 7b 15. 

συναρμόζειν 8a ὃ. 

συνδοκεῖν 7 Ὁ 5. 

σύνεσες Τὸ b 3. 

συνεφέλκειν 6 b 21. 

συνέχειν Yo Ὁ 12, 11 Ὁ 6, 8, 13, 16, 17, 
18, 16a 6 

συνεχείᾳ : κοινωνεῖν 15 Ὁ 3, εἷς 20a 3. 

συνεχὴς 7 ἃ 9, 10, Ig 8 14; joined with 
els 7a 7, το Ὁ 38; μετὰ συνεχοῦς 20 Ὁ 
19: ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ Qa 14; 30 Ὁ 19, τῇ 
ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς 25 τ 10---συνεχῶς 
κιψεῖσθαι 4 αὶ τὸ, 5a 32. 

σύνθεσις: μεγεθῶν Sa 7, ἐναντίων 7b 31, 
τῶν μειχθέντων 7 Ὁ 53, τῶν τοῦ σώματος 
μερῶν 8a fo, II, 12; joined with λόγος 
1oa 8, with λόγος ris loa 23 νοημάτων 
30a 27, ἐν συνθέσει 30b 2. 

σύνθετος; οὐσία 122 τό; τὰ σύνθετα τοῦ I. 

συνιστάναι 52 26, Ὁ 16, 24, 6b 28, toa 10. 
16a τό, 23 ἃ 13. 

σύνολον gb 31. 

συντηκτικὸς 22 ἃ 10. 

συντιθέναι 302% 30, 31, bi, 3- 

συρριζοῦσθαι 15 b 20. 

σφαῖρα: sphere 3 ἃ 14, 344 131 spherical 
atoms 6b 21, 9b 9; ball 19 Ὁ 27. 

σφαιρίον 92 12. 

σφαιροειδὴς 42 2, 6, 5ἃ 12. 

σφόδρα 214 31, 24a 35, 260 1, 29b τ, 3. 

σφοδρῶς 19 Ὁ 22. 

σχεδόν: δύο ταῦτα 3 Ὁ 28, διεληλύθαμεν 0 
b 23, αὗται 22 Ὁ ry. 

σχῆμα: μέγεθός τι 25 ἃ 18: one of the 
common sensibles 18a 18, 25 a 16, 18: 
shape, imprint 12 b 7, 35 a 7—geo- 
metrical figure οὐκ ἔστι σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ 
τρίγωνον καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς 14 b 21. so 14 
b 23, 24, 28, 30—-atomic shape 5 a 11 
(4ézs)——-atom 44 2, 11- 

σώζειν : φύσιν τι Ὁ 23, οὐσίαν 16 b 14, αὐτὸ 
ἑαυτὸ τό Ὁ 17, τὸ ἔχον τό Ὁ 18, τὸ Sor 
84 Ὁ τῷ, τῇ, τό: σωζομένου τοῦ wpdy- 
ματος 28b 6, σωζόμενον 22 Ὁ 4; σώζεσθαι 
opposed to φθείρεσθαι 26.4 τῇ. 

σῶμα: ἅπαν darrév, αἰσθητὸν ἁφῇ 340 128q., 
ἁπταί εἰσιν αἱ διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡ 
σῶμα 543 1» 27; δύο σώματα ἅμα ἐν τῷ 
αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀδύνατον 18b 17 (cf. gb 3)- 
οὐσίαι μάλιστα τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα 128. ΤΥ, 
rav ἄλλων ἀρχαὶ 128 12; φυσικὸν σῶμα 
in a narrower sense Χ2 Ὁ 12, 15} 183 τὰ 
ἐνταῦθα 25 a 13, τὸ ἄνω 18 Ὁ 9, £3; 
τὰ ἀδιαίρετα 54 το, σωμάτων ἢ στοιχείων 
16a τὶ, ἁπλοῖς σώμασι 16a 28; ἀνάγκη 
τὸ σῶμα εἶναι ἢ ἁπλοῦν ἢ μεικτὸν 34 Ὁ 9; 
τὸ ὑγρὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ σώματος 23 25; 
ἀλλότριον σῶμα 22a --οὐχ ἁπλοῦν τὸ 
τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα 354 11, 34 b 10 (cf. 34 
a 28, 23 ἃ 13), σύγκειται ἐξ ἐναντίων 7b 
31, ἐξ ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος ἀδύνατον συστῆναι 
τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα, δεῖ στερεόν τι εἶναι 
253 ἃ 13 (cf. 35 a 20), κινεῖται φορᾷ 6b 
1, τὸ δυνάμει ὃν 138 2, ob τῶν Kal? ὑπο- 
κειμένον, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὡς ὑποκείμενον καὶ 
ὕλη 12 ἃ 18 5Ξαᾳ., οὐκ ἔστιν ἐντελέχεια, 


621 


ψυχῆς, ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη σώματός τινος 144 18, 
δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον 12 ἃ 20, 27 (cf. 12 ἃ 
15, 16 54., Ὁ 5), τὸ fav σῶμα 12 Ὁ 23, 
Ι5 Ὁ 8, τὸ ἔμψνχον 15 Ὁ 1τ, 16b το, 35 
8. 14, τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ο Ὁ 2, τὸ αἰσθη- 
τικὸν 12 Ὁ 25, τὸ ἁπτικὸν 35a 14. 54 Ὁ 
13, πορευτικὸν" 34.2 33, μὴ μόνιμον 84 Ὁ 
8 (cf. 34 b 4); ἔν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα 
12 Ὁ 6, ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σώμα ἕῷον 123 4a 
2-κατὰ τὸ σῶμα 6 Ὁ 2, 8a 17. μετὰ 
σώματος 53 ἃ 17, 15. 7 b 4, οὐκ ἄνευ 
σώματος 3 a 6, το, 14 a 20, 23 a 25, 
20 Ὁ 5. 

σωματικός : ἀρεταὶ ὃ ἃ 29. στοιχεῖα 10a 28, 
τὸ νοεῖν 278. 26, ᾧ κινεῖ ὀργάνῳ 33b 19; 
opposed to ἀσώματος of ἀρχαὶ 4 Ὁ 31. 

σωμάτιον ga Il. 

σωρὸς 19 Ὁ 24. 

σωτηρία 17 Ὁ 3- 


τάχος 20 8 33. 

Taxus 20 a 32, b 4: ταχὺ adverbial 19 Ὁ 
25—raxéws 19 Ὁ 22, 24 Ὁ 18, θᾶττον 23 
a 5. 

TEKTOVUKH ἢ Ὁ 25- 

τέκτων 3b 13, 16b 1, 2. 

τέλειος opposed to πήρωμα 15a 27, 32 Ὁ 23. 

τελεῖσθαι : τοῦ τετελεσμένου 31 a 7» 

τελευταῖον (adverb) 15 a 7. 16b 3. 

τελευτὴ opposed to ἀρχὴ 33 Ὁ 22, 23. 

τέλος: 15b 17, 16b 23, 24, 338. 15, Τέλος 
ἔχειν 7227, els τέλος ἐλθεῖν 34D 1, διὰ 
τέλους 13 8. 30, 32 Ὁ 21. 

τέμνεσθαι 321 Ὁ 24. 

τετραγωνισμὸς 13 ἃ 17, 10. 

τεγράγωνον 14D 31. 

τέχνη 7 Ὁ 26, 304 12. 

τεχνίτης 3 Ὁ 13. 

τῇ μὲν...τῇ δὲ 26a 22. 

τί ἐστι: ὀργὴ τί ἐστι and the like 3 a 30, 
2a 23, 12a 5, Ὁ 10, 13 ἃ 17, 15 a 15; 
16, 17, 18, 16 Ὁ 30, 18 Ὁ 3, 298 8 and 
elsewhere—7é τί ἐστε: joined with οὐσία 
2a 133 πάσης ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ 2b 26, 
ὁ νοῦς τοῦ τί ἐστι 30 Ὁ 28, κοινὴ μέθοδος 
περὶ τὸ τί ἐστι 28. 17, τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι 
2b 17, εἰδέναι 2b 22. 

τί ἣν εἶναι : see εἶναι. 

τίς interrogative 7a 18, 9 b 31: see also 
γί ἐστι--τινὲς indefinite: distinguished 
from πάντες 14.4 30, from τῷ τυχόντι 
34 Ὁ 25; τινὶ distinguished from ἁπλῶς 
31 Ὁ 123 περὶ τινῶν 3 Ὁ 13; τινὸς πρός 
τι καὶ & τινί τὸ Ὁ τὸ (cf. τὸ b 12, 20 
Ὁ 15); τὶ κατά τινος 30 Ὁ 26, 28 54.; 
ἕνεκά rov 15 Ὁ 16 and often, μέχρι Tov 
34 Ὁ 30—ri τοιοῦτον 3a 31, §b 25, 29 
a 18, 32 Ὁ 20. 

τό: the article τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, τὸ μὲν 
οὗ, τὸ δὲ ᾧ 15b 2, τὸ οὗ ἡ ὕλη τὰ Ὁ 8— 
demonstrative pronoun 8 Ὁ 5, 16a 13, 
2304; τὸ μέν τι...τὸ δ' ILA 21, 22; τὶ 
οὐ τὸ μὲν... τὸ 52.98 13; τὶ τὸ μὲν... ἕτερον 
δὲ 304 I0, 11: 

τόδε ἐν τῷδε 29 Ὁ τ4-τόδε ἢ τόδε πράξει 
34 a 8---τόδε τοιόνδε 34a 10. 

τόδε te: one of the categories 10a 14; 


622 


joined with οὐσία 2a 24, 16b 13; κατὰ 
τὸ εἶδος λέγεται 12a 7, 8 

τοῖος (Homer) 27 a 26. 

τοιοσδί: σῶμα 38. 26, Ὁ 11, 12 Ὁ 11, 16, 
27, ὄμμα 8 Ὁ 22, κόρη 31 a 18, ὕλη 3 
b 33 ἢ τοιονδὶ καὶ κατὰ τὸν Adyor 24. 
a 24. 

τόνος 248. 32. 

τόπος : πᾶσαι αἱ κινήσεις ἐν τόπῳ 6a τό: 
οὐκ ἔστι τόπος τοῦ λευκοῦ ἢ τριπήχεος 6 
ἃ 21; ὧν ὁ τόπος ἀδιαίρετος, καὶ αὐτὰ 0 
1243 ὃ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν 20b 26: τόπον 
εἰδῶν 29a 27: χωριστὸν λόγῳ ἢ καὶ τόπῳ 
12 Ὁ τ, τόπῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον 27 
a2 5: κατὰ τόπον ΤΟ Ὁ 20, 11a 29, Ὁ 22, 
138. 24, b 22, 148 32, Db 17, 15 a 7. 
b 22, 27a 18, 32a 17, Ὁ 8, 13, 334 13; 
34 Ὁ 30, κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους 13.4 
28; ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ 35 a 2. 

τραχύτης (of vocal sound) opposed to 
λειότης 22 Ὁ 821. 

τρέφειν: τρέφεσθαι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ τό 
a 30 (cf. τό ἢ 6 54.), ξηροῖς καὶ ὑγροῖς 
καὶ θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς τρέφεται τὰ ζῶντα 
πάντα 14 Ὁ 8; τρέφεται οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ κοινωνεῖ 
ζωῆς 15. Ὁ 27 (οἷ. 16b g); μέχρι τούτου 
ἐστὶν ἕως ἂν τρέφηται 16 b 15 (cf. ὅσα 
τρέφεταίξ re καὶ ζῇ xré. 13 a 30 sq.): 
ἐστὶ τρία, τὸ τρεφόμενον καὶ ᾧ τρέφεται 
καὶ τὸ τρέφον τό Ὁ 20, τὸ τρέφον ἐστὶν 
n πρώτη Ψψυχὴ τό Ὁ 21 (cf. τό ἃ 9, 18 
a 24), ᾧ τρέφεται διττὸν τό 1) 25—16a 
II, 27, 29, 35, Ὁ 10, τό, 22, 23, 34b 1, 
20. 

τρίγωνον 2b 20, 14 b 21. 31. 

τρίπηχυς 6a τό. 

τριχῶς I4 a 14: 18 ἃ 8. 

τροφὴ: joined with αὔξησις τό ἃ το, with 
αὔξησις and φθίσις 12a 14, with γέννησις 
15a 23, with αἰσθητὸν and νοητὸν 15 4a 
22; τροφῇ χρῆσθαι ἔργον τῆς θρεπτικῆς 
ψυχῆς 15 4 26; ἡ τροφὴ τὸ σῶμα τὸ 
ἁπτὸν 3. Ὁ 19, δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ τροφὴ τὸ 
ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ 16 a 22 (cf. 16 Ὁ 
6 sq.), ᾧ τρέφεται 16 b “3: πάσχει τι 
ὑπὸ τοῦ τρεφομένου 16a 35, παρασκευάζει 
ἐνεργεῖν (τὸ τρέφον») 16 Ὁ 19; αὔξησιν ἔχειν 
ἄνευ τροφῆς ἀδύνατον 34a 28, ἀναγκαῖον 
τὴν τροφὴν δύνασθαι πέττεσθαι τό Ὁ 28 
(cf. 16a 33); πρὸς ἔμψυχόν ἔστι 16b 11: 
ἕλκειν τὴν τροφὴν 12 Ὁ 4, λαμβάνειν 13 
a 31; κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφὴν 13 ἃ 54: 
ἕτερον τροφῇ καὶ αὐξητικῷ εἶναι τό Ὁ 12— 
14.b 6, 7, 10, 16a 20, 26, 27, 29, b 1, 3, 
13, 20, 30, 21 b 12, 34 Ὁ 18, 35 Ὁ 23. 

τυγχάνειν: τυχὼν as adjective; ψυχὴ " Ὁ 
22, σῶμα 7b 23, μεῖξις 8a 22, μόριον 
20 14, γένος 34 Ὁ 25---τὸ τυχὸν 7b 19, 
148 24, 25, τὰ τυχόντα 19 b 1..--ἰῦῇ ἃ 
It, 18a 28, 24 b 29, 258 23. 

τύπος: τύπῳ διωρίσθω καὶ ὑπογεγράφθω 13 
ἃ 9, εἴρηται 16 b 30, 24 ἃ τ6. 

τύπτω 19b 12 (bis), 24, 20a 20 (bis), 24 
(2s), 25, Ὁ 14, 31, 22a 1. 


ὑγιαίνω Iga 7. 
ὑγιαστικός : τὸ ὑγιαστικὸν 144 το. 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


ὑγίεια : εἶδός τι καὶ λόγος τοῦ ὑγιαστικοῦ 
14 ἃ 98q.—I4a 7, 8a 2. 

ὑγιὴς Opposed to κάμνων 16a 28. 

ὑγραίνεσθαι 22 Ὦ 2, 3, 4. 

ὑγρὸς 5b 3, 228 14, 34, Ὁ I, 4,65; opposed 
to ξηρὸς τά Ὁ 7, 13, 22.4 6, Ὁ 26, 23 Ὁ 
29; τὸ ὑγρὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ σώματος 23 
a 24, τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ εἶναι ἢ 
ἔχειν ὕδωρ 23 ἃ 251} τοῦ πρώτου ὑγροῦ 
22b 73 τὸ γευστὸν ἐν ὑγρῷ ὡς ὕλῃ 22 
211: ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ 22 ἃ 4, 5. 

ὑγρότης 2528 18 (Az), Ὁ 9. 

ὕδωρ: jomed with ἀὴρ 18 hb 6, 7, 19 ἃ 33, 
Ὁ 18, 19, 21 Ὁ 0; 23 ἃ 28sqq., b ri, 18, 
4 Ὁ 30, 25a 1, 4, 8: τὸ tdwp τῷ πυρὶ 
τροφή, τὸ δὲ πῦρ ob τρέφει τὸ ὕδωρ τό 
a 26 sq.: διαφανὲς 18b 6, 3510 21 56.» 
οὐ ψόφου κύριον το 19; ἀδύνατον ἅψασ- 
θαι ἄλλο ἄλλου ἐν ὕδατι 23a 28: ἄλλο 
ἐστὶν ὕδωρ καὶ ὕδατι εἶναι 20 10 11---τὸ 
b 31, 20a Ir, 220 12, 232 ἃ 25, 26, 27, 
31, 35a 4, § b 2—(Emped.) 4b 18. 

vids 18a 21, 25 ἃ 25, 26 (des), 50. 

ὕλη: distinguished from λόγος and εἶδος 
3b, 3, 7, 16a 18, 24a 19, b 3, 34 
a 30, from αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικὸν 304 10, 
from ἀρχὴ 30a 19; joined with ὑποκεί- 
μενον 124 19, 14% I4, with γένος 17 a 
a7; οὐσία ws ὕλη 12a 7, 142 τό; ἡ ὕλη 
δύναμις 12a ὦ. 144 1603 ἡ ὕλη Kai τὸ οὗ 
ἡ ὕλη ὃν τ b 8; ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη ὄψεως 
121) 20, ἡ φυσικὴ ὕλη τῶν ξῴων 3) 18, 
ἢ οἰκεία 14.2 263 τὰ πάθη τῆς ὕλης 3b 
To, ἔργα καὶ πάθη 2 Ὁ 1:--τὰ ἔχοντα 
ὕλην 302 6, τὰ ἄνευ ὕλης 204 3, ὅσα 
ἄνευ ὕλης 30 b 31; ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης 25 b 
24, ἄνευ ὕλης 30a 8, 32 4 IO, οὐκ ἄνευ 
ὕλης 29b c4—-ro bry, 16b 1, 22a 11, 
29 b 22, 30a 13. 

ὑμὴν 232 3, Ὁ 0. . . 

ὑπάρχειν: τοῖς ζῴοις 2a 10, TH vexD 3b 
25, τῷ λευκῷ Ga τ and often: ἐν σώματι 
Iq 21 56., ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις 19 ἃ 
35, and so often: ὑπάρχει ἀδύνατα ὃ 1) 33. 

ὑπαρχή: ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς 12 ἃ 4. 

ὑπεναντίωσις ᾧ Ὁ 22. 

ὑπερβάλλειν 26a 20, 1» 7. 

ὑπερβολὴ 24ἃ 4, 35} 8, 15, τῶν ἁπτῶν 24a 
14. 35 b 13, £8, τῶν αἰσθητῶν 24a 20. 

ὕπνος : ἀνάλογον τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην 
καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν (contrasted with ἐγρήγορ- 
ots) 12a 24 5η.πῶῖρα 8, 22}} τ1-.ὲὃν τοῖς 
ὕπνοις 28a 8. 

ὑπογράφειν 132. ἃ 10. 

ὑποδεής: τὰ ὑποδεέστερα 40 b 4. 

ὑποκείμενος : χρῶμα 25 b 14, αἰσθητὸν 26 
Ὁ 8, το: τί τὸ ὃν τὸ ὑποκείμενον 12 Ὁ 311 
τὸ ὑποκεΐμενον joined with ὕλη 124 19, 
Iga 14: τῶν καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένον 12a 18. 

ὑπολαμβάνειν (cf. λαμβάνειν): with εἶναι ex- 
pressed or understood 24 1, 3 b 31, 4 
a 8, 22, Ὁ 8 58 5, 20, b 7, 8a 12, 
11a 16, 16a 13, 27a 27: used absolutely 
29 a 23; παραπλησίως 5 a 30, οὕτως UF 
a 2, καλῶς Iga TQ. 

ὑπόληψις : οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντασίας 27 b 
16; οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις 27 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


D173 THs ὑπολήψεως διαφοραὶ 27 Ὁ 253 
TOU νοεῖν τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ 
δὲ ὑπόληψις 47 Ὁ 28; ἀληθὴς 28 Ὁ 3—F 
καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος 34a 17. 

ὑπομένειν τῷ Ὁ 21. 

ὕποσμος 21% Ὁ 12. 

ὕστερος : τὸ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν 
ἢ ὕστερον 21 8: ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν and the 
like τῷ Ὁ το, χα ἃ τ, b ry, τό, τό Ὁ 31, 
Ι0 8 21, b 3, 31 Ὁ 19, 32 Ὁ 12. 

ὑφαίνειν 8 Ὁ 12. 


φαίνεσθαι : of presentation, whether to 
sense, iasinitiues Or thought, πικρὰ 22 
bg, ivtputus "sa 13, ἄπορον 21 Ὁ 13, 
ποδιαῖος 28 b 3, ἄπειρα 32 a 24, δύο 33 
a9, 17, ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ 33 b 8, τὰ πυρώδη 
φαινόμενα 19 a 3, τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν 
334 28: absolutely 4a 3, φαίνεται δέ τι 
ἡμῖν 28a 7. ὁράματα 28a τό, ἄλλα μόρια 
φανεῖται 32a 27, φαίνεσθαι 28b 1, 2, οὐ 
φαίνεται δὲ 19 ἃ 321: παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα 
18 b 24: (of earlier thinkers) τὸ ἀληθὲς 
εἶναι TO φαινόμενον 4a 29, 27b 3—with 
participle 4a 20, 6a 30, 7a 15, 13 8 
26,609, 17, τό ἃ 11, 21 b 23, 28 a Lo, 
21 4, 238 23, 34a 2; with infinitive 
325, 4b 5, 6b 24, rob 19, 22, τὰ b 
IQ, 4. ἢ 24, 16a 25, 19 a 38. 

φάναι: φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν 31a 8; φήσῃ 
ἢ ἀποφήσῃ 31 a 16---ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ 
διαίρεσιν φάναι πάντα 30 Ὁ 4. 

φαντάζεσθαι 33 b 12. 

φαντασία (see 111... 6. 3): τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ 
φάους εἴληφεν 29a 3; καθ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν 
φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι χϑα τ, ἡ κατὰ 
μεταφορὰν λεγομένη 28 a2; ἕτερον καὶ 
αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας 27 Ὁ 14. 288 5566.; 
διαφέρει ἐπιστήμης, νοῦ, δόξης 28a 17 5η6.; 
λογισμοῦ τῇ ἃ 108q., 332125 δύναμις ἢ ἕξις 
καθ᾽ ἣν κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδό- 
μεθα 28233 ἔστε καὶ ψευδὴς 28a 18, Ὁ 17 
(cf. 28b 25—30), αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς 28a 
12, καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθὴ 33427: τί ἐστι 
20 ἃ 8, κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς Kar’ 
ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη 29a 1 (cf. 27 Ὁ 18, 
28 ἢ 118qq.)3 ἀπελθόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν 
ἔνεισιν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις 25 Ὁ 25: εἰ 
αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ ὄρεξιν 13 Ὁ 
22, οὐκ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον ἄνευ φαντασίας 
33b 28, 208 5 sq., 33a 12, ἐνίοις ἀορί- 
orws ἔνεστιν 34a 3—-5 (contrast τοῖς μὲν 
τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲ φαντασία, ra δὲ ταύτῃ 
μόνῃ ζῶσι 15a 11, 28b 16, 28a 10 8q., 
22, 24, οὐκ ἀεὶ πάρεστι 2849): αἰσθητικὴ 
83 Ὁ 29, 348 5 5Ξῦ., λογιστιΚὴ 33 b 29, βου- 
AeuTLiKH 348 7, ἡ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ 34a 11: 
τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ 
δὲ ὑπόληψις 27 Ὁ 28 (cf. 3 ἃ 8 54.) ; νόησίς 
τις 338 10; ἄνευ φαντασίας οὐκ ἔστιν 
ὑπόληψις 27b 16: ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις 
ἢ μετὰ φαντασίας ἢ ὀρέξεως 32 Ὁ 16, ἡ 
φαντασία ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως 
238. 20; παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι 
ταῖς φαντασίαις 33a 11 (cf. “98 5---8): 
14. Ὁ 16, 20b 32, 27b 29, 28a 29: κατὰ 
χὴν φαντασίαν 27 Ὁ 23 (cf. 28a 1, Ὁ 25): 





623 


in a wider sense=Kard τοῦτο ὃ φαίνεται 
ἡμῖν 2b 23 (cf. 28a 13 sq.)—Platonic 
definitions rejected δόξα μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως, 
δι’ αἰσθήσεως, συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθή- 
σεως 28 ἃ 25 Sq. 

φάντασμα 28a 1: τῇ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ 
φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει 31 8. 
Ι5, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης 328 οἱ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ 
ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ Ψυχὴ 31a 17 (cf. 
32a 8); τὰ εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς 
φαντάσμασι νοεῖ 31 Ὁ 23 ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν 
φαντασμάτων FG, κινεῖται 531 Ὁ 4 (cf. 3rb 
7): τὰ πρῶτα νοήματα τίνι διοίσει τοῦ μὴ 
φαντάσματα εἶναι 52 a 12—14: ὃν ἐκ 
πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν 34a το. 

φανταστικόν, Τὸ 32a 31. 

φάος 20 ἃ 3. 

φάρυγξ 20 b 23, 218 4. 

φάσις : ἐστί τι κατά τινος 30b 26, ἀληθὴς ἢ 
ψευδὴς πᾶσα 30b 27; distinguished from 
φαντασία 32a Lo. 

φάσκειν 5 Ὁ 4. 

φαῦλος : defective 22a 32, τό τε μικρὰν 
ἔχον καὶ τὸ φαύλην 21 b 8, μικρὸν ἢ 
φαῦλον 22a Ξ3ο--Ἡῤ  Ααύλως 21a 10, 22a 
28. 

φέρεσθαι 6 b 30, 7b 6, 7, το. ΟΡ 10, ob 
29, 16a 1, 6, 18} 21, rob 24: ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ 
4@ 21. 

φεύγειν: opposed to διώκειν 21 a το, τό, 
b9, 320 28, 30, 338. 2, to ὀρέγεσθαι 
32 Ὁ 17, to λαβεῖν 34 Ὁ 17. 

φευκτικὸν 31a 13 

φευκτὸς 7b 3: opposed to διωκτὸς 21 Ὁ 3, 
32 Ὁ 28. 

φθάνειν 19 Ὁ 23. 

φθαρτικός : τῆς γεύσεως 22a 31, Opposed to 
κατὰ φύσιν 22a 33: τὰ φθαρτικὰ 24a 15. 

φθαρτὸς 300 25: τὸ φθαρτὸν opposed to τὸ 
ἀίδιον 15 Ὁ 27: τῶν φθαρτῶν 158 0: Ὁ 4. 

φθείρειν 24.19 29, 26a 30, b 7, 35 Ὁ 12, 13, 
IS: φθείρεσθαι Sa 28, Ὁ το (25), 25, 27; 
21 Ὁ 23, 26a 17, 34a 33. 

φθίνειν τα Ὁ 26, 34a 26. 

φθίσεις : κίνησίς τις 6a 13, joined with αὔξη 
and ἀκμὴ τὰ a 30 (cf. 34 ἃ 25), with 
αὔξησις 128 15, 13 4 25, 27, 15 Ὁ 26, 
32 b g, 34. b 21, with ἀκμὴ 32 Ὁ 25. 

φθορὰ 3b 4, 17 Ὁ 3, 344 23. 

φιλεῖν 3ἃ 18, 8b 26, 28. 

φιλία 8a 22, 30a 30 (both of Emped.). 

φιλοσοφία : (of Plato) ἐν rots περὶ φιλο- 
σοφίας Ἀεγομένοις 4 Ὁ 19. 

φιλόσοφος, ὁ πρῶτος 3b 16. 

φλέβιον 22 a 3. 

φοβεῖσθαι 3 ἃ 20, 24, 8b 2, 8, 32 Ὁ 31. 

φοβερὸς 38 23, 21a 15, 27b 22, 32b 21. 

φόβος 3.4 17, Ὁ 18. 

φορά: κίνησίς ris 6a 13. DI, 31, 10b 23, 
19 Ὁ 133 τὰς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰς 7a 2, 
τρεῖς 342 153 κατὰ φορὰν 8 Ὁ το. 

φορτικώτερος 5 Ὁ 2. 

φράγμα 2x Ὁ 29. 

φρονεῖν 17 Ὁ 8 (is) : joined with γινώσκειν 
aga 1, with νοεῖν 17b 11, 27a τὸ; οὐ 
ταὐτὸν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν 27 Ὁ 
y—ol ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι 


624 


ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν 27a 21, αἰσθάνεσθαί τε 
καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον 27a 28, 
(Emped.) φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα 27 a 24. 

φρόνησις : τὸ ὀρθῶς νοεῖν φρόνησις καὶ ἐπι- 
στήμη καὶ δόξα ἀληθὴς 27 Ὁ 10; ὑπόληψίς 
τις 247 Ὁ 258; ὁ κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος 
νοῦς 4 Ὁ 5. 

φρονιμώτατος 2L aA 22. 

φρυκτὸς 31 Ὁ 5. 

φυγὴ 31a 12. 

φύεσθαι: τὰ φνόμενα πάντα δοκεῖ ζῆν 13 8. 
25, μετέχει τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ μορίον 13 a 33, 
b 8 34a 26. 

φύλλον 12 Ὁ 2. 

φυσικός : ὁ φυσικὸς 3a 28, b7, 113 dis- 
tinguished from ὁ διαλεκτικὸς 3a 29: ὕλη 
τῶν ζῴων 3b 17, σῶμα 12a 12, 13, 15; 
20, 28, Ὁ 5, 12, τό, 15 b 18; φυσικώτατον 
ἔργον 15a 26---ἀῥΛυσικῶς 15 Ὁ 27. 

φυσιολογεῖν 6 Ὁ 26. 

φυσιολόγος 26 ἃ 20. 

φύσις: joined with οὐσία 2a 7, so 18 Ὁ 2, 
58 18. 1 Ὁ 24, 29a 21, ἢ τοῦ αἵματος 
φύσις 5 Ὁ 7, τοῦ πυρὸς 16a 9, ἡ αὐτὴ 
φύσις ὁτὲ μὲν σκότος ὁτὲ δὲ φῶς 18 Ὁ 31 
(cf. 1:8} 8); μεταβολὴ εἰς τὰς ἕξεις καὶ 
τὴν φύσιν 17 Ὁ 16, κινητικὸν τὴν φύσιν 
524—7 ὅλη φύσις 425; πρὸς τὴν φύσιν 
226, ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστί τι τὸ μὲν 
ὕλη ἑκάστῳ γένει, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ 
ποιητικὸν 30a Ἰοϑα6.; ἡ φύσις ἕνεκά Tov 
moe t§b 17, καταχρῆται ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα 
20 ὃ 17, μήτε ποιεῖ μάτην μηθὲν μήτε 
ἀπολείπει τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων 32b 21,548 
21: φύσεως ἔργον 34 Ὁ 1: τὰ φύσει 34a 
32, τὰ φύσει συνιστάμενα 16a 16; φύσει 
6a 15, 21:348 145) opposed τὸ βίᾳ 6a 22, 
23, 24, 25; κατὰ φύσιν 3b 25, ΤΟ 15, 
15b 2, 18, τόδ 1, 22a 33; παρὰ φύσιν 
7 b 2. 

φυτόν: ἡ ἐν rots φυτοῖς ἀρχὴ ψυχὴ τις τὶ Ὁ 
28; φαίνεται τὰ φυτὰ (ἣν rob 23 (cf. 15 ἃ 
258q.); ὑπάρχει τοῖς φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν 
μόνον 14.4 33, 158. 2 56. (cf. 13a 33, 11 Ὁ 
28—30, 322 20); οὐ μετέχουσι φορᾶς οὐδ᾽ 
αἰσθήσεως τὸ Ὁ 23, οὐκ ἀναπνέουσιν τὸ ἴὉ 
30, διὰ τί οὐκ αἰσθάνεται 24a 33, οὐδεμίαν 
ἔχει αἴσθησιν ὅτι “γῆς ἐστὶν 35a 25, διαι- 
ρούμενα ζῇ 9a9, 11b 19, 13b τό; ὄργανα 
τὰ τῶν φυτῶν μέρῃ 12b 1, αἱ ῥίξαι τῷ 

στόματι ἀνάλογον 12b 3, ὡς ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν 

ἔων 16a 4---τ3 Ὁ 19, 14 b 33.158 29 (2), 
b 20, 32a 29, Ὁ 18—(the view of Emped.) 
15 Ὁ 20, (of others) 16a 12. 

φωνεῖν : εὐλόγως ἂν φωνοίη ταῦτα μόνα ὅσα 
δέχεται τὸν ἀέρα 20d 16, ἀναπνέοντα μηδ᾽ 
ἐκπνέοντα 21a 11 οἱ λεγόμενοι φωνεῖν 
(ἰχθύες) 20b 12; τῶν ἀψύχων οὐθὲν φωνεῖ, 
ἀλλὰ Kad’ ὁμοιόγητα λέγεται φωνεῖν 20b 
9. 7- 

φωνή: ψόφος τίς ἐστιν ἐμψύχου 20b 5, ζῴου 

20 ἢ) 13, οὐ πᾶς ζῴου ψόφος φωνὴ 20 Ὁ 29, 

ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἔμψυχον εἶναι τὸ τύπτον καὶ μετὰ 

φαντασίας τινὸς 20 Ὁ 31, σημαντικός τις 

ψόφος 20 b 33, πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἔχουσι 

20 Ὁ το: ἔχει ἀπότασιν καὶ μέλος καὶ 

διάλεκτον 20 Ὁ 9; ἡ φύσις καταχρῆται 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


τῷ πνεύματι πρὸς τὴν φωνὴν 20b 223 ἐν 
φωνῇ διαφοραὶ 22b 20---31; ἡ φωνὴ καὶ ἡ 
ἀκοὴ ἔστιν ὡς ἔν ἐστι 26a 27. 

φῶς (see 11... c. 7): ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ διαφανοῦς 
ἐνέργεια, τϑ Ὁ ο, ἐντελέχεια IQ ἃ 11, οἷον 
χρῶμα τοῦ διαφανοῦς τ Ὁ 11 sq., οὐ πῦρ 
οὔθ᾽ ὅλως σῶμα οὐδ᾽ ἀπορροὴ σώματος 18b 
14, ἀλλὰ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία 
ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ 18} 16 (cf. 18 Ὁ 20, 31); 
ἐναντίον τῷ σκότει 18b 18; ἀεὶ ἀνακλᾶται 
19b 29, οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε σκιὰν ποιεῖν το Ὁ 
31 Sq.; ποιεῖ ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα 30a 16sq.; 
ἕξις 30a 15 (cf. 18 b 19)—dvev φωτὸς 
Iga 9, 20a 28, 29a 4, ἐν φωτὶ 18b 3, 
Iga 1, 2, 8, 22, 23, περὶ φωτὸς 18b 3, 
ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτὸς 19 b 29—19 Ὁ 30, 33, 24b 
10, 25 Ὁ 22 —(Emped.) φερομένον τοῦ 
φωτὸς 18 Ὁ 22. 


χαίρειν 8b 2, 6. 

χαλεπὸς 402b 10, 6b 23, δα 5, r1b 18, 
13 b 15, χαλεπώτερον 2a Ly, ἐστὶ τῶν 
χαλεπωτάτων 2a 11. 

χαλκὸς τ Ὁ 7, 15. 16, 32, 24a 21- 

χαλκοῦς: σφαῖρα ἃ ἃ 13, σημεῖον 24 ἃ 21. 

χαρὰ 3a 18. 

χάριν : ἑτέρου χάριν 7 ἃ 24. 

χεὶρ 16b 26: % χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων 
32a 1- 

χείρων 21 ἃ 1ο.- 

χθὼν (Emped.) τὸ ἃ 4. 

χόανος (Emped.) roa 4. 

ΧΟΛῊ 25 b 1, 3. 

ΧΟΡδῊ 24 32. 

χρῆσθαι 4a 30, 5a τ4, 7 Ὁ 26, τα 26, 
18a 2, 27 ἃ 12, 13. 

χρόα 24 b 34, 25 a I. 

xpévos: joined with μῆκος as συνεχές τι 
80 Ὦ 20; ὁμοίως διαιρετὸς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος 
τῷ μήκει 30b 9 (cf. 301) 12, 18); χρόνου 
αἴσθησιν 3310 7, ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ 26h 
31, 30b 8, 15, ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἐπὶ πολύ, ἐν 
πολλῷ ἐπ᾽ ὀλέγον 20a 31 (cf. zob 3), ἐν 
ᾧ χρόνῳ 30b 173 χρόνῳ προτέρα 30 ἃ 
ax (bis), 31a 2,3—11b 22, 27 Ὁ 2, 30b 
I, (3. 

χρυσὸς 242 20, 214. 

χρυσοῦς: σημεῖον 24.2 20. 

χρῶμα (see 11.,) c. 7): ὁρᾶται χρῶμα ἢ τὸ 
ἔχον 25 Ὁ 18, ὄψις χρώματος 18a 12, 
ὁρατόν ἐστι τ88 27, 220 τό; τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ 
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ 18a 293 τὸ ἑκάστου ὧν 
φωτὶ δρᾶται 18h 3 (cf. rga 8, 22, 204 
28, οἰκεῖον χρῶμα τὸ a 2, 6); ἀλλότριον 
χρῶμα 18b6; κινητικὸν τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν 
διαφανοῦς 18a 31 (cf. 19a 13, τὸ χρώματι 
εἶναι 19a 10); οὐχ ὁρᾶται τῷ μείγνυσθαι, 
οὐδὲ ταῖς ἀπορροίαις 22a 145 οὐ τρέφει 
34.) 20 (cf. 14 Ὁ 1ο); δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ 
χρώματα 364 16, 17; χρώματος δεκτικὸν 
τὸ ἄχρουν 18 Ὁ 26; ἡ τοῦ χρώματος 
ἐνέργεια ἀνώνυμος αὖ ἃ τα; οἷον χρῶμα 
18 Ὁ τὰς; διαφοραὶ χρωμάτων 21 8. 18, 
περὶ χρῶμα 22 Ὁ 32, εἴδη ἐπὶ τῶν χρω- 
μάτων 22b 11-78 ἃ rg, 190 12, 10, 
218 0, 13, 238. 9; 24a 22, b 4, 15 Ὁ 9, 
14, 19, 26b 1, 29b 2, 35a 47, Ὁ 8. 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


χρωματίξεσθαι 25 b 22. 

χρώννυσθαι: Kexpwoudvov 18a 16, 

χυμός (see II., 6. 10): γεῦσις χυμοῦ 18a 13, 
τὸ γευστὸν ὁ χυμὸς 22a 177 (contrast 22a 
10); ἕν τι τῶν ἁπτῶν 14b 11, τοῦ ὑγροῦ 
22a 6, οἷον ἥδυσμα 14 Ὁ 13; χυμοῦ 
αἴσθησιν 22 ἃ 17; τὰ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν 
ἀνάλογον ἔχει τοῖς τῆς ὀσμῆς 21a 18 
(cf. 21a 28 54.), τίνα ἐστὶν 22b rosqq., 
ὁ μὲν γλυκὺς ὁ δὲ πικρὸς 21a 26, διαφοραὶ 
χυμῶν 22 Ὁ 143 ἢἣ τοῦ χυμοῦ ἐνέργεια 
ἀνώνυμος 260 15; τὰ ἁπτὰ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ 
ποιοῦσι τὰ σώματα 24 123 ἣ ἅμα συμ- 
βαίνει ἁπτικὸν εἶναι, ταύτῃ φθείρει 35 b 


12. 

χυτὸς Ob 10., 

χώρα στιγμῆς Qa 23. 

χωρίξειν 324 27, 330 2: χωρίξεσθαι 3 rr, 
ga 20, 11 29,139 31, Ὁ 5» 26, 15a 2: 
φαίνεται χωριζόμενα τῷ Ὁ 17, χωρισθεὶς 
30 2% 22, χωρισθείσης 12 Ὁ 13; χωρισθὲν 
BZaly: ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα συντίθεται 30a 
30---.κεχωρισμένος used as an adjective ἐν 
κεχωρισμένῳ χρόνῳ 26b 24, κεχωρισμένα 
μόρια 42 10 2, οὐθέν ἔστι κεχωρισμένον 
32 ἃ 4, κεχωρισμένον ὄντα 31. 18, ἡ 
κεχωρισμένα 3b 68, so 26b 147, 23: 278 
3. 13, (4, 31 Ὁ 16 (ὀξ5) ; τὰ κεχωρισμένα 
20b 23, 3th 18--  κΚεχωρισμένως 31} 14. 

χωρὶς ἑκάτερον νοῶν 30 b 11. 

χωριστὸς 3212, b 10 (és), 11 Ὁ 26, 134 4; 
b 28, 29) 5, 16, 21, 30a 317, b 18; 
ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ καὶ χωριστὸν 30b 26; λόγῳ 
μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ 13D 14, μὴ κατὰ 
μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον 29 a II, ἢ 
μεγέϑει ἢ λόγῳ 35 ἃ 20. 


ψαθυρὸς τὸ b 35. 

ψάμμος τὸ b 24. 

ψεύδεσθαι 27 Ὁ 21, 28a 4, b 21, 22. 

ψευδὴς 28a 12, 15, 18, τὸ, b 2, 8 (025), 17, 
40, 30b 27---ψευδῶς 27 b 13. 

ψεῦδος 5b 32, 28b 19, 30a 27 (dés), 10 2, 4. 
31 rr, 32a 12. 

ψοφεῖν 19 b 22, 20 Ὁ 12, 30; πᾶν ψοφεῖ 
γύπτοντός τινὸς Kal re καὶ ἔν τινι 20b 14 
(cf. 19 b 13); πότερον ψοφεῖ τὸ τυπτό- 
μενον ἢ τὸ τύπτον; ἢ καὶ ἄμφω 200% 20; 
δύναται ψοφῆσαι 19 b 8, τὸ δυνάμενον 
ψοφεῖν 25 ἢ 30; τὸ ἔχον ψόφον οὐκ ἀεὶ 
ψοφεῖ 25 Ὁ 29 (cf. 25 Ὁ 298q-); τὸ ψοφοῦν 
18a 16, 194 20, b 12; αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν 
ψοφούντων 20a 20. 

ψόφησις: ὁ Kar’ ἐνέργειαν ψόφος 26a τ, ἡ 
τοῦ ψοφητικοῦ ἐνέργεια 26a 7 (cf. 26a 
12). 

ψοφητικός : τὸ κινητικὸν ἑνὸς ἀέρος συνεχείᾳ 
μέχρις ἀκοῆς 20a 3; τοῦ ψοφητικοῦ ἐνέρ- 
γειὰ 262 6; 80 ἑτέρων αἰσθανόμεθα “3 Ὁ 
ὅ, τῷ τὸ μεταξὺ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς 28 Ὁ 13. 

ψόφος (see ΤΙ., c. 8): διττὸς 19b 5, 26a 8, 
ὁ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ τις, ὁ δὲ δυνάμει τὸ Ὁ 5, 9, 
ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν τὸ Ὁ 9, 20a 27 (cf. 26a 
18); ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ψόφος καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἡ 
κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μία “5 Ὁ 27 sqq. 
(cf. 25 Ὁ 31), ἀνάγκη ἐν τῇ κατὰ δύναμιν 
εἶναι 26a 5: ἀκοὴ ψόφον 18a 13, ψόφου 


625 


τε καὶ σιγῆς 22a 23, τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀκοῇ 
ψόφος 25 Ὁ 33; ψόφου δεκτικὸν τὸ ἄψοφον 
18 Ὁ 27; τὸ μεταξὺ ψόφων ἀὴρ 19a 32, 
ὑπὸ ψόφου τὸ μεταξὺ κινεῖται, ὑπὸ δὲ 
τούτου τὸ αἰσθητήριον Iga 27, οὐ ψόφου 
κύριος ὁ ἀὴρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ το Ὁ 19; ἡ ἀέρος 
κένησις ψόφος, ὅταν κωλυθῇ θρύπτεσθαι 
20a 9 (ch. 20a 21, Ὁ 11); ἀδύνατον ἑνὸς 
ὄντος γενέσθαι ψόφον 19 Ὁ ττ, πληγή ἐστιν 
ἡ ποιοῦσα 19b το 54., οὐ τῶν τυχόντων 
wanyh τὸ Ὁ 14. 83644., ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς οὐ 
διαφθείρει τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ αἰσθη- 
τήριον 35 Ὁ 9, 10; οὐ τρέφει 34 Ὁ το (cf. 
τά Ὁ 10), οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα 246 το; 
οὐκ ἄνευ ψόφου τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρὺ 20a 28; 
distinguished from φωνῇ 20b 29 (cf. 20b 
5) 13, 32)—-18a 15, 19225, Ὁ 4. 6, 28, 
20417, 218 09, 228. 24. 25, 23a 8, 24a 
23, Ὁ 15, 34, 25b 29, 26a 7, 2gb 1, 2. 

ψυκτὸς “6 Ὁ 6. 

ψύχεσθαι 24a 34. 

ψυχή: φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς 3a 
28 (cf. 2a 4—6); πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδια 
2209, κοινὰ τοῦ ἔχοντος 38 4 (εἷ. 2 ἃ 9 54:); 
ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ἔῴων 3b 
17; τί ἐστι, τίς κοινότατος λόγος 12 ἃ 8 
(cf. 12 Ὁ 4, 158 23-—28), ἐντελέχεια ἡ 
πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ 12b 5 
(cf. 12a 27, 19—21, 148. 27), οὐσία ἡἣ 
κατὰ τὸν λόγον 12b το, τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι τῷ 
τοιῳδὶ σώματι τα Ὁ rx (ch. τ48 18), τοῦτο 
ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ διανοούμεθα 
πρώτως 148. 12, λόγος τις καὶ εἶδος, ἀλλ᾽ 
οὐχ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ΤΆ a 13 Sq., 
σῶμα οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι 14a 20; ἐν 
σώματι ὑπάρχει καὶ dv σώματι τοιούτῳ 
14a 21 sqq. (ch 7b 15 sqq.), τῆς ἐν 
τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς 20 Ὁ 28, τὸν 
αὐτὸν τρόπον εἷς ἂν εἴη λόγος ψυχῆς τε 
καὶ σχήματος 14b 20 (οἷ. 2b 5 sqq.), ὃς 
ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἔσται 
Ι4 Ὁ 23, τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος αἰτία καὶ 
ἀρχὴ 15 b 8, κατὰ τοὺς διωρισμένους 
τρόπους τρεῖς 15 Ὁ 9--Σ2ζ8; τὸ σῶμα συνέχει 
16a 8, 11 b 8 (cf. 11 ἃ 30—b 30, τὸ Ὁ 
10---12); τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς ψυχῆς 
ὄργανα 15b 18 (cf. 7b 26, 11 Ὁ 14-—17, 
δεῖ λαβεῖν τὸ ἐπὶ μέρυυς ἐφ᾽ ὅλου τοῦ 
ζῶντος σώματος xré. 12 Ὁ 22---2 8) οὐ 
κινεῖται 6a 28qq., 88 338q., b 15, 30 56.) 
Il a 25 sq., κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινεῖσθαι 
ἔστιν, οἷον κινεῖσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ 8a 30—33; 
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ 6a 1τ4---ὄ10: ἡ ὅλη 
ψυχὴ distinguished from τὰ μόριο,, μέρη, 
δυνάμεις 2b 2, 1τἃ 30, Ὁ 2—24, 13 Ὁ 12, 
14a 321, 328 19 56., but contrast 32a 
a2—b 7 (see s.v. μόριον); ἐνίοις τῶν 
ξῴων ἅπανθ᾽ ὑπάρχει, rect δέ τινα, ἑτέροις 
δὲ ὃν μόνον 13 Ὁ 32,148 22566, Ὁ 15-- 
10, 29Sqq., 158. I-~—3, 6---ὃ ; οἷς ὑπάρχει 
λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ 
λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς δ᾽ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ 
πᾶσι λογισμὸς 15 a 8, 28 Sq., b 21—23 
(cf. 138 31, 11 b 29); del ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς 
ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον 14. Ὁ 293 ἡ 
πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἷον αὐτὸ τό Ὁ 25 
(cf. gb 4.8q.), ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ πρώτη καὶ 


626 


κοινοτάτη I5 a 24, ἧς ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ 
τροφῇ χρῆσθαι 15a 25, 16 Ὁ L7—203 τὰ 
μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστι χωριστὰ ἀλλήλων 
13b 14.8qq., 11b 26, τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι ἕτερα 
φανερὸν 13 Ὁ 29, 32 Ὁ I, 3 56.) τὸ εἶναι 
ἄλλο 31a 143 ἡ Ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι 
21 Ὁ 21, οὐκ αὐτὰ ἀλλὰ τὰ εἴδη 31b 28, 
32a 2, τόπος εἰδῶν 20 a 27, 17 Ὁ 23-- 
earlier views: δύο διαφοραῖς ὁρίζονται 
μάλιστα τὴν ψυχήν, κινήσει τε τῇ κατὰ 
τόπον καὶ τῷ νοεῖν καὶ τῷ κρίνειν καὶ 
αἰσθάνεσθαι 27a 17, 3b 25---27.: 22 ἃ 


INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 


ὧδε 51 ἃ 21. 

wot Δ6 Ὁ 31. 

ὠθεῖν 6b 6, 34b 31 (025), 32 (d25), 33 (d25), 
τὸ ἀμβλὺ οἷον ὠθεῖ 20 b 2. 

ὦσις: ὥσει καὶ ἕλξει 33} 25, ὦσις καὶ πληγὴ 
25 Ὁ το. 

ws: with accusative absolute 7a 1, 11 b 26, 
15 b 20: with genitive absolute 8b rs, 
1b 27, 13b 18, 16a 32, 17a 14, 18b 
2I, 21a 12, 24a 4, 26b 3, 33a 4—wWs 
εἰπεῖν 5b 11, 8a τ, ws ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν τ Ὁ 
5, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν 33 b ar. 


15—17, ὁρίζονται πάντες τρισὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὡσαύτως “5 Ὁ 22, 27 b 23, 31 ἃ 18. 
κινήσει, αἰσθήσει, τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ 5Ὁ 1τἰ (ο΄. ὥσπερ: introducing an elliptical clause (cf. 
gb 19—24), τὸ κινοῦν 3b 29, τῶν κινου- καθάπερ) 24a 15, b 18, 3a 2, b 19, 4ἃ 
μένων τι 3b 308q., (Democr., Leucip.) 27,6a 18, 8b 22, 9a ry, 120 7, 13a 9, 
πῦρ τι καὶ θερμὸν 4a τ, 58 5—13 (cf. Ob 17 Ὁ 9, 18, 19 b 27, 31, 20a τῷ, 16, 21a 
15—24, 9b 8), (Anaxag.) τὴν κινοῦσαν 32, bir, 27, 22a 27, 28, b 7, 10, 33, 
44 25, Ὁ 2—5, (certain Pythagoreans) 23a 31, bro, 15, 2404 7, 14, 31, b 16, 
τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα 4a 18, τὸ ταῦτα 27b 19, 208 17, 26, Ὁ 29, 30a 1,3, b 21, 
κινοῦν 4a 19, (Thales) κινητικόν re 5a 10, 26, 312 28, 33b 26, 34a 133 ὥσπερ ἂν 
(Alemaeon) ἀεὶ κινουμένην 5 a 29 Sqq.— εἰ ob 27, 19b 24, 23a 7, 27b 23, 85 ἃ 
ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων 5b 13, 9--.ἅῈ5 it were (like οἷον) 7b 29, 122 4, 
(Emped.) ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι 138 τό, 21b 29, 27419, 304 28, 31b 7, 
δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων 4b 1 564.; 32209, 34b 18, 35a 2r—more inegular, 
gb 238qq., τὸ a 28, (Diogenes) ἀέρα apodosis to be supplied r40 22, 27a τὸ, 
5a 218qq., (Heraclitus) ἀναθυμίασιν 5 a 31a 17 (cf. οὕτως ἔχει worep)—with 
26 sqq., (Hippon) ὕδωρ 5 Ὁ 2, (Critias accusative absolute (like @s) 7b 21—in 
and others) αἶμα 5b 4, 6sq., (Philolaus) apparently redundant clause ἔοικεν ὡς ὁ 
ἁρμονίαν τινὰ 7 Ὁ 30 sqq., ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἀήρ, οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον 
μεμεῖχθαι τὶ a 7 sqq., (the Orphic 23 Ὁ τὸ (cf. 31 Ὁ 12 Sqq.). 


doctrine) τὸ Ὁ 28sqq.—(Plato) τὸ κινοῦν dore: after οὕτως with finite verb 24 b 31, 
ἑαυτὸ ἢ δυνάμενον κινεῖν 6a τ, Ὁ 26sqq., with infinitive 13 b 14, 19 b 32, so with- 


ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων 4b 17—27, (Xenocrates) out οὕτως 12 b 26, 204 25, 29a 21, 344 
ἀριθμὸν κινοῦνθ᾽ ἑαντὸν 4 Ὁ 29 sq., 8b 15, Ὁ 31—~introducing an inference or the 
32 sqq., 9b r1sq.—etymology: διὰ τὴν conclusion of a discussion 2b 26, 21 b 19, 
κατάψυξιν καλεῖσθαι ψυχὴν 5 b 20. 23 Ὁ 15, b26, 258 11, 334 17, 34b ar 
ψυχικὸν μόριον 24 ἃ 33. and often: so in apodosis after ἐπεὶ τὰ ἃ 
ψυχρὸς contrasted with θερμὸς 5 Ὁ 25, 28, 13, after ef 32 b 25: without verb ex- 
Ι4 Ὁ 8, 13, 22b 26, 23b 28, 248 3, ro, pressed 31 a 27, 35 b τὸ (cf. 6 | 2). 


29a 25, Ὁ 15, 35a 23, Ὁ 14. 





CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.